It has been announced that researchers at Shanghai University have achieved a breakthrough in quantum computing that could have a profound impact on modern cryptographic systems. They achieved a significant leap in quantum computing. The team used a quantum annealing processor called D-Wave to successfully factor a 22-bit RSA number, a feat that has, until now, been beyond the practical capabilities of this particular class of quantum processor.
There is no real-world value in a 22-bit key, but this milestone marks the beginning of the development of quantum algorithms and the improvement of hardware efficiency, even though it is relatively small and holds no real-world encryption value today. A growing vulnerability has been observed in classical encryption methods such as RSA, which are foundational to digital security across a wide range of financial systems, communication networks and government infrastructures.
It is a great example of the accelerated pace at which the quantum arms race is occurring, and it reinforces the urgency around the creation of quantum-resistant cryptographic standards and the adoption of quantum-resistant protocols globally.
As a result of quantum computing's progress, one of the greatest threats is that it has the potential to break widely used public key cryptographic algorithms, including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman, and even symmetric encryption standards, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), very quickly and with ease.
Global digital security is built on the backbone of these encryption protocols, safeguarding everything from financial transactions and confidential communications to government and defense data, a safeguard that protects everything from financial transactions to confidential communications. As quantum computers become more advanced, this system might become obsolete if quantum computers become sufficiently advanced by dramatically reducing the time required to decrypt, posing a serious risk to privacy and infrastructure security.
As a result of this threat looming over the world, major global powers have already refocused their strategic priorities. There is a widespread belief that nation-states that are financially and technologically able to develop quantum computing capabilities are actively engaged in a long-term offensive referred to as “harvest now, decrypt later”, which is the purpose of this offensive.
Essentially, this tactic involves gathering enormous amounts of encrypted data today to decrypt that data in the future, when quantum computers reach a level of functionality that can break classical encryption. Even if the data has remained secure for now, its long-term confidentiality could be compromised.
According to this strategy, there is a pressing need for quantum-resistant cryptographic standards to be developed and deployed urgently to provide a future-proof solution to sensitive data against the inevitable rise in quantum decryption capabilities that is inevitable.
Despite the fact that 22-bit RSA keys are far from secure by contemporary standards, and they can be easily cracked by classical computer methods, this experiment marks the largest number of quantum annealing calculations to date, a process that is fundamentally different from the gate-based quantum systems that are most commonly discussed.
It is important to note that this experiment is not related to Shor's algorithm, which has been thecentrer of theoretical discussions about breaking RSA encryption and uses gate-based quantum computers based on highly advanced technology. Instead, this experiment utilised quantum annealing, an algorithm that is specifically designed to solve a specific type of mathematical problem, such as factoring and optimisation, using quantum computing.
The difference is very significant: whereas Shor's algorithm remains largely impractical at scale because of hardware limitations at the moment, D-Wave offers a solution to this dilemma by demonstrating how real-world factoring can be achieved on existing quantum hardware. Although it is limited to small key sizes, it does demonstrate the potential for real-world factoring on existing quantum hardware. This development has a lot of importance for the broader cryptographic security community.
For decades, RSA encryption has provided online transactions, confidential communications, software integrity, and authentication systems with the necessary level of security. The RSA encryption is heavily dependent upon the computational difficulty of factorising large semiprime numbers. Classical computers have required a tremendous amount of time and resources to crack such encryption, which has kept the RSA encryption in business for decades to come.
In spite of the advances made by Wang and his team, it appears that even alternative quantum methods, beyond the widely discussed gate-based systems, may have tangible results for attacking these cryptographic barriers in the coming years. While it may be the case that quantum annealing is still at its infancy, the trajectory is still clearly in sight: quantum annealing is maturing, and as a result, the urgency for transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic standards becomes increasingly important.
A 22-bit RSA key does not have any real cryptographic value in today's digital landscape — where standard RSA keys usually exceed 2048 bits — but the successful factoring of such a key using quantum annealing represents a crucial step forward in quantum computing research. A demonstration, which is being organised by researchers in Shanghai, will not address the immediate practical threats that quantum attacks pose, but rather what it will reveal concerning quantum attack scalability in the future.
A compelling proof-of-concept has been demonstrated here, illustrating that with refined techniques and optimisation, more significant encryption scenarios may soon come under attack. What makes this experiment so compelling is the technical efficiency reached by the research team as a result of their work.
A team of researchers demonstrated that the current hardware limitations might actually be more flexible than previously thought by minimising the number of physical qubits required per variable, improving embeddings, and reducing noise through improved embeddings.
By using quantum annealers—specialised quantum devices previously thought to be too limited for such tasks, this opens up the possibility to factor out larger key sizes.
Additionally, there have been successful implementations of the quantum annealing approach for use with symmetric cryptography algorithms, including Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) cyphers such as Present and Rectangle, which have proven to be highly effective.
In the real world, lightweight cyphers are common in embedded systems as well as Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which makes this the first demonstration of a quantum processor that poses a credible threat to both asymmetric as well as symmetric encryption mechanisms simultaneously instead of only one or the other.
There are far-reaching implications to the advancements that have been made as a result of this advancement, and they have not gone unnoticed by the world at large. In response to the accelerated pace of quantum developments, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first official post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards in August of 2024. These standards were formalised under the FIPS 203, 204, and 205 codes.
There is no doubt that this transition is backed by the adoption of the Hamming Quasi-Cyclic scheme by NIST, marking another milestone in the move toward a quantum-safe infrastructure, as it is based on lattice-based cryptography that is believed to be resistant to both current and emerging quantum attacks. This adoption further solidifies the transition into this field.
There has also been a strong emphasis on the urgency of the issue from the White House in policy directives issued by the White House.
A number of federal agencies have been instructed to begin phasing out vulnerable public key encryption protocols. The directive highlights the growing consensus that proactive mitigation is essential in light of the threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" strategies, where adversaries collect encrypted data today in anticipation of the possibility that future quantum technologies can be used to decrypt it.
Increasing quantum breakthroughs are making it increasingly important to move to post-quantum cryptographic systems as soon as possible, as this is no longer a theoretical exercise but a necessity for the security of the world at large. While the 22-bit RSA key is very small when compared to the 2048-bit keys commonly used in contemporary cryptographic systems, the recent breakthrough by Shanghai researchers holds a great deal of significance both scientifically and technologically.
Previously, quantum factoring was attempted with annealing-based systems, but had reached a plateau at 19-bit keys. This required a significant number of qubits per variable, which was rather excessive. By fine-tuning the local field and coupling coefficients within their Ising model, the researchers were able to overcome this barrier in their quantum setup.
Through these optimisations, the noise reduction and factoring process was enhanced, and the factoring process was more consistent, which suggests that with further refinement, a higher level of complexity can be reached in the future with the RSA key size, according to independent experts who are aware of the possible implications.
Despite not being involved in this study, Prabhjyot Kaur, an analyst at Everest Group who was not involved, has warned that advances in quantum computing could pose serious security threats to a wide range of industries. She underscored that cybersecurity professionals and policymakers alike are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that theoretical risks are rapidly becoming operational realities in the field of cybersecurity.
A significant majority of the concern surrounding quantum threats to encryption has traditionally focused on Shor's algorithm - a powerful quantum technique capable of factoring large numbers efficiently, but requiring a quantum computer based on gate-based quantum algorithms to be implemented.
Though theoretically, these universal quantum machines are not without their limitations in hardware, such as the limited number of qubits, the limited coherence times, and the difficult correction of quantum errors. The quantum annealers from D-Wave, on the other hand, are much more mature, commercially accessible and do not have a universal function, but are considerably more mature than the ones from other companies.
With its current generation of Advantage systems, D-Wave has been able to boast over 5,000 qubits and maintain an analogue quantum evolution process that is extremely stable at an ultra-low temperature of 15 millikelvin. There are limitations to quantum annealers, particularly in the form of exponential scaling costs, limiting their ability to crack only small moduli at present, but they also present a unique path to quantum-assisted cryptanalysis that is becoming increasingly viable as time goes by.
By utilising a fundamentally different model of computation, annealers avoid many of the pitfalls associated with gate-based systems, including deep quantum circuits and high error rates, which are common in gate-based systems. In addition to demonstrating the versatility of quantum platforms, this divergence in approach also underscores how important it is for organisations to remain up to date and adaptive as multiple forms of quantum computing continue to evolve at the same time.
The quantum era is steadily approaching, and as a result, organisations, governments, and security professionals must acknowledge the importance of cryptographic resilience as not only a theoretical concern but an urgent operational issue. There is no doubt that recent advances in quantum annealing, although they may be limited in their immediate threat, serve as a clear indication that quantum technology is progressing at a faster ra///-te than many had expected.
The risk of enterprises and institutions not being able to afford to wait for large-scale quantum computers to become fully capable before implementing security transitions is too great to take. Rather than passively watching, companies and institutions must start by establishing a full understanding of the cryptographic assets they are deploying across their infrastructure in order to be able to make informed decisions about their cryptographic assets.
It is also critical to adopt quantum-resistant algorithms, embrace crypto-agility, and participate in standards-based migration efforts if people hope to secure digital ecosystems for the long term. Moreover, continuous education is equally important to ensure that decision-makers remain informed about quantum developments as they develop to make timely and strategic security investments promptly.
The disruptive potential of quantum computing presents undeniable risks, however it also presents a rare opportunity for modernizing foundational digital security practices. As people approach post-quantum cryptography, the digital future should be viewed not as one-time upgrade but as a transformation that integrates foresight, flexibility, and resilience, enabling us to become more resilient, resilient, and flexible. Taking proactive measures today will have a significant impact on whether people remain secure in the future.
