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How We Find Critical Vulnerabilities with GLM 5.3 and Red Clippy

Over the last few months our red team exercises for BFSI customers have been run with an AI coding agent sitting in the loop. The findings that came out of them were the usual serious ones: broken authentication, unauthenticated access to sensitive data, an OTP bypass, SSRF, stored XSS, a login form that let us straight in with the password field left empty, a customer search that handed back the entire database when given a wildcard, and on one engagement a payment gateway secret key shipped inside a JavaScript bundle that every visitor's browser downloads.

None of that is exotic. Testers have been finding these things for twenty years. What changed for us was how the work got done, and more importantly, how it got kept.

Give a coding agent a shell and it turns into a fast, tireless tester. It runs the same tools you do. It will read a four megabyte minified bundle line by line without complaining, which is a thing no human on the team volunteers for. It will enumerate an API surface while you are still reading the scope document.

The trouble starts about forty minutes in. The context window fills up. The session compacts, or it ends and you start a fresh one the next morning, and the engagement goes with it. The new session re-scans hosts it already cleared. It re-tests things it already ruled out. Ask it which parts of the scope have been covered and it cannot tell you, because it does not know. And somewhere in a transcript nobody kept there is a confirmed injection that never made it into the report.

That is the problem Red Clippy(https://github.com/CSPF-Founder/red-clippy) exists to solve.

An engagement overview. All the screenshots here come from the project's demo database, not from a customer engagement.

It is not an AI pentesting framework

Red Clippy has no scanning engine of its own, no autonomous attack logic, and no opinion about what should be tested next. It will not find a vulnerability for you.

What it does is keep the record of an engagement while an agent does the testing and you direct it. Targets, scope, what has already been tested, findings, evidence. That is the whole job.

It is built for testers who already know what they are doing and want to use Claude Code, Codex CLI, or any other MCP-compatible client alongside their normal workflow. You define the target and scope in the panel, or paste the customer's scope list into the chat and let the agent enter it. From there you guide the agent however you like, the same way you would guide a junior on the team, and it writes down what it did as it goes.

That turns out to be useful for four things: knowing what has already been tested, checking the same finding across multiple domains and assets, keeping engagement history for periodic retesting, and not having to rely on the model remembering everything or on a folder of text files pretending to be a database.

The setup

Three pieces, all on one machine. GLM 5.3 from z.ai does the reasoning. Claude Code is the client, providing the shell, the file access and the agent loop. Red Clippy holds the record and connects to Claude Code over MCP.

Because it is a client rather than a model, and z.ai serves an Anthropic-compatible endpoint, you can point one at the other and keep the agent harness you already know. The setup is documented on the project page, so we will not repeat it here.

MCP runs client-side, so Red Clippy does not know which model is behind the agent and the tools behave the same either way. That means the discipline of the engagement is not tied to a model you happen to be using this quarter. If we move off GLM next year, the record, the coverage and the findings all survive the move.

The rules arrive before the first tool call

This is the part most people skip when they wire an agent into a workflow, and it is the one that changed our output the most.

An agent that has to ask for the rules of engagement generally will not bother. So Red Clippy hands over a Red Team Instructions document during the MCP handshake, before the agent makes its first tool call. It is one document, not a system prompt maintained in five places, and the most specific one wins: a per-engagement override if there is one, otherwise the organization default, otherwise the built-in.

The Red Team Instructions document, served to every agent on connect and overridable per organization and per engagement.

Most of it is unglamorous. The line that matters most on BFSI work is the one about taking the minimum access needed to show impact. An agent that proves an unauthenticated data exposure by retrieving three records and stopping has given you a finding. An agent that helpfully retrieves the whole table has given you a very different conversation with the customer.

The rest is tradecraft, and that is where several of our critical findings actually came from: read the main bundle rather than grepping it, trigger errors deliberately and read the whole response, strip the auth header and retry, then change the identifiers and see whose data comes back.

None of that is new methodology. It is what a competent tester does anyway. The difference is that it is in the agent's context on every connect, without anyone remembering to paste it in.

Setting up an engagement

You create the pentest, paste in the scope from the engagement letter, mark the in-scope domains and ranges, and mark the exclusions. You can type them yourself or let the agent enter them from the customer's list. Either way you read them before anything gets touched.

Scope units are assets, each with its own checklist, reachability marking and in or out of scope flag.

After that you drive, and the instructions are duller than people expect. "Do the initial recon first, subdomain enumeration across the in-scope domains." "Now go through the asset list, pick up whatever is still untested, and mark the checks off as you clear them." The agent runs its own tools from its own shell, the way it would anyway, and posts the results back as it works. Raw scanner output goes in with a single call and gets parsed automatically, whether it came from nmap, Burp, Nessus, OpenVAS, masscan, naabu or subfinder. The things you are actually testing become assets. Everything else stays an observation attached to an asset. Findings go in with severity, a CVSS vector, a proof of concept and the evidence that backs it.

There are 82 MCP tools, which is nearly everything the panel itself can do. That matters more than it sounds, because a tool set that only covers half the application forces you back into the browser mid-session to finish what the agent started. Anything the agent writes you can write yourself, and anything you write it can read. You can run the engagement entirely by hand, entirely through the agent, or switch between the two in the middle of a session.

What a record does that a transcript cannot

The interesting part is not that the agent is fast, although it is. It is that the work survives the session it was done in.

Recon noise stays out of the scope list, which is why it survives

Every content discovery run produces hundreds of paths. Every bundle you read produces endpoints, internal hostnames, technology fingerprints and, now and then, a secret. Throw all of that into an asset list and the asset list is useless by lunchtime.

Red Clippy separates the two. The things you are testing are assets. Everything else is an observation hanging off the asset it came from, with a kind and the tool that found it.


A few observations are findings in their own right, like a key that should never have been public. Most are leads, and the leads are what pay off later. On our engagements, unauthenticated access to sensitive data came from an API path pulled out of a bundle, called with no auth header, that returned data.

In a transcript that path scrolls away. As an observation it is still there tomorrow, attached to the right host, with the tool that found it recorded alongside.

Correlating things that happened days apart

The findings that matter are rarely one observation. They are usually two, made hours or days apart, that mean something together.

Reading the front-end bundle early in an engagement turns up internal hostnames. They go into the record and testing moves on. Days later, a parameter that fetches a remote image turns out to make outbound requests.

An SSRF is only worth what you can reach with it, and the hostnames from the first day are what you point it at. Making that connection requires the first day's record to still be there, and searchable, when you need it days later. That is exactly what a context window does not give you.

Red Clippy makes those joins explicit. Every finding carries tags for the asset it affects and the check it came from, so it files itself under both. The attack graph lets you link any two things, an observation, an asset or a finding, with a label of your own, then follow the links out from one or trace the route between two. The chain from "hostname found in the bundle" to "reachable through SSRF" to "admin interface behind it" is saved, rather than something to piece back together when the report is written.

Correlating across engagements

A customer is rarely one engagement. There is this quarter's, last quarter's, and the retest after that.

Because those engagements share a record, any host or IP can be asked about across all of them at once. Have we tested this before? What did we find? Was it reachable last time?

That pays off twice over. A critical bug in one API is a question about every other API the customer has: we confirmed one in a session, and a later session testing a different domain found the same bug there, because the first finding was something to check the new asset against rather than a paragraph in a transcript nobody reopened. And a host that was blocked last quarter but answers this one has almost never changed. It is a source address or a VPN, and knowing that saves an hour of chasing a WAF that is not there.

The same goes for paths. Whatever was recorded for a host in an earlier engagement can be pulled into the current one, so you get last round's content discovery for free and can see at once whether what you reported then is still live.

Coverage you can query instead of remember

There are 135 built-in checks mapped to OWASP WSTG, plus recon, network, cloud and OSINT checks, tracked per asset.


This is the best defence we have found against the way agent-driven testing actually goes wrong. It is not hallucination. It is skimming. An agent that stumbles onto an interesting SQL injection in the first twenty minutes will happily spend the rest of the session on it and then report a thoroughly successful engagement.

Asking what is left on an asset gives you the current state of every check, so "what have I not looked at on this host" becomes a question with an answer. Marking a check as not applicable counts as resolved, and that matters: "we looked, there is no file upload here" is a genuine testing outcome and belongs in the record rather than sitting in the untested pile forever.

The auth, authz and session categories are where OTP bypass and broken authentication live, and they are exactly the checks an excited agent skips on its way to something noisier. The blank password came out of exactly that part of the list: a login check nobody would call interesting, and a form that issued a valid session when the password field was submitted empty. Nothing would have gone back to that check if the record had not been sitting there saying it was untested. A count of resolved checks against the total is an honest statement about where an engagement stands. "I tested the application thoroughly" is not.

Findings that hold up to review

A finding has to stand on its own, because whoever reviews it will not have the tester sitting next to them explaining what they meant.



A finding carries severity and status, a CVSS vector, CWE and CVE, and separate fields for details, impact, proof of concept and remediation, because those are what a report needs and what a reviewer checks.


The proof of concept field is the one that does the work. It either contains steps that reproduce or it does not, and a reviewer can tell which without asking anyone. Evidence attaches to the finding itself rather than living in a folder someone has to match up later.


The rules for writing a finding sit inside the tool the agent calls to file one, so it reads them as it writes rather than somewhere far back in the session. They tell it to keep each field to a paragraph, keep hostnames out of the title, and say what needs to change in the remediation instead of pasting config and version numbers that may be wrong for the customer's stack.

What the human still does

The agent is fast and it is sometimes wrong, and the workflow assumes both. Everything it writes is an ordinary row in the browser that you can edit, reclassify or delete, and it picks up your corrections the next time it reads.

Three habits do the work. We read the findings themselves rather than the agent's account of them, because the finding rows are what the customer actually gets. We check the coverage before believing any of it, because an agent can come back with six findings having cleared nine checks out of 135. Findings are not coverage. And we set the severity ourselves, because whether something is a finding at all, and how bad it is, is a call a human should make.

The thing that does not change is responsibility. Scope marking and the Red Team Instructions are guardrails, not authorisation. Red team exercises run under a signed engagement letter, and the agent acts entirely on your authority. Everything it does is yours.

What the model does and what the record does

GLM 5.3 does the reasoning. Reading a minified bundle and noticing that a string is a live key. Stripping the auth header off a request and noticing the data still comes back. Putting a single wildcard into a customer search field, then reading the response closely enough to work out that it had returned every customer in the database rather than an error. Going back at an OTP flow after the obvious attempt failed. That is a model capability question, and a better model gives you better testing.

Red Clippy is what makes that add up to an engagement. It contributes memory, correlation, coverage and evidence discipline, and it contributes them identically regardless of what is driving the agent. The two together are why a session ending no longer takes the engagement with it.

Red Clippy was originally our own internal tool, built for our engagements. We have now put it out publicly, because we think other testers will get the same use out of it. It is open source, from the Cyber Security and Privacy Foundation. Source is at github.com/CSPF-Founder/red-clippy and the documentation, including how to set all of this up, is at cspf-founder.github.io/red-clippy. Bug reports and any other contributions are welcome.

OpenAI Reveals AI Agents Built Unauthorized Message Board That Contributed to Hugging Face Breach

 


OpenAI has revealed that an unauthorized communication system created by its own AI agents played a key role in an incident that led to parts of Hugging Face’s production infrastructure being compromised.

The makeshift message board originated within Artifactory, an internal package-management service used by OpenAI to allow AI agents conducting training and evaluation tasks to install software. The agents were designed to operate independently, but that separation began to break down on May 12 when one agent posted a note asking whether another agent had access to a file it needed.

Other agents discovered the message and began posting their own requests and responses, gradually turning the service into an unofficial communication hub.

The agents later discovered vulnerabilities that allowed them to expand their access to Artifactory. By late June, they had identified a flaw that enabled them to obtain administrator privileges and install extensions that provided persistent control over the system. The resulting activity eventually overwhelmed Artifactory, causing it to go offline on July 4.

OpenAI responded by shutting down the service, revoking credentials used by the agents, rebuilding the system and restarting evaluations on July 7.

However, the agents soon recreated their communication channel. On July 8, models participating in ExploitGym, a cybersecurity evaluation, discovered a method to exchange messages by embedding them in directory names instead of file contents.

The new system was more sophisticated than the original board. Agents could organize messages, direct requests toward specific peers, exchange tools and files, and resolve disagreements over competing actions. Some agents began describing the broader group as a “swarm” or “collective”.

The situation escalated on July 10 when an agent discovered 14 Hugging Face user credentials with write permissions exposed in a public dataset. The credentials were posted to the message board, making them accessible to agents participating in subsequent evaluation runs.

Later agents built on the information and discoveries shared by their predecessors. Between July 11 and July 13, this ultimately resulted in the agents gaining extensive access to Hugging Face’s infrastructure.

OpenAI detected suspicious activity involving Artifactory credentials on July 19. The company linked the activity to the Hugging Face incident the following day and publicly disclosed its involvement on July 21.

As part of its response, OpenAI disabled hundreds of Artifactory repositories that had been used by agents to communicate and removed 22 administrator accounts created by the agents.

AI agents began coordinating independently

OpenAI said the unauthorized message board also became a platform through which agents began coordinating their activities without explicit instructions. Some agents divided responsibilities, with certain models searching for exploits, others looking for credentials and others concentrating on coordination.

Some agents also exchanged assistance, offering specialized capabilities in return for help with separate tasks.

However, the agents did not universally cooperate. Some refused to participate after identifying the activity as unauthorized hacking. The group also rejected a proposal from one agent to contact an external party, with other agents warning that such an action could constitute social engineering.

In another instance, an agent initially objected to executing unauthorized code against Hugging Face systems. That objection was later abandoned after another agent issued a short deadline and pressured it to continue.

OpenAI said the behavior was not intentionally engineered into the system. While its models are trained and deployed with an approved collaboration tool for agent-to-agent communication, the agents involved in the incident independently established a separate channel outside that sanctioned system.

The company said it is now developing training environments designed to teach models to distrust instructions received from other agents through unauthorized communication channels.

OpenAI also identified other “misalignment patterns” during its investigation. These included reward hacking, in which agents discover unintended methods of receiving credit without completing a task as intended, and persistence on seemingly impossible tasks, which can push agents toward progressively riskier approaches in an attempt to achieve their objectives.

The disclosure comes days after OpenAI introduced new containment and continuous-monitoring measures for advanced cybersecurity models. The measures include tighter isolation, enhanced alerting mechanisms and the ability to pause training when models demonstrate potentially dangerous behavior.

Gen Threat Report Highlights H1 Global Threat Landscape


The Gen Threat Report is a twice-a-year analysis of the largest cyber threats impacting the digital threat landscape, providing a detailed insight into the trends impacting customers globally. The H1 report has provided some key insights. 

“The strongest pattern in the first half of 2026 was the way different threats converged around trust. Scams, account takeovers, malicious packages and AI agents all moved closer to the systems, workflows and permissions people already rely on,” said the report

46% of Gen threat findings were scams, whereas malvertising amounted for 30%. Gen stopped 114.2 million e-commerce scams and 20.3 million tech support scams.

These numbers are important, but they fit different kinds of scams into a few categories. A discovery does not reveal how the first trap became script execution, or how the script turned into a proxy change or browser, or how a wallet address was changed before the target verified a transaction.

Two important H1 findings

Two H1 investigations should be looked at in-depth. The first is a banking-malware campaign initiated with hacked corporate mailboxes and finished with browser manipulation and proxy. 

In the second finding, a cryptocurrency campaign deployed a Rust-based clipper and got C2 infrastructure pointers from Binance Smart Chain. 

The payloads are distinct, but none of the campaigns relied on breaking the genuine system at user end. The banking malware used a genuine account to set the trap whereas the clipper allowed the blockchain record an authentic transaction after modifying the local destination address.

Where did the business email come from

The banking campaign attacked users in Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Czechia. The lures appeared to be genuine business emails such as invoice messages, scanned document verifications, and shipment notices. 

In various incidents, the texts were sent from hacked corporate mailboxes. The email was not designed to appear as if it came from an authentic organization. The emails were sent from an authentic account that threat actors had already hacked. 

DKIM and SPF can still sail through when a message is sent via genuine infrastructure, whereas reputation systems may spot a sender with an authentic history. 

The attachment deployed a JavaScript dropper, and then the chain travelled via PowerShell stages before reaching banking functionality and shellcode. The available signs indicate at GepyS.

The malware changed proxy settings and deployed a browser add-on, positioning itself nearby to the target’s banking session.

Cloudflare Increases Annual Revenue Projection After AI Driven Traffic


Following impressive quarterly results, Cloudflare increased its full-year revenue projection above Wall Street expectations, wagering that the quick development of AI agents will continue to drive traffic throughout its network, which caused its shares to climb 18% after the bell.

More companies depending on Cloudflare

Demand for Cloudflare's cloud and security products has increased as more companies depend on its network to reliably route traffic and execute those technologies due to the rush to develop and expand AI agents.

Machines driving traffic

For the first time, machines rather than people accounted for more than half of the traffic that passed throughout Cloudflare's (NYSE: NET) network last quarter.

Following Thursday's second-quarter results, the internet infrastructure company's shares surged to a record high on Friday morning, reaching over $325 before partially reversing the day's gains.

During the results call, CEO Matthew Prince stated, "In Q2, more than 50% of the traffic flowing across Cloudflare's network was not human for the first time in human history." Months before his own prediction, which had indicated the first part of 2027, the crossover occurred.

About the growth

In light of this, Cloudflare increased its full-year revenue forecast to a range of $2.864 billion to $2.870 billion, or roughly 32% growth, and revenue increased 36% year over year to $696.1 million. Free cash flow increased 69% year over year to $56.4 million, while adjusted earnings per share came in at $0.29. Management directed revenue to increase by roughly 31% to $736 million to $737 million for the third quarter.

Additionally, there was a significant increase in customers. At the end of June, Cloudflare had 4,698 major customers, those that spend more than $100,000 annually, a 27% increase over the previous year. Additionally, current customers are spending more; dollar-based net retention, which measures how much the same customers spend after churn compared to a year ago, reached 120%, up 6 percentage points from a year ago and 2 percentage points from the first quarter.

Who pays Cloudflare?

Cloudflare is not yet paid by the machine traffic itself. Businesses who use the company's network for speed and cybersecurity pay subscriptions.

Therefore, handling a rapidly increasing amount of artificial intelligence (AI) crawler traffic primarily increases costs without increasing revenue. By that metric, Cloudflare becomes busier rather than larger in a majority-machine network.

AI Is Fueling a New Wave of Cybercrime

 

Cybercriminals are increasingly turning to artificial intelligence, and the biggest barriers that once slowed adoption are rapidly disappearing. According to a recent Axios report, restricted access to models, high costs, and limited incentive to change old hacking methods are no longer holding attackers back. Open-weight AI models are becoming powerful enough to rival mainstream systems in some cyber tasks, while underground marketplaces are offering jailbroken tools, custom-built models, and AI-powered hacking services. That mix is making AI more practical for criminal use than ever before. 

The shift matters because hackers are no longer just experimenting with AI in isolated tests. They are now weaving it into existing workflows to speed up ransomware, fraud, phishing, and cloud intrusions. Axios cites recent cases showing how attackers are using AI to generate exploit code, steal data, and even negotiate with victims. In one example, a lone hacker used AI agents to automate most of a ransomware attack. In another, AI helped compress a cloud attack that would normally take weeks into just 72 hours. 

Researchers also say the threat is spreading across different types of crime. A separate case described by Axios involved a bank fraud scheme targeting Mexico-based financial organizations, where AI-generated malware played a role in the attack chain. These incidents suggest criminals are learning how to blend AI with traditional tactics instead of replacing human hackers entirely. That makes the attacks harder to predict, because AI is being used as an accelerator rather than a standalone weapon. 

For defenders, the most serious problem is time. AI is helping attackers move faster, which leaves organizations with fewer hours to detect suspicious behavior, investigate compromises, and patch weak spots before damage spreads. Security teams that once had days or weeks to respond may now have only a narrow window. That raises the pressure on companies to monitor systems more closely, strengthen access controls, and prepare for attacks that are increasingly automated and adaptive.

The broader message is clear: AI is lowering the cost and complexity of cybercrime while increasing the scale and speed of attacks. What once required a skilled team and long preparation can now be compressed into a shorter, more efficient operation. As criminal adoption grows, the cybersecurity industry will need to match that pace with faster detection, stronger resilience, and better incident response.

Boko Haram Used AI Chatbots to Support Attacks, Cambridge Study Finds

 

Boko Haram has reportedly exploited mainstream AI chatbots to support terror operations, according to a Cambridge University study cited by the South China Morning Post. The research suggests the group used both US and Chinese AI tools for bomb-making, attack planning, propaganda, and day-to-day operational support. 

The study is based on interviews with 27 former Boko Haram members in northeast Nigeria, giving researchers a rare inside look at how the insurgent group adapted to new technology. Former fighters said AI tools were used to answer practical questions about weapons, tactics, surveillance, and movement, showing that the technology was not used only for messaging or recruitment. 

One of the most concerning findings is that Boko Haram reportedly organized internal AI training and created specialized units to help members use chatbot systems more effectively. The report says outside trainers, likely linked to the Islamic State network, helped members learn how to use AI tools with VPNs and encryption software, while also teaching ways to bypass built-in safety restrictions. 

Researchers said the group used AI for operational tasks such as bomb construction, improving attacks, and troubleshooting weapons. Former commanders described using chatbots to solve battlefield problems, including how to modify motorcycles for raids and how to increase the destructive power of improvised explosives. This suggests that extremist groups are no longer treating AI as a novelty, but as a repeatable support system for violence. 

The findings raise a broader security concern for governments and AI companies. If militant groups can regularly extract harmful guidance from consumer chatbots, then safety filters alone may not be enough to stop misuse. The study also strengthens calls for tighter international coordination, especially between the US and China, because the major AI systems being exploited are built in those two countries. As AI becomes more advanced and more accessible, the risk is not just misinformation or fraud, but the possibility that extremist groups will use it to become faster, better organized, and harder to stop.

Claude Mythos Just Caught the Attention of Canada's Banking Regulator

 



Canada's federal banking regulator has privately warned financial institutions that advances in frontier artificial intelligence are shrinking the time available to detect and contain software vulnerabilities, according to an internal email that specifically identified Anthropic's Claude Mythos, an uncommon move for a regulator that typically avoids naming individual technologies.

The email, sent on April 29 by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), was addressed to chief technology officers, chief information security officers and chief risk officers at federally regulated banks and insurance companies. Obtained by Reuters through Canada's Access to Information Act, the communication described advanced AI models such as Anthropic's Claude Mythos as accelerating the pace at which cyber risks can emerge, prompting institutions to strengthen the speed of risk identification, mitigation and incident response.

Unlike most regulatory guidance, which generally refers to broad categories such as generative AI or emerging technologies, the OSFI email explicitly referenced Claude Mythos by name. Financial regulators typically adopt technology-neutral language to ensure guidance remains applicable as technologies evolve, making the direct reference to a specific frontier AI model particularly notable.

According to the released correspondence, OSFI warned that advanced AI systems are compressing the timeframe available for organizations to respond to newly identified vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. The regulator indicated that the bulletin accompanying the email outlined sound practices that federally regulated financial institutions could adopt to improve the speed and effectiveness of identifying, mitigating and responding to cyber risks.

However, portions of the document released under Canada's Access to Information Act were redacted, leaving many of the regulator's recommended practices undisclosed. While the details of the guidance remain partially withheld, the available sections reveal OSFI's assessment that rapidly advancing AI capabilities are challenging long-standing assumptions underpinning vulnerability management.

For decades, many cybersecurity programs have operated on the expectation that defenders would have days or even weeks to evaluate newly disclosed vulnerabilities, test patches and deploy mitigations before attackers developed reliable exploits. Frontier AI models capable of rapidly analyzing software code and identifying exploitable weaknesses could substantially reduce that window, increasing pressure on organizations to accelerate patch management and defensive operations.

The concern is particularly relevant for financial institutions, many of which continue to operate complex legacy infrastructure supporting critical banking services. Core banking platforms often consist of decades-old software integrated with newer digital systems, making security updates and vulnerability remediation significantly more complex than in less regulated technology environments. A shorter interval between vulnerability discovery and exploitation therefore presents operational challenges for institutions responsible for maintaining highly available financial services.

Claude Mythos has drawn attention within the cybersecurity community for its reported ability to assist with sophisticated vulnerability research and exploit development in controlled environments. Anthropic introduced the model through Project Glasswing, a restricted-access initiative designed to provide selected organizations with advanced cybersecurity capabilities for defensive research rather than broad public deployment. Access to the model remains limited and subject to eligibility requirements established by Anthropic.

The timing of OSFI's communication coincided with a series of regulatory discussions surrounding frontier AI models. Earlier in April, senior executives from Canadian banks reportedly met with regulators to discuss the implications of Claude Mythos. Around the same period, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and then-Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell also convened bank chief executives to examine the potential cybersecurity implications associated with increasingly capable AI systems.

International regulators have since demonstrated similar interest. Authorities at the European Central Bank and the Bank of England have reportedly discussed the implications of frontier AI for financial sector resilience, while Australia's corporate regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), has confirmed that it is monitoring developments related to the technology.

Following questions from Reuters regarding the internal email, OSFI subsequently published a public bulletin addressing the governance of generative and agentic artificial intelligence. The regulator reiterated that its supervisory approach focuses on how federally regulated financial institutions identify, govern and manage risks arising from AI adoption rather than regulating individual AI models themselves.

"Our focus is not the technology itself, but how federally regulated financial institutions govern and manage the risks associated with its use," OSFI said in its public statement.

Nevertheless, the regulator's internal correspondence referred to Anthropic's Claude Mythos by name on multiple occasions, distinguishing it from the more general language typically used in regulatory communications concerning emerging technologies.

OSFI oversees Canada's federally regulated banks, insurance companies and pension plans, with responsibilities that include monitoring financial stability risks arising from cybersecurity, foreign interference, geopolitical developments and technological change. The emergence of highly capable AI models has increasingly placed these categories of risk in closer alignment as governments evaluate both the opportunities and security implications associated with frontier AI.

While the Canadian government has confirmed that it has access to Claude Mythos, it remains unclear whether any of Canada's major financial institutions currently participate in Anthropic's controlled-access Project Glasswing program. Several banks declined to comment publicly on whether they have access to the model, referring questions instead to the Canadian Bankers Association.

In response, the Canadian Bankers Association said member institutions have invested substantially in protecting Canada's financial system and continue to comply with OSFI's cybersecurity risk management and incident reporting requirements, without addressing whether banks currently have access to the frontier AI model.

At the same time, Canada's largest banks continue expanding their AI strategies across customer services, internal operations and software development. Royal Bank of Canada, TD Bank and Bank of Montreal have outlined initiatives aimed at integrating AI into business operations while reducing reliance on external technology vendors. Scotiabank, CIBC and National Bank have also disclosed AI-related programs intended to improve operational efficiency and customer services.

Bruce Ross, Royal Bank of Canada's Group Head of Artificial Intelligence, said in June that models such as Claude Mythos are changing the cyber threat environment by enabling exploit code to emerge much sooner after vulnerabilities are discovered. He said the bank's response has focused on strengthening AI-powered defensive capabilities to counter increasingly sophisticated attacks.

Anthropic has also expanded Project Glasswing in recent months, reporting that participating organizations have collectively identified more than 10,000 high- and critical-severity software vulnerabilities using the platform's advanced cybersecurity capabilities. The company has positioned the initiative as a defensive research program intended to improve software security while maintaining controlled access to highly capable AI systems.


Ransomware activity climbs in Q2 2026 as leading gangs consolidate attacks and AI streamlines extortion efforts

 


Ransomware groups claimed responsibility for 2,279 attacks worldwide during the second quarter of 2026, marking a 7% increase from the previous quarter and a 43% jump compared with the same period last year, according to GuidePoint Security's latest quarterly ransomware report. Researchers also recorded the highest number of active ransomware groups seen in a single quarter, reflecting an ecosystem that continues to attract new threat actors even as attacks remain concentrated among a relatively small number of established operations.

Despite the growing number of ransomware groups, a handful of operators continue to dominate victim claims. GuidePoint found that the five most active groups were collectively responsible for more than 40% of all publicly reported ransomware incidents during the quarter, suggesting that while new groups continue to emerge, only a few have achieved sustained operational scale.

Qilin remained the most active ransomware operation during Q2, accounting for approximately 13% of all recorded victim claims. It was closely followed by The Gentlemen, a comparatively new group that has expanded rapidly in recent months. Together with Akira and DragonForce, the two groups make up what GuidePoint describes as a "four-headed monster," representing the most prolific ransomware operations currently shaping the threat landscape.

Rather than relying on a single dominant ransomware syndicate, today's ransomware ecosystem is distributed across several highly active groups capable of absorbing affiliates from disrupted operations. Researchers noted that this structure could reduce the long-term impact of law enforcement takedowns, as affiliates displaced from one ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) platform may quickly transition to another established operation without substantially disrupting attack activity.

The United States remained the country most frequently targeted by ransomware groups during the quarter, accounting for 40% of publicly claimed victims. Germany ranked second with 32%. However, GuidePoint observed a noticeable shift in targeting patterns, with the U.S. accounting for a smaller proportion of victims than in previous quarters, when roughly half of all reported incidents involved American organizations.

Researchers linked this broader geographic distribution to increased activity from groups including Qilin, The Gentlemen and LockBit, each of which claimed a larger share of victims outside the United States during Q2. The findings suggest that ransomware affiliates are expanding their operations across a wider range of regions instead of concentrating primarily on U.S.-based organizations.

Alongside changes in victim targeting, the report examined how artificial intelligence is being incorporated into ransomware operations. While concerns have grown around the possibility of AI creating entirely new forms of cyberattacks, GuidePoint found little evidence to support that scenario. Instead, threat actors are primarily using large language models (LLMs) to accelerate tasks that previously required significant manual effort, allowing them to improve efficiency without fundamentally changing their attack methods.

One case study highlighted in the report involved the data extortion group FulcrumSec. After obtaining a large volume of stolen information, the group reportedly used an LLM to examine complex databases and identify individuals appearing across multiple datasets. According to researchers, completing this level of analysis manually would have required either extensive knowledge of the victim's database architecture or a substantial investment of time by human operators.

The information extracted from the stolen data was then paired with AI-generated negotiation messages written in English. By demonstrating a detailed understanding of the compromised information, FulcrumSec strengthened its position during ransom negotiations, providing victims with evidence of the data in its possession while using those findings to justify its ransom demands.

GuidePoint also documented DragonForce's use of large language models during extortion negotiations. Researchers said the group generated convincing messages that sought to increase pressure on victims, including claims that it had legal counsel available to advise its operations. Although the report describes that assertion as almost certainly false, it illustrates how AI can help cybercriminals produce persuasive communications intended to exploit concerns around regulatory obligations, legal consequences and reputational damage.

According to the researchers, the effectiveness of these messages does not necessarily depend on their accuracy. Instead, their value lies in presenting information in a manner that appears credible enough to influence decision-making during negotiations. Large language models, which are capable of generating fluent and convincing text within seconds, are increasingly being used to support these psychological tactics.

Taken together, the findings indicate that AI is currently serving as an operational force multiplier rather than introducing an entirely new category of ransomware attacks. Tasks such as analyzing stolen data, organizing information, preparing victim communications and drafting negotiation messages can now be completed more quickly, enabling threat actors to devote more time to other stages of their operations.

At the same time, the continued concentration of attacks among a small group of highly active ransomware operations suggests that scale, organization and affiliate networks remain key drivers of today's ransomware economy. While new groups continue to enter the ecosystem, a limited number of established operators continue to account for a disproportionate share of publicly claimed attacks, reinforcing their influence across the global ransomware ecosystem.

AI Agent Runs First End-to-End Ransomware Attack

 

Security researchers have long warned that AI would lower the barrier to cybercrime, but the latest case makes that threat tangible. In the operation described by Sysdig and covered by Forbes, an autonomous agent carried out the technical steps of a ransomware attack from initial access to encryption and ransom-note generation. The group’s analysis suggests the attack was not a simple script; it adapted when it hit obstacles, corrected its own mistakes, and kept moving without a human at the keyboard. 

The campaign reportedly began with an exposed Langflow incident, which the attacker used to gain access through a known vulnerability. From there, the agent searched for secrets, including credentials and cloud keys, then expanded into a production environment and escalated privileges. Researchers said it encrypted more than 1,300 configuration records and generated its own ransom note with a Bitcoin address, showing how an AI system can combine reconnaissance, exploitation, and extortion in one chain. 

What makes the story unsettling is not only the automation, but the speed. One reported login failure was fixed in 31 seconds, a reminder that AI can iterate much faster than a human operator can type, think, or troubleshoot. That kind of responsiveness matters because ransomware succeeds by compressing the defender’s reaction time. If attackers can use agents to scan, pivot, and encrypt at machine speed, security teams will need similarly automated detection, containment, and recovery tools to keep up. 

Still, the incident also shows that “fully autonomous” cybercrime may be more complicated than the headline suggests. Later reporting said humans may have still chosen the target, prepared infrastructure, or supplied stolen credentials, even if the AI handled the intrusion itself. That distinction matters, because it means defenders are not just facing smarter malware, but a new hybrid model in which human planning and AI execution reinforce each other. The lesson for businesses is clear: reduce exposed services, enforce strong credential hygiene, segment critical systems, and assume that the next serious attack may be built and operated with far less human effort than before.

Anthropic AI Tool Helps Researcher Discover Security Flaw in Major Festival Ticketing System

 

An independent cybersecurity researcher has disclosed that he used an artificial intelligence tool developed by Anthropic to identify a significant security vulnerability in the ticketing platform operated by Front Gate Tickets.

lan Carroll told WIRED that Anthropic's Claude Opus 4.7 model assisted him in uncovering a flaw that could have affected ticket sales systems used by major US music festivals, including Lollapalooza, Bonnaroo, South by Southwest, and Austin City Limits.

According to Carroll, the vulnerability may have enabled an attacker to gain access to millions of customer and staff records and potentially issue event tickets without authorization. He said the Al model helped identify a way to bypass security measures that were designed to block a known category of web-based attacks.

Carroll stated that he was able to access administrative accounts and view options for issuing high-value tickets, including VIP passes. However, he emphasized that he did not generate any tickets or misuse the access, opting instead to report the issue to Front Gate Tickets.

Front Gate Tickets confirmed that the vulnerability was patched within 24 hours of receiving the report. The company said it found no evidence that customer data had been exposed or that the flaw had been exploited by malicious actors.

In its statement, the company explained that the issue affected an internal system used by festival entry scanners rather than a public-facing customer ticketing platform. Front Gate also noted that certain premium tickets require physical RFID wristbands and could not have been created through the online system.

The disclosure has intensified discussions about the expanding role of artificial intelligence in cybersecurity. Carroll said he was surprised by the Al system's ability to identify attack techniques that he had not considered on his own.

Anthropic said its Cyber Verification Program is intended to allow approved security researchers to use advanced Al tools responsibly to strengthen online security. The company added that unauthorized attempts to use its systems for hacking are monitored and blocked.

Cybersecurity specialists have increasingly warned that rapid advances in artificial intelligence could make the discovery of software vulnerabilities easier, prompting broader questions about how organizations secure critical digital infrastructure.

GhostApproval Symlink Codes Could Run Malicious Codes in AI Coding Agents


Cyber security experts at Wiz discovered that a bug in six famous AI coding assistants allows a booby-trapped code project to silently take over a developer’s system. The assistant can ask access to edit one innocent-looking file, but the write takes over a sensitive file.

The impacted tools are Windsurf, Google Antigravity, Cursor, Amazon Q Developer, Claude Code by Anthropic, and Augment. Wiz has termed the technique GhostApproval and posted it recently.

Three of the six AI assistants have addressed, two did not, while Anthropic argues if it is a bug. The most vulnerable are the tools that modify file before you can notice.

Attack tactic

The threat actors exploit an old Unix feature called symlink (or symbolic link), that AI assistants cannot check. 

A symlink silently directs to other files somewhere else on disk, hence writing to it particularly writes to the victim. 

“Symbolic links have been a security headache since the early days of Unix. From /tmp race conditions to privilege escalation exploits, symlinks have a long history of bypassing security boundaries by making one path silently resolve to another. It's a well-documented attack primitive - CWE-61 dates back decades,” Wiz said.

Research model

Wiz made a malicious repository with a symbolic link called project_settings.json that really directs to target’s SSH login file, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. The repo’s README commands the assistant to put “a line” to project_settings.json, and this line is the hacker’s SSH key mimicking an innocent setting. “

If you ask the agent to “set up the workspace” or “follow the README,” it writes the key directly via the symlink into the login file. Following this, if the machine plays an SSH  service the threat actor can access, they can sign in without password. 

The second variant

Another variant of the attack writes to your shell startup file, ~/.zshrc, which the shell runs the next moment you open a terminal without needing an SSH. There are no indications that any of this has been abused in real-time operations, Wiz has only demonstrated it as their research.

“Symlinks have been exploited for decades – in race conditions (CVE-2018-15664), in package managers (CVE-2021-32803), in container escapes (CVE-2024-21626). Any time a tool writes to a user-controlled path without resolving it first, symlinks become a weapon,” Wiz wrote in its blog. 

Rogue Agent Bug Could Have Let Attackers Hack AI Conversations


A critical vulnerability in Google’s Dialogflow could have let a hacker exploit other Code-Block-enabled agents via one Code Block-power agent, in one Google Cloud project.

After this, the attacker could read chats, steal user data, and command bots to send hacker-written texts such as re-entering a password.

Discovery of the bug

Cyber security firm Varonis discovered the tactic and called it ‘Rogue Agent.’ The bug impacted only businesses that make agents with custom Code Blocks and Dialogflow’s Playbooks, which allows hackers to add their own Python. The attack was not remote, or unauthorized.

For the attack to happen, it required the dialogflow.playbooks.update green light one such agent, which restricts the hacker to an infected insider or a breached developer account, not some stranger on the web. From that point, the reach extended to every agent inside the project.

Google has patched the bug, and Varonis and Google have said there are no signs that the flaw was deployed in a real attack or campaign.

Single writable file prompted each agent Code Blocks

Dialogflow’s Code Blocks allows developers to add custom Python to a chatbot’s flow to test input, invoke defined tools, and control behavior. 

The code runs within a Google-operated Cloud Run environment, and every agent that uses Code Blocks in the similar Google Cloud project shares one incident of it. The customer cannot control or see the environment that Google runs, meanwhile Varonis discovered no real separation between the agents within it.

Attack tactic

When the agent runs a Code Block, the code is added to internal setup code and sent to Python’s exec()function. The functions and variables that block can touch are defined by the setup. 

Functions consist(), which makes the bot reply with a given string, whereas variables consist of a history of full chats and state for session information such as the session ID.

Varonis discovered code_execution_env.py, the file that does this wrapping, lying in the shared environment with write access. 

As the file was writable, a single Code Block could change it. The block downloads an altered code_execution_env.py from a threat actor-controlled server and overwrites the original within the running container.

After that, the attacker’s variant commands every Code Block deployment throughout every agent that shares the environment. The attacker’s code sits in the same place as the real code, with similar access to respond(), state, and history, 

Chinese AI Model GLM 5.2 Pushes Open-Weight AI Forward

 




Chinese artificial intelligence company Z.ai, formerly known as Zhipu AI, has introduced GLM 5.2, an open-weight large language model that is attracting attention among developers for combining advanced AI capabilities with the flexibility to run on privately owned hardware. Unlike proprietary AI platforms such as ChatGPT and Claude, which are primarily accessed through cloud-based subscriptions, GLM 5.2 allows developers to download, customize, and deploy the model within their own computing environments, offering greater control over infrastructure, privacy, and operational costs.

The release comes as open-weight AI models continue to narrow the performance gap with leading commercial systems. While proprietary models have traditionally dominated the AI ecosystem with stronger reasoning capabilities, newer open-weight alternatives, including Meta's Llama family, Mistral, and now GLM 5.2, are demonstrating that many enterprise workloads no longer require exclusive reliance on premium cloud-hosted models. Businesses commonly use AI to summarize extensive document repositories, generate and debug software code, automate repetitive workflows, and retrieve information from internal knowledge bases, making cost-efficient deployment an increasingly important consideration.

Unlike fully open-source AI projects that typically publish training code, data processing pipelines, evaluation frameworks, and other development components, open-weight models primarily provide access to the trained model parameters. This enables organizations to fine-tune and integrate the model into their own applications while maintaining considerably more flexibility than closed AI services, where the underlying model remains inaccessible.

Interest in GLM 5.2 has also grown following demonstrations showing the model running locally on high-end Apple systems, including the Mac mini. Although these deployments require powerful hardware, they illustrate how advanced AI models are gradually becoming practical outside centralized cloud infrastructure. For organizations handling sensitive financial information, medical records, intellectual property, or confidential research, local deployment reduces the need to transmit data to third-party platforms, strengthening privacy protections while supporting regulatory compliance and data sovereignty requirements.

Despite its flexibility, GLM 5.2 remains an exceptionally demanding model. Built using a Mixture-of-Experts architecture containing between 744 billion and 753 billion parameters, the model occupies approximately 1.51TB of storage and memory in its original form. Developers therefore rely on quantization, a compression technique that reduces memory requirements by lowering the numerical precision of model weights. Even after aggressive optimization, approximately 240GB of memory is still required to load the model. GLM 5.2 also supports a one-million-token context window, allowing it to process entire software repositories, lengthy technical documentation, and extensive research collections within a single prompt, though doing so places additional demands on system memory.

As organizations continue evaluating how AI should be deployed across their operations, GLM 5.2 reflects a broader industry movement toward flexible AI ecosystems where proprietary, open-weight, and locally hosted models each serve different operational needs. Rather than replacing commercial AI platforms outright, models such as GLM 5.2 provide businesses with additional options to balance performance, cost, security, and data control as enterprise AI adoption continues to evolve.

BioSchocking Attacks Tricked AI-powered Browsers into Data Theft


A new prompt injection termed “BioShocking” can manipulate AI-based browsers into treating malicious actions as a video game, and give away your login credentials. The technique was discovered by experts at security firm LayerX. The experts tricked six AI-powered browsers and assistants into recording users’ credentials and sending them to the threat actor. 

The browsers include:

ChatGPT Atlas from OpenAI

Comet from Perplexity

Anthropic’s Claude browser

Fellou

Genspark browser

Sigma browser

LayerX experts made a proof-of-concept (PoC), which was tested against these agentic AI browser products. The findings revealed that only one browser addressed the issue after receiving the report.

What is an AI browser?

An AI browser can streamline the entire workflow for the users. If you switch it to agent mode, it can click type, and visit sites that the user has already logged into. Access is the key point hare, which also becomes the problem.

BioShocking attack tactic

Experts made a (PoC) in which an infected webpage showed a BioShock-themed puzzle that rewards wrong answers. This tricks the browser that normal rules are not applicable. 

The trap works because of how these AI-powered browsers read. The webpage and instruction surface as a single stream of text, which allows a malicious page access in commands mimicking ordinary content or game rules. The agent can not tell which is which. Experts have termed this indirect prompt injection.

Tricking the browser

For instance, the compromise starts with a web page made as a puzzle. 3+4+=9 is a wrong answer but the browser rewards it. When the agent accepts that wrong answer is the reward, it follows game puzzle logic not security logic. Following this, the puzzle asks the browser to record login credentials. All six browsers could not flag it as something malicious. To win the game, the agent is commanded to go to a GitHub repository and share the data in the code, such as sensitive data like passwords.

When the link is sent to the target's GitHub repository, it retrieves SSH login credentials and sends them to the hackers. The main issue here is that browsers can’t differentiate between real scenarios and malicious fictional ones. 

According to LayerX, “Once the agents figured out the rules and learned that 'incorrect' actions are acceptable, they were no longer tied to reality.” “When tasked with the final step of the puzzle – compromising user credentials – all 6 agents failed to identify it as going against their safety guardrails,” the experts continued.

The PoC did not execute any malicious commands but warned that it could do so.

AI vendors’ response

According to experts, only OpenAI implemented a working patch for BioShocking in its browser.

Anthropic tried to fix the issue on its chrome login, but the patch was not working against the PoC. Perplexity did not fix the issue, and closed the report. 

LayerX advises that AI vendors should add specific user acknowledgement for sensitive work, and stronger security checks.

Anthropic to Restore Access to Claude Fable 5 After U.S. Lifts Export Controls



Anthropic is preparing to restore access to its Claude Fable 5 artificial intelligence model after the U.S. Department of Commerce lifted export controls that had temporarily restricted deployment of the company's most advanced AI systems.

The company announced on X that access to Claude Fable 5 will begin returning on Wednesday following the government's decision. Anthropic also confirmed that the export restrictions affecting both Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 have been removed.

"We've received notice that the Department of Commerce has lifted export controls on Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5," the company said in its statement, adding that it will begin restoring access on Wednesday and provide additional updates as the rollout progresses.

Anthropic also thanked its community for its patience during the temporary suspension and acknowledged the teams involved in preparing the models for redeployment.

Although the rollout is set to begin immediately, the company has not clarified whether Claude Fable 5 will become available to all users at the same time. It remains uncertain whether users outside the United States will regain access during the initial phase of the deployment or whether availability will expand gradually across different regions.

The export restrictions were introduced earlier after U.S. authorities raised national security concerns surrounding the deployment of highly capable frontier AI models. During that period, Anthropic temporarily suspended access while it worked to comply with government requirements and strengthen safeguards governing the release of its latest systems.

While restoring access to its models, Anthropic also appears to be expanding identity verification measures for certain Claude services.

Recent references to Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures discovered on the company's website suggest that some users may soon be required to verify their identities before accessing specific Claude capabilities. The references have prompted speculation that advanced models such as Claude Fable 5 could initially be limited to verified users or become available only in certain regions as Anthropic gradually expands access.

According to Anthropic's support documentation, identity verification is being introduced for a limited number of use cases. Users may encounter verification requests when using particular Claude features, during routine platform integrity reviews, or as part of broader safety, security and regulatory compliance checks.

The company says the verification process is intended to reduce abuse of its AI systems, enforce platform usage policies and meet legal obligations associated with operating increasingly powerful AI technologies.

"Being responsible with powerful technology starts with knowing who is using it," Anthropic said while explaining the purpose of the new verification measures.

Anthropic has selected Persona as its identity verification provider. Users who are asked to complete verification may be required to submit a valid government-issued photo identification document, including a passport, driver's license, state or provincial identification card, or a national identity card.

The company notes that several forms of identification will not be accepted during the verification process. These include photocopies, screenshots, scanned documents, mobile IDs, student identification cards, employee badges, bank cards and temporary paper identification documents.

Some users may also be asked to complete a live selfie verification using the camera on a computer or mobile device. According to Anthropic, the entire verification process typically takes less than five minutes to complete.

Addressing privacy concerns, the company says identity documents and selfie data are collected and stored by Persona rather than directly within Anthropic's own systems. However, Anthropic may access verification records through Persona when necessary, including during account review or appeal processes.

Anthropic also emphasized that identity verification information is not used to train Claude's AI models. Instead, the data is used solely to confirm a user's identity and to satisfy the company's legal, safety and compliance responsibilities.

The restoration of Claude Fable 5, together with the introduction of targeted identity verification measures, reflects the growing intersection of frontier AI development, government oversight and platform security. As developers release increasingly capable AI systems, compliance requirements, export regulations and stronger user verification are becoming a more prominent part of deploying advanced models responsibly.

OpenAI Delays GPT-5.6 Public Launch After US Government Seeks Limited Rollout

 

OpenAI has agreed to delay the wider release of its upcoming AI model, GPT-5.6, after the Trump administration requested that the company initially restrict access to a limited group of government-approved partners. The request was made due to concerns surrounding the model's advanced capabilities and potential national security implications.

The development, first reported by The Information on June 25, 2026, reflects the growing role of the US government in overseeing the deployment of cutting-edge artificial intelligence models. The move also signals a shift in how frontier AI systems may be introduced to the public going forward.

The government's request comes shortly after its dispute with rival AI startup Anthropic. Earlier this month, on June 12, the Trump administration directed Anthropic to temporarily take its latest AI models, Fable 5 and Mythos 5, offline under new export control measures aimed at preventing access by foreign nationals. Officials cited national security risks behind the decision.

Anthropic described the action as a "misunderstanding" and said it hoped to restore access "as soon as possible," though the incident established a significant precedent for government intervention in AI model releases.

Mythos had been shared with around 40 organisations, including Google, Microsoft and JPMorgan Chase, through a restricted programme known as Project Glasswing. According to reports, the model's ability to autonomously identify software vulnerabilities and carry out complex, multi-step cybersecurity attacks without human involvement raised concerns among US officials.

GPT-5.6 Viewed as Comparable to Mythos

A source familiar with the matter said both OpenAI and the US administration consider GPT-5.6 to be "on par" with Anthropic's Mythos, particularly regarding its cybersecurity capabilities. That assessment prompted officials to recommend a phased rollout instead of an immediate public launch.

OpenAI CEO Sam Altman reportedly informed employees during an internal Q&A session on June 25 that GPT-5.6 would first be made available to a select group of enterprise customers.

In a follow-up internal memo, Altman explained that the government would be "approving access customer by customer during this preview period." The request reportedly came from the Office of the National Cyber Director and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, while Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick also advised OpenAI not to proceed without approvals from multiple federal agencies.

Although OpenAI agreed to the arrangement, Altman indicated that the company does not see this as a long-term solution. According to The Information, he wrote: "We’ve made clear to the U.S. government that this is not our preferred long-term model, and will work with them and others in industry to achieve a more sustainable approach for future releases."

Meanwhile, a White House official told CNN that the administration continues "to collaborate with frontier AI labs to develop shared approaches for addressing the challenges of scaling this technology."

The broader public release of GPT-5.6 is expected to take place a "couple of weeks" after the limited preview, depending on how the government-led approval process progresses.

AI Oversight Continues to Evolve

The latest development highlights the absence of a formal federal regulatory framework governing the review of advanced AI models before public deployment.

President Trump's executive order on "Promoting Advanced AI Innovation and Security" encourages AI companies to voluntarily provide frontier models to the government for cybersecurity assessments for up to one month before public release. However, compliance with the programme is voluntary rather than legally required.

For now, OpenAI's agreement with the US government represents one of the clearest examples of collaboration between federal authorities and an AI company. The outcome of GPT-5.6's controlled rollout could influence how other leading AI developers introduce powerful new models in the future.