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PostgreSQL’s Largest Ever Security Release Patches 52 Flaws, Including a 22-Year-Old Bug Any Logged-In User Could Weaponize

 


The PostgreSQL Global Development Group shipped security updates on November 12 for all five supported major versions, issuing fixes for 52 vulnerabilities at once: the largest security release the project has published. Thirty-two of the 52 flaws carry a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.8, with no user interaction required, full confidentiality and availability impact, and network reachability through a low-privilege login. The fixed releases are 18.7, 17.12, 16.16, 15.20, and 14.25.

At the center of the batch is CVE-2026-6460, a type confusion flaw in how PostgreSQL handles composite types — data structures built from named fields. When a field's type is changed after values of the original type are already stored, PostgreSQL's binary representation keeps those old bytes intact while the catalog metadata shifts around them. The server then reads a stale value through the new type's output function. That mismatch is enough for a database user who can create objects to run arbitrary code as the OS account running PostgreSQL, no superuser status, no extensions, no file access.

The trigger takes exactly four SQL statements. A user creates a composite type, prepares a query using it, alters the attribute to a different type, then executes the prepared query. The backend selects the wrong output handler, dereferences a null pointer, and crashes. That crash is the entry point.

Security researcher Mehmet Ince found the flaw and published a writeup alongside a demonstration on PostgreSQL 18.6. He traces the root cause to a commit made May 5, 2004, the one that added ALTER TABLE ... ALTER COLUMN ... TYPE. That logic never accounted for prepared statements holding values built against the old type. The code sat there for 22 years. His exploit chain defeats ASLR through a related confusion involving PostgreSQL's unnest() function, then calls system() through a forged object whose methods table points at the system call. He stopped short of publishing that final step. He found 21 variants of the problem in total, and six of the 52 CVEs in this release trace to his work. The release credits 18 researchers for CVE-2026-6460 alone, including PostgreSQL core developers Heikki Linnakangas and Andres Freund, along with the OpenAI Security Research Team and the Anthropic OSS program.

Before going public, Ince spent August coordinating with every major managed provider. He shared working proofs of concept with AWS covering both Aurora and RDS, Microsoft for Azure Database for PostgreSQL, Google for AlloyDB, Supabase, Databricks, and Ubicloud. Google AlloyDB escalated the report to its highest internal priority. Databricks validated the exploits the same day they arrived. Several vendors deployed their own mitigations before the upstream release shipped. Their current patch status is not public, so administrators on managed services should verify the minor version their provider is running.

The release also contains a flaw that skips authentication entirely. CVE-2026-116322, rated 5.3, lets any client restart a PostgreSQL 18 server without logging in. It involves a cancel request and a spinlock held during the authentication timeout window. Two further vulnerabilities sit in the client tools: a crafted archive fed to pg_restore can execute code as whoever invoked it, and a compromised source server can inject commands through the restore script inside pg_dump's tar output to any psql client connecting to it.

The November release permanently closes the PostgreSQL 14 branch. Version 14.25 is its last update. Administrators still on that version are running unsupported software from today. PostgreSQL 15 reaches the same status in November 2027.

Upgrading involves more than swapping binaries. The fix for CVE-2026-6460 changes the server's internal ABI for C-language extensions, which must be rebuilt against the patched version. Extensions compiled for the new release will not load on an unpatched server, so the upgrade and the rebuild must happen together. A new server setting, composite_type_mismatch, enables the type-version checks behind the fix; the project says disabling it carries security risk. Client tools must be updated on every machine running them, not just servers. Clusters managed by Patroni or any custom service unit need a manual restart. Users of incremental backups should take a new full backup before anchoring further incrementals. No workaround exists for the principal vulnerability on servers that cannot be patched, and PostgreSQL has reported no attacks in the wild.

The same acknowledgment list that names Ince, Linnakangas, and Freund also includes AI-assisted tooling. That dynamic cuts both ways. PostgreSQL 19, normally shipped in September or October, was pushed to November 19 partly because AI and LLM tools generated enough new reports to overwhelm the maintainers' review capacity before the feature freeze. Developer Robert Haas noted that LLM-drafted patches still need human review to meet project standards, and consultant Christophe Pettus pointed to the volume of low-quality machine-generated reports as a growing burden. The same tools that surfaced a 22-year-old bug made it harder to ship the next version.


Russia-Aligned Hackers Target Ukraine's War Crimes Courts and Military Aid Networks

 



A Russia-aligned hacking group that researchers had not previously named or documented has been running a systematic intelligence campaign against Ukrainian institutions since at least February 2025, targeting courts, prosecutors, local government bodies, and a major foreign military aid hub, according to a report published Tuesday by cybersecurity firm ESET.

The group, which ESET has labeled Gorbag, operates with a focused mandate: collect documents and credentials that give Russian intelligence visibility into how Ukraine is tracking war crimes, where foreign weapons are arriving, and how effectively Russian strikes are degrading infrastructure near the front lines. ESET said the group "demonstrates precise targeting and operational intent to contribute to Russia's broader strategic goals in the war with Ukraine."

About a quarter of Gorbag's known targets are law enforcement and judicial institutions. ESET researchers say this pattern points to Russian efforts to monitor ongoing war crimes investigations, including which soldiers and officers have been identified, what evidence has been gathered, and which individuals face prosecution. Courts and prosecutors hold precisely that case material, and the Kremlin would have an obvious interest in knowing what investigators know.

Another quarter of the group's victims are local government bodies, concentrated among city councils operating near active fighting. These are not high-profile targets on their own, but they hold something specific: internal damage assessments from Russian airstrikes, including infrastructure repair estimates that have never been publicly released. For Russian military planners evaluating whether strikes are achieving their intended effect, that internal accounting is far more useful than what appears in news reports.

ESET also identified a major transportation hub for foreign military aid as a Gorbag target, one that had been previously struck in Russian airstrikes. Its inclusion in the campaign fits a third intelligence priority the firm attributes to the group: tracking inbound weapons deliveries and mapping the logistics infrastructure that moves military equipment into Ukraine from abroad.


Getting in through the mailbox

Gorbag's entry method is phishing, specifically emails carrying malicious attachments formatted to look like official correspondence about administrative penalties or outstanding taxes. The choice of lure is deliberate. Administrative staff in Ukrainian municipal offices process exactly these kinds of documents, and a notice framed as an overdue government fine is designed to generate urgency without triggering immediate suspicion.

Once a machine is compromised, Gorbag deploys a custom info-stealer ESET calls BeautyStealer. The tool searches the infected computer, removable drives, and connected network shares for files of value, then attempts to erase itself after sending the data out, limiting what forensic investigators would find. The group also uses a remote access tool called Prime ReverseShell, built on publicly available code, that allows operators to issue commands to a compromised machine directly.

What BeautyStealer collects is a combination of credentials and documents. Saved browser passwords, authentication cookies, VPN configuration files, Microsoft Office documents, email archives, and compressed files all fall within scope. That mixture is significant: credentials open doors to systems the attacker has not yet reached, while the documents provide the raw intelligence. ESET notes Gorbag may pass stolen credentials to separate groups for follow-on intrusions, though this relationship has not been confirmed.


An old flaw put to new use

Starting in early 2026, Gorbag added another technique. The group began exploiting CVE-2025-8088, a path traversal vulnerability in WinRAR that lets an attacker write files outside an intended extraction folder by abusing NTFS Alternate Data Streams. The flaw was patched in July 2025, but systems running older versions remained open. WinRAR is used extensively across Ukrainian organizations, making it a consistent point of interest for Russia-aligned actors. RomCom, another Russian-linked group, had exploited the same vulnerability before Gorbag adopted it.

"As long as the war in Ukraine continues, we expect groups such as Gorbag to remain a persistent threat to Ukrainian government, justice, and defense entities." [ESET researchers]

ESET characterizes Gorbag as less technically sophisticated than elite Russian state hacking units. The group shows little interest in deep persistence or careful lateral movement through networks over time. Its posture is transactional: access a machine, harvest whatever is reachable, and exit. That approach may reflect a division of labor inside Russia's intelligence apparatus, where collection-focused units gather raw material and pass it upstream to actors with more specialized capabilities.

The targeting reinforces that reading. Gorbag is not hitting central government ministries or high-value military command networks in Kyiv. It is operating at the administrative layer of a country at war, the city councils, the courts, the logistics checkpoints, the bureaucratic infrastructure that underpins both civilian governance and military operations near the contact line. That is exactly where granular, operational intelligence lives, and exactly where it is least expected to be a target.



Synology NAS Owners Hit by C3RB3R Ransomware as Old Vulnerability Gets New Life

 



A ransomware strain called C3RB3R is actively hitting Synology network-attached storage devices, locking files and demanding bitcoin payments from victims who, in many cases, were running software patched nearly two years ago.

Synology confirmed the attacks on October 29, pointing to CVE-2024-10441, a critical remote code execution flaw in its DiskStation Manager operating system rated 9.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale. The vulnerability was found at Pwn2Own 2024 by DEVCORE researchers Pumpkin Chang and Orange Tsai, and Synology patched it by December 2024 under security advisory SA-24:20. The patch has been available ever since. The fact that attackers are still finding success with it tells you something about how many users never applied it.

Once attackers get into a device, C3RB3R goes to work quickly. The ransomware skips 27 system directories and a handful of file types, then recursively encrypts everything else. Each file receives its own 256-bit encryption key generated on the fly, locked with ChaCha8 and then wrapped with RSA-2048, which means there is no way to crack it without the attacker's private key. The malware drops a ransom note called read-me3.txt into every affected folder, containing a six-digit victim ID and a Tor address. Files come out the other side with a .L0CK3D extension. Backups stored on the same NAS are not spared.

The ransom demand starts at 0.036960 bitcoin, which works out to roughly $2,952 at current rates. Victims who miss the five-day deadline see that figure double to 0.073920 BTC, or about $5,904. No free decryptor exists, and Synology has offered none. Affected users who do not have off-site backups are, for practical purposes, out of options.

Reports first surfaced in South Korea around October 28. Victims filed complaints with KISA, the country's internet security agency, but KISA declined to say how many devices were affected, what caused the intrusions, or what it was doing about them. Synology has similarly not disclosed how many users were hit, which device models were targeted, or when it first became aware of the campaign. A Taiwanese NAS research group that compiled damage cases found a common thread: in every instance they reviewed, the device's management interface was reachable directly from the internet, whether through router port forwarding, UPnP, QuickConnect, or a reverse proxy.

The attack timing is not coincidental. On October 25, four days before Synology issued its statement, a public proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-10441 appeared on GitHub. That kind of public PoC typically compresses the window between disclosure and active exploitation to days, sometimes hours. Security researchers at 360 Security Team and Solar Emergency Response Team, who both published analysis on October 29, noted that the campaign appears to have kicked into gear almost immediately after the PoC dropped.

There is, however, a complication in Synology's explanation. The Solar team examined one affected device running DSM 7.4.1-90080 Update 1, a build that does not fit neatly into the SA-24:20 vulnerability timeline. The researchers have not ruled out other entry points, including vulnerable third-party packages, container services, or stolen credentials. No zero-day has been confirmed, but the mismatch has not been fully explained either.

Adding another layer, the 360 Security Team's analysis points to a different set of flaws entirely: CVE-2026-13639 and CVE-2026-13684, both scored 9.8, patched by Synology on September 18, 2026. Under 360's reading, these are "1-day" exploits built on patches that were barely a month old when the attacks began. If 360 is right, devices that only applied the 2024 patch would still be exposed.

Separately, Synology disclosed two more critical vulnerabilities in its PHP infrastructure, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, affecting packages including Web Station, WordPress, Joomla, and phpMyAdmin. Synology says these flaws are not the C3RB3R entry point, but has advised users to patch them regardless. Security firm Genians found that 96 percent of internal-network devices running PHP were exposed.

Synology's guidance for users is practical if grim for those already affected. The company recommends running a Security Advisor scan, checking Task Scheduler for unfamiliar scripts, and reviewing User and Group settings for administrator accounts that were not created by the device owner. If either check turns up something unexpected, Synology says to contact its support team rather than attempt a manual cleanup. For everyone else, the advice is to update DSM immediately, enable automatic updates, and move backup jobs off-device using Hyper Backup or Snapshot Replication.

The patches for SA-24:20 are in DSM 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2.2-72806-1, 7.2-64570-4, 7.1.1-42962-7, and 6.2.4-25556-8. Synology PSIRT says it continues to monitor the campaign.



Drupal Commerce Flaw Exposes Online Stores to Fraudulent Order Manipulation

 



Drupal has confirmed active exploitation of a highly critical access bypass vulnerability in its Commerce Core module, warning online retailers that attackers could manipulate orders and circumvent payment processes. The company has urged administrators to install the latest security updates and investigate existing transactions for unauthorized modifications.

Tracked as CVE-2026-118539, the vulnerability affects Drupal Commerce Core, a contributed module that enables websites to sell products and services through shopping carts, checkout systems and payment integrations. It also supports headless commerce architectures, where external applications interact with Drupal through APIs.

According to the original security advisory, certain application routes and entity fields do not have sufficient access restrictions, allowing unauthorized users to bypass established permission checks. This could enable attackers to manipulate commerce-related information, potentially causing direct financial losses for merchants.

Published on October 28 under advisory SA-CONTRIB-2026-254, the vulnerability received a Drupal security risk score of 21 out of 25, placing it in the highly critical category. Its assessment identifies the flaw as exploitable without authentication or special access requirements, regardless of the module's configuration.

Drupal has confirmed that the vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild. However, its initial advisory did not disclose the attack methodology, affected organizations or the number of compromised websites.


Fraudulent Order Attempts Reported on Live Websites

Additional information published on October 29 by Centarro, the maintainer of Drupal Commerce, provides further insight into the exploitation activity.

According to Centarro, it received two reports from merchants who observed suspicious attempts to place fraudulent orders on their live websites. Following an investigation conducted alongside the Drupal Security Team, the maintainers stated that they had not found evidence of scripted or widespread exploitation beyond the initially reported sites.

The vulnerability affects both traditional, full-stack Drupal Commerce installations and headless deployments, although the potential attack paths differ depending on the website's architecture.

Centarro identified several suspicious transaction patterns that administrators should investigate. These include orders placed without corresponding payments, transactions marked as paid despite having no associated payment records, product prices modified without legitimate promotions, and unauthorized discounts, fees or other adjustments applied to orders.

Some reported attempts involved products listed at unusually low prices, including $0.01, while others used apparently normal prices to make fraudulent transactions less conspicuous.

The maintainers also warned that the vulnerability may have existed in earlier Commerce Core releases for several years. Exploitation was theoretically possible from version 8.x-2.18, released in May 2020, on installations using Drupal's JSON:API module. Other configurations became potentially vulnerable from version 8.x-2.25, released in June 2021.

Consequently, organizations should not restrict their investigation to transactions created shortly before the October security disclosure.


Security Updates and Additional Commerce Vulnerabilities

Drupal has released Commerce Core 3.3.13 and 8.x-2.41 to address CVE-2026-118539. Administrators running the 3.x branch should upgrade to version 3.3.13, while installations using the earlier 8.x-2.x branch should move to 8.x-2.41.

Centarro has also recommended updating the associated Commerce API, Commerce License, Commerce Shipping and Commerce Stripe modules, which received separate security releases. Websites that do not require write operations through JSON:API should consider restricting the interface to read-only access.

The October 28 security releases addressed several additional vulnerabilities across Drupal's contributed projects.

Among them, CVE-2026-118558 affects Commerce Stripe through a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability. The module does not include a CSRF token in the return URI used during Stripe Connect authorization. An attacker could exploit this weakness by tricking an administrator into following a malicious link, potentially causing an order to be marked as paid without an actual payment.

Another issue, CVE-2026-118582, affects the CAPTCHA module. The vulnerability results from inadequate invalidation of previously solved CAPTCHA sessions, allowing an already-submitted protected form to be submitted again without completing another challenge. This could weaken protections against automated registrations, comment spam and login brute-force attempts. Drupal's advisory indicates that exploit code exists, although it does not confirm active exploitation.

Drupal also disclosed information disclosure vulnerabilities in Commerce Core and Media Alias Display. The former can expose information about unpublished product variations under certain JSON:API configurations, while the latter involves improperly configured caching that could expose files containing information intended to remain inaccessible.


Earlier Critical Drupal Vulnerabilities

The October disclosures follow another security release on October 14, when Drupal addressed two critical remote code execution vulnerabilities.

CVE-2026-108097 affects the Field UI module in Drupal Core, while CVE-2026-108099 impacts the contributed Entity List module. Although neither component independently exposes the vulnerabilities through its default functionality, certain contributed modules and custom implementations can introduce exploitable pathways. Drupal identified at least one potential attack path that does not require authentication.

Another vulnerability, CVE-2026-9082, involved SQL injection in Drupal Core's database abstraction API, affecting websites using PostgreSQL databases. The flaw could allow unauthenticated attackers to execute specially crafted database queries, potentially resulting in information disclosure, privilege escalation or remote code execution. The vulnerability was added to the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog in May 2026 following confirmed exploitation.

With CVE-2026-118539 now confirmed under active exploitation, administrators should prioritize security updates, examine historical order records and verify that payment confirmations correspond to actual transactions before fulfilling orders. Centarro has also recommended comparing suspicious transactions against website access logs to establish whether they originated through legitimate checkout processes.

Millions of Routers Running Broadcom Wi-Fi Chips Have an Unpatched Flaw That Hands Attackers Root Access Over the Air

 




A security researcher has demonstrated working exploits against a class of Wi-Fi gateways running Broadcom chips, showing that an attacker within radio range can gain root-level code execution on the device without knowing the Wi-Fi password or completing any kind of pairing process. As of this writing, no patch has been deployed to affected routers, and no CVE identifier has been assigned.

Quentin Kaiser published his findings on October 16, 2026, after a disclosure process that effectively went nowhere. The vulnerability sits inside Broadcom's own implementation of Wi-Fi Protected Setup, the handshake protocol designed to simplify connecting new devices to a network. Kaiser found that the code mishandles the reassembly of fragmented WPS messages. By sending carefully crafted fragments, an attacker can corrupt the device's memory and redirect execution, all through the air, from a position outside the building.


Two Working Exploits, Two Different Outcomes

Kaiser demonstrated the attack against two Belgian ISP-supplied gateways. On an Orange Belgium device, an Askey TCG3000, the exploit read the Wi-Fi pre-shared key directly from stored settings and transmitted it back to the attacker, effectively handing over the network password. On a Proximus gateway, the Sagemcom BBOX3V+, the exploit did something more severe: it opened a reverse shell transported entirely over Wi-Fi frames, without requiring the attacker to have an external server or any prior foothold on the network.

Both attacks required no credentials and no interaction from anyone inside the network. Distance helps the attacker, not the defender.


The Code Is Old, and So Is Broadcom's Awareness

The vulnerable code traces back to at least 2010. Broadcom issued a partial fix in 2018 and simultaneously told downstream customers to migrate to the hostapd Wi-Fi software package instead of relying on Broadcom's own WPS implementation. That guidance went unheeded across a large portion of the device ecosystem, and the underlying flaw was never fully resolved.

Kaiser says Broadcom was informed about the issue again through his disclosure process and declined to assign a CVE or comment publicly. CERT/CC, which typically coordinates vulnerability disclosures between researchers and vendors, closed his case the day it was opened, citing the fact that Broadcom holds its own CVE numbering authority.

The result is a vulnerability without an identifier, without a patch, and without any official acknowledgment from the company whose code is responsible.


Which Hardware Is Affected

Kaiser sorted the affected chips into two groups. Older eCos-based chips, the BCM3380, BCM3383, and BCM33834, cannot receive a practical fix given their architecture. He described these as a "forever day," meaning a vulnerability that will remain open for the functional life of the hardware. Newer Linux-based chips, including the BCM3390, BCM65xx, and BCM68xx series, are technically fixable if device makers choose to replace the WPS software stack.

Among confirmed deployments in Belgium, Proximus, Orange Belgium, and VOO gateways are affected. Kaiser was unable to test Telenet devices but considers them potentially in scope. His broader analysis, which involved automated firmware scanning, identified vulnerable code across Cisco small-business access points, Huawei gear, and ARRIS routers, among others. He estimates the total number of affected devices runs into the millions globally, though some entries in his published list are flagged as "likely vulnerable" rather than confirmed.


Detection Tools, but No Mitigation

For organizations trying to assess their exposure, Kaiser published YARA detection rules and a scanning script on GitHub at github.com/qkaiser/broadcom-wps. Both are intended as triage tools to identify firmware containing the vulnerable code. He notes that patched devices may still trigger the YARA rules, so a positive result requires additional verification rather than automatic remediation.

For devices that fall into the "forever day" category, the practical answer is replacement.


Why Proximity Attacks Are Getting More Attention

The threat model here matters beyond the technical details. Kaiser noted that this vulnerability is particularly useful to attackers who can position themselves in physical range of a target rather than approaching through the internet. That scenario is no longer theoretical.

In November 2024, Volexity documented how a Russian state-sponsored group, tracked as GruesomeLarch and linked to APT28, compromised organizations near a high-value target in Washington, D.C., and then used dual-homed systems inside those neighboring buildings to connect to the actual target's corporate Wi-Fi. The attacker never needed to be in the same room or even the same building. They just needed a wireless network with weak enough controls to reach from the street.

A flaw that lets anyone within radio range become root on the router, without a password, without a handshake, fits neatly into that playbook. The attack surface is wherever the signal reaches.



Atlassian CVE-2026-21589 Exploited Hours After Public Disclosure

 

Attackers started scanning the systems vulnerable to the Atlassian flaw several hours after the researchers published the technical details and proof-of-concept code. Assigned the identifier CVE-2026-21589, the vulnerability impacts several self-hosted Data Center products and could allow unauthorized access to the credentials in some circumstances. 

The problem was disclosed by Atlassian on October 5, 2026, with a CVSS score of 9.3. The products affected by the bug are Bitbucket, Confluence, Jira Software, Jira Service Management, Bamboo, Crowd, Crucible and Fisheye. The company already released fixes for all software versions. The flaw allows the adversaries to access some files in the application root directory without providing proper authentication. 

However, it is only possible if the attacker knows the exact name and location of the file because the vulnerability does not allow listing the contents of a directory. Therefore, the attack surface is limited, but there is still a potential risk if the adversary somehow manages to guess the file location. The security researchers from WatchTowr posted the proof-of-concept code and technical details of the discovered flaw on October 6, 2026. 

They managed to identify the origin of the issue – a popular library used in all Atlassian products mentioned above. More importantly, they found out that the vulnerability could be chained to get access to the configuration file with Crowd application credentials in some circumstances. According to WatchTowr, Crowd is Atlassian’s identity management system, and the mentioned scenario involves Jira Software connected to it. 

In this case, the attacker could use the credentials to create a new administrative account and assign it to the Jira administration group. As a result, the adversary would be able to attain full privileged access to the targeted Jira Software instance. In addition, the security company showed how the proof-of-concept code could be used to take over a victim’s account in case of success. Moreover, the researcher added that the attacks are not random, but rather targeted. 

Several hours after the publication of the results, the exploitation framework started scanning corporate websites to find the instances of the affected applications. On October 8, 2026, Previdian, the exploitation intelligence company, counted 190 attempts from 32 IP addresses in 10 countries. Although the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) has not included the vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list, the attacks indicate that the problem needs urgent attention. 

The companies using Atlassian’s products should make sure that the affected applications are updated to the latest versions. Those who are not able to do it right away should take the vulnerable instances of the software offline or follow the recommendations stated by Atlassian. In particular, the company suggests deploying the blocking rules to the firewalls or using the Web Server rewrite rules. 

In addition, the organizations with Jira Software and Crowd should make sure that the mentioned applications are not at risk of compromise as well. As seen from the recent incident, the response to the exposure of the flaw may take too long. Moreover, the attacks are often launched right after the proof-of-concept code is published. Therefore, it is critical to apply the necessary security updates as soon as possible.

Hackers Exploit Two Unpatched AhsayCBS Flaws to Deploy Webshells and Cryptominers

 

Two security flaws in AhsayCBS backup management software are currently being actively exploited by attackers to initiate remote access to the targeted systems, establish webshells, and cryptocurrency miners. Huntress reported that the flaws are being used in attacks that chain the two issues together to bypass authentication and run commands on vulnerable systems. 

At least five companies have been reported targeted as of October 8, 2026. The vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2026-105133 and CVE-2026-105134 are generic for the AhsayCBS product, which serves as a centralized management system for managed service providers and system integrators that need to configure and control backup policies and schedules, storage, and users. Both flaws are caused by improper function arguments, which enable an attacker to bypass authentication and execute operating system commands. 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published information about the disclosed security issues on October 4, 2026. Initially, all AhsayCBS versions up to 10.3.2. were considered to be affected. However, Huntress revealed that the company’s latest version at the time, 10.3.4., was also vulnerable. One of the vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-105134, is a remote code execution issue that allows an unauthenticated attacker to run code with System-level privileges. It utilizes an API in AhsayCBS’s Replication Receiver component to establish a reverse connection to an attacker-controlled server. 

An attacker can leverage the Replication Receiver bug by creating a fake replication receiver and delivering a Java Server Page webshell in the application directory served by AhsayCBS. After establishing initial access to the system, the threat actor performs inventory collection and uses Microsoft Edge-labeled XMRig cryptocurrency miners. Huntress discovered that the attackers used an AI-powered PowerShell script that terminates itself if the Task Manager is opened for more than 50 seconds. 

In addition, the script monitors whether the Task Manager has been closed and reopened. The attackers also create a new Windows service that masquerades as Microsoft Edge Updater. It employs an alternate data stream and runs as a System process when using the Non-Sucking Service Manager tool. The service carries the msedge.exe file with custom modifications applied.  The modifications to the Non-Sucking Service Manager allow it to maintain a durable process that restarts applications that were terminated due to an error or when the system restarts. 

The attackers also installed a legitimate but deprecated kernel-mode driver called WinRing0x64.sys, which provides userspace programs with kernel-mode privileges. This component enables the cryptocurrency miner process to maintain persistence even after system reboots. AhsayCBS software, utilized in the attacks, does not currently have a patch available. 

As such, organizations are recommended to restrict access to the management portal by only allowing specific IP addresses or networks, such as those provided by a virtual private network. 

In addition to that, administrators should monitor their systems for signs of compromise, such as webshells, unknown services, scripts, and cryptomining activities. Attackers are currently leveraging the AhsayCBS flaws to target businesses. 

The widespread nature of the issues, as well as the utilization of the latest version of the software at the time of publication, should compel organizations using it to consider limiting access and conducting comprehensive reviews.

SolarWinds Patches Critical Unauthenticated RCE Vulnerabilities in Observability Self-Hosted

 

SolarWinds has issued security updates for two critical vulnerabilities in its Observability Self-Hosted product that could enable remote code execution without authentication. The flaws, tracked as CVE-2026-28324 and CVE-2026-28325, are present in multiple versions of the IT monitoring solution and have been patched in the latest release. Observability Self-Hosted is an on-premises and hybrid IT monitoring platform that enables organizations to centrally monitor their environments. 

It also features configuration management and control over operations data and security compliance. The first vulnerability, CVE-2026-28324, has a CVSS score of 9.8 and is described as an insufficient integrity check leading to remote code execution. SolarWinds reported that the problem affects deployments that use a non-default and non-secure configuration. Since the weakness is an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, SolarWinds warned that such deployments could be at risk of exploitation. 

The second flaw, CVE-2026-28325, has a CVSS score of 8.8 and is described as a deserialization of untrusted data issue that affects the instances of the application running in a specific communication mode. The company stated that it also allows for an unauthenticated RCE, meaning that the affected systems could be compromised by an attacker. Both weaknesses impact Observability Self-Hosted up to and including version 2026.2.2. SolarWinds has already released updates in the 2026.2.3 version of the product which resolves the identified issues. 

The company credited Kai Huang of Armadin for reporting the problems. The recent updates to Observability Self-Hosted follow the patch for an unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in SolarWinds Access Rights Manager (ARM). The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-28326, has a CVSS score of 8.8 and impacts ARM versions up to and including 2026.2. This vulnerability also resides in a hardcoded static key for the affected system version. SolarWinds released the patch for CVE-2026-28326 last week after receiving the report from the anonymous security researcher. 

According to the company, this is the third high-severity flaw discovered in its products this year. Moreover, SolarWinds warned that all three could be actively exploited. However, the company added that there were no reports of exploitation for any of the three vulnerabilities. More information on the discovered issues can be found in the company’s advisory. 

The affected organizations should update their Observability Self-Hosted instances to version 2026.2.3 as it includes the fixes for two newly discovered RCE flaws. In particular, the update is recommended for the deployments that feature the non-default, insecure configurations described by the vendor.

Check Point Warns of Active Exploitation of Two Critical Pre-Authentication Vulnerabilities

 

Check Point has issued urgent warnings to customers following the discovery of active attacks targeting two zero-day flaws in its products. The two vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2026-85102 and CVE-2026-93616, both with a CVSS score of 9.8, have had patches released by the company after confirmation of exploitation. CVE-2026-85102 is a pre-authentication remote code execution vulnerability in the processing of certificates during a VPN negotiation. 

Check Point published details of the issue and a fix on September 9, 2026. The company said there was no evidence of exploitation at the time of the patch release, but it has since detected attacks targeting Check Point Spark customers. The attacks, which first appeared on September 12, originate from anonymization infrastructure including VPN offerings and proxies. The researchers noted several certificates with subjects including “CN=vpn,OU=users,O=global,” “CN=vpn-user,OU=users,O=global” and “CN=vpnuser,OU=users,O=global.” 

Check Point warned that the list of certificate subjects is not comprehensive. Customers were advised to review logs for anomalous certificate-based Mobile Access logins and not limit search terms to the certificate subjects included in the advisory. They should also look out for any suspicious activity from users that have authenticated to the gateway via Mobile Access including scanning of internal ports and services. The second issue, CVE-2026-93616, is a pre-authentication path traversal vulnerability in the management web service of Check Point Security Management. 

An attacker could cause the system to execute a script from an arbitrary path and read an arbitrary Java class file, enabling them to gain unauthorized access to the underlying system. Check Point reported several limited attacks using this flaw on July 23, 2026. A patch for CVE-2026-93616 has been released, and customers are being urged to apply it immediately. 

Affected versions of Check Point Security Management include R82.20, R82.10 Jumbo Hotfix Take 44 or lower, R82 Jumbo Hotfix Take 126 or lower, R81.20 Jumbo Hotfix Take 166 or lower and R81.10 Jumbo Hotfix Take 190 or lower. LivePatch Take 28/29 does not mitigate the vulnerability. End-of-life versions of the product are also affected. Check Point recommended that all customers with affected versions of the product should apply the relevant hotfix as both flaws are currently being actively exploited.

The Four-Character Password Guarding Your Company's AI Keys

 




Security researchers at Wiz scanned 3,074 internet-facing deployments of LiteLLM in February and found something that should embarrass more than a few engineering teams: 294 of them, just under 10 percent, accepted `sk-1234` as the administrator password. That is the exact value printed in LiteLLM's own quickstart guide, sitting above a comment telling operators to replace it with a long random value before any real use. As of September 9, the guide still reads that way.

The number sounds like a configuration slip, the kind that shows up in enterprise audits and gets quietly fixed. The consequences here are anything but quiet. LiteLLM sits between a company's applications and every AI provider it pays for. Whoever holds the master key can read every provider API key stored on the server, inspect every prompt and reply that moves through it, reach internal tools connected via the Model Context Protocol, and, as Wiz demonstrated, pull the cloud IAM credentials off the machine the gateway runs on. Researchers also found a code execution path that returned root access inside the container during testing. Attackers have since been seen using related flaws to install cryptocurrency miners and copy entire databases of provider credentials.


What LiteLLM Actually Is, and Why It Matters

LiteLLM is an open-source AI gateway. Companies use it as a single routing layer for more than 100 model providers, including OpenAI, Anthropic, AWS Bedrock, Azure, and Google Vertex AI. Rather than scattering API keys and budgets across every team and application, organizations push all their inference traffic through one place. That makes LiteLLM a centralized store for some of the most valuable secrets in a modern cloud environment.

According to Wiz's own cloud data, roughly one in three cloud environments already has a LiteLLM deployment. The project has more than 22,000 stars on GitHub. Many of those instances sit behind corporate networks and VPNs, unreachable from the internet. But the 3,074 Wiz found on Shodan in February were not.

The master key does two things at once, which is what makes a default value particularly dangerous here. It is the administrator credential for the proxy. It is also the secret LiteLLM uses to sign session JWTs with HS256. When it stays at `sk-1234`, anyone who knows that can forge arbitrary user sessions for the entire proxy without ever brute-forcing a password. They just already know it because they read the docs.

Of the 294 instances that accepted the default key, 191 had no master key set at all, meaning the server accepted any request. Before version 1.82.0-stable, gateways with no master key granted every incoming request full proxy administrator rights automatically, no credential needed.


How Far an Attacker Gets

Wiz researchers, working through LiteLLM's codebase with Claude Code, traced what an administrator credential actually unlocks beyond the obvious credential theft.

LiteLLM has a pass-through endpoint feature that lets administrators create proxy routes forwarding requests to any URL they choose. The target URL is never checked against private address ranges, localhost, or cloud metadata addresses. A researcher can point a route at the AWS instance metadata service and read back IAM credentials in a straightforward request chain. The feature works the same way against IMDSv2, which is supposed to require a specific token header to prevent exactly this kind of request. LiteLLM's header forwarding mechanism passes any header prefixed with `x-pass-` to the target with the prefix removed, so an attacker can send the IMDSv2 token request headers along for the ride.

Wiz describes this as arguably working as intended. LiteLLM's threat model treats administrators as trusted, and the project has not assigned it a CVE or issued a fix. The problem, as the researchers put it, is that the threat model has often been broken by deployments that never changed the default key.

The code execution path is a separate issue. LiteLLM lets administrators register custom Python guardrails, code that runs around every inference request to enforce policies like blocking sensitive prompts or filtering outputs. Before version 1.82.0-stable, the endpoint that registers a guardrail applied none of the safety checks present in the test interface. The test interface blocks `import`, `os`, `subprocess`, and strips Python's built-in functions before execution. The registration endpoint did neither. Submitted code ran with the full standard library, inside the container, at root, immediately on registration. Wiz showed this with a proof of concept returning `uid=0(root) gid=0(root)` in the guardrail's block reason field after a single chat completion call.

A second flaw, CVE-2026-40217, published in May, showed that even after the guardrail sandbox was added in 1.82.0, it could be escaped using Python bytecode techniques. That one affects versions 1.81.8 through 1.83.10. The same admin credential is the entry point for both.


The Disagreement Over Severity

Wiz and LiteLLM's maintainers describe the guardrail code execution flaw, CVE-2026-59821, in almost incompatible terms.

Wiz calls it post-authentication code execution at root level and shows test output to support that. LiteLLM's own advisory rates it as Low severity, with a CVSS score of 2.1, noting that the flaw requires a high-privilege account. Both are describing the same behavior. What they disagree on is how to weigh the significance of that requirement, given that high-privilege access was readily available on nearly 10 percent of public instances.

LiteLLM's published security policy categorizes attacks that depend on setup mistakes, such as leaving the master key at its default value, as explicitly out of scope and not treated as vulnerabilities. The project's position is that operators who do not follow the setup instructions have created their own exposure. That is a reasonable position for a software maintainer to take. It is a harder position to defend when the setup guide's own example value is still `sk-1234` months after researchers flagged the issue.


The Flaw Attackers Have Actually Used

The code execution and cloud credential paths described above are Wiz demonstrations. Real attackers have been doing something related but distinct, using a different set of flaws against the same product.

CVE-2026-59822, a separate flaw also found by Wiz, lets an unauthenticated attacker establish a valid MCP session using any Bearer token, including a single character. The authentication handler for LiteLLM's MCP endpoint catches a 401 error from a failed token validation and silently returns an empty authentication object, granting access as if the request were valid. CISA added this to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 2, with a CVSS score of 8.8. Federal civilian agencies had until September 16 to address it. Wiz's honeypots first recorded it being used in the wild on July 7, in requests probing model listing endpoints with single-character tokens. The agency designation makes it an urgent patch for government networks; the active exploitation makes it pressing for everyone else.

CVE-2026-42271, a different flaw with a CVSS score of 8.7, let any authenticated user run commands on the host through two MCP test endpoints. Horizon3.ai reported in June that it could be chained with a Starlette host-header validation bypass, CVE-2026-48710, to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on vulnerable instances. Wiz's honeypots recorded attackers using that chain to drop an XMRig cryptocurrency miner via an ELF binary, after first fingerprinting the host and killing competing mining processes.

Microsoft published a case in August where attackers went further. After getting command execution inside a LiteLLM gateway process, they read the container's environment variables for the master key, provider keys, and database connection string. They then used the database string to connect to the PostgreSQL backend and copy records from LiteLLM's model and virtual-key tables. Microsoft assessed with high confidence that the entry point matched the CVE-2026-42271 and CVE-2026-48710 chain. "Treat AI gateways as Tier-0 secrets stores," the company said.

These active attacks sit on top of a separate incident from earlier this year. In March 2026, attackers used stolen maintainer credentials to publish two backdoored versions of LiteLLM to PyPI, versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8. The malicious packages collected SSH keys, AWS, GCP, and Azure credentials, Kubernetes secrets, and database configurations from any environment that pulled them as a dependency. DSPy, MLflow, CrewAI, and OpenHands all pulled the compromised versions. A subsequent analysis by Hudson Rock found a 153-gigabyte stolen archive linked to the incident, containing files attributed to roughly 2,500 corporate domains including AWS, Samsung, Cisco, and Salesforce. The supply chain attack and the authentication flaws are separate incidents, but they affect the same product, and some organizations are managing fallout from both simultaneously.


What Needs to Happen

Every flaw in the Wiz report is patched in version 1.84.0 or later. The upgrade covers the MCP authentication bypass, the guardrail code execution flaw, the sandbox escape, and the endpoint that let non-admin accounts reach the pass-through configuration. There is no patch for the pass-through route to instance metadata, because LiteLLM does not treat it as a vulnerability. Restricting outbound network access from the container and scoping the workload's cloud IAM role as narrowly as possible are the only controls available for that path.

Changing the master key from `sk-1234` to a long random value requires no upgrade at all and closes every attack path in Wiz's report that depends on holding it. One check is worth doing before rotating: if a separate salt key is set in the configuration, the rotation procedure differs, and using the wrong one can leave stored credentials unreadable.

Organizations that cannot upgrade immediately should block the `/mcp/` path and the two MCP test endpoints at their reverse proxy or API gateway. Blocking `POST /guardrails/test_custom_code` and restricting the guardrail creation and update endpoints to administrators are the workarounds in LiteLLM's own advisories.

If there is any chance an attacker had access, the guardrails list should be reviewed for entries that were not created by the team, and the process should be restarted to clear code held in memory. Guardrails an attacker registered and SSH keys they may have added persist through an upgrade. The provider keys, master key, and database credentials should all be rotated.

The underlying issue is structural and not unique to LiteLLM. AI gateways now hold credentials for every model provider, execute server-side code, connect to internal tools through MCP, and run with the cloud permissions of the workloads they are deployed in. They have become critical infrastructure that is often still being treated as a developer convenience. The security controls surrounding them have not caught up.



Elementor Pro WordPress Flaw Exploited to Upload Webshells and Execute Commands

 

A critical vulnerability in the Elementor Pro WordPress plugin is being actively exploited to upload malicious PHP files and execute commands remotely on the affected websites. 

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-32475, affects the Elementor Pro versions 4.2.1 and lower. This issue was patched on August 19. Elementor Pro has more than 6 million active installations and is widely used to design WordPress websites with drag-and-drop tools. 

The vulnerability is related to the insufficient validation of file-upload arrays in Elementor Pro forms. Attackers can exploit this issue by uploading an empty file as the first element of the upload array and a malicious PHP file as the second. Then the plugin will not validate the following files in the array, thus allowing the attacker-controlled PHP payload to be successfully uploaded on the server without any additional checks. 

Once the malicious file is uploaded, it will be stored on the /wp-content/uploads/elementor/forms/ directory with a randomly generated name but preserving the attacker’s .php extension. Then the attacker will be able to directly access this file on the server to execute arbitrary commands and potentially deploy a webshell for further attacks. To successfully exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to have access to a WordPress website with a published Elementor Pro Form widget that contains at least one File Upload field. 

This is a relatively common case for WordPress websites that utilize Elementor Pro forms. WordPress security company Defiant, which operates the Wordfence firewall, noted that exploitation began on August 19, the same day Elementor released the 4.2.2 version to address the vulnerability. Wordfence observed that the traffic was especially heavy between August 19 and 23, having blocked more than 190,000 attempts to target its customers. 

Wordfence has identified IP addresses that were responsible for thousands of exploitation attempts. Website administrators can add these addresses to their blocklists to protect their WordPress sites. Administrators that utilize Elementor Pro need to make sure to update their software to the latest versions, preferably 4.2.2 or newer. Moreover, they should check their /wp-content/uploads/elementor/forms/ directories for any unexpected .php files. 

As the name suggests, the directory is supposed to contain the files that users upload with Elementor forms, meaning that the discovery of any .php files should be investigated and potentially result in an intrusion assessment.

Critical Avada WordPress Vulnerability Allows Unauthenticated PHP Code Execution

 

A critical vulnerability chain in the popular Avada theme for WordPress could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary PHP code on the targeted server. Six distinct security issues are collectively referred to as CVE-2026-18431 and have a critical severity level of 9.8. The first weakness in the six-step chain allows an attacker to expose user-controlled input to a public request. Combined with some other vulnerabilities, it bypasses checks that would otherwise restrict file writes and their locations. 

An attacker could gain full control over the targeted website and do whatever they want, for example, deploy malware, exfiltrate data, redirect users to malicious sites, and create backdoors in the form of administrator accounts. CVE-2026-18431 affects Avada themes up to version 7.16 and Fusion Builder plugins up to version 3.16, the report states. ThemeFusion, the company behind Avada and Fusion Builder, has released a patch, but Wordfence has not yet disclosed all the details of the vulnerability chain for the benefit of site administrators.  

While exploitation of this vulnerability requires the presence of a vulnerable Avada theme, it should be noted that Fusion Builder is a mandatory plugin for Avada, and therefore it is included in all distributions of the theme. This means that the attack surface is not limited in any way, and all sites running on Avada versions up to 7.16 are at risk.

Avada is one of the most popular WordPress products, with more than 1 million sales, so the danger is considerable. In addition to the large volume of traffic, the technical complexity of the vulnerability is significant: Wordfence’s team used its own agentic framework, Argus, to find a six-step vulnerability chain and generate proof-of-concept code for this vulnerability. This process took about two hours from the moment of discovery on July 30. 

Wordfence notified ThemeFusion of the vulnerability on August 5, and the company fixed the issues in Avada 7.16.1 and Fusion Builder 3.16.1 on August 10. The vulnerabilities described in the report show how multiple security weaknesses in one product can be combined to create a complex attack chain that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary PHP code on the server with almost no restrictions. All site administrators using the Avada theme are advised to upgrade to the latest versions to fix CVE-2026-18431.

GeoServer Zero Day Being Probed While No Patch Available


A newly found GeoServer zero-day is already receiving active exploitation efforts, while there is no patch ready yet. Firms using the open-source geospatial platform should keep an eye out for their exposure. 

A cybersecurity expert with the handle q1uf3ng found the vulnerability which has not been given any CVE identifier yet.

Zero-day with no patch

The vulnerability exists in the jsonArrayContains functionality and permits illegal SQL injection. In few configurations, particularly where the flaw can reach a privileged database account, that path may result in remote code execution. The vulnerability has not been given any CVE identifier yet. 

The flaw was publicly revealed on 12 August 2026. Soon after, watchTowr said it started noticing exploitation attempts, with hundreds of attempts coming from a few IP addresses. According to WatchTowr’s Jake Knott, “Within hours of public disclosure, we began observing exploitation attempts and have since recorded hundreds of attempts originating from a small number of source IP addresses. Yet another example of how quickly attackers move once a vulnerability enters the public domain.”

The timing is crucial here. When enough technical information or proof of concept is public, threat actors don’t have to wait for a well planned exploit. They can compare responses, scan broadly, trigger errors, and make a list of devices to visit later. It is spying with an error message as a compass.

Cyber criminals are probing the flawed GeoServer systems, but no confirmed exploit has been found yet. But experts have warned that exploitation could soon happen. 

According to Knott, “However, this is unlikely to remain the case for long: GeoServer has a track record of being targeted and exploited at scale, with multiple vulnerabilities listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. With no patch currently available and exploitation already underway, organizations running GeoServer should take this vulnerability seriously and, where possible, identify exposed instances, restrict public access, and monitor for a vendor fix.”

Threat actors are triggering errors to find vulnerable targets before active exploitation, and probing GeoServer systems for unpatched zero-day.

About GeoServer

A well-liked framework for exchanging and publishing geographic data via web services is called GeoServer. Public sector portals, environmental platforms, mapping initiatives, utilities, transportation systems, academic institutions, and internal corporate applications are some of the places where it can be found. Because of this, a remotely reachable instance becomes more than just a technical detail; it may provide credentials, backend services, geographic data, or a path to a larger network.

New 'Zapscape' Linux KVM Vulnerability Opens Path for Privileged Guest-to-Host Escape

 



A newly disclosed vulnerability in Linux's Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) could allow an attacker with kernel-level control inside a nested virtual machine to break out of virtualization boundaries and execute code on the underlying host system under specific conditions.

Tracked as CVE-2026-64561 and dubbed Zapscape, the flaw affects KVM's x86 shadow memory management unit (MMU), a core component responsible for maintaining shadow page tables that translate memory between guest virtual machines and the host. Security researcher Hyunwoo Kim, who identified and disclosed the issue, demonstrated that the vulnerability can be leveraged to execute commands on the host with root privileges.

The issue has been addressed upstream, and administrators operating KVM environments that expose nested virtualization to untrusted virtual machines are advised to deploy patched kernel releases or vendor packages containing the backported fix.

Unlike conventional virtualization deployments where guest systems operate in isolation from the host, nested virtualization allows a virtual machine to function as a hypervisor itself. In this configuration, an L1 guest can create and manage additional virtual machines, commonly referred to as L2 guests. While this capability is widely used for cloud infrastructure testing, development environments, virtualization research, and continuous integration workloads, it also introduces additional complexity into memory management, making implementation flaws particularly impactful.

Zapscape requires an attacker to already possess kernel-level privileges inside an L1 guest, which generally translates to root access within that virtual machine. On Intel-based systems, exploitation additionally depends on exposing both Extended Page Table (EPT) page-walk lengths four and five to the L1 guest. AMD platforms do not impose this additional requirement.

At the heart of the vulnerability is a flaw in the ordering of stale-root validation within KVM's shadow MMU bookkeeping. The weakness results in a use-after-free condition, a class of memory safety bug in which software continues interacting with memory after it has already been released.

According to Kim's technical analysis, the issue occurs while KVM is servicing guest-triggered page faults. During this process, KVM may reclaim shadow MMU pages to free memory resources. That reclamation can invalidate the shadow MMU root page currently being used by the ongoing page-fault handling routine. However, because the fault-handling path fails to verify that the root remains valid after the reclamation step, execution continues using an object that has already become stale.

The researcher explained that the vulnerability originates within KVM's recursive "zap" path, which is responsible for reclaiming shadow MMU pages. Before additional MMU pages are made available, KVM performs an initial stale-root validation. The problem arises because the subsequent reclamation process can invalidate that same root after the check has already completed. Rather than restarting with a fresh and valid root, KVM proceeds to construct new child shadow pages beneath the invalid parent.

Those newly created child pages inherit the parent's invalid state while simultaneously being inserted into KVM's active MMU page list. During later cleanup operations, the same list entry can become attached to multiple linked lists simultaneously. Eventually, the affected page may be freed even though stale references continue pointing to it, leaving behind a dangling pointer and enabling writes to memory that should no longer be accessible.

Such memory corruption primitives can provide the foundation for privilege escalation and virtualization escape techniques, particularly when an attacker already controls a privileged guest operating system.

To demonstrate the vulnerability, Kim released a public proof-of-concept that exploits the bug to create a root-owned file named /Zapscape on the vulnerable Linux host, illustrating successful code execution beyond the guest boundary.

The proof-of-concept was developed against AMD nested virtualization using Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) and Nested Page Tables (NPT) on Linux 7.1.3. For safe experimentation, Kim recommends running the demonstration under QEMU's Tiny Code Generator (TCG) mode. However, the researcher emphasized that QEMU itself is not affected by the vulnerability. Instead, the flaw resides entirely within the Linux kernel's KVM implementation and can be triggered independently of QEMU's device emulation.

Although exploit code is publicly available, Kim cautioned that the demonstration should not be interpreted as an immediately deployable attack against production cloud infrastructure. In its current form, the proof-of-concept requires additional engineering before it could be adapted for real-world environments. Among other changes, portions of the L1 guest activity would need to be moved into a guest kernel module, while the exploit would also require customization for the target host's kernel configuration and memory management backend.

At the time of disclosure, no evidence had emerged indicating that CVE-2026-64561 had been exploited in active attacks.

The National Vulnerability Database lists Linux kernel versions beginning with 5.9 as affected until fixed stable releases became available, including versions 6.6.148, 6.12.101, 6.18.42, 7.1.6, and 7.2-rc5.

Security advisories note that administrators should not rely solely on upstream version numbers when assessing exposure. Many enterprise Linux distributions routinely backport security fixes into existing kernel packages without rebasing to newer upstream releases, making vendor advisories the authoritative source for determining whether individual systems have received the necessary patches.

Red Hat assigned the vulnerability a preliminary CVSS score of 7.0 and categorized it under CWE-825: Expired Pointer Dereference, reflecting the use-after-free behavior underlying the flaw.

Package availability also varies across Linux distributions. As of August 6, Debian's security tracker listed kernel packages for bullseye, bookworm, trixie, and forky, including their security repositories, as vulnerable, while sid had already incorporated the fix beginning with version 7.1.6-1.

The coordinated disclosure followed a structured timeline spanning several weeks. Kim privately reported the vulnerability to security@kernel.org on July 11, 2026. A corrective patch was proposed and merged on July 21 before being shared with the linux-distros security mailing list on August 1 under a five-day embargo. The vulnerability subsequently received the identifier CVE-2026-64561 on August 4, with public disclosure taking place on August 6.

The upstream patch, merged as commit 2abd5287f083, modifies KVM's page-fault handling sequence by moving the stale-root validation until after make_mmu_pages_available() completes. If memory reclamation invalidates the current shadow MMU root, KVM now abandons the active page-fault operation and restarts it using RET_PF_RETRY, preventing further memory mappings from being created beneath an invalid root and eliminating the conditions that produced the use-after-free.

Zapscape marks the latest addition to Kim's ongoing security research into Linux virtualization. Earlier this year, the researcher disclosed Januscape (CVE-2026-53359), which affected KVM/x86's shadow MMU, and ITScape (CVE-2026-46316), a separate guest escape vulnerability impacting KVM on Arm64 systems. Together, the disclosures continue to draw attention to the security challenges involved in protecting complex virtualization infrastructure that underpins modern cloud and enterprise computing environments.

Researchers Warn of Unpatched Argo CD Flaw That Enables Cluster Takeover

 


Organizations using Argo CD to automate application deployments on Kubernetes are being urged to review their network configurations after security researchers disclosed an unpatched vulnerability that could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code on the platform's repo-server component and ultimately seize control of an entire Kubernetes cluster.

The vulnerability was identified by French cybersecurity firm Synacktiv, which says the issue affects the repo-server, a core Argo CD service responsible for retrieving application source code from Git repositories and converting it into Kubernetes manifests before workloads are deployed. Because the repo-server sits at the center of the GitOps deployment process, compromising it gives an attacker an opportunity to interfere with how applications are delivered throughout the cluster.

According to the researchers, exploitation does not require authentication. An attacker only needs network access to the repo-server's internal gRPC service, which accepts requests from other Argo CD components but does not verify the identity of the caller. Once that communication channel becomes reachable, a specially crafted request can be used to trigger remote code execution on the vulnerable service.

Synacktiv reported the vulnerability to the Argo CD maintainers in January 2025 through a responsible disclosure process. However, roughly eighteen months later, the issue remains unresolved, with no official security patch or CVE identifier assigned. The researchers chose to disclose their findings publicly to give administrators time to strengthen their deployments while awaiting a permanent fix.

At the center of the attack is Argo CD's repo-server, which continuously retrieves application definitions stored in Git repositories and prepares them for deployment by generating Kubernetes manifests. These manifests describe the desired state of applications, including containers, services, networking, storage, and other deployment configurations that Kubernetes uses to build and manage workloads. Since every deployment passes through this component, gaining control of the repo-server can provide attackers with extensive influence over the software being deployed inside a cluster.

The vulnerability stems from an unauthenticated internal gRPC interface exposed by the repo-server. gRPC is a high-performance communication framework commonly used for communication between services inside distributed applications. In Argo CD's design, the interface is intended for trusted internal communication. However, Synacktiv found that the service performs no authentication checks, allowing any system capable of reaching the port to submit requests that the repo-server will process.

The researchers demonstrated the attack against Argo CD version 2.13.3. They noted that no patched release currently exists and did not publish a complete list of affected versions, leaving administrators without a definitive inventory of vulnerable deployments.

To achieve code execution, the attack abuses Kustomize, a Kubernetes configuration management tool that Argo CD relies on to generate deployment manifests. Kustomize can also invoke Helm, another widely used package manager for Kubernetes, through the "--helm-command" option that specifies which executable should be launched.

Instead of directing Kustomize to the legitimate Helm binary, Synacktiv discovered that an attacker can send a malicious GenerateManifest request instructing it to execute a script stored inside an attacker-controlled Git repository. When Kustomize begins processing the deployment, it unknowingly launches the attacker's script in place of Helm, providing arbitrary code execution within the repo-server environment.

Although the vulnerable interface is intended to remain internal, the researchers warn that internal services should not automatically be considered secure. Kubernetes clusters frequently host dozens or even hundreds of interconnected workloads, and a compromise affecting a single pod can become the starting point for lateral movement if internal communication is not properly restricted.

Argo CD includes Kubernetes NetworkPolicy resources designed to limit access to sensitive services such as the repo-server and Redis. However, Synacktiv found that these protections are disabled by default when Argo CD is deployed using its Helm chart because the "networkPolicy.create" option is set to "false". As a result, installations that rely on the default configuration may unintentionally leave the repo-server reachable from other workloads running inside the cluster.

In such environments, compromising a single pod may be enough for an attacker to contact the repo-server and exploit the vulnerability.

The researchers also demonstrated that remote code execution represents only the beginning of the attack chain. After obtaining execution on the repo-server, they extracted the Redis password stored in an environment variable, authenticated to Argo CD's Redis instance, and modified cached deployment information. When Argo CD later performed its routine synchronization with the Git repository, the poisoned cache caused the platform to deploy an attacker-controlled workload instead of the intended application.

According to Synacktiv, this technique effectively revives a previously addressed weakness tracked as CVE-2024-31989. That earlier vulnerability, discovered by Cycode, exposed Argo CD deployments where Redis lacked password protection, allowing any pod inside the cluster to manipulate deployment cache data. Although Argo CD later introduced Redis password protection to address that issue, the cache contents themselves remain unsigned. By stealing the Redis credentials through the newly disclosed repo-server vulnerability, attackers can once again tamper with deployment data and recreate a similar compromise path.

With no software update currently available, researchers recommend treating network segmentation as the primary line of defense. Administrators should enable Kubernetes NetworkPolicy rules to ensure that only legitimate Argo CD components can communicate with the repo-server and Redis services. Organizations deploying Argo CD through Helm should verify that these policies have been explicitly enabled rather than relying on the chart's default configuration.

Administrators can inspect active network policies by running:

"kubectl get networkpolicy -A"

A properly secured deployment should display dedicated network policies protecting each Argo CD component, including both the repo-server and Redis. Missing policies may indicate that sensitive internal services remain accessible to other workloads inside the cluster.

To help organizations evaluate their exposure, Synacktiv developed a proof-of-concept tool named argo-cdown, capable of automating the complete attack chain. The researchers have postponed its public release to provide defenders with additional time to secure vulnerable environments. The tool is expected to be published on GitHub later, allowing administrators to validate the effectiveness of their own security controls.

The newly disclosed vulnerability is the latest in a series of security issues affecting Argo CD's privileged position within Kubernetes environments. In September 2025, the project patched CVE-2025-55190 after researchers found that an API token with only basic read permissions could retrieve Git repository credentials associated with a project. Several months later, in May 2026, another flaw tracked as CVE-2026-42880 enabled read-only users to access plaintext Kubernetes secrets.

Taken together, these incidents point to a recurring challenge rather than isolated implementation flaws. Argo CD occupies one of the most privileged positions within Kubernetes deployments, maintaining access to source repositories, deployment pipelines, cluster resources, and sensitive credentials. As a result, weaknesses affecting its internal services can quickly become pathways to broader infrastructure compromise.

Until an official patch becomes available, organizations should assume that internal cluster traffic cannot always be trusted. Restricting communication between workloads, enabling Kubernetes NetworkPolicy protections, and limiting access to critical Argo CD services remain the most effective measures for reducing exposure to this newly disclosed attack technique.

Researcher Reveals VS Code Flaw That Could Expose GitHub Access Tokens Through a Single Click

A publicly disclosed security flaw affecting the browser-based version of Visual Studio Code has drawn attention from developers after a researcher demonstrated how attackers could potentially obtain GitHub authentication tokens through a single user interaction.

The issue was disclosed by security researcher Ammar Askar, who published technical details alongside proof-of-concept code showing how the vulnerability could be abused. At the time of disclosure, no CVE identifier had been assigned and Microsoft had not released an official software patch.

According to Askar's analysis, the weakness exists within github.dev, GitHub's web-based development environment that allows users to work with repositories directly from a browser using technology derived from Visual Studio Code. The attack takes advantage of the way VS Code's webview components communicate with the main editor environment.

Webviews are embedded browser windows used by extensions and web applications to display interactive content. While these components are designed to operate within restricted environments, the researcher found a method to abuse the message-passing mechanism that connects a webview to the editor interface.

The published demonstration shows how malicious JavaScript running inside a webview can trigger actions within the main editor window. By simulating keyboard input and user activity, the code can install a malicious extension without requiring the victim to manually perform the installation process.

Once deployed, the extension is capable of extracting a GitHub OAuth token that is transmitted when users access github.dev. OAuth tokens act as authorization credentials that allow applications to interact with GitHub services on behalf of authenticated users.

According to the researcher, the security concern extends beyond access to a single repository. The token passed to github.dev can inherit the permissions associated with the user's GitHub account, potentially granting access to every repository available to that account, including private projects.

Using the proof-of-concept attack, a malicious extension can retrieve the token and communicate with GitHub's API. This allows an attacker to identify repositories accessible to the compromised account and gather information about private development resources.

Askar argued that the broad permissions associated with the token significantly increase the potential impact of exploitation because access is not limited to the repository that initially triggered the github.dev session.

To reduce exposure while no official fix was available, the researcher advised users to clear cookies and locally stored site data associated with github.dev. Removing this stored data forces additional authentication checks that can help expose suspicious sign-in attempts.

After clearing the stored information, users attempting to access github.dev through a malicious link would be more likely to encounter a warning indicating that the GitHub Repositories extension is requesting authorization through GitHub. Such prompts can serve as an indication that unexpected account access is being requested.

The disclosure also highlighted ongoing tensions surrounding vulnerability reporting processes. Askar stated that GitHub was notified approximately one hour before publication of the research. He described the disclosure as a deliberate decision to release the information publicly rather than pursue a lengthy coordinated disclosure process.

The researcher cited previous interactions involving another VS Code vulnerability that he reported through Microsoft's security channels. According to his account, the issue was later addressed without attribution and was classified as having no security impact despite his concerns regarding its implications.

Askar said that experience influenced his decision to publicly disclose future VS Code security findings rather than continue working through Microsoft's reporting process.

The incident follows several other public disclosures involving Microsoft products by an independent researcher operating under the online alias "Nightmare Eclipse." Over recent months, that researcher has released details regarding multiple unpatched vulnerabilities affecting Windows and related Microsoft technologies, including flaws known as BlueHammer, RedSun, GreenPlasma, MiniPlasma, YellowKey, and UnDefend.

Some of those vulnerabilities were later reported as being actively exploited, further intensifying discussions within the security community about vulnerability handling, disclosure timelines, and communication between vendors and independent researchers.

Microsoft previously responded to some of those disclosures by warning that legal action could be considered when individuals engage in activities that cause harm to customers. The company also stated that it may cooperate with law enforcement agencies when necessary.

In comments provided following the publication of the VS Code findings, Microsoft emphasized the role independent researchers play in improving product security. The company stated that it remains committed to evaluating reported issues, coordinating engineering responses, and delivering mitigations intended to protect customers.

A subsequent statement from Microsoft indicated that the issue had been mitigated within its services and that users were not required to take additional action.

The developer-focused platforms remain attractive targets because authentication tokens can provide access to source code repositories, development environments, and organizational assets. Security teams generally recommend reviewing unexpected links carefully, limiting unnecessary permissions, monitoring account activity, and using strong authentication controls to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access.