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Showing posts with label e-commerce security. Show all posts

Brazilian Magecart Group Exploits Plausible Installation to Steal Checkout


Data Magecart, a Brazilian group of hackers, compromised the analytics script used by e-commerce platform Convertr, potentially revealing payment information provided by customers to dozens of Brazilian fashion brands. During the attack, which was detected by cybersecurity firm Sansec on October 24, 2026, malicious code was injected into Convertr's Plausible analytics tracker. 

By modifying a JavaScript file loaded into Convertr's merchant checkouts, the attackers allowed the card skimmer to collect sensitive information during online purchases by modifying the JavaScript file. The data obtained was comprised of card numbers, expiration dates, CVV security codes, cardholder names, and Brazilian CPF taxpayer identification numbers. 

The information was transmitted to a server controlled by the attacker at 1x0.is. Online shopping and checkout services are provided by Convertr to dozens of Brazilian fashion retailers. According to the platform, its merchants have processed more than R$2 billion in sales. Due to the fact that the affected analytics tracker was distributed throughout its merchant network, compromising one file created a potential supply chain risk that extends beyond one individual online store. 

The malicious script was detected by Sansec after a clean version was captured earlier on October 24th. In October, the attackers modified the skimmer in order to target Convertr's payment API field names, making it more effective in capturing payment information. Researchers also reported that the compromised tracker continued to serve on October 26, despite efforts to notify Convertr. 

As Sansec has been tracking the Brazilian Magecart group since July 2024, the incident represents a significant development in its activities. The group has previously targeted individual online stores using Magento, OpenCart and WooCommerce, mainly in Brazil. With the Convertr compromise, Sansec has shifted from infecting individual stores to compromising a service shared by multiple businesses, resulting in the first supply chain attack attributed to the group. 

An unpatched installation of Plausible Community Edition, an open-source web analytics platform, is believed to have been the source of the attack. Versions 3.0.0 through 3.2.0 were affected by CVE-2026-8467, a critical vulnerability that could allow unauthenticated command execution through an exposed component of the /storybook component. 

Convertr reported installing version 3.0 in 2025 and not updating it prior to the incident. On May 15, 2026, Plausible released version 3.2.1 which fixed the vulnerability. Since researchers were not able to access the platform’s server logs, Sansec has not confirmed that the vulnerability was exploited to gain access. Therefore, it remains unclear what specific method was used to compromise the analytics server. Furthermore, the group has consistently targeted Brazilian payment systems as a focus for their methods. 

According to Sansec, its skimmers exhibit recurring characteristics, including the use of short-lived domains as recipients of stolen information, and endpoints containing Portuguese names related to card payments. Other variants have also been developed to attack payment services, including e.Rede, PagSeguro, Pagar.me and Mercado Pago. 

Another version is reported to replace genuine PIX payment QR codes with malicious codes. Convertr confirmed on October 27 that Plausible had been updated with a patched version following the discovery of the malicious script. In addition to notifying affected merchants, payment providers, and relevant authorities, the company also verified that the tracker hosted on Convertr's analytics server was free of infection. 

While it is important to remove malicious code, it does not necessarily eliminate all immediate risks for all shoppers. Sansec stated that browsers may retain cached copies of infected scripts for up to 24 hours following the server-side cleanup, potentially allowing the malicious code to remain active during that period. 

Payments made by Brazilian customers through checkout addresses containing checkout.convertr from October 24 onward should be blocked and replaced by their banks. It is also recommended to monitor transactions for suspicious activity involving CPF identification numbers in order to identify suspicious activity. 

A Sansec recommendation for organizations using Plausible Community Edition is to update the version to 3.2.1 or later and to review server access logs for requests to the exposed path of /storybook. Upon detecting evidence of exploitation, the affected server should be rebuilt, secrets rotated, tracker files checked against the official release, and a more thorough investigation conducted. The incident emphasizes the wider risks associated with shared web infrastructure. 

Multiple businesses can be affected by compromised analytics scripts without the attacker having to breach each merchant individually. To reduce the risk of similar attacks, it is vital that software be updated, scripts loaded on payment pages are monitored, and unauthorized outbound connections are restricted. 

This incident illustrates the dangers posed by compromised third-party scripts used on checkout pages. Preventing digital skimming attacks requires timely software updates, continuous script monitoring, and stronger protection of payment infrastructure.

Malware Campaign Infects 953 Online Stores in Prolonged Attack

 

In the past two years, 953 online stores, primarily Magento-based websites, have been compromised by malicious JavaScript code injected into their websites as part of a long-running malware campaign. According to the cybersecurity firm Sansec, the attack began in July 2025 and continues to this day, with attackers periodically changing the domain used to deliver malicious software. 

There is a small piece of loader code embedded in the content management system of affected stores that is used in this campaign. When a visitor opens a compromised website, it contacts an attacker-controlled server to determine what action to take next. The server identifies genuine shoppers from automated security scanners by analyzing browser characteristics, rather than exposing all visitors to the same activity. 

There may not be malicious content in automated requests, making detection of the infection more difficult for researchers and security tools. Sansec has identified five primary domains associated with the campaign: manulfie.click, neswnsssn.click, lanhd6549tdhse.top, additionalver.com, and deepveindrilling.com. 

On October 6, 2026, the latest domain, deepveindrilling.com, was registered and appeared on infected stores shortly thereafter. This malicious script was embedded into the CMS blocks of 83 online stores, including 60 that were previously loaded with earlier versions of the malicious script. As well as introducing new infrastructure, deepveindrilling.com now responds to script requests generated by visitors of infected stores rather than serving content openly. 

Hosted behind Cloudflare, the loader also introduces new features to how it operates. In the Magento database, the loader code is stored in the cms_block table, which controls the content displayed on storefront pages. Scripts injected into a visitor's browser can also be preserved, allowing them to execute them again during subsequent page visits, regardless of whether the external domain becomes unavailable or blocked. 

During testing, Sansec's automated scanning was not capable of retrieving the final malicious payload, as evidenced by the fact that the filtering mechanism is capable of concealing the campaign's actual activity from security investigations. The newer version employs browser fingerprinting techniques to examine indicators such as automation tools, hardware specifications, screen dimensions, language settings, and other browser characteristics before selecting a response. 

Although earlier versions have been observed loading scripts from domains which are similar to the Ledger cryptocurrency wallet brand, this raises concerns regarding possible financial fraud against online shoppers. The initial methods used by this campaign indicate that Magento and Adobe Commerce installations are vulnerable. 

Using PolyShell (CVE-2026-54236), attackers were reportedly able to inject malicious code into 471 stores in March 2026. Additionally, researchers identified more than 100 stores where files were uploaded using PolyShell or the SessionReaper vulnerability (CVE-2025-5436). However, the investigation determined that applying security patches does not necessarily eliminate a compromise that has already taken place. 

In one Magento 2.4.7-p10 store that had no missing core patches, the latest malicious loader occurred on October 23rd. In earlier scans, a GSocket backdoor and unauthorized administrator account were found on the same installation, suggesting that attackers could still gain access to this system even after software updates have been applied. 

Sansec has not recovered the final payload of the latest version of the campaign, which leaves the full impact of the campaign unclear. Financial fraud was suspected as a result of earlier activity involving cryptocurrency-themed domains, including a website impersonating the Ledger wallet brand. In certain circumstances, compromised storefronts may result in payments-data theft, credential harvesting or malicious redirects depending on the payload delivered. However, all 953 affected stores have not yet been confirmed to have experienced these outcomes. 

A number of security measures have been recommended to address the threat, including examining Magento installations for injected scripts, suspicious administrator accounts, and backdoors. Store operators are advised to examine the CMS database tables for unauthorized modifications, review uploaded files for webshells, and patch known vulnerabilities. As part of the investigation and removal of unauthorized access following the compromise, it is also essential to change administrator, database and API credentials. 

By relying solely on routine vulnerability scans, the campaign highlights the limitations of such scanning. As a result of persistent access, changing attacker infrastructure and browser-based evasion, malicious code can remain active without being detected by automated scans. It is imperative for e-commerce operators to identify the original entry point, remove persistence mechanisms, and confirm that attackers no longer have access to the affected environment in order to effectively remediate. 

It emphasizes the need for e-commerce businesses to conduct more thorough security checks than just routine patching. For the prevention of reinfection and the protection of customer data, it is imperative that malicious scripts be identified, backdoors be removed, administrator accounts be secured, and suspicious activity be monitored.

ZAGG Inc. Data Breach Compromises Customer Payment Information

 


ZAGG Inc., a leading manufacturer of mobile accessories such as screen protectors, phone cases, and power banks, recently alerted customers about a data breach that compromised payment information. The breach occurred due to hackers infiltrating a third-party app, FreshClick, available through the BigCommerce platform.

"We learned that an unknown actor injected into the FreshClick app malicious code that was designed to scrape credit card data entered as part of the checkout process for certain ZAGG.com customer transactions between October 26, 2024, and November 7, 2024,” ZAGG stated in its notification to affected individuals.

BigCommerce Responds

BigCommerce, an Austin-based SaaS e-commerce platform, confirmed that its systems were not directly compromised. In a statement to BleepingComputer, the company explained, “Using our internal tools and in communication with the partner, we verified the third-party FreshClick app was compromised. Acting in the best interest of our customers and their shoppers, we immediately uninstalled the app in their stores, which removed any compromised APIs and malicious code.”

The FreshClick app, designed to enhance e-commerce functionality and customer experience, was exploited by malicious actors who stole sensitive shopper information, including:

  • Personal Details: Names and addresses.
  • Payment Information: Credit card data entered during the checkout process.

ZAGG’s Mitigation Measures

In response to the breach, ZAGG has implemented several remediation measures, including notifying law enforcement and offering impacted customers 12 months of complimentary credit monitoring through Experian. Customers are encouraged to:

  • Monitor financial accounts for unauthorized transactions.
  • Place fraud alerts on their credit reports.
  • Consider implementing a credit freeze for added protection.

Scope of the Breach

The company has not yet disclosed the total number of customers affected by the breach. However, it has assured its customers that steps are being taken to enhance security and prevent similar incidents in the future.

This incident underscores the vulnerabilities associated with third-party integrations in e-commerce platforms. ZAGG’s proactive measures, along with BigCommerce’s swift response in removing the compromised app, highlight the importance of collaboration in addressing cybersecurity threats and protecting customer data.