At DEF CON 33, independent security researcher Marek Tóth revealed a new class of attack called DOM-based extension clickjacking that can manipulate browser-based password managers and, in limited scenarios, hijack passkey authentication flows. This is not a failure of cryptography itself, but a breakdown in the layers surrounding it.
What is being attacked, and how?
Clickjacking is not new. In its classic form, an attacker overlays a transparent frame or control on a visible page so that a user thinks they are clicking one thing but actually triggers another.
What Tóth’s technique adds is the targeting of browser extensions’ UI elements specifically, the autofill prompts that password managers inject into web pages. The attacker’s script controls the page’s Document Object Model (DOM) and applies CSS tricks (such as setting opacity to zero or overlaying fake elements) so that a user’s genuine click (for example, “Accept cookies”) also activates that hidden autofill element. The result: the extension may populate fields transparently, then the attacker reads the filled data.
In many of Tóth’s tests, a single click was sufficient to trigger data leakage credentials, TOTP codes (2FA), credit card information, or personal data. In some setups, passkey workflows could also be subverted using “signed assertion hijacking,” if the server did not enforce session-bound challenges.
How serious is the exposure?
Tóth examined 11 popular password-manager extensions (such as Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass, iCloud Passwords). All were vulnerable under default settings to at least one variant of the attack.
Among the risks:
Credential theft: Usernames, passwords and even stored TOTP codes could be auto-populated and exfiltrated.
Credit card data: Autofill of payment fields (card number, expiration, CVV) was exposed in several tests.
Passkey hijack: If the relying server does not bind the challenge to a session, an attacker controlling a page could co-opt a passkey login request.
Some vendors have already released patches. For example, Enpass addressed clickjacking in browser extensions in version 6.11.6. Other tools remain at risk under certain configurations.
Why this doesn’t mean cryptographic failure
It is critical to clarify: the underlying passkey standards (WebAuthn / FIDO protocols) were not broken. Instead, the attack targets the implementation and environment around them namely, the browser’s extension UI interaction. The exploit is possible only when the extension injects visible elements into the page DOM, and when an attacker can manipulate those elements.
In other words, passkeys are strong in theory. But every layer above — browser, extension, site must preserve integrity or risk defeat.
What must users and organizations do
Users should:
1. Update your browser and your password-manager extensions immediately; enable auto-update.
2. Disable inline autofill where possible; prefer manual copy-paste or invoke filling only through the extension’s menu.
3. On Chromium-based browsers, set extension site access to “on click,” not “all sites.”
4. Remove or disable unused extensions.
5. For high-value accounts, prefer platform-native passkey or hardware-backed authenticators rather than extension-based credentials.
Organizations should:
• Audit extension policies and restrict or whitelist extensions.
• Enforce secure best practices on web apps (e.g., session-bound challenges with passkeys).
• Encourage or mandate the use of vetted and updated password-management tools.
This disclosure emphasizes that security is a chain, and your cryptographic strength is only as strong as its weakest link. Passkeys are an important evolution beyond passwords, but until all layers: browser, extensions, applications are hardened, risk remains. Act now before attackers exploit complacency.
For years, password managers have been promoted as one of the safest ways to store and manage login details. They keep everything in one place, help generate strong credentials, and protect against weak or reused passwords. But new research has uncovered a weakness in several widely used browser extensions that could expose sensitive information for millions of people.
Details about the flows
Security researchers recently found that 11 different password manager extensions share a vulnerability linked to the way they rely on the Document Object Model (DOM). The DOM is part of how web pages are structured, and in this case, it opens a door to a technique known as “clickjacking.”
Clickjacking works by tricking users into clicking on invisible or disguised elements of a web page. For example, a malicious site may look legitimate but contain hidden layers. A single misplaced click can unintentionally activate the password manager’s autofill function. Once that happens, the manager may begin entering saved credentials directly into the attacker’s page.
The danger lies in how quietly this happens. Users often close the site without realizing that their passwords or even stored credit card information and personal details like addresses or phone numbers may already have been copied by attackers.
The scale of the issue
The affected list includes some of the most recognized password managers in the industry. An estimated 40 million users worldwide could be impacted. While some companies have already addressed the issue through updates, not all providers have released fixes yet. For example, RoboForm has patched its extension, and Bitwarden has rolled out a new version. However, others remain in the process of responding.
Protecting yourself
There is no universal fix for clickjacking, but users can take important steps to reduce risk:
1. Be cautious with links: Avoid clicking on unfamiliar or suspicious links, even if they appear genuine. It is always safer to type the website address directly or use trusted bookmarks.
2. Update your tools: Make sure your password manager extension is up to date. Updates often contain security fixes that block known vulnerabilities.
3. Change autofill settings: If you use a Chromium-based browser, switch your password manager’s autofill to “on-click.” This ensures that details are only filled in when you actively choose to do so.
4. Disable unnecessary autofill: Consider turning off automatic completion for personal information like email addresses in your browser settings.
The bottom line
Password managers are still an essential tool for safe online habits, but like any technology, they are not immune to flaws. Staying alert, practicing careful browsing, and keeping your software updated can substantially lower the risk. Until every provider has addressed the vulnerability, users should take extra precautions to keep their digital identities secure.
9to5Mac is brought to you by Incogni: a service that helps you wipe your personal data—including your phone number, address, and email—from data brokers and people-search websites. With a 30-day money-back guarantee, Incogni offers peace of mind for anyone looking to guard their privacy.
The disappearing password problem affected Chrome users worldwide, causing them trouble finding saved passwords. Users even had trouble finding newly saved passwords. Google has fixed the issue now, saying the problem was in the M127 version of Chrome Browser on Windows devices.
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact numbers, but based on Google’s 3 Billion Chrome users worldwide, with the majority of Chrome users, we can get a positive estimate. According to experts, around 15 million users experienced the vanishing password problem. "Impacted users were unable to find passwords in Chrome's password manager. Users can save passwords, however it was not visible to them. The impact was limited to the M127 version of Chrome Browser on the Windows platform," said Google.
Fortunately, Google has now fixed the issue, users only need to restart their Chrome browsers. “We apologize for the inconvenience this service disruption/outage may have caused,” said Google. If a user has any inconveniences beyond what Google has covered, they are free to contact Google Workplace Support.
Google's Chrome password manager may be accessed through the browser's three-dot menu by selecting Passwords & Autofill, then Google Password Manager. Alternatively, you can install the password manager Chrome app from the password manager settings and then access it from the Google Apps menu. If Chrome invites you to autofill a password, clicking Manage Passwords will take you directly there.
According to cybersecurity reporter Brian Krebs, the email verification while creating a new Google Workplace Account also went missing for a few Chrome users.
The authentication problem, which is now fixed, allowed threat actors to skip the email verification needed to create a Google Workplace account, allowing them to mimic a domain holder at third-party services. This allowed a threat actor to log in to third-party services like a Dropbox account.
The threat actors carry out the operation particularly when the password manager is trying to autofill login credentials.
In a presentation at the Black Hat Europe security conference, the researchers revealed that the majority of Android password managers are susceptible to AutoSpill even in the absence of JavaScript injection.
WebView is frequently used in Android apps to render web content, which includes login pages, within the app, rather than redirecting users to the main browser, which would be more challenging on small-screen devices.
Android password managers automatically enter a user's account information when an app loads the login page for services like Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, or Google by utilizing the WebView component of the platform.
According to the researchers, it is possible to exploit vulnerabilities in this process to obtain the auto-filled credentials on the app that is being invoked.
The researchers added that the password managers on Androids will be more vulnerable to the attack if the JavaScript injections are enabled.
One of the main causes of the issue regarding AutoSpill is Android’s inability to specify who is responsible for handling the auto-filled data securely, which leaves the data vulnerable to leakage or capture by the host app.
In an attack scenario, the user's credentials could be obtained by a rogue app presenting a login form without leaving any trace of the breach.
Using Android's autofill framework, the researchers tested AutoSpill against a number of password managers on Android 10, 11, and 12. They discovered that 1Password 7.9.4, LastPass 5.11.0.9519, Enpass 6.8.2.666, Keeper 16.4.3.1048, and Keepass2Android 1.09c-r0 are vulnerable to assaults.
It was found that Google Smart Lock 13.30.8.26 and DashLane 6.2221.3 had different technical approaches for the autofill process, wherein they did not compromise data to the host app unless JavaScript injection was used.
The researchers submitted their recommendations for fixing the issue along with their results to the security team of Android and the affected software manufacturers. Their report was accepted as legitimate, however, no information regarding the plans for rectifying it was disclosed.
The iLeakage exploit is a new issue that security researchers have discovered for Apple users. This clever hack may reveal private data, including passwords and emails, and it targets Macs and iPhones. It's critical to comprehend how this attack operates and take the necessary safety measures in order to stay safe.
Freecycle, a well-known website for recycling and giving away unwanted stuff, recently announced a huge data breach that has affected millions of its users. This news has shocked the internet world. Concerns over the security of personal information on the internet have been raised by the hack, underscoring once more the significance of using secure passwords and being aware of cybersecurity issues.
Apparently, the vulnerability enables an attacker to extract the master password from the target computer's memory and take it away in plain text, or in other words, in an unencrypted form. Although it is a fairly easy hack, there are expected to be some unsettling repercussions.
Password managers, like in this case KeePass, lock up a user’s login info encrypted and secure behind a master password in order to keep it safe. The vault is a valuable target for hackers since the user is required to input the master password to access everything within.
Security researcher 'vdohney,' according to a report by Bleeping Computer, found the KeePass vulnerability and posted a proof-of-concept (PoC) program on GitHub.
With the exception of the initial one or two characters, this tool can almost entirely extract the master password in readable, unencrypted form. Even if KeePass is locked and, possibly, if the app is completely closed, it is still capable of doing this.
All this is because the vulnerability extracts the master password from KeePass’s memory. This can be acquired, as the researcher says, in a number of ways: “It doesn’t matter where the memory comes from — can be the process dump, swap file (pagefile.sys), hibernation file (hiberfil.sys) or RAM dump of the entire system.”
The exploit is only possible due to some custom code KeePass uses. Your master password is entered in a unique box named SecureTextBoxEx. Despite its name, it turns out that this box is actually not all that secure since each character that is entered essentially creates a duplicate of itself in the system memory. The PoC tool locates and extracts these remaining characters.
Having physical access to the computer from which the master password is to be taken is the only drawback to this security breach. However, that is not always a problem; as the LastPass vulnerability case demonstrated, hackers can access a target's computer by utilizing weak remote access software installed on the device.
In case a device was infected by a malware, it may as well be set up to dump KeePass's memory and send it and the app's database back to the hacker's server, giving the threat actor time to get the master password.
Fortunately, the developer of KeePass promises that a fix is incoming; one of the potential fixes is to add random dummy text that would obscure the password into the app's memory. It may be agonizing to wait until June or July 2023 for the update to be made available for anyone concerned about their master password being compromised. The fix, however, is also available in beta form and may be downloaded from the KeePass website.