A cybersecurity expert with the handle q1uf3ng found the vulnerability which has not been given any CVE identifier yet.
The vulnerability exists in the jsonArrayContains functionality and permits illegal SQL injection. In few configurations, particularly where the flaw can reach a privileged database account, that path may result in remote code execution. The vulnerability has not been given any CVE identifier yet.
The flaw was publicly revealed on 12 August 2026. Soon after, watchTowr said it started noticing exploitation attempts, with hundreds of attempts coming from a few IP addresses. According to WatchTowr’s Jake Knott, “Within hours of public disclosure, we began observing exploitation attempts and have since recorded hundreds of attempts originating from a small number of source IP addresses. Yet another example of how quickly attackers move once a vulnerability enters the public domain.”
The timing is crucial here. When enough technical information or proof of concept is public, threat actors don’t have to wait for a well planned exploit. They can compare responses, scan broadly, trigger errors, and make a list of devices to visit later. It is spying with an error message as a compass.
Cyber criminals are probing the flawed GeoServer systems, but no confirmed exploit has been found yet. But experts have warned that exploitation could soon happen.
According to Knott, “However, this is unlikely to remain the case for long: GeoServer has a track record of being targeted and exploited at scale, with multiple vulnerabilities listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. With no patch currently available and exploitation already underway, organizations running GeoServer should take this vulnerability seriously and, where possible, identify exposed instances, restrict public access, and monitor for a vendor fix.”
Threat actors are triggering errors to find vulnerable targets before active exploitation, and probing GeoServer systems for unpatched zero-day.
A well-liked framework for exchanging and publishing geographic data via web services is called GeoServer. Public sector portals, environmental platforms, mapping initiatives, utilities, transportation systems, academic institutions, and internal corporate applications are some of the places where it can be found. Because of this, a remotely reachable instance becomes more than just a technical detail; it may provide credentials, backend services, geographic data, or a path to a larger network.
A newly disclosed vulnerability in Linux's Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) could allow an attacker with kernel-level control inside a nested virtual machine to break out of virtualization boundaries and execute code on the underlying host system under specific conditions.
Tracked as CVE-2026-64561 and dubbed Zapscape, the flaw affects KVM's x86 shadow memory management unit (MMU), a core component responsible for maintaining shadow page tables that translate memory between guest virtual machines and the host. Security researcher Hyunwoo Kim, who identified and disclosed the issue, demonstrated that the vulnerability can be leveraged to execute commands on the host with root privileges.
The issue has been addressed upstream, and administrators operating KVM environments that expose nested virtualization to untrusted virtual machines are advised to deploy patched kernel releases or vendor packages containing the backported fix.
Unlike conventional virtualization deployments where guest systems operate in isolation from the host, nested virtualization allows a virtual machine to function as a hypervisor itself. In this configuration, an L1 guest can create and manage additional virtual machines, commonly referred to as L2 guests. While this capability is widely used for cloud infrastructure testing, development environments, virtualization research, and continuous integration workloads, it also introduces additional complexity into memory management, making implementation flaws particularly impactful.
Zapscape requires an attacker to already possess kernel-level privileges inside an L1 guest, which generally translates to root access within that virtual machine. On Intel-based systems, exploitation additionally depends on exposing both Extended Page Table (EPT) page-walk lengths four and five to the L1 guest. AMD platforms do not impose this additional requirement.
At the heart of the vulnerability is a flaw in the ordering of stale-root validation within KVM's shadow MMU bookkeeping. The weakness results in a use-after-free condition, a class of memory safety bug in which software continues interacting with memory after it has already been released.
According to Kim's technical analysis, the issue occurs while KVM is servicing guest-triggered page faults. During this process, KVM may reclaim shadow MMU pages to free memory resources. That reclamation can invalidate the shadow MMU root page currently being used by the ongoing page-fault handling routine. However, because the fault-handling path fails to verify that the root remains valid after the reclamation step, execution continues using an object that has already become stale.
The researcher explained that the vulnerability originates within KVM's recursive "zap" path, which is responsible for reclaiming shadow MMU pages. Before additional MMU pages are made available, KVM performs an initial stale-root validation. The problem arises because the subsequent reclamation process can invalidate that same root after the check has already completed. Rather than restarting with a fresh and valid root, KVM proceeds to construct new child shadow pages beneath the invalid parent.
Those newly created child pages inherit the parent's invalid state while simultaneously being inserted into KVM's active MMU page list. During later cleanup operations, the same list entry can become attached to multiple linked lists simultaneously. Eventually, the affected page may be freed even though stale references continue pointing to it, leaving behind a dangling pointer and enabling writes to memory that should no longer be accessible.
Such memory corruption primitives can provide the foundation for privilege escalation and virtualization escape techniques, particularly when an attacker already controls a privileged guest operating system.
To demonstrate the vulnerability, Kim released a public proof-of-concept that exploits the bug to create a root-owned file named /Zapscape on the vulnerable Linux host, illustrating successful code execution beyond the guest boundary.
The proof-of-concept was developed against AMD nested virtualization using Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) and Nested Page Tables (NPT) on Linux 7.1.3. For safe experimentation, Kim recommends running the demonstration under QEMU's Tiny Code Generator (TCG) mode. However, the researcher emphasized that QEMU itself is not affected by the vulnerability. Instead, the flaw resides entirely within the Linux kernel's KVM implementation and can be triggered independently of QEMU's device emulation.
Although exploit code is publicly available, Kim cautioned that the demonstration should not be interpreted as an immediately deployable attack against production cloud infrastructure. In its current form, the proof-of-concept requires additional engineering before it could be adapted for real-world environments. Among other changes, portions of the L1 guest activity would need to be moved into a guest kernel module, while the exploit would also require customization for the target host's kernel configuration and memory management backend.
At the time of disclosure, no evidence had emerged indicating that CVE-2026-64561 had been exploited in active attacks.
The National Vulnerability Database lists Linux kernel versions beginning with 5.9 as affected until fixed stable releases became available, including versions 6.6.148, 6.12.101, 6.18.42, 7.1.6, and 7.2-rc5.
Security advisories note that administrators should not rely solely on upstream version numbers when assessing exposure. Many enterprise Linux distributions routinely backport security fixes into existing kernel packages without rebasing to newer upstream releases, making vendor advisories the authoritative source for determining whether individual systems have received the necessary patches.
Red Hat assigned the vulnerability a preliminary CVSS score of 7.0 and categorized it under CWE-825: Expired Pointer Dereference, reflecting the use-after-free behavior underlying the flaw.
Package availability also varies across Linux distributions. As of August 6, Debian's security tracker listed kernel packages for bullseye, bookworm, trixie, and forky, including their security repositories, as vulnerable, while sid had already incorporated the fix beginning with version 7.1.6-1.
The coordinated disclosure followed a structured timeline spanning several weeks. Kim privately reported the vulnerability to security@kernel.org on July 11, 2026. A corrective patch was proposed and merged on July 21 before being shared with the linux-distros security mailing list on August 1 under a five-day embargo. The vulnerability subsequently received the identifier CVE-2026-64561 on August 4, with public disclosure taking place on August 6.
The upstream patch, merged as commit 2abd5287f083, modifies KVM's page-fault handling sequence by moving the stale-root validation until after make_mmu_pages_available() completes. If memory reclamation invalidates the current shadow MMU root, KVM now abandons the active page-fault operation and restarts it using RET_PF_RETRY, preventing further memory mappings from being created beneath an invalid root and eliminating the conditions that produced the use-after-free.
Zapscape marks the latest addition to Kim's ongoing security research into Linux virtualization. Earlier this year, the researcher disclosed Januscape (CVE-2026-53359), which affected KVM/x86's shadow MMU, and ITScape (CVE-2026-46316), a separate guest escape vulnerability impacting KVM on Arm64 systems. Together, the disclosures continue to draw attention to the security challenges involved in protecting complex virtualization infrastructure that underpins modern cloud and enterprise computing environments.
MIT CSAIL researchers have uncovered a new speculative-execution technique that can potentially undermine Linux protections designed to defend against Spectre v2 attacks. Called INTERRUPT INJECTION, the method allows an unprivileged local attacker to trigger a hardware interrupt during a narrow window between the processor sanitizing its branch predictor and the kernel relying on that protection.
Researchers Daniël Trujillo and Mengjia Yan demonstrated the technique on an AMD Zen 2 processor running Linux 6.14 with the default Spectre v2 mitigations enabled. Their proof-of-concept was able to leak arbitrary kernel memory at a rate of 5.47 bytes per second with 91.97% accuracy. In five out of 10 attempts, the researchers were able to identify and read /etc/shadow, the Linux file containing password hashes.
The attack does not require elevated privileges. It only requires the attacker to execute code locally, making the issue particularly relevant to shared systems where multiple users or workloads operate on the same machine.
The researchers reported the vulnerability to AMD and Intel on February 5. AMD subsequently indicated that a Linux kernel fix was planned, and a corresponding patch has since been incorporated into the kernel and distributed through regular operating-system updates.
The Linux fix is included in the commit titled "x86/bugs: Make Safe-RET robust against interrupt injection", dated June 2. Authored by AMD engineers Borislav Petkov and David Kaplan, the patch specifically addresses the possibility of interrupts interfering with the Safe-RET sequence. The commit warns that interrupt injection "can neutralize the safe return sequence, potentially leading to data leakage through speculative execution."
The fix modifies the processor's register state following an interrupt so that it reflects a completed Safe-RET sequence. It also prevents the system from executing a RET instruction after returning from the interrupt, addressing one of the attack paths outlined by the researchers.
AMD later published security bulletin AMD-SB-7061, titled "Safe RET Interrupt Vulnerability," on August 6. The advisory identifies Zen 1 through Zen 4 processors as affected. AMD says an attacker "could inject an interrupt at a precise moment to disrupt Safe RET," which "could potentially weaken that protection and may result in information disclosure." The company also notes that the vulnerability "appears to be associated with the Linux implementation of the Safe RET mitigation."
According to AMD, the researchers demonstrated the behavior on Zen 1 and Zen 2, while Zen 3 and Zen 4 were identified as potentially affected but were not demonstrated by the researchers. The paper itself describes AMD testing on Zen 2 and Zen 4. However, the advisory's affected-products section does not provide a specific kernel version, patch reference or CVE identifier, potentially making it harder for administrators to determine whether a system has been updated.
The Linux kernel exposes Safe-RET status through /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow. However, documentation describing the possible values of that file did not reference interrupt-based attacks when The Hacker News reviewed it on August 6.
Intel has taken a different position. In a statement to The Hacker News, Jerry Bryant, Senior Director, Intel Product Assurance and Security, said, "Intel's assessment is that the behavior is related to BHI/IMBTI scenarios which are addressed by Intel's existing Spectre v2 and BHI/IMBTI guidance. Intel has not observed a real-world end-to-end attack on Intel processors and does not plan to add any additional mitigation guidance at this time. Intel's guidance is the same for all supported processor generations."
Arm also responded to the research, stating, "Arm is aware of the TONTOU research paper. While the analysis suggests that some Arm CPUs may exhibit aspects of the behavior described, this behavior would not give an attacker direct deterministic control over the processor’s predicted branch target. Our existing guidance for mitigating Spectre-v2 and Spectre-BHB already addresses the risks identified by this research."
The underlying issue stems from how existing Spectre defenses handle branch predictor state. These protections are designed to prevent attacker-controlled training from influencing speculative execution in kernel code. Intel performs the relevant protections when entering the kernel using eIBRS and, depending on the processor, either a branch history buffer clearing sequence or the BHI_DIS_S control. AMD's Safe-RET mechanism instead operates immediately before returning from the kernel.
The researchers found that these approaches rely on an assumption that no attacker-controlled event can interfere between the predictor state being neutralized and its subsequent use. Their research introduces the term TONTOU, short for "Time-of-Neutralization to Time-of-Use," drawing an analogy with traditional time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerabilities.
Hardware interrupts challenge that assumption because they can occur at extremely precise points during execution. Linux also allows user-controlled scheduling of certain interrupt-related events with nanosecond-level timing.
On AMD Zen 2, the researchers identified a window spanning just two instructions, or six bytes. To increase the likelihood of hitting that window, they used a sibling hyperthread to evict the relevant instructions from the L1 and L2 caches, slowing their execution. They also targeted the write system call because it allowed them to retain control of two registers.
The researchers observed interrupts landing inside the vulnerable window between 5% and 12% of attempts, with the rate falling to around 2% when the attacker-controlled registers were taken into account.
Once an interrupt occurred at the right point, the interrupt handler could serve as the training mechanism. The researchers combined this behavior with Inception (CVE-2023-20569), an AMD vulnerability disclosed in 2023 that can manipulate the return stack buffer using attacker-selected targets. Safe-RET was itself developed to mitigate threats associated with techniques such as Inception.
The experiments produced speculative mispredictions in kernel code on three of the four processors tested. The researchers recorded success rates of 0.75% on AMD Zen 2, 0.22% on Intel Arrow Lake and 0.037% on Cascade Lake Refresh. No mispredictions were observed during the corresponding test on Zen 4.
An end-to-end information leak was not demonstrated on Intel systems. Such an attack would additionally require a suitable kernel disclosure gadget that could turn speculative execution into observable data leakage.
However, the researchers argue that this does not rule out a practical Intel attack. They told The Hacker News that mispredictions are "a necessary but not sufficient condition for a Spectre attack," and noted that previous research has demonstrated disclosure gadgets in kernels. They added, "we believe an end-to-end attack is possible on Intel as well by combining our Interrupt Injection primitive with this work."
Intel reportedly provided a discretionary bug bounty bonus but, according to the paper, "does not consider mitigation to be required." The company said exploitability "depends on many factors" and that the technique falls within its existing security guidance. However, a review of Intel's INTEL-SA-00598 advisory, whose current version was last updated in May 2025, reportedly found no references to interrupts.
The researchers presented their findings at Black Hat USA. Their paper is also scheduled for presentation at USENIX Security in Baltimore. As of August 6, the artifact repository associated with the research had not yet been made publicly available.
The campaign combines phishing techniques with the exploitation of a Zimbra security vulnerability that has since been patched. CISA said the group has compromised organizations linked to the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), federal and local governments, educational institutions, energy companies, law enforcement agencies, media organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the technology sector.
At the centre of the campaign is CVE-2025-66376, a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Classic UI of Zimbra Collaboration Suite. The flaw could allow malicious JavaScript contained within specially crafted HTML emails to execute when the message was opened. This means attackers could potentially steal sensitive account information without requiring victims to click on a malicious link or access a fraudulent website.
CISA said Laundry Bear used the vulnerability as a zero-day before Zimbra released a patch in November 2025. Despite the availability of a fix, the group continues to target organizations operating vulnerable and unpatched Zimbra servers. CISA subsequently classified the vulnerability as being actively exploited.
The exploitation enables attackers to collect a wide range of information from compromised accounts. According to CISA, this includes a victim's emails from the previous 90 days, email address, password, Global Address List (GAL), and two-factor authentication (2FA) tokens.
The attackers can also generate and send a new Zimbra application passcode. Such passcodes are used by older email clients, including IMAP and ActiveSync, that cannot use TOTP-based authentication. By obtaining an application passcode, attackers can maintain access to compromised accounts even when multi-factor authentication (MFA) is enabled.
CISA said Laundry Bear transfers stolen information to infrastructure controlled by the attackers using both DNS and HTTPS. The group relies on its "Flowerbed" collection framework to receive the stolen data.
Smaller pieces of information are encoded and transmitted through DNS A-record queries, while larger datasets, including mailbox contents, are sent over HTTPS. The larger data packages are compressed before being uploaded to attacker-controlled servers.
The campaign is not limited to exploiting Zimbra's vulnerability. Laundry Bear has also deployed adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kits that mimic genuine Zimbra login pages. These fraudulent portals are designed to capture users' credentials and session cookies, potentially allowing attackers to take over email accounts.
CISA's indicators of compromise identified several domains designed to resemble legitimate Zimbra-related infrastructure. These include 'mailnalysis.com', 'emailanalytics.com.ua', 'zimbrastat.com', 'zimbra-metadata.com', 'istc-cloud.com', and 'zmailanalytics.com'.
Organizations using Zimbra Collaboration Suite have been advised to take several steps to reduce the risk of compromise. CISA recommends:
Updating Zimbra Collaboration Suite to the latest available version and applying all security patches.
Reviewing CISA's published indicators of compromise.
Checking networks and systems for communications with the identified domains and IP addresses.
Monitoring accounts for unusual or suspicious authentication activity.
Revoking unauthorized application passcodes, particularly those containing the 'ZimbraWeb'.
Examining user accounts for signs of unauthorized mailbox access.
Deploying phishing-resistant MFA wherever technically possible.
Laundry Bear was publicly linked to Russian cyber espionage activity in May 2025, when Dutch intelligence agencies attributed the group to a 2024 intrusion into the Dutch National Police. The incident resulted in the exposure of personal information belonging to police personnel and helped authorities identify a previously unknown Russian espionage operation.
Microsoft tracks the group as Void Blizzard. The threat actor has reportedly been active since at least 2024, focusing on intelligence-gathering operations against organizations considered strategically relevant to Russia. Its activity has largely centred on NATO member countries and Ukraine.
Microsoft has also reported successful intrusions into organizations supporting Ukraine, including those operating in the defense, transportation, and aviation industries.
Laundry Bear has previously used phishing as part of its operations. Earlier in 2026, a separate campaign attributed to the group targeted Ukraine's military with charity-themed phishing messages. The emails reportedly attempted to distribute malware disguised as donation-related requests.
The latest campaign highlights the continued risk posed by unpatched collaboration and email platforms, particularly when attackers combine software vulnerabilities with credential theft and phishing techniques to maintain long-term access to sensitive communications.