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New Email Scam Targets NTLM Hashes in Covert Data Theft Operation

 


TA577 has been identified as a notorious threat actor who orchestrated a sophisticated phishing campaign, according to researchers at security firm Proofpoint. Currently, the group is utilizing a new method of phishing involving ZIP archive attachments. This tactic is geared towards pilfering the hash data of NT LAN Manager (NTLM) users.

According to our investigation, this group is utilizing a chain of attacks aimed at stealing authentication information from the NT LAN Manager (NTLM) system. It would be possible to exploit this method for obtaining sensitive data and facilitating further malicious activity if this method were to be exploited. 

By using booby-trapped email attachments containing booby-trapped NTLM hashes to steal employees' NTLM hashes, a threat actor that is known for establishing initial access to organizations' computer systems and networks is using these attachments to steal employees’ hashes. Earlier this week, enterprise security firm Proofpoint published a report that suggested that the new attack chain "is capable of gathering sensitive information and facilitating follow-on activities." 

As reported by the company, at least two phishing campaigns have utilized this approach since February 26, 2024, when thousands of messages were distributed worldwide and hundreds of organizations were targeted. As an initial access broker (IAB), TA577 has previously been associated with Qbot and has been linked to Black Basta ransomware infections. 

The phishing waves spread thousands of messages around the world and targeted hundreds of organizations. The email security company Proofpoint reported today that although it has seen TA577 favouring Pikabot deployment in recent months, two recent attacks indicate that TA577 has taken a different approach to the attack. 

A group called TA578, which has been linked with the Qbot malware campaign and the Black Basta ransomware campaign, is one of the first access brokers. Recently, it has demonstrated an increasing interest in exploiting authentication protocols despite its previous inclination toward deploying Pikabot malware. 

NTLM hashes are a cornerstone of the security of Windows systems for authentication and session management. Attackers are extremely interested in these hashes as they are potentially useful in offline password cracking and in pass-the-hash attacks, which do not require actual passwords to gain access to services but instead use hashes as shortcuts. 

A technique known as thread hijacking, by which the attackers craft phishing emails that seem like legitimate follow-up emails to ongoing conversations, is used by the attackers. There is a malicious external server that is used to capture NTLM hashes, as these emails contain personalized ZIP files with HTML documents. When opened, these malicious servers start connecting to a malicious external server that has been set up specifically to capture these hashes. 

TA577 likely has the resources, time, and experience to iterate and test new delivery methods at the rate at which it adopts and distributes new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). TA577, along with other IABs, seems to be on top of the threat landscape and understands when and why certain attack chains cease to be effective. 

To increase the effectiveness and likelihood of victim engagement with their payload delivery and bypass detections, they will be able to create new methods to bypass detections and make use of them as quickly as possible. Researchers at Proofpoint have also noticed an increase in the use of file scheme URIs to direct recipients to external file shares such as SMB and WebDAV for the delivery of malware. To prevent exploits identified in this campaign, organizations should block outbound SMBs to prevent these sophisticated attacks. 

While restricting guest access to SMB servers is a simple security measure, it falls short of preventing these sophisticated attacks. The company advises that strict email filtering be implemented, outbound SMB connections should not be allowed, and Windows group policies should be activated to minimize the risk. 

To combat these types of NTLM-based threats effectively, Microsoft has introduced advanced security features into Windows 11 to help users. It is important to maintain constant vigilance and take strong security measures to prevent phishing attacks targeting the NTLM authentication protocol. For organizations to remain safe from sophisticated cybercriminal endeavours, they must stay abreast of emerging threats and adjust their defences to keep up with the rapidly evolving threats.

Microsoft Released Security Updates that Block PetitPotam NTLM Relay Attacks

 

The PetitPotam NTLM relay exploit, which allows a threat actor to take over a Windows domain, has been blocked by Microsoft security patches. Gilles Lionel, nicknamed Topotam, a security researcher, revealed a new method called PetitPotam in July that forces a domain controller to authenticate against a threat actor's server utilizing the MS-EFSRPC API capabilities. 

Gilles Lionel published a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for a brand new PetitPotam security flaw on July 23, 2021. This problem affected Microsoft's Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), which is needed to assure public key infrastructure (PKI) server functionality. 

According to the SANS Institute's Internet Storm Center, PetitPotam uses the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSRPC) to start the authentication process in remote Windows instances and force them to divulge the NTLM hashes to the adversary. The attacker specifically exploits LSARPC to force any targeted server, including domain controllers (DCs), to connect to the malicious random server and perform NTLM authentication. As a result, the adversary acquires an authentication certificate that is valid for all domain services, including the DC. 

Despite the fact that the PetitPotam attack had devastating results and was simple to launch, the adversaries faced some constraints. To transfer the stolen credentials back to the DC or other internal instances, threat actors needed to achieve SYSTEM/ADMIN rights or maintain covert malicious infrastructure within the LAN, according to the researchers' findings. 

The majority of supported Windows versions, according to the researchers, are vulnerable to the PetitPotam. The technique has been successfully applied to Windows 10, Windows Server 2016, and Windows Server 2019. 

Microsoft provided a security update in August 2021 Patch Tuesday, that prevents the PetitPotam vector (CVE-2021-36942) from forcing a domain controller to authenticate against another server. "This security update blocks the affected API calls OpenEncryptedFileRawA and OpenEncryptedFileRawW through LSARPC interface," explains Microsoft in the CVE-2021-36942 advisory. 

Installing this update may damage backup software that uses the EFS API OpenEncryptedFileRaw(A/W) function, according to Microsoft. "The EFS API OpenEncryptedFileRaw(A/W), often used in backup software, continues to work in all versions of Windows (local and remote), except when backing up to or from a system running Windows Server 2008 SP2. OpenEncryptedFileRaw will no longer work on Windows Server 2008 SP2," warns Microsoft.

NTLM Relay Attack Exploits Windows RPC Flaws

 

Security researchers at SentinelLabs revealed the details of a newly identified NTLM (New Technology LAN Manager) relay attack that exploits a remote procedure call (RPC) flaw to enable elevation of privilege.

This new vulnerability in RPC, which apparently impacts all versions of Windows, enables an attacker to escalate privileges from User to Domain Admin, all without requiring interaction from the user (NTLM relay attacks typically do require user intervention). 

The researchers used a DCOM client that was instructed to connect to an RPC server, operation that involved two NTLM authentications, one without the sign flag being set, and also leveraged the fact that the DCOM activation service can be abused to trigger RPC authentication. 

According to SentinelLabs, the motive behind the attack was that a shell in Session 0, even as a low privileged user, combined with triggering some CLSIDs, could allow the attacker to obtain “an NTLM authentication from the user who is interactively connected.”

Methodology used by cybercriminals 

Threat actors have a shell in Session 0 on the target machine, even with a low privileges account, user with high privileges (such as Domain Admin) logs in interactively, then the attacker triggers the DCOM activation service to impersonate the high-privileged user and then implements a man-in-the-middle to receive an authenticated call, the binding of the RPC under the attacker’s control takes place and then the victim machine makes an authenticated call, authentication is relayed to a privileged resource such as LDAP, SMB, HTTP or other, lastly the authentication is forwarded for privilege escalation.

Researchers at SentinelLabs also published proof-of-concept code to demonstrate how the exploit works, and revealed that, although Microsoft has acknowledged the vulnerability, a patch won’t be released. The researchers, however, did publish a series of mitigations that should help prevent attacks that would trigger an authenticated RPC/DCOM call and then relay the NTLM authentication. 

“This is different from other known techniques such as CVE-2020-1113 and CVE-2021-1678, where relaying happens between a generic ‘client’ protocol vs. an RPC server. In this case, we had an RPC client whose authentication was relayed to other ‘server’ protocols and without ‘victim’ interaction. Therefore, we hope that MS reconsider their decision not to fix this serious vulnerability,” SentinelLabs concludes.