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UK Issued New Cybersecurity Guidelines on Emerging Supply Chain Attacks

A surge in the number of instances has prompted cyber security experts to issue a fresh warning about the danger of supply chain hacks. Businesses have been advised by the UK's cybersecurity agency to take additional precautions against supply chain assaults. In response to what it claims to be a recent increase in supply chain threats, the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) has produced fresh advice for enterprises.

Although the advice is applicable to businesses in all industries, it was released in collaboration with the Cross-Market Operational Resilience Group (CMORG), which promotes the enhancement of the operational resilience of the financial sector. The advice, which is intended to assist medium-sized and larger enterprises, evaluates the cyber risks of collaborating with suppliers and provides confirmation that mitigation techniques are in effect for vulnerabilities related to doing business with suppliers.

The 2020 hack on SolarWinds' software build system, the 2021 ransomware attack on Kaseya clients, and the 2017 NotPetya attack via a Ukraine accounting program are a few notable recent incidents. President Joe Biden of the United States issued an executive order to improve cybersecurity in response to SolarWinds.

In a document titled 'Defending the Pipeline' published by NCSC in February, the agency recommended businesses and programmers use continuous integration and delivery (CI/CD) to automate software development. The CEO of NCSC ranked ransomware as the top cyber danger in October of last year, while also warning that supply chain concerns will persist for years.

The new guidance is assisted medium and bigger enterprises in "evaluating the cyber risks of collaborating with suppliers and gaining assurance that mitigations are in place," according to NCSC in an announcement.

According to the UK government's report on security breaches in 2022, more than half of companies, big and small, contract out their IT and cybersecurity needs to outside companies. However,  s evaluated the dangers posed by immediate suppliers. These respondents claimed that the importance of cybersecurity in procurement was low.

According to Ian McCormack, NCSC deputy director for government cyber resilience, supply chain attacks represents a significant cyber danger to organizations and incidents can have a significant, ongoing effect on companies and customers.

The advice is broken down into five stages that address why businesses should care about supply chain cybersecurity, how to identify and protect one's private data when developing an approach, how to apply the approach to new suppliers, how to apply it to contracts with current suppliers, and continuous improvement.

The US intelligence agency, NSA, released its software supply chain recommendations last month with a focus on developers. New standards for the purchase of software were also released in the same month by the US Office of Management and Budget.

Trojanized Comm100 Live Chat App Installer Distributed a JavaScript Backdoor

Cybersecurity platform CrowdStrike reported a supply chain attack that involved the use of a trojanized installer for the Comm100 Live Chat application to distribute a JavaScript backdoor. The application suffered an attack from 27 September to 29, 2022. 

Additionally, the malicious group actively attacked other sectors of the organizations with the same installer including the industrial, technology, healthcare, manufacturing, telecommunications sectors, and insurance in North America and Europe. 

Canadian application Comm100 facilitates over 200,000 businesses with its customer service and communication products. With more than 15,000 clients, the Comm100 company offers chat and customer engagement applications to businesses in 51 countries. However, the company did not report anything on how many customers got affected by the attack. 

According to the Cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, the malware was proliferated using a Comm100 installer that was downloadable from the company’s website. On September 26, the installer was signed with legitimate information on the Comm100 desktop agent app. 

“CrowdStrike Intelligence can confirm that the Microsoft Windows 7+ desktop agent hosted at hxxps[:]//dash11.comm100[.]io/livechat/electron/10000/Comm100LiveChat-Setup-win[.]exe that was available until the morning of September 29 was a trojanized installer.”, Crowdstrike confirmed. 

Also, a malicious loader DLL called MidlrtMd[.]dll has been used as part of the post-exploitation action. It starts an in-memory shellcode to inject an embedded payload into a new Notepad process (notepad[.]exe). The CrowdStrike believed that the China nexus threat actor is behind the attack because the group previously targeted several Asian online gambling organizations. 

“Furthermore, CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses with moderate confidence that this actor likely has a China nexus. This assessment is based on the presence of Chinese-language comments in the malware, the aforementioned tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and the connection to the targeting of online gambling entities in East and Southeast Asia — a previously established area of focus for China-nexus targeted intrusion actors”, CrowdStrike Intelligence customers reported.

Ransomware Exposed Stolen Data From Cisco on Dark Web

Yanluowang ransomware Gang has published Cisco Systems' stolen data on the dark web and following the data leak, Cisco confirmed that the data was stolen from its network during an intrusion that took place in May. 

Cisco Security Incident Response (CSIRT) conducted an investigation wherein it was found that the attackers acquired control of a personal Google account that had the credentials saved in the browser. The threat actors compromised these credentials to launch voice phishing attacks. The idea behind the attacks was to lure the targeted employee into accepting the MFA notification. 

Cisco revealed in a report published in August that the firm's networks had been infiltrated by the Yanluowang ransomware after hackers gained access to an employee's VPN account. The company further asserted that the only information taken was employee login information from Active Directory and non-sensitive files saved in a Box account.

Once the threat actors obtained the employee's Cisco credentials, the hackers employed social engineering and other techniques to get beyond multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gather more data.

After gaining initial access, the hackers registered a list of new devices for MFA, authenticated effectively to the Cisco VPN, and dropped multiple tools in the victim network including RATs such as LogMeIn, TeamViewer, Cobalt Strike, PowerSploit, Mimikatz, and Impacket, as per Security Affairs. 

Over the weekend, Cisco said in an update that "the content of these files matched what we have detected and released.  We continue to see no effect on the business, including Cisco goods or services, confidential customer data or sensitive employee data, copyrights, or supply chain activities, which is consistent with our previous examination of this incident."

The researchers at the cybersecurity firm eSentire linked Yanluowang with "Evil Corp" (UNC2165), the Lapsus$ gang, and FiveHands malware (UNC2447).

The hacked Google account of an employee that had enabled password synchronization through Google Chrome and saved their Cisco details in the browser allowed the thieves to initially access the Cisco VPN.

The leader of Yanluowang ransomware told BleepingComputer that they had stolen thousands of files totaling 55GB from a cache that contained sensitive information including technical schematics and source code. The hacker did not offer any evidence. The only thing they provided was a screenshot showing access to what seemed like a development system. 

Erich Kron, security awareness advocate at security awareness training company KnowBe4 implies that it goes unsaid that Cisco decided against paying the ransom demanded by the ransomware group, which resulted in the stolen data being posted. 

JuiceLedger Attacker Linked to Phishing Attacks Targeting PyPI Users


Threat analysts at SentinelOne and Checkmarx have unearthed the hacker behind the recently launched phishing attacks targeting Python Package Index (PyPI) users. 

Earlier this week on Thursday, researchers disclosed that the supply chain attacks were part of a larger campaign aimed at spreading the JuiceStealer credential-stealing malware since late last year. 

Initially, JuiceStealer was deployed via a methodology called typosquatting, in which the hacker tracked as JuiceLedger injected PyPI with hundreds of packages that nearly impersonated the names of popular ones, in the hopes that some users would fall into a trap and install them. 

The malware was identified on VirusTotal in February when the hacker submitted a Python app that secretly installed the malware. JuiceStealer is developed using the .Net programming framework to steal sensitive data from victims’ browsers. Based on the data extracted from the code, the researchers have linked the malware to activity that started in late 2021 and has evolved rapidly since then. One likely connection is to Nowblox, a fraud site that claimed to offer free Robux, the online currency for the game Roblox. 

Recently, the hacker started employing crypto-themed fake apps such as the Tesla Trading bot, which was deployed in zip files accompanying additional legitimate software. 

"JuiceLedger appears to have evolved very quickly from opportunistic, small-scale infections only a few months ago to conducting a supply chain attack on a major software distributor," the researchers wrote in a post. "The escalation in complexity in the attack on PyPI contributors, involving a targeted phishing campaign, hundreds of typosquatting packages, and account takeovers of trusted developers, indicates that the threat actor has time and resources at their disposal." 

With account takeover attacks becoming a popular technique for hackers looking to exploit software supply chains, PyPI has started imposing a mandatory two-factor authentication (2FA) requirement for projects deemed "critical." People downloading packages from PyPI—or any other open-source repository—should remain vigilant to ensure the software they're downloading is authentic. 

PyPI is by far not the sole code repository that threat actors have exploited recently. Security vendors have reported multiple identical attack incidents involving other widely employed registries such as npm and Maven Central. 

“Given the widespread use of PyPI and other open source packages in enterprise environments, attacks such as these are a cause of concern, and security teams are urged to review the provided indicators and take appropriate mitigation measures,” researchers added.

Over 130 Organizations Targeted in Okta Phishing Campaign

In a single phishing attempt, the hackers behind a number of recent attacks, such as those targeting Twilio, Cloudfare, MailChimp, and Klaviyo, infiltrated over 130 firms.

Through this phishing attack, 9,931 login credentials were stolen using a phishing kit with the codename "0ktapus," which the hackers then used to log into business networks and systems using VPNs and other remote access tools.

Because the primary intent of the assaults was to "get Okta identity credentials and two-factor authentication (2FA) codes from users of the targeted organizations," the conduct has been denounced by Group-IB.

The Singapore-based corporation said that the opponent sought out employees of businesses that use Okta, a provider of identity services, and praised the attacks for being well-planned and carried out. With the help of the identity-as-a-service (IDaaS) platform Okta, employees may access all of their company's software with just one login. 

The phrases "OKTA," "HELP," "VPN," and "SSO" were used in 169 different phishing domains that supported the 0ktapus campaign.  

In addition, customers who used these services, such as Signal, and DigitalOcean, became the target of supply-chain attacks as a result of these breaches.

The threat actors targeted businesses in a variety of areas, including bitcoin, technology, banking, and recruiting, based on the phishing domains built as part of this effort.

These login credentials were then utilized by the hackers to log into internal customer support systems, corporate networks, and VPNs in order to steal consumer data. As earlier witnessed with DigitalOcean and Signal, subsequent supply-chain hacks were carried out using this customer data.

The hacked information was disseminated over a Telegram channel via the phishing kit employed in this effort. One of the channel administrators who went by the handle "X" was connected by the experts to a Twitter and GitHub account, which suggests the person may be based in North Carolina, US.

Threat actors frequently targeted data belonging to organizations in the bitcoin industry, according to revelations from previous victims.

According to Group-IB, the hackers were able to steal 5,441 records with MFA codes, 3,129 data with emails, and 9,931 records with user credentials from 136 businesses, with the mass of the targeted businesses being based in the United States.

Third-party Attacks: Hacker's Exploit Software Networks

Third-party incursions are yet another reminder of how fast and widely supply-chain assaults may spread, as seen most recently at Twilio and Mailchimp.

All of these cases have one thing in common – they were service supply chain assaults, which are intrusions in which the attackers used access granted to third-party services as a backdoor into the target companies' critical core systems.

Hackers pay attention and return for more when an attack on one institution opens the door for prospective strikes on many more. Attacks involving phishing and social engineering are frequently used to acquire unauthorized access.

This amplification effect has led to an increase in attacks by third-party vendors. Hackers now have a way to reach more targets more reliably and successfully due to the level of access or data that is potentially exposed throughout the supply chain.

Companies are rapidly incorporating third-party apps into the fabric of their enterprise IT as digitalization and the rise in cloud-based, remote, or hybrid work progress to boost productivity and streamline business procedures. These linked apps increase productivity across the board, which is why they have gained so much attention recently. 

Twilio suffered a phishing assault that affected 125 customers, resulting in the exposure of 1,900 Signal users' phone numbers and verification credentials. DigitalOcean was one of 214 accounts impacted by the vulnerability of Mailchimp's internal tooling caused by social engineering assaults.

The firm wants to implement new technologies to increase automation and productivity, but security and IT teams are becoming more underfunded and overworked. Traditional third-party review procedures and security governance models are under pressure due to the quick expansion of new integrations between third-party cloud apps and core systems, which is overwhelming IT and security teams and ultimately leading to the creation of a new, expansive, largely unmonitored attack surface.

Similar supply chain attacks will inevitably continue to take place if these integrations spread without adequate comprehension and mitigation of the specific vulnerabilities they bring. In fact, 93% of businesses in 2021 had a cybersecurity compromise of some type as a result of unreliable third parties or weak supply chains. 

Email Threat Report for 2022 via Abnormal Security

The premier AI-based cloud-native email security platform, Abnormal Security, today published its H2 2022 Email Threat Report. The study examines the state of the email threat landscape. It provides data on the most recent events in email attack methods, such as the emergence of brand impersonation in credential phishing and the expansion of business email compromise.

According to the report, email attacks have increased by 48% in the last six months, and 68.5% of them have links that steal credentials. In 15% of phishing emails, fraudsters impersonated well-known companies in addition to internal staff and executives, relying on the familiarity and goodwill of the brands to persuade employees to divulge their login information. Microsoft items and social networks were the two 265 brands that were most frequently impersonated in these attacks.

"Most cybercrime nowadays is successful because it preys on the individuals using the computer. By compromising individuals rather than networks, attackers may more easily get beyond standard security precautions" stated Crane Hassold, head of threat intelligence at Abnormal Security.

LinkedIn was perhaps the most frequently impersonated brand, although 20% of all attacks also included Outlook, OneDrive, and Microsoft 365. Since employee email accounts are frequently hacked through phishing emails, these attacks are hazardous. By gaining Microsoft login information, fraudsters can gain access to the entire range of linked goods, access sensitive information, and use the account to launch business email compromise attacks. 

Findings from the report entail:
  • The target of more than a third of brand-impersonation-based credential phishing attacks was a school or a place of worship.
  • BEC attacks rose by 150% year over year, proving the growing risk of these truly severe threats to financial stability. 
  • BEC attacks target every area, but advertising and marketing organizations continue to be the most vulnerable, with an 83% weekly chance of being the target.
  • Nearly every level of business is being targeted by financial supply chain hacks, with 89% of major enterprises experiencing at least one vendor assault each week.
"We generally understand that email attacks target businesses of all sizes and in all sectors, but these findings just serve to confirm our suspicions. Since the most sophisticated attacks are very difficult to distinguish from a genuine email from that brand, brand impersonation is particularly concerning for cybersecurity leaders," according to Mike Britton, a chief information security officer at Abnormal Security.

Abnormal Security has also introduced Abnormal Intelligence, a research and data hub devoted to offering insight into emerging new threats across the threat landscape, in support of its objective to shield enterprises from cybercrime. 

This portal, which showcases some of the most inventive assaults targeting Abnormal consumers, is made to assist firms in staying informed of new trends and attacks. The website offers threat intelligence content in the form of blog entries, downloadable materials, and webinars in addition to the daily feed of actual attacks. 

GitHub Supply Chain Attack Cloned Thousands of Repositories to Target Developers


GitHub, a code repository with more than 83 million developers, has been targeted in a supply chain attack.

The attack was unearthed earlier this week by software developer Stephen Lacy and involved a hacker cloning and adding malicious code to more than 35,000 GitHub repositories while keeping intact the code’s original source code. Nearly 40 percent (13,000) of the repositories compromised originated from a single organization, called “redhat-operator-ecosystem” on the site, a spoof of the RedHat openshift ecosystem. 

The cloned projects attempted to lure users to click on them by spoofing genuine user accounts, using names identical to the original project and legitimate-sounding firm names. 

The malicious code allowed the repositories to exfiltrate the environment variables containing sensitive data like Amazon AWS credentials, API keys, crypto keys, and a one-line backdoor. The malware also allowed remote hackers to execute arbitrary code on those systems that install/run the clones. 

The weaponized code could lead to developers accidentally downloading cloned code repositories that contain malicious code. If used in their applications, this would then lead them to expose their users to code that includes malware. 

Fortunately, Lacy thwarted the attack by removing the affected projects and organizations including Golang, Bash, Python, Docker, JavaScript, and Kubernetes. GitHub confirmed that the original repositories weren’t compromised, and the clones have been quarantined and cleaned. 

According to security experts, cloning open-source code is common among developers. But, in this case, the hackers injected malicious code/links into genuine GitHub projects to target innocent users.

The methodology applied by hackers is identical to the approach unearthed by ReversingLabs last month, where typo-squatting packages were being picked up by GitHub-owned NPM, and then exfiltrated data from forms designed with the malicious packages. 

Additionally, the researchers identified more than two dozen infected packages, all cloning popular NPM packages, stretching back to December 2021. 

Thwarting supply chain attacks 

 GitHub has issued an advisory for guarding the code supply chain on its website. 

• For accounts employed for personal use as well as those used by organizations and enterprises, set up two-factor authentication. 
• Connect to GitHub using secure socket shell (SSH) keys. 
• For enterprises, centralize user authentication. 
• Design a vulnerability management program for dependencies which will allow them to have full visibility over any vulnerabilities the code they are using has. 
• Avoid using passwords or API keys within the source code. 
• Block vulnerable coding patterns by reviewing and examining all pull requests before merging.

Solana Funds Breached via Unknown Bug

After customers complained about their funds being stolen, Solana, a blockchain that is growing in popularity for its quick transactions, became the subject of the most recent breach in the cryptocurrency world.

The platform has launched an inquiry and is currently attempting to ascertain how the hackers were able to steal the money. 

What is SOL?

The value of Solana's stake, dropped by 7% to $38.4 in the past day, marking its lowest level in a week.

Solana is an open-source project that relies on the permissionlessness of blockchain technology to offer decentralized financial (DeFi) solutions. According to CoinGecko, end-user applications in the Solana ecosystem include non-fungible tokens (NFT), marketplaces, gaming, e-commerce, and decentralized finance (DeFi).

According to CoinGecko, Solana is one of the top 10 cryptocurrency assets in terms of market value, although its value has fallen significantly from its all-time high of $259.96 reached in November 2021.

The primary reason for the breach

The security problem appears to have affected more than 8,000 wallets, depleting them of their SOL tokens and USDC stablecoins, according to Changpeng  Zhao, CEO of cryptocurrency exchange Binance.

A blockchain consulting firm called Elliptic stated that the attack started on August 2 and has already resulted in the data theft of $5.8 million for its clients. The Solana cryptocurrency, and non-fungible tokens, as per the report, were among the stolen goods.

Elliptic noted that the issue didn't seem to be with the blockchain core, the digital ledger of transactions that serves as the foundation of cryptocurrency assets, but rather with software utilized by such wallets.

Phantom, Slope, and TrustWallet are among the other wallets that have been compromised by the hack.

Several blockchain security experts believe that a supply chain attack, a browser zero-day vulnerability, or a flawed random number generator used during the key generation process might have been leveraged to access such a huge number of private keys.

Attack Against NPM Software Supply Chain Unearthed


Iconburst's most recent attack is described as a massive and well-planned effort to spread malicious Javascript packages distributed through the open-source NPM package system.

Upon further analysis, evidence of a planned supply chain assault was found, with numerous NPM packages containing jQuery scripts created to steal data from deployed apps that use them, as per researchers.

ReversingLabs noted that the malicious packages we identified are probably used by hundreds or thousands of downstream mobile and desktop programs as well as websites, even if the full scope of this assault is still unknown. In one instance, malicious software had been downloaded more than 17,000 times.

Obfuscation used 

The firm said that its analysis of the modules had found signs of coordination, with malicious modules linked to a select group of NPM publishers and recurrent patterns in the infrastructure that supported them, such as unencrypted domains.

“The revelation of a javascript obfuscator was the first trigger for our team to examine a broad variety of NPM packages, the majority of which had been released within the previous two months and utilized the stated obfuscator. It revealed more than 20 NPM packages in total. When these NPM modules are examined in greater detail, it becomes clear that they are associated with one of a small number of NPM accounts with names like ionic-io, arpanrizki, kbrstore, and aselole,” according to ReversingLabs. 

Meanwhile, Checkmarx said, "Roughly a thousand unique user accounts released over 1200 NPM packages to the registry, which we found. Automation was used, which allowed for the successful completion of the NPM 2FA challenge. At this moment, this collection of packages appears to be a part of an attacker's testing." 

Obfuscated malware data theft 

The de-obfuscated examples underwent a thorough analysis, which showed that every one of them collects form data using jQuery Ajax methods and subsequently exploits that data to different domains controlled by malevolent writers.

To exfiltrate serialized form data to domains under the attacker's control, the malicious packages employ a modified script that extends the functionality of the jQuery ajax() function. The function verifies the URL content before transmitting the data to carry out target filtering checks. 

Attack on supply chain 

The NPM modules which ReversingLabs found have been downloaded more than 27,000 times in total. The attacks occurred for months before coming to attention because very few development firms can identify malicious software within open source libraries and modules.

"It is certain from the report of this study that software development businesses and their clients both require new tools and procedures for evaluating supply chain risks, such as those posed by these malicious NPM packages," researchers told.

"Applications and services are only as secure as their weakest component due to the decentralized and modular nature of application development. The attack's success—more than two dozen malicious modules were made available for download on a well-known package repository, and one of them received 17,000 downloads in just a few weeks—underscores the lax standards for application development and the low barriers that prevent malicious or even vulnerable code from exploiting IT environments and sensitive applications," ReversingLabs further added.

NIST Seeking Feedback for a New Cybersecurity Framework and Supply Chain Guidance


Addressing the SolarWinds disaster and other major third-party assaults targeting vital infrastructure, the National Institute of Standards and Technology is due to publish advice for securing organizations against supply chain breaches. [Special Publication 800-161] is the most important cybersecurity supply chain risk management guidance.' Angela Smith of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) stated. 

Angela Smith of the NIST talked at an Atlantic Council session on Tuesday about initiatives to protect information and communications technology supply chains. The first big revised version will be released by the end of next week, so stay tuned if you haven't already reviewed some of the public drafts. 

The NIST upgrade comes as the Biden administration tries to use the government's procurement power to prod contractors such as IT management firm SolarWinds and other software vendors to improve the security of their environments. 

Vendors of the underlying information and communications technology are pitching in and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency consider expanding private-sector partnerships and taking a more comprehensive approach to tackling dangers to critical infrastructure. 

Future guidelines on trying to manage cybersecurity risks that emerge through the supply chain, according to Smith, would focus more on actions for providers along the chain to address, in addition to the upcoming change. The current literature on the subject has been centered on the organizations' responsibilities for integrating supply-chain aspects into existing surroundings. 

The previous draft version, R2, which was released in October 2021, had a new appendix, Appendix F, which gave implementation assistance for Executive Order 14028 to government agencies. Following NIST's February 4, 2022, Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Recommendations, the SP 800-161 release scheduled for next week is likely to deliver more EO 14028 guidance.

The CSF was last updated by NIST in 2018. "There is no single reason causing this transition, This is a scheduled upgrade to keep the CSF current and consistent with other regularly used tools," said Kevin Stine, Chief Cybersecurity Advisor at the NIST. NIST is seeking public input on three primary topics to help guide the revision: revisions to the CSF itself, relationships and alignment between the CSF and other resources, and approaches to improve supply chain cybersecurity. President Barack Obama directed NIST to develop the CSF and directed federal agencies to use it, as well as advising the private sector to do so.

NIST should give a definition for an agency to "use" the framework, and agencies should furnish NIST with cybersecurity risk documents developed and used to comply with this requirement. For enterprises that are utilizing or considering adopting the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, seeing how it is used by US government entities would be extremely beneficial.

Forged Kubernetes Apps is used to Extract Sensitive Data from Argo CD Setups


Argo CD is among the most popular Kubernetes continuous deployment technologies. Besides being easy to operate, it has a lot of power too. Kubernetes GitOps is the first tool that comes to mind. For cluster bootstrapping, Argo CD uses the App of Apps pattern.

Instead of manually developing each Argo CD app, we can make it programmatically and automatically. The idea is simple: make a single Argo CD application that looks for a git repo directory and puts all of the Argo CD application configuration files there. As a result, whenever an application definition file is created on the git repo location, the Argo CD application is immediately produced. Inspiringly, any Kubernetes object, including Argo CD, can be generated or handled. 

Apiiro's Security Research team discovered a vulnerability scanning supply chain 0-day vulnerability (CVE-2022-24348) in Argo CD, another famous open source Continuous Delivery platform, which allows attackers to access sensitive data like secrets, passwords, and API keys. 

Argo CD organizes and instigates the operation and monitoring of post-integration application deployment. A user can create a new deployment pipeline by specifying an Archive or a Kubernetes Helm Chart file which contains:
  • The metadata and data required to deploy the correct Kubernetes setup.
  • The ability to update the cloud setup dynamically as the manifest is changed. 

A Helm Infographic is a YAML document that has multiple fields which constitute a declaration of assets and configurations required for an application to be deployed. File names and indirect paths to self-contained software sections in other files are one form of value that can be found in the application in question. 

In reality, Argo CD contributors predicted as this type of exploitation will be available in 2019 and designed a dedicated framework to facilitate it. The vulnerability has two consequences: 

First, the direct consequences of reading contents from other files on the repository, which may contain sensitive data. The aforementioned can have a significant influence on a company. 

Second, because application files typically contain a variety of transitive values of secrets, tokens, and environmentally sensitive settings, the attacker can effectively use this to expand the campaign by moving laterally through different services and escalating the privileges to gain more ground on the system and target organization's resources. 

Argo CD-reposerver is a central server or pod where repositories are saved; apart from file architecture, there is no robust segmentation, hence the anti-path-traversal technique is a crucial component of file security. The mechanism's inner workings are mostly contained in a single source code file called util/security/path traversal.go, which details the systematic cleanup of origin path input.

SureMDM Vulnerabilities Expose Organizations to Supply Chain Attacks

A chain of vulnerabilities in 42Gears' SureMDM device management products could have led to a supply chain disruption via the platform. 42Gears, based in Bangalore, was established in 2009 and offers mobile device management and productivity products for organizations with an extensive mobile workforce. 

The website's list consists of major customers, which include Deloitte, Saab, Lufthansa, Thales, Tesco, Intel, etc. Experts at Immersive Labs found and revealed the first flaws to 42Gears on July 6, 2021. A series of extra bugs disclosure along with 'failed' private security patches. 

It means efficient public security fixes were not issued until November 2021 and January 2022. 
"An authentication method can be turned on by the user, but an oversight in the setup allows Linux and Mac devices to bypass the authentication step. This has been fixed in the latest patch, but it is still not the default setting and requires the user to manually enable it," reports Security Week. Earlier in January, 42Gears told Immersive that they continuously applied additional patches beyond the reports by the experts. 

At this moment, Immersive thought that everything necessary for ensuring principles of trustworthy disclosure was done, and they could publicize their discovery. The identified vulnerabilities include a few that affect the 42Gears web console and also other Linux agents. 

But most critical are the web console vulnerabilities. Chaining these will allow a hacker to shut down security tools and enable malware into macOS, Linux, or Android devices that installed SureMDM. The Linux agent flaws can allow an attacker to execute remote code on the systems, mirroring the root user. 

Hackers can use authentication methods against the users via an oversight in the setup that lets Mac and Linux devices evade the authentication level. Security Week reports, "the SureMDM agent vulnerabilities include command injection on the Linux agent. Users with physical access to a device can use a hidden key sequence to launch SureLock (kiosk software included with SureMDM) as the root user. The attacker can then use command injection to gain local privilege escalation."

Lazarus Has Started to Target the IT Supply Chain


The Lazarus hacker gang, which is backed by North Korea, has shifted its emphasis to new targets and has been detected by Kaspersky security experts improving its supply chain assault capabilities. After breaching a Latvian IT provider in May, Lazarus utilized a new form of the BLINDINGCAN backdoor to attack a South Korean research tank in June.

Lazarus built an infection chain in the first case found by Kaspersky researchers, which began with legitimate South Korean security software distributing a malicious payload. The target in the second case was a Latvian company that develops asset monitoring solutions, an unusual victim for Lazarus. CISA and the FBI were the first to notice the backdoor utilized in these assaults. It can elude detection by removing itself from infiltrated computers, exfiltrate data, create and destroy processes, and tamper with file and folder timestamps, according to the researchers. 

The infection chain included the Racket downloader, which was signed with a stolen certificate. The hacker gang infiltrated weak web servers and installed scripts that gave them control over the dangerous implants. 

Lazarus has been targeting the defence industry using the MATA malware architecture for cyber-espionage purposes for some months, according to Kaspersky. MATA had previously been utilized by the gang for a variety of reasons, including data theft and ransomware transmission. A downloader was used to collect further malware from the command and control (C&C) server in the attacks, which leveraged a multi-stage infection chain. For this campaign, Lazarus upgraded the MATA framework and signed some of its components with a legitimate but stolen digital certificate. 

“Through this research, we discovered a stronger connection between MATA and the Lazarus group, including the fact that the downloader malware fetching MATA malware showed ties to TangoDaiwbo, which we had previously attributed to the Lazarus group,” Kaspersky said. 

Lazarus, also known as Hidden Cobra, has been active since at least 2009 and is suspected of orchestrating a number of high-profile strikes. In 2020, the group targeted COVID-19 research, as well as members of the security research community and vaccine maker Pfizer. 

"These recent developments highlight two things: Lazarus remains interested in the defense industry and is also looking to expand its capabilities with supply chain attacks," said Ariel Jungheit, a senior security researcher at Kaspersky. "When carried out successfully, supply chain attacks can cause devastating results, affecting much more than one organization – something we saw clearly with the SolarWinds attack last year."

Siamesekitten Launches New Operations Against Israeli Organizations


To mask their actual objectives, hackers affiliated with the government of Iran have concentrated their offensive efforts on IT and communications businesses in Israel. Ever since least 2018, operations have indeed been ascribed to the APT group of Iranians known as Lyceum, Hexane, and Siamesekitten. 

At the epicenter of a cyberattack on the supply chain, IT and communications companies in Israel has been led by Iranian threat actors who have impersonated businesses and their HR professionals to target victims with fraudulent employment proposals to infiltrate their systems and obtain access to the firms' customers. ClearSky claimed that the cyberattacks on IT and telecom firms are designed to make supply chain attacks on its customers simpler.

The operations, which took place in two phases in May and July 2021, are connected with the hacking group Siamesekitten, which has mainly pinpointed the Middle East and African oil, gas, and telecommunications suppliers. The attackers coupled social engineering technology with an enhanced malware version to provide remote access to the affected machine. 

In one case, the cybercriminals used the username of a former HR manager of ChipPC company to construct a fraudulent LinkedIn profile, a strong indication that the hackers had been doing their research even before the campaign was launched.

In addition to using Lure documents as the initial vector of attacks, its network comprised the establishment of fraudulent websites, which imitated the impersonation of the organization, and the creation of false LinkedIn profiles. The bait files take the shape of a macro-embedded Excel table, detailing alleged job offers and of a portable (PE) file containing a 'catalog' of products utilized by the impersonated firm. 

"This campaign is similar to the North Korean 'job seekers' campaign, employing what has become a widely used attack vector in recent years - impersonation," the Israeli cybersecurity company said. "The group's main goal is to conduct espionage and utilize the infected network to gain access to their clients' networks. As with other groups, it is possible that espionage and intelligence gathering are the first steps toward executing impersonation attacks targeting ransomware or wiper malware." 

Whatever file the victim downloads, the attack chain is completed with a C++-based Milan backdoor installation. The attacks against Israel's enterprises in July 2021 are especially noteworthy since Milan had been substituted by the threat player with a new installation named Shark, written in.NET.

1.2 Million People Affected by Practicefirst's Supply Chain Ransomware Breach


One of the largest health data breaches disclosed to federal regulators so far this year is a supply chain ransomware attack that affected over 1.2 million people. Practicefirst, a medical management services company situated in Amherst, New York, disclosed a data breach to federal officials on July 1. According to the company's breach notification statement, the company paid a ransom in exchange for the attackers promising to destroy and not further expose files seized in the incident. 

The HIPAA Breach Reporting Tool, a website run by the Department of Health and Human Services that lists health data breaches impacting 500 or more people, says that Practicefirst reported the event affecting more than 1.2 million people. The Practicefirst hack was the sixth-largest health data breach reported on the HHS website so far in 2021 as of Tuesday.

According to Practicefirst's breach notification statement, on December 30, 2020, "an unauthorized actor who attempted to deploy ransomware to encrypt our systems copied several files from our system, including files that include limited patient and employee personal information." When the corporation learned of the situation, it says it shut down its systems, changed passwords, notified law enforcement, and hired privacy and security specialists to help.

"The information copied from our system by the unauthorized actor before it was permanently deleted, included name, address, email address, date of birth, driver’s license number, Social Security number, diagnosis, laboratory and treatment information, patient identification number, medication information, health insurance identification and claims information, tax identification number, employee username with password, employee username with security questions and answers, and bank account and/or credit card/debit card information," Practicefirst says. 

"We are not aware of any fraud or misuse of any of the information as a result of this incident," the company says. "The actor who took the copy has advised that the information is destroyed and was not shared." Many security experts believe that such promises made by hackers are untrustworthy. "Cybercriminals who infiltrate information systems are not reputable or reliable. By their nature, they will lie, cheat and steal," says privacy attorney David Holtzman of consulting firm HITprivacy LLC. 

"Vendors to healthcare organizations should be transparent to the public and to the organizations contracted with those providers to make clear statements as to what happened, what data may have been compromised and what steps they are taking to notify the organizations they serve of the data that was put at risk."

Mongolian Certificate Authority Hacked Eight Times


The unidentified hackers attacked the website of MonPass, one of Mongolia's leading certificate authorities, to backdoor its installation software with Cobalt Strike binaries in yet another software supply chain attack. 

According to a study published on Thursday by Czech cybersecurity software provider Avast, the trojanized client was accessible for download between February 8, 2021, and March 3, 2021. 

In addition, the researchers discovered eight distinct web shells and backdoors on a public webserver hosted by MonPass, which shows that it was compromised as many as eight times. After discovering the backdoored installation and implant on one of its clients' PCs, Avast launched an inquiry into the matter. 

"The malicious installer is an unsigned [Portable Executable] file," the researchers stated. "It starts by downloading the legitimate version of the installer from the MonPass official website. This legitimate version is dropped to the 'C:\Users\Public\' folder and executed under a new process. This guarantees that the installer behaves as expected, meaning that a regular user is unlikely to notice anything suspicious." 

The installer downloads a bitmap image (.BMP) file from a remote server to extract and execute an encrypted Cobalt Strike beacon payload, which is notable for its use of steganography to send shellcode to the victim's device. 

On April 22, MonPass was informed of the situation, and the certificate authority took measures to resolve the compromised server and notify those who had downloaded the backdoored client. The incident is the second time that certificate authority software has been used to attack targets with malicious backdoors. ESET revealed a campaign called "Operation SignSight" in December 2020, in which a digital signature toolset from the Vietnam Government Certification Authority (VGCA) was modified to incorporate spyware competent in collecting system data and installing additional malware. 

The development also comes as Proofpoint's announced earlier this week that the use of the Cobalt Strike penetration testing tool in threat actor campaigns has increased by 161% year over year from 2019 to 2020. 

According to Proofpoint analysts, “"Cobalt Strike is becoming increasingly popular among threat actors as an initial access payload, not just a second-stage tool threat actors use once access is achieved, with criminal threat actors making up the bulk of attributed Cobalt Strike campaigns in 2020."