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Docker Hub Leaked Cloud Credentials Exploited Within 8 Seconds of Image Publication

  Attackers are extracting and exploiting exposed cloud credentials from publicly accessible Docker images within seconds of their publicati...

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Apache Roller RCE Vulnerability Actively Exploited in Attacks

 

Apache has issued an urgent warning for administrators running Apache Roller after confirming that attackers are actively exploiting a critical remote code execution flaw. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-129448, affects Roller versions 4.0.0 through 6.1.4 and allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable server. Apache has released Roller 6.1.6 to address the issue, and organizations that cannot update immediately are being urged to apply temporary mitigation steps. 

The flaw affects Apache Roller, an open-source, Java-based group-blogging server. Although it has a smaller user base than mainstream content-management systems, the issue is serious because it can give attackers full control over affected servers. The vulnerability involves the deserialization of untrusted data through the platform’s XML-RPC endpoint. 

Roller accepts vendor extension types and deserializes them before authenticating the requester, allowing an attacker to send malicious data that the server processes before checking whether the sender is authorized. This unsafe sequence can lead to arbitrary code execution, enabling attackers to run commands, install malware, steal data, or use the compromised server for further attacks. 

Apache has confirmed that CVE-2026-129448 is being exploited in the wild, although it has not disclosed details about the attackers, the scale of the campaign, or how many systems have already been compromised. The company also noted that the flaw is the same underlying issue as CVE-2026-82384, which had previously listed only Apache Roller 6.1.5 as affected. The confirmation of active exploitation raises the urgency considerably. Organizations running Roller should assume that internet-facing instances may be targeted and should prioritize patching over routine maintenance. 

The most effective response is to upgrade to Apache Roller 6.1.6 or later. The updated release disables the vulnerable extension types and rejects malicious XML-RPC requests after turning off the XML-RPC feature, closing the path attackers are using to exploit the flaw. Administrators who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by setting enabledForExtensions to false in WEB-INF/web.xml, removing the /roller-services/xmlrpc servlet mapping, and restarting Roller. These steps block the vulnerable functionality while a permanent update is prepared.

Apache specifically warns that disabling XML-RPC through the administration interface is not enough on older versions, because affected Roller builds deserialize incoming requests before checking whether the XML-RPC setting has been turned off. This means an administrator may believe the service is disabled while the server remains exploitable. 

The Roller flaw arrives amid a broader run of Apache security issues, including a recent critical vulnerability in the HTTP/2 module of Apache HTTP Server that could also allow unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution. Since November 2021, CISA has added 41 Apache flaws to its catalog of vulnerabilities exploited in the wild, and eight of those have also been abused by ransomware gangs. Organizations should inventory their systems, identify any Roller installations, and treat this vulnerability as an immediate security priority.

How Do Spam Callers Get Your Phone Number? The Hidden Sources Behind Unwanted Calls

Many smartphone users are experiencing unwanted calls from unknown numbers, ranging from promotional messages and automated marketing calls to fraudster scams designed to steal money and personal information. 

The majority of calls originate from databases containing telephone numbers collected from online and offline sources, although some are generated by random dialing systems. There is a growing market for the collection, organization, and sharing of personal information among businesses and third parties as consumer information becomes increasingly valuable. 

When users register on a website, complete online forms, install mobile applications, shop online, or enter promotional contests, you can reveal your contact information to several organizations. There is also the possibility that this information may circulate through third-party data-sharing arrangements or be made available following a data breach. 

As one of the lesser-known players in this ecosystem, data brokers are able to collect information from multiple sources and create consumer profiles that can then be sold to advertisers, marketing firms, and other interested parties. It is therefore possible to reach businesses and individuals through a number shared for ordinary services or registrations without any direct connection to the original source, for example. Cybercriminals can use such information to conduct targeted spam campaigns, impersonation scams, and financial fraud. 

How Phone Numbers Find Their Way Into Spam Lists

The majority of spam calls are not the result of stolen databases. Some are reached using automated dialing systems that generate and call random combinations, while others are acquired from publicly available records, such as business directories, property documents, and online listings. 

The commercial distribution of consumer information remains an important source of unwanted phone numbers, however. A number of methods are commonly employed to collect phone numbers, including registration forms, online purchases, loyalty programs, surveys, promotional offers, and account sign-ups. 

If a user provides their contact information, the company may share it with advertising partners or other third parties in accordance with the company's data sharing policy. There are instances where consent is buried in lengthy terms and conditions or presented in confusing opt-in settings, causing confusion about where the information will end up. As part of this process, data brokers play a key role. They combine information gathered from various sources including websites, public records, purchase histories, social media activity, and commercial databases to create consumer profiles. 

Marketing agencies, businesses, and other organizations can purchase or license the resulting lists. Despite the fact that most of this activity occurs within the advertising industry, poorly controlled data-sharing practices can also make contact information available to scammers. It is also possible to expose customer information through breaches of security and phishing attacks. 

When a security breach occurs, customer records may include telephone numbers, names, email addresses, and other personal information when an online service suffers a security incident. As an alternative to using legitimate websites, cybercriminals can also retrieve information through the use of fake job advertisements, fake login pages, and malicious applications. 

By using automated tools known as web scrapers, some phone numbers can also be harvested directly from websites and social media platforms. Once a number has been scanned and extracted in bulk, it can be added to calling lists or combined with other personal information to make fraudulent calls appear more convincing. 

Although it is important to distinguish between legitimate data collection and criminal activity, these two concepts can intersect when personal information is shared widely, inadequately protected, or exposed by security flaws. 

Ultimately, a number that was originally provided to register for a shopping account or service may become part of a database that is used to sell unsolicited information or perpetrate targeted scams. 

How to Keep a Phone Number Away From Spammers

A person can minimize their chances of receiving unwanted calls and targeted scams by limiting the exposure of their personal contact information, even though preventing every spam call may not be possible. The first step to preventing unwanted calls and targeted scams is to be selective when sharing personal contact information. It is important to be cautious when dealing with unfamiliar websites, suspicious registration pages, fraudulent job portals, and promotional offers requesting unnecessary personal information. 

When submitting information to a website, you should check the reputation and privacy policies to identify questionable services. Public exposure should also be considered. It is important to remove phone numbers from public social media profiles, online directories, and other platforms whenever possible. Mobile users should review application permissions on a regular basis, particularly access to contact information, location, photographs, and other personal information. 

A user can revoke unnecessary permissions through the privacy settings on Android and iOS devices. Reviewing account privacy options as well as avoiding unnecessary third party sign-ups can also help limit data sharing. For users already receiving frequent unwanted calls, built-in spam detection features and call-blocking services can assist in filtering out suspicious numbers. 

In order to avoid answering unknown calls immediately, you can place them into voicemail. It is important to avoid giving passwords, banking information, OTPs, or remote access to devices to suspicious callers, regardless of their claim to represent a trustworthy organization. A user should also check whether their personal information has been exposed in known data breaches. 

Services such as Have I Been Pwned can be used to identify exposed email addresses corresponding to compromised accounts, while searching online may reveal information that can be accessed by the public. The primary cause of spam calls is not always careless sharing. Random dialing, commercial data collection, and security breaches can expose numbers without the owner being aware of them. 

Spammers and cybercriminals may have a harder time converting ordinary contact information into opportunities for fraud if privacy practices are strengthened, app permissions are handled carefully, and unsolicited calls are made more aware.

Hackers Exploit Critical Puppet Vulnerability Allowing Remote Code Execution on Enterprise Servers

 

Cybercriminals are exploiting a critical security vulnerability in Perforce Puppet. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) database on 17th November and is urging organisations to apply patches. 

The vulnerability (CVE-2026-115731) has been assigned a severity rating of 9.4/10. It exists within the reporting function of Perforce Puppet and allows remote code execution. If an attacker has access to an agent certificate signed by the certificate authority (CA), they can create a malicious report and send it to the server using a PUT request. Processing this report can result in arbitrary code execution on the Puppet server with the privileges of the service account. 

If certificates are being automatically approved by the certificate authority with insufficient validation, an attacker can gain access to a valid certificate via network access. This means that they can exploit this vulnerability without authentication. This vulnerability affects multiple versions of Puppet Enterprise and Core. The affected versions are: Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.0, 2025.0.0, 2023.8.0 (before patching). Puppet Core 9.0.0 (before 9.1.3) and 8.x (before 8.22.2). 

The vulnerability was resolved by Perforce Software on 3rd November 2026. Patches have been included in Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1, 2023.8.13 and Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.2. However, OpenVox (an open source implementation of Puppet) is also affected. Developers of this product have released patches for the following versions: OpenVox Agent 9.3.0, 8.32.0, OpenVox Server 9.2.0, 8.18.0. The vulnerability was discovered by Alain Rödel of German cybersecurity firm Neodyme. 

A further vulnerability (CVE-2026-115732) was also discovered in Puppet and OpenVox, allowing certificate name authorisation to be bypassed. This vulnerability, which has a CVSS score of 9.0, was discovered using AI. The research was very specific and followed clear instructions. Attackers exploiting these vulnerabilities may be able to do more than just attack the Puppet server. If an attacker is able to perform remote code execution on a Puppet server, they may be able to get access to signing keys for the certificate authority. This would allow them to imitate other machines. 

As Puppet can be used to manage large numbers of systems across a corporate network, if an attacker is able to get access to a Puppet server, they may be able to deploy ransomware, collect large amounts of data and transfer it to other areas of the organisation. The effect of this vulnerability will depend on configuration and orchestrations protocols implemented on the server.  

Whilst CISA has confirmed this vulnerability is being exploited, little is known about how it is being exploited. However, one user on Reddit reported an exploit using this vulnerability on 4th November. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies are required to implement patches for this vulnerability by 1st December 2026. This is detailed in Binding Operational Directive 26-04, which prioritises patches based on risk.

Hackers Hijacked Optimizely’s CDN to Push Card Skimmers and iOS Exploits to CNN, BBC, and Zoom Visitors

 




Visitors to some of the world's most recognizable websites spent roughly 17 hours on Monday exposed to malicious code that could steal their payment cards, swap their cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and attempt to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in their iPhones, after attackers quietly modified JavaScript snippets served by marketing platform Optimizely.

The campaign, which researchers at Cynet and StepSecurity have named OPTIMJACK, touched at least 178 organizations including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock. Optimizely's own main site and login page were also affected.


How the Attack Got In

Optimizely Web Experimentation works by having client websites load a small JavaScript file, known as a snippet, from cdn.optimizely.com. Each snippet then executes what Optimizely calls "Project JavaScript," a customizable field that site operators can populate with their own code for A/B testing and personalization experiments. The attacker used a flaw in Optimizely's account signup flow, according to the company's incident notice, to gain write access to that field across unrelated customer projects and planted a loader inside it.

Because the modified snippets still came from Optimizely's own domain over a valid certificate, nothing about the delivery chain flagged the change. Organizations that cached and served the snippet from their own infrastructure were also affected, since the payload content came from the same compromised project fields.

The loader itself came in three forms: one that fetched the payload directly, one that encoded the payload domain in base64 to avoid string-matching detection, and a third that bundled a full copy of the payload inline as a contingency if the domain was blocked.


A Tight, Eventful Timeline

The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC on Monday in the BBC's snippet, loading a domain researchers identified as webshell[.]lol, an injector already linked to this actor. That same injector had previously appeared through scripts belonging to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media starting the prior week, and first showed up on Turkish websites as far back as September 17.

The card skimmer component went live at 13:43 UTC. Between 17:13 and 17:57, every visitor arriving from iOS 18.6 or earlier was served a hidden iframe pointed at known exploit kits. Mass cleanup began around 20:40. TalkTalk's snippet was the last to be cleared, at 21:52.


What the Payload Actually Did

The injected code carried four distinct capabilities. The crypto address swapper monitored page text, form fields, links, the clipboard API, and outgoing network requests. When it found a valid wallet address near payment-related words like "wallet," "deposit," or "send," it replaced that address with one controlled by the attacker. The swap was precise enough to pass checksum validation for each blockchain, meaning it only substituted addresses that the page or the user's application would have accepted as legitimate.

The card skimmer captured payment card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs submitted through a site's own form fields, then transmitted them to 1688360[.]cc. It could not read card data entered into cross-origin payment iframes, which covers hosted fields from providers like Stripe and Adyen.

After any crypto address swap, the payload also harvested the page's cookies and took a screenshot of the visible content, sending both to the attacker's server. HttpOnly cookies, which are inaccessible to JavaScript by design, were not captured.

The iOS component loaded a second-stage script that checked the device's software version and routed it to one of three exploit chains: Coruna targeting iOS 13 through 17.2.1, DarkSword targeting iOS 18.4 through 18.7, and a third chain for iOS 26 that researchers say currently only collected device fingerprints. Affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, a behavior that observant users might have noticed. No confirmed device compromises on physical iPhones have been reported.


The Money

By 19:25 UTC Monday, the attacker's cryptocurrency wallets had received roughly $7,040 across a window of about nine hours, according to Report URI. StepSecurity put the figure at approximately $6,600. Researchers noted that two of the wallet addresses were already in use before Monday's injections started, so it is not possible to attribute every incoming transfer directly to victims of this campaign.


What to Do Now

Security firms advise anyone who entered payment card details on Monday on a major commercial website to treat the card as potentially compromised. Crypto payments made that day should be compared against intended recipient addresses on a hardware wallet screen rather than from copied text, since clipboard contents may have been silently altered.

Site operators using Optimizely should inspect every Project JavaScript field for strings like "1688360", `atob(`, or scripts they do not recognize, and audit all users and API tokens with write access to their projects.

iPhone and iPad users on iOS 18.6 or earlier who visited any of the affected sites on Monday should update to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 immediately.

Optimizely has said the flaw has been patched and the injected code removed, though the company's incident notice did not specify how many projects were altered or confirm whether attacker access has been fully revoked.



Fandango Warns Customers of Potential Payment Card Data Exposure Following Security Incident

 

A security incident may have caused customers’ payment card information and email addresses to be compromised via Fandango’s online ticket purchasing system between 8 and 11 October 2026. 

Fandango has conducted an investigation into the incident with the help of third-party information security experts. It has found evidence that unauthorised access may have occurred to payment card information for customers purchasing tickets during this period. Fandango has identified customers who may have been affected by this incident and is informing them. Payment card numbers, CVV numbers, card expiry dates, ZIP codes and email addresses may have been compromised.

However, customer names, Social Security numbers, government issued ID information, and further account information were not compromised. Fandango has not given any details on how unauthorised access occurred. It has confirmed that the issue has been resolved and additional security measures have been implemented within the company. Fandango has stated that it is not aware of any fraudulent activity occurring with customer data related to this incident. 

However, it has recommended that impacted customers take precautions. The notice is being sent out to inform customers that they may have been impacted by this incident. Those customers who may have been impacted will be offered two years free identity protection from IDX. This includes credit monitoring, dark web monitoring, identity theft insurance, and managed identity recovery. This should allow customers to monitor for unusual activity and take steps to protect themselves if personal/financial data has been misused. 

Fandango has not published the total number of customers potentially impacted. However, information given to state regulators gives an indication of the scale. In Oregon, 913 residents have been identified as having been impacted. In Vermont, 18 residents have been identified. Fandango has also made a notice to the office of the Attorney General of California. 

If over 500 residents of California are impacted by a data breach, businesses must submit a copy of their notice to the state. Fandango, a brand under Versant Media Group, offers a large online ticket purchasing service within the US. The platform allows customers to purchase tickets to over 31,000 screens across the country. The company also runs Rotten Tomatoes, a popular review site for films and TV. 

This incident demonstrates the risk of online payment systems. Even if other account information is secure, unauthorised access to payment information may mean that customers face financial fraud.

GitDoor and GraphDoor Exploit GitHub and SharePoint for Cyberespionage

 

Government organizations across Asia and Africa are facing a cyberespionage campaign that turns familiar cloud platforms into channels for covert communication. Discovered by Kaspersky in early 2026 and named Operation ShadowCloud, the campaign deploys two previously undocumented backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. These tools abuse GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint, and the Ably messaging service to disguise malicious communications as ordinary enterprise activity. Their modular design allows attackers to download additional capabilities and execute code in memory, making the operation adaptable while complicating detection and analysis efforts. 

The investigated attack chain begins with MeshCentral Agent, a legitimate utility normally used for remote administration, including desktop access and file management. Researchers traced one intrusion to an unnamed Taiwanese organization, although how the agent initially reached the system remains unknown. Evidence suggests attackers may have reused an existing infection. The agent retrieves legitimate executable files, malicious loader libraries, and encrypted payloads. Through DLL sideloading, trusted applications load malicious code, which decrypts and launches the backdoors inside process memory rather than through conventional execution. 

GitDoor uses GitHub repositories to separate incoming instructions from outgoing results. Commands arrive through a public repository called Havo, while execution results are uploaded to a private repository named Trix. Repository creation dates indicate preparations began by late 2024. Supporting 26 commands, GitDoor enables file management, keylogging, proxy operation, and additional code execution. Downloadable modules expand its reach to screenshots, browser cookie theft, credential dumping, scheduled tasks, and Windows account management, giving operators extensive surveillance and control capabilities across compromised systems within targeted networks. 

GraphDoor instead communicates through Microsoft Graph and SharePoint. It authenticates through a malicious application, obtains an access token, and uses cloud storage to exchange information and retrieve instructions. After collecting system details, it downloads plugins that capture screenshots, list processes, and record keystrokes. Other components provide proxy services, including a SOCKS5 tunnel carried through Ably infrastructure. Like GitDoor, GraphDoor can execute additional code, allowing attackers to extend functionality without replacing the entire implant or relying exclusively on files stored locally on the infected machine. 

Attribution remains uncertain. Kaspersky identified overlaps with Bronze Sandcastle and tactical similarities involving FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle, also known as BlackTech. Some implants appeared in shared staging directories within one day of GitDoor deployment, but researchers stressed that this does not establish a direct connection. The broader significance lies in the abuse of trusted infrastructure: legitimate cloud destinations can carry hostile instructions. Operation ShadowCloud illustrates how attackers combine remote administration software, concealed payloads, and flexible plugins to sustain espionage while blending into routine organizational traffic.

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