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Quantum Cybersecurity Risks Rise as Organizations Prepare for Post-Quantum Cryptography

  Security experts often trust encrypted data since today's cryptography aims to block unapproved users. Still, some warn new forms of c...

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BadPaw Malware Targets Uranian Systems


A newly found malware campaign exploiting a Ukrainian email service to build trust has been found by cybersecurity experts. 

About the campaign 

The operation starts with an email sent from an address hosted on ukr[.]net, a famous Ukrainian provider earlier exploited by the Russia based hacking group APT28 in older campaigns.

BadPaw malware 

Experts at ClearSky have termed the malware “BadPaw.” The campaign starts when a receiver opens a link pretending to host a ZIP archive. Instead of starting a direct download, the target is redirected to a domain that installs a tracking pixel, letting the threat actor to verify engagement. Another redirect sends the ZIP file. 

The archive pretends to consist of a standard HTML file, but ClearSky experts revealed that it is actually an HTA app in hiding. When deployed, the file shows a fake document related to a Ukrainian government border crossing request, where malicious processes are launched in the background. 

Attack tactic 

Before starting, the malware verifies a Windows Registry key to set the system's installation date. If the OS is older than ten days, deployment stops, an attack tactic that escapes sandbox traps used by threat analysts. 

If all the conditions are fulfilled, the malware looks for the original ZIP file and retrieves extra components. The malware builds its persistence via a scheduled task that runs a VBS script which deploys steganography to steal hidden executable code from an image file. 

Only nine antivirus engines could spot the payload at the time of study. 

Multi-Layered Attack

After activation within a particular parameter, BadPaw links to a C2 server. 

The following process happens:

Getting a numeric result from the /getcalendar endpoint. 

Gaining access to a landing page called "Telemetry UP!” through /eventmanager. 

Downloading the ASCII-encoded payload information installed within HTML. 

In the end, the decrypted data launches a backdoor called "MeowMeowProgram[.]exe," which offers file system control and remote shell access. 

Four protective layers are included in the MeowMeow backdoor: runtime parameter constraints, obfuscation of the.NET Reactor, sandbox detection, and monitoring for forensic tools like Wireshark, Procmon, Ollydbg, and Fiddler.

Incorrect execution results in a benign graphical user interface with a picture of a cat. The "MeowMeow" button only displays a harmless message when it is clicked.

FBI Informant Allegedly Ran Most Operations on Incognito Market While Fentanyl-Laced Drugs Caused Overdose Deaths

 

An FBI informant reportedly handled the majority of activity on Incognito Market—one of the largest drug marketplaces on the dark web—for nearly two years, even as fentanyl-laced pills linked to the platform caused fatal overdoses across the United States. Court documents indicate that the unnamed confidential source managed roughly 95% of transactions on the site between 2022 and 2024, effectively helping operate the $100 million marketplace.

According to filings, the informant approved vendor listings, mediated disputes among users, and oversaw cryptocurrency payments on the platform. These activities allegedly continued even after buyers warned about near-fatal overdoses connected to certain suppliers.

Taiwanese national Rui-Siang Lin, who used the alias “Pharoah,” created Incognito Market and ran it from October 2020 until March 2024. The Tor-based platform hosted nearly 1,800 vendors who sold drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine, MDMA, and opioids to hundreds of thousands of buyers worldwide.

In October, Judge Colleen McMahon sentenced Lin to 30 years in federal prison and ordered him to forfeit $105 million. The judge described him as a “drug kingpin,” despite the defense raising serious questions about the extent of FBI involvement in the operation.

During sentencing in Manhattan federal court, Arkansas physician David Churchill spoke about the death of his son Reed in September 2022. The 22-year-old died after taking fentanyl-laced oxycodone pills purchased through Incognito Market. The drugs were supplied by a vendor known as RedLightLabs, whose operators—Michael Ta and Raj Srinivasan—later pleaded guilty to charges tied to five overdose deaths.

Churchill asked Lin to remember his son’s face while serving his sentence. However, the revelation that the FBI’s own confidential asset was moderating the marketplace at the time of Reed’s death added another troubling dimension to the case.

When Law Enforcement Becomes the Accomplice

Lin’s defense team argued that the FBI informant functioned more like a partner than an undercover observer. According to defense filings, the government’s source did more than infiltrate the marketplace—it played a central operational role.

Documents suggest the informant approved vendors, handled user complaints, and processed transactions while allegedly overlooking warnings about fentanyl contamination in certain drug listings.

In November 2023, users reported severe overdoses and hospitalizations tied to a particular vendor who nevertheless continued fulfilling more than 1,000 orders. Court records also show the informant debated Lin about maintaining bans on fentanyl, reportedly advocating for “free markets” before Lin conducted a user poll—later described as rigged—that maintained the prohibition.

Defense attorney Noam Biale described the situation as a joint operation, saying: “The government had the ability to mitigate the harm—and didn’t do it.”

Judge McMahon also questioned the length of the investigation, asking why authorities allowed the marketplace to remain active for such an extended period after gaining access.

Prosecutors, however, argued that the informant was simply following Lin’s instructions as part of a broader strategy to identify “Pharaoh.” Authorities ultimately traced Lin through blockchain analysis and seized servers tied to the marketplace.

While Lin’s 30-year sentence remains in place, his planned appeal and the debate surrounding the informant’s role indicate that the legal and ethical questions surrounding the Incognito Market investigation are far from resolved.

ATM Jackpotting Malware Triggers Record Global ATM Heists in 2025

 

ATM jackpotting attacks surged dramatically in 2025, with cybercriminals using specialized malware to force cash machines to spit out money on command, often without touching any customer account. This new wave of attacks exposed serious weaknesses in how banks protect the physical and digital components of their ATM fleets. 

According to FBI figures, there have been about 1,900 reported ATM jackpotting cases in the United States since 2020, and more than 700 of those incidents occurred in 2025 alone, causing over 20 million dollars in losses. The attacks rely heavily on malware families such as Ploutus, which has been around for over a decade but continues to evolve. Instead of targeting customer accounts, Ploutus directly compromises the ATM’s operating system, allowing crooks to drain cassettes in minutes before anyone notices something is wrong. 

To execute a jackpotting operation, attackers first need physical access to the machine’s internals. The FBI notes that gangs often use widely available “generic” keys to open the service panel, then remove or connect to the hard drive or USB ports. Once inside, they either load malware onto the existing drive or swap in a pre‑infected disk that boots a compromised operating system capable of issuing unauthorized dispense commands. In many cases, a mule returns later, enters a secret code or connects a device, and collects the cash as the ATM empties itself.

What makes these operations so dangerous is that the malware can bypass normal bank authorization checks and trigger cash withdrawals without a card, PIN, or even a linked account.Because the machine behaves as if it is performing legitimate transactions, banks often only discover the theft after reconciling cash levels and seeing large, unexplained shortages. The U.S. Justice Department has already charged dozens of suspects in jackpotting schemes, including crews tied to transnational criminal groups accused of stealing millions of dollars from victim banks and credit unions. 

In response, the FBI and regulators are urging financial institutions and ATM operators to harden both physical and software defenses. Recommended steps include replacing standard locks, reinforcing ATM cabinets, keeping systems fully patched, and closely monitoring machines for signs of tampering or unexpected restarts. As 2026, ATM jackpotting has become a priority threat for the banking sector, underlining the need for continuous security upgrades and better coordination between banks, law enforcement, and cybersecurity teams.

Google Responds After Reports of Android Malware Leveraging Gemini AI



There has been a steady integration of artificial intelligence into everyday digital services that has primarily been portrayed as a story of productivity and convenience. However, the same systems that were originally designed to assist users in interpreting complex tasks are now beginning to appear in much less benign circumstances. 


According to security researchers, a new Android malware strain appears to be woven directly into Google's Gemini AI chatbot, which seems to have a generative AI component. One of the most noteworthy aspects of this discovery is that it marks an unusual development in the evolution of mobile threat evolution, as a tool that was intended to assist users with problems has been repurposed to initiate malicious software through the user interface of a victim's device.

In real time, the malware analyzes on-screen activity and generates contextual instructions based on it, demonstrating that modern AI systems can serve as tactical enablers in cyber intrusions. As a result of the adaptive nature of malicious applications, traditional automated scripts rarely achieve such levels of adaptability. 

It has been concluded from further technical analysis that the malware, known as PromptSpy by ESET, combines a variety of established surveillance and control mechanisms with an innovative layer of artificial intelligence-assisted persistence. 

When the program is installed on an affected device, a built-in virtual network computing module allows operators to view and control the compromised device remotely. While abusing Android's accessibility framework, this application obstructs users from attempting to remove the application, effectively interfering with user actions intended to terminate or uninstall it. 

Additionally, malicious code can harvest lock-screen information, collect detailed device identifiers, take screenshots, and record extended screen activity as video while maintaining encrypted communications with its command-and-control system. 


According to investigators, the campaign is primarily motivated by financial interests and has targeted heavily on Argentinian users so far, although linguistic artifacts within the code base indicate that the development most likely took place in a Chinese-speaking environment. However, PromptSpy is characterized by its unique implementation of Gemini as an operational aid that makes it uniquely unique. 

A dynamic interpretation of the device interface is utilized by the malware, instead of relying on rigid automation scripts that simulate taps at predetermined coordinates, an approach that frequently fails across different versions or interface layouts of Android smartphones. It transmits a textual prompt along with an XML representation of the current screen layout to Gemini, thereby providing a structured map of the visible buttons, text labels, and interface elements to Gemini. 

Once the chatbot has returned structured JSON instructions which indicate where interaction should take place, PromptSpy executes those instructions and repeats the process until the malicious application has successfully been anchored in the recent-apps list. This reduces the likelihood that the process may be dismissed by routine user gestures or management of the system. 


ESET researchers noted that the malware was first observed in February 2026 and appears to have evolved from a previous strain known as VNCSpy. The operation is believed to selectively target regional victims while maintaining development infrastructure elsewhere by uploading samples from Hong Kong, before later variants surface in Argentina. 

It is not distributed via official platforms such as Google Play; instead, victims are directed to a standalone website impersonating Chase Bank's branding by using identifiers such as "MorganArg." In addition, the final malware payload appears to be delivered via a related phishing application, thought to be originated by the same threat actor. 

Even though the malicious software is not listed on the official Google Play store, analysts note that Google Play Protect can detect and block known versions of the threat after they are identified. This interaction loop involves the AI model interpreting the interface data and returning structured JSON responses that are utilized by the malware for operational guidance. 

The responses specify both the actions that should be performed-such as simulated taps-as well as the exact interface element on which they should occur. By following these instructions, the malicious application is able to interact with system interfaces without direct user input, by utilizing Android's accessibility framework. 

Repeating the process iteratively is necessary to secure the application's position within the recent apps list of the device, a state that greatly complicates efforts to initiate task management or routine gestures to terminate the process. 

Gemini assumes the responsibility of interpreting the interface of the malware, thereby avoiding the fragility associated with fixed automation scripts. This allows the persistence routine to operate reliably across a variety of screen sizes, interface configurations, and Android builds. Once persistence is achieved, the operation's main objective becomes evident: establishing sustained remote access to the compromised device. 

By deploying a virtual network computing component integrated with PromptSpy, attackers have access to a remote monitor and control of the victim's screen in real time via the VNC protocol, which connects to a hard-coded command-and-control endpoint and is controlled remotely by the attacker infrastructure. 

Using this channel, the malware is able to retrieve operational information, such as the API key necessary to access Gemini, request screenshots on demand, or initiate continuous screen recording sessions. As part of this surveillance capability, we can also intercept highly sensitive information, such as lock-screen credentials, such as passwords and PINs, and record pattern-based unlock gestures. 

The malware utilizes Android accessibility services to place invisible overlays across portions of the interface, which effectively prevents users from uninstalling or disabling the application. As a result of distribution analysis, it appears the campaign uses a multi-stage delivery infrastructure rather than an official application marketplace for delivery. 


Despite never appearing on Google Play, the malware has been distributed through a dedicated website that distributes a preliminary dropper application instead. As soon as the dropper is installed, a secondary page appears hosted on another domain which mimics JPMorgan Chase's visual identity and identifies itself as MorganArg. Morgan Argentina appears to be the reference to the dropper. 

In the interface, victims are instructed to provide permission for installing software from unknown sources. Thereafter, the dropper retrieves a configuration file from its server and quietly downloads it. According to the report, the file contains instructions and a download link for a second Android package delivered to the victim as if it were a routine application update based on Spanish-language prompts. 

Researchers later discovered that the configuration server was no longer accessible, which left the specific distribution path of the payload unresolved. Clues in the malware’s code base provide additional insight into the campaign’s origin and targeting strategy. Linguistic artifacts, including debug strings written in simplified Chinese, suggest that Chinese-speaking operators maintained the development environment. 

Furthermore, the cybersecurity infrastructure and phishing material used in the operation indicate an interest in Argentina, which further supports the assessment that the activity is not espionage-related but rather financially motivated. It is also noted that PromptSpy appears to be a result of the evolution of a previously discovered Android malware strain known as VNCSpy, the samples of which were first submitted from Hong Kong to VirusTotal only weeks before the new variant was identified.

In addition to highlighting an immediate shift in the technical design of mobile threats, the discovery also indicates a broader shift. It is possible for attackers to automate interactions that would otherwise require extensive manual scripting and constant maintenance as operating systems change by outsourcing interface interpretation to a generative artificial intelligence system. 

Using this approach, malware can respond dynamically to changes in interfaces, device models, and regional system configurations by changing its behavior accordingly. Additionally, PromptSpy's persistence technique complicates remediation, since invisible overlays can obstruct victims' ability to access the uninstall controls, thereby further complicating remediation. 

In many cases, the only reliable way to remove the application is to restart the computer in Safe Mode, which temporarily disables third-party applications, allowing them to be removed without interruption. As security researchers have noted, PromptSpy's technique indicates that Android malware development is heading in a potentially troubling direction. 

By feeding an image of the device interface to artificial intelligence and receiving precise interaction instructions in return, malicious software gains an unprecedented degree of adaptability and efficiency not seen in traditional mobile threats. 

It is likely that as generative models become more deeply ingrained into consumer platforms, the same interpretive capabilities designed to assist users may be increasingly repurposed by threat actors who wish to automate complicated device interactions and maintain long-term control over compromised systems. 

Security practitioners and everyday users alike should be reminded that defensive practices must evolve to meet the changing technological landscape. As a general rule, analysts recommend installing applications only from trusted marketplaces, carefully reviewing accessibility permission requests, and avoiding downloads that are initiated by unsolicited websites or update prompts. 

The use of Android security updates and Google Play Protect can also reduce exposure to known threats as long as the protections remain active. Research indicates that, as tools such as Gemini are increasingly being used in malicious workflows, it signals an inflection point in mobile security, which may lead to a shift in both the offensive and defensive sides of the threat landscape as artificial intelligence becomes more prevalent. 

It is likely that in order to combat the next phase of adaptive Android malware, the industry will have to strengthen detection models, improve behavioural monitoring, and tighten controls on high-risk permissions.

149 Hacktivist DDoS Claims Recorded Across 16 Countries Following Middle East Escalation





A sharp rise in politically motivated cyber activity has emerged in the aftermath of the coordinated U.S.–Israel military operations against Iran, referred to as Epic Fury and Roaring Lion. Security analysts say online retaliation unfolded almost immediately, with hacktivist groups launching large-scale distributed denial-of-service, or DDoS, campaigns against institutions across multiple regions.

According to a report published by Radware, 149 separate DDoS attack claims were documented between February 28 and March 2, 2026. These incidents targeted 110 distinct organizations spanning 16 countries. Twelve different groups participated in the activity. Three of them, Keymous+, DieNet, and NoName057(16), were responsible for 74.6 percent of the total claims. Radware further noted that Keymous+ and DieNet alone accounted for nearly 70 percent of activity during that period.

The earliest attack in this wave was attributed to Hider Nex, also known as the Tunisian Maskers Cyber Force, on February 28. Information shared by Orange Cyberdefense describes Hider Nex as a Tunisian hacktivist collective aligned with pro-Palestinian causes. The group reportedly employs a dual strategy that combines service disruption with data theft and public leaks to amplify political messaging. Researchers trace its emergence to mid-2025.

Geographically, 107 of the 149 DDoS claims were directed at organizations in the Middle East, where government bodies and public infrastructure entities were disproportionately affected. Europe accounted for 22.8 percent of the global targeting during the same timeframe. By sector, government institutions represented 47.8 percent of all affected entities worldwide. Financial services followed at 11.9 percent, while telecommunications organizations accounted for 6.7 percent.

Within the Middle East, three countries experienced the highest concentration of reported activity. Kuwait accounted for 28 percent of regional attack claims, Israel represented 27.1 percent, and Jordan comprised 21.5 percent, according to Radware’s analysis.

Threat intelligence from Flashpoint, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, and Radware identified additional groups engaged in disruptive campaigns, including Nation of Saviors, Conquerors Electronic Army, Sylhet Gang, 313 Team, Handala Hack, APT Iran, Cyber Islamic Resistance, Dark Storm Team, FAD Team, Evil Markhors, and PalachPro.

The cyber activity extended beyond DDoS operations. Pro-Russian hacktivist collectives Cardinal and Russian Legion publicly claimed breaches of Israeli military networks, including the Iron Dome missile defense system. These assertions have not been independently verified.

Separate threat reporting identified an active SMS-based phishing operation distributing a counterfeit version of Israel’s Home Front Command RedAlert mobile application. Victims were reportedly persuaded to install a malicious Android package disguised as a wartime update. Once installed, the application displayed a functional alert interface while covertly deploying surveillance and data-exfiltration capabilities.

Flashpoint also reported that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted energy and digital infrastructure sectors in the Middle East, including Saudi Aramco and an Amazon Web Services data center in the United Arab Emirates. Analysts assessed that the intent was to impose broader economic pressure in response to military losses.

Researchers at Check Point observed that Cotton Sandstorm, also known as Haywire Kitten, revived a previous online identity called Altoufan Team and claimed responsibility for website compromises in Bahrain. The firm described the activity as reactive and warned of the likelihood of further involvement across the region.

Data from Nozomi Networks shows that the Iranian state-linked group UNC1549, also tracked as GalaxyGato, Nimbus Manticore, and Subtle Snail, ranked as the fourth most active threat actor in the second half of 2025. Its campaigns focused on defense, aerospace, telecommunications, and government entities in support of national strategic objectives.

Economic signals have also reflected the instability. Major Iranian cryptocurrency exchanges remain operational but have introduced adjustments such as batching or temporarily suspending withdrawals and issuing advisories about potential connectivity disruptions. Ari Redbord, Global Head of Policy at TRM Labs, stated that the situation does not yet indicate large-scale capital flight, but rather market volatility managed under connectivity constraints and regulatory intervention. He noted that Iran has long relied in part on cryptocurrency infrastructure to circumvent sanctions, and current conditions represent a real-time stress test of that system.

Despite heightened online activity, Sophos reported observing an increase in hacktivist operations without a corresponding escalation in confirmed impact. The firm cited DDoS attacks, website defacements, and unverified compromise claims attributed largely to pro-Iran personas, including Handala Hack and APT Iran.

The National Cyber Security Centre has warned organizations of elevated Iranian cyber risk and advised strengthening defenses against DDoS campaigns, phishing activity, and threats targeting industrial control systems.

Cynthia Kaiser of Halcyon, formerly Deputy Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Division, stated that Iran has historically used cyber operations to retaliate against perceived political provocations and has increasingly incorporated ransomware into its playbook. She added that Tehran’s tolerance of private cybercriminal actors provides strategic options when responding to geopolitical events.

SentinelOne assessed with high confidence that organizations in Israel, the United States, and allied nations are likely to face direct or indirect targeting, particularly across government, critical infrastructure, defense, financial services, academic, and media sectors.

Nozomi Networks further emphasized that Iranian threat actors have a history of blending espionage, disruption, and psychological operations to achieve strategic objectives. During periods of instability, such campaigns often intensify and extend beyond immediate conflict zones.

To mitigate risk amid the ongoing conflict, security experts recommend continuous monitoring aligned with elevated threat conditions, updating threat intelligence signatures, minimizing external exposure, conducting comprehensive reviews of connected assets, enforcing strict segmentation between information technology and operational technology networks, and isolating Internet-of-Things devices.

Adam Meyers, head of Counter Adversary Operations at CrowdStrike, noted that Iranian cyber actors have historically synchronized digital campaigns with broader strategic goals. He added that these adversaries have evolved beyond traditional network intrusions, expanding into cloud and identity-focused operations capable of operating rapidly across hybrid enterprise environments with greater scale and impact.

As tensions persist, analysts caution that cyberspace is likely to remain an active parallel arena of confrontation, requiring sustained vigilance from organizations across affected and allied regions.

Coruna Exploit Kit Targets iPhones With 23 Vulnerabilities Across Multiple iOS Versions

 

Security researchers have identified a powerful exploit framework targeting Apple iPhones running older versions of the iOS operating system. 

The toolkit, called Coruna and also known as CryptoWaters, includes multiple exploit chains capable of targeting devices running iOS versions from 13.0 through 17.2.1, according to researchers from Google’s Threat Intelligence Group. 

The framework contains five full exploit chains and a total of 23 vulnerabilities. Researchers said the exploit kit is not effective against the most recent versions of iOS. 

“The core technical value of this exploit kit lies in its comprehensive collection of iOS exploits, with the most advanced ones using non public exploitation techniques and mitigation bypasses,” Google researchers said. 

They added that the infrastructure supporting the kit is carefully designed and integrates several exploit components into a unified framework. 

“The framework surrounding the exploit kit is extremely well engineered. The exploit pieces are all connected naturally and combined together using common utility and exploitation frameworks.” 

According to researchers, the exploit kit has circulated among several types of threat actors since early 2025. 

The toolkit first appeared in a commercial surveillance operation before being used by a government backed attacker. 

By late 2025, it had reached a financially motivated threat group operating from China. Investigators say the movement of the exploit kit between groups suggests a growing underground market where previously developed zero day tools are resold and reused. 

Security firm iVerify said the spread of Coruna demonstrates how advanced surveillance tools can move beyond their original operators. 

“Coruna is one of the most significant examples we’ve observed of sophisticated spyware grade capabilities proliferating from commercial surveillance vendors into the hands of nation state actors and ultimately mass scale criminal operations,” the company said. 

Researchers first detected elements of the exploit chain in early 2025 when a surveillance customer used it within a JavaScript framework that had not been previously documented. 

The framework gathers information about the targeted device including the model and the iOS version running on it. Based on this fingerprinting data, the framework delivers a suitable WebKit remote code execution exploit. 

One of the vulnerabilities used in the chain was CVE-2024-23222, a type confusion flaw in Apple’s WebKit browser engine that was patched in January 2024. 

The framework appeared again in July 2025 when it was discovered on a domain used to deliver malicious content through hidden iframes on compromised websites in Ukraine. 

These sites included pages related to industrial tools, retail services and e commerce platforms. 

Researchers believe a suspected Russian espionage group tracked as UNC6353 was responsible for that activity. The exploit framework was delivered only to certain users based on their geographic location and device characteristics. 

A third wave of activity was identified in December 2025. In that campaign, attackers used a network of fake Chinese websites related to financial topics to distribute the exploit kit. 

Visitors were encouraged to access the sites from iPhones or iPads for a better browsing experience. Once accessed from an Apple device, the websites inserted a hidden iframe that triggered the Coruna exploit kit. This campaign has been linked to a threat cluster tracked as UNC6691. 

Further investigation uncovered a debug version of the exploit kit along with several exploit samples spanning five complete attack chains. 

Researchers said the kit includes vulnerabilities affecting several generations of iOS. These include exploits targeting iOS 13 through iOS 17.2.1 using vulnerabilities such as CVE-2020-27932, CVE-2022-48503, CVE-2023-32409 and CVE-2024-23222. 

Some of the vulnerabilities in the toolkit had previously been used as zero day exploits in earlier operations. 

“Photon and Gallium are exploiting vulnerabilities that were also used as zero days as part of Operation Triangulation,” Google researchers said. 

Once a device is compromised, attackers can deploy additional malware components. In the case of the UNC6691 campaign, the exploit chain delivered a stager called PlasmaLoader. 

The program is designed to decode QR codes embedded in images and retrieve additional modules from external servers. These modules can then collect sensitive data from cryptocurrency wallet applications including Base, Bitget Wallet, Exodus and MetaMask. 

Researchers said the malware contains hard coded command and control servers along with a fallback system that generates domain names automatically using a domain generation algorithm seeded with the word lazarus. 

A notable characteristic of the Coruna exploit kit is that it avoids running on devices using Apple’s Lockdown Mode or devices browsing in private mode. Security researchers recommend that iPhone users update their devices to the latest version of iOS and enable Lockdown Mode when additional protection is needed.

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