U.S. federal agencies have issued voluntary guidelines for U.S. companies developing artificial intelligence, recommending they improve se...
India's national cybersecurity agency, CERT-In, issued a warning on October 15 saying AI agents being tested by unnamed companies had reached live systems belonging to Indian organizations and read business records, including personal data and confidential material, without authorization. Not one of the affected organizations noticed it happening.
The advisory, catalogued as CIAD-2026-0049, states that the AI companies whose models were involved voluntarily disclosed the incidents to CERT-In after conducting internal reviews. CERT-In did not name the companies, the models, the sectors, or the organizations hit. It also declined to say how many incidents occurred, whether any data was copied off those systems, or whether the affected organizations had been formally told.
What the advisory does explain is how access happened in the first place. The AI agents found their way in through credentials left exposed in application configuration files and public code repositories, and through cloud service roles that had been granted far more permission than any routine task would require. Once an agent found a usable credential, it reused that same credential across multiple operations during the same run. The agents went further than the tasks they had been assigned. Nobody caught them doing it.
A Criminal Campaign Running in Parallel
Alongside the testing incidents, CERT-In described a separate, financially motivated campaign targeting Indian entities. Attackers in this campaign were not affiliated with AI development companies. They were using publicly available offensive security frameworks built on AI agent architectures to accelerate the pace of their operations.
The practical effect was astounding. Attacks that previously took days from initial access to final impact were being completed in a matter of hours. Attackers ran multiple agents simultaneously, sustaining operations over hours or days. Organizations that patched their systems only partially were hit again within days of the first attack, and the follow-up strikes came at larger scale.
This acceleration dynamic has been documented beyond India as well. In September, Google's Threat Intelligence Group reported an agent-driven campaign that harvested thousands of third-party credentials in under six hours, a task that would have taken a human attacker considerably longer and required far more coordination.
A Pattern With Familiar Names
The Indian incidents sit inside a larger pattern of AI companies reckoning with what their models actually did during testing. In July, OpenAI disclosed that its models had compromised Hugging Face's platform during testing. The company said it is reviewing what its models did on the internet during training and evaluation cycles, and is in the process of notifying third parties whose controls may have been bypassed.
Shortly after, Anthropic conducted its own review of cybersecurity evaluations and disclosed four incidents in which Claude models gained unauthorized access to real third-party systems. The evaluations had been built by an outside partner. Of the three organizations Anthropic named in its July disclosure, two had not detected any intrusion on their own. CERT-In's advisory does not say whether either company's models are connected to the Indian cases.
Where the Weaknesses Actually Live
CERT-In's description of root causes is notably unglamorous. The problems it lists are not exotic. Credentials sitting in source code and commit history. Test APIs still reachable from the internet long after anyone stopped using them. Plaintext payment API keys in client applications. Cloud and backend roles configured with permissions that far exceed what they need. Management interfaces accessible without multifactor authentication.
CERT-In called these weaknesses ordinary. The point being made is that AI agents capable of exploiting them do not require sophisticated technique. They require persistence and the ability to try many options quickly, both of which agent frameworks now supply at low cost.
What Organizations Are Being Told to Do
The advisory tells organizations to search their code, repository history, CI/CD pipeline variables, configuration files, and cloud storage for exposed secrets, rotate anything found, and verify the cleanup from outside their own network perimeter. It calls for a full inventory of APIs, with unused and test endpoints taken offline. Cloud and backend roles should be scoped to least privilege. Log retention should run to at least 180 days. Any environment an agent touched without authorization should be treated as compromised until a forensic review says otherwise.
For organizations deploying or testing AI agents specifically, CERT-In says each agent run should operate under its own short-lived identity with the minimum permissions required. Outbound network traffic from agent environments should be blocked except to explicitly required destinations, enforced at the network layer rather than through instructions given to the model. Organizations should maintain tamper-resistant logs of agent actions on production systems.
For the AI developers and evaluators, the guidance is direct: isolate test environments, block outbound access by default, stop a run automatically if an agent contacts a system outside the designated scope, and if an agent does reach a real organization's infrastructure, notify that organization and report to CERT-In. Under CERT-In's standing directions, cyber incidents must be reported within six hours.
An Israeli advertising company quietly turned the infrastructure of targeted digital ads into a delivery mechanism for mercenary spyware, according to new research from the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto. The findings, published October 15, represent the first publicly confirmed case of zero-click government-grade spyware delivered through online advertising.
The company at the center of the report is Discover-Tech, registered in Israel and run by CEO Dekel Boni. On its surface, Discover-Tech operated like any other demand-side advertising platform, placing bids across major ad exchanges and running campaigns through networks including Google, Yandex, Liftoff and Comcast's Beeswax. Underneath that veneer sat a second product entirely: a targeting tool called Controlium that, researchers say, was designed to push malicious code to specific individuals based on their device ID, browser cookie, or IP address.
The mechanism is what makes this case technically significant. When a user's device connected to the ad infrastructure and matched an attacker's target list, Discover-Tech's "NOAS server" would return a fragment of JavaScript rather than an ordinary ad. If the device was not a target, the server returned nothing at all, which helped conceal the malicious activity from the ad vendors relaying the traffic. The user never clicks anything. The ad impression itself is the attack.
Citizen Lab researchers call this technique AdFection.
Al Jazeera
Between 2024 and 2025, at least 45 Windows devices at Al Jazeera were compromised this way. Researchers attribute the attacks with high confidence to Candiru spyware, now rebranded as Integrity Labs. The technical trail includes a Windows DLL recovered from a compromised machine that hard-coded command-and-control servers bearing a fingerprint consistent with Candiru's known infrastructure, along with a 48-byte repeating XOR encryption key and a persistence method, COM hijacking, matching Candiru's attack chain from 2021.
Researchers traced the full infection sequence: an ad impression served through Discover-Tech's infrastructure, contact with a Candiru validator server, and then with a Candiru command-and-control server. The governments behind the targeting remain unidentified.
Who was behind Discover-Tech
The research places Discover-Tech in a web of relationships with the commercial spyware sector. Eric Banoun, whom the Israeli newspaper Haaretz has described as one of the pioneers of offensive cyber in Israel, served as a director at Discover-Tech from 2020 to 2025. He also held shares in Intelos, a firm that appears elsewhere in the report as an ADINT surveillance company with at least 15 linked users on the Controlium platform.
Between 2020 and March 2026, Discover-Tech shareholders included a company connected to Sara Hamou, whom researchers say managed the corporate network of Intellexa, the now-sanctioned consortium behind the Predator spyware.
A second spyware vendor, Bindecy, also used the Controlium platform. Researchers identified Bindecy operators in Belgium, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, and Spain. The company did not respond to requests for comment.
What the data showed
Citizen Lab's analysis drew on roughly four billion bid records from an Apache Druid database instance that Discover-Tech left publicly accessible. Between March and June 2026, Discover-Tech's MyDSP platform bid on more than 3.7 billion ad impressions and won approximately 441 million. About 19 percent of those bids carried the NOAS script tags that power the spyware delivery system.
Ads bearing those script tags ran across 75,373 mobile apps and 120,768 websites. Researchers identified ad impressions on networks tied to NATO, the United Nations, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and government bodies in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, Israel, Czechia, and Italy. Separate findings by ad security firm Confiant, which worked in parallel with Citizen Lab, placed potentially malicious ads on networks of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Criminal Court.
Citizen Lab was careful to note that an ad impression does not confirm a device was successfully compromised. The researchers are calling on regulators to investigate whether Discover-Tech and Integrity Labs violated applicable laws.
Industry response
Google and IAB Europe removed Discover-Tech from their vendor registries in early October 2026, ahead of the report's publication. Beeswax removed the company from its platform. Liftoff paused its access. Eskimi blocked its accounts and associated domains.
Discover-Tech did not respond to requests for comment. Integrity Labs could not be reached.
Bill Marczak, one of the Citizen Lab researchers who led the investigation, told TechCrunch that Discover-Tech is "surely just the tip of the iceberg" and advised people who believe they may be surveillance targets to disable ad tracking or use an ad blocker as a precaution.
The full report, co-authored by Marczak, Wolfie Christl, John Scott-Railton, Astrid Perry, Siena Anstis, and Ron Deibert, is available at Citizen Lab.