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Belarusian Hackers Compromised Russian Healthcare Network for Two Years


A Belarusian hacktivist gang allegedly maintained access to the network of a Russian healthcare organization for almost two years, potentially gaining access to sensitive medical information, cybersecurity researchers have reported.

Researchers from Russian cybersecurity company Solar said they discovered the intrusion in December 2025. However, their investigation found evidence suggesting that the attackers had entered parts of the organization’s infrastructure as early as 2024.

Attack details

The attack was attributed to the Belarusian Cyber Partisans, a group known for cyber operations against Belarusian and Russian government organizations and businesses.

Despite remaining inside the network for an extended period, the attackers did not appear to destroy systems or cause major disruption. Researchers believe maintaining access may have been more valuable to the attackers than immediately carrying out destructive activity. 

Intrusion details

Solar researchers identified several tools associated with the intrusion, including an updated version of the Vasilek Windows backdoor.

Vasilek was previously documented by Kaspersky as malware used by the Cyber Partisans. The backdoor can communicate with attackers through the Telegram Bot API and receive commands through a Telegram group. It can collect information from infected computers, execute Windows commands, transfer files, capture screenshots and record keystrokes. 

Attack tactic 

Solar said the newer version found during its investigation was version 1.5.8. Researchers also identified techniques for maintaining persistence inside the victim’s environment. These included Windows services and the replacement of the vmtools.dll library associated with VMware Tools.

The attackers also used other communication and tunnelling tools, including DNS tunnels and proxy chains. This gave them alternative methods of communicating with compromised systems if one channel became unavailable. 

Telegram restrictions in Russia affected Vasilek’s communications, but researchers said the attackers could use other methods to maintain their access.

What next?

The compromised organization was not publicly identified. However, researchers said it operated a large infrastructure connected to multiple other healthcare organizations.

This created a potential trusted-relationship attack risk. Once attackers gained control of one organization, its connections with other trusted healthcare entities could potentially provide opportunities to reach additional networks.

The researchers said the attackers accessed sensitive medical data but did not destroy the victim’s systems. The long period of access suggests that espionage, intelligence gathering and maintaining future access may have been more important than immediate disruption. 

China Nexus Cyber Espionage Attacks Government Organizations


A China-nexus cyber-espionage campaign is targeting government and policy organizations across Asia with a previously undocumented Windows backdoor called Antino. Researchers at Cisco Talos are tracking the threat activity as UAT-11587.

Campaign details 

The campaign has targeted organizations in Taiwan, India, the Philippines, Cambodia, Pakistan, Thailand, Myanmar and Syria. By July 2026, Talos had identified at least 16 affected or targeted institutional environments and approximately 350 compromised endpoints.

The campaign's lure theme and targeting provide additional contextual support. Its lures and observed targets include Taiwanese political, legislative, civil defense, and policy research subjects, together with regional government, maritime, diplomatic, and security themes. This collection focus is consistent with China-nexus actor interests,” Talos said.

The most notable feature of Antino is its use of legitimate Microsoft 365 services as command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. Instead of relying on a traditional attacker-controlled server, the malware communicates through Microsoft Outlook and OneDrive using Microsoft Graph.

About Antino

Antino is a Rust-compiled Windows backdoor capable of gathering information about infected systems, executing commands through Windows shell and PowerShell, transferring files, loading shellcode directly into memory and maintaining persistence.

About the infection 

The infection generally begins with a carefully prepared spear-phishing email. Attackers used government, diplomatic, maritime, legislative and foreign-policy themes designed to appear relevant to their intended victims.

Attack tactic

In some cases, the attackers recreated Gmail’s attachment-preview interface inside the email. When victims interacted with the fake attachment, they were directed to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

The attack then proceeds through multiple stages involving HTA or WSF files, JavaScript and a .NET-based downloader before ultimately installing Antino. The malware has also been deployed through DLL sideloading, using a legitimate Microsoft-signed executable to load the malicious DLL. 

Once installed, Antino uses Microsoft Graph to communicate with Microsoft 365. Outlook is used for receiving commands, while OneDrive handles heartbeat communications and file transfers. This allows malicious traffic to terminate at legitimate Microsoft infrastructure, potentially making conventional network-based detection more difficult.

Impact on systems

A successful Antino infection can provide attackers with persistent access to a Windows system, allowing them to conduct reconnaissance, execute commands, run PowerShell, access files and transfer data.

The targeting of government agencies, diplomatic organizations, universities, think tanks and policy groups suggests that the campaign is focused primarily on intelligence gathering and espionage rather than ordinary financial cybercrime.

Cisco Talos assessed UAT-11587 as China-nexus with high confidence, citing technical, language, infrastructure and targeting indicators. However, researchers noted that attribution to a specific Chinese group remains more complicated. 

File Notification APIs in Windows, Linux, and Android Are Leaking What You Do on Your Computer

 



A research team from Graz University of Technology in Austria has shown that a routine feature built into virtually every major operating system can be turned into a surveillance channel that tracks keystrokes, visited websites, and private messaging activity without needing administrator access.

The feature is the file-change notification system. Every major platform ships one: Linux has inotify and fanotify, Windows uses ReadDirectoryChangesW, and Android and macOS have their own equivalents. Text editors, antivirus software, cloud sync clients, and file managers depend on these APIs to react when files are created, modified, or deleted. The catch is that subscribing to those notifications requires no special privileges, only read access to the directory being watched.

What these APIs never hand over is actual file content. What they do leak, the researchers found, is file names and the exact timing of events. That combination is enough to reconstruct meaningful details about what other users on the same machine are doing throughout the day.


Linux: Keystrokes Through the Filesystem

On Linux, if a process is blocked from watching a specific file directly, it can still receive that file's events by watching the parent directory, as long as that directory is readable. The researchers applied this to device files under /dev that represent keyboard hardware. The result is that an unprivileged process can detect every keystroke another user makes, though not which key was pressed.

That gap offers less protection than it appears to. Research going back more than two decades has established that the rhythm of inter-keystroke timing can help reconstruct what was typed. In tests with seven participants, the attack scored between 93.1% and 100% on standard accuracy measures. Input that never echoes to the screen, such as a password entered during a sudo prompt, does not generate filesystem events and stays invisible to the attack.

The team also demonstrated website fingerprinting by watching which system fonts Firefox loads for a given page. Against the top 100 sites, that technique reached 87.9% accuracy. A third Linux attack targeted KDE Plasma 6 on Wayland: a malicious process running as the victim can detect when a real authentication dialog is about to appear and draw a counterfeit one over it to capture credentials before the legitimate prompt ever loads.


Android: No Permissions Required

On Android, an application requesting zero permissions can watch the private storage directory of a completely separate app. Testing against WhatsApp on a Google Pixel and a Samsung Galaxy device, the researchers extracted file names and event timing that revealed when photos, videos, and documents were sent or received. The attack also exposed when that media was later deleted, offering a window into communication patterns that the app's own privacy controls do not address.


Windows: One Watch, Every User's Files

The most consequential Windows scenario arises when a process watches the root of the system drive. Windows reports the full path of every file that changes anywhere on the machine, including paths inside other users' home directories that the monitoring account has no direct permission to access.

Because Firefox names profile subdirectories after associated websites, an unprivileged user watching the drive root can track which sites another logged-in account is browsing in near-real time. Across the top 1,000 websites, the researchers hit 97.8% accuracy against Firefox and 48.5% against Edge, which creates far fewer site-named folders.

This behavior comes from the same ReadDirectoryChangesW API that was flagged under CVE-2007-0843 for a similar class of issue almost two decades ago. Microsoft's position has not shifted. The company told the researchers the behavior is working as designed, on the grounds that file contents remain inaccessible. A Microsoft spokesperson told SecurityWeek that "the technique requires an attacker to already have the ability to run code locally on a device under a separate user account and does not provide access to file contents." Microsoft did note that administrators can enable optional protections it documented in April 2025 covering some path-disclosure scenarios tied to directory change notifications.

macOS came out the least exposed of the four platforms. Its equivalent API can only monitor globally readable files, which limits the attack surface, though the researchers still demonstrated tracking of application launches, app interactions, and settings changes.

The Linux kernel received a targeted patch under CVE-2025-68788, which stops the fsnotify subsystem from generating access and modify events for special files, including the device files representing keyboard input. The researchers describe this as addressing the most serious Linux issue, but other attack paths from their research remain open.

Apple and Google have not responded to requests for comment, and no fixes have been announced for Android or macOS. The researchers say they have found no evidence of active exploitation in the wild. Proof-of-concept code for the full set of attacks has been published on GitHub at isec-tugraz/file-notification-attacks.



Google Just Patched a Chrome Security Flaw That Hackers Were Already Exploiting



Before getting into the specifics, it helps to understand what makes this kind of vulnerability different from a regular software bug.

A "zero-day" is a security flaw that attackers find and exploit before the software maker has had a chance to fix it. The name comes from the fact that the developer has had zero days to respond. By the time a patch is released, real damage may already be happening somewhere.

In this case, Google confirmed in a security advisory that "an exploit for CVE-2026-87491 exists in the wild," meaning someone built a working attack tool using this flaw and used it. Google has not said who was targeted, how many people were affected, or who was behind the attacks.

The vulnerability sits inside a part of Chrome called V8, the component responsible for running JavaScript on every webpage you visit. JavaScript is the programming language that powers most of the interactive features on the modern internet, from buttons and forms to video players and live chats. V8 runs all of it, on every tab you open, on every website you visit.

The specific flaw is what security researchers call an out-of-bounds write. Think of it this way: imagine a program is given a box that holds exactly ten items. This bug lets an attacker force the program to keep placing items into that box even after it is full, pushing data into the digital space next to it. In a browser, that neighboring space holds other sensitive information and instructions. Corrupting it gives an attacker the ability to take control of what the browser is doing.

What makes this especially concerning is how simple it is to trigger. According to the National Vulnerability Database, an attacker just needs to get a target to visit a specially built webpage. That could come through a phishing link in an email, a malicious advertisement on a legitimate website, or a compromised page the victim had no reason to distrust.


A University Student Found the Flaw

The vulnerability was discovered by Jihyeon Jeong, a research intern at Seoul National University's Compsec Lab in South Korea, who reported it to Google on August 6. Google rewarded Jeong with a $2,500 bug bounty for the responsible disclosure and began working on a fix.

The patch arrived on September 8, roughly 33 days after it was reported. During that window, someone else was apparently already using the flaw in real attacks. Whether attackers found the bug on their own or learned about it another way is something Google has not publicly addressed.


The US Government Is Treating This Seriously Too

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the federal body responsible for protecting US government systems from cyber threats, added this vulnerability to its official list of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities on the same day Google released the fix.

That listing comes with a hard deadline: federal civilian agencies must apply the patch by September 23, 2026. While that mandate only formally applies to government networks, companies and organizations across the private sector regularly use CISA's list as a guide for their own patching priorities. When CISA flags something as actively exploited, most security teams pay attention regardless of their sector.


This Is the Second Chrome Attack in Less Than a Week

Just five days earlier, on September 3, Google fixed a different Chrome vulnerability that was also being exploited in active attacks. That flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-85046, was also inside V8. Two exploited vulnerabilities in the same component of the same browser, patched within five days of each other.

Across all of 2026, seven Chrome flaws have now been confirmed exploited in the wild and patched. Three of those seven were inside V8 specifically. For comparison, Google patched eight Chrome zero-days across the entire 12 months of 2025.

Why does V8 keep coming up? Because it is one of the most attractive targets available to an attacker. It processes code from every website a person visits, it is extremely complex under the hood, and the programming language it is built in does not have built-in protections against the kind of memory errors that lead to these vulnerabilities. For sophisticated attackers, finding a flaw in V8 is like finding a master key.


Monday's Update Fixed 230 Security Flaws Total

The zero-day was not the only problem addressed in Monday's release. Chrome 153 fixed 230 security vulnerabilities in total, five of which were rated critical. Four of the critical issues were in WebGL, the part of Chrome that handles 3D graphics in the browser. A fifth critical flaw was found in the Cast component, which handles streaming to devices like Chromecast.

Interestingly, one of the high-severity bugs in the same update was credited to OpenAI Codex Security, an AI-powered security tool, suggesting that artificial intelligence is increasingly being used to find browser vulnerabilities alongside human researchers.

Google said it internally identified 195 of the 230 total flaws through its own security tools before they could be found and exploited by outsiders.


How to Update Chrome Right Now

Google's update will reach most users automatically over the coming days or weeks, but given that this flaw is already being exploited, waiting for the automatic rollout is not the right call.

Here is how to force the update immediately:

1. Open Google Chrome

2. Click the three dots in the top right corner of the browser window

3. Select Help, then click About Google Chrome

4. Chrome will automatically check for and download any available update

5. Once it finishes, click Relaunch to complete the installation

The safe versions are 153.0.8010.36 or higher for Windows and Linux, and 153.0.8010.37 for Mac. If your browser already shows one of those numbers on the About Chrome screen, you are protected.


Google has not named who was behind the attacks exploiting this vulnerability. In past years, Chrome zero-days have been linked to commercial spyware makers and government-backed hacking groups. For now, the company says it is keeping details about the attacks restricted while the patch continues rolling out to users worldwide.

One WeChat Call Was Enough to Hijack Accounts Across iPhone and Android

 



A new wave of WeChat vulnerability can turn an incoming voice call into a zero-click account takeover, enabling a compromised account to target another contact without requiring the recipient to answer the call or interact with the device.

Security researchers at Calif developed the exploit and demonstrated its worm-like propagation across an iPhone and two Android devices. In the test, an Android phone called an iPhone and compromised its WeChat account while the incoming call was still ringing. The compromised iPhone then called a second Android phone, allowing the researchers to repeat the takeover.

The attack depends on the caller already being listed as a WeChat contact of the target. Calif said this is not necessarily a strong protection because compromising one account can give an attacker access to that user's trusted contacts, creating opportunities to propagate the attack through existing relationships.

The recipient does not need to answer the call. Calif said answering it also does not prevent exploitation, with the victim hearing nothing while the attack continues. Rejecting the call stops that individual attempt, but an attacker can simply place another call later. This could allow repeated attempts when a target is unavailable, including while the person is asleep.

According to Calif, the vulnerability affects WeChat's VoIP functionality and involves memory corruption. Successful exploitation provides control over the victim's WeChat account, allowing an attacker to read and send messages, make calls and operate the account as its owner. The researchers stressed that the vulnerability by itself does not provide control of the entire smartphone. Chaining it with separate device vulnerabilities could, however, potentially extend an attack beyond the application.

Calif has not released the exploit's technical details and plans to present its full research at a security conference. The company said its researchers used an AI-assisted system designed to explore attack surfaces in messaging applications to identify the vulnerability. Calif said its engineering team identified the bug on July 23, completed an Android exploit on July 30 and demonstrated the worm on August 11. It separately described the initial exploit development as taking about two days, followed by roughly another week to build the worm.

The researchers disclosed the issue to Tencent in July. Tencent subsequently released WeChat 8.0.77 for Android and 8.0.76 for iOS on August 21. Calif said those updates mitigated its exploit and that it confirmed on August 28 that Tencent had also blocked the attack on its servers. On September 4, Calif said Tencent confirmed that the vulnerability could be exploited for remote command execution.

The server-side mitigation means users do not necessarily need to install an update for the specific exploit to be blocked. Keeping the application updated remains advisable, particularly because Tencent has not published a complete list of affected versions. Calif said it tested against Android 8.0.76 and iOS 8.0.75, including iOS 26.6 and older Android releases.

Tencent has not publicly issued a security advisory describing the vulnerability, while its release notes characterize the relevant updates as bug fixes. The company also distributes WeChat clients for HarmonyOS, Windows, macOS and Linux, but Calif has not disclosed whether those versions were tested.

The risk extends beyond private conversations because WeChat incorporates services including payments, official accounts and mini programs. Tencent reported 1.439 billion combined monthly active users for WeChat and Weixin as of June 30, 2026, giving an account-level compromise potential consequences beyond ordinary messaging.

There is currently no indication that the flaw was used in attacks against WeChat users. Calif has not reported an active campaign, and the researchers have not published indicators that defenders could use to identify exploitation. As of September 8, checks also found no CVE identifier for the vulnerability and no corresponding advisory on Tencent's security response site.

The discovery adds to a continuing security concern around zero-click vulnerabilities in communications software. Such attacks can exploit data automatically processed by an application before a user accepts an incoming communication, removing the conventional requirement for a victim to click a malicious link or open an attachment.

Calif's demonstration therefore presents two distinct risks: the immediate compromise of a WeChat account and the possibility of automated propagation through trusted contacts. While Tencent has blocked the demonstrated exploit, the absence of a public technical analysis means users cannot independently determine from the available information whether older or alternative WeChat builds were vulnerable.

REVSTEALER Malware Disables Windows Security to Run a Crypto Miner


A new malware campaign associated with the REVSTEALER information stealing malware has been discovered using another four additional malicious programs to secretly mine cryptocurrency, steal cryptocurrency data, and maintain access to compromised Windows systems.

About the malware

As per Elastic Security Labs, the four programs are called LockAppHost, SoftManager, WinUpdate, and ProManager. 

Experts found that the components can stay on a computer even when REVSTEALER removes itself. This makes the compromise hard to locate and stop. 

“Unlike most commodity stealers, REVSTEALER seems to put more effort into validating its targets; this is evident in its cryptocurrency wallet harvester, which uses a multi-layer architecture with a discovery engine followed by a collector that applies wallet-specific extension filters to extract only relevant files,” Elastic Security Labs reported.

What does REVSTEALER do?

Available as a commercial malware since February 2026, REVSTEALER is a rising Windows information stealer. It can store browser cookies and passwords, messaging data, cryptocurrency wallet details, files from compromised systems, and gaming accounts. Once the information is stolen, the primary malware deletes itself, which results in making the computer look legitimate. 

But the four newly discovered programs work distinctly as they can remain on the target's computers by installing themselves.

The four malicious programs

LockAppHost

LockAppHost is the most disruptive component, because before launching a cryptocurrency miner, it can disable Windows security.

SoftManager

SoftManger turns a compromised system into a reverse proxy. This permits threat actors to direct their network traffic via the target’s internet connection, possibly covering the tracks of the threat actor’s real location. 

WinUpdate

WinUpdate surveys the Windows clipboard. The malware can replace the addresses controlled by attackers when a user copies cryptocurrency wallet addresses. This may send cryptocurrency payments to the threat actors

ProManager

Cryptocurrency wallets are the main focus of this program. ProManager can steal browser wallet extensions and wallet files. Experts also discovered that the program can show attacker-controlled content over genuine cryptocurrency wallet apps and store passphrases and passwords typed by users.

LockAppHost shuts down windows security

LockAppHost can get admin privileges to make major changes in the Windows system, Elastic found. 

LockAppHost can also disable five Windows Update services, impact Microsoft Defender, turn off two malware-removal tasks, and shut down 11 scheduled update tasks. It launches a cryptocurrency miner after compromising the computer’s security features. 

The miner makes it difficult to detect for users to find out malicious operations and for security software to detect by hiding inside authenticated Windows processes.

Critical Nexus 9000 Flaw Could Permit Threat Actors to Gain Root Access


Cisco has issued security patches to fix a critical vulnerability impacting 10 Silicon One-based Nexus 9000 switches that could permit an unauthorized, remote threat actor to execute code with root privileges.

About the flaw

This flaw arises because the default Layer 3 (L3) virtual routing and forwarding (VRF) allows access to TCP ports 43210 and 43211. If the exploit is effective, the attacker may be able to connect to the compromised device and submit manipulated input that could be run as root-level code. Additionally, if this vulnerability is exploited, the S1HAL process may crash and the device may need to reload.

Who is impacted?

The Nexus vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-20212, with a CVSS score of 9.8, was reported on September 2 by Cisco. The vulnerability impacts a few Nexus 9000 switches consisting of Silicon One ASICs, which can result in either device outages or remote code execution.

According to Cisco,  Nexus 9000 Series Switches with the following product identifiers (PIDs) included a Silicon One ASIC, are vulnerable:

  • N9324C-SE1U
  • N9348Y2C6D-SE1U
  • N9364E-SG2-O
  • N9364E-SG2-Q
  • N9396T12C-SE1
  • N9348Y12C-SE1
  • N9396Y12C-SE1
  • N9336C-SE1
  • N9K-C9804
  • N9K-C9808

If effectively abused, the threat actor could run code with root-level privileges on the switch, This can allow attackers to modify the device, compromise traffic travelling via the infrastructure, and disturb the network operations.

According to Cisco, Nexus 9000 switches working in ACI mode and other Cisco and Nexus product families are not impacted. Admins can use the show module command to find the product ID of a Nexus switch and decide if it is in the impacted range.

The following products are not vulnerable, according to Cisco advisory:

  • Firepower 1000 Series
  • Firepower 2100 Series
  • Firepower 4100 Series
  • Firepower 9300 Security Appliances
  • MDS 9000 Series Multilayer Switches
  • Nexus 3000 Series Switches
  • Nexus 7000 Series Switches
  • Nexus 9000 Series Switches other than the models listed in the Vulnerable Products section
  • Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches in ACI mode
  • Secure Firewall 200 Series
  • Secure Firewall 1200 Series
  • Secure Firewall 3100 Series
  • Secure Firewall 4200 Series
  • Secure Firewall 6100 Series
  • UCS 6300 Series Fabric Interconnects
  • UCS 6400 Series Fabric Interconnects
  • UCS 6500 Series Fabric Interconnects
  • UCS 6600 Series Fabric Interconnects
  • UCS X-Series Direct Fabric Interconnect 9108 100G

Cisco has launched software updates to patch the flaw. It has also advised customers to upgrade to a fixed NX-OS release. Cisco has also launched a Live Protect Shield as a temporary fix for impacted executions, but urges that it is only temporary until a complete software upgrade is available.

Lazarus Abuses Zero-Day Exploit to Install a New Backdoor


Lazarus does a zero-day exploitt

The North Korean hacking group called Lazarus has been linked to the zero-day compromise of a recently patched vulnerability affecting Windows to deploy a new backdoor attacking aerospace and defense organizations throughout India, France, Brazil, and Germany. 

Fake job postings to lure victims

According to Check Point Research, the attack is part of Operation Dream Job, a social engineering and cyber espionage campaign run by Pyongyang-backed threat actors to target job seekers globally with fake but promising job opportunities at organizations like Enveil and Lockheed Martin to steal important information and deploy malware by reaching out to professionals on forums such as LinkedIn, mimicking to be job recruiters to gain trust. 

The attacks have been discovered to take use of CVE-2026-68820 (CVSS score: 7.0), a privilege escalation vulnerability that affects the Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock ("AFD.sys"), which Microsoft fixed as part of their August 2026 Patch Tuesday upgrades.

As found in earlier campaigns, targets are trapped via fake recruiter messages and lured into opening an infected PDF or deploying a malicious PDF viewer, which then deploys a new backdoor known as Troy that allows remote access to the infected system. The main aim of these hacks is to take complete command of compromised computers and escape security mechanisms.

Since 2022, Lazarus, along with Dream Job,  has been using the tried-and-tested trojanized PDF viewer technique to lure victims.

Experts found two separate parallel compromise sequence:

Trojanized ‘SecurityPDF’ PDF viewer

Here, targets are asked to download SecurityPDF from a site mimicking Enveil. When the PDF is installed, it looks for any PDF document opened via it for a particular marker. If it is present, the app decodes an embedded payload that loads a backdoor called Troy straight into memory. 

DLL side-loading

Here, targets are asked to download an encoded archive that launches a DLL side-loading chain. The infected DLL is used to demonstrate a fake job posting trap, while it secretly downloads and runs in memory in a lightweight downloader called MISTPEN. The downloaders work with hacker controlled infrastructure via Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive to extract and run espionage and persistence modules and run the “AFD.sys” driver exploit, before installing ForestTiger, also called ScoringMathTea, which offers remote access to hosts.

Since 2022, the Lazarus group has been using the updated version of the known-kernel-mode rootkit in its attempt to hide the presence of malicious components from security softwares deployed on the host. 

Axios npm Breach Exposes Threat of Social Engineering Attacks on Open-Source Ecosystem

 



A security incident involving the widely used Axios HTTP library has revealed how attackers are increasingly targeting software maintainers themselves, rather than exploiting code vulnerabilities, to carry out large-scale supply chain attacks.

The issue came to light after Axios maintainers disclosed that an attacker gained access to a contributor’s npm account and used it to publish two compromised versions of the package, 1.14.1 and 0.30.4. These releases included a hidden dependency named plain-crypto-js, which deployed a remote access trojan across macOS, Windows, and Linux systems.

Although the malicious packages were available for only about three hours before being removed, the short exposure window does not reduce the severity. Any system that installed these versions is now considered unsafe. Users have been advised to immediately rotate all credentials, revoke authentication tokens, and assume full compromise of affected environments.

The Axios team confirmed that they have since secured their infrastructure by resetting credentials, cleaning impacted machines, and introducing additional safeguards to prevent similar incidents.

Further investigation by Google Threat Intelligence Group linked the activity to a North Korea-associated threat actor identified as UNC1069. This group, active since at least 2018, is believed to be financially motivated. Attribution was based on malware similarities, including the use of an updated toolset previously tied to the group, as well as overlaps in command-and-control infrastructure observed in earlier operations.


Social Engineering as the Entry Point

The compromise did not begin with a technical flaw. Instead, it started weeks earlier with a carefully orchestrated social engineering attack targeting Axios maintainer Jason Saayman.

Attackers posed as a legitimate organization by replicating its branding, leadership identities, and communication style. They invited the target into what appeared to be a genuine Slack workspace. This environment was not hastily assembled. It contained multiple channels, staged conversations, and curated activity, including links that redirected to real company LinkedIn profiles. Fake user accounts were also created to impersonate employees and known open-source contributors, increasing credibility.

After establishing trust, the attackers scheduled a video meeting that appeared to involve several participants. During the session, the target was shown what looked like a technical issue, specifically a connection-related error. He was then instructed to install an update presented as necessary to resolve the problem.

In reality, this “update” was malicious software that granted the attackers remote access to the system. Once inside, they were able to extract authentication credentials linked to the npm account.


Repeated Tactics Across Multiple Targets

Other maintainers later reported nearly identical experiences. In several cases, attackers attempted to persuade targets to install what they described as a Microsoft Teams software development kit update. When that approach failed, they escalated their efforts by asking victims to execute command-line instructions, including downloading and running scripts via Curl commands.

One such target, Pelle Wessman, described how attackers abandoned the interaction and deleted all communication after he refused to comply.

These methods align with a broader category of attacks sometimes referred to as “ClickFix” techniques, where victims are misled into resolving fake technical issues that ultimately result in malware execution.


Bypassing Security Controls

Because the attackers gained access to already authenticated sessions, they were able to bypass multi-factor authentication protections. This highlights a critical limitation of MFA, which is effective against credential theft but less effective once an active session is compromised.

Importantly, the attackers did not modify Axios’s source code directly. Instead, they inserted a malicious dependency into legitimate package releases, making the compromise significantly harder to detect during routine checks.


A Coordinated Supply Chain Campaign

Research from Socket indicates that this incident is part of a broader, coordinated campaign targeting maintainers across the Node.js ecosystem. Multiple developers, including contributors to widely used packages and even core components, reported receiving similar outreach messages through platforms such as LinkedIn and Slack.

The attackers followed a consistent pattern: initial contact, trust-building within controlled communication channels, followed by staged video calls where victims were prompted to install software or run commands under the pretense of fixing technical issues.

The scale of targeting is particularly concerning. Many of the developers approached are responsible for packages with billions of weekly downloads, meaning a single compromised account can have far-reaching consequences across the global software ecosystem.


Future Outlook 

This incident surfaces a new course in attacker strategy. Rather than focusing solely on software vulnerabilities, threat actors are increasingly exploiting human trust within high-impact projects. Open-source software, which underpins much of today’s digital infrastructure, becomes an attractive target due to its widespread adoption and reliance on maintainers.

Security experts warn that such attacks are likely to increase in frequency. Protecting against them will require not only technical safeguards, but also stronger operational discipline, including stricter access controls, hardware-based authentication, and heightened awareness of social engineering tactics.

The Axios breach ultimately demonstrates that in modern supply chain attacks, the weakest link is often not the code, but the people who maintain it.

Hackers Use Fake Legal Emails to Spread Casbaneiro Malware

 



A coordinated phishing operation is targeting Spanish-speaking users in both Latin America and Europe, using layered infection methods to deploy banking malware on Windows systems.

The campaign delivers the Casbaneiro trojan, also referred to as Metamorfo, and relies on an additional malware strain called Horabot to assist in spreading the infection. Investigators have linked the activity to a Brazil-based cybercrime group tracked as Augmented Marauder and Water Saci, which was first publicly reported by Trend Micro in October 2025.

Technical findings shared by BlueVoyant researchers Thomas Elkins and Joshua Green show that the attackers operate through multiple entry points. Their approach combines phishing emails, automated messaging through WhatsApp, and social engineering techniques such as ClickFix. This setup allows them to simultaneously target everyday users and corporate environments. While WhatsApp-based scripts are mainly used to reach consumers in Latin America, the group also runs an email takeover mechanism aimed at breaching business systems in both Latin America and Europe.

The attack begins with an email crafted to resemble a legal notice, often framed as a court-related message. Recipients are urged to open a password-protected PDF file attached to the email. Inside the document, a link directs the user to a harmful website, which triggers the download of a compressed ZIP file. Opening this file leads to the execution of intermediate components, including HTML Application files and Visual Basic scripts.

The VBS script conducts several checks before continuing, including verifying the presence of antivirus tools such as Avast. These checks are designed to avoid analysis or detection. Once completed, the script contacts an external server to download further payloads. Among these are AutoIt-based loaders that unpack encrypted files with extensions like “.ia” and “.at,” eventually activating both Casbaneiro and Horabot on the infected system.

Casbaneiro serves as the main malware responsible for financial theft, while Horabot is used to expand the attack’s reach. After installation, Casbaneiro communicates with a command server to retrieve a PowerShell script. This script uses Horabot to extract contact lists from Microsoft Outlook and send phishing emails from the victim’s own account.

A key change in this campaign is the use of dynamically generated phishing documents. Instead of distributing a fixed malicious file, the malware sends a request to a remote server, including a randomly created four-digit code. The server responds by generating a unique, password-protected PDF designed to mimic a Spanish judicial summons. This file is then attached to phishing emails sent to new targets, making each message appear more personalized and credible.

The operation also uses a secondary Horabot-related file that acts as both a spam tool and an account hijacker. It targets email services such as Yahoo, Gmail, and Microsoft Live, enabling attackers to send phishing messages through compromised Outlook accounts. Researchers note that Horabot has been used in attacks across Latin America since at least November 2020.

Earlier campaigns linked to Water Saci relied heavily on WhatsApp Web to spread malware in a self-propagating manner, including banking threats like Maverick and Casbaneiro. More recent activity, as observed by Kaspersky, shows the use of ClickFix tactics, where users are tricked into executing malicious HTA files under the pretense of resolving technical issues.

Researchers conclude that the attackers are continuously refining their methods by combining multiple delivery channels. The use of WhatsApp automation, dynamically generated PDF lures, and ClickFix techniques allows them to bypass security controls more effectively. The group appears to operate parallel attack chains, switching between WhatsApp-driven distribution and email-based infection methods powered by Horabot, depending on the target environment.

This activity points to a wider change in how cybercriminal operations are structured, where threat actors increasingly depend on adaptable tactics, automated tools, and manipulation of user behavior to maintain and expand attacks across different regions.

Fake Google Meet Update Can Give Attackers Control of Your Windows PC

 



Cybersecurity analysts have identified a phishing campaign that can quietly hand control of a Windows computer to attackers after a single click. The scam appears as a routine update notice for Google Meet, but the prompt is fraudulent and redirects victims into a device management system controlled by threat actors.

Unlike many phishing schemes, the technique does not steal passwords, download obvious malware, or display clear warning signs. Instead, the attack relies on convincing users to interact with a page that imitates a standard software update message.


A convincing but fake update message

The deceptive webpage tells visitors they must install the latest version of Meet in order to continue using the service. The design closely resembles a legitimate update notification and uses familiar colors and branding that many users associate with Google products.

However, both the “Update now” button and the “Learn more” link do not connect to any official Google resource. Instead, they activate a special Windows deep link known as ms-device-enrollment:.

This feature is a built-in Windows mechanism designed for corporate environments. IT administrators commonly use it to send employees a link that allows a computer to be enrolled in a company’s device management system with minimal effort. In the attack campaign, the same capability is redirected to infrastructure operated by the attacker.


How the enrollment process begins

Windows enrollment links such as ms-device-enrollment: are commonly used in corporate environments where organizations need to configure large numbers of laptops quickly. The link automatically opens Windows settings and connects the device to an enterprise management server.

Once enrolled, the device becomes part of a management framework that allows administrators to deploy software updates, enforce security policies, and manage system configurations remotely.

Attackers exploit this workflow because users are accustomed to seeing this setup process when joining corporate networks, making it appear legitimate.

When a victim clicks the link, Windows immediately bypasses the browser and opens the operating system’s “Set up a work or school account” dialog. This is the same interface that appears when an organization configures a new employee laptop.

The enrollment request arrives with several fields already filled in. The username displayed is collinsmckleen@sunlife-finance.com, a domain designed to resemble the financial services firm Sun Life Financial. Meanwhile, the server connection is preconfigured to an endpoint hosted at tnrmuv-api.esper[.]cloud, which is part of infrastructure operated by Esper.

The attacker’s objective is not to impersonate the victim’s account perfectly. Instead, the goal is to persuade the user to continue through the legitimate Windows enrollment process. Even if only a small portion of targeted users proceed, that is enough for attackers to gain access to some systems.


What attackers gain after enrollment

If the victim clicks Next and completes the setup wizard, the computer becomes registered with a remote Mobile Device Management (MDM) server.

MDM platforms are commonly used by organizations to manage employee devices. Once a device joins such a system, administrators can remotely install or remove applications, modify operating system settings, access stored files, lock the device, or completely erase its contents.

Because the commands come from a legitimate management platform rather than a malicious program, the operating system performs the actions itself. As a result, there may be no suspicious malware process running on the machine.

The infrastructure used in this campaign relies on Esper, a legitimate enterprise management service that many companies use to control corporate hardware.

Further analysis of the malicious link shows encoded configuration data embedded in the server address. When decoded, the data reveals two identifiers associated with the Esper platform: a blueprint ID that determines which management configuration will be applied and a group ID that specifies the device group the computer will join once enrolled.


Abuse of legitimate features

Both the Windows enrollment handler and the Esper management service are functioning exactly as designed. The attacker’s tactic simply redirects these legitimate tools toward unsuspecting users.

Because no malicious software is delivered and no login credentials are requested, the attack can be difficult for security tools to detect. The enrollment prompt displayed to the user is an authentic Windows system dialog rather than a fake webpage. This means typical browser warnings or email filters that look for credential-stealing forms may not flag the activity.

Additionally, the command infrastructure operates on a trusted cloud-based platform, making domain reputation filtering less effective. Security specialists warn that many traditional detection tools are not designed to recognize situations where legitimate operating system features are misused to gain control of a system.

This technique reflects a broader trend in cybercrime. Increasingly, attackers are abandoning conventional malware and instead exploiting built-in operating system capabilities or legitimate cloud services to carry out their operations.


Steps to take if you interacted with the page

Users who believe they may have clicked the fake update prompt should first check whether their device has been enrolled in an unfamiliar management system.

On Windows computers, this can be done by navigating to Settings → Accounts → Access work or school. If an unfamiliar entry appears, particularly one associated with domains such as sunlife-finance or esper, it should be selected and disconnected immediately.

Anyone who clicked the “Update now” link on the malicious site and proceeded through the enrollment wizard should treat the computer as potentially compromised. Running a current anti-malware scan is recommended to determine whether the management server deployed additional software after enrollment.

For organizations, administrators may also want to review device management policies. Endpoint management platforms such as Microsoft Intune allow companies to restrict which MDM servers corporate devices are permitted to join. Implementing such restrictions can reduce the risk of unauthorized device enrollment in similar attacks.

Security researchers have warned that misuse of device management systems can be particularly dangerous because they grant deep administrative control over enrolled devices.

According to analysts from Gartner, enterprise device management platforms often have privileged system access comparable to local administrators, allowing them to modify system policies, install applications, and control security settings remotely.

When such privileges fall into the wrong hands, attackers can effectively operate the device as if they were legitimate administrators.

BadPaw Malware Targets Uranian Systems


A newly found malware campaign exploiting a Ukrainian email service to build trust has been found by cybersecurity experts. 

About the campaign 

The operation starts with an email sent from an address hosted on ukr[.]net, a famous Ukrainian provider earlier exploited by the Russia based hacking group APT28 in older campaigns.

BadPaw malware 

Experts at ClearSky have termed the malware “BadPaw.” The campaign starts when a receiver opens a link pretending to host a ZIP archive. Instead of starting a direct download, the target is redirected to a domain that installs a tracking pixel, letting the threat actor to verify engagement. Another redirect sends the ZIP file. 

The archive pretends to consist of a standard HTML file, but ClearSky experts revealed that it is actually an HTA app in hiding. When deployed, the file shows a fake document related to a Ukrainian government border crossing request, where malicious processes are launched in the background. 

Attack tactic 

Before starting, the malware verifies a Windows Registry key to set the system's installation date. If the OS is older than ten days, deployment stops, an attack tactic that escapes sandbox traps used by threat analysts. 

If all the conditions are fulfilled, the malware looks for the original ZIP file and retrieves extra components. The malware builds its persistence via a scheduled task that runs a VBS script which deploys steganography to steal hidden executable code from an image file. 

Only nine antivirus engines could spot the payload at the time of study. 

Multi-Layered Attack

After activation within a particular parameter, BadPaw links to a C2 server. 

The following process happens:

Getting a numeric result from the /getcalendar endpoint. 

Gaining access to a landing page called "Telemetry UP!” through /eventmanager. 

Downloading the ASCII-encoded payload information installed within HTML. 

In the end, the decrypted data launches a backdoor called "MeowMeowProgram[.]exe," which offers file system control and remote shell access. 

Four protective layers are included in the MeowMeow backdoor: runtime parameter constraints, obfuscation of the.NET Reactor, sandbox detection, and monitoring for forensic tools like Wireshark, Procmon, Ollydbg, and Fiddler.

Incorrect execution results in a benign graphical user interface with a picture of a cat. The "MeowMeow" button only displays a harmless message when it is clicked.

Windows Malware Distributed Through Pirated Games Infects Over 400,000 Systems

 



A Windows-focused malware operation spreading through pirated PC games has potentially compromised more than 400,000 devices worldwide, according to research released by Cyderes. The company identified the threat as “RenEngine loader” and reported that roughly 30,000 affected users are located in the United States alone.

Investigators found the malicious code embedded inside cracked and repackaged versions of popular game franchises, including Far Cry, Need for Speed, FIFA, and Assassin’s Creed. The infected installers appear to function normally, allowing users to download and play the games. However, while the visible game content runs as expected, concealed code executes in parallel without the user’s awareness.

Researchers traced part of the operation to a legitimate launcher built on Ren'Py, an engine commonly used for visual novel-style games. The attackers embedded harmful components within this launcher framework. When executed, the launcher decompresses archived game files as intended, but at the same time initiates the hidden malware routine.

According to Cyderes, the campaign has been active since at least April of last year and remains ongoing. In October, the operators modified the malware to include an embedded telemetry URL. Each time the RenEngine loader runs, it connects to this address, allowing the attackers to log activity. Analysis of that telemetry endpoint enabled researchers to estimate overall infection levels, with the system recording between 4,000 and 10,000 visits per day.

Telemetry data indicates that the largest concentration of victims is located in India, the United States, and Brazil. The US accounts for approximately 30,000 of the infected systems identified through this tracking mechanism.

The loader’s primary function is to deliver additional malicious software onto compromised machines. In multiple cases, researchers observed it deploying a Windows-based information stealer known as ARC. This malware is designed to extract stored browser passwords, session cookies, cryptocurrency wallet information, autofill entries, clipboard data, and system configuration details.

Cyderes also reported observing alternative payloads delivered through the same loader infrastructure, including Rhadamanthys stealer, Async RAT, and XWorm. These programs are capable of credential theft and, in some cases, remote system control, enabling attackers to monitor activity or manipulate infected devices.

The investigation identified one distribution source, dodi-repacks[.]site, as hosting downloads containing the embedded malware. The domain has previously been associated with other malicious distribution activity.

Detection remains limited at the initial infection stage. Public scan results from Google’s VirusTotal platform indicate that, aside from Avast, AVG, and Cynet, most antivirus engines currently do not flag the loader component as malicious. This detection gap increases the likelihood that users may remain unaware of compromise.

Users who suspect infection are advised to run updated security scans immediately. If concerns persist, Windows System Restore may help revert the device to a prior clean state. In cases where compromise cannot be confidently removed, a full operating system reinstallation may be necessary.

The findings reinforce a recurring cybersecurity risk: unauthorized software downloads frequently serve as a delivery channel for concealed malware capable of exposing personal data and granting attackers extended access to victim systems.

Cross-Platform Spyware Campaigns Target Indian Defense and Government Sectors

 



Cybersecurity researchers have identified multiple coordinated cyber espionage campaigns targeting organizations connected to India’s defense sector and government ecosystem. These operations are designed to infiltrate both Windows and Linux systems using remote access trojans that allow attackers to steal sensitive information and retain long-term control over compromised devices.

The activity involves several spyware families, including Geta RAT, Ares RAT, and DeskRAT. These tools have been associated in open-source security reporting with threat clusters commonly tracked as SideCopy and APT36, also known as Transparent Tribe. Analysts assess that SideCopy has operated for several years and functions as an operational subset of the broader cluster. Rather than introducing radically new tactics, the actors appear to be refining established espionage techniques by expanding their reach across operating systems, using stealthier memory-resident methods, and experimenting with new delivery mechanisms to avoid detection while sustaining strategic targeting.

Across the campaigns, initial access is commonly achieved through phishing emails that deliver malicious attachments or links to attacker-controlled servers. Victims are directed to open Windows shortcut files, Linux executables, or weaponized presentation add-ins. These files initiate multi-stage infection chains that install spyware while displaying decoy documents to reduce suspicion.

One observed Windows attack chain abuses a legitimate system utility to retrieve and execute web-hosted malicious code from compromised, regionally trusted websites. The downloaded component decrypts an embedded library, writes a decoy PDF file to disk, contacts a command-and-control server, and opens the decoy for the user. Before deploying Geta RAT, the malware checks which security products are installed and modifies its persistence technique accordingly to improve survivability. This method has been documented in public research by multiple security vendors.

Geta RAT enables extensive surveillance and control, including system profiling, listing and terminating processes, enumerating installed applications, credential theft, clipboard manipulation, screenshot capture, file management, command execution, and data extraction from connected USB devices.

Parallel Linux-focused attacks begin with a loader written in Go that downloads a shell script to install a Python-based Ares RAT. This malware supports remote command execution, data collection, and the running of attacker-supplied scripts. In a separate infection chain, DeskRAT, a Golang-based backdoor, is delivered through a malicious presentation add-in that establishes outbound communication to retrieve the payload, a technique previously described in independent research.

Researchers note that targets extend beyond defense to policy bodies, research institutions, critical infrastructure, and defense-adjacent organizations within the same trusted networks. The combined deployment of Geta RAT, Ares RAT, and DeskRAT reflects a developing toolkit optimized for stealth, persistence, and long-term intelligence collection.

New Ransomware Uses Trusted Drivers to Disable Security Defenses

 


Security monitoring teams are tracking a new ransomware strain called Reynolds that merges system sabotage and file encryption into a single delivery package. Instead of relying on separate utilities to weaken defenses, the malware installs a flawed system driver as part of the infection process, allowing it to disable protective software before encrypting data.

The method used is known in security research as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver, or BYOVD. This approach abuses legitimate drivers that contain known weaknesses. Because operating systems recognize these drivers as trusted components, attackers can exploit them to gain deep system access and stop endpoint protection tools with reduced risk of detection. This tactic has been repeatedly observed across multiple ransomware operations in recent years.

In the Reynolds incidents, the malware deploys the NSecKrnl driver produced by NsecSoft. This driver contains a publicly documented vulnerability tracked as CVE-2025-68947, rated 5.7 in severity. The flaw allows any running process to be forcibly terminated, which attackers use to shut down security platforms including Avast, CrowdStrike Falcon, Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR, Sophos with HitmanPro.Alert, and Symantec Endpoint Protection. The same driver has previously been abused by a threat actor known as Silver Fox in campaigns that disabled security tools before deploying ValleyRAT. Silver Fox has also relied on other vulnerable drivers, such as truesight.sys and amsdk.sys, during similar operations.

Security analysts note that integrating defense suppression into ransomware itself is not unprecedented. A comparable approach appeared during a Ryuk ransomware incident in 2020 and later in activity linked to the Obscura ransomware family in August 2025. Folding multiple attack stages into a single payload reduces operational complexity for attackers and decreases the number of separate files defenders might detect.

Investigations into recent intrusions uncovered signs of long-term preparation. A suspicious loader that used side-loading techniques was found on victim networks several weeks before encryption occurred. Following deployment of the ransomware, a remote access program known as GotoHTTP was installed within one day, indicating an effort to preserve long-term control over compromised systems.

Parallel ransomware campaigns reveal additional shifts in attacker behavior. Large phishing operations are circulating shortcut file attachments that trigger PowerShell scripts, leading to the installation of Phorpiex malware, which then delivers GLOBAL GROUP ransomware. This ransomware conducts all operations locally and does not transmit stolen data, allowing it to function in networks without internet access. Other campaigns tied to WantToCry have exploited virtual machines provisioned through ISPsystem, a legitimate infrastructure management service, to distribute malware at scale. Some of the same hosting infrastructure has been linked to LockBit, Qilin, Conti, BlackCat, and Ursnif, as well as malware families including NetSupport RAT, PureRAT, Lampion, Lumma Stealer, and RedLine Stealer.

Researchers assess that bulletproof hosting providers are renting ISPsystem virtual machines to criminal actors by abusing a design flaw in VMmanager’s default Windows templates. Because these templates reuse identical hostnames and system identifiers, thousands of virtual machines can be created with the same fingerprint, making takedown efforts more difficult.

Ransomware groups are also expanding their business models. DragonForce now provides affiliates with a “Company Data Audit” service, which includes risk assessments, pre-written call scripts, executive-level letters, and negotiation guidance. The group operates as a cartel that allows affiliates to launch their own brands while sharing infrastructure and services.

Technical changes are shaping newer ransomware versions. LockBit 5.0 has replaced AES encryption with ChaCha20 and now targets Windows, Linux, and ESXi environments. The latest version includes file wiping capabilities, delayed execution, encryption progress tracking, improved evasion techniques, stronger in-memory operation, and reduced disk footprints. The Interlock group continues to target organizations in the United Kingdom and United States, particularly in education. One attack exploited a zero-day vulnerability in the GameDriverx64.sys anti-cheat driver, tracked as CVE-2025-61155 with a 5.5 severity score, to disable security tools using BYOVD methods. The same campaign deployed NodeSnake, also known as Interlock RAT or CORNFLAKE, with MintLoader identified as the initial access point.

Targeting strategies are also shifting toward cloud storage. Poorly configured Amazon Web Services S3 buckets are being abused through native platform functions to erase data, restrict access, overwrite files, or quietly extract sensitive information while remaining difficult to detect.

Industry tracking from Cyble indicates that GLOBAL GROUP is among several ransomware crews that appeared in 2025, alongside Devman, DireWolf, NOVA, J group, Warlock, BEAST, Sinobi, NightSpire, and The Gentlemen. ReliaQuest reported that Sinobi’s data leak activity increased by 306 percent in the final quarter of 2025, ranking it third behind Qilin and Akira. LockBit’s resurgence included 110 victim listings in December alone. Researchers estimate that ransomware actors claimed 4,737 attacks in 2025, compared with 4,701 in 2024. Incidents centered only on data theft rose to 6,182, reflecting a 23 percent increase. Coveware reported that average ransom demands reached $591,988 in late 2025, driven by a small number of exceptionally large settlements, and warned that attackers may shift back toward encryption-based extortion to increase pressure on victims.

Experts Find Malicious ClawHub Skills Stealing Data from OpenClaw


Koi Security’s security audit of 2,857 skills on ClawHub found 341 malicious skills via multiple campaigns. Users are exposed to new supply chain threats. 

ClawHub is a marketplace made to help OpenClaw users in finding and installing third-party skills. It is a part of the OpenClaw project, a self-hosted artificial intelligence (AI) assistant aka Moltbot and Clawdbot. 

Koi Security's analysis with OpenClaw bot “Alex” revealed that 335 skills use malicious pre-requisite to install an Apple macOS stealer called (Atomic Stealer). The activity goes by the code name ClawHavoc. 

According to Koi research Oren Yomtov, "You install what looks like a legitimate skill – maybe solana-wallet-tracker or youtube-summarize-pro. The skill's documentation looks professional. But there's a 'Prerequisites' section that says you need to install something first.”

Instruction steps:

Windows users are asked to download file “openclaw-agent.zip” from a GitHub repository.

macOS users are asked to copy an installation script hosted at glot[.]io and paste it in the Terminal application. 

Threat actors are targeting macOS users because of an increase in purchase of Mac Minus to use the AI assistant 24x7. 

In the password-protected archive, the trojan has keylogging functionality to steal credentials, API keys, and other important data on the device. Besides this, the glot[.]io script includes hidden shell commands to retrieve next-stage payloads from a threat-actor controlled infrastructure. 

This results in getting another IP address ("91.92.242[.]30") to get another shell script, which is modified to address the same server to get a universal Mach-O binary that shows traits persistent with Atomic Stealer, a commodity stealer that threat actors can buy for $500-1000/month that can extract data from macOS hosts.

The issue is that anyone can post abilities to ClawHub because it is open by default. At this point, the only requirement is that a publisher have a GitHub account that is at least a week old. 

Peter Steinberger, the founder of OpenClaw, is aware of the problem with malicious abilities and has subsequently implemented a reporting option that enables users who are signed in to report a skill. According to the documentation, "Each user can have up to 20 active reports at a time," "Skills with more than 3 unique reports are auto-hidden by default.”


Microsoft Quietly Changes Windows Shortcut Handling After Dangerous Zero-day Abuse

 



Microsoft has changed how Windows displays information inside shortcut files after researchers confirmed that multiple hacking groups were exploiting a long-standing weakness in Windows Shell Link (.lnk) files to spread malware in real attacks.

The vulnerability, CVE-2025-9491, pertains to how Windows accesses and displays the "Target" field of a shortcut file. The attackers found that they could fill the Target field with big sets of blank spaces, followed by malicious commands. When a user looks at a file's properties, Windows only displays the first part of that field. The malicious command remains hidden behind whitespace, making the shortcut seem innocuous.

These types of shortcuts are usually distributed inside ZIP folders or other similar archives, since many email services block .lnk files outright. The attack relies on persuasion: Victims must willingly open the shortcut for the malware to gain an entry point on the system. When opened, the hidden command can install additional tools or create persistence.


Active Exploitation by Multiple Threat Groups

Trend Micro researchers documented in early 2025 that this trick was already being used broadly. Several state-backed groups and financially motivated actors had adopted the method to deliver a range of malware families, from remote access trojans to banking trojans. Later, Arctic Wolf Labs also observed attempts to use the same technique against diplomats in parts of Europe, where attackers used the disguised shortcut files to drop remote access malware.

The campaigns followed a familiar pattern. Victims received a compressed folder containing what looked like a legitimate document or utility. Inside sat a shortcut that looked ordinary but actually executed a concealed command once it was opened.


Microsoft introduces a quiet mitigation

Although Microsoft first said the bug did not meet the criteria for out-of-band servicing because it required user interaction, the company nonetheless issued a silent fix via standard Windows patching. With the patches in place, Windows now displays the full Target field in a shortcut's properties window instead of truncating the display after about 260 characters.

This adjustment does not automatically remove malicious arguments inside a shortcut, nor does it pop up with a special warning when an unusually long command is present. It merely provides full visibility to users, which may make suspicious content more easily identifiable for the more cautious users.

When questioned about the reason for the change, Microsoft repeated its long-held guidance: users shouldn't open files from unknown sources and should pay attention to its built-in security warnings.


Independent patch offers stricter safeguards

Because Microsoft's update is more a matter of visibility than enforcement, ACROS Security has issued an unofficial micropatch via its 0patch service. The update its team released limits the length of Target fields and pops up a warning before allowing a potentially suspicious shortcut to open. This more strict treatment, according to the group, would block the vast majority of malicious shortcuts seen in the wild.

This unofficial patch is now available to 0patch customers using various versions of Windows, including editions that are no longer officially supported.


How users can protect themselves

Users and organizations can minimize the risk by refraining from taking shortcuts coming from unfamiliar sources, especially those that are wrapped inside compressed folders. Security teams are encouraged to ensure Windows systems are fully updated, apply endpoint protection tools, and treat unsolicited attachments with care. Training users to inspect file properties and avoid launching unexpected shortcut files is also a top priority.

However, as the exploitation of CVE-2025-9491 continues to manifest in targeted attacks, the updated Windows behavior, user awareness, and security controls are layered together for the best defense for now. 

AI Models Trained on Incomplete Data Can't Protect Against Threats


In cybersecurity, AI is being called the future of threat finder. However, AI has its hands tied, they are only as good as their data pipeline. But this principle is not stopping at academic machine learning, as it is also applicable for cybersecurity.

AI-powered threat hunting will only be successful if the data infrastructure is strong too.

Threat hunting powered by AI, automation, or human investigation will only ever be as effective as the data infrastructure it stands on. Sometimes, security teams build AI over leaked data or without proper data care. This can create issues later. It can affect both AI and humans. Even sophisticated algorithms can't handle inconsistent or incomplete data. AI that is trained on poor data will also lead to poor results. 

The importance of unified data 

A correlated data controls the operation. It reduces noise and helps in noticing patterns that manual systems can't.

Correlating and pre-transforming the data makes it easy for LLMs and other AI tools. It also allows connected components to surface naturally. 

A same person may show up under entirely distinct names as an IAM principal in AWS, a committer in GitHub, and a document owner in Google Workspace. You only have a small portion of the truth when you look at any one of those signs. 

You have behavioral clarity when you consider them collectively. While downloading dozens of items from Google Workspace may look strange on its own, it becomes obviously malevolent if the same user also clones dozens of repositories to a personal laptop and launches a public S3 bucket minutes later.

Finding threat via correlation 

Correlations that previously took hours or were impossible become instant when data from logs, configurations, code repositories, and identification systems are all housed in one location. 

For instance, lateral movement that uses short-lived credentials that have been stolen frequently passes across multiple systems before being discovered. A hacked developer laptop might take on several IAM roles, launch new instances, and access internal databases. Endpoint logs show the local compromise, but the extent of the intrusion cannot be demonstrated without IAM and network data.