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Sandworm Hackers Fail in DynoWiper Attack on Poland's Power Grid

  A recently disclosed cyberattack against Poland’s energy infrastructure has been linked to the Russian state-backed hacking group Sandworm...

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Voice Phishing Attacks
Data Breach Identity-Based Breaches Microsoft Entra Security Okta SSO Compromise Phishing-Resistant MFA Single Sign-On Security Voice Phishing Attacks

ShinyHunters Targets Okta and Microsoft SSO in Data Breach


 

Several voice-based social engineering attacks have prompted renewed scrutiny of single sign-on ecosystem security assumptions. The cybercrime collective ShinyHunters has publicly announced that it has carried out an extensive campaign to harvest SSO credentials from approximately 100 organizations, signaling an intentional shift toward identity-centered intrusion methods. 

As a result of the early disclosures, substantial amounts of data have already been exposed, as leaks have been confirmed to platforms such as SoundCloud, Crunchbase, and Betterment, which have affected tens of millions of user records. 

Moreover, the intrusions were not the result of software malfunctions or misconfigurations, but rather carefully executed voice phishing attacks that took advantage of human trust in modern authentication workflows to achieve success. 

A growing reality for enterprises is underscored by this tactic. As authentication becomes more centralized via single sign-on providers, compromises of individual identities can result in systemic access to entire SaaS environments, amplifying the scale and impact of these breaches. 

Once an employee's single sign-on credentials have been successfully accessed, the impact is extensive beyond the initial account compromise. By gaining access to a single sign-on identity, attackers will gain access to the organization's broader application ecosystem. 

Various SSO platforms, including Okta, Microsoft Entra, and Google, streamline authentication by federating access to a variety of internal and third-party services under a single login, which facilitates streamlining authentication. As a result of this architecture, usability and administrative control are improved, but risk is also concentrated, as a single breached identity can unlock multiple downstream systems.

The SSO dashboard provides authenticated users with an integrated view of all enterprise applications connected to it, transforming a compromised account into a digital footprint map of the organization. A number of business-critical applications are commonly integrated into platforms, including Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Salesforce, SAP, Slack, Atlassian, Dropbox, Adobe, Zendesk, and other software as a service applications. 

ShinyHunters and associated actors have exploited this model through targeted voice phishing campaigns, impersonating internal IT personnel, and guiding victims through credential entry and multi-factor authentication challenges on convincingly replicated login portals. 

Following authentication, the attackers systematically enumerate all available applications within the SSO environment, and then begin extracting data from each platform, enabling massive data thefts and lateral expansion across interconnected services before security teams may detect any abnormal activity. 

In the aftermath of initial access, attackers began targeting cloud-based software-as-a-service environments, which are systematically targeting systems for storing corporate data and internal documents. The objective goes beyond data theft, with stolen information increasingly being utilized for subsequent extortion campaigns following the initial data theft. 

Various designations are being tracked by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), including UNC6661, UNC6671, and UNC6240, reflecting a loosely coordinated but tactically aligned group of operators employing a similar approach to intrusions and monetizations. 

The GTIG and Mandiant investigations indicate that activity associated with UNC6661 intensified in mid-January, when attackers posed as internal IT personnel to contact employees within targeted organizations. In addition to being told that multifactor authentication settings would soon be updated, victims were directed to convincingly branded credentials harvesting portals.

It was designed to capture both single-sign-on credentials and MFA codes in real-time, thereby enabling immediate account control. Mandiant confirmed that, in multiple instances, the compromised credentials came from Okta customers, as mentioned in an Okta blog posting describing a campaign employing advanced phishing kits in response to the compromised credentials. 

In a subsequent study, researchers attributed follow-up extortion efforts to UNC6240, citing overlapping operational artifacts including the reuse of a common Tox account during negotiations, among others. In late January, a newly established leak site listing alleged victims was published, which described the nature of the stolen information and imposed payment deadlines of 72 hours. 

Researchers have previously reported that allegations of compromise have been made against at least five organizations. UNC6671 is exhibiting similar tradecraft in parallel activities. Throughout the past week, operators connected to this cluster have conducted vishing attacks involving impersonation of IT personnel and real-time credential harvesting.

In spite of the underlying domain infrastructure being similar to that of UNC6661, researchers observed differences in domain registration services, suggesting that operations are separate despite common tools and techniques. It is believed that these groups are collectively associated with ShinyHunters, which operates under alternative banners such as Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters at times. 

The collective is derived from an ecosystem of loosely affiliated cybercriminals known as The Com, whose members have proven to be skilled at telephone social engineering. An increasingly sophisticated phishing toolkit is at the core of these operations, designed to manage the complete lifecycle of an attack. 

The latest kits are capable of generating phishing emails and hosting replicate login pages, as well as relaying captured credentials in real time to attackers—an essential feature of multifactor authentication. 

A growing number of advanced frameworks now support voice-enabled phishing, which allows attackers to coordinate live phone calls in conjunction with dynamic manipulations of the victim's browser session Okta researchers have observed that these toolkits can be adjusted on the fly, enabling callers to control which pages are presented to victims according to their scripts as well as with legitimate MFA challenges encountered during the login process. 

With this level of orchestration, attackers are able to neutralize most multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms that are not explicitly phishing-resistant. These campaigns are known to target identity platforms, cryptocurrencies, and Okta's own identity and access management services, which serve as authentication hubs for extensive corporate application portfolios, including Google and Microsoft Entra. 

It has been demonstrated that phishing pages are closely modeled after legitimate sign-in interfaces, ensuring a seamless experience for victims. According to Okta threat researcher Moussa Diallo, attackers can coordinate on-screen instructions with spoken instructions, even advising victims that they will receive MFA push notifications in advance, thus lending credibility to what would otherwise appear to be an unsolicited authentication request. 

However, phishing-resistant MFA technology such as smartcards, FIDO security keys, cryptographic passkeys, and Okta FastPass introduces cryptographic binding between the service and the user, thus reducing the effectiveness of real-time social engineering attacks. 

Ultimately, the campaign reinforces the critical lesson that defenders should take away: identity has become the primary attack surface, and human interaction has become one of its most vulnerable components. 

Threat actors have refined their abilities to manipulate trust by engaging in real-time voice engagements, challenging traditional assumptions about authentication strength. In addition to considering the fact that even well-implemented SSO and MFA controls can be undermined when users are persuaded to actively participate in an attack chain, security teams must change both technical and operational strategies to address this risk. 

By adopting cryptographically bound authentication mechanisms that are phishing-resistant, organizations can reduce the probability of credential replay in real-time. Furthermore, sustained employee awareness training that recognizes voice phishing as a major threat, rather than a niche variant of email-based scams, is equally important. 

The use of clear internal IT communication processes, along with monitoring for anomalous SSO behavior and rapid response playbooks, can further limit the blast radius in the event of compromise. In order to increase resilience against identity-driven attacks, layered controls will need to remain effective even when social engineering is successfully employed.
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Cyberspace Threats
AI Security AI technology Cyber Protection Cyber Security Cybersecurity Strategy Cyberspace Cyberspace Threats

US Cybersecurity Strategy Shifts Toward Prevention and AI Security

 

Early next month, changes to how cyber breaches are reported will begin to surface, alongside a broader shift in national cybersecurity planning. Under current leadership, federal teams are advancing a more proactive approach to digital defense, focusing on risks posed by hostile governments and increasingly complex cyber threats. Central to this effort is stronger coordination across agencies, updated procedures, and shared responsibility models rather than reliance on technology upgrades alone. Officials emphasize resilience, faster implementation timelines, and adapting safeguards to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies. 

At the Information Technology Industry Council’s Intersect Summit, White House National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross previewed an upcoming national cybersecurity strategy expected to be released soon. While details remain limited, the strategy is built around six pillars, including shaping adversary behavior in cyberspace. The aim is to move away from reactive responses and toward reducing incentives for cybercrime and state-backed attacks. Prevention, rather than damage control, is driving the update, with layered actions and long-term thinking guiding near-term decisions. Much of the work happens behind the scenes, with success measured by systems that remain secure. 

Cairncross noted that cyber harm often occurs before responses begin. The updated approach targets a wide range of threats, including nation states, state-linked criminal groups, ransomware actors, and fraud operations. By reshaping the digital environment, officials hope to make cybercrime less profitable and less attractive. This philosophy now sits at the core of federal cybersecurity policy. 

Another pillar focuses on refining the regulatory environment through closer collaboration with industry. Instead of rigid compliance checklists, officials want cybersecurity rules aligned with real-world threats and operational realities. According to Cairncross, effective oversight depends on adaptability and practicality, ensuring regulations support security outcomes rather than burden organizations unnecessarily. 

Additional priorities include modernizing and securing federal IT systems, protecting critical infrastructure such as power and transportation networks, maintaining leadership in emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, and addressing shortages in skilled cyber professionals. Officials are under pressure to deliver visible progress quickly, given political time constraints. Meanwhile, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is preparing updates to the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act, or CIRCIA. Although Congress passed the law in 2022, it will not take effect until final rules are issued. 

Once implemented, organizations across 16 critical infrastructure sectors must report significant cyber incidents to CISA within 72 hours. Nick Andersen, CISA’s executive assistant director for cybersecurity, said clarification on the rules could arrive within weeks. Until then, reporting remains voluntary. CISA released a proposed CIRCIA rule in early 2024, estimating it would apply to roughly 316,000 entities. Industry groups and some lawmakers criticized the proposal as overly broad and raised concerns about overlapping reporting requirements. They have urged CISA to better align CIRCIA with existing federal and sector-specific disclosure mandates. 

Originally expected in October 2025, the final rules are now delayed until May 2026. Some Republicans, including House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Andrew Garbarino, are calling for an ex parte process to allow direct industry feedback. Andersen also discussed progress on establishing an AI Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or AI-ISAC, outlined in the administration’s AI Action Plan. The proposed group would facilitate sharing AI-related threat intelligence across critical infrastructure sectors. He stressed the importance of avoiding fragmented public and private efforts and ensuring coordination from the outset as AI adoption accelerates. 

Separately, the Office of the National Cyber Director is developing an AI security policy framework. Cairncross emphasized that security must be built into AI systems from the start, not added later, as AI becomes embedded in essential services and daily life. Uncertainty remains around a replacement for the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, which DHS disbanded last year. A successor body, potentially called the Alliance of National Councils for Homeland Operational Resilience, or ANCHOR, is under consideration. Andersen said the redesign aims to address past shortcomings, including limited focus on cybersecurity and inflexible structures that restricted targeted collaboration.
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Russia
Cyber Attacks Cyberattack Cybersecurity Threats Germany Russia

A New Twist on Old Cyber Tricks

 


Germany’s domestic intelligence and cybersecurity agencies have warned of a covert espionage campaign that turns secure messaging apps into tools of surveillance without exploiting any technical flaws. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Office for Information Security said the operation relies instead on social engineering carried out through the Signal messaging service. In a joint advisory, the agencies said the campaign targets senior figures in politics, the military and diplomacy, as well as investigative journalists in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. 

By hijacking messenger accounts, attackers can gain access not only to private conversations but also to contact networks and group chats, potentially widening the scope of compromise. The operation does not involve malware or the exploitation of vulnerabilities in Signal. Instead, attackers impersonate official support channels, posing as “Signal Support” or a so-called security chatbot. 

Targets are urged to share a PIN or verification code sent by text message, often under the pretext that their account will otherwise be lost. Once the victim complies, the attackers can register the account on a device they control and monitor incoming messages while impersonating the user. In an alternative approach, victims are tricked into scanning a QR code linked to Signal’s device-linking feature. 

This grants attackers access to recent messages and contact lists while allowing the victim to continue using the app, unaware that their communications are being mirrored elsewhere. German authorities warned that similar tactics could be applied to WhatsApp, which uses comparable features for account linking and two-step verification. 

They urged users not to engage with unsolicited support messages and to enable registration locks and regularly review linked devices. Although the perpetrators have not been formally identified, the agencies noted that comparable campaigns have previously been attributed to Russia-aligned threat groups. Reports last year from Microsoft and the Google Threat Intelligence Group documented similar methods used against diplomatic and political targets. 

The warning comes amid a flurry of state-linked cyber activity across Europe. Norway’s security services recently accused Chinese-backed groups of penetrating multiple organisations by exploiting vulnerable network equipment, while also citing Russian monitoring of military targets and Iranian cyber operations against dissidents. 

Separately, CERT Polska said a Russian-linked group was likely behind attacks on energy facilities that relied on exposed network devices lacking multi-factor authentication. 

Taken together, the incidents highlight a shift in cyber espionage away from technical exploits towards psychological manipulation. As secure messaging becomes ubiquitous among officials and journalists, the weakest link increasingly lies not in encryption, but in the trust users place in what appears to be help.
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Ransomware
cyber attack Data Breach Hacking Information Security IT Security Italy Law Enforcement Ransomware

La Sapienza University’s Digital Systems Remain Shut After Cyber Intrusion Disrupts Services

 




Rome’s La Sapienza University is continuing to experience major operational disruption after a cyber intrusion forced administrators to take its digital infrastructure offline as a safety measure. The shutdown began on February 2 and has affected core online services used by students, faculty, and administrative staff.

Since the incident, students have been unable to complete basic academic and administrative tasks such as registering for examinations, viewing tuition-related records, or accessing official contact information for teaching staff. With internal platforms unavailable, the university has relied mainly on its social media channels to share updates. These notices have acknowledged the disruption but have not provided detailed technical explanations or a confirmed date for when full access will be restored.

University officials confirmed that their systems were deliberately powered down to contain the threat and to prevent malicious software from spreading to other parts of the network. Emergency shutdowns of this kind are typically used when there is a risk that an attack could compromise additional servers, user accounts, or stored data. This response suggests that the incident involved harmful software capable of moving across connected systems.

According to publicly available reporting, the disruption was caused by ransomware, a category of cyber attack in which criminals attempt to lock organizations out of their own systems or data. Some media sources have claimed that a newly observed cybercrime group may be linked to the breach and that a ransomware variant referred to in security research as Bablock, also known as Rorschach, may have been involved. These attributions are part of ongoing assessments and have not been formally confirmed by authorities.

Technical analyses cited in public reporting describe this malware family as drawing components from previously leaked cybercrime tools, allowing attackers to combine multiple techniques into a single, highly disruptive program. Such ransomware is designed to operate rapidly and can spread across large digital environments, which helps explain the scale of the disruption experienced by one of Europe’s largest universities by student enrollment.

The university has formally reported the incident to Italian law enforcement and to the National Cybersecurity Agency, both of which are now involved in the investigation and response. Administrators have stated that emergency management is being coordinated across academic offices, administrative departments, and student representatives, with discussions underway to introduce deadline extensions and flexible arrangements to limit academic harm.

Due to the ongoing shutdown of internal systems, campus information desks are currently unable to access digital records that would normally support student inquiries. Updates about service availability and office hours are being shared through official faculty social media pages.

Meanwhile, technical teams are examining the full scope of the breach before restoring systems from backups. This step is necessary to ensure that no malicious code remains active. It is still unclear whether all stored data can be fully recovered or whether some information may remain inaccessible following the attack.


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Romania National Oil Pipeline
Cybersecurity Attack Data Breach data threat Romania National Oil Pipeline

Romania’s National Oil Pipeline Joins a Growing Cyberattack list

Romania’s national oil pipeline operator, Conpet, has disclosed that it suffered a cyberattack that disrupted its corporate IT systems and temporarily knocked its website offline, adding to a growing series of digital incidents affecting the country’s critical infrastructure. 

In a statement issued on Wednesday, the company said the attack affected its business information systems but did not interfere with pipeline operations or its ability to meet contractual obligations. 

Conpet operates almost 4,000 kilometres of pipelines, transporting domestically produced and imported crude oil, gasoline and other petroleum derivatives to refineries across Romania, making it a key component of the country’s energy infrastructure. 

The firm sought to reassure customers and authorities that its core operational technologies were not compromised. Systems responsible for supervising and controlling pipeline flows, as well as telecommunications networks, continued to function normally throughout the incident. 

As a result, the transport of crude oil and fuel through the national pipeline system was not disrupted. Conpet’s public website, however, remained inaccessible as recovery efforts were under way. 

Conpet said it is investigating the breach in cooperation with national cybersecurity authorities and has notified Romania’s Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism, filing a formal criminal complaint. 

The company has not provided details on how the attackers gained access or the specific techniques used, citing the ongoing investigation. Despite this lack of official confirmation, the ransomware group Qilin has claimed responsibility for the attack. 

The group has listed Conpet on its dark web leak site and alleges it exfiltrated close to one terabyte of data from the company’s systems. 

To support its claim, Qilin published a selection of images said to show internal documents, including financial information and scans of passports. Qilin emerged in 2022 as a ransomware-as-a-service operation, initially operating under the name Agenda. 

Since then, it has built a long list of alleged victims across the world, targeting private companies and public institutions alike. Such groups typically combine data theft with extortion, threatening to publish stolen material unless a ransom is paid. 

The attack on Conpet follows a spate of ransomware incidents in Romania over the past year. Water authorities, major energy producers, electricity distributors and dozens of hospitals have all reported disruptive cyberattacks. 

Together, these cases underline a persistent weakness in the corporate IT systems that support essential services, even when industrial control networks are kept separate. 


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State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage
Advanced Persistent Threats Critical Infrastructure Cyberattack Data Breach Global Cybersecurity Threats Linux Rootkit Malware nation-state hackers Palo Alto Unit 42 State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage

Widespread Cyber Espionage Campaign Breaches Infrastructure in 37 Countries


 

Research over the past year indicates that a newly identified cyberespionage threat actor operating in Asia has been conducting a sustained and methodical cyberespionage campaign that is characterized both by its operational scale and technical proficiency. 

A fully adaptive and mature toolchain has been utilized by this group to successfully compromise 70 government and critical infrastructure institutions spanning 37 countries. The group's operations utilize a range of classic intrusion vectors, including targeted phishing, advanced exploitation frameworks, along with custom malware, Linux-based rootkits, persistent web shells, tunneling and proxying mechanisms to hide command-and-control traffic and maintain long-term access. 

According to the analysis of the campaign, these intrusions represent only a portion of the group's overall activities. There appears to be an increase in reconnaissance efforts, indicating a strategic expansion beyond confirmed victims, according to security researchers. 

During November and December of 2025, the actor was observed conducting active scanning and reconnaissance against government-linked infrastructures located in 155 countries, indicating that an intelligence collection operation had a global perspective rather than an opportunistic approach. 

A previously unknown cyberespionage actor identified as TGR-STA-1030, also known as UNC6619, has been attributed to the activity by researchers at Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42. Based on a combination of technical artifacts, operational behavior, and targeting patterns, Unit 42 assesses with high confidence that the group is state-aligned and operating from Asia. 

A 12-month period during which the actor compromised government and critical infrastructure organizations across 37 countries puts nearly one fifth of the world's countries within the campaign's verified impact zone. 

A sharp increase in reconnaissance activity was observed by Unit 42 in parallel with these intrusions between November and December 2025, as the group actively scanned government-linked infrastructure associated with 155 countries, signaling a shift toward a broader collection of intelligence. 

Based on the analysis conducted by Unit 42, the group was first discovered during an investigation into coordinated phishing operations targeting European government entities in early 2025. 

Eventually, as the actor refined its access methods, these campaigns, which were part of the initial phase of the Shadow Campaigns, evolved into more direct exploitation-driven intrusions based on exploitation. In light of the assessment that the activity aligns with state interests but has not yet been conclusively linked to a particular sponsoring organization, the designation TGR-STA-1030 is serving as a temporary tracking label while attribution efforts are continued.

Over time, the group demonstrated increasing technical maturity by deploying persistence mechanisms capable of providing extended access to exposed services beyond email-based lures, and exploiting exposed services. To date, a wide range of sensitive government and infrastructure sectors have been identified as victims, including interior affairs, foreign relations, finance, trade, economic policy, immigration, mining, justice, and energy ministries and departments. 

Despite confirmed compromises, researchers from Unit 42 believe that the breadth of reconnaissance activity offers insight into the actor's global priorities, while confirmed scanning efforts indicate that scanning efforts can be translated into operational access. 

There were at least 70 successful breaches during the period under review, and attackers maintained footholds in several environments for several months at a time. Although the campaign appears to be primarily geared toward espionage, Unit 42 has cautioned that the scale, persistence, and alignment of the activity with real-world geopolitical events raise concerns about potential long-term consequences for national security and critical service resilience. 

According to an in-depth analysis of the campaign, a pattern of targeting closely tracked sensitive geopolitical and commercial developments. Unit 42 documented the compromise of one of the largest suppliers in Taiwan's power equipment industry among the confirmed intrusions, which underscores the group's interest in energy-related industrial ecosystems. 

The actors also breached an Indonesian airline's network during the active procurement process with a U.S.-based aircraft manufacturer in a separate incident. Researchers noted that the intrusion coincided with a significant increase in the promotion of competing aircraft products from a manufacturer based in Southeast Asia, suggesting that the operation was not limited to passive intelligence gathering, but extended to strategic economic interests. 

It is important to note that several intrusion waves corresponded directly with diplomatic and political flashpoints involving China. After a high-profile meeting between the country’s president and the Dalai Lama, scanning activity was observed against the Czech military, national police, parliamentary systems, and multiple government bureaus in the Czech Republic. 

A month prior to Honduras' presidential election, during which both of the leading candidates indicated their willingness to reestablish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the group launched a targeted attack against Honduran government infrastructure on October 31, approximately one month before the election. 

At least 200 government-associated IP addresses were targeted during this period by Unit 42, marking one of the largest concentrations of activity recorded by the group to date, which resulted in reconnaissance attempts and intrusion attempts. From a technical standpoint, the actor's tooling exhibits a high level of sophistication and operational discipline. 

As a part of initial access, phishing campaigns were frequently used to deliver custom malware loaders known as DiaoYu. DiaoYu is the Chinese word for fishing. Upon execution, the malware loader performed antivirus checks before deploying follow-on payloads, including command-and-control beacons known as Cobalt Strike beacons.

Additionally, the group exploited various enterprise-facing vulnerabilities, including Microsoft Exchange Server, SAP Solution Manager, as well as more than a dozen other widely deployed platforms and services, attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities in parallel. By utilizing a previously undocumented Linux rootkit known as ShadowGuard, Palo Alto Networks enhanced persistence and stealth. 

Rootkits operate within Linux kernel virtual machines referred to as Extended Berkeley Packet Filters (eBPF), allowing malicious logic to be executed entirely within highly trusted kernel space. According to researchers from Unit 42, eBPF-based backdoors pose a particular challenge for detection, because they are capable of intercepting and manipulating core system functions and auditing data before host-based security tools or monitoring platforms are aware of them. 

A similar approach has been documented in recent research on advanced Chinese-linked threat actors. However, certain operational artifacts also emerged in spite of the group's multi-tiered infrastructure strategy designed to obscure command-and-control pathways and impede attribution. 

Several cases involved investigators observing connections to victims' environments originating from IP address ranges associated with China Mobile Communications Group, a major backbone telecommunications provider. 

According to Palo Alto Networks, based on infrastructure analysis and historical telemetry, this group has been active since at least January 2024 and continues to pose a threat to the company. According to Unit 42, TGR-STA-1030 remains an active and evolving threat to critical infrastructure and government environments worldwide. This threat's combination of geopolitical alignment, technical capability, and sustained access creates a potential long-term threat. 

Unit 42 encourages governments and critical infrastructure operators to revisit long-held assumptions related to perimeter security and incident visibility in light of these findings. Through the campaign, it can be seen how advanced threat actors are increasingly combining prolonged reconnaissance with selective exploitation in order to achieve durable access and remain undetected for extended periods of time. 

It is recommended that security professionals prioritize continuous monitoring of exposed services, improve detection capabilities at both the endpoint and network layers, and closely monitor anomalous activity within trusted system components, such as kernel-level processes, where appropriate. 

Additionally, the researchers emphasize the importance of cross-sector coordination and threat intelligence sharing in addition to immediate technical mitigations, noting that the campaign's scale and geopolitical alignment demonstrate the deterioration of national resilience over time through cyberespionage operations. 

Keeping a keen eye on current and future state-aligned operations and adjusting defensive strategies in response will remain critical to limiting their strategic impact, especially as state-aligned actors continue to develop their skills.
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