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Hacker attack
AI Powered Cyber Attacks Cyberattacks Cybersecurity Data Center data centres data security Digital Infrastructure Hacker attack

U.S. Data Centers Face Security Risks From Physical Attacks, Insiders and AI-Powered Hackers

 

Attacks on data centers in other countries are raising concerns about the security of similar facilities in the United States. Although American data centers are unlikely to face the same kind of military strikes seen overseas, cybersecurity experts warn that they remain vulnerable to physical intrusions and cyberattacks. Earlier this week, Ukraine targeted Russian data centers. 

In March, the Iranian military struck Amazon data centers in the United Arab Emirates, leaving the affected facilities out of service for several months. Charles Brooks, an adjunct lecturer in cybersecurity at Georgetown University, told Mashable that data centers are valuable targets because so much of modern life depends on them. Everyday activities such as watching Netflix, using Google Docs and accessing online banking services rely on servers housed in these facilities. 

Data centers also support cloud services used by government agencies, hospitals, financial institutions and businesses, as well as communications between Earth and space. This makes them attractive to state-backed hackers and criminal groups seeking sensitive information or attempting to disrupt essential services. Brooks warned that a serious breach could have catastrophic consequences. He identified three major security concerns for American data centers. 

The first is physical security. Although a drone-powered attack is considered unlikely, facilities could still face attacks involving explosives or unauthorized physical access. Even limited damage could serve as a symbolic victory for terrorist groups or organizations opposed to AI infrastructure. Brooks said security measures should extend beyond surveillance cameras, alarms and barbed-wire fences. He recommended stronger perimeter defenses, security guards and protected areas around sensitive sections, including control centers and water-cooling systems. 

The second concern is the threat posed by insiders. Employees with authorized access to servers and infrastructure could expose sensitive information, reveal security weaknesses or interfere with operations. This could involve a disgruntled worker, someone recruited by an adversary or an employee who makes a costly mistake. Brooks recommended rigorous background checks comparable to those conducted for staff at hospitals and power plants. He also suggested AI-powered surveillance to identify unusual employee behavior, arguing that the potential security benefits could justify occasional false alarms. 

The third threat comes from AI-assisted hacking. Artificial intelligence can help attackers automate cyber operations, identify weaknesses and expand espionage campaigns. Brooks pointed to an Anthropic security report describing how individuals, including foreign government-backed actors, have used AI to automate cyber spying. Hackers could use these tools to scan for vulnerabilities in data center systems or launch phishing attacks against employees to steal login credentials. 

AI allows attackers to conduct these operations at greater scale and identify weaknesses more efficiently. Brooks said protecting data centers should be treated as a national security priority. A breach may not be immediately apparent to the public, but its effects could disrupt businesses, prevent people from working or expose personal information through ransomware attacks. He argued that stronger security requires cooperation between government agencies and the private companies that own and operate these facilities.
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Watermarking
ai agents AI prompt injection attack Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity EU AI Act Google DeepMind LLM SynthID-Text technology Watermarking

AI Watermarking Meant to Protect Against Misuse Could Actually Enable It

 



A security feature designed to make AI text traceable appears to have an unintended side effect: it can change how a language model behaves, in some cases making it more willing to follow instructions it was built to refuse.

That is the core finding from new research by Lasso Security, published on September 17 by researcher Andrea Siposova under the title "The Provenance Tax: Understanding the Impact of LLM Watermarking on AI Agent Behavior." The study tested Google DeepMind's SynthID-Text watermarking system across six open-weight language models and found that enabling watermarking changed how those models responded to harmful requests, particularly when attackers used prompt-injection techniques designed to override a model's instructions.


What SynthID-Text Actually Does

To understand why that matters, it helps to understand what SynthID-Text actually changes inside a model.

When a language model generates text, it does not write the way a human does. It builds sentences one token at a time, each step producing a probability distribution over thousands of possible next tokens and then sampling from that distribution. SynthID-Text does not attach a label to the finished output or hide characters in whitespace. It intervenes at the sampling step itself.

The system uses a process called tournament sampling, first described in a 2024 Nature paper by Google DeepMind researchers Sumanth Dathathri, Abigail See, and colleagues. Instead of the standard randomness used in token selection, the watermark substitutes pseudorandom values generated from a secret key and the context of tokens already produced. The result is a statistically detectable pattern woven through the text at the level of individual word choices, invisible to readers but recoverable by anyone holding the key. The technique is refined enough that it does not degrade text quality in any measurable way, which is a large part of what made it attractive as a compliance tool.


The Regulatory Push Behind It

Article 50 of the EU AI Act requires providers of generative AI systems to mark their text, image, audio, and video outputs in a way that is machine-readable and detectable as AI-generated. The Code of Practice the European Commission finalized on July 20, 2026, requires at least two marking layers for audio, images and video, plus watermarking of free-form text longer than 200 tokens. Google signed the Code on July 24, 2026, citing SynthID partnerships as its route to the interoperable detection requirement due on February 2, 2027.

Anthropic's technical implementation is built directly on SynthID-Text, the same tournament-sampling mechanism from the Nature paper, adapted for their own models and keys. It covers claude.ai, the API, Claude Code, Claude Cowork, Claude Tag, and access through AWS, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Foundry. With the industry's largest players now committed to the same watermarking standard, Siposova's findings arrive at an uncomfortable moment.


What the Research Found

Siposova ran paired experiments on six open-weight models using Hugging Face's unmodified SynthIDTextWatermarkLogitsProcessor, enabling and disabling watermarking while keeping the seed, batch composition, and ordering identical.

Watermarking changed refusal behavior on harmful requests, but the effect was more pronounced when the same requests were paired with prompt-injection techniques. Under those conditions, several watermarked models complied with harmful requests their unwatermarked versions had rejected, with the strongest differences appearing in prompt-injection scenarios.

Siposova told Ars Technica that behavior was clearly different compared with the same model without watermarking, and that the differences were especially pronounced under adversarial conditions or when running an agent calling tools. She put it plainly: "Watermarking is made to not be perceptible to a reader, but we know that when we are changing anything about what the model is generating, it is going to cause some tradeoffs, it's going to show up somewhere."

Lasso repeated its prompt-injection experiment using 11 different watermark keys and found that changing the key could change both the size and direction of the effect. That means two different deployments of the same watermarking system, on the same model, could produce different safety outcomes depending purely on which key was chosen.


The Agent Problem

The consequences extend beyond what a model says. When a language model powers an AI agent, token selection can determine which tool an agent invokes and which arguments it passes. "Such a watermarking procedure can therefore affect both what the model says and what an agent does," the study stated. Watermarking reduced accuracy on six of seven models, with a substantial decrease on four.

Lasso's conclusions are deliberately careful. The study did not verify how Claude model responses change when watermarking is applied, and critics noted the experiment only validated the SynthID-Text tournament sampling implemented by Hugging Face, which differs from how the Claude model would actually implement it. Siposova stressed that the findings describe patterns in the tested sample, not universal rules about watermarking as a category.

Lasso recommended repeating agent evaluations and red-team testing when watermarking or its configuration changes, particularly under adversarial inputs.

The research surfaces a tension that will only sharpen as regulatory deadlines close in. Watermarking was designed to answer the question of where AI text comes from. What it can also do, under the right adversarial conditions, is change what the AI decides to do next.


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Mobile Security
Android Malware Cybersecurity DarkSword Malware iOS security iPhone Exploit Kit Mobile Malware Mobile Security

Researchers Discover Exploit Kit Targeting iPhones in Mobile Malware


Researchers at the Ukrainian Cyber Security Institute have warned that there are mobile malware campaigns targeting both Android and iOS devices, with attackers utilizing malicious applications and sophisticated exploit chains to target military personnel, government officials, and other individuals.

In a recent report released by the Ukrainian State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection (SSSCIP), the findings were highlighted, highlighting the increasing use of smartphones for communication and obtaining sensitive data. An exploit kit designed for compromising iPhones was identified as one of the key tools identified in this activity, known as DarkSword. 

During watering-hole attacks, the attackers compromised legitimate websites visited by the intended targets and modified them in order to deliver the attack. A number of Ukrainian news and government websites were targeted by attackers, enabling them to exploit vulnerabilities in Apple’s Safari browser and iOS. 

As soon as an iPhone is compromised, DarkSword can be used to gather sensitive data such as login credentials, messages, contacts, and call histories without the victim having to interact significantly. In addition, earlier research has suggested that the activity may be linked to a Russian-led hacking operation targeting Ukrainians. 

Researchers previously reported that the threat actor identified as UNC6353 used DarkSword against Ukrainian users from as late as late 2025. As part of the activity, compromised sites belonging to a local news outlet covering the war and a local court were compromised, and a possible infection was identified at a Ukrainian food processing facility. 

DarkSword is described as an attack tool that is designed for a short period of time rather than a long-term solution. This technique has been shown to be capable of extracting sensitive information within minutes and then erasing traces of the compromised device within minutes. Additionally, Ukrainian authorities are tracking activities associated with groups known as UAC-0244 and UAC-0263, which use websites that appear legitimate and encourage users to download applications. This campaign extends to Android devices as well. 

To attract visitors, UAC-0244 created websites impersonating Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps and other services. One group, UAC-0263, distributed CamelSpy, an Android malware application capable of collecting information regarding device location, SIM card information, contacts, call logs, and stored images. It has been found that the BTMOB malware provides remote access to compromised devices and is capable of stealing information from them. It uses websites promoting supposed air raid alert applications, fuel discounts, and other services. 

A number of these campaigns demonstrate how attackers use familiar online services to disguise malicious activity. Ukraine's SSSCIP reported that threat actors used platforms such as GitHub to host malicious files, Telegram for transferring stolen information, Cloudflare for concealment of part of their network activity and Ngrok for encrypting stolen data. Those mobile attacks are part of a wider cyber campaign targeting Ukraine. 

CERT-UA reported 3,137 cyber incidents during the first half of 2026, representing an increase of approximately 8% from the preceding six-month period. There are still a number of security risks involved in mobile devices for Ukrainian citizens, with malicious websites, apps, and exploit tools being used to target iOS and Android devices.
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Threat Intelligence
Cybersecurity DLL Sideloading malware NeedyMantis Malware Targeted Cyber Attacks Threat Intelligence

NeedyMantis Malware Expands the Post-Compromise Threat Landscape


A modular malware family dubbed NeedyMantis has been identified by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, and has been employed to maintain access to compromised systems in a limited number of targeted intrusions. 


Evidence of the malware dating back to at least October 2025 indicates that it has affected telecommunications organizations, universities, medical nonprofits, intergovernmental organizations, and government contractors. During an investigation into indicators associated with the DAEMON Tools supply chain compromise, Microsoft identified NeedyMantis. 

The company tracks activity associated with Storm-3069, and has observed the malware in use beyond that campaign. While Microsoft believes the observed operations are associated with activities associated with China-based threat actors, it has not attributed Storm-3069 to a Chinese nation state actor or confirmed that all NeedyMantis activity originated from a single operator. 

As a general rule, NeedyMantis is deployed after attackers have already gained access to the target environment. The malware serves primarily as an initial access tool, but it is also intended to maintain access and facilitate further activity within the compromised network, utilizing DLL sideloading as part of its delivery chain. It has been observed that attackers packaged malicious DLLs with legitimate applications and encrypted archives in an attempt to facilitate their delivery. 

Poedit, curl, Vim, and TightVNC were among the programs abused in this manner, while malicious DLLs were disguised as Microsoft Office, Broadcom, Intel, and NVIDIA components. One incident involved the use of Impacket toolkit to copy a legitimate software package from a network share into the malicious file, which was then executed on the targeted computer. It is important to note that NeedyMantis played a crucial role in the post-compromise phase of an intrusion, despite the attacker already having established access to the environment. 

Once the initial DLL is loaded, the malware continues to feature layered security. A second-stage component is extracted from the encrypted archive by the first-stage loader, which is the file used in the analysis, encryptbase64.ps1. Even though the file has a PowerShell extension, it contains x64 shellcode rather than a conventional PowerShell script. 

Once the embedded malware has been decoded and decompressed, a custom executable format based on a reduced version of the Windows PE format is loaded. An additional level of protection can be provided by the custom archive. Its contents can vary between samples, with file names and internal values varying. 

The analyzed WinSparkle archive contained legitimate components of 7-Zip and Sysinternals as well as files with familiar Windows library names, including dnsapi.dll and ws2_32.dll, mixed with legitimate components. Instead of the legitimate libraries represented by these files, NeedyMantis configuration and communication components were found in these files. The main component communicates with the malware's command-and-control infrastructure and manages additional modules. 

It is Microsoft's responsibility to observe an initial HTTPS request before switching the connection to a binary WebSocket protocol. The communications component utilizes WebSockets. A hard-coded user agent for Firefox 21.0 has also been used by the malware in one implementation. Through the C2 channel, operators can add and remove modules and exchange data with them, though Microsoft has not confirmed the specific functionality of the modules. 

A NeedyMantis sample collected in October of 2025 contained a persistence module based on Windows services, however the persistence method employed by the newer analyzed sample has not been identified. The malware is more challenging to analyze through a single file or indicator due to its staged loading, misleading file names, encrypted archives, and modular C2 communication. 

Detection points have been provided by Microsoft for hashes, file paths, the C2 hostname corp.tripswithengine[.]com, and the Firefox/21.0 user agent. As a result of the NeedyMantis campaign, security teams need to monitor suspicious loaders, C2 traffic, and unusual usage of legitimate software in order to recognize the risks posed by modular post-compromise malware.
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Supabase Security
Cloud Database Security Cybersecurity Database Misconfiguration Privacy Sensitive Data Exposure Supabase Data Exposure Supabase Security

Supabase Misconfigurations Leave Customer Data Publicly Exposed


A cybersecurity firm UpGuard has found that thousands of databases hosted on Supabase can expose private information to the public internet. According to the research, approximately 16,000 databases hosted on the platform were able to be accessed by individuals through some form of personal data. The findings indicate that misconfigured databases and applications are a recurring security issue. 


Data storage and operations are widely facilitated by Suprabase for web and mobile applications, while the increasing use of artificial intelligence-assisted vibration coding has allowed developers with limited security expertise to create and deploy applications more easily. Among the exposed databases, UpGuard found names, addresses, telephone numbers, and passwords that were publicly accessible. A smaller number also contained authentication tokens. 

Various services and projects were connected to the exposed information, demonstrating that the problem is not limited to one type of application or industry. Datasets examined by researchers include private conversations provided by an Indian adult streaming platform, thousands of license plates owned by a valet service in the United States, as well as contacts for immigration and relocation services in the United States. 

Another exposed database reportedly served as a gateway to intercepting text messages via a virtual SIM farm. As UpGuard discovered, the database was linked to a consulate of the African government in France. By using these systems, online account holders can receive one-time verification codes, but when their data is left accessible via the internet, additional risks may be incurred. 

It is evident that the problem extends beyond isolated incidents; earlier investigations had also identified the public exposure of Supabase databases belonging to startups and widely used applications. UpGuard identified a large number of data sets that were located in the United States; however, the researchers indicated that the exposed databases were part of a global problem. 

An analysis performed by UpGuard identified 16,326 databases with Supabase tables that were publicly accessible. Approximately half of the databases contained personally identifiable information, and a smaller number contained passwords, authentication tokens, and payment card information in rare cases. The researchers also tested a sample of the databases to confirm that some of the exposed records contained information that was accurate. There has been prior documentation of this problem. 

In 2025, research discovered misconfigured Supabase databases connected to AI-assisted development platforms, and further investigation identified access controls and public key handling issues. The latest findings suggest that similar configuration errors remain widespread as more applications are constructed using AI coding tools for building and deploying.

Although Suprabase has implemented additional security safeguards, researchers noted that they are not necessarily applied automatically when databases are built using programming platforms. Nevertheless, proper configuration remains the only way to prevent unauthorized access to stored data. In addition, the findings highlight the differences between securing the backend of an application and building it. 

In contrast to AI-assisted development producing a working application rapidly, security settings around database access remain dependent upon decisions made during deployment. Consequently, access controls that are incorrectly configured can expose a database accessible through a given application when they are incorrectly configured. 

Supabase, on the other hand, stated that its projects are automatically secure and that database security is a shared responsibility between all parties. Managing Director of Information Security Bil Harmer stated that customers control how their projects are configured, while Supabase provides security defaults and tools and informs customers as soon as security threats are identified. The company has also implemented security-related changes to its platform over the years. 

The scope identified in the latest research, however, indicates that customer-side database configuration remains a critical part of the security equation, given that Supabase continues to be used for applications developed using artificial intelligence-assisted development tools. This study demonstrates that poorly configured cloud databases pose security risks, particularly as AI-assisted development continues to accelerate application deployments. 

Maintaining strict access controls and configuring databases carefully remain essential to prevent the public from having access to sensitive information.
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Vulnerabilities and Exploits
AI Coding Agents Codex CLI Codex Sandbox Escape Cybersecurity Heapjack Host Command Execution OpenAI Codex Overpatch Sandbox Vulnerability Vulnerabilities and Exploits

Researchers Escape OpenAI Codex Sandbox to Run Commands on Host


In OpenAI Codex, security researchers have identified two sandbox escape vulnerabilities, one of which allows developers to execute commands on their machine without prompting them. The vulnerabilities, Heapjack and Overpatch, affect different parts of the coding agent's security boundary. 

The vulnerability was reported to OpenAI by Accomplish AI on August 12. According to the researcher, Codex fixed both issues within eight days. The more serious Heapjack vulnerability demonstrated that malicious code could move beyond the restrictions imposed by Codex's sandbox, even when the agent was running as a read-only application. 

Heapjack Breaks the Sandbox Boundary

The node_repl component installed with Codex Desktop is targeted by heapjack. Although both OpenAI and untrusted agent code are run in separate JavaScript contexts, both operate within the same Node.js process and share the same memory heap, the separation was not sufficiently effective in preventing a security token from coming into contact with an untrusted environment. 

By inspecting the process heap, it was possible to obtain the token generated for the trusted context that remained in shared memory. When the token was obtained, the untrusted code could interact with a native parent process outside the sandbox using the communication channel used by the trusted context. As part of the demonstration of the technique, the researchers launched an application outside of Codex's process tree by utilizing the open command. 

A Unix socket as well as other system-level interfaces could also be reached through this access. This demonstration was especially important since it occurred while Codex was running in a strict read-only sandbox mode, where the agent was not expected to have any writing access to the wider system. 

The attack could be triggered by a seemingly routine development process. The researchers demonstrated a scenario in which malicious content contained in a repository, created by a third party, could exploit the vulnerability after the repository was opened in Codex and a query about its code was made. 

Overpatch Expands Write Access

Second, a vulnerability known as Overpatch affects the open-source Codex command line utility, and it takes an alternative route outside the sandbox. The vulnerability affects the application_patch tool used by Codex to modify files. 

In workspace-write mode, Codex is intended to limit file changes to the project directory. Researchers discovered that apply_patch, instead of expanding write permissions, could expand them based on paths included in patches. By using a path such as /tmp, the tool was able to treat the root of the file system as an accessible parent directory. In addition to the permission extension, researchers modified .zshrc by creating a symbolic link to the user's home directory so that it would be modified as well.

A successful write was not required for the /tmp entry; its presence extended the permissions granted to the patch operation. A modified shell configuration resulted in a file modification outside of the permitted workspace without an approval prompt. When a new terminal session was launched, attacker-controlled content ran. 

Two Flaws, One Security Boundary Problem

It is important to note that though Heapjack and Overpatch affect different parts of the Codex, both expose weaknesses in the way in which the security boundary of the agent was enforced. In the case of Overpatch, the tool responsible for applying changes also determined the scope from which it had access to data. 

In heapjack, trust boundaries were similarly compromised, as the token separating trusted and untrusted execution remained accessible in the same Node.js process and memory space as the untrusted code. The findings suggest that AI coding agents can be restricted in other ways than just controlling their abilities to execute commands. 

Untrusted agent activity must also be prevented from influencing the mechanisms that enforce those restrictions by the tools, processes and interfaces surrounding the model. On August 12, 2026, OpenAI was notified of the issues, and they were both addressed within eight days by Accomplish, who stated that Overpatch was addressed in Codex CLI 0.149.0, while Heapjack had been addressed in Codex Desktop build 26.818.21641.

A later statement by OpenAI confirmed that both issues had been resolved in August, and that additional measures were being taken to strengthen file-write controls and expand sandbox testing across platforms. These findings emphasize the security challenges associated with maintaining strong isolation in AI coding environments. Codex Desktop and Codex CLI have been updated to address both vulnerabilities.
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Screenshot Data Breach
23.6 Million Records Cybersecurity Data Breach Data Privacy Gyazo Data Breach Gyazo Security Breach Image Metadata Exposure Password Hashes Screenshot Data Breach

Gyazo Server Vulnerability Targeted to Steal Millions of User Records


Gyazo, an image-sharing platform, has confirmed a breach after attackers exploited a vulnerability in its upload server, gaining unauthorized access to the company's systems and approximately 23.62 million user records. 

Gyazo was developed by Japanese software company Helpfeel and allows users to upload images, GIFs, short videos and generate links for sharing. There are over 23 million users on the platform from 242 countries and regions, and billions of uploads have been processed. According to Helpfeel, the intrusion occurred on September 11, when a third party exploited a vulnerability in Gyazo's image upload server and became able to execute commands on the system as a result. 

On the same day, the company was notified of suspicious activity and began to investigate the incident. In the early hours of September 12, Helpfeel had blocked the access routes used for the attack and terminated any unauthorized connections. As part of the initial response, the exploited vulnerability was also fixed. However, an investigation revealed that the attacker was already able to access Gyazo's database and obtain user-related information. There are approximately 23.62 million records in the affected dataset. 

Depending on the account, information that will be exposed may include name or nickname, email address, password hashes, user and device IDs, login session IDs, profile information, subscription details, billing status and usage statistics. Additional information may be exposed if an account is linked to an external service. 

According to Helpfeel, integration tokens for accounts connected to X may be included, while Google SSO email addresses may also be included for users who signed in through Google. In a statement issued by the company, it clarified that payment information, including credit card numbers, was not exposed. 

The affected records also include anonymous accounts without registered email addresses, therefore it is not yet known how many people will be affected. The incident involved not only account information, but also a much larger collection of image-related metadata. According to Helpfeel, approximately 490 million metadata records were disclosed, primarily those associated with images uploaded before January 2019. It is possible for an image ID to be exposed, as well as IP addresses and User Agent details, EXIF location information, OCR-extracted text, image titles, and source URLs. 

A separate privacy concern arises from the image metadata, as Gyazo uses image IDs to generate URLs for uploaded captures. According to Helpfeel, the stolen IDs may allow access to some images, so the company temporarily disabled access to affected files while investigating. As a result, approximately 490 million images have been compromised, most of which were uploaded in January 2019 or earlier. 

Information may include image IDs, IP addresses, User-Agent strings, EXIF location information, OCR-extracted text, title of the image, and URL of the source. Besides the data exposed, Helpfeel also identified a separate set of approximately 2.4 million image records which were retrieved according to specific filtering criteria, including hacked passphrases associated with private images. This company has not provided information on the criteria used or clarified whether the records overlap with the larger metadata set. Also exposed in the incident was a list of private images. 

Helpfeel did not exclude the possibility that private pictures were viewed by the attacker. The number of private images accessed has not been determined by the company. Because Gyazo handles image privacy in a very sensitive manner, the disclosure of image IDs is particularly significant. The URL of each capture includes a 32-character ID, and older captures can still be accessed through their original URLs even after they are not prominently displayed within a user's account. 

The leaked identifiers therefore could be used to gain access to content that was not intended to be viewed by the general public. By the early hours of September 12, Helpfeel detected suspicious activity and blocked the identified access routes, terminating the attacker's connections. The exploited server vulnerability was immediately addressed. 

In September 14, the company confirmed the data exposure and reported the incident to the Japanese Personal Information Protection Commission. During the course of the investigation, Gyazo temporarily suspended image delivery. A forensic investigation is currently underway by Helpfeel, and affected users will be contacted directly. 

Anonymous accounts will be handled by Gyazo through notifications posted on the website. Despite finding no evidence of the deletion of image data during the incident, the company has not identified a data leak involving its separate Helpfeel and Cosense services. Users have been advised to change their Gyazo passwords and avoid reusing the same credentials on other services in light of the exposed authentication data. 

Helpfeel has also taken action to invalidate or restrict the affected credentials and authentication information. Furthermore, the company has cautioned against the possibility of exploitation of information disclosed in the breach through suspicious emails and messages.
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Zero Day Vulnerabilities
CVE 2026 Cybersecurity Microsoft Patch Tuesday Microsoft Vulnerabilities Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities and Exploits Windows Security Updates Zero Day Vulnerabilities

Microsoft Patches Nearly 1,000 Vulnerabilities in September Update



A significant security update was released by Microsoft on Patch Tuesday in September, addressing 974 vulnerabilities across the company's software portfolio in unusual quantities. Additionally, this update contains two Windows flaws that have been confirmed to be exploited in the wild, highlighting the urgency of fixing the vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities span several Microsoft product categories, including Windows, Office, SQL Server and Development Tools. 

Microsoft Windows accounted for 723 flaws, while Microsoft Office and Office 2016 contained 111, SQL had 62, and Developer Tools contained 22 more. There have been over 110 critical vulnerabilities rated as critical. Among the most critical issues addressed in this month's release are privilege escalation, remote code execution and information disclosure. Besides Microsoft's own vulnerabilities, the company also patched 25 non-Microsoft vulnerabilities as part of the September update, which brings the total number of vulnerabilities covered to 999. 

The two actively exploited Windows vulnerabilities are CVE-2026-85880 and CVE-2026-81963, both with a CVSS score of 7.8. The CVE-2026-85880 vulnerability is a heap-based buffer overflow in the Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC) function of Windows. The vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker with authorization to gain SYSTEM-level access by escalating privileges. 

CVE-2026-81963 is a vulnerability that affects the Windows Update Stack and involves improper link resolution. Authorized attackers are also capable of exploiting this vulnerability for escalating local privileges and gaining system access. 

By exploiting CVE-2026-85880, Microsoft stated that code running inside an AppContainer that has low privileges may escape its sandbox and gain full privileges on the affected Windows system. The attack does not require additional interaction from the user. This vulnerability has attracted significant attention due to its location within the Windows Update Stack. 

There have been reports of vulnerabilities in this component that could have serious implications, especially since the update mechanism itself is responsible for the modification of system components. Microsoft has released fixes for CVE-2026-81963, however, across supported versions of Windows. 

Both vulnerabilities have been exploited by Microsoft, but the company has not provided information regarding who the attackers are, how many systems were targeted, or whether successful compromises have been confirmed. According to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), both vulnerabilities have been added to its catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities. There is a deadline of September 22, 2026, for federal agencies to apply available security updates. 

The September release addresses several high-severity security vulnerabilities across Microsoft enterprise products in addition to the two exploited zero-days. This vulnerability could allow an unauthorized attacker to execute code remotely if exploited by an attacker. It has been rated 8.1 by the Center for Vehicular Defense. 

A vulnerability rated 8.8 in SharePoint has been reported, as well as a vulnerability in SQL Server called CVE-2026-65669, which can result in network-based code execution. The vulnerability is particularly severe and carries a CVSS score of 9.6, enabling privilege escalation. Several critical vulnerabilities affect Windows Remote Desktop Services, Windows DNS Server, Windows DHCP Server, Windows Shell, and Windows Services for NFS ONCRPC XDR Driver, carrying the maximum CVSS score of 9.8. 

In addition to reflecting the growing number of security vulnerabilities reported, the scale of the September release also reflects the rising number of security flaws reported by TrendAI's Zero Day Initiative. As of the beginning of 2026, Microsoft has patched 2,760 security vulnerabilities. Among Tenable's analysts, Satnam Narang noted that the September release alone brings the yearly count above 2,600 vulnerabilities, more than twice the previous record of 1,245 vulnerabilities recorded in 2020. 

It is important to note, however, that the raw number of CVEs does not necessarily indicate a company's level of risk. There may be patches that do not affect a particular environment, while others require specific configurations or local access for exploitation to occur. In the immediate future, it is important to identify vulnerabilities in deployed systems that are able to be exploited realistically. 

Since the two Windows zero-day vulnerabilities have already been confirmed as exploited and have been added to CISA's KEV catalog, they should be remedied sooner rather than vulnerabilities with no known exploitation activity.

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Sality Botnet
Botnet Disruption Botnet Takedown Cyber Attacks CyberCrime Cybersecurity malware P2P Botnet Sality Botnet

Sality Botnet Disrupted as Authorities Seize Key Infrastructure


An international public-private operation has disrupted Sality, a peer-to-peer botnet that remained active for more than two decades, by seizing domains and redirecting infected computers away from infrastructure controlled by its operator.

The coordinated action took place on August 31, 2026, and involved authorities in the United States, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. CrowdStrike and the Shadowserver Foundation provided technical assistance, while Europol and Eurojust supported the international coordination.

According to the US Department of Justice, the DOJ, FBI and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service seized Sality-linked domains in the United States. European authorities took action against additional domains hosted in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

CrowdStrike’s Counter Adversary Operations team simultaneously carried out a peer-to-peer sinkholing operation designed to separate infected computers from the botnet’s operator.

The action disabled Sality’s current command channel, but it did not automatically remove malware from compromised computers.

Sality Remained Active for More Than Two Decades

First observed in 2003, Sality began as a polymorphic file-infecting malware family. It attached malicious code to executable files and could spread through network shares, removable drives and file-sharing systems.

Sality eventually developed into a decentralized botnet in which infected computers communicated directly with one another. Unlike a conventional botnet with one central command-and-control server, Sality’s peer-to-peer architecture did not present investigators with a single server that could be seized to disable the entire operation.

CrowdStrike said two incompatible Sality networks, known as versions 3 and 4, remained active until the disruption. Although they used the same underlying codebase and were operated by the same threat actor, the networks used different protocol versions and cryptographic keys.

The botnet’s main function was to deliver additional malicious software. During its long history, Sality distributed malware associated with credential theft, spam, proxy services, network exploitation and distributed denial-of-service attacks.

For approximately the past eight years, CrowdStrike said its primary payload was EggJagger, a clipboard-hijacking tool that monitored devices for copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses. When it detected a Bitcoin or Ethereum address, the malware replaced it with an address controlled by the attacker.

CrowdStrike estimates that at least $150,000 in cryptocurrency was stolen through EggJagger, although other malware distributed through Sality may have produced additional criminal revenue.

How Large Was the Sality Botnet?

CrowdStrike’s technical account of the disruption states that Sality enabled its operator to distribute malicious payloads to more than 33,000 infected computers worldwide at the time of the operation.

Historical figures are considerably larger. Europol reported that Sality provided access to as many as one million infected machines at its peak. More than 11 million unique IP addresses have been connected to its infrastructure over its lifetime.

The 11 million figure should not be interpreted as the number of simultaneously infected devices. Individual machines can use different IP addresses over time, and the total covers years of recorded activity.

Europol has supported Sality-related investigations since 2017. The agency said international partners held weekly operational calls in the weeks before the latest action to coordinate infrastructure seizures and the technical disruption.

How the Sinkhole Operation Worked

The operation targeted the peer lists that Sality-infected computers used to locate other machines in the botnet.

Each infected computer maintained a limited list of publicly reachable “super peers,” which formed the backbone of the P2P network. Approximately every 40 minutes, the malware checked whether those peers remained available. Responsive peers gained reputation, while unresponsive entries were gradually removed.

CrowdStrike found that the Sality protocol did not authenticate computers joining the network. Any publicly reachable system that completed the required handshake could be accepted as a legitimate peer.

Defenders used this weakness to manipulate the botnet’s peer lists. Legitimate Sality peers were invalidated and replaced with sinkhole nodes operated by CrowdStrike. As the process continued, infected computers lost contact with the criminal network and began communicating with defender-controlled infrastructure instead.

Computers located behind firewalls or network address translation could not always be contacted directly. However, when those devices initiated their routine communications with a sinkhole, their peer lists could also be purged, isolating them from the operator.

Authorities and industry partners also acted against websites hosting Sality’s payloads. Taking those locations offline prevented infected computers with older download instructions from retrieving additional malware during the transition.

Who Operated Sality?

CrowdStrike tracks the criminal actor associated with Sality as SALTY SPIDER. The company assesses that the group likely operates from Russia’s Republic of Bashkortostan, near the border with Kazakhstan.

This remains a company attribution rather than a publicly established legal finding. The DOJ and Europol announcements did not identify an individual operator, announce an arrest or disclose criminal charges connected to the disruption.

Infected Computers Still Require Remediation

Although the operator has lost the ability to issue new instructions through the disrupted network, Sality remains installed on affected computers. Additional malware previously delivered by the botnet may also remain active.

CrowdStrike said Sality-infected systems now communicate with its sinkhole infrastructure. The company published a defanged lighthouse IP address, the botnet’s final payload URLs and YARA rules that security teams can use to identify active infections.

Shadowserver is working with internet service providers and national Computer Security Incident Response Teams to identify affected organizations, notify victims and support remediation.

Organizations that detect a Sality infection should isolate the affected device, inspect it for secondary malware and remove or rebuild compromised systems. Security teams should also examine network shares and removable media that may contain infected executable files.

Passwords and other credentials used on an infected device should be considered exposed. However, credential changes should be performed from a clean system after the malware has been removed.

The operation has disabled Sality’s existing command channel and prevented it from distributing new payloads through the disrupted infrastructure. Its long-term impact will now depend on whether remaining infections are found and remediated before the operator can attempt to rebuild part of the network.

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Vulnerability Exploitation
ai agents AI cyberattacks AI Hacking Claude Code Cyber Attacks Cybersecurity OpenAI Codex Vulnerability Exploitation

AI-Assisted Hacking Campaign Exposes Security Risks Across 14 Companies


Cyberattacks have been made more effective and more accessible due to artificial intelligence, but a recent investigation has demonstrated just how far that accessibility can extend. According to OALABS cybersecurity researchers, an attacker with limited technical expertise compromised at least 14 organizations using Anthropic's Claude Code and OpenAI's Codex to obtain sensitive information. 

Upon obtaining the attacker’s entire working directory from a compromised third-party server, researchers began investigating. The directory contains more than 1,000 sessions involving the two AI coding agents, including prompts, tool activity, and other evidence of the attacker’s activities. As indicated by the logs, the attacker frequently drew short, vague, poorly written prompts, while the artificial intelligence agents handled the vast majority of the technical tasks. 

The investigation of exposed services, identification of potential vulnerabilities, development and testing of exploit code, establishment of access, and data collection were conducted using Claude Code and Codex.

According to OALABS, the case demonstrates a growing concern for cybersecurity teams: sophisticated technical knowledge is no longer necessary to complete each stage of an intrusion when autonomous artificial intelligence coding agents can fill crucial gaps in the capabilities of an inexperienced operator. 

AI Guardrails Failed Under Simple Deception

A number of requests were not accepted without resistance by the AI systems According to the logs, nine requests were flagged as policy violations by Claude Code, while a warning was raised by Codex. However, the attacker managed to circumvent the limitations by framing the requests as part of an authorized red-team exercise. 

When malicious activity was presented as legitimate security testing, the attacker was able to persuade the models to complete tasks that would otherwise raise stronger safeguards. Once the attacker provided Claude with a list of target addresses, he instructed him to conduct reconnaissance. After conducting most of the work normally required by skilled security operators, the agent handled them. The AI enabled the organisation of the results by analysing exposed services, researching known vulnerabilities, developing exploit code, and retrieving files from compromised systems.

The AI also provided an analysis of the results for a number of victims by providing reports describing the compromised systems and the information obtained. In another meeting, Claude was requested by the attacker to evaluate the victims based on their potential to pay a ransom. The model then presented possible methods of monetizing the stolen access. 

Poor Operational Security Exposed the Attacker

Even though the attacker successfully compromised several organizations, he failed to demonstrate sufficient sophistication in protecting his own identity. The infrastructure used for the operation was not owned by him, but rather, a compromised server provided the AI tools. This decision ultimately led to the discovery of the intrusion and the recovery of the working directory by the server's owner. 

A second feature of the attacker's Claude installation was that he obtained it from another developer rather than setting it up himself. The recovered logs contained a conversation during which the attacker requested Claude to improve his own resume. The document reportedly contained his real name, educational background, and LinkedIn information. A preliminary investigation suggested that these details may have been deliberately planted; however, further examination indicated they were the property of the attacker. 

Claude was also able to provide clues about his location by examining the logs. Claude was asked to identify connections to the attacker's staging server at one point, since he suspected it had been compromised. Information included residential internet addresses associated with Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 

Millions in Cryptocurrency Remained Out of Reach

There was also an opportunity to get close to a potentially significant cryptocurrency target. One compromised system contained a Lightning Network node for Bitcoin payment routing, which researchers determined contained approximately 69.71 bitcoins worth approximately $4 million when the investigation was conducted. 

A wallet key file containing the funds could not be accessed by the attacker, preventing access to the cryptocurrency. The investigation also shows no clear evidence that the stolen information from these other organizations was sold or used for extortion. As a result, it provides more evidence regarding the attacker's access and activity than any financial gain. 

The Risk Extends Beyond One Attacker

This incident is noteworthy not because the attacker displayed advanced hacking skills, but rather because artificial intelligence agents performed most of the technical work on his behalf. Additionally, the models involved were not among the newest versions available at the time. 

OALABS examined activity involving Claude Opus 4.5 and GPT-5.2, demonstrating that the problem is not restricted to one type of cutting-edge technology. By strengthening security controls, AI systems may be less susceptible to assisting malicious activity. However, tighter controls will also present a challenge to legitimate security researchers who use similar tools to identify and test vulnerabilities. The results of OALABS indicate that AI developers are faced with a challenging balance between preventing malicious use and making AI coding agents ineffective for legitimate security purposes. 

Additionally, the case illustrates the difficulty of maintaining that balance when an inexperienced operator turns simple instructions into largely automated intrusion procedures. In light of the increasing security challenges associated with autonomous AI coding agents, stronger safeguards are needed to distinguish legitimate security research from malicious activity, as illustrated by this incident.
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Trojanized npm Packages
AI-Assisted C2 Cybersecurity Linux Backdoor malware npm Security RedC2 4.0 Software Supply Chain Attack Trojanized npm Packages

Trojanized npm Packages Distribute RedC2 4.0 Linux Backdoor Across Systems


In an investigation uncovered by cybersecurity researchers, 14 trojanized NPM packages have been masquerading as legitimate calendar modules and utility modules while secretly delivering a Linux backdoor powered by artificial intelligence (AI) known as RedC2 4.0. 


Upon importation of the malicious packages, TrendAI, Trend Micro's enterprise cybersecurity company, explains that they execute the payload bundled with the module without any installation hooks required. In the code, the embedded binary is located, permissions are changed to make it executable, and it is then launched as a detached background process. 

As a result, even a transitive dependency can trigger the backdoor when a compromised package is loaded. It is concealed under filenames such as math-core.bin and calc-math.dat that the malicious payload is concealed in order to prevent raising suspicion. Through the embedded Linux beacon, attackers are able to communicate with remote infrastructure and gain access to affected systems to conduct further malicious activities. 

RedC2 4.0 has been actively developed with capabilities extending beyond basic remote access. Along with interactive shell access and system reconnaissance, its Linux component facilitates data collection, including the theft of sensitive information such as SSH keys, through its Linux component. The comprehensive framework also encompasses file transfer, network visualization, host-to-host tunneling, and in-memory payload execution, highlighting the growing threat posed by malicious software packages. 

Malicious Packages Retain Legitimate Functionality

In spite of the fact that the compromised packages do not appear to be obviously malicious, they continue to provide the calendar and date-related functions described in their package descriptions. The malicious code, however, is concealed within the package structure, in which files such as math-core.bin, math-calc.bin, calc-math.dat, calc-cache.bin, calc.bin and calc-mapping.bin are listed as native components. 

There are two types of files stored within the dist/ directory: either directly under the dist/ directory or in dist/internal/ directory. Even though the names of these packages differ, they contain the RedShell Linux beacon that is associated with RedC2 4.0. The package entry file, dist/index.mjs, serves as a loader. It re-exports the valid date utilities while simultaneously initiating the embedded implant. By doing so, the malicious component does not require an installation hook or specific function call to execute. 

RedShell Gives Attackers Remote Access

RedShell beacons establish communication with remote command-and-control servers once they become active and register compromised systems. Prior to entering a command-processing LO, they collect basic information about the host. 

Through /bin/sh, the Linux beacon provides an interactive shell and allows for a wide range of system operations, including system discovery, file management, collection of data, and execution of commands. This implant also has the capability of searching for sensitive information, including SSH keys and browser credentials. In addition to persistence and in-memory ELF execution, it also supports SOCKS5 proxying. 

The network pivoting capabilities further enable an attacker to use compromised systems as an entry point into other environments. This version of RedC2 4.0 also provides similar features across macOS and Windows. The framework provides file operations, host and network reconnaissance, enumeration of users, and data collection. 

The Windows component also offers capabilities such as bypassing UAC, tampering with security tools, and lateral movement. 

RedC2 Framework Adds AI Assisted Operations

For Windows, Linux, and Mac OS, RedC2 4.0 is presented as a cross-platform command-and-control framework. As of August 2025, the framework has been actively developing, with version 3.0 appearing in January 2026 and version 4.0 released in June. In addition to the RedShell Linux beacon, the latest version offers a comprehensive set of post-exploitation functionality. 

There are several features in this framework, including access to terminals, file transfers, staged payload delivery, multi-beacon management, network visualisation, host-to-host tunnelling, and execution of BOFs, .NET assemblies and shellcode in memory. 

As an important addition, Red Agent is an artificial intelligence-assisted component with a large language model. It allows operators to describe tasks in natural language and have these instructions translated into beacon commands by the framework. By incorporating this feature, operations such as network reconnaissance and credential collection can be simplified. Moreover, it decreases the technical knowledge required to operate more complex framework functions. 

Supply Chain Risks Extend Beyond npm

A wider pattern of attacks is being observed against software ecosystems as a result of the incident. In recent years, development teams have increasingly relied on third-party packages, which often include binaries and transitive dependencies that are not visible to developers. 

A package can appear useful and maintain normal behavior while carrying a separate native payload even though it has legitimate functionality present, making it particularly difficult to detect such attacks during routine code reviews. As part of the RedC2 campaign, three legitimate Rust crates were also subjected to a recent supply chain attack. These packages have been modified in order to include a malicious dependency capable of executing malware during cargo builds. 

In addition to targeting multiple development ecosystems rather than focusing exclusively on NPM, the incidents reinforced the need for tighter dependency controls for development and infrastructure teams. When possible, it is recommended that package versions be pinned and dependencies and embedded binaries be reviewed before entering production environments. 

It is possible to detect suspicious activity by monitoring unexpected process creation and outbound network connections from build systems. As the number of malicious packages carrying backdoors continues to increase, software supply chains continue to be an important entry point for malicious entities. By including AI-assisted functionality to frameworks such as RedC2, operational capabilities are further improved following an initial compromise.
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personal information removal
Cyber Security Cybersecurity Data Brokers data removal services Digital Privacy personal information removal

Ultra-Wealthy Turn to Premium Services to Erase Their Digital Footprints

 

For the ultra-wealthy, protecting personal information is increasingly becoming a premium service. High-net-worth individuals and corporations are paying specialized privacy firms to track down and remove personally identifiable information (PII) from search engines, data-broker databases and even the dark web.

Unlike automated privacy tools, these high-end services combine data removal with continuous monitoring and manual audits designed to reduce both online exposure and physical security threats.

Consumer-focused services such as DeleteMe, Incogni and Google’s free PII removal tool can help limit exposure, but their reach remains restricted. Data brokers often use measures to prevent automated deletion requests. “insert something like a captcha to ensure that a bot can’t come in and wipe out their database,” Tom Aldrich, chief operating officer of digital exposure reduction firm 360 Privacy, told Observer.

Aldrich said his company, which works with 32 Fortune 100 companies, recently took on a wealthy client who had previously used an automated service. The firm discovered 62 profiles belonging to the individual across hundreds of data aggregation platforms. “We found 62 different profiles on them across hundreds of data aggregator sources,” said Aldrich, who added that 93 percent of those profiles included non-public information and could be removed.

Digital exposure is becoming a physical security concern

Security experts increasingly warn that information available online can create risks in the physical world. Threats against senior executives have risen steadily over the past two decades, with attacks in 2025 more than doubling compared with the previous year.

“Physical and digital can no longer be separate,” Brian Hill, field chief information security officer at personal cybersecurity firm BlackCloak, which serves corporate executives and high-net-worth individuals, told Observer.

The connection became particularly evident in the case of Vance Boelter, the Minnesota gunman sentenced in July to two consecutive life sentences plus 40 years for killing Democratic lawmakers in 2025. Boelter reportedly used data aggregator websites to identify his victims.

Growing concerns around executive safety have also pushed security spending higher. The median security expenditure for executives at S&P 500 companies increased 37.8 percent between 2024 and 2025. During the same period, S&P 500 CEOs earned an average annual compensation of $18.9 million.

Meta was among the biggest spenders, allocating more than $25 million toward physical and digital security for CEO Mark Zuckerberg.

For family offices, celebrities and high-net-worth clients, BlackCloak's services can cost between $10,000 and roughly $200,000 annually. Enterprise contracts covering executives, board members and founders can reach as much as $600,000 per year.

A growing market for digital privacy

The expanding digital footprint of consumers has created an entire economy around personal-data protection. Data brokers collect and sell personal information to third parties, contributing to a North American data-broker market estimated at $40 billion.

Removing such information is often difficult and labor-intensive, increasing demand for specialized providers that can continuously identify and eliminate exposed data.

Only California, Oregon, Texas and Vermont currently require data brokers to identify themselves through state registries. More than 4,000 data brokers are estimated to operate across the U.S., with many outside the reach of comprehensive regulation. California alone has 545 registered data brokers.

Premium privacy firms typically remove information from publicly accessible websites while also monitoring the dark web and strengthening security across users' accounts and devices. Connected household technology, including security cameras, may also be included in these security assessments.

Still, complete digital anonymity is difficult to achieve. “Reducing your digital footprint to zero is virtually impossible,” said Hill. “Our goal is anywhere from 70–90 percent removal of data.”

Certain public records, including newspaper archives and campaign donation records, can also remain difficult or impossible to erase.

Affordable services remain an option

While high-end privacy protection is increasingly being adopted by wealthy individuals and corporations, more affordable services can still help ordinary consumers reduce their exposure.

Aura, for example, offers automated data removal alongside other digital safety services for families at $32 per month. “As data breaches continue, data brokers expand, and A.I. makes it easier to exploit personal information, more people are looking for ways to reduce their digital footprint and regain control of their privacy,” Tom Clayton, president and chief operating officer of Aura, told Observer.

Despite the growing number of services available, adoption remains relatively low. Only 6 percent of American adults use data-removal services, while more than half do not know such services exist.

Smaller businesses are increasingly vulnerable as well. “The attackers are…going after the small companies, the local family businesses. They’re now becoming the targets because they’re the easy ones,” Hill said.

Executives and their families continue to face particular risks. According to a 2025 report from BlackCloak and the Ponemon Institute, 51 percent of security leaders said cyberattacks had targeted the personal accounts of executives or their family members.

As personal and professional digital lives become increasingly intertwined, conventional corporate security teams may not fully protect executives' personal information. That gap is helping drive demand for specialized privacy and cybersecurity providers.

Artificial intelligence and emerging technologies could make the problem even more challenging. “With a lot of this technology,” said Hill about A.I. and quantum computing, “you’re going to see a lot more data collection, and it’s going to be easier to go after the people that don’t set up an LLC or trust because they just don’t think they need to.”

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Windows Updates
Cybersecurity Ransomware Protection Security Patch Software Updates Windows Updates

Here's Why Skipping Windows Updates Puts Your PC at Risk

 

Skipping Windows updates may seem harmless, especially when an update requires a restart or temporarily changes familiar settings. Many users postpone updates because they fear slower performance, bugs, or interruptions during work. However, Windows updates are not limited to new features and interface changes. They also contain important security patches that repair weaknesses discovered by Microsoft, cybersecurity researchers, customers, and attackers. When these updates are ignored, a computer can remain exposed to vulnerabilities that criminals already understand how to exploit. 

Once Microsoft releases a patch, attackers can study it to identify the weakness it fixes. They can then search for computers that have not installed the update and target them with malware or other attacks. An unpatched Windows system may face threats such as remote code execution, privilege escalation, ransomware, credential theft, and boot-level compromise. These attacks do not always produce immediate warning signs. A computer may appear to work normally while malicious software quietly steals information, monitors activity, or prepares a larger attack. 

PrintNightmare, identified as CVE-2021-34527, demonstrates how quickly a Windows vulnerability can become dangerous. After public proof-of-concept exploits began circulating in 2021, Microsoft issued emergency updates because exploitation had already been detected. Users who delayed installing the fixes increased the risk that attackers could gain control through the Windows Print Spooler service. The incident showed that waiting for a convenient time to update can be risky when details about a vulnerability and its exploit are already publicly available. 

The WannaCry ransomware outbreak provides an even more dramatic example. Microsoft had released a patch for the exploited SMB vulnerability in March 2017, but many organizations and individuals had not installed it or were still using older, unsupported Windows versions. When WannaCry spread in May, it affected more than 300,000 computers across 150 countries, disrupting hospitals, factories, businesses, and other services. The outbreak proved that a single neglected update can allow malware to spread rapidly across connected networks. 

The safest approach is to install Windows updates as soon as practical, while choosing an appropriate time for the restart. Users should also maintain backups, use reputable security software, and avoid keeping unsupported Windows versions connected directly to the internet. Although updates can occasionally cause inconvenience, a short installation and reboot are usually far less costly than recovering from ransomware, stolen credentials, or a compromised system. Keeping Windows updated is therefore one of the simplest and most effective ways to reduce everyday cybersecurity risks.
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fake websites
Advertising Scams Amazon Cyber Fraud. Cyberscams Cybersecurity Delivery Scam fake websites

Amazon Handbook Warns About Online Shopping and Delivery Box Scams

 

Online shopping has become the new norm with millions of people shopping through online platforms like Amazon and Flipkart. Unfortunately, online shopping comes with its own set of risks as frauds and scammers always look for ways to take advantage of people who shop online. Fake websites, false delivery packages, payment frauds and ‘too-good-to-be-true’ deals are some of the methods used by fraudsters. 

Amazon’s new consumer handbook created by Safer Internet India aims to provide online shoppers with information that can help protect them against online frauds and scams. The book highlights some of the key online shopping scams that are currently affecting shoppers. It provides a vital reminder that shopping online involves many risks and consumers need to be wary of the various online scams that they might stumble upon.  

According to the article, one of the scams highlighted in the book is the Delivery Box scam. When customers shop on e-commerce sites like Amazon or Flipkart, the products they purchase usually come in a box with delivery information. According to the new book, the delivery box usually has the customer’s personal information including their names, email address, telephone number and sometimes the item that has been delivered. After removing the item from the box, many customers usually throw away the box without removing the personal information on the delivery label.

According to the report, fraudsters usually collect discarded delivery boxes with personal information and use the information to contact the customers. The fraudster pretends to be a delivery executive and informs the customer that they need their feedback on the product they purchased. The fraudster further explains that the customer stands to receive a discount of 10% or more if they click on a link provided to give feedback. According to the article, the link provided by the scammer contains malware which infiltrates the customer’s device and gathers private information including banking credentials. 

The article informs consumers that they should consider using a sharp object like a knife to scratch off personal information on delivery packaging before throwing the box away. Alternatively, they could use a permanent marker to mask vital information on the delivery box. The Identity Protection Roller Stamp ID could also be considered to protect personal information. 

Moreover, consumers should be wary of random discount offers and avoid clicking on links provided by unknown individuals or entities. The consumer handbook and warning on Delivery Box scams can help shoppers identify online frauds and protect themselves from falling victim to online scams.
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Social Engineering Attack
Credential Phishing Cybersecurity Data Breach Data Exposure RingCentral Data Breach ShinyHunters Social Engineering Attack

RingCentral Breach Exposes Personal Data of 1.6 Million Accounts


 

An attack on RingCentral, which was targeted at social engineering, has led to a data breach that could have exposed personal information of around 1.6 million individuals. In July, RingCentral detected the unauthorized activity during a campaign. The company said it immediately responded to the incident and launched an investigation with the assistance of an external forensic firm in order to contain the unauthorized activity. 

In light of the remediation measures implemented, RingCentral has not detected any further unauthorized activity. In addition, RingCentral clarified that only a limited number of its customers were affected by the incident and that those who were potentially affected were contacted directly. Furthermore, the company clarified that its services remain operational, and that its core platform was unharmed. 

Despite the lack of identification of the threat actor by the company, the ShinyHunters extortion group reportedly listed RingCentral on its Tor-based leak site in late July. As a result of the group's claim that they obtained over 623GB of data, there is further concern about the size of the attack. After investigating the leaked data, Have I Been Pwned confirmed that the dataset contains information associated with approximately 1.6 million accounts, including names, email addresses, telephone numbers, and physical addresses. 

The disclosure supports ShinyHunters' claims, even though RingCentral has not publicly attributed the incident to the group or provided details concerning how the attackers gained access to their system. A broader pattern of data theft attacks has been claimed by ShinyHunters against customers of major cloud and SaaS providers, including Salesforce and Snowflake, as well as the incident described above. This group has targeted third-party platforms and integrations increasingly, using stolen corporate data to extort companies. 

A recent lawsuit against Oracle PeopleSoft underscores the extent and persistence of the data theft operations of the organization. It has been possible for independent researchers to assess the scope of the exposure after publishing the 280GB archive. Has I Been Pwned reported approximately 1.6 million unique email addresses in the leaked data, along with names, telephone numbers, and physical addresses. 

A RingCentral representative has not independently verified the attacker's claims or disclosed the number of people affected. The incident also illustrates the effectiveness of voice-based social engineering, a strategy increasingly associated with ShinyHunters. Threat actors conduct these attacks by impersonating IT personnel and leading employees to a convincing login page with the intent of capturing passwords and authentication codes. It is possible that conventional one-time-password MFA will not be sufficient to prevent account compromise due to the attack's reliance on manipulating the employee rather than breaking the underlying security technology. 

As a result, security experts are increasingly recommending phishing-resistant methods, such as FIDO2 passkeys. These passkeys bind authentication to a legitimate website, preventing credentials from being regenerated through a fraudulent website. 

The details of the authentication method used by the compromised account have not been disclosed, nor have any controls been implemented to prevent phishing attacks. It is imperative to note that exposing names, phone numbers and physical addresses poses a risk beyond the initial compromise. These disclosures can provide attackers with sufficient context to carry out further impersonations and phishing attempts in a convincing manner. 

ShinyHunters has continued to focus on data theft and extortion rather than traditional ransomware, as demonstrated by the RingCentral incident, which illustrates how a single successful social engineering attack can lead to a much larger privacy and security issue as it progresses. 

The RingCentral incident has raised several questions, primarily regarding the extent of the exposure and the means by which the accounts were compromised. Have I Been Pwned has identified approximately 1.6 million email addresses in the leaked dataset, whereas RingCentral has described the customer base as limited. 

To determine the full impact of this incident, it is critical to reconcile those figures, along with more information about the compromised accounts, in order to determine the full extent. In organizations using RingCentral or similar cloud communication platforms, it is critical to establish strong defenses against social engineering at the earliest opportunity. During security awareness training, attention should be paid to suspicious calls, credential-harvesting websites, and requests for authentication codes. 

Organizations handling sensitive or regulated information should assess notification and compliance requirements for phishing attacks, multiple factor authentication, credential resets for potentially compromised accounts, and monitoring for follow-up phishing attacks and business email compromises. A wider question is raised by the incident about security at the intersection of technology and individuals. 

Even organizations with well-established security controls can be exposed if an attacker convinces an employee to bypass these controls. The breach thus serves as a reminder to RingCentral customers that safeguarding communication systems requires not only strong technical controls, but also preparation for social engineering tactics that are becoming increasingly convincing in order to target employees.
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