A ransomware strain called C3RB3R is actively hitting Synology network-attached storage devices, locking files and demanding bitcoin payments from victims who, in many cases, were running software patched nearly two years ago.
Synology confirmed the attacks on October 29, pointing to CVE-2024-10441, a critical remote code execution flaw in its DiskStation Manager operating system rated 9.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale. The vulnerability was found at Pwn2Own 2024 by DEVCORE researchers Pumpkin Chang and Orange Tsai, and Synology patched it by December 2024 under security advisory SA-24:20. The patch has been available ever since. The fact that attackers are still finding success with it tells you something about how many users never applied it.
Once attackers get into a device, C3RB3R goes to work quickly. The ransomware skips 27 system directories and a handful of file types, then recursively encrypts everything else. Each file receives its own 256-bit encryption key generated on the fly, locked with ChaCha8 and then wrapped with RSA-2048, which means there is no way to crack it without the attacker's private key. The malware drops a ransom note called read-me3.txt into every affected folder, containing a six-digit victim ID and a Tor address. Files come out the other side with a .L0CK3D extension. Backups stored on the same NAS are not spared.
The ransom demand starts at 0.036960 bitcoin, which works out to roughly $2,952 at current rates. Victims who miss the five-day deadline see that figure double to 0.073920 BTC, or about $5,904. No free decryptor exists, and Synology has offered none. Affected users who do not have off-site backups are, for practical purposes, out of options.
Reports first surfaced in South Korea around October 28. Victims filed complaints with KISA, the country's internet security agency, but KISA declined to say how many devices were affected, what caused the intrusions, or what it was doing about them. Synology has similarly not disclosed how many users were hit, which device models were targeted, or when it first became aware of the campaign. A Taiwanese NAS research group that compiled damage cases found a common thread: in every instance they reviewed, the device's management interface was reachable directly from the internet, whether through router port forwarding, UPnP, QuickConnect, or a reverse proxy.
The attack timing is not coincidental. On October 25, four days before Synology issued its statement, a public proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-10441 appeared on GitHub. That kind of public PoC typically compresses the window between disclosure and active exploitation to days, sometimes hours. Security researchers at 360 Security Team and Solar Emergency Response Team, who both published analysis on October 29, noted that the campaign appears to have kicked into gear almost immediately after the PoC dropped.
There is, however, a complication in Synology's explanation. The Solar team examined one affected device running DSM 7.4.1-90080 Update 1, a build that does not fit neatly into the SA-24:20 vulnerability timeline. The researchers have not ruled out other entry points, including vulnerable third-party packages, container services, or stolen credentials. No zero-day has been confirmed, but the mismatch has not been fully explained either.
Adding another layer, the 360 Security Team's analysis points to a different set of flaws entirely: CVE-2026-13639 and CVE-2026-13684, both scored 9.8, patched by Synology on September 18, 2026. Under 360's reading, these are "1-day" exploits built on patches that were barely a month old when the attacks began. If 360 is right, devices that only applied the 2024 patch would still be exposed.
Separately, Synology disclosed two more critical vulnerabilities in its PHP infrastructure, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, affecting packages including Web Station, WordPress, Joomla, and phpMyAdmin. Synology says these flaws are not the C3RB3R entry point, but has advised users to patch them regardless. Security firm Genians found that 96 percent of internal-network devices running PHP were exposed.
Synology's guidance for users is practical if grim for those already affected. The company recommends running a Security Advisor scan, checking Task Scheduler for unfamiliar scripts, and reviewing User and Group settings for administrator accounts that were not created by the device owner. If either check turns up something unexpected, Synology says to contact its support team rather than attempt a manual cleanup. For everyone else, the advice is to update DSM immediately, enable automatic updates, and move backup jobs off-device using Hyper Backup or Snapshot Replication.
The patches for SA-24:20 are in DSM 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2.2-72806-1, 7.2-64570-4, 7.1.1-42962-7, and 6.2.4-25556-8. Synology PSIRT says it continues to monitor the campaign.
Drupal has confirmed active exploitation of a highly critical access bypass vulnerability in its Commerce Core module, warning online retailers that attackers could manipulate orders and circumvent payment processes. The company has urged administrators to install the latest security updates and investigate existing transactions for unauthorized modifications.
Tracked as CVE-2026-118539, the vulnerability affects Drupal Commerce Core, a contributed module that enables websites to sell products and services through shopping carts, checkout systems and payment integrations. It also supports headless commerce architectures, where external applications interact with Drupal through APIs.
According to the original security advisory, certain application routes and entity fields do not have sufficient access restrictions, allowing unauthorized users to bypass established permission checks. This could enable attackers to manipulate commerce-related information, potentially causing direct financial losses for merchants.
Published on October 28 under advisory SA-CONTRIB-2026-254, the vulnerability received a Drupal security risk score of 21 out of 25, placing it in the highly critical category. Its assessment identifies the flaw as exploitable without authentication or special access requirements, regardless of the module's configuration.
Drupal has confirmed that the vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild. However, its initial advisory did not disclose the attack methodology, affected organizations or the number of compromised websites.
Fraudulent Order Attempts Reported on Live Websites
Additional information published on October 29 by Centarro, the maintainer of Drupal Commerce, provides further insight into the exploitation activity.
According to Centarro, it received two reports from merchants who observed suspicious attempts to place fraudulent orders on their live websites. Following an investigation conducted alongside the Drupal Security Team, the maintainers stated that they had not found evidence of scripted or widespread exploitation beyond the initially reported sites.
The vulnerability affects both traditional, full-stack Drupal Commerce installations and headless deployments, although the potential attack paths differ depending on the website's architecture.
Centarro identified several suspicious transaction patterns that administrators should investigate. These include orders placed without corresponding payments, transactions marked as paid despite having no associated payment records, product prices modified without legitimate promotions, and unauthorized discounts, fees or other adjustments applied to orders.
Some reported attempts involved products listed at unusually low prices, including $0.01, while others used apparently normal prices to make fraudulent transactions less conspicuous.
The maintainers also warned that the vulnerability may have existed in earlier Commerce Core releases for several years. Exploitation was theoretically possible from version 8.x-2.18, released in May 2020, on installations using Drupal's JSON:API module. Other configurations became potentially vulnerable from version 8.x-2.25, released in June 2021.
Consequently, organizations should not restrict their investigation to transactions created shortly before the October security disclosure.
Security Updates and Additional Commerce Vulnerabilities
Drupal has released Commerce Core 3.3.13 and 8.x-2.41 to address CVE-2026-118539. Administrators running the 3.x branch should upgrade to version 3.3.13, while installations using the earlier 8.x-2.x branch should move to 8.x-2.41.
Centarro has also recommended updating the associated Commerce API, Commerce License, Commerce Shipping and Commerce Stripe modules, which received separate security releases. Websites that do not require write operations through JSON:API should consider restricting the interface to read-only access.
The October 28 security releases addressed several additional vulnerabilities across Drupal's contributed projects.
Among them, CVE-2026-118558 affects Commerce Stripe through a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability. The module does not include a CSRF token in the return URI used during Stripe Connect authorization. An attacker could exploit this weakness by tricking an administrator into following a malicious link, potentially causing an order to be marked as paid without an actual payment.
Another issue, CVE-2026-118582, affects the CAPTCHA module. The vulnerability results from inadequate invalidation of previously solved CAPTCHA sessions, allowing an already-submitted protected form to be submitted again without completing another challenge. This could weaken protections against automated registrations, comment spam and login brute-force attempts. Drupal's advisory indicates that exploit code exists, although it does not confirm active exploitation.
Drupal also disclosed information disclosure vulnerabilities in Commerce Core and Media Alias Display. The former can expose information about unpublished product variations under certain JSON:API configurations, while the latter involves improperly configured caching that could expose files containing information intended to remain inaccessible.
Earlier Critical Drupal Vulnerabilities
The October disclosures follow another security release on October 14, when Drupal addressed two critical remote code execution vulnerabilities.
CVE-2026-108097 affects the Field UI module in Drupal Core, while CVE-2026-108099 impacts the contributed Entity List module. Although neither component independently exposes the vulnerabilities through its default functionality, certain contributed modules and custom implementations can introduce exploitable pathways. Drupal identified at least one potential attack path that does not require authentication.
Another vulnerability, CVE-2026-9082, involved SQL injection in Drupal Core's database abstraction API, affecting websites using PostgreSQL databases. The flaw could allow unauthenticated attackers to execute specially crafted database queries, potentially resulting in information disclosure, privilege escalation or remote code execution. The vulnerability was added to the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog in May 2026 following confirmed exploitation.
With CVE-2026-118539 now confirmed under active exploitation, administrators should prioritize security updates, examine historical order records and verify that payment confirmations correspond to actual transactions before fulfilling orders. Centarro has also recommended comparing suspicious transactions against website access logs to establish whether they originated through legitimate checkout processes.
A security researcher has demonstrated working exploits against a class of Wi-Fi gateways running Broadcom chips, showing that an attacker within radio range can gain root-level code execution on the device without knowing the Wi-Fi password or completing any kind of pairing process. As of this writing, no patch has been deployed to affected routers, and no CVE identifier has been assigned.
Quentin Kaiser published his findings on October 16, 2026, after a disclosure process that effectively went nowhere. The vulnerability sits inside Broadcom's own implementation of Wi-Fi Protected Setup, the handshake protocol designed to simplify connecting new devices to a network. Kaiser found that the code mishandles the reassembly of fragmented WPS messages. By sending carefully crafted fragments, an attacker can corrupt the device's memory and redirect execution, all through the air, from a position outside the building.
Two Working Exploits, Two Different Outcomes
Kaiser demonstrated the attack against two Belgian ISP-supplied gateways. On an Orange Belgium device, an Askey TCG3000, the exploit read the Wi-Fi pre-shared key directly from stored settings and transmitted it back to the attacker, effectively handing over the network password. On a Proximus gateway, the Sagemcom BBOX3V+, the exploit did something more severe: it opened a reverse shell transported entirely over Wi-Fi frames, without requiring the attacker to have an external server or any prior foothold on the network.
Both attacks required no credentials and no interaction from anyone inside the network. Distance helps the attacker, not the defender.
The Code Is Old, and So Is Broadcom's Awareness
The vulnerable code traces back to at least 2010. Broadcom issued a partial fix in 2018 and simultaneously told downstream customers to migrate to the hostapd Wi-Fi software package instead of relying on Broadcom's own WPS implementation. That guidance went unheeded across a large portion of the device ecosystem, and the underlying flaw was never fully resolved.
Kaiser says Broadcom was informed about the issue again through his disclosure process and declined to assign a CVE or comment publicly. CERT/CC, which typically coordinates vulnerability disclosures between researchers and vendors, closed his case the day it was opened, citing the fact that Broadcom holds its own CVE numbering authority.
The result is a vulnerability without an identifier, without a patch, and without any official acknowledgment from the company whose code is responsible.
Which Hardware Is Affected
Kaiser sorted the affected chips into two groups. Older eCos-based chips, the BCM3380, BCM3383, and BCM33834, cannot receive a practical fix given their architecture. He described these as a "forever day," meaning a vulnerability that will remain open for the functional life of the hardware. Newer Linux-based chips, including the BCM3390, BCM65xx, and BCM68xx series, are technically fixable if device makers choose to replace the WPS software stack.
Among confirmed deployments in Belgium, Proximus, Orange Belgium, and VOO gateways are affected. Kaiser was unable to test Telenet devices but considers them potentially in scope. His broader analysis, which involved automated firmware scanning, identified vulnerable code across Cisco small-business access points, Huawei gear, and ARRIS routers, among others. He estimates the total number of affected devices runs into the millions globally, though some entries in his published list are flagged as "likely vulnerable" rather than confirmed.
Detection Tools, but No Mitigation
For organizations trying to assess their exposure, Kaiser published YARA detection rules and a scanning script on GitHub at github.com/qkaiser/broadcom-wps. Both are intended as triage tools to identify firmware containing the vulnerable code. He notes that patched devices may still trigger the YARA rules, so a positive result requires additional verification rather than automatic remediation.
For devices that fall into the "forever day" category, the practical answer is replacement.
Why Proximity Attacks Are Getting More Attention
The threat model here matters beyond the technical details. Kaiser noted that this vulnerability is particularly useful to attackers who can position themselves in physical range of a target rather than approaching through the internet. That scenario is no longer theoretical.
In November 2024, Volexity documented how a Russian state-sponsored group, tracked as GruesomeLarch and linked to APT28, compromised organizations near a high-value target in Washington, D.C., and then used dual-homed systems inside those neighboring buildings to connect to the actual target's corporate Wi-Fi. The attacker never needed to be in the same room or even the same building. They just needed a wireless network with weak enough controls to reach from the street.
A flaw that lets anyone within radio range become root on the router, without a password, without a handshake, fits neatly into that playbook. The attack surface is wherever the signal reaches.
A new frontier artificial intelligence model, Gemini 4 Argon, has been introduced by Google through its Fairwind Program for initial distribution to trusted cybersecurity defenders. In addition to internal security teams using this model, the company expects wider access as it collects feedback from early users.
As a software engineering, enterprise knowledge work, and cybersecurity operations solution, Argon is designed to handle complex software engineering and knowledge management tasks. A model developed by Google will be able to identify, validate and patch critical vulnerabilities independently in security environments, thereby expanding the use of artificial intelligence for vulnerability research and remediation.
Argon will be available to trusted defenders and the company's own teams without cyber-specific guardrails, according to the company. As part of this approach, vetted security professionals will be given full access to the model's capabilities when investigating and addressing threats. In September, Fairwind, a limited access AI security tool for governments, Google Cloud customers and cybersecurity partners, launched.
A significant finding has already been made as a result of its early deployment, Wiz, which is using Argon as part of its Scan for Good initiative, reported that it identified a previously unknown critical vulnerability in healthcare software used by hospitals worldwide. The vulnerability may expose sensitive personal information, although Google has not disclosed the name of the affected software or whether the issue has been resolved.
Google also reports significantly improved vulnerability detection performance compared with Gemini 3.8 Flash Cyber. A security test conducted by Argon on complex codebases identified security weaknesses, while a test conducted by Wiz on live web applications demonstrated improvements in attack surface discovery, vulnerability identification, and proof-of-concept generation.
A phased approach is being taken by Google to the wider release, with the model currently restricted to internal teams and vetted defenders. Moreover, the company is participating in the U.S. government's voluntary pre-release process and will refine its safeguards after receiving feedback from early testers in order to broaden the availability to developers, enterprises, and individuals.
Argon will be designed to reject requests attempting to support cyber or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks as part of its broader rollout, while also preserving the support of legitimate dual-purpose research as part of its broader rollout. Additionally, Google is monitoring the model's internal activity for signs of misuse. Indirect prompt injection is also being investigated.
In Google's opinion, Argon is protected against attempts to manipulate it through malicious instructions or external content. The Fairwind program provides another layer of control around access by monitoring the model’s reasoning and actions, and stopping execution when behavior goes beyond the intended task.
Organizations participating in the program have been vetted and their use has been restricted to authorized defense activities such as threat simulation, reverse engineering, and malware analysis for research or security purposes. Partners are not permitted to share or distribute access to the model. Google has not provided a date of general availability yet.
Upon initial deployment of Argon Defender, API customers and Google AI Ultra subscribers should have access, although the broader deployment of Argon will be dependent on the results of ongoing safety and security evaluations.
A cyberattack on Polish healthcare software company Qbusoft has left patient records from its Medyc platform potentially in the hands of attackers, coming just weeks after a separate, larger breach hit another Polish medical software provider and rattled the country's entire health data infrastructure.
The attacker exploited an SQL injection vulnerability in Medyc's application interface during late August, according to a breach notification published last week by the Addiction and Psychiatric Treatment Center in Inowrocław, one of the healthcare facilities running the platform. SQL injection is one of the oldest and best-documented attack techniques in security research, allowing an attacker to manipulate a web application into pulling data directly from its database. Despite decades of awareness about the flaw, it remains a recurring entry point in healthcare system compromises.
Qbusoft confirmed on Friday that the attackers obtained names, national identification numbers, home addresses, phone numbers and email addresses. In Poland, the national identification number, called a PESEL, functions similarly to a Social Security number in the United States and is a standard credential for identity verification across government services, banking and healthcare. Its theft puts affected patients at real risk of identity fraud.
The company said it had not confirmed the theft of clinical records. But the Inowrocław center told patients that Qbusoft found evidence the attacker ran scripts specifically targeting database tables containing medical information, making it "highly likely" that medical records were also pulled. The data in scope for that facility included hospital treatment records and discharge summaries from patients treated at its Day Treatment Unit for Addiction Treatment between July 2024 and August 2026.
The intrusion occurred on August 22-23 and went undetected until the night of September 8-9, a gap of more than two weeks. By that point, the attacker had already transferred an encrypted archive of the database outside Qbusoft's systems. Some fields, including names and PESEL numbers, had been encrypted in the database. Qbusoft nonetheless advised the affected center to assume the attackers could decrypt that information without difficulty, given the specifics of how the protection was implemented.
Qbusoft patched the vulnerability on the day the breach was detected, restricted database access permissions, rotated passwords and technical credentials, and introduced additional monitoring. The company has not publicly commented on the incident through any official statement.
That silence drew a sharp response from Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski, who said the Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime had opened an investigation and criticized Qbusoft for failing to notify CERT Polska or the national incident response team for the healthcare sector before authorities reached out. "Hiding attacks by companies is the biggest mistake, as it always puts citizens at risk," Gawkowski said. Poland's data protection authority separately announced that its president had ordered a formal audit of Qbusoft.
Medyc, which has operated as a cloud-based platform since 2014, is used across Polish medical practices and clinics for electronic medical records, patient scheduling, electronic prescriptions, referrals, sick notes, telemedicine and administrative billing. In a public notice, the company warned that its infrastructure had faced repeated attack attempts since the incident and that users might see temporary slowdowns or restricted access to certain modules.
The Same Attacker?
Polish cybersecurity publication Zaufana Trzecia Strona reported that a person or group using the alias "fingerprint" contacted the outlet claiming responsibility for the Medyc attack. The publication had previously linked that alias to the MyDr breach, a separate incident involving another Polish healthcare software vendor. Polish broadcaster RMF FM also reported that the same attackers behind MyDr were likely responsible for the Medyc intrusion, though Polish authorities have not formally attributed the attack to any individual or group.
The alleged attacker claimed to have obtained records on 5 million patients and 8 million private photographs, some of which Zaufana Trzecia Strona said may depict patients in sensitive medical settings. Neither figure has been independently confirmed, and the stolen data has not been made public. The actor reportedly framed the operations as an effort to expose weak security rather than profit from the data.
The MyDr breach, confirmed in August, potentially affected close to 19 million people across more than 12,000 healthcare facilities, involving over 2 terabytes of stolen data including names, PESEL numbers, prescription histories, diagnoses and appointment records. Poland has roughly 36.5 million residents, meaning the MyDr incident alone touched the records of nearly half the country's population. The Inowrocław treatment center caught up in the Medyc breach was also among the organizations affected by MyDr.
Gawkowski said Polish authorities had observed a surge in criminal activity targeting healthcare organizations in recent weeks and were preparing new regulations in response, including mandatory security certification for healthcare technology companies and tighter controls on how private vendors handle medical data. Poland recorded a 144 percent year-on-year rise in reported cybersecurity incidents in 2025. The consecutive breaches of Medyc and MyDr, both software vendors connecting thousands of clinics to national health infrastructure, have made clear that the weakest link in Poland's health data chain is not the government platform but the private companies sitting in front of it.