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Nslookup Exploit
CastleLoader Malware ClickFix Attack DNS-based malware Lumma Stealer macOS infostealer malware Nslookup Exploit

Microsoft Uncovers DNS-Based ClickFix Variant as Stealer Campaigns Escalate Across Windows and macOS

 

Microsoft has revealed a new evolution of the ClickFix social engineering technique, where attackers manipulate users into executing commands that initiate a Domain Name System (DNS) lookup to fetch a secondary malicious payload.

In this updated approach, threat actors use the “nslookup” command—short for nameserver lookup—triggered through the Windows Run dialog. The command performs a custom DNS query that retrieves instructions for the next stage of the attack.

ClickFix has gained traction in recent years and is commonly distributed through phishing emails, malvertising campaigns, and drive-by download schemes. Victims are typically redirected to fraudulent landing pages featuring fake CAPTCHA checks or fabricated system alerts, urging them to run commands in the Windows Run dialog or the macOS Terminal app to “resolve” non-existent issues.

The technique has spread rapidly over the past two years because it relies on users unknowingly infecting their own systems, effectively bypassing traditional security safeguards. Its success has led to multiple offshoots, including FileFix, JackFix, ConsentFix, CrashFix, and GlitchFix.

"In the latest DNS-based staging using ClickFix, the initial command runs through cmd.exe and performs a DNS lookup against a hard-coded external DNS server, rather than the system's default resolver," the Microsoft Threat Intelligence team said in a series of posts on X. "The output is filtered to extract the Name: DNS response, which is executed as the second-stage payload."

Microsoft explained that this variation uses DNS as a “lightweight staging or signaling channel,” allowing attackers to communicate with their infrastructure while introducing an additional validation layer before delivering the next payload.

"Using DNS in this way reduces dependency on traditional web requests and can help blend malicious activity into normal network traffic," the Windows maker added.

Following the DNS lookup, the attack chain downloads a ZIP archive from an external server (“azwsappdev[.]com”). Inside is a malicious Python script that conducts system reconnaissance, executes discovery commands, and drops a Visual Basic Script (VBScript). That VBScript launches ModeloRAT—a Python-based remote access trojan previously linked to CrashFix campaigns.

To maintain persistence, the malware creates a Windows shortcut (LNK) file in the Startup folder, ensuring automatic execution whenever the system reboots.

Lumma Stealer and CastleLoader Activity Intensifies

Separately, Bitdefender has reported a spike in Lumma Stealer operations, fueled by ClickFix-style fake CAPTCHA campaigns. These attacks deploy an AutoIt-based version of CastleLoader, a loader attributed to a threat actor known as GrayBravo (formerly TAG-150).

CastleLoader checks for virtualization environments and certain security software before decrypting and executing the stealer in memory. Beyond ClickFix tactics, attackers are also using websites offering cracked software and pirated movies to lure victims into downloading malicious installers disguised as MP4 files.

Additional campaigns have delivered a counterfeit NSIS installer that runs obfuscated VBA scripts before launching AutoIt components responsible for loading Lumma Stealer. The VBA component establishes scheduled tasks to ensure persistence.

"Despite significant law enforcement disruption efforts in 2025, Lumma Stealer operations continued, demonstrating resilience by rapidly migrating to new hosting providers and adapting alternative loaders and delivery techniques," the Romanian cybersecurity company said. "At the core of many of these campaigns is CastleLoader, which plays a central role in helping LummaStealer spread through delivery chains."

One domain tied to CastleLoader infrastructure (“testdomain123123[.]shop”) was also identified as a Lumma Stealer command-and-control (C2) server, suggesting possible collaboration or shared services between operators. India has recorded the highest number of Lumma infections, followed by France, the U.S., Spain, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Romania, Italy, and Canada.

"The effectiveness of ClickFix lies in its abuse of procedural trust rather than technical vulnerabilities," Bitdefender said. "The instructions resemble troubleshooting steps or verification workarounds that users may have encountered previously. As a result, victims often fail to recognize that they are manually executing arbitrary code on their own system."

Expanding Threat Landscape: RenEngine, macOS Stealers, and Malvertising

CastleLoader is not the only distribution mechanism in play. Since March 2025, campaigns using RenEngine Loader have spread Lumma Stealer through fake game cheats and pirated applications such as CorelDRAW. In these cases, RenEngine deploys Hijack Loader, which then installs the stealer. Kaspersky data shows primary impact in Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Germany, Mexico, Algeria, Egypt, Italy, and France.

Meanwhile, macOS users are increasingly being targeted. A campaign leveraging phishing and malvertising techniques has distributed Odyssey Stealer—a rebranded version of Poseidon Stealer and a fork of Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS). The malware steals credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data from over 200 browser wallet extensions and multiple desktop wallet apps.

"Beyond credential theft, Odyssey operates as a full remote access trojan," Censys said. "A persistent LaunchDaemon polls the C2 every 60 seconds for commands, supporting arbitrary shell execution, reinfection, and a SOCKS5 proxy for tunneling traffic through victim machines."

Other campaigns include:
  • Fake CAPTCHA pages on compromised websites tricking Windows users into running PowerShell commands that deploy StealC.
  • Email phishing attacks using malicious SVG files inside password-protected ZIP archives to deliver the open-source .NET stealer Stealerium.
  • Abuse of generative AI platforms such as Claude to host ClickFix instructions distributed via sponsored Google search results.
  • Fake Medium articles impersonating Apple’s Support Team to spread macOS stealers via domains like “raxelpak[.]com.”
"The C2 domain raxelpak[.]com has URL history going back to 2021, when it appeared to host a safety workwear e-commerce site," MacPaw's Moonlock Lab said. "Whether the domain was hijacked or simply expired and re-registered by the [threat actor] is unclear, but it fits the broader pattern of leveraging aged domains with existing reputation to avoid detection."

Malvertising abuse has also raised concerns. "The ad shows a real, recognized domain (claude.ai), not a spoof or typo-squatted site," AdGuard said. "Clicking the ad leads to a real Claude page, not a phishing copy. The consequence is clear: Google Ads + a well-known trusted platform + technical users with high downstream impact = a potent malware distribution vector."

macOS Threats on the Rise

Security researchers note a broader shift toward targeting Apple systems with advanced infostealers. According to recent analysis, macOS stealers now target more than 100 Chrome cryptocurrency extensions, and attackers are even acquiring legitimate Apple developer signatures to bypass Gatekeeper protections.

"Nearly every macOS stealer prioritizes cryptocurrency theft above all else," the company said. "This laser focus reflects economic reality. Cryptocurrency users disproportionately use Macs. They often hold significant value in software wallets. Unlike bank accounts, crypto transactions are irreversible. Once seed phrases are compromised, funds disappear permanently with no recourse."

"The 'Macs don't get viruses' assumption is not just outdated but actively dangerous. Organizations with Mac users need detection capabilities for macOS-specific TTPs: unsigned applications requesting passwords, unusual Terminal activity, connections to blockchain nodes for non-financial purposes, and data exfiltration patterns targeting Keychain and browser storage."


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Social Engineering Cyberattack
CastleLoader Malware ClickFix Attack DNS Delivery GrayBravo Threat Actor Lumma Stealer Campaign malware ModeloRAT Trojan Nslookup Exploit PowerShell Abuse Social Engineering Cyberattack

New ClickFix Campaign Uses Nslookup to Fetch Malicious PowerShell Script


 

According to Microsoft, the ClickFix social engineering technique has evolved in a refined manner, emphasizing that even the most common software applications can be repurposed into covert channels for malware distribution. Using this latest iteration, hackers are no longer only relying on deceptive downloads and embedded scripts to spread malware. 

Through carefully staged prompts, they manipulate victims' trust by instructing them to execute what appears to be harmless system commands. Under this veneer of legitimacy, the command initiates a DNS query via nslookup, quietly retrieving the next-stage payload from attacker-controlled infrastructure. 

By embedding malicious intent within routine administrative behaviors, the campaign transforms a standard troubleshooting tool into an unassuming channel of infection. In Microsoft's analysis, the newly observed campaign instructs victims to use an nslookup command to query a DNS server controlled by the attacker, rather than the system's configured resolver, as directed by the attacker. 

It is designed to request a specific hostname from a remote IP address controlled by the threat actor and forward the query to that address. Instead of returning a regular DNS record, the server responds with a crafted DNS entry with a second PowerShell command embedded in the "Name" field. 

In addition, the Windows command interpreter parses and executes that response, thereby converting a standard DNS query into a covert staging mechanism for code delivery. According to Microsoft Threat Intelligence, this strategy represents another evolution of ClickFix's evasion strategy. 

While earlier versions primarily utilized HTTP-based payload retrieval, this version relies on DNS for both communication and dynamic payload distribution. In spite of the unclear lure used to persuade users, victims are reportedly instructed to execute the command through Windows Run, strengthening the tactic's dependency on social engineering rather than exploits. 

By moving execution to user-initiated system utilities, attackers are reducing the probability that conventional web or network filtering controls will be triggered. PowerShell scripts that are executed in this stage retrieve additional components from infrastructure under attacker control. 

As a result of Microsoft's investigation, it has been determined that the subsequent payload consists of a compressed archive containing a portable Python runtime along with malicious scripts. Prior to establishing persistence on the infected host, these scripts conduct reconnaissance against the host and its domain environment, gathering network and system information. 

In this method, the user creates a VBScript file in their AppData directory, and a shortcut is placed in their Windows Startup folder to ensure execution upon logon. A remote access trojan named ModeloRAT is deployed as part of the infection chain, granting the operator sustained control over compromised systems.

A DNS-based staging strategy allows adversaries to adjust payloads in real time while blending malicious traffic with routine name resolution activity by embedding executable instructions within DNS responses. As well as complicating detection, this DNS-based staging technique demonstrates that ClickFix continues to refine itself into a modular intrusion framework that is adaptable. 

In addition, Microsoft's Threat Intelligence team has assessed that the intrusion sequence is initiated by launching a command from the Windows Run dialog, which directly directs a DNS query to an adversary-controlled hard-coded external resolver. This command output is programmatically filtered to isolate the Name: field of the DNS response, and it is then executed as the second stage payload.

There has been documentation of this technique being used in multiple malware distribution campaigns, including campaigns that deliver Lumma Stealer. This malware has been detected in India, France, the United States, Spain, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Romania, Italy, and Canada. 

Attributed to the GrayBravo threat actor, Lumma Stealer incorporates environmental awareness checks, identifying virtualization platforms and specific security products before decrypting and executing its payload directly in memory to evade analysis and detection. 

Rather than relying on phishing emails, malvertising networks, and drive-by download schemes, ClickFix has evolved beyond its earlier reliance on these methods to move toward DNS-based staging. By exploiting procedural trust rather than software flaws, operators persuade users to execute commands to resolve benign system problems. 

A parallel campaign distributing Lumma Stealer used CastleLoader and RenEngine Loader as primary delivery mechanisms. CastleLoader has been deployed by compromised websites that present fraudulent CAPTCHA verification prompts instructing victims to use PowerShell. 

In campaigns targeting Russian, Brazilian, Turkish, Spanish, German, Mexico, Algeria, Egypt, Italy, and France users, RenEngine Loader facilitates the deployment of Hijack Loader, which eventually installs Lumma Stealer on compromised hosts. These campaigns do not have limited operational footprints to Windows environments.

The evidence suggests that macOS-targeted infostealer activity has increased dramatically in recent years, which indicates that long-held assumptions about Apple platform immunity have been eroded. In order to capitalize on the concentration of high-value software wallets within the macOS ecosystem, attackers frequently prioritize cryptocurrency theft. 

There are numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures that macOS-specific detection strategies must consider, including unsigned applications requesting elevated credentials, anomalous Terminal execution patterns, suspicious outbound connections to blockchain infrastructure that are unrelated to financial workflows, as well as attempts to exfiltrate data from Keychain repositories and browser storage media. 

In addition to ClickFix itself, many other variants and affiliate campaigns have been launched. Security analysts have documented macOS-focused operations utilizing phishing and malvertising to distribute Odyssey Stealer, a rebranded version of Poseidon Stealer. Using compromised websites that appear legitimate, attackers have hosted deceptive CAPTCHA pages that trigger the deployment of StealC information stealer via PowerShell.

Additionally, malicious SVG files have been embedded in password-protected ZIP archives, instructing victims to execute ClickFix commands, leading to the installation of Stealerium, an open-source NET infostealer that is open-source. More unconventionally, adversaries have used public sharing features of generative AI services such as Anthropic Claude to publish staged instructions for installing the ClickFix application on macOS systems. 

Search results for macOS command-line disk space analysis tools were manipulated by a campaign resulting in redirection to a fake Medium article impersonating Apple Support, which ultimately resulted in stealer payloads being delivered by external infrastructure. These developments demonstrate how ClickFix is becoming a cross-platform social engineering framework capable of adapting to diverse malware environments by demonstrating its increasing operational flexibility. 

By creating a Windows shortcut (LNK) to the previously dropped VBScript component within the Startup directory, the malware maintains long-term access by creating persistence. By ensuring that the malicious script is executed every time the operating system boots up, the infection is embedded into the routine startup sequence of the host, ensuring long-term access to the host is maintained. 

According to Bitdefender's separate findings, Lumma Stealer activity has increased significantly as a result of ClickFix-type campaigns designed around fake CAPTCHA verification prompts. This disclosure is consistent with Bitdefender's separate findings. These operations are carried out by attackers using the AutoIt-based CastleLoader malware loader associated with GrayBravo, formerly known as TAG-150. It is linked to the threat actor GrayBravo.

After detecting virtualization platforms and specific security tools, CastleLoader decrypts and executes the stealer payload in memory, a technique designed to thwart sandbox analysis and endpoint detection. 

Furthermore, CastleLoader has been distributed via websites that advertise pirated and cracked software, as well as ClickFix-driven distribution channels. A rogue installer or executable may be downloaded by users in these scenarios, masquerading as legitimate MP4 files.

In addition, counterfeit NSIS installers have been used to execute obfuscated VBA scripts prior to starting the embedded AutoIt loader responsible for installing Lumma Stealer. Using the VBA component, these systems are reinforced by scheduled tasks designed to reinforce persistence mechanisms. 

The Bitdefender assessment indicates that, despite coordinated law enforcement actions in 2025 designed to disrupt Lumma Stealer infrastructure, Lumma Stealer has demonstrated considerable resilience. 

While shifting to alternate hosting providers, operators are rotating loaders and delivery techniques to maintain infection volumes while rapidly migrating to alternative hosting providers. Several of these campaigns remain centrally located in CastleLoader, which serves as a primary distribution tool within Lumma's broader ecosystem. As a result of analyzing CastleLoader infrastructure, it was found that domains previously identified as Lumma Stealer command-and-control servers overlapped, suggesting that the two malware clusters collaborated operationally or shared service providers. 

According to infection telemetry, the largest number of Lumma Stealer cases originate in India, followed by France, the United States, Spain, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Romania, Italy, and Canada. In their view, ClickFix's sustained success is due not to zero-day exploits or sophisticated technical vulnerabilities but rather to the exploitation of procedural trust.

In order to reduce suspicion and increase compliance, instructions presented to victims are designed to appear like legitimate troubleshooting procedures or verification procedures. Due to this inadvertent execution of malicious code, users mistakenly believe they are resolving a routine system issue. CastleLoader is not the sole delivery mechanism facilitating Lumma Stealer's spread. 

The RenEngine Loader has also been used for campaign purposes since at least March 2025, commonly posing as game cheats or pirated commercial software such as CorelDRAW. In these attack chains, RenEngine Loader also deploys a secondary component, Hijack Loader, which installs Lumma Stealer as a result.

It is evident from these parallel loader frameworks that the Lumma distribution ecosystem is modular and adaptive, which reinforces its persistence irrespective of sustained disruption attempts. As ClickFix and its associated loader ecosystem continue to be refined, organizations must recognize a greater defensive imperative. 

Organizations cannot rely on perimeter filtering or signature-based detection alone to mitigate malicious activities originating within trusted system utilities and user workflows anymore. As part of defensive strategies, PowerShell logging should be strictly enforced, DNS queries should be monitored for anomalous patterns, and behavior detection can be used to identify command-line abuse from user-initiated processes. 

Similarly, it is crucial to implement application control policies, restrict script execution, and monitor persistent mechanisms, such as startup folder modifications and scheduled tasks, at an early stage. Training in procedural social engineering, not just phishing links and attachments, is also vital for sustained user awareness. 

Since such campaigns rely increasingly on convincing users to execute commands themselves, security programs must emphasize the risks associated with running unsolicited system instructions, regardless of how routine they appear. As ClickFix has evolved into a cross-platform, DNS-enabled staging framework, it is clear that in order to maintain defensive resilience, one must recognize and disrupt these intersections.
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software supply chain attacks
cryptocurrency Fake Recruiter Scam Lazarus Group malware NPM malware Open Source Security PyPI Security Threats Remote Access Trojan software supply chain attacks

Fraudulent Recruiters Target Developers with Malicious Coding Tests


 

If a software developer is accustomed to receiving unsolicited messages offering lucrative remote employment opportunities, the initial approach may appear routine—a brief introduction, a well-written job description, and an invitation to complete a small technical exercise. Nevertheless, behind the recent waves of such outreach lies a sophisticated operation. 

During the investigation, investigators have discovered a new version of the long-running fake recruiter campaign linked to North Korean threat actors. This campaign now targets JavaScript and Python developers with cryptocurrency-themed assignments. 

With a deliberate, modular design that makes it possible for operators to rapidly rebuild and re-deploy infrastructure when parts of the campaign are exposed or dismantled since at least May 2025. Several malicious packages were quietly published to the NPM and PyPI ecosystems, which developers utilize in routine work processes. 

Once executed within a developer's environment, the packages serve as downloaders that discreetly retrieve a remote access trojan. Researchers have compiled 192 packages associated with the campaign, which they have labeled Graphalgo, confirming the threat's scale and persistence. 

It has been determined that the operation is more than just opportunistic phishing and represents a carefully orchestrated social engineering campaign incorporated into legitimate hiring processes rather than just opportunistic phishing. 

A recruiting impersonator impersonates a recruiter from an established technology company, initiating communication through professional networking platforms and via email with job descriptions, technical prerequisites, and compensation information aligned with market trends. By cultivating trust over a number of exchanges, the operators resemble the cadence and tone of authentic recruitment cycles without relying on urgency or alarm. 

Following the establishment of legitimacy, they implement a coding assessment, typically a compressed archive, designed to provide a standard measure of the candidate's ability to solve problems or develop blockchain-related applications. 

In addition, the files provided contain embedded malware that is designed to execute once the developer tries to review or run the project locally. Using routine practices such as cloning repositories, installing dependencies, and executing test scripts, the attackers were able to circumvent conventional suspicion triggers associated with unsolicited attachments. 

The strategy demonstrates a deep understanding of developer behavior, technical interview conventions, and the implicit trust derived from structured hiring processes, according to researchers. The execution of the malicious project components in several observed cases enabled unauthorized system access, resulting in credential harvesting, lateral movement, as well as the possibility of exposing proprietary source code and corporate infrastructure to unauthorized access. 

A key component of the campaign's success is not exploiting software vulnerabilities, but rather manipulating professional norms—transforming recruitment itself into a delivery channel for compromise. Several ReversingLabs researchers have determined that the infrastructure supporting the campaign is intended to mirror legitimate activity within the blockchain and crypto-trading industries. 

Threat actors establish fictitious companies, post detailed job postings on professional and social platforms, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, and Reddit, and request candidates to complete technical assignments as part of the simulated interview process. The tasks are usually similar to routine coding evaluations, where candidates clone repositories, execute projects locally, resolve minor bugs, and submit improvements. 

Nevertheless, the critical objective is not the solution submitted, but the process of executing it. When running a project, a malicious dependency sourced from trusted ecosystems such as npm and PyPI is installed, thus allowing the payload to be introduced indirectly through dependency resolution processes. 

As investigators point out, the process of assembling such repositories is straightforward: a legitimate open-source template is modified to reference a compromised or weaponized package, following which the project appears technically sound and professionally structured. An example of a benign package called “bigmathutils,” which had accumulated approximately 10,000 downloads, was introduced into malicious functionality by version 1.1.0. 

A maneuver likely intended to limit forensic visibility followed by the deprecation and removal of the package soon thereafter. A more extensive campaign was later developed, dubbed Graphalgo for its frequent use of packages containing the term "graph" and their imitations of well-established libraries such as graphlib.

Researchers have observed a shift in package names that include the word "big" since December 2025, although there has not been a comprehensive identification of the recruitment infrastructure associated with that phase. As a means of giving structural legitimacy to their operations, actors utilize GitHub Organizations. The visible project files of GitHub repositories do not contain any overtly malicious code.

Instead, compromise occurs by resolving external dependencies -Graphalgo packages retrieved from npm or PyPI - thus separating the malicious logic from the repository, making detection more challenging. By executing the projects as instructed, developers inadvertently install a remote access trojan on their computer systems. Analysis of the malware indicates it is capable of enumerating processes, executing arbitrary commands via command-and-control channels, exfiltrating data and delivering secondary payloads. 

A clear financial motive associated with cryptocurrency asset theft is also evident from the fact that the RAT checks for the MetaMask browser extension. According to researchers, multiple developers were successfully compromised before the activity was discovered, demonstrating the operational effectiveness of embedding malicious logic within trusted mechanics in software development workflows.

According to a technical examination of the later infection stages, the intermediate payloads serve mainly as downloaders, retrieving the final remote access trojan from the attacker's infrastructure. Upon deployment, the RAT communicates periodically with its command-and-control server, polling it for tasking and executing the instructions given by the operator. 

The tool has a feature set that is consistent with mature post-exploitation tools: file uploading and downloading capabilities, process enumeration, and execution of arbitrary system commands. Additionally, communications with the C2 endpoint are token-protected, requiring a valid server-issued token when registering an agent or issuing a command command. 

It is believed that this additional authentication layer serves to restrict unsolicited interaction with the infrastructure and to reflect operational discipline previously observed in North Korean state-backed campaigns. In addition to detecting the MetaMask browser extension, the malware demonstrates a clear interest in crypto assets, aligning with financial motivations historically linked to Pyongyang-aligned groups as well as a clear interest in cryptocurrency assets. 

As part of their investigation, researchers identified three functionally equivalent variants of the final payload implemented in various languages. JavaScript and Python versions were distributed through malicious packages hosted on npm and PyPI, while a third variant was found independently using Visual Basic Script. 

As first noted in early February 2026, the VBS sample communicates with the same C2 infrastructure associated with earlier "graph"-named packages, as evidenced by the SHA1 hash dbb4031e9bb8f8821a5758a6c308932b88599f18. This suggests a parallel or yet to be identified recruitment frontend is part of the broader operation. North Korean activity in public open-source ecosystems has been documented in a number of cases. 

VMConnect, an operation later dubbed and attributed to the Lazarus Group, was detected by ReversingLabs in 2023 involving malicious PyPI impersonation operations. The attack involved weaponized packages linked to convincing GitHub repositories which were able to reinforce trust before delivering malware from attacker infrastructure.

In a year, researchers observed the VMConnect tradecraft continuing to be practiced, this time incorporating fabricated coding assessments associated with fraudulent job interviews. As in some instances, the actors assumed the identity of Capital One, further demonstrating their willingness to appropriate established corporate identities to legitimize outreach. Other security firms have confirmed the pattern through their reports. 

As of 2023, Phylum provided information about NPM malware campaigns that utilize token-based mechanisms and paired packages to avoid detection, while Unit 42 provided information about the methods North Korean state-sponsored actors used to distribute multi-stage malware through developer ecosystems. In addition to Veracode and Socket's disclosures during 2024 and 2025, further npm packages attributed to Lazarus-related activity were also identified, including second-stage payloads that erased forensic evidence upon execution of the package.

In the present campaign, attribution is based on a convergence of technical and operational indicators rather than a single artifact. Lazarus methodologies, such as using fake interviews to gain access, cryptocurrency-themed lures, multistage payload chains layered with obfuscation, and deliberately delaying the release of benign and malicious package versions, are similar to previously documented Lazarus methods. 

Moreover, token-protected C2 communications and Git commit timestamps aligned with GMT+9, North Korea's time zone, provide context alignment. These characteristics suggest a coordinated, state-sponsored effort rather than opportunistic cybercrime. Researchers cite the modular architecture of the campaign as a significant strength. By separating recruitment personas from backend payload infrastructure, operators can rotate the company names, job postings, and thematic branding without altering core delivery mechanisms.

Although a direct link has been established between "graph"-named packages and specific blockchain-based job offerings, the frontend elements for the newer "big"-named packages and the VBS RAT variant have not yet been identified in detail. 

ReversingLabs analyzed the Graphalgo activity and compiled an extensive set of indicators of compromise linked to the operation, including malicious package names, hashes, domains, and C2 endpoints as part of its investigation. This gap indicates that elements of the operation likely remain active and evolving. These artifacts are crucial in assisting organizations in the detection and response to incidents, since they enable them to identify exposures within development environments and within software supply chains.

Lazarus-related operations persisting across NPM and PyPI underscores a broader reality: open-source ecosystems remain strategically valuable target surfaces, while recruitment-themed social engineering has evolved into an extremely sophisticated intrusion vector that is capable of bypassing conventional defense measures. Those findings underscore the importance of reassessing the implicit trust placed in external code and recruitment-driven processes among development teams.

Besides email filtering and endpoint protection, security controls should include rigorous dependency monitoring, sandboxing of third-party projects, and stricter verification of unsolicited technical assessments in addition to traditional email filtering and endpoint protection. 

An organization should implement a software composition analysis, enforce a least-privilege development environment, and monitor anomalous outbound connections originating from the build system or developer workstations. As a result, awareness programs must be updated to address recruitment-themed social engineering, which incorporates professional credibility with technical deception in order to achieve effective recruitment results.

Threat actors are continuing to adapt their tactics to mimic legitimate industry practices, which is why defensive strategies should mature as well - treating development environments and open-source dependencies as critical security boundaries as opposed to mere conveniences.
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World Leaks
Cyber Extortion Data Leaks malware RustyRocket Software World Leaks

Researchers Identify Previously Undocumented Malware Used in World Leaks Intrusions

 



Cybersecurity researchers have identified a newly developed malicious software tool being used by the extortion-focused cybercrime group World Leaks, marking a pivotal dent the group’s technical capabilities. According to findings published by the cybersecurity research division of Accenture, the malware has not been observed in prior investigations and appears to be custom-built for covert operations within victim networks. The researchers have designated the tool “RustyRocket” to distinguish it from previously documented malware families.

Analysts explain that RustyRocket functions as a long-term persistence mechanism. Instead of triggering immediate disruption, the malware is designed to quietly embed itself within compromised systems, allowing attackers to remain present for extended periods without raising alarms. This hidden presence enables threat actors to move through internal networks, quietly extract sensitive information, and route network traffic through compromised machines. Security experts involved in the research noted that the tool had operated unnoticed until its recent discovery, surfacing the challenges organizations face in detecting advanced covert threats.

Although World Leaks is commonly categorized as a ransomware group, its operations differ from traditional ransomware campaigns that encrypt files and demand payment for decryption keys. Rather than denying access to data, the group prioritizes unauthorized data collection. Victims are pressured with the threat of having confidential corporate and personal information publicly disclosed if payment demands are not met. This model places reputational damage, regulatory penalties, and legal exposure at the center of the extortion strategy.

The group has publicly claimed responsibility for attacks against large international corporations. In one widely reported incident, World Leaks alleged that a major global sportswear company declined to comply with extortion demands, after which a substantial volume of internal documents was released. As with many threat actor statements, independent verification of the full scope of such claims remains limited, underlining the importance of cautious attribution in cyber incident reporting.

From a technical perspective, RustyRocket is written in the Rust programming language and engineered to operate across both Microsoft Windows and Linux environments. This cross-platform design allows the malware to function in mixed enterprise infrastructures, increasing its usefulness to attackers. Researchers describe the tool as a combined data extraction and network proxy utility, capable of transferring stolen information through multiple layers of encrypted communication. By masking malicious traffic within normal network activity, the malware makes detection by conventional security tools comparatively more difficult.

The tool also incorporates an execution safeguard that requires attackers to supply a pre-encrypted configuration file at runtime. Without this configuration, the malware remains dormant. This feature complicates forensic analysis and reduces the likelihood that automated security systems will successfully analyze or neutralize the tool.

Investigators assess that World Leaks has been active since early 2025 and typically gains initial access through social engineering techniques, misuse of compromised credentials, or exploitation of externally exposed systems. Once inside a network, tools like RustyRocket enable attackers to quietly maintain their presence while systematically collecting data for later extortion.

Security specialists warn that RustyRocket reflects a broader turn in cybercriminal operations toward stealth-based, intelligence-gathering intrusions rather than overtly disruptive attacks. To reduce exposure, organizations are advised to closely monitor unusual outbound data transfers and enforce strict network segmentation. These measures can limit an attacker’s ability to move across systems and reduce the volume of data that can be silently extracted.

The rise of RustyRocket illustrates how extortion groups are increasingly investing in custom malware designed to evade traditional defenses, reinforcing the need for continuous security testing, proactive threat monitoring, and workforce preparedness to counter evolving attack methods.


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Network Layer DDoS
Aisuru botnet Botnet Infrastructure Cloud Security Cyber Threat Intelligence DDOS Attack HTTP Flood Attacks Hyper Volumetric Attacks malware Network Layer DDoS

Largest Ever 31.4 Tbps DDoS Attack Attributed to Aisuru Botnet


 

A surge of traffic unprecedented to the public internet occurred in November 2025 for thirty five seconds. The acceleration was immediate and absolute, peaking at 31.4 terabits per second before dissipating nearly as quickly as it formed. As the result of the AISURU botnet, also known as Kimwolf, the event demonstrated the use of distributed infrastructure to achieve extreme bandwidth saturation over a short period of time. 

Cloudflare has released findings indicating that the incident was the largest distributed denial of service attack disclosed to date as well as contributing to an overall rise in hyper volumetric HTTP DDoS activity observed during the year 2025. In contrast to being an isolated outlier, the November spike is associated with a sustained upward trend in both the scale and operational speed of large-scale DDoS campaigns. 

Throughout the year, Cloudflare's telemetry indicated significant increases in attack frequency and intensity, culminating in a sharp increase in hypervolumetric incidents during the fourth quarter. There has been an increase in observed attack sizes by more than 700 percent since late 2024, reflecting a significant change in bandwidth resources and orchestration techniques available to contemporary botnet operators as compared to late 2024. 31.4 Tbps burst was attributed to AISURU Kimwolf infrastructure, which researchers have linked with multiple coordinated campaigns in 2025.

Automated traffic analysis and inline filtering systems helped spot and mitigate the November event, proving how relying on them is becoming more important to combat high speed volumetric floods. This botnet was also involved in the operation that began on December 19, which has been referred to as The Night Before Christmas. 

At the peak of that campaign, attack volumes were measured at approximately 3 billion packets per second, 4 Tbps of throughput, and 54 million HTTP requests per second. The peak rates were 9 billion packets a second, 24 Tbps, and 205 million requests a second, which shows simultaneous exploitation of application and network layer vectors. These year-end metrics help you understand the operational environment that inspired these campaigns. 

According to Cloudflare, DDoS activity increased by 121 percent during 2025, with defensive systems mitigating an average of 5,376 attacks per hour. The number of aggregated attacks exceeded 47.1 million, more than doubling that of the previous year. It is estimated that 34.4 million network layer attacks took place in the fourth quarter, an increase from 11.4 million in 2024. 

These attacks accounted for 78 percent of all DDoS activity. During the last quarter, DDoS incidents increased 31 percent, while year over year, they increased by 58 percent, suggesting a sustained expansion instead of episodic surges. 

A distinctive component of that growth curve was hyper volumetric attacks. In the fourth quarter alone, 1,824 such incidents were recorded, as compared to 1,304 recorded in the previous quarter and 717 during the first quarter. As a result, attack volumes increased severalfold within a single annual cycle, and not only the frequency of attacks has increased, but the amplitude has also increased notably. 

Combined, the data indicates that the threat landscape has been enhanced by compressed attack windows, increased packet rates, and unprecedented throughput levels, which reinforces concerns that record-breaking DDoS capacity is becoming an iterative benchmark rather than an exceptional event.

It was a calculated extension of the same operational doctrine in the December campaign, known as The Night Before Christmas. As of December 19, 2025, Cloudflare's infrastructure and downstream customers have been subjected to sustained hypervolumetric traffic directed by the botnet, which blends record scale Layer 4 floods with HTTP surges exceeding 200 million requests per second at the application layer. 

In September 2025, this operation exceeded the botnet's own previous benchmark of 29.7 Tbps, which marked a significant increase in bandwidth deployment and request augmentation. Upon examining the campaign, investigators determined that millions of unofficial streaming boxes were conscripted into the campaign, which generated packets and requests rarely seen at such a high rate. 

At its apex, 31.4 Tbps, the attack reached a magnitude that would have exceeded several major providers' publicly disclosed mitigation ceilings. In purely theoretical terms, Akamai Prolexic's capacity of 20 Tbps, Netscout Arbor Cloud's capacity of 15 Tbps, and Imperva's capacity of 13 Tbps would have reached bandwidth utilization levels exceeding 150 to 240 percent under equivalent load based on stated capacities. 

However, this comparison highlights the structural stress such volumes impose on conventional scrubbing architectures when comparing distributed absorption and traffic engineering strategies with real world resilience. In contrast to a single monolithic flood, telemetry from this campaign revealed a pattern of distributed, highly coordinated bursts.

Thousands of discrete attack waves exhibited consistent scaling characteristics, each exhibiting a similar pattern. Ninety-three percent of events reached peak rates between one and five Tbps, while 5.5 percent reached peak rates between five and ten Tbps. There was only a fractional 0.1 percent of events exceeding 30 Tbps, demonstrating that the headline-breaking spike was not only rare, but deliberate from a statistical perspective. 

According to packet rate analysis, 94.5 percent of attacks generated packets between one and five billion per second, while 4 percent peaked at five to ten billion, and 1.5 percent reached ten to fifteen billion packets per second. A number of attack waves were engineered as concentrated bursts rather than prolonged sieges, highlighting the tactical refinement of the operation. 

 There were 9.7 percent of attacks lasting less than 30 seconds, 27.1% lasting between 30 and 60 seconds, and 57.2% lasting 60 to 120 seconds. Only 6% exceeded the two-minute mark, suggesting a focus on high intensity volleys designed to strain defensive thresholds before adaptive mitigation can fully adjust. 

In hyper volumetric incidents, 42.5 percent of incidents were targeted against gaming organizations, while 15.3 percent were targeting IT and services organizations. This distribution indicates that it is aimed at industries with high latency sensitives and infrastructure-dependent infrastructures where even brief disruptions can have a substantial impact on operational and financial performance. 

In the wake of the December offensive, a botnet has gradually evolved into one of the most significant distributed denial of service threats observed over the past few years. Through the compromise of consumer grade devices, the Aisuru operation, which split into an Android-focused Kimwolf variant in August 2025, expanded aggressively.

According to Synthient, Kimwolf infected more than two million unofficial Android TVs, making them into a global attack grid. They built layered command and control architectures using residential proxy networks to make origin infrastructure look bad and make takedown harder. 

Botnet activity captured the attention of the public after it briefly pushed its own domain activity to the top of Cloudflare's global rankings, an outcome achieved as a consequence of artificial traffic amplification rather than organic traffic. Disruption efforts are ongoing. Black Lotus Labs, a division of Lumen Technologies, began counter-operations in early October 2025, disrupting traffic to more than 550 command and control servers connected to Kimwolf and Aisuru. 

Although the network displayed adaptive resilience, the endpoints were rapidly migrating to newly provisioned hosts, frequently using IP address space associated with Resi Rack LLC and recurring autonomous system numbers to reconstitute its control plane, and reconfiguring its control plane in a timely manner. This infrastructure rotation illustrates a trend in botnet engineering which emphasizes redundancy and rapid redeployment as part of operational design rather than as a contingency measure. 

An accelerating level of DDoS activity was evident across the entire internet as the record-setting events unfolded. There will be 47.1 million DDoS incidents in the year 2025, which represents a 121 percent increase over 2024 and a 236 percent increase over 2023. In the past year, automated mitigation systems processed approximately 5,376 attacks per hour, which included approximately 3,925 network level events and 1,451 HTTP layer floods. 

Most of the expansion has occurred at the network layer, with network layer attacks doubling from 11.4 million incidents to 34.4 million incidents year over year. In the fourth quarter alone, 8.5 million such attacks took place, reflecting 152 percent year-over-year growth and 43 percent quarter-over-quarter increase, with network layer vectors accounting for 78 percent of all DDoS activity in that quarter. 

Indicators of scale and sophistication reveal an intensifying threat model. There was a 600 percent increase in network layer attacks exceeding 100 million packets per second over the previous quarter, while those surpassing 1 Tbps increased by 65 percent. Nearly 1 percent of network layer attacks exceeded the 1 million packet per second threshold, emphasizing the increasing use of high intensity traffic bursts designed to stress routing and filtering systems. 

Most HTTP DDoS activity was caused by known botnets, accounting for 71.5 percent, anomalous HTTP attributes accounted for 18.8 percent, fake or headless browser signatures accounted for 5.8 percent, and generic flood techniques accounted for 1.8%. As indicated by the duration analysis, 78.9 percent of HTTP floods ended within ten minutes, suggesting a tactical preference for high impact, compressed attack cycles. 

It has been estimated that roughly three out of each hundred HTTP events qualified as hyper volumetric at the application layer while 69.4 percent of HTTP events remain below 50,000 requests per second, whereas 2.8% exceed 1 million requests per second. More than half of HTTP DDoS attempts were automatically neutralized without human intervention through Cloudflare's real-time botnet detection systems, reflecting an increased reliance on machine learning-driven mitigation frameworks. 

DDoS traffic observed in the fourth quarter exhibited notable changes in source distribution. Bangladesh emerged as the largest origin, replacing Indonesia, which fell to third place. In second place, Ecuador was ranked, while Argentina rose by twenty places to become the fourth largest source. Hong Kong, Ukraine, Vietnam, Taiwan, Singapore, and Peru also contributed significantly.

Analyzing data from autonomous systems indicates that adversaries disproportionately exploit cloud computing platforms and telecommunications infrastructure to gain an edge over their adversaries. In this report, Russia has lost five positions in the rankings, while the United States has lost four positions. 

There were six cloud providers collectively represented in the top ten source networks, including DigitalOcean, Microsoft, Tencent, Oracle, and Hetzner, reflecting the misuse of rapidly deployable virtual machines to generate traffic. The remaining high volume infrastructure has been mainly provided by telecommunications carriers in Asia Pacific, primarily in Vietnam, China, Malaysia, and Taiwan. 

With Cloudflare's globally distributed architecture, despite the extraordinary magnitude of the Night Before Christmas campaign, the load was contained within operational limits owing to Cloudflare's global distribution. The spike of 31.4 Tbps consumed approximately 7 percent of available bandwidth across 330 points of presence, leaving considerable residual bandwidth available for the next few months. 

In this case, the attack was detected and contained autonomously, without triggering any emergency escalation protocols. This episode highlights the gap between the capabilities of adversarial traffic generators and those of smaller providers in terms of their defensive capabilities. 

With volumetric ceilings on the rise and botnets adopting increasingly modular command frameworks, the sustainability of internet-facing services will depend on the availability of hyperscale mitigation infrastructure that can handle not only record-setting spikes in DDoS activity but also an accelerated baseline of global DDoS activity as it continues to grow. These events indicate a trajectory that has clear implications for enterprises, service providers, and infrastructure operators. 

In a world where volumetric thresholds continue to grow and botnets continue to industrialize device compromises at scale, incremental upgrades and reactive control cannot be relied upon to maintain a defensive edge. Mitigation partners must be evaluated based on their demonstrated absorption capacity, architectural distribution, maturity in automated response, and transparency in telemetry.

Edge assets, IoT ecosystems, and cloud workloads must also be hardened in order to prevent them from becoming targets and unwitting launch platforms, as they are increasingly exploited. 

In addition to indicating a structural shift in adversarial capability, the November and December campaigns serve not only as record setting anomalies. Defining resilience in this environment is less about preventing every attack and more about engineering networks that are capable of sustaining, absorbing, and recovering from traffic volumes that were once considered unimaginable.

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Windows
cyber espionage deskrat Indian Government Linux malware RAT Windows

Cross-Platform Spyware Campaigns Target Indian Defense and Government Sectors

 



Cybersecurity researchers have identified multiple coordinated cyber espionage campaigns targeting organizations connected to India’s defense sector and government ecosystem. These operations are designed to infiltrate both Windows and Linux systems using remote access trojans that allow attackers to steal sensitive information and retain long-term control over compromised devices.

The activity involves several spyware families, including Geta RAT, Ares RAT, and DeskRAT. These tools have been associated in open-source security reporting with threat clusters commonly tracked as SideCopy and APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe. Analysts assess that SideCopy has operated for several years and functions as an operational subset of the broader cluster. Rather than introducing radically new tactics, the actors appear to be refining established espionage techniques by expanding their reach across operating systems, using stealthier memory-resident methods, and experimenting with new delivery mechanisms to avoid detection while sustaining strategic targeting.

Across the campaigns, initial access is commonly achieved through phishing emails that deliver malicious attachments or links to attacker-controlled servers. Victims are directed to open Windows shortcut files, Linux executables, or weaponized presentation add-ins. These files initiate multi-stage infection chains that install spyware while displaying decoy documents to reduce suspicion.

One observed Windows attack chain abuses a legitimate system utility to retrieve and execute web-hosted malicious code from compromised, regionally trusted websites. The downloaded component decrypts an embedded library, writes a decoy PDF file to disk, contacts a command-and-control server, and opens the decoy for the user. Before deploying Geta RAT, the malware checks which security products are installed and modifies its persistence technique accordingly to improve survivability. This method has been documented in public research by multiple security vendors.

Geta RAT enables extensive surveillance and control, including system profiling, listing and terminating processes, enumerating installed applications, credential theft, clipboard manipulation, screenshot capture, file management, command execution, and data extraction from connected USB devices.

Parallel Linux-focused attacks begin with a loader written in Go that downloads a shell script to install a Python-based Ares RAT. This malware supports remote command execution, data collection, and the running of attacker-supplied scripts. In a separate infection chain, DeskRAT, a Golang-based backdoor, is delivered through a malicious presentation add-in that establishes outbound communication to retrieve the payload, a technique previously described in independent research.

Researchers note that targets extend beyond defense to policy bodies, research institutions, critical infrastructure, and defense-adjacent organizations within the same trusted networks. The combined deployment of Geta RAT, Ares RAT, and DeskRAT reflects a developing toolkit optimized for stealth, persistence, and long-term intelligence collection.

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supply chain attacks
Blockchain Security Threats Cryptocurrency Cybersecurity Konni APT malware North Korean Hackers Phishing Campaign PowerShell Backdoor supply chain attacks

Emerging AI Built Malware Used in Targeted Attacks on Blockchain Engineers


In the shadows of geopolitics, KONNI has been operating quietly for more than a decade, building on its playbook of carefully staged spear-phishing campaigns and political lures targeted at South Korean institutions.


In the past, KONNI's operations followed the fault lines between diplomacy and regional security, targeting government agencies, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, and individuals involved in inter-Korean affairs. However, new findings from Check Point Research indicate the organization is no longer restricted to this familiar territory.

In a marked departure from its traditional approach, KONNI is currently conducting phishing campaigns targeted at blockchain developers throughout the Asia-Pacific region — including Japan, Australia, and India — signaling the company's intention of expanding geographically and recalibrating its strategic approach.

As part of the campaign, in addition to shifting attention to individuals with access to blockchain infrastructure, a novel AI-based backdoor is also introduced, illustrating a refinement of the group's technical capabilities and operational priorities. In Check Point's analysis, the campaign appears to be the product of the North Korean threat group Konni (also tracked as Opal Sleet and TA406), which researchers believe has operational overlaps with activity clusters such as APT37 and Kimsuky. 

As of at least 2014, the group has been engaged in espionage operations against South Korean entities, Russian entities, Ukrainian entities, and multiple European countries. The telemetry generated by recent analyzed samples, however, indicates that the current wave of malware is concentrated in Asia-Pacific, with submissions originating from Japan, Australia, and India. 

This confirms the assessment of a deliberate geographic pivot. Infection chains are carefully staged and multilayered, indicating that they are designed to infect in a controlled manner. There is a Discord link provided to victims that serves a ZIP archive which contains a decoy PDF along with a malicious Windows shortcut file (LNK). 

By executing the shortcut, an embedded PowerShell loader will be invoked to extract additional components, including a DOCX lure and a CAB archive. Several payload components are contained in the cabinet file, including a PowerShell-based backdoor, two batch scripts for automating User Account Control (UAC), and an executable for bypassing User Account Control. 

Upon opening the shortcut, a decoy document is displayed while covertly executing a batch file embedded within, thereby ensuring the malicious activity is concealed in legitimate documentation. The lure content itself indicates that attackers intend to penetrate development environments, allowing them access to infrastructure repositories, API credentials, wallet configurations, and possibly cryptocurrency holdings.

An initial batch script establishes a staging directory for persistent storage, deposits the backdoor and secondary scripts and configures a scheduled task designed to run on an hourly basis in order to avoid detection by OneDrive. This procedure consists of retrieving PowerShell payloads from disk, decrypting them at runtime and subsequently removing them from the system in an effort to minimize forensic visibility and complicate incident response. 

A Check Point Research report further indicated that KONNI's operators have been contacting IT technicians and developers directly, using carefully constructed phishing emails that appear to be legitimate project requirements. It is the firm's belief that the objective is not limited to compromising individual systems, but is intended to gain access to cloud infrastructure, source code repositories, APIs, and blockchain credentials as well. 

It has been reported that a successful compromise results in the deployment of a PowerShell backdoor that is artificial intelligence-assisted, providing persistent access to infected systems and sensitive assets within development environments. The apparent use of artificial intelligence in designing the backdoor is a distinguishing feature of the campaign. 

According to Check Point, the malware's modular architecture, structured formatting, embedded developer-style comments, including placeholders indicating that AI tooling was used during development, as well as its embedded developer-style comments. 

Instead of introducing fundamentally new exploitation techniques, it appears that the use of artificial intelligence simplifies the generation of code, accelerates iteration cycles, and enables rapid customization while maintaining established delivery methods. 

Despite the lack of determination of the exact initial access vector, the intrusion chain unfolds through a multi-stage process that uses ZIP archives hosted by Discord's content delivery network. Each archive contains an innocent-looking PDF decoy in addition to a malicious LNK shortcut. 

A shortcut is executed, launching an embedded PowerShell loader that generates an embedded Word document to serve as a distraction, as well as a CAB archive that contains the primary payload components. These include a PowerShell backdoor, two batch scripts, and an executable specifically designed for bypassing User Account Control.

Using the first batch script, the execution environment is prepared, persistence is established by way of scheduled tasks, and the backdoor is staged and launched, and it is then deleted to reduce forensic artifacts. PowerShell implants perform a number of anti-analysis and sandbox-evasion checks prior to profiling the host system and then attempt to gain access to the host system by using FodHelper UAC bypass. 

A secondary batch script is executed by the malware after elevation, which removes the dropped UAC bypass binary, configures Microsoft Defender exclusions for the "C:/ProgramData" directory, and replaces the original scheduled task with an elevated task version. 

A backdoor is used to maintain remote access by deploying SimpleHelp, a legitimate remote management and monitoring tool. A command-and-control server is connected via an encryption gate to filter non-browser traffic, enabling the backdoor to communicate with it continuously. This channel is used to transmit system metadata periodically and to execute PowerShell instructions provided by the server to the compromised host. 

Using this layered approach, Check Point assesses that the campaign's main purpose is to establish footholds within development ecosystems, rather than targeting isolated end users. It combines malicious activity with legitimate administrative tooling to reinforce persistence. Through the use of development environments, multiple projects, services, and digital asset platforms can be leveraged downstream. 

As researchers argue, the integration of AI-assisted tooling demonstrates the use of standardization and speed up of malware production while continuing to rely on proven social engineering strategies. North Korea-related operations have been observed in recent months that align with these findings. 

A number of campaigns have deployed JavaScript encoded scripts disguised as Hangul Word Processor documents as a means of enabling remote access to Visual Studio Code, while others have distributed LNK files masquerading as PDF documents to deliver the MoonPeak remote access trojan following virtual environment verification.

As a result of activities associated with the Andariel subgroup in 2025, TigerRAT was used against a European law firm. An update mechanism of a South Korean ERP software vendor was compromised, allowing the distribution of multiple Trojans — StarshellRAT, JelusRAT, and GopherRAT — to downstream customers. 

According to WithSecure, this ERP vendor was previously utilized in supply chain intrusions in 2017 and 2024 to propagate malware families including HotCroissant and Xctdoor. Several of the newly identified implants demonstrate technical diversity. JelusRAT, developed in C++, is capable of retrieving plugins from command servers; StarshellRAT, created in C#, allows command execution, file transfers, screenshot capture, and GopherRAT, developed in Golang, is capable of enumerating file systems, executing commands, and exfiltrating data. 

There has been a continuous display of strategic adaptability on the part of North Korea-related threat groups. Several objectives have been pursued by these groups, ranging from theft of cryptocurrency as a form of financial motivation to gathering intelligence aligned with government priorities. 

Through the incorporation of artificial intelligence-assisted development techniques in conjunction with operational flexibility, a sustained evolution in tooling and targeting is evident — particularly in light of adversaries' increasing pursuit of operational areas of high value, such as software supply chains and blockchain ecosystems.

Throughout this campaign, security teams are urged to treat developer workstations, build pipelines, and repository access with the same rigor traditionally reserved for production systems as they represent one of the most strategically valuable attack surfaces in the digital economy. 

Multifactor authentication is enforced on source control and cloud platforms by enforcing hardware-backed authentication, restricting local administrative privileges, monitoring schedule creation and PowerShell execution, and auditing endpoint security exclusions to ensure unauthorized changes have not occurred. 

Additionally, organizations operating within blockchain-based and digital asset ecosystems should have a strict system of network segmentation, continuous credential rotation, and behavior monitoring capabilities that can detect anomalous behavior involving legitimate remote management tools. In addition, it is necessary to strengthen defenses at the human layer of the attack given the campaign's reliance on convincingly themed project documentation and developer-centered lures.

As a result, targeted phishing simulations and secure code environment awareness training should be prioritised for engineers. Defensers must also anticipate faster tooling cycles and increasingly modular payloads with the emergence of AI-assisted malware development. 

Taking proactive measures to mitigate downstream impact will require telemetry correlation across endpoints and cloud environments, as well as rapid incident containment procedures. Resilience will be equally dependent upon integrating security controls directly into the development lifecycle rather than treating them as a downstream safeguard as adversaries continue to recalculate their targeting of high-value technical roles and software supply chains.
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Stanley
Chrome Web Store Maas Hack malware Phising Campaign Stanley

Stanley Malware Service Bypasses Chrome Web Store Safeguards

 

Researchers at Varonis have discovered a new malware-as-a-service (MaaS) offering, dubbed "Stanley," which allows malicious Chrome extensions to evade Google’s review process and be listed on the official Chrome Web Store. Dubbed after the alias of the seller, Stanley is also designed to target other popular browsers like Edge and Brave, making it easier for phishing attacks to be deployed. The service is offered at high-end pricing tiers, going up to $6,000, and is designed to make it easier for malicious actors with less technical knowledge. 

The main functionality is achieved through the use of a full-screen iframe overlay of phishing content on top of legitimate websites, with the browser’s address bar still visible to maintain a level of authenticity. The user is presented with interfaces for trusted websites, such as banking websites, but their interactions are instead routed to attacker-controlled pages that are designed for phishing. Other functionalities include IP targeting, geographic filtering, cross-device session correlation, and Chrome-native push notifications to improve user engagement.

The attackers use a web-based control panel to dynamically change hijacking rules, poll command-and-control (C2) servers every ten seconds, and change backup domains to make it more difficult to take down. The service offers subscription plans, with the final option being a "Luxe" plan that includes full support for publication to the Web Store and customization options. Despite the code being described as "rudimentary" with Russian-language comments and poor error handling, the step-by-step implementation of known techniques seems to offer high levels of effectiveness. 

This development exacerbates ongoing issues with the Chrome Web Store, where malicious extensions have repeatedly evaded detection, as noted in recent Symantec and LayerX reports. Varonis highlights Stanley's distribution promise as its standout feature amid rising browser add-on threats. Google has been contacted for comment, but such incidents underscore persistent vetting gaps in the ecosystem serving billions. 

Users must adopt vigilant habits: install only essential extensions, scrutinize developer reputations and reviews, and enable browser protections like Enhanced Safe Browsing. Enterprises should enforce extension whitelisting and monitor for anomalous behavior via endpoint detection tools. As MaaS evolves, staying proactive against store-approved threats remains critical for cybersecurity in 2026.
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Traffic Manipulation
Adversary In The Middle China Linked APT DarkNimbus DKnife Framework malware Network Edge Attacks Router Hijacking ShadowPad Traffic Manipulation

China-Linked DKnife Threat Underscores Risks to Network Edge Devices

 


Despite adversaries increasing their focus on the network edge, recent findings suggest a sustained and deliberate effort to weaponize routing infrastructure itself for surveillance and delivery purposes. An attacker can observe, modify, and selectively redirect data streams in transit by embedding malicious logic directly into traffic paths rather than relying on endpoint compromise. 

This evolution is reflected in the development of the DKnife framework, which has transformed attacker-in-the-middle capabilities into modular, long-lived platforms that are designed to be persistent, stealthy, and operationally flexible. 

Through the framework's ability to operate at a level where legitimate traffic aggregation and inspection already take place, the line between benign network functionality and hostile control is blurred, enabling malware deployment and long-term monitoring across a variety of device classes and user environments targeted at targeted users. 

According to cybersecurity researchers, DKnife is an adversary-in-the-middle framework that has operated from at least 2019 to maintain router-centric infrastructure by threat actors who have been found to be linked to China. 

In order to enable deep packet inspection, selective traffic manipulation, and covert delivery of malicious payloads, seven Linux-based implants are installed on gateways and edge devices. Several code artifacts and telemetry indicate a clear focus on Chinese-speaking users, including credential-harvesting components tailored specifically for Chinese email services, data exfiltration modules specifically targeted at popular mobile applications, and hard-coded references to domestic media domains buried within the implants. 

It is argued that DKnife's potential strategic value lies in its ability to act as a conduit between legitimate update and download channels and users. As the framework intercepts binary transfers and mobile application updates in transit, it is possible to deploy and manage established backdoors across a broad range of endpoints ranging from desktop systems to mobile devices to Internet of Things environments, including ShadowPad and DarkNimbus. 

According to Cisco Talos, the activity has been associated with the ongoing tracking of a Chinese threat cluster dubbed Earth Minotaur, previously associated with exploit kits like MOONSHINE as well as backdoors like DarkNimbus. The reuse of DarkNimbus is noteworthy, as the malware has also been found in operations attributed to another Chinese advanced persistent threat group, The Wizards, indicating the possibility of sharing tools or infrastructure among these groups. 

Upon further analysis of the infrastructure, it was revealed that DKnife-associated resources overlapped with those connected to WizardNet, a Windows implant deployed by TheWizards through an AitM framework called Spellbinder, which was publicized in 2025. This led to additional connections between DKnife-associated systems and WizardNet resources. 

As Cisco cautions, current insights into DKnife's targeting may be incomplete due to the fact that the configuration data obtained from a single command-and-control server provide limited information about its target market of Chinese-speaking users. It is possible that parallel servers exist to support operations in other regions as well. 

Due to The Wizards' history of targeting individuals and gambling-related entities across Southeast Asia, Greater China, and the Middle East, the convergence of infrastructure and tactics is significant, highlighting the wider implications of DKnife as a traffic hijacking platform with reusable, regionally adaptable features. 

Although researchers have not determined the exact vector used to compromise network equipment, researchers have established that DKnife functions to deliver and control backdoors known as ShadowPad and DarkNimbus, both of which have been used by Chinese-allied threat actors for decades. A technical analysis reveals that there are seven discrete modules in the framework. 

Each module is designed to support a particular operational role, such as traffic inspection, manipulation, and control-and-control messages, as well as origin obfuscation. In addition to packet inspection and attack logic, the system includes relay services to facilitate communication with remote C2 servers as well as a customized reverse proxy derived from HAProxy to mask and manage malicious traffic flows. 

Additionally, DKnife extends its capabilities beyond passive monitoring with additional modules. An attacker is able to establish a virtual Ethernet TAP interface on the compromised router and connect it directly to the local network, effectively placing themselves in the data path of internal communications.

In addition, there are third parties who provide peer-to-peer VPN connectivity using modified n2n software, coordinate the download and update of malicious Android applications, and manage the deployment of the DKnife implants themselves. 

Together, these elements provide a range of tools for a wide range of activities, including DNS hijacking, intercepting legitimate binary and application updates, selectively disrupting security-related traffic, and exfiltrating detailed user activity to external command infrastructures. In addition to intercepting and rewriting packets destined for their original hosts once activated on a device, DKnife also uses its network-bridging capabilities to substitute malicious payloads during transit transparently. 

Through this technique, weaponized APK files can be delivered to Android devices as well as compromised binaries to Windows systems connected to the affected network using this technique. Research conducted by Cisco Talos demonstrated instances in which the framework first installed ShadowPad backdoors for Windows, signed by Chinese certificates, followed by the installation of DarkNimbus backdoors to establish long-term access. 

Unlike secondary droppers, DarkNimbus was delivered directly to Android environments through the manipulated update channel. It was further revealed by investigators that infrastructure was associated with a framework hosting the WizardNet backdoor, a Windows implant previously associated with Spellbinder AitM. This confirmed the link between DKnife and previously documented adversary-in-the-middle attacks. 

Incorporating these tools within the same operational environment implies that development resources will likely be shared or infrastructure will be coordinated. As a result, threat actors are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their use of compromised network devices as covert malware distribution channels as opposed to utilizing endpoints to spread malware. 

The Cisco Talos team further concluded that DKnife is capable of intercepting Windows binary downloads in addition to mobile ecosystems. As observed, the framework was capable of manipulating download URLs in transit, either substituting legitimate installers for trojanized counterparts or redirecting users to malicious distribution points controlled by the attackers. 

In combination with its DNS manipulation capabilities and control over application update channels, DKnife provides an extensive traffic-hijacking platform that can silently deliver malware while maintaining the appearance of normal network behavior.

The framework's components work together to create a continuous attack system at the network gateway that functions in conjunction with each other. Moreover, DKnife offers a broad range of secondary functionality in addition to payload delivery, such as credential harvesting through decrypted POP3 and IMAP sessions, hosting phishing pages, selectively disrupting antivirus and security product traffic, and detailed user activity monitoring. 

Several applications and services were observed to collect telemetry, including messaging platforms, navigation tools, news consumption, telephony, ridesharing, and online shopping, by researchers. In particular, WeChat was observed to receive significant attention, with the framework tracking voice and video calls, message content, media exchanges, and articles accessed through the application. The placement of DKnife on gateway devices permits near real-time visibility into user behavior. 

Activity events are processed internally across the framework's modular components first before being exfiltrated via structured HTTP POST requests to dedicated API endpoints and then forwarded to remote command-and-control infrastructure. 

A significant reduction in the need for persistent malware on individual endpoints is achieved through this architecture, which allows attackers to correlate traffic flows and user actions as packets traverse the network. Researchers note that this approach reflects a greater trend towards infrastructure-level compromise, which is the use of routers and edge devices as persistent delivery platforms for malware. 

According to Cisco Talos, DKnife-associated command-and-control servers remain active as of January 2026, highlighting the continued nature of this threat. An exhaustive set of indicators of compromise has been developed by the firm to assist defenders in identifying compromised systems, as well as emphasizing the need to pay increased attention to network infrastructure as adversaries continue to utilize its unique position within modern digital environments to their advantage.
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