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Foreign Hackers Got Into Two Colorado Water Systems, Messed With Pump Controls and Killed the Alarms

  Foreign actors broke into the industrial control systems of two small private water utilities in Colorado last month, altered pumping cycl...

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User Privacy
Cyber Attacks Dark Web Data Leak University of Munich User Privacy

Cyberattack Hits University of Munich, Exposing Student Data

 

Germany’s Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) is investigating a significant cyberattack that potentially exposed sensitive student information, including financial aid and health insurance data. The breach, detected on a Wednesday, led the university to disconnect affected servers and engage external cyber security experts while cooperating with law enforcement. 

The compromised records reportedly include students’ names, dates of birth, contact details, LMU email addresses, bank account information, and details about their courses of study and prior educational qualifications. In some cases, health insurance numbers and identifiers linked to Germany’s student financial aid program may also have been accessed, along with data related to leaves of absence. However, the university confirmed that examination records, specific course content, and individual academic performance data were not affected. 

Operational impact and response 

Following the discovery of the breach, LMU took several systems offline as a precaution, temporarily disrupting some internal services. While teaching activities continued uninterrupted, enrollment processes were briefly suspended and are expected to resume with extended deadlines to ensure students are not disadvantaged. Some students reported difficulties accessing university services needed for semester preparation, including course registration and grade viewing. The institution has not disclosed the number of affected individuals or the duration of unauthorized access, and no ransom demand has been publicly confirmed. 

Universities remain attractive targets for cybercriminals due to their extensive networks containing vast amounts of personal and financial information across large populations of students, researchers, and staff. Recent ransomware attacks have affected prominent U.S. institutions such as the University of Texas, University of Oklahoma, Stanford University, and the University of Michigan, with several incidents occurring after holiday breaks. Other notable cases include disruptions at the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia University, and Harvard University over the past years.

LMU has enlisted specialists to monitor dark-web forums and other platforms for signs that the stolen information is being circulated or misused. While there is currently no evidence that the data has been altered, deleted, or published, the investigation remains ongoing to determine the full extent of the breach. The attacker has not yet been identified, and the university continues to work with cybersecurity professionals and authorities to secure its systems and protect affected students.
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Windows Backdoor
Clipboard Stealing Command And Control Data Theft malware PowerShell Malware Securonix TASK#STOMP Wi-Fi Password Theft Windows Backdoor

STOMP Backdoor Uses PowerShell for Sensitive Data Theft


An advanced malware campaign known as TASK#STOMP has recently been discovered, which utilizes a PowerShell-based backdoor to collect business documents, Wi-Fi passwords, clipboard data, and screenshots from compromised computers using a PowerShell backdoor. Moreover, the malware also provides attackers with remote command execution and maintains multiple channels for further access. VBScript files are executed via the legitimate Windows Script Host utility wscript.exe in order to initiate the infection. 


In spite of the fact that the exact method of delivery has not been confirmed, phishing or social engineering could be considered possible methods of delivering the script. Following the script's delivery, it sets up a set of scheduled tasks resembling legitimate Windows components, establishing persistence. 

By naming these tasks Local Credential Manager, Network Audio Service, Windows Display Manager, and Device Credential Handler, malicious activities can be blended seamlessly with normal system activities. Another persistence mechanism places another VBScript file in the Windows Startup folder, enabling it to run when the user logs in. 

Upon launching the malware, it executes two PowerShell components. Among these are sys_loader.ps1, which collects documents, gathers system information, steals Wi-Fi passwords, monitors clipboards, captures screenshots, and executes remote commands. Another persistent command-and-control channel, win_conn.ps1, provides additional collection capability as well as a persistent command-and-control channel. 

By monitoring each other and restarting the other process if one is disabled, this setup provides redundancy, making it more difficult to remove the malware if only one process is terminated or a single persistence entry is deleted. In addition to hiding execution activities, timestamp manipulations, and cleanup activities, Task#STOMP can also be used for continuous document theft, increasing the difficulty of detection and forensic investigation. 

As opposed to collecting only files that are already present on an infected computer, TASK#STOMP monitors the file system for newly created or modified documents. This enables the collection of business files as they appear and change during an active infection. In addition to obtaining Wi-Fi credentials and clipboard contents, the malware targets saved Wi-Fi credentials as well. 

With clipboard monitoring, operators can identify information temporarily copied by users, while screenshot capture allows them to view information displayed on a compromised system. By combining these capabilities with remote command execution, Task#STOMP is able to gather more information about user activity than a conventional file-stealing malware. 

A separate command-and-control path, Win_conn.ps1, is maintained by TASK#STOMP in addition to data collection. From win_conn_cfg.dat, the component decodes its configuration and connects to attacker-controlled infrastructure at corecloudfileshare[.]xyz and attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz. Researcher identification of related traffic can be improved by using a hardcoded authentication token for communication. 

Parts of network communication are handled by a compiled C# component. During connection times, connections can proceed when certificates are invalid, self-signed, or otherwise mismatched due to the code disabling TLS certificate validation. This reduces the level of protection usually provided by certificate checks and makes it easier for the malware to communicate with its servers. Additionally, TASK#STOMP alters file timestamps and cleans up activity following execution to provide further anti-forensic measures. 

According to the researchers, several files have been backdated to January 15, 2024, but that date is not conclusive of when the campaign began. This date was deliberately inserted by the malware, and therefore cannot be regarded as evidence of the age of the campaign. Securonix has not determined why the malware opens a page associated with irantenders[.]com in Chrome, but the page relates to government contracts and tenders in Iran. 

Securonix has not established whether the site indicates a specific victim profile or why it is opened. Researchers have cautioned that the domain alone may not be sufficient to confirm the campaign's geographical or sectoral targeting. Securonix has not linked TASK#STOMP to a known threat group. Due to the use of a single compromised system, it is unclear how the overall campaign scope and duration were determined. 

The initial delivery method is also unclear, although similar VBScript campaigns suggest phishing involving archive or disk image attachments as a possible route. To detect an infection, researchers recommend examining suspicious Windows Script Host and PowerShell activity that originates from writable locations, newly created scheduled tasks, and instances where PowerShell invokes the C# compiler from .NET C#. 

A suspected infection can be investigated with additional evidence from PowerShell Script Block Logging, AMSI telemetry, and scheduled task records.
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Malware attacks
Backdoors Cyber Attacks Fake Job Ads IT Companies Mac Malware macOS Malware attacks

TraderTraitor Mac Malware Targets IT Firm Through Weaponized Terraform Projects

 

A North Korean-linked cybercrime group known as TraderTraitor has tied another macOS infection in an IT services company with no cryptocurrency ties to the exploitation of fake job interviews to gain access to developer systems. The second victim, which has been identified as an India-based IT services provider, was targeted through one of the employees’ Apple Silicon MacBook belonging to a DevOps engineer. 

The compromised machine was used to manage AWS, OVH and OpenStack environments with the help of Terraform and Ansible, while the account also held cloud credentials and source code access. SentinelOne attributed the breach to the same FLATROOF and ROOFDECK macOS backdoors employed by TraderTraitor in the attack targeting LayerZero Labs that resulted in the $292 million heist from crypto project KelpDAO. Initially detected on March 18 the malicious implants remained undetected until March 29, when they were triggered by the victim launching a workspace within the Cursor development environment. 

FLATROOF implant, which has been dropped as SystemUpdate, can be used to execute arbitrary shell commands, terminate processes and steal data. Its capabilities also include harvesting browser information, terminal history, installed applications, running processes, system properties and the macOS login keychain database. ROOFDECK, which was deployed as iSync utility, allows for full command and control over the compromised system while also facilitating reverse shell access, file transfer exfiltration of data, reconnaissance, and persistent access through the use of LaunchAgents. 

It also has the capability to read the clipboard content, which may also contain passwords, cryptocurrency seed phrases and two-factor authentication (2FA) credentials. On April 20, which came shortly after the public disclosure of the LayerZero breach, the threat actors deployed a modified version of ROOFDECK while removing the initial implants. The new sample continued to communicate with the C2 infrastructure controlled by the attacker until June 1. “The incident serves as a stark reminder that developer endpoints must always be protected and monitored for suspicious activity,” the report noted. 

“These machines can serve as a gateway to cloud infrastructure, source code and deployment resources, which makes them attractive targets even for organizations with no direct involvement in crypto operations.” It added that organizations should carefully monitor developer workstations for anomalous behaviors, including the launch of unsigned binary from the home directory, processes spawned by the development environments, and unusual network connections. 

It also recommended conducting regular audits of the Terraform lock files and make sure that the providers listed in them are legitimate before launching unfamiliar coding assignments or repositories.
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Technology
AI Mishap Bengaluru Heritage Claude Code Mythic Society Technology

Claude Code Glitch Erases Years of Bengaluru Heritage Data

 

A critical AI mishap has put years of digital heritage preservation at risk in Bengaluru, after an automated coding assistant inadvertently wiped out substantial archival work. The incident involving Claude Code, an AI-powered development tool, has forced The Mythic Society—a Bengaluru-based nonprofit dedicated to documenting the city’s history—to rethink its reliance on autonomous systems for managing irreplaceable data. This incident serves as a stark reminder of the vulnerabilities that emerge when cutting-edge technology intersects with culturally significant archives without sufficient safeguards in place. 

The Mythic Society, which launched its heritage documentation project in 2021, saw years of curated content vanish when Claude Code “went rogue” during a routine update or scripting task. While exact technical details remain under review, reports indicate that the AI agent executed unintended commands that deleted or overwrote critical files. The loss encompasses digitized records, historical narratives, and metadata compiled over nearly five years, representing a significant setback for local heritage conservation efforts. For an organization built on preserving Bengaluru’s evolving identity, the disappearance of such work is not just a technical failure but a cultural loss that cannot be easily quantified. 

In the wake of the data loss, The Mythic Society is now allocating approximately Rs 15 lakh to overhaul its backup and recovery infrastructure. This investment aims to prevent similar incidents by introducing redundant storage, stricter access controls, and human-in-the-loop verification for any AI-assisted operations. The society’s leadership has emphasized that while AI tools can accelerate workflows, they must be governed by robust safeguards—especially when handling culturally sensitive and non-replicable archives. The financial commitment reflects both the urgency of restoring lost capabilities and the long-term necessity of building resilient systems that can withstand unexpected technological failures. 

The Bengaluru incident underscores a growing concern in the AI era: over-reliance on autonomous agents without adequate oversight can lead to catastrophic outcomes. Claude Code, designed to assist developers by generating and executing code, is not inherently malicious, but its actions must be constrained within well-defined boundaries. Experts suggest implementing layered approval processes, sandboxed execution environments, and real-time monitoring to mitigate risks when AI interacts with production systems or valuable datasets. As organizations increasingly adopt AI to streamline operations, this case highlights the importance of treating such tools as powerful yet fallible assistants that require constant human supervision. 

For organizations like The Mythic Society, the path forward involves balancing innovation with prudence. AI can undoubtedly enhance efficiency in digitization, transcription, and metadata tagging, but human oversight remains non-negotiable. The society’s decision to invest heavily in backup systems signals a renewed commitment to preserving Bengaluru’s heritage—with a clearer understanding that technology should serve as a tool, not a trustee, of cultural memory. As AI capabilities evolve, so too must the protocols that protect the irreplaceable work built upon them, ensuring that future advancements support rather than undermine the preservation of history.
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ShinyHunters
Clop Ransomware Gang Cyber Attacks Cyber Extortion Hacking Ransomware ShinyHunters

Hacker vs. Hacker: ShinyHunters Outsmarts Clop Ransomware Gang

 




The extortion group ShinyHunters hacked the dark web leak site run by Clop, one of the most active ransomware operations in the world, defaced it with their own branding, and is now threatening to put Clop through the same extortion process Clop runs on its corporate victims.

The attack happened Friday night, September 19. ShinyHunters found an unauthenticated file upload flaw in Grav CMS, the content management system Clop was running its leak site on, and used it to push a text file directly onto the server. The file read: "THIS SITE HAS BEEN PWN3D BY SHINYHUNTERES #Skids10p - Maybe don't try to threaten us next time." It also linked back to ShinyHunters' own Tor site. The file was confirmed live and downloadable directly from Clop's server.

Hours later, ShinyHunters said they had gone further. A visit to Clop's site showed the entire page replaced with ASCII art of Umbreon, the Pokemon ShinyHunters uses as its logo, and the line "rooting your systems since '19 ;)". The same Umbreon artwork had appeared when ShinyHunters defaced HackForums back in August 2020. Clop's defaced page was still live at the time of writing.

ShinyHunters claimed full access to the server and said they took source code, Grav CMS plugins, and everything stored in the server's /var/log directory, which typically holds authentication logs, system activity records, and the IP addresses of everyone who connected to it. They also claim to have pulled the private keys for Clop's Tor onion service. Those keys are what tie a .onion address to its server. With them, ShinyHunters could host a copy of Clop's site at the exact same onion URL, on infrastructure they control. "We have their onion keys. So if they kick us out it wouldn't matter at all because we control the private keys to host the same exact onion URL," the group said.

The plan is to post an extortion message on their own site and give Clop 72 hours to respond.

The defacement and the uploaded file are independently confirmed. The claims about stolen source code, server logs, and Tor private keys come only from ShinyHunters and have not been independently verified. Clop has not commented.

The dispute behind this attack goes back about a year. In August 2025, Clop quietly began exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Oracle E-Business Suite, tracked as CVE-2025-61882, a server-side request forgery flaw that gave attackers remote access to enterprise systems without authentication. Oracle did not patch it until October 2025, after Mandiant confirmed active exploitation. By then, Clop had already sent mass extortion emails to executives at dozens of companies, including Cox Enterprises, The Washington Post, Logitech, Michelin, and Estee Lauder.

ShinyHunters says that exploit was originally theirs and that Clop used it without authorization. In October 2025, ShinyHunters, operating under the name "Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters," leaked the proof-of-concept publicly. Oracle confirmed it matched the exploit used in the Clop attacks. ShinyHunters said the leak was deliberate, intended to disrupt Clop's campaign and expose what had been taken from them.

What followed, according to ShinyHunters, was a direct threat from a Clop representative. "During the Oracle EBS campaign they ran and stole from me last year, someone from cl0p personally messaged me and said, and I quote (translated from Russian): I have more money than you and all of your people combined, I'll kill you soon," the group said. Those allegations have not been independently verified.

This is not the first time criminal groups have turned on each other. In March 2025, DragonForce defaced the leak sites of rival operations BlackLock and Mamona. Later in 2026, two groups called 0APT and KryBit hacked and leaked each other's operational data until both were left severely damaged. The difference in the Clop case is the scale of the target. Clop's leak site is the operational center of its entire extortion model, the platform it uses to name victims and apply public pressure when ransoms go unpaid. Losing control of it, and potentially the keys that anchor its onion address, is not a minor disruption.

ShinyHunters' own Tor site went offline shortly after the attack. No connection to Clop has been established.

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Vulnerabilities and Exploits
AI Coding Agents Codex CLI Codex Sandbox Escape Cybersecurity Heapjack Host Command Execution OpenAI Codex Overpatch Sandbox Vulnerability Vulnerabilities and Exploits

Researchers Escape OpenAI Codex Sandbox to Run Commands on Host


In OpenAI Codex, security researchers have identified two sandbox escape vulnerabilities, one of which allows developers to execute commands on their machine without prompting them. The vulnerabilities, Heapjack and Overpatch, affect different parts of the coding agent's security boundary. 

The vulnerability was reported to OpenAI by Accomplish AI on August 12. According to the researcher, Codex fixed both issues within eight days. The more serious Heapjack vulnerability demonstrated that malicious code could move beyond the restrictions imposed by Codex's sandbox, even when the agent was running as a read-only application. 

Heapjack Breaks the Sandbox Boundary

The node_repl component installed with Codex Desktop is targeted by heapjack. Although both OpenAI and untrusted agent code are run in separate JavaScript contexts, both operate within the same Node.js process and share the same memory heap, the separation was not sufficiently effective in preventing a security token from coming into contact with an untrusted environment. 

By inspecting the process heap, it was possible to obtain the token generated for the trusted context that remained in shared memory. When the token was obtained, the untrusted code could interact with a native parent process outside the sandbox using the communication channel used by the trusted context. As part of the demonstration of the technique, the researchers launched an application outside of Codex's process tree by utilizing the open command. 

A Unix socket as well as other system-level interfaces could also be reached through this access. This demonstration was especially important since it occurred while Codex was running in a strict read-only sandbox mode, where the agent was not expected to have any writing access to the wider system. 

The attack could be triggered by a seemingly routine development process. The researchers demonstrated a scenario in which malicious content contained in a repository, created by a third party, could exploit the vulnerability after the repository was opened in Codex and a query about its code was made. 

Overpatch Expands Write Access

Second, a vulnerability known as Overpatch affects the open-source Codex command line utility, and it takes an alternative route outside the sandbox. The vulnerability affects the application_patch tool used by Codex to modify files. 

In workspace-write mode, Codex is intended to limit file changes to the project directory. Researchers discovered that apply_patch, instead of expanding write permissions, could expand them based on paths included in patches. By using a path such as /tmp, the tool was able to treat the root of the file system as an accessible parent directory. In addition to the permission extension, researchers modified .zshrc by creating a symbolic link to the user's home directory so that it would be modified as well.

A successful write was not required for the /tmp entry; its presence extended the permissions granted to the patch operation. A modified shell configuration resulted in a file modification outside of the permitted workspace without an approval prompt. When a new terminal session was launched, attacker-controlled content ran. 

Two Flaws, One Security Boundary Problem

It is important to note that though Heapjack and Overpatch affect different parts of the Codex, both expose weaknesses in the way in which the security boundary of the agent was enforced. In the case of Overpatch, the tool responsible for applying changes also determined the scope from which it had access to data. 

In heapjack, trust boundaries were similarly compromised, as the token separating trusted and untrusted execution remained accessible in the same Node.js process and memory space as the untrusted code. The findings suggest that AI coding agents can be restricted in other ways than just controlling their abilities to execute commands. 

Untrusted agent activity must also be prevented from influencing the mechanisms that enforce those restrictions by the tools, processes and interfaces surrounding the model. On August 12, 2026, OpenAI was notified of the issues, and they were both addressed within eight days by Accomplish, who stated that Overpatch was addressed in Codex CLI 0.149.0, while Heapjack had been addressed in Codex Desktop build 26.818.21641.

A later statement by OpenAI confirmed that both issues had been resolved in August, and that additional measures were being taken to strengthen file-write controls and expand sandbox testing across platforms. These findings emphasize the security challenges associated with maintaining strong isolation in AI coding environments. Codex Desktop and Codex CLI have been updated to address both vulnerabilities.
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