A cyber threat targeting critical infrastructure has been reported by the U.S. government utilizing AI-generated exploit scripts aimed at Si...
For commuters, a journey on public transport can now come with an unexpected soundtrack: someone else's smartphone.
A passenger watching videos without headphones, streaming music through a phone speaker or taking a call on loudspeaker turns what should be a private activity into something everyone nearby can hear. The habit has acquired names including “loudcasting” and “sodcasting”, and growing public frustration is prompting transport authorities, politicians and businesses to reconsider how phone use should fit into shared spaces.
Ofcom's 2022 research found that 46% of people had watched videos without headphones in public, while 45% had made video calls and 36% had listened to music without them. The behaviour was particularly common among teenagers. Among 13-to-17-year-olds, 83% considered watching videos without headphones acceptable, compared with 21% of people aged 55 and above. At the same time, eight in 10 people said loudcasting annoyed them.
Newer polling suggests the irritation has persisted. A 2025 YouGov survey found that 79% of Britons were bothered by people playing music or videos through phone speakers, including 41% who said they were bothered "a great deal".
The divide is therefore not simply about whether people use their phones loudly. It is also about what different generations consider acceptable behaviour in public.
Why do people loudcast?
Researchers studying technology and behaviour argue that loudcasting can serve purposes beyond simple disregard for others.
For younger people, smartphones are often social devices. Friends travelling together may watch content, listen to music or make video calls collectively. Playing something aloud can also become a form of self-expression, allowing users to display their musical or entertainment preferences to people around them.
This helps explain why the behaviour can appear perfectly ordinary to one passenger and deeply irritating to another.
The phenomenon itself is not entirely new. Previous technologies, from portable radios to boomboxes, generated similar arguments about noise in shared environments. Even early mobile-phone users could attract disapproving looks for speaking on their devices in public.
What has changed is the scale of what a smartphone can deliver. A single device can now stream video, music, social-media content and live conversations almost anywhere.
Faster mobile networks and increasingly accessible data have made consuming that content while travelling easier, reducing the practical barriers that once encouraged people to wait until they reached a private space.
Why does phone audio feel so intrusive?
The irritation may also have less to do with volume than with context.
Researchers who study soundscapes distinguish between noises people expect to hear in particular environments and sounds that appear out of place. Passengers generally expect the noise of engines, brakes and railway tracks on public transport, allowing them to become accustomed to those sounds.
A stranger's conversation or video is different. It contains information that the brain may automatically try to process, while unpredictable changes between speech, music and video clips repeatedly attract attention.
The result is that a relatively quiet smartphone can sometimes feel more disruptive than a louder but predictable background noise.
The Covid-19 lockdowns may have complicated those social expectations further. People spent prolonged periods consuming media and communicating from home, where they did not have to negotiate the same public-space etiquette. Some researchers argue that certain habits may have followed people back into shared environments.
Should loudcasting be punished?
The debate has increasingly moved from social etiquette into policy.
Transport for London has repeatedly encouraged passengers to use headphones, while its earlier research found loud mobile conversations and audible headphone music were already among the most commonly witnessed forms of inconsiderate behaviour.
The Liberal Democrats have called for tougher penalties, including fines of up to £1,000, while a 2025 YouGov poll found that 62% of Britons supported fines for playing music or videos aloud on public transport.
However, Britain already has legal mechanisms for dealing with disruptive noise. Railway byelaws prohibit behaviour that interferes with other passengers' comfort or convenience and restrict sound-producing equipment when it causes annoyance. Updated railway byelaws came into force in 2025.
The Bus Services Act 2025 has also expanded the powers available to local transport authorities to create and enforce passenger-behaviour byelaws.
Businesses are beginning to establish their own rules as well. In August 2026, Wetherspoons introduced a policy across its 792 UK pubs prohibiting customers from playing music or taking calls through phone loudspeakers, following complaints about disruptive noise.
A global problem with different social rules
The dispute is not uniquely British.
Countries differ considerably in how strongly public spaces are governed by expectations of quiet. Japan, for example, has strict social norms around phone use on public transport, while other more individualistic societies may tolerate louder personal behaviour.
Ofcom's research also found differences in loudcasting behaviour between ethnic groups, but negative reactions remained high across all groups, suggesting that the behaviour cannot be explained simply through ethnicity. Age, social context, cultural expectations and individual technology habits are likely to intersect.
The central question is therefore not whether smartphones will continue producing sound in public. They almost certainly will.
The question is whether society will continue treating that sound as a breach of etiquette, introduce stronger rules to control it, or gradually become so accustomed to it that another person's phone becomes just another part of the public soundscape.
OpenAI published the research on August 1, using the name Astra for its next major model family. The work spans several areas of advanced mathematics, including group theory, high-dimensional geometry, coding theory, quantum complexity, lattice cryptography and extremal combinatorics.
The research was released as a 249-page collection of manuscripts, accompanied by machine-checkable certificates for each of the 10 results. The problems were not routine mathematical exercises: several had remained open for decades and were regarded as significant questions within their respective fields.
Among the reported breakthroughs are a construction demonstrating the existence of non-sofic groups, a disproof of Connes's rigidity conjecture in the theory of von Neumann algebras, and an improved general upper bound for sphere-packing density in high dimensions. The latter improves upon a bound that had remained in place since 1978.
Three of the problems also came from the extensive collection of unsolved questions associated with mathematician Paul Erdős.
The announcement builds on a result reported in May, when the same model family was said to have disproved the Erdős unit distance conjecture, an 80-year-old problem in discrete geometry that had resisted sustained efforts since 1946. Fields Medalist Tim Gowers said he would have recommended the proof for publication in a leading mathematics journal without hesitation. A group of nine mathematicians, including Gowers and Noga Alon, subsequently published a companion paper presenting the proof in a more accessible form for human mathematicians.
Thomas Bloom, who maintains the ErdÅ‘s problem catalogue, described the August results as “big news” and said they were even more significant than the earlier unit distance result. OpenAI researcher Noam Brown offered a more cautious assessment: “Sadly, no Millennium Prize Problems (yet).”
AI research announcements have frequently faced questions over whether reported achievements can be independently evaluated. Benchmarks can be influenced by training data, demonstrations can be selectively presented, and external researchers may have limited ways to reproduce proprietary results.
Astra's mathematical work takes a different approach because the reported proofs were formalized using Lean, a proof assistant designed to verify mathematical arguments step by step. OpenAI also released the certificate files on GitHub under an open license, allowing researchers to download them and run the verification process themselves.
If an individual step does not logically follow from what came before it, the checker rejects the proof. The process therefore does not depend on trusting the organization that produced the result or on subjective interpretation of the argument.
Traditionally, a major mathematical proof goes through peer review, with human experts potentially spending months examining its reasoning before the wider community accepts the result. Machine verification can dramatically shorten the technical verification stage, allowing the validity of a formalized argument to be checked almost immediately.
That distinction makes the Astra announcement different from a conventional AI benchmark. A machine-verified proof can be independently checked even when the underlying model itself is not publicly available.
There are, however, important limitations to the claims.
The selection of the 10 problems was controlled by OpenAI, meaning the published results may not represent the full range of problems the model attempted. The reported $2,000 figure also relates to the successful results rather than the total cost of all experimentation, making it more accurately a measure of the cost of producing the published results than the complete cost of mathematical discovery.
OpenAI researchers also participated in preparing the papers and formalizing the arguments, while the company maintains that Astra generated the mathematical content. Because Astra itself is not available to external researchers, independent reproduction of the model's discovery process is not currently possible.
AI critic Gary Marcus described the release as impressive but substantially oversold. Some mathematicians have also suggested that further scrutiny could reveal that only a portion of the 10 problems represent genuinely unexpected breakthroughs, while others may prove to have been problems that were technically approachable but had not yet received the necessary attention.
Even with those qualifications, one feature remains significant: the results can be mechanically verified. Whether or not the problem selection was optimized for success, a result accompanied by a formal certificate is fundamentally different from an AI-generated claim that cannot be independently checked.
The larger implication may extend well beyond mathematical research.
AI systems can generate large quantities of content and technical output, but organizations often struggle to validate that output at the same scale. Human review may work for a handful of documents or analyses, but it becomes increasingly impractical as AI-generated output grows.
Some industries have already addressed this challenge by building automated verification into their workflows.
Chip design is a prominent example. Formal verification systems can mathematically establish whether a circuit meets its specifications, providing an automated layer of assurance that existed well before generative AI became widely used.
At Computex in May, Cadence said it had expanded its design agent toward full autonomy. The system reportedly runs hundreds of simulations through the company's Jasper formal verification engine, reducing a validation cycle that previously took around five weeks to less than a day. Synopsys offers a similar category of technology through VC Formal, which uses static analysis to verify designs rather than relying solely on individual test cases.
The economics are straightforward: when a machine-generated answer can be checked automatically and inexpensively, mistakes become far easier to detect and correct.
The same principle applies to areas such as cryptography, safety-critical software and hardware verification, where formal proof or automated checking is already part of the development process.
As AI systems become capable of generating increasingly sophisticated output, the ability to verify that output may become more important than the ability to generate it.
The central shift is therefore not simply that AI can produce difficult answers more cheaply. It is that the bottleneck is moving from generating an answer to proving that the answer is correct.
Phishing is no longer limited to technically skilled criminals building fraudulent campaigns from scratch. Through phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS), attackers can rent ready-made infrastructure and tools that allow them to impersonate trusted organisations, harvest credentials and target victims at scale.
Phishing attacks use social engineering to persuade victims to surrender sensitive information. The lure can arrive through an email, text message, phone call, QR code, fake website or malicious application, often impersonating a bank, employer, delivery company or another trusted entity. Stolen passwords, financial details and authentication information can then be used for account takeovers, fraud, identity theft or further attacks.
The emergence of PhaaS has made this process considerably easier.
PhaaS lowers the barrier for cybercriminals
Instead of developing an operation independently, criminals can purchase packages containing fake login pages, legitimate-looking email templates, phishing-site hosting, target lists and setup instructions. Some providers also offer technical assistance and campaign-management capabilities.
The model mirrors legitimate software-as-a-service businesses, except the product is designed to facilitate cybercrime. Microsoft describes the wider cybercrime-as-a-service economy as increasingly commercialised, with specialised services allowing criminals to outsource different parts of an attack.
This creates a multiplier effect. Criminals with limited technical expertise can deploy infrastructure developed by more experienced operators, allowing phishing campaigns to reach far more people than a small group of skilled attackers could target independently.
The threat is therefore not simply that individual phishing messages are becoming more convincing. It is that the number of people capable of launching campaigns is increasing.
PhaaS is evolving beyond password theft
Modern phishing services can also target authentication sessions rather than simply collecting usernames and passwords.
Adversary-in-the-middle attacks, for example, place attacker-controlled infrastructure between a victim and the legitimate authentication service. The victim may still complete the expected login and MFA process, while the attacker attempts to capture authentication information or session tokens that can later be used to access the account.
Microsoft has documented phishing campaigns in which attackers captured tokens generated during legitimate authentication, demonstrating why stolen credentials are not the only concern.
The scale of these operations was illustrated in March 2026 when authorities disrupted Tycoon 2FA, a PhaaS platform that facilitated phishing attacks against nearly 100,000 organisations. Europol said the service generated tens of millions of phishing emails each month and, by mid-2025, accounted for roughly 62% of phishing attempts blocked by Microsoft.
AI is making familiar warning signs less reliable
Artificial intelligence is adding another advantage for attackers by making social-engineering content faster and easier to produce.
Poor grammar and spelling mistakes were once common indicators of phishing. Generative AI can now produce polished messages in seconds, allowing criminals to create more convincing communications and adapt them to different targets. Microsoft has reported that cybercriminals are using AI to automate phishing and generate synthetic content.
Users therefore need to focus less on whether a message is grammatically correct and more on what it is asking them to do.
Unexpected requests for passwords, payment information, verification codes or urgent account actions should be independently verified. Links should be inspected before opening, while sensitive websites are safer to access directly rather than through unsolicited messages. Unexpected attachments should also be treated cautiously.
Defence must account for stolen credentials
Basic security practices remain important, but organisations should also assume that phishing attempts will occasionally succeed.
Unique passwords stored in a password manager can limit the damage caused by credential reuse, while multifactor authentication adds another layer of protection. However, phishing-resistant authentication such as passkeys and FIDO-based methods provides stronger protection against attacks designed to capture authentication information.
Microsoft says phishing-resistant MFA can stop more than 99% of attacks of this type even when attackers possess the password.
Organisations should also monitor unusual account activity, remove unnecessary accounts and minimise user privileges so that compromised credentials do not automatically provide extensive access.
PhaaS has therefore changed more than the technical mechanics of phishing. It has changed who can conduct these attacks and how easily they can be scaled. As criminal infrastructure becomes increasingly commercialised and AI reduces the effort required to produce convincing lures, defending against phishing can no longer depend solely on recognising suspicious messages.
The stronger strategy is to combine user awareness with authentication and access controls designed to limit what happens when a phishing attempt succeeds.