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Browsers Revoke Trust in Eight eMudhra Certificates After Private Key Compromise

  Major browser vendors and certificate trust stores have blacklisted eight intermediate certificates issued by Indian certificate authority...

All the recent news you need to know

SBI Probes Suspected Exposure of 3,897 Customer Records

 

State Bank of India (SBI) is investigating a suspected data exposure after identifying personal information in 3,897 customer records reportedly found on the dark web. The country’s largest lender said it received alerts about the issue last week and has initiated cyber incident response procedures. The bank has also appointed an independent cybersecurity agency to assess the suspected compromise and determine the source, scope, and potential impact of the exposure. 

According to SBI’s October 21 stock-exchange filing, the bank first received alerts on October 16 from its Threat Intelligence Service Provider, the Defence Cyber Agency, and the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). Its initial review covered around 375,000 records found on the dark web. Of these, 3,897 records were found to contain personal customer information. SBI is now verifying whether the exposed records are genuine and complete, while also attempting to trace their origin and assess the risks for affected customers and the bank. 

The exposed records reportedly included customers’ names, dates of birth, gender, registered mobile numbers, email addresses, and home addresses. They also contained branch and Customer Information File identifiers, lead IDs, and metadata linked to loan and lead records. Although the information does not appear to include banking passwords or transaction credentials, personal and loan-related details can still be misused for phishing, identity fraud, targeted scams, and social-engineering attacks. 

SBI said it activated its cyber incident response and containment procedures after receiving the alerts. The bank has engaged a CERT-In-empanelled independent cybersecurity agency to investigate the matter and is working on remedial and preventive measures in line with regulatory requirements. SBI added that it is continuing to monitor the situation and will take appropriate steps to prevent similar incidents in the future. 

The bank has sought to reassure customers that the incident has not materially affected its financial performance, core business operations, or ability to continue services. Core banking functions are reportedly running normally, with no disruption reported. However, customers should remain cautious: avoid clicking unexpected links claiming to be from SBI, never share OTPs, passwords, or card details, and verify suspicious communications directly through the bank’s official app, website, or customer-care channels. The investigation is ongoing, and further clarity is expected once SBI confirms whether the dark-web data is authentic and identifies how it was exposed.

Second Zeabur Breach Exposes Cloud Infrastructure Weaknesses


Zeabur, a cloud development platform, has announced plans to shut down their services following a second major security breach in less than two months. A malicious attack occurred on October 14-15, 2026, which resulted in unauthorized access to internal systems, compromised hosting infrastructure, and the reading of sensitive information belonging to more than 321,000 accounts. 

As stated by Zeabur's preliminary incident report, the attacker was able to gain access to shared hosting clusters in nine regions as well as several dedicated servers by using leaked administrator credentials and cloud access keys. An internal configuration repository contained plaintext credentials, and administrator tokens were still active without expiration and had not been rotated since January 2024. 

Approximately 3.2 million environment-variable records including application settings, API keys, and other secrets were exposed in the breach, along with account information for 321,810 users. Zeabur further confirmed that 92 Google Cloud Platform (GCP) servers were accessed unauthorizedy by root accessers. In addition to adding their own SSH keys to 50 servers, hackers attached 16 copies of customer server disks to virtual machines that were under their control with their own SSH keys. 

During the investigation, records indicate that the attacker compromised both shared infrastructure as well as dedicated servers, and gained access to the production database through their internal network. Insufficient audit logs, Zeabur observed, prevent the full extent of data exposure from being confirmed. The attacker read service configurations, searched for API keys, and accessed data within hundreds of database services. 

Security Failures Linked to Earlier Breach

A separate security breach occurred in August 2026, when attackers exploited a vulnerability in the NextChat application of a customer, then migrated through internal systems that were insufficiently isolated. 

In the incident, Amazon Web Services credentials, API keys, and other sensitive information were exposed Zeabur believes the credentials used in the latest attack may have been obtained during the earlier breach, although a connection has not been confirmed. In its August response, the company acknowledged that not all affected credentials were addressed, resulting in the activation of certain administrator tokens and cloud keys.

As part of the investigation, the investigator identified public administrator interfaces, plaintext storage of sensitive credentials, and excessive cloud permissions as factors contributing to the severity of the attack. 

The attack began on October 14, but was only identified following a user report on October 15. In response to discovery, the company revoked compromised access tokens and cloud keys, blocked public SSH access to affected GCP servers, and restricted internal access to internal systems. 

Users have been advised to replace passwords, API keys, and other secrets, revoke existing sessions, and rebuild compromised servers. There is also concern about the security of shared cloud hosting environments following the breach, which can expose multiple customer workloads with only a single compromised set of credentials. 

Zeabur's shutdown program will commence on December 1, when renewals are disabled and services running on shared clusters are paused. However, all remaining infrastructure is scheduled to cease operation by December 31, 2026, despite remaining dedicated servers remaining available until their respective expiration dates.

As the company has not yet provided a final date for data export or deletion, customers who need additional time to migrate their data are advised to contact customer service for further assistance. During the investigation, Zeabur also revealed gaps in its monitoring and incident response systems. It took 36 hours for the investigation to begin after the attacker's first known use of credentials on October 14 was revealed.

During that time, no alerts were triggered; a user report was the cause of the investigation. A two-part attack converged within Zeabur's internal network as the attacker gained access to shared clusters and Google Cloud servers managed by customers. The attacker is believed to have acquired root passwords stored in plaintext in server initialization settings by using an older Google Cloud key.

It was then the attacker's responsibility to add SSH keys to 50 servers to maintain access, as well as attach copies of customer disks to virtual machines within Zeabur's own cloud project. These disk copies have since been deleted by Zeabur, which believes the credentials used in October were obtained during the August incident, during which an attacker accessed Zeabur's GitHub private key. 

With that key, access was granted to code repositories, including a private repository containing the exposed credentials and administrator tokens. Despite Zeabur replacing the GitHub App key on August 31st, the credentials stored in the repository were not altered, making it possible to retrieve previously copied secrets. 

There is no evidence of a direct connection between the two incidents, nor did the IP addresses of the attackers overlap. All users were notified that Zeabur has revoked their access tokens in response to the latest security breach. Customers were advised to replace credentials and secrets stored on the platform, including those changed after the August incident, and to re-create their access tokens. 

The owners of affected Google Cloud servers were also advised to make a backup of their data and rebuild their systems to prevent any unauthorized access remaining. Following 3.5 years of growth, the company decided to close after citing increasing operational complexity and difficulty maintaining its platform as factors. 

As a result of these two breaches, credential management, infrastructure isolation, and security monitoring vulnerabilities were also exposed, raising concerns concerning the potential risks associated with maintaining sensitive deployment secrets across shared cloud environments. Zeabur's incidents highlight the risks associated with unrotated credentials, publicly exposed administrative interfaces, and inadequate security monitoring in cloud computing facilities. 

A shutdown like this also emphasizes the importance of securing resources, managing secrets securely, and detecting incidents promptly in order to ensure that customer data is protected.

FBI Flags SafePay Ransomware as One of 2026’s Most Active Threats After 600 Victims

 



The FBI, alongside cybersecurity authorities in Germany and the United Kingdom, issued a joint advisory this week warning that a ransomware group called SafePay has compromised at least 600 organizations across the United States and Europe since it surfaced in late 2024, placing it among the most active extortion operations active right now.

The advisory, which draws on FBI and German law enforcement investigations, marks a significant escalation in attention for a group that operated in relative obscurity before racking up victims at a pace that rivals far better-known criminal networks. The most recent incident cited in the advisory occurred in August.


A Group Built on Borrowed Code

SafePay is not a ransomware-as-a-service operation, meaning it does not rent out its tools to outside affiliates the way groups like RansomHub do. Instead, it runs as a centralized crew, which security researchers say likely keeps operations tighter and reduces the risk of internal leaks.

Its malware, however, did not emerge from nothing. Analysts at Bitdefender and others found that SafePay's ransomware binary closely mirrors a late-2022 version of LockBit's code, with additional elements borrowed from ALPHV and INC Ransom. The group surfaced around the same period that law enforcement actions gutted LockBit in early 2024, and some researchers suspect its members include former Conti or LockBit operators who reconstituted under a new name. A telling technical detail: the ransomware includes a kill switch that deactivates itself on systems with Russian or Cyrillic as the default language, a pattern commonly associated with Eastern European criminal groups trying to avoid prosecution at home.


Getting In and Moving Fast

SafePay gets into networks through a combination of methods. The advisory lists password guessing, phishing, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities, including flaws in Cisco VPN products and Veeam backup software, as primary entry points. The group also buys stolen credentials from initial access brokers on dark web markets and uses automated scripts to scan the internet for exposed systems.

Once inside, the group moves quickly. Attacks have been documented going from initial access to full ransomware deployment in under 24 hours. Operators create new accounts or hijack existing ones, use Windows' own built-in tools to map the network, and disable security software using living-off-the-land techniques that avoid dropping obvious malware. Data is archived with WinRAR or 7-Zip and transferred out via FileZilla or RClone before encryption begins. In some cases, attackers change user passwords to lock out IT staff and slow down the response.

The group has also adopted a social engineering playbook that goes well beyond a simple phishing link. In several documented attacks, SafePay flooded employees with thousands of spam messages to overwhelm their inboxes, then followed up by impersonating IT support over Microsoft Teams or through direct phone calls. Vishing specialists, sometimes hired as a third-party service, would then convince employees to hand over remote access through Microsoft Quick Assist or approve multi-factor authentication prompts.


A Pattern of High-Profile Hits

Three incidents stand out in terms of impact. Government technology contractor Conduent confirmed an attack that disrupted Medicaid payments, child support disbursements, food assistance programs, and roadway tolls in multiple U.S. states. Conduent recently agreed to an $80 million class action settlement over the breach. British transport technology firm Microlise was hit in October 2024, disrupting DHL delivery operations and security systems installed in UK Ministry of Justice prisoner transport vans. In July 2025, researchers linked SafePay to an attack on Ingram Micro, one of the world's largest IT distributors, with analysts estimating the disruption cost the company at least $136 million in daily sales while order fulfillment was offline.


Germany as a Primary Target

Among the countries SafePay has focused on, Germany stands out. During the first quarter of 2025, Check Point Research found that 24 percent of all publicly reported ransomware victims in Germany were attributed to SafePay, the highest concentration of any single ransomware group in any single country during that period. The advisory confirms that dozens of German companies appear on SafePay's dark web leak site alongside government organizations across Latin America and the United States.


Ransom Demands Framed as a Business Transaction

SafePay's ransom notes describe the payment demand as "a subset of company revenue," typically falling between one and three percent of the victim's annual revenue. The group uses cryptocurrency for payments and, according to the advisory, sometimes employs third parties to make phone calls to pressure victims into paying. In cases where paying could expose a victim to regulatory penalties, the group has reportedly offered reduced demands.

The joint advisory stops short of attributing SafePay to any specific country or naming individual suspects.



OVHcloud CLI Packages on GitHub Were Replaced With Secret-Stealing Malware

 



Attackers replaced the binary releases of OVHcloud's open-source CLI tool on GitHub with malicious builds designed to harvest secrets from developer machines, the company confirmed this week. The incident, which affected versions v0.11.0 through v0.15.0, went live on October 19 and was only caught after a customer raised an alarm about a suspicious release.

The malicious files were live for roughly 94 minutes. A customer's CI pipeline, which had a pinned SHA-256 checksum for the v0.15.0 Linux binary, failed when the hash no longer matched, and the customer opened issue #300 on the public GitHub repository. OVHcloud pulled the replaced assets at 14:21 UTC and shipped a clean replacement, v0.16.0, three hours later.


A Compromised Account, Months in the Making

The attack traced back to a single GitHub account: `HassenBF`, belonging to a legitimate OVHcloud contributor who had write access to the release repository. According to the security research group OpenSourceMalware, the account was compromised roughly seven months before the attack, with evidence pointing to early March 2026.

On March 5 and 6, four personal repositories on the account were force-pushed within a scripted window. Three of those rewrites embedded a `preinstall.js` loader file containing a payload hidden inside invisible Unicode variation-selector characters. A fourth repository inlined the same decoder into a React source file. The push cadence for the first three repositories was 42 seconds, which OpenSourceMalware interpreted as automated rather than manual activity.

After that, the account went quiet on the CLI project. It continued contributing to `ovh/ovhcloud-docs` through May to September 2026, with several pull requests merged normally. That cover of normalcy made the account hard to flag.


How the Malicious Binaries Were Built

The attacker did not touch OVHcloud's CI/CD pipeline. Instead, they built the infected packages locally and uploaded them directly using the GitHub Releases API, replacing the macOS (Intel and ARM), Linux (x86_64 and ARM64), and Windows x86-64 binaries across five versions. The i386, Windows ARM64, and WASM builds were left alone, which OpenSourceMalware read as deliberate targeting of developer and operations workstations.

Critically, the attacker also replaced the `checksums.txt` file last, so the new hashes matched the malicious binaries. Anyone who verified the checksum would still get a false sense of security.

OVHcloud CEO Octave Klaba confirmed that GitHub's release immutability setting had been turned off on the repository, which is what allowed an account with write access to silently overwrite already-published releases without triggering any CI checks. Since the incident, OVHcloud has re-enabled that setting. The v0.16.0 release is now marked immutable, meaning its files cannot be replaced.

A forensic check of the malicious binary using `go version -m` revealed it was built from a git checkout with uncommitted changes (`vcs.modified=true`), a dead giveaway that it came from a local workstation build rather than the official GoReleaser pipeline.


The Payload: A Solana Dead Drop and GlassWorm Fingerprints

OpenSourceMalware dug into the `preinstall.js` file loaded into the compromised account's repositories back in March. The loader uses a two-stage design. The first stage AES-256-CBC decrypts a hex blob, and the resulting second-stage script checks whether the victim machine appears to be based in Russia by testing language and timezone settings; if it is, the script exits after 10 seconds.

Otherwise, it contacts public Solana RPC endpoints, queries transactions from a specific wallet address, and reads a JSON memo embedded in the blockchain. That memo carries a base64-encoded URL pointing to the next-stage payload. This "dead drop" technique lets the attacker swap out the payload URL anytime without touching any code repository.

The Solana wallet in question, `BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC`, appears in public indicator lists for GlassWorm, a threat actor that has been running campaigns since late 2025 targeting VS Code, OpenVSX, GitHub, and npm. OpenSourceMalware attributes this attack to GlassWorm with moderate confidence.


Who Is Affected and What to Do

Any developer or CI pipeline that downloaded or ran the CLI through `install.sh`, the Homebrew cask, or a direct GitHub release between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC on October 19 may have been exposed. Klaba said the malware's goal was to collect secrets sitting on disk, and while he described the binary as low quality, he warned it was still capable of doing real damage.

Affected users should update to v0.16.0 or roll back to v0.10.0 immediately, but updating the tool alone is not enough. Any machine that ran a compromised version should be treated as having all its readable secrets exposed. That means rotating OVHcloud API keys, cloud credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, package registry tokens, and anything stored in `.env` files, from a separate, clean machine. Users on macOS should also check for an `~/init.json` file in the home directory, which the second-stage script writes as a throttle marker.

OVHcloud has said a full post-mortem is coming. Key questions remain open: how the developer account credentials were first stolen, whether the same actor maintained access for the entire seven months, and exactly what the final payload did before OVHcloud deleted the files.



Nigerian Hacker Sentenced To Eight Years For Fraud And Identity Theft

 

A Nigerian man has been sentenced to eight years in a U.S. prison for his role in wide-ranging hacking, tax fraud, identity theft, and investment fraud schemes. Chukwuemeka Victor Amachukwu, also known as “Chukwuemeka Victor Eletuo” and “So Kwan Leung,” pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit computer intrusions and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The sentence was announced by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York on October 19, 2026. 

According to U.S. prosecutors, Amachukwu and Nigeria-based co-conspirators began targeting U.S. tax preparation businesses around 2019. They used spearphishing emails to gain access to the companies’ electronic systems, then stole tax and identity information belonging to at least about 800 customers. The affected businesses were located in New York, Texas, and other U.S. states. 

The stolen data was allegedly used to file fraudulent tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service and state tax authorities. Prosecutors said the group sought fraudulent refunds of at least approximately $8.4 million and successfully obtained at least $2.5 million. The conspirators also used stolen identities to submit fraudulent claims under the Small Business Administration’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, receiving about $819,000 in additional payouts. 

Amachukwu was also accused of participating in a separate investment fraud scheme. Prosecutors said he posed as a wealthy overseas financier to persuade U.S. victims to invest in purportedly valuable standby letters of credit. The investments did not exist, and Amachukwu and his co-conspirators allegedly pocketed more than $7 million in fraudulent proceeds. 

In addition to the eight-year prison term, the 40-year-old was sentenced to one year of supervised release. He was ordered to pay $3,647,629.39 in restitution and forfeit $10,846,634.39. U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald said the case demonstrated that offenders cannot assume they can operate safely from abroad, while the FBI was credited for its investigative work.

Russia-Linked Hackers Target NATO Defense Contractors in European Espionage Campaign

 

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered an espionage operation targeting defense-related organizations in Europe, including a naval shipbuilder, a military aircraft engine manufacturer and a law enforcement agency. The campaign has been attributed to APT28, a hacking group associated with Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. According to cybersecurity firm Symantec, the affected organizations were located in two NATO member countries, although their identities and locations have not been disclosed. 

The operation relied on a backdoor called Hookedge, which enables attackers to access compromised systems, collect login credentials and investigate internal networks. The malware was documented by Recorded Future’s Insikt Group in August, adding to concerns about the group’s continued efforts to obtain information from strategically important organizations. 

One documented intrusion began in July after an employee at a naval shipbuilding company opened a malicious Microsoft Word document delivered through an email attachment. Following the initial compromise, the attackers began examining the organization’s internal network and attempting to obtain credentials that could help them access additional resources. 

The activity continued over the following weeks. Investigators found that the hackers repeatedly revisited an infected computer and introduced a previously undocumented tool capable of decrypting and executing malicious code directly in system memory. Researchers have not yet determined the tool’s ultimate purpose, leaving questions about the full scope of the operation unanswered. 

The first confirmed infection was recorded on July 24, while associated malicious activity continued to appear as late as September 24. This indicates that the campaign extended across at least two months. However, researchers could not confirm whether the attackers maintained continuous access to the compromised environment throughout that period. Symantec intelligence analyst Dick O’Brien told Recorded Future News that investigators were unable to establish whether sensitive information had been successfully exfiltrated. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the affected organizations suggests that defense-related intelligence may have been a primary objective. O’Brien noted that prolonged access could have provided attackers with opportunities to collect valuable information. The selection of targets also points toward a wider intelligence-gathering effort involving European government and defense interests. The continued activity observed in September, after the campaign was documented in August, suggests that the operation may still be underway. 

APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, BlueDelta and Forest Blizzard, has conducted cyber-espionage operations against military, government and defense organizations across Europe and North America for more than a decade. The group attracted international attention in 2016 following its association with the hacking of the Democratic National Committee ahead of the U.S. presidential election. Western cybersecurity agencies have repeatedly linked the group to operations involving defense infrastructure, military logistics and organizations supporting Ukraine. 

In April, British security officials warned that APT28 had exploited internet router vulnerabilities to redirect web traffic and conduct surveillance. Other reported campaigns have targeted maritime, transportation and diplomatic organizations in Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, Greece and the United Arab Emirates. Last year, more than 20 Western intelligence and cybersecurity agencies jointly warned that the group had targeted logistics providers and technology companies involved in delivering foreign assistance to Ukraine. The latest findings add to continuing concerns about cyber-espionage against organizations connected to European defense and security.

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