Search This Blog

Powered by Blogger.

Blog Archive

Labels

Footer About

Footer About

Labels

Showing posts with label cybersecurity research. Show all posts

Your Company's Phishing Tests Are Measuring the Wrong Thing

 



When a phishing simulation returns a low click rate, security teams tend to relax. Leadership checks a compliance box. The program gets renewed. But a major new study suggests that sense of relief may be completely misplaced.

Oslo-based cybersecurity firm Pistachio released its Phishing Behaviour Report 2026 this week, built from 2.47 million simulated phishing attacks sent to more than 123,000 employees across 1,200-plus organizations between June 2025 and May 2026. The finding that runs through all of it: the click rate, which most phishing programs live and die by, is the wrong thing to measure.

"A low click rate can create a false sense of security," said Joe Jones, CEO and co-founder of Pistachio. "What matters more is what happens next: does the employee hand over credentials, recognize the attack and stop, or report it so the wider business can act?"

A click alone does nothing. Credentials do.

Clicking a phishing link causes no damage on its own. The actual risk begins when an employee submits a password or other sensitive information into a fake login page after clicking. That is the moment a simulated test becomes a real-world breach scenario, and it is largely what most phishing programs do not track.

On their very first simulated phishing exercise, more employees in the Pistachio study reported the suspicious email than clicked it. That sounds like good news. The problem is that 1.57% handed over their credentials anyway. In a company with 500 employees, that works out to roughly eight people who will submit login details to a convincing enough lure with zero prior exposure. Click rate metrics would not flag any of them.


Tech workers are not the safe bet they are assumed to be

One of the more uncomfortable findings in the report concerns employees who are expected to know better. Tech development workers clicked at least one simulated phishing attempt at a rate of 30.27%. IT workers were not far behind at 28.53%.

The assumption that technical employees carry lower phishing risk because they understand how attacks work does not hold up against the data. Understanding how phishing operates and catching a convincing one under inbox pressure are two different things.

Construction carries the most risk. Financial services carry the least.

The gap between industries was wider than most organization-wide risk scores would suggest. Construction workers showed the highest click rate of any department at 41.31% and the highest credential leak rate at 16.47%. Design workers, by contrast, clicked at just 26.35%.

Financial services employees topped every resilience category in the study, which carries some irony. Financial services accounted for 27.7% of all observed phishing attempts in 2025, making it one of the most targeted sectors on the internet. That sustained pressure, combined with strict regulatory requirements and mandatory security training, appears to have produced genuinely more vigilant employees at the individual level.

Health workers showed the lowest reporting rate of any department at 13.17%, despite a relatively low click rate. Logistics workers combined an above-average click rate with a below-average reporting rate of 17.11%. In both cases, the click rate alone would present a more reassuring picture than the full data supports.


Things get worse before they get better

Organizations running 12-month programs saw click rates and credential submission rates both rise through the first six months before declining. That initial rise reflects harder and more frequent testing rather than employees regressing. At the six-month mark, employees were receiving an average of 3.5 simulations per person, with 50.4% classified as hard difficulty.

From that six-month peak to the 12-month stage, clicks declined by 27% and credential leaks by 41%. The report-to-click ratio increased from 1.3 at three months to 1.8 at 12 months, indicating that suspicious messages were reported nearly twice as often as they were clicked by the end of the program. 

Organizations that run a single phishing simulation and judge the program from that result are drawing conclusions from the noisiest and least reliable moment in the entire training cycle.


What to track instead

The report does not argue that click rates should be dropped entirely. It argues they should sit alongside credential submission rates and reporting rates, which together give a far more accurate picture of actual resilience. Making it easy for employees to report suspicious emails, through one-click tools and fast confirmation, converts the workforce into an active detection channel rather than a passive one.

NIST research found that 72% of organizations use phishing simulation click rates to gauge training effectiveness. By that measure, nearly three quarters of corporate security awareness programs are optimizing for an incomplete signal, in a threat environment where AI-driven phishing has pushed click rates among untrained employees to a record high of 54% in 2026. 

The click rate was never the whole story. At this point, relying on it alone is a liability.

Study Warns Enterprise AI Rollouts Are Outpacing Data Security Checks

 

Companies are adopting AI tools faster than they are testing whether their underlying data is appropriately secure, a new report from governance firm Syskit suggests. Based on a survey of 327 IT and security decision-makers at U.S. and U.K. organizations with at least 500 workers, Syskit's State of Microsoft 365 Governance Report, published Sept. 10, found that 76% of the companies surveyed had deployed or tested enterprise AI tools such as Copilot in their Microsoft 365 environments, but less than half (43%) had conducted a thorough review of file permissions and potential oversharing risks prior to deployment, and the rest skipped the review process or reviewed only partially.  

There was a similar gap for oversight over AI agents. While 91% of respondents said they were confident about their knowledge of what AI agents were and had access to, in practice, barely one in five companies (22%) had a formal policy outlining permitted agents' access, and roughly one in 10 (9%) had an agent that had inherited all the permissions of the person who had deployed it. "If you look at tools such as Copilot, you can see the value it can bring," said Syskit CEO Toni Frankola, noting that some content could be exposed purely based on permissions that had been set years ago and then simply forgotten about, and that AI had removed the friction that had previously prevented accidental exposure. 

"Permission audits may be the most critical and least desirable step in preparing a safe and secure AI deployment." The report also highlighted areas of weakness in Microsoft 365 environments overall. Roughly 41% of organizations had SharePoint sites that were publicly available with no access restrictions, 35% had visible files for past employees, and a third had files shared publicly with "Everyone." Ownerless content was the biggest concern, with 47% of organizations citing orphaned teams, groups and sites, which had no one accountable for reviewing or securing them, despite being accessible to an AI just as readily as any other content.  

"There seems to be a disconnect between confidence and reality with regard to the management and control of data and information," said Frankola. "While eight in 10 (83%) organizations feel confident that they know exactly who can access specific sensitive information, only 4% could provide a complete access report for an auditor within an hour if asked ... and more than half would need at least a day to prepare one." Perhaps most concerningly, 90% of organizations said they had suffered or suspected a security incident related to incorrectly configured permissions or excessive access in the last two years, and 39% confirmed that a security incident had definitely occurred.

China-Linked UNC3569 Exploited Sogou Input Method Flaw to Deploy GRAYRABBIT Backdoor

 

China-linked hackers took advantage of a vulnerability within Sogou Input Method, a widely used typing utility for Chinese characters on Windows, and managed to implant a backdoor onto their victims' computers, security company Gen Digital stated in research published Thursday. 

An initial crafted link would kick off the chain of events, giving the attackers end-to-end access to perform anything the logged in user would have access to. Tencent, which both owns and is developing Sogou, has alreadypatched the vulnerability in April 2026. The vulnerability was uncovered by Gen as they tracked a live ongoing breach by a group known as UNC3569, a China based hacker-for-hire. The group has been tracked since 2021 by Google Threat Intelligence to government, academic, technology, and financial targets, predominantly in Eastern and Southeast Asia. 

The planted backdoor (GRAYRABBIT), is a small program the group has been using for many years. As the first stage of gaining access to a machine, it is used to create a command shell remotely from the attacker, allowing for the uploading and downloading of files. More modules from the attacker's server could also be added into a system at any point via this command-line interface. Research produced in 2023 by Citizen Lab suggests that Sogou Input Method boasts over 455,000,000 monthly users on Windows, Android, and iOS respectively, and has captured approximately 70% of the Chinese input-method market. 

On Windows, this application functions by having several components send messages between one another utilizing its own custom link type, sgbiz:. Gen discovered that the program intended to process these links had an error. It failed to correctly screen command-line arguments from the user, meaning attackers can order Sogou's settings program to instead launch its skin store functionality, but directing it towards the attacker controlled website instead- the only functioning part of the application that opens the browsing window without checking which site you are visiting. 

This browser is already outdated; embedded within the Sogou package is version 80 of Chromium from March 2020. Neither the sandbox protection, nor the same-origin policy in this Chromium build were disabled in the codebase. This allowed a vulnerability released within the Java Script Engine in October 2021 (CVE-2021-38003, fixed in Chrome 95 October that year) to be taken advantage of once more by Chinese hackers. The exploit sends a downloader which can then fetch a few files from an Alibaba Cloud server situated in Hong Kong. 

One file was a DLL designed to spoof and hide inside a pirated copy of 7-Zip. Running processes would be scrutinized for analysis methods in a sandboxed environment prior to deployment of the GRAYRABBIT, which sends out requests for and receives information from a command server, encrypted by RC4 over port 443. Gen alerted Tencent on April 9 th 2026 (the vulnerability has been noted under the designation CVE-2026-51990), and Tencent provided a fix within twelve days in version 16.3.0.3498 (released April 21 st). 

It should be noted that the vulnerability present with the old Chromium build and compromised securities does not appear to have been amended. Users are instructed to update their version of Sogou Input Method without delay, and maintain an eye on the indicators of compromise on publication, which includes the malicious DLL, backdoor files, and applicable command and control websites.

Microsoft Tracks Cloud Intrusion Campaign Using Passkey Phishing and Graph API Abuse

 

Microsoft Security Research published a report on September 9, 2026, detailing active cloud-based intrusions spanning multiple accounts, in which unusual sign-ins were followed by threat actor-added authentication methods, high-volume Microsoft Graph activity, SharePoint and OneDrive downloads, and email collection through REST APIs. 

According to Microsoft, the activity begins with identity-focused social engineering and impersonation infrastructure, then progresses through authentication persistence and cloud reconnaissance before culminating in targeted data access consistent with data collection and potential exfiltration. Microsoft Threat Intelligence assesses that the initial access techniques observed in this campaign are used by a range of threat actors, including Storm-3121, Storm-3032, and others. 

The attack typically begins with what appears to be a routine call or message to a user's personal phone number from someone posing as the organization's IT helpdesk. Microsoft found that a "passkey" narrative is frequently used as a pretext, guiding victims through adversary-in-the-middle phishing or device-code authentication flows designed to hijack their session. 

Once initial access is achieved, the actor's first priority is converting a temporary compromise into a persistent foothold. This is typically done by enrolling a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) method under the attacker's control, such as registering a new phone number, an authenticator app, or a software-based one-time password token. With MFA persistence established, the actor moves into an extensive internal reconnaissance phase, using Microsoft Graph to inventory users, groups, permissions, resources, and accessible content across the compromised tenant. 

Following reconnaissance, the actor transitions into large-scale data collection across Microsoft 365 workloads. Microsoft observed significant volumes of FileAccessed and FileDownloaded events across SharePoint and OneDrive, indicating systematic retrieval of cloud-hosted documents and organizational data. Microsoft recommends that defenders investigate this attack sequence across identity, Microsoft Graph, SharePoint, OneDrive, and Exchange signals. For confirmed compromises, organizations should revoke active sessions and remove any unauthorized authentication methods added by the attacker. 

Microsoft further advises enforcing phishing-resistant MFA through Conditional Access policies, along with Conditional Access rules requiring a managed, compliant device for access to Exchange, SharePoint, and Graph-privileged applications. Microsoft has published a list of indicators of compromise associated with the campaign. These include domains tied to fraudulent passkey support and setup lures, such as passkeyhelpdesk[.]com, secure-passkey[.]com, setupmypasskey[.]com, and add-passkey[.]com. Additional domains are linked to identity-provider sessions and key synchronization infrastructure, including oktasession[.]com, keysyncos[.]com, oskeysync[.]com, oskeysetup[.]com, oskeyregister[.]com, syncmykey[.]com, myconnectkey[.]com, and oskeyconnect[.]com. Other identified domains, validationsetupac[.]com and portalsetuphub[.]com, are associated with account validation and portal setup lures respectively. 

Microsoft's report underscores the growing sophistication of identity-based attacks that blend social engineering with legitimate cloud APIs, making early detection across authentication and Graph activity critical for organizations defending Microsoft 365 environments.

DoppelCart Fake-Shop Network Found Operating Across 119,000 Domains

 

A newly published investigation has uncovered what may be the largest documented fake-shop network to date, spanning roughly 119,000 domains and dubbed "DoppelCart" by researchers at nebty. The cluster's .shop domains alone account for 2.72 percent of the entire .shop domain population captured in a September 2026 snapshot — roughly one in every 37 domains registered under that extension. 

The investigation, led by Benedikt Scheungraber and published September 7, began not as a large-scale probe but as routine work handling individual customer complaints. Researchers found fake shops targeting several clients and arranged for their removal, but noticed the same infrastructure patterns recurring across unrelated takedowns and monitoring cases. Using publicly accessible website scans from urlscan, the team began connecting domains and quickly realized the scale far exceeded a handful of isolated scam sites — eventually tracing around 119,000 associated domains back to a single technical foundation dressed up as countless different brand identities. 

To put the discovery in context, researchers compared it to other publicly documented fake-shop networks. BogusBazaar, reported by SRLabs in 2024, spanned more than 75,000 domains over several years, with about 22,500 active at any one time. FraudWear, documented by CTM360 in 2026, involved over 30,000 domains with roughly 8,000 simultaneously active. Malwarebytes identified a cluster of more than 20,000 domains in March 2026, while Netcraft's Fibergrid investigation found 16,700 active fake shops on connected hosting infrastructure in April 2026. 

DoppelCart's scale surpasses all of these prior cases. What makes the fake shops convincing, according to the investigation, is their use of genuine material lifted from real businesses. Examined storefronts featured product descriptions copied word for word from legitimate online stores, including detailed explanations of product features and construction. In some cases, the fake sites even embedded images directly from the legitimate brand's own image servers, pairing authentic-looking product photos with advertised discounts of 65 percent to create a convincing illusion of a genuine sale. 

The fallout lands squarely on the copied businesses. Because many fake shops list the legitimate store's real support address, customers who never receive their orders end up contacting the authentic company, forcing its support staff to untangle orders they never placed or received payment for — all while trust in the real brand suffers. 

To help affected companies respond, the researchers are publishing the full investigation database, allowing businesses to search for their own brand name or domain and review classifications and evidence for each entry. Journalists and security researchers can request the underlying raw data, including archived HTML pages, by contacting the team directly. While takedowns pursued so far have kept removed stores offline, the majority of the DoppelCart cluster reportedly remains active.

Bitdefender Uncovers Windows Bind Link Technique That Evades EDR Detection


 

Researchers at Bitdefender have discovered a new technique for hiding malware from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions by utilizing bind links, a valid Windows feature. Despite Microsoft's classification of this issue as low severity due to the fact that administrator privileges are required, Bitdefender maintains that the attack technique poses a significant risk since attackers frequently obtain elevated access during actual intrusions. 

The Bind Link feature is a valid kernel-level functionality that can be used by components such as Windows Sandboxes, Microsoft Store apps, and Windows containers to redirect virtual paths to actual system locations. As Bitdefender reports, attackers can manipulate these links so that trusted Windows paths point to malicious files instead of legitimate ones, enabling malware to execute while appearing harmless to security applications.

The issue affects Windows 10 RS4 and later versions, including Windows 11, meaning that most modern enterprise Windows systems may be vulnerable if attackers gain local administrator privileges. As a result, Bitdefender reports that this technique is particularly relevant as ransomware groups often seek elevated permissions before deploying malicious software or disabling security controls, making it particularly effective. 

Several attack methods were identified by researchers that abuse bind links. The first, file-binding, redirects trusted Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) paths to malicious DLLs, thus allowing attackers to bypass security mechanisms such as the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). Second, process-binding tricks EDR solutions into inspecting trusted executables while a malicious file is actually being executed. 

By using Windows silos to create isolated filesystem views, silo-binding is the most advanced technique. Using this technique, malware is permitted to run within the silo while external security tools will only view clean, legitimate files. By disguising Invoke-Mimikatz as a trusted Windows system process, Bitdefender successfully bypassed an EDR solution by demonstrating the technique in practice. 

In addition to bypassing built-in Windows security measures such as AppLocker, Windows Firewall, and Sysmon, researchers observed that bind-link abuse was an effective post-compromise evasion technique. A legitimate Windows capability is exploited by bind-link abuse, unlike traditional "EDR killer" techniques which often rely upon vulnerable drivers. 

Instead of creating a permanent file on disk, the malicious redirection occurs only in memory via the Windows' bindflt.sys minifilter driver. Although Microsoft acknowledged these findings, they rated the issue as low severity since it requires local administrator privileges to exploit it. A ransomware group and advanced threat actor routinely obtain elevated privileges after compromising a computer system, according to Bitdefender, who disagreed with that assessment. 

Using bind-link abuse is similar to the increasingly common Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) approach, as attackers are able to evade endpoint protection similarly, but utilizing legitimate Windows functionality rather than vulnerable drivers for evasion. To detect path manipulation, endpoint security products should repeatedly verify the underlying file during execution to detect path manipulation. 

In addition, Bitdefender recommended that security vendors refrain from solely using trusted file paths when validating processes. Moreover, the researchers noted that Windows 24H2 offers protection against certain bind-link scenarios, although they described the safeguard as only a partial one. The findings of Bitdefender have been shared with Microsoft and the company has recommended strengthening monitoring of administrator-level activity and kernel-level filesystem changes. 

In spite of the low severity of the issue, researchers report that attackers are increasingly utilizing legitimate Windows features rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities, resulting in a new challenge to endpoint security. Bitdefender's findings illustrate the importance of stronger endpoint security beyond trustable file paths as attackers continue to exploit legitimate Windows features to evade detection. To protect against evolving post-compromise threats, organizations should closely monitor privileged activity and employ advanced detection techniques.

Lumen Disrupts Aisuru–Kimwolf Botnet Powering Massive DDoS Attacks

 

Lumen Technologies’ Black Lotus Labs has successfully disrupted more than 550 command-and-control (C2) servers connected to the Aisuru and Kimwolf botnets, a large-scale malicious infrastructure widely used for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and residential proxy abuse.

Aisuru operates as a DDoS-for-hire platform and deliberately avoids targeting government and military entities. However, broadband service providers have borne the brunt of its activity, with attacks surpassing 1.5Tb/sec originating from compromised customer devices, causing severe service interruptions.

Similar to other TurboMirai-based botnets, Aisuru includes enhanced DDoS capabilities alongside multifunctional features. These allow threat actors to engage in a range of illegal operations such as credential stuffing, AI-powered web scraping, spam campaigns, phishing attacks, and proxy services.

The botnet launches assaults using UDP, TCP, and GRE flood techniques, leveraging medium-sized packets with randomized ports and flags. Traffic volumes exceeding 1Tb/sec from infected customer premises equipment (CPEs) have disrupted broadband networks, while packet floods surpassing 4 billion packets per second have led to router line card failures.

Kimwolf, a recently identified Android-based botnet closely associated with Aisuru, has compromised more than 1.8 million devices and generated over 1.7 billion DDoS commands, according to cybersecurity firm XLab.

Primarily targeting Android TV boxes, the Kimwolf botnet is built using the Android NDK and includes capabilities such as DDoS attacks, proxy forwarding, reverse shell access, and file management. To conceal its operations, it encrypts sensitive information using a simple Stack XOR method, employs DNS over TLS for communication obfuscation, and verifies C2 commands through elliptic curve digital signatures. Newer variants also use EtherHiding, leveraging blockchain-based domains to evade takedown efforts.

Kimwolf variants follow a consistent naming convention of “niggabox + v[number],” with versions v4 and v5 currently observed in the wild. Researchers who seized control of a single C2 domain recorded interactions from approximately 2.7 million IP addresses within three days, reinforcing estimates that infections exceed 1.8 million devices. The botnet’s globally distributed infrastructure, multiple C2 servers, and varied versions make precise infection counts difficult.

Although Kimwolf borrows elements from the Aisuru codebase, its operators significantly modified it to avoid detection. While traffic proxying is its primary function, the botnet is capable of executing large-scale DDoS campaigns. This was evident during a three-day window between November 19 and 22, when it issued 1.7 billion attack commands.

Lumen observed daily bot traffic to Aisuru C2 servers rise sharply from 50,000 to 200,000 connections in September 2025. Upon validating the emergence of a new botnet, the company blocked the traffic and null-routed more than 550 C2 servers.

By examining C2 infrastructure and residential proxy traffic, researchers traced links to Canadian IP addresses and shared this intelligence with law enforcement agencies.

“The Canadian IPs in question were using SSH to access 194.46.59[.]169, which resolved to proxy-sdk.14emeliaterracewestroxburyma02132[.]su. In short order, we would learn that the Aisuru backend C2 we were tracking adopted the domain name client.14emeliaterracewestroxburyma02132[.]su, a similarity that further tied these servers together” reads the report published by Lumen.

In early October, Black Lotus Labs detected infrastructure shifts signaling the rise of the Kimwolf botnet. Its growth was rapid, adding hundreds of thousands of infected devices within weeks, largely through exploitation of insecure residential proxy services. By mid-October, infections had reached approximately 800,000 devices, with the botnet actively scanning proxy networks to accelerate expansion.

Black Lotus Labs initiated disruption efforts against Kimwolf in October by swiftly null-routing its C2 servers. While operators were able to reestablish operations within hours, Lumen persistently blocked new infrastructure as it surfaced. Through continuous monitoring, collaboration with industry partners, and integration of threat indicators into its security products, Lumen worked to reduce the botnet’s operational capacity over time.

“To date, we have null-routed over 550 Aisuru/Kimwolf servers in 4 months as part of our efforts to combat this botnet, leading its operators to some distress, as noted in Xlabs’ post, showing the actors addressing Lumen with profanity in one DDoS payload” concludes the report.


Akira Ransomware Bypasses MFA in Ongoing Attacks on SonicWall SSL VPN Devices

 

The Akira ransomware group continues to evolve its attacks on SonicWall SSL VPN devices, with researchers warning that the threat actors are managing to log into accounts even when one-time password (OTP) multi-factor authentication (MFA) is enabled. Cybersecurity firm Arctic Wolf reported that attackers appear to be exploiting previously stolen OTP seeds or a similar method to bypass MFA, though the exact technique remains unclear. 

Earlier this year, Akira was observed exploiting SonicWall SSL VPN devices to breach corporate networks. Initially, researchers suspected a zero-day vulnerability was involved. However, SonicWall later attributed the incidents to an improper access control flaw identified as CVE-2024-40766, disclosed in September 2024. The flaw had been patched in August 2024, but attackers continued to exploit stolen credentials from compromised devices even after updates were applied. SonicWall advised administrators to reset all VPN credentials and update to the latest SonicOS firmware.  

The latest Arctic Wolf findings reveal a persistent campaign in which multiple OTP challenges were triggered before successful logins, implying that attackers may be generating valid OTP tokens using previously harvested OTP seeds. The company confirmed that these logins were linked to devices affected by CVE-2024-40766, suggesting that stolen credentials remain a key entry point.

In a related investigation, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) observed a similar campaign in July, where a financially motivated group known as UNC6148 deployed the OVERSTEP rootkit on SonicWall SMA 100 series appliances. GTIG assessed that the attackers were using stolen one-time password seeds from earlier zero-day intrusions, allowing continued access even after organizations patched their systems. 

Once Akira gained access to networks, the attackers moved rapidly, often initiating internal scans within minutes. According to Arctic Wolf, they used Impacket SMB session requests, Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) logins, and Active Directory enumeration tools like dsquery, SharpShares, and BloodHound to expand their reach. A major focus was on Veeam Backup & Replication servers, where a custom PowerShell script extracted and decrypted stored MSSQL and PostgreSQL credentials. 

To disable endpoint protection, Akira affiliates executed a Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) attack, using Microsoft’s legitimate consent.exe executable to sideload malicious DLLs that deployed vulnerable drivers such as rwdrv.sys and churchill_driver.sys. These drivers were then used to terminate security processes, enabling the ransomware to encrypt systems undetected. 

The report notes that some compromised systems were running SonicOS 7.3.0, the very version recommended by SonicWall to mitigate such attacks. Security experts urge all administrators to reset VPN credentials and review access logs on any devices that previously used vulnerable firmware, as threat actors may still exploit stolen data to infiltrate networks.

Global Supply Chains at Risk as Indian Third-Party Suppliers Face Rising Cybersecurity Breaches

 

Global supply chains face growing cybersecurity risks as research highlights vulnerabilities in Indian third-party suppliers. According to a recent report by risk management firm SecurityScorecard, more than half of surveyed suppliers in India experienced breaches last year, raising concerns about cascading effects on international businesses. The study examined security postures across multiple sectors, including manufacturing for aerospace and pharmaceuticals, as well as IT service providers. 

The findings suggest that security weaknesses among Indian suppliers are both more widespread and severe than analysts initially anticipated. These vulnerabilities could create a domino effect, exposing global companies that rely on Indian vendors to significant cyber threats. Despite the generally strong security posture of Indian IT service providers, they recorded the highest number of breaches in the study, underscoring their position as prime targets for attackers. 

SecurityScorecard noted that IT service providers worldwide face heightened cyber risks due to their central role in enabling third-party access, their expansive attack surfaces, and their value as high-profile targets. In India, IT companies were found to be particularly vulnerable to typosquatting domains, compromised credentials, and infected devices. The research further revealed that suppliers of outsourced IT operations and managed services were linked to 62.5% of all documented third-party breaches in the country—the highest proportion the company has ever recorded. 

Given India’s dominant role in the global IT services market, the implications are profound. Multinational corporations across industries rely heavily on Indian IT vendors, making them critical nodes in the international digital economy. “India is a cornerstone of the global digital economy,” said Ryan Sherstobitoff, Field Chief Threat Intelligence Officer at SecurityScorecard. “Our findings highlight both strong performance and areas where resilience must improve. Supply chain security is now an operational requirement.” 

The report also emphasized the risks of “fourth-party” vulnerabilities, where the suppliers of Indian companies themselves create additional points of weakness. A single ransomware attack or disruptive incident against an Indian vendor, the researchers warned, could halt manufacturing, delay service delivery, or disrupt logistics across multiple countries. 

The risks are not limited to India. A separate SecurityScorecard study revealed that 96% of Europe’s largest financial institutions have been affected by a breach at a third-party supplier, while 97% reported breaches stemming from fourth-party partners, a sharp increase from 84% two years earlier. 

As global supply chains become increasingly interconnected, these findings highlight the urgent need for businesses to strengthen third-party risk management and enforce stricter cybersecurity practices across their vendor ecosystems. Without stronger safeguards, both direct and indirect supplier vulnerabilities could leave multinational enterprises exposed to significant financial and operational disruptions.

Researchers Link Surge in Malicious Scanning to New Vulnerability Disclosures Weeks Ahead

 

A new study suggests that in nearly 80% of cases, unusual spikes in malicious online activity — such as network reconnaissance, targeted scanning, and brute-force attacks on edge networking devices — occur within six weeks before the public disclosure of new security vulnerabilities (CVEs).

The finding comes from threat intelligence company GreyNoise, which says these incidents are not random, but instead follow consistent and statistically significant patterns.

GreyNoise analyzed data from its Global Observation Grid (GOG) dating back to September 2024, applying objective statistical measures to filter out noise, ambiguity, and low-quality entries. This process identified 216 significant spike events linked to eight enterprise edge vendors.

"Across all 216 spike events we studied, 50 percent were followed by a new CVE within three weeks, and 80 percent within six weeks," explain the researchers. The correlation was especially strong for products from Ivanti, SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks, and Fortinet, and weaker for MikroTik, Citrix, and Cisco. According to GreyNoise, state-sponsored actors have consistently targeted such systems for initial access and persistence, often probing for older, already-documented flaws.

Researchers believe this scanning activity either aids in uncovering new vulnerabilities or in identifying exposed endpoints that could later be exploited with novel attacks.

Traditionally, defenders act after a CVE is published. However, GreyNoise’s findings indicate that unusual attacker behavior can serve as an early warning system — giving security teams a valuable window to strengthen defenses before a vulnerability becomes public knowledge.

These pre-disclosure spikes allow defenders to bolster monitoring, tighten security controls, and prepare for possible exploits, even if no patch is yet available or the targeted component remains unknown. GreyNoise recommends closely monitoring scanning activity and swiftly blocking source IPs to prevent reconnaissance from progressing to active attacks.

The company also stresses that scans targeting older vulnerabilities shouldn’t be dismissed as harmless, since attackers often use them to catalog internet-facing systems that might be vulnerable to other exploits in the future.

In a related move, Google’s Project Zero announced it will now notify the public within one week of discovering a new vulnerability. The disclosure will include the affected vendor or product, the discovery date, and the standard 90-day patch deadline. No technical details, proof-of-concept code, or exploit information will be released in this early notice, ensuring attackers cannot leverage the information while helping administrators reduce the “patch gap.”

North Korea Establishes Research Center 227 to Strengthen Cyber Warfare Capabilities

 

North Korea has reportedly launched a new cyber research unit, Research Center 227, as part of its efforts to enhance hacking capabilities and intelligence operations. According to Daily NK, this center is expected to function continuously, providing real-time support to North Korean intelligence agencies by developing advanced cyber tools. 

The initiative highlights North Korea’s increasing reliance on cyber warfare as a key component of its broader security strategy. In February 2025, North Korean leadership directed the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) under the General Staff Department to strengthen the nation’s offensive cyber capabilities. As part of this directive, Research Center 227 was formed to focus on the development of sophisticated hacking techniques and cyber warfare tools. 

These efforts are primarily aimed at infiltrating foreign cybersecurity systems, disrupting critical infrastructure, and stealing sensitive data from targeted nations. The research facility will recruit approximately 90 highly skilled professionals, including graduates from top universities and individuals with advanced degrees in computer science. Unlike frontline cyber operatives who execute attacks, these researchers will focus on creating and refining malware, intrusion methods, and other offensive cyber tools. 

By centralizing its cyber research efforts, North Korea aims to develop more sophisticated digital weapons that can be deployed by operational hacking units in intelligence and espionage missions. North Korea has significantly expanded its cyber operations in recent years, with its state-sponsored hacking groups, such as Lazarus, launching large-scale attacks across the globe. These groups have been responsible for financial cybercrimes, espionage, and the theft of cryptocurrency, targeting both private companies and government agencies. 

Their activities have included spreading malware, infiltrating secure networks, and deploying information-stealing tools to compromise Western organizations. One particularly deceptive tactic used by North Korean hackers is the “Contagious Interview” campaign, in which cybercriminals pose as recruiters or hiring managers to manipulate professionals into downloading malicious software disguised as video conferencing applications. 

This technique has allowed hackers to gain access to corporate systems and steal valuable credentials. Additionally, there have been numerous cases of North Korean operatives using false identities to secure employment in global technology firms, potentially accessing critical software infrastructure or engaging in fraudulent activities. With the establishment of Research Center 227, North Korea is likely to intensify its cyber warfare operations, making its hacking activities more strategic and efficient. 

The development of custom malware, sophisticated intrusion techniques, and advanced cyber espionage methods could further increase the scale and complexity of North Korean cyberattacks. As these threats evolve, governments and cybersecurity professionals worldwide will need to bolster their defenses against the growing risks posed by North Korea’s cyber capabilities.

Researchers Hijack Hacker Backdoors Through Abandoned Infrastructure

 

Shadow IT has long been a pressing concern for Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs). Forgotten systems, infrastructure, or hardware connected to enterprise networks often resurface as entry points for data breaches or compromises years later. However, new findings from watchTowr Labs reveal that this issue extends beyond enterprise networks, offering a unique opportunity to exploit the sloppy practices of malicious hackers themselves.

In a recent post, watchTowr Labs CEO Benjamin Harris and researcher Aliz Hammond unveiled their discovery of thousands of live backdoors used by hackers, accessed through abandoned infrastructure and expired domains.

“Put simply — we have been hijacking backdoors (that were reliant on now-abandoned infrastructure and/or expired domains) that themselves existed inside backdoors, and have since been watching the results flood in,” Harris and Hammond wrote.

Their method involved identifying and purchasing expired domains — often costing as little as $20 — linked to older web shells. By redirecting these domains to their logging server, the team tracked incoming traffic from compromised hosts.

Among the attackers’ missteps were unprotected or poorly secured web shells, many of which contained code that enabled researchers to overwrite hardcoded passwords with their own credentials. This allowed watchTowr Labs to monitor and document compromised hosts without illegal interference.

The researchers uncovered a vast network of backdoors, impacting thousands of victims worldwide. For instance, one backdoor tied to a previous Lazarus Group operation connected to over 3,900 unique compromised domains. Victims included government organizations in Bangladesh, China, and Nigeria, as well as universities across China, Thailand, and South Korea.

Interestingly, much of the attacker traffic appeared to originate from Chinese and Hong Kong IP addresses, targeting Chinese organizations. However, Harris and Hammond noted this could reflect their sample size and emphasized that hackers often use proxy infrastructure in other countries.

Throughout their research, watchTowr Labs took care to remain within legal boundaries. “These requests were coming to us, we didn’t manipulate systems into communicating with us, and we certainly did not respond with code to be evaluated,” the researchers clarified. The compromised domains were ultimately handed over to the nonprofit Shadowserver Foundation, which converted them into a sinkhole to prevent further misuse.

This project sheds light on the vulnerabilities stemming from abandoned and expired infrastructure. “As the Internet ages, and as we begin to truly understand the scope of impact for abandoned and expired infrastructure, we’re likely to see problems like this continue,” Harris and Hammond wrote.

Despite the serious implications, the findings also offer a silver lining. “It’s somewhat encouraging to see that attackers make the same mistakes as defenders,” the researchers noted, adding that vulnerabilities such as expired domains and unprotected web shells show attackers are not infallible.

The work by watchTowr Labs underscores the importance of vigilance in cybersecurity, highlighting that shadow IT — whether in enterprise environments or hacker operations — remains a critical issue. As Harris and Hammond humorously concluded, “Perhaps attackers need to attend more Washington D.C. cybersecurity conferences for tips on properly managing their shadow IT.”

ENISA’s Biennial Cybersecurity Report Highlights EU Threats and Policy Needs

 

The EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) has released its inaugural biennial report under the NIS 2 Directive, offering an analysis of cybersecurity maturity and capabilities across the EU. Developed in collaboration with all 27 EU Member States and the European Commission, the report provides evidence-based insights into existing vulnerabilities, strengths, and areas requiring improvement. Juhan Lepassaar, ENISA’s Executive Director, emphasized the importance of readiness in addressing increasing cybersecurity threats, technological advancements, and complex geopolitical dynamics. Lepassaar described the report as a collective effort to bolster security and resilience across the EU.

The findings draw on multiple sources, including the EU Cybersecurity Index, the NIS Investment reports, the Foresight 2030 report, and the ENISA Threat Landscape report. A Union-wide risk assessment identified significant cyber threats, with vulnerabilities actively exploited by threat actors. While Member States share common cybersecurity objectives, variations in critical sector sizes and complexities pose challenges to implementing uniform cybersecurity measures. At the individual level, younger generations have shown improvements in cybersecurity awareness, though disparities persist in the availability and maturity of education programs across Member States.

ENISA has outlined four priority areas for policy enhancement: policy implementation, cyber crisis management, supply chain security, and skills development. The report recommends providing increased financial and technical support to EU bodies and national authorities to ensure consistent implementation of the NIS 2 Directive. Revising the EU Blueprint for managing large-scale cyber incidents is also suggested, aiming to align with evolving policies and improve resilience. Tackling the cybersecurity skills gap is a key focus, with plans to establish a unified EU training framework, evaluate future skills needs, and introduce a European attestation scheme for cybersecurity qualifications.

Additionally, the report highlights the need for a coordinated EU-wide risk assessment framework to address supply chain vulnerabilities and improve preparedness in specific sectors. Proposed mechanisms, such as the Cybersecurity Emergency Mechanism under the Cyber Solidarity Act, aim to strengthen collective resilience.

Looking to the future, ENISA anticipates increased policy attention on emerging technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Post-Quantum Cryptography. While the EU’s cybersecurity framework provides a solid foundation, evolving threats and expanding roles for authorities present ongoing challenges. To address these, ENISA underscores the importance of enhancing situational awareness and operational cooperation, ensuring the EU remains resilient and competitive in addressing cybersecurity challenges.

New Windows Vulnerability CVE-2024-6768 Triggers Blue Screen of Death on All Versions of Windows 10 and 11

 

A recently uncovered Windows vulnerability, known as CVE-2024-6768, has raised alarm among cybersecurity experts due to its potential to cause widespread disruption by triggering the dreaded blue screen of death (BSOD) on a range of Windows operating systems. Discovered by cybersecurity researchers from Fortra, this vulnerability impacts all versions of Windows 10 and Windows 11, as well as Windows Server 2022, even if they have received the latest security patches. 

The flaw lies within the common log file system (CLFS) driver, which, when improperly validated, can result in a system crash by initiating the KeBugCheckEx function, causing the infamous BSOD. The vulnerability is significant because it can be exploited by a user with no administrative privileges. By using a specially crafted file, a malicious actor can crash the system, leading to potential data loss and disruption of services. Although the attack vector is local rather than remote, the ease with which the vulnerability can be exploited raises concerns about its potential impact. The vulnerability is graded as medium risk due to the requirement for local access, but the consequences of exploitation—especially in environments with multiple users—are severe. 

The discovery of CVE-2024-6768 dates back to December 2023, when Fortra initially reported the issue to Microsoft, providing a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit. Despite Fortra’s efforts to demonstrate the vulnerability across various systems, including those with the latest security updates, Microsoft was unable to reproduce the flaw and therefore did not prioritize a fix. Fortra continued to provide evidence, including screenshots, videos, and memory dumps, but Microsoft remained unresponsive, ultimately closing the case in February 2024. In June 2024, frustrated by the lack of progress, Fortra announced its intention to pursue a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) designation and publish its findings. 

The vulnerability was officially cataloged as CVE-2024-6768 in July 2024, and Fortra planned to release its research publicly in August 2024. The report highlights the vulnerability’s potential to be exploited by low-privileged users to crash systems, which could be particularly damaging in multi-user environments or where system stability is crucial. Microsoft, for its part, has downplayed the severity of the issue, stating that the vulnerability does not meet its criteria for immediate servicing. The company noted that an attacker would need to have already gained code execution capabilities on the target machine and that the vulnerability does not grant elevated permissions. 

However, the lack of a workaround or mitigation has left many organizations concerned about the potential impact of this flaw. While the average Windows user may not be significantly affected by CVE-2024-6768, the vulnerability poses a serious risk to businesses and organizations that rely on stable and secure systems. The possibility of a low-privileged user crashing a system without warning could lead to significant operational disruptions, especially in environments where uptime is critical. For these organizations, the absence of a timely fix from Microsoft is a cause for concern, and they may need to take additional precautions to safeguard their systems. 

In conclusion, the discovery of CVE-2024-6768 underscores the ongoing challenges in maintaining the security and stability of widely used operating systems. As Microsoft considers whether to release a fix, the vulnerability serves as a reminder of the importance of proactive cybersecurity measures and the need for organizations to remain vigilant in the face of evolving threats.

AutoSpill Attack Steal Credentials from Android Password Managers


Security researchers from the International Institute of Information Technology (IIIT) in Hyderabad, India, have discovered a new vulnerability with some Android password managers in which some malicious apps may steal or capture users’ data credentials in WebView. 

The threat actors carry out the operation particularly when the password manager is trying to autofill login credentials. 

In a presentation at the Black Hat Europe security conference, the researchers revealed that the majority of Android password managers are susceptible to AutoSpill even in the absence of JavaScript injection. 

How AutoSpill Works

WebView is frequently used in Android apps to render web content, which includes login pages, within the app, rather than redirecting users to the main browser, which would be more challenging on small-screen devices. 

Android password managers automatically enter a user's account information when an app loads the login page for services like Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, or Google by utilizing the WebView component of the platform. 

According to the researchers, it is possible to exploit vulnerabilities in this process to obtain the auto-filled credentials on the app that is being invoked. 

The researchers added that the password managers on Androids will be more vulnerable to the attack if the JavaScript injections are enabled. 

One of the main causes of the issue regarding AutoSpill is Android’s inability to specify who is responsible for handling the auto-filled data securely, which leaves the data vulnerable to leakage or capture by the host app.

In an attack scenario, the user's credentials could be obtained by a rogue app presenting a login form without leaving any trace of the breach.

Impact and Patch Work

Using Android's autofill framework, the researchers tested AutoSpill against a number of password managers on Android 10, 11, and 12. They discovered that 1Password 7.9.4, LastPass 5.11.0.9519, Enpass 6.8.2.666, Keeper 16.4.3.1048, and Keepass2Android 1.09c-r0 are vulnerable to assaults.

It was found that Google Smart Lock 13.30.8.26 and DashLane 6.2221.3 had different technical approaches for the autofill process, wherein they did not compromise data to the host app unless JavaScript injection was used.

The researchers submitted their recommendations for fixing the issue along with their results to the security team of Android and the affected software manufacturers. Their report was accepted as legitimate, however, no information regarding the plans for rectifying it was disclosed.  

88% of Healthcare Organizations Have Suffered a Cybersecurity Incident in Past Year


Organizations included in the healthcare sector, like hospitals and clinics, have struggled with a series of cyberattacks in recent years, resulting in their inability to provide even the minimum services because of computer outages and loss of important files in the data breaches.

In a recent report published on Wednesday by research conducted by Proofpoint, an email security company, around 90% of healthcare organizations have experienced at least one cybersecurity incident in the past year. 

In the past two years, more than half of the healthcare organizations have reported to have experienced an average of four ransomware attacks. 68% of the organizations surveyed noted that the attacks “negatively impacted patient safety and care.”

The aforementioned report conducted by Proofpoint includes a survey of more than 650 IT and cybersecurity professionals in the US healthcare sector, highlighting the healthcare sector's ongoing susceptibility to common attack methods. It occurs as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency works to provide greater assistance to small, rural hospitals that are underfunded and wilting under constant cyberattacks.

As healthcare organizations struggle to find alternatives to their outdated technology so they can keep providing services, these efforts are using up more and more of their resources. Between 2022 and 2023, the cost of the time spent minimizing the attacks' consequences on patient care rose by 50%, from around $660,000 to $1 million.

In the case of ransomware assault in hospital systems, where computer networks shut down, the impact is rapid and extensive. 

Stephen Leffler, president and chief operating officer of the University of Vermont Medical Center, spoke about how a ransomware assault in October 2020 brought about a catastrophe at his facility during a congressional hearing in September. For 28 days, senior physicians had to train junior physicians on how to use paper records as the National Guard assisted the IT department in a round-the-clock operation to wipe and reconfigure every computer in the network.

Leffler remarked, "We literally went to Best Buy and bought every walkie-talkie they had." This was due to their internet-based phone system being offline. Between 2022 and 2023, the cost of patient care grew by 50%, from about $660,000 to $1 million.

Leffler, who has been an emergency medicine doctor for 30 years, further commented “I've been a hospital president for four years. The cyberattack was much harder than the pandemic by far.”