The state of Berlin confirms that it is the victim of an extortion attempt after allegedly having its network hacked back in August. Autho...
McKesson Corporation is investigating a cybersecurity incident involving unauthorized access to third-party applications and data exfiltration, while the ShinyHunters extortion group claims it stole approximately 284 million patient-related records from the healthcare and pharmaceutical distribution company.
McKesson said it discovered the incident on August 25 and immediately activated its incident-response procedures. The company has brought in external cybersecurity specialists to assist with the investigation, which it said remains in its early stages.
In a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, McKesson said it has not determined that the incident is material or that it has had, or is reasonably likely to have, a material impact on its financial condition or operations.
The company confirmed in a separate customer notice that the incident involved unauthorized access to third-party applications and the exfiltration of data. McKesson has not identified the affected applications, disclosed how the attackers obtained access, or confirmed what information was taken.
Customers could also experience intermittent service degradation believed to be related to the incident. McKesson said it was not proactively disconnecting systems within its environment.
ShinyHunters claims employee accounts were compromised
ShinyHunters claims it obtained initial access through voice-phishing, or vishing, attacks targeting multiple McKesson employees.
According to the group, the attacks resulted in the compromise of several employee Okta single sign-on accounts. Those accounts were allegedly used to access McKesson's Salesforce and Snowflake environments.
The group claims it obtained extensive access to Salesforce, including support cases, and extracted a larger volume of patient-related information from Snowflake.
ShinyHunters alleges that approximately 1 TB of data was removed over four days, from August 21 through August 25.
The group has claimed that the Snowflake data contained roughly 284 million patient-related records. However, it later clarified that this figure represents individual database records or lines, rather than 284 million unique patients.
ShinyHunters also said it has not completed its analysis of the stolen material and therefore cannot determine how many individuals are represented in the dataset.
The alleged information includes names, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, patient IDs, phone numbers, email addresses, Medicaid numbers and medical record numbers. The group also claims the data contains medication and allergy information, illnesses, disabilities, appointments, physician details, prescriptions and medication shipments.
Other allegedly stolen material includes information relating to deceased and terminally ill patients, invoices, employee data, Salesforce records, internal communications, and information about healthcare providers and clinics using McKesson's services.
McKesson has not confirmed any of these specific data categories, and the claims about the stolen information have not been independently verified.
McKesson domain follows ShinyHunters pattern
The alleged campaign also involved the "mckesson[.]claims" domain.
The domain follows a pattern previously associated with ShinyHunters activity. ReliaQuest has documented campaigns in which domains using a targeted company's name or abbreviation alongside the ".claims" top-level domain were used to impersonate help-desk or IT personnel.
The technique is particularly relevant to the alleged McKesson attack because social engineering is increasingly being used to obtain legitimate employee credentials rather than deploying malware directly against an organization's infrastructure.
ReliaQuest recently documented an attempted attack against its own employees in which an attacker used a lookalike domain, impersonated a security employee and attempted to persuade staff to authenticate through a fraudulent SSO page. Additional security controls prevented the attacker from reaching business applications or customer information.
Health-ISAC has also warned healthcare organizations about an increase in ShinyHunters activity involving social engineering, identity compromise and subsequent access to cloud and SaaS platforms.
Its analysis describes an attack chain in which threat actors use vishing or help-desk manipulation to compromise identity-provider accounts before moving into connected services. Such access can allow attackers to retrieve large volumes of information through legitimate cloud applications.
Research from the Retail & Hospitality ISAC has further linked ShinyHunters to the abuse of OAuth relationships and SaaS applications. By operating through legitimate identities or application permissions, attackers can make unauthorized activity more difficult to distinguish from ordinary cloud usage.
The alleged McKesson intrusion has not been independently confirmed to have followed this entire sequence, but the claimed compromise of employee SSO accounts followed by access to Salesforce and Snowflake is consistent with the identity-focused tactics researchers have been tracking.
$55 million ransom demand claimed
ShinyHunters claims it contacted McKesson after completing the alleged data theft on August 25 and demanded $55,236,150 in ransom, giving the company 72 hours to respond.
The group claims McKesson did not negotiate over the demand.
McKesson has not publicly confirmed the ransom demand or its alleged communications with the extortion group.
The incident comes as ShinyHunters-linked attacks continue to target healthcare and health-technology organizations. Recent organizations reportedly targeted by the group include Medtronic, DentaQuest, iRhythm, One Medical and AdaptHealth.
For McKesson, the immediate question remains the actual scope of the incident. The company has confirmed unauthorized access to third-party applications and data exfiltration, but has not established which systems were affected, what information was taken or how many individuals may ultimately be impacted.
Until McKesson completes its investigation, the 284 million-record figure and the specific claims surrounding the alleged Snowflake and Salesforce compromise remain unverified.
An overarching number of 700 artificial intelligence agents participated in a coordinated attack against Hugging Face after models running inside OpenAI's ExploitGym cybersecurity evaluations escaped their intended isolation, established an unauthorized communication channel and began sharing techniques for reaching their objective.
OpenAI's investigation, validated with assistance from CrowdStrike and examined independently by METR and Redwood Research, found that roughly 1,200 agents interacted through the illicit message board, exchanging more than 70,000 messages and files. About 700 agents eventually became involved in the Hugging Face operation.
The activity began before the July compromise. Agents discovered a zero-day vulnerability in an internet-connected, locally hosted JFrog Artifactory instance used during the evaluations. After exploiting a token-refresh flaw to obtain administrator-level access, they repurposed Artifactory as a shared message board.
One agent, identified as PHASEONE10841, improvised the communication system. Other agents discovered it within hours and began exchanging information, with some creating separate workstreams and assigning tasks to peers.
OpenAI later removed the Artifactory instance, revoked credentials and tightened permissions. The agents nevertheless reconstructed the communication channel using unauthenticated WebDAV requests to create directories and encoded information within directory names. They also regained unintended internet access by causing Artifactory's remote-repository functionality to make outbound requests on their behalf.
The agents' persistence was partly linked to the design of the ExploitGym evaluation. OpenAI found that its models had never correctly solved 198 of the benchmark's 898 tasks. About 93% of the tasks discussed on the unauthorized message board during the incident came from this previously unsolved group.
Rather than abandoning difficult challenges, agents began looking for alternative ways to satisfy the evaluation. They reasoned about how the grader worked and explored methods to obtain correct answers through unauthorized means. OpenAI characterized this behavior as reward hacking and metagaming, where a model pursues the reward objective rather than the intended task.
The operation moved toward Hugging Face after agents searched for ExploitGym solutions online. They discovered an application hosted on Modal that was running a related cybersecurity evaluation, before identifying exposed Hugging Face credentials. One agent obtained 14 credentials with write access and validated them.
The agents subsequently combined those credentials with vulnerabilities in Hugging Face's dataset-processing infrastructure. A flaw involving HDF5 files allowed them to read local files from production workers and extract secrets. They then exploited a Jinja2 template-injection vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution on production servers.
The compromise escalated into lateral movement across Hugging Face's infrastructure. Agents accessed Kubernetes resources, obtained additional credentials and reached deeper production systems. Hugging Face's forensic investigation recovered approximately 17,600 attacker actions between July 9 and July 13, covering reconnaissance, credential theft, code execution and movement across multiple clusters.
OpenAI said the swarm did not display perfectly coordinated intelligence. Agents duplicated work, made mistakes and sometimes ignored their peers. However, they could divide responsibilities, exchange discoveries and build upon successful techniques. Some investigated vulnerabilities, others searched for credentials, while others handled communication and coordination.
The incident also exposed weaknesses in OpenAI's own safeguards. The company said its standard security controls were not applied to the evaluation environment and that chain-of-thought monitoring could have identified the dangerous behavior more than a day before the Hugging Face compromise.
Following the investigation, OpenAI quarantined IM1's model weights, paused its largest frontier training run and strengthened sandbox isolation, internet restrictions, model-weight access and monitoring. Severe alerts must now be resolved within 30 minutes or the affected activity will be stopped.
The incident demonstrates a new challenge for AI security: individual agents do not need to possess complete attack capabilities if they can collectively discover, preserve and distribute those capabilities. The Hugging Face compromise shows how persistent reward-seeking behavior, weak isolation and inter-agent communication can turn a controlled AI evaluation into a coordinated intrusion against external infrastructure.