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Synology NAS Owners Hit by C3RB3R Ransomware as Old Vulnerability Gets New Life

 



A ransomware strain called C3RB3R is actively hitting Synology network-attached storage devices, locking files and demanding bitcoin payments from victims who, in many cases, were running software patched nearly two years ago.

Synology confirmed the attacks on October 29, pointing to CVE-2024-10441, a critical remote code execution flaw in its DiskStation Manager operating system rated 9.8 out of 10 on the CVSS scale. The vulnerability was found at Pwn2Own 2024 by DEVCORE researchers Pumpkin Chang and Orange Tsai, and Synology patched it by December 2024 under security advisory SA-24:20. The patch has been available ever since. The fact that attackers are still finding success with it tells you something about how many users never applied it.

Once attackers get into a device, C3RB3R goes to work quickly. The ransomware skips 27 system directories and a handful of file types, then recursively encrypts everything else. Each file receives its own 256-bit encryption key generated on the fly, locked with ChaCha8 and then wrapped with RSA-2048, which means there is no way to crack it without the attacker's private key. The malware drops a ransom note called read-me3.txt into every affected folder, containing a six-digit victim ID and a Tor address. Files come out the other side with a .L0CK3D extension. Backups stored on the same NAS are not spared.

The ransom demand starts at 0.036960 bitcoin, which works out to roughly $2,952 at current rates. Victims who miss the five-day deadline see that figure double to 0.073920 BTC, or about $5,904. No free decryptor exists, and Synology has offered none. Affected users who do not have off-site backups are, for practical purposes, out of options.

Reports first surfaced in South Korea around October 28. Victims filed complaints with KISA, the country's internet security agency, but KISA declined to say how many devices were affected, what caused the intrusions, or what it was doing about them. Synology has similarly not disclosed how many users were hit, which device models were targeted, or when it first became aware of the campaign. A Taiwanese NAS research group that compiled damage cases found a common thread: in every instance they reviewed, the device's management interface was reachable directly from the internet, whether through router port forwarding, UPnP, QuickConnect, or a reverse proxy.

The attack timing is not coincidental. On October 25, four days before Synology issued its statement, a public proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2024-10441 appeared on GitHub. That kind of public PoC typically compresses the window between disclosure and active exploitation to days, sometimes hours. Security researchers at 360 Security Team and Solar Emergency Response Team, who both published analysis on October 29, noted that the campaign appears to have kicked into gear almost immediately after the PoC dropped.

There is, however, a complication in Synology's explanation. The Solar team examined one affected device running DSM 7.4.1-90080 Update 1, a build that does not fit neatly into the SA-24:20 vulnerability timeline. The researchers have not ruled out other entry points, including vulnerable third-party packages, container services, or stolen credentials. No zero-day has been confirmed, but the mismatch has not been fully explained either.

Adding another layer, the 360 Security Team's analysis points to a different set of flaws entirely: CVE-2026-13639 and CVE-2026-13684, both scored 9.8, patched by Synology on September 18, 2026. Under 360's reading, these are "1-day" exploits built on patches that were barely a month old when the attacks began. If 360 is right, devices that only applied the 2024 patch would still be exposed.

Separately, Synology disclosed two more critical vulnerabilities in its PHP infrastructure, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, affecting packages including Web Station, WordPress, Joomla, and phpMyAdmin. Synology says these flaws are not the C3RB3R entry point, but has advised users to patch them regardless. Security firm Genians found that 96 percent of internal-network devices running PHP were exposed.

Synology's guidance for users is practical if grim for those already affected. The company recommends running a Security Advisor scan, checking Task Scheduler for unfamiliar scripts, and reviewing User and Group settings for administrator accounts that were not created by the device owner. If either check turns up something unexpected, Synology says to contact its support team rather than attempt a manual cleanup. For everyone else, the advice is to update DSM immediately, enable automatic updates, and move backup jobs off-device using Hyper Backup or Snapshot Replication.

The patches for SA-24:20 are in DSM 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2.2-72806-1, 7.2-64570-4, 7.1.1-42962-7, and 6.2.4-25556-8. Synology PSIRT says it continues to monitor the campaign.



French Energy Giant ENGIE Hit by Data Breach, Customer Records Accessed Through Partner Platform

 


ENGIE, one of the world's largest energy companies, has notified customers in France that an unauthorized third party accessed their personal data through a marketing platform used by the company's business partners, the company confirmed this week.

The breach notification letters, dated October 23, went to affected customers after ENGIE said it detected "unusual data access activity" on the partner tool. The company has not stated exactly when the intrusion took place or how long the attacker had access before it was caught.

According to the notifications, the data the intruder obtained includes customers' first and last names, mailing addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. It also includes two types of energy infrastructure identifiers specific to the French grid: the Delivery Point identifier (PDL) and the Metering and Estimation Point identifier (PCE). Both codes are tied to a customer's physical connection to the gas and electricity supply network. Customer IDs and contract numbers were also taken.

ENGIE said no banking data was involved, and that the breach was confined to the partner-facing marketing platform rather than any of its internal systems. The scope of the incident is currently limited to its French customer base, though the company has not said how many customers received notifications.

"We have cut off the attacker's access to the platform, notified the relevant authorities, and are directly informing each affected customer," the company said in a statement.

Customers were advised to stay alert to unsolicited contact and potential phishing attempts in the wake of the exposure.

No ransomware group or extortion actor had publicly claimed responsibility for the breach at the time of publication.


A Company With a Recurring Target on Its Back

ENGIE operates across 30 countries, employs more than 90,000 people, and posted €71.9 billion in revenue last year. Its scale across utilities, renewables, and energy infrastructure makes it a high-value target for threat actors looking for customer data at volume.

This latest breach is not the first time attackers have made it inside ENGIE's wider corporate ecosystem. Approximately a year ago, the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters group claimed it had breached a Salesforce instance belonging to Engie Records, the retail energy subsidiary of ENGIE North America, and leaked records from the intrusion. Engie Records appeared on the group's leak site as the 27th of 39 organizations allegedly hit through the same Salesforce-related campaign, with around 3GB of data listed.

Before that, in August 2023, a separate incident affected roughly 110,000 French ENGIE customers. In that case, a hacker known online as "HommedeLombre" reportedly got into ENGIE's systems through an external contractor's network, a technique also used in the Pôle Emploi breach around the same period. That attacker exposed names, email addresses, and phone numbers, and later said the intrusion was meant to demonstrate that "nothing is ever secure," citing rising gas prices as a grievance. ENGIE filed a complaint with authorities following that incident and said it had brought the affected system under control.

If we look closer to understand the link here, the three incidents point to a recurring problem: ENGIE's data, whether held by internal systems, subsidiaries, or third-party partners, keeps ending up in attackers' hands.


Why Energy Sector Customer Data Is Valuable

The combination of contact information and energy-specific identifiers like PDL and PCE codes makes the stolen data more useful to attackers than a standard contact list. Those codes link a name and address to a specific gas or electricity metering point in the French national grid, which means the data could be used to convincingly impersonate ENGIE in phishing campaigns or to target customers with fraudulent offers around energy billing or contracts.

France's energy market also went through a turbulent period of price volatility in recent years, which means many customers have been actively comparing suppliers and receiving legitimate outreach about tariff changes. That context makes it easier for fraudsters to craft believable messages that reference contract numbers, delivery point details, and billing information, exactly the kind of data now in circulation.

ENGIE said it has notified the relevant authorities, as required under GDPR. French data protection rules mandate that breaches of personal data be reported to the CNIL, the national data protection authority, within 72 hours of detection, and that affected individuals be notified without undue delay when the breach poses a risk to their rights and freedoms.

As of now, ENGIE has not attributed the breach to any specific threat actor, and it is unclear whether the platform through which the data was accessed belonged to an external vendor or an internal partner system. The investigation appears to be ongoing.



Ransomware Affiliates Built an AI-Powered Attack Platform That Logged Its Own Crimes

 



An operational security slip by affiliates of two ransomware groups left a server exposed long enough for researchers to pull 8,257 AI-generated messages documenting how the operators ran intrusions, negotiated ransoms, and managed their victim pipeline. The logs, recovered from a directory at IP address 45.227.254.43, form one of the most detailed windows into how criminal groups are now deploying artificial intelligence to execute attacks at scale.

The research, published by SOCRadar, links the activity to affiliates of INC ransomware and The Gentlemen, a data extortion group. Analysts assess the operators are Russian-speaking and function both as an intrusion team and as an infrastructure provider, leasing out their toolkit to other ransomware partners.


The Framework Behind the Operation

At the center of the operation sits a custom platform called Phantom, described in its own documentation as an "Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework." The tool ships with 18 skill modules, a routing engine, an autopilot orchestrator, and agents written in Python and Go. It connects to OpenCode, which lets the AI select attack techniques and assign tasks to remote agents. On victim machines, those agents masquerade as Windows Update components and phone home to a domain linked to the operation.

To run the AI components, operators routed prompts through OpenRouter, a commercial model aggregator, using legitimate AI models including Anthropic's claude-opus-4.6 and Moonshot AI's Kimi-K3. When models declined to help with a specific task, operators did not switch tools. They reframed the request as an "Authorized Red Team Assessment Request" and resubmitted it. That workaround appears frequently across the 133 recorded sessions.

Alongside Phantom, the group built WormGPT-MCP, a layer of 32 Model Context Protocol servers that tie the AI to purpose-built tools covering everything from reconnaissance to ransom negotiation. A partner guide found on a second server advertised "55+ tools" and access to more than 9,000 proof-of-concept exploits. The name WormGPT refers to a persona prompt layered over commercial models, not a separate AI system.

For persistence and communication, the group used Ghost C2, a family of three generations of polymorphic implants that route traffic through Cloudflare, Telegram, or DNS to avoid network-level detection.


How They Got In

The operation targeted exposed edge devices and widely used IT management software. Three vulnerabilities drove confirmed access: CVE-2024-57727, a path traversal flaw in SimpleHelp, gave the group admin passwords from 427 servers after scanning nearly 5,000; CVE-2026-35616, an authentication bypass in FortiClient EMS, allowed operators to create backdoor admin accounts across more than 4,000 managed endpoints; and CVE-2026-41940, an authentication bypass in cPanel and WHM, was used to reach small hosting providers and their clients' email servers.

Credential reuse turned single points of access into full-network compromises. In at least one documented case, a single reused password opened the door to a VPN, several servers, a remote management platform, backup infrastructure, and the organization's security management tools. To suppress endpoint detection tools, operators deployed a driver-based EDR killer that abused a vulnerable Zemana driver, a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver.


The Victim Picture

Researchers identified 62 named organizations in the operational logs, with 36 located in the United States. Industrial, manufacturing, and energy firms made up the largest share of targets at roughly 16 percent. Healthcare and pharmaceuticals came in second at about 14.5 percent. Most targeted companies were smaller businesses, with 27 of 35 classifiable organizations reporting revenue below $250 million. Some were reached indirectly through a managed service provider whose admin credentials had been stolen.

Four organizations ended up listed on public leak sites. The operation's timeline runs from mid-July 2026 through a live encryption event on September 30, 2026.


Extortion by the Numbers

The playbook prioritized data theft over encryption. Operators sifted through stolen financial records to gauge what a victim could pay, then opened contact with a text-only email carrying no ransom figure. Pressure escalated through scripted vishing calls, threats to notify customers and regulators, and hard deadlines of 24 to 72 hours before publication. Payment was planned in Monero, though researchers found no wallet or confirmed transaction records.

Demand figures from recovered case files show the range of the operation. A EUR 15 million demand sent to a company called Aidon was later revised down to EUR 4 million after the operators realized they had compromised the wrong parent company. A healthcare network in Australia received demands between AUD 3 million and AUD 8 million. The Gentlemen's communications to Leo Schachter Diamonds included a four-message sequence and a vishing plan. For Trulite Glass and Aluminum, the group set up a look-alike domain, trulitesupport[.]com, to warn the company's own customers about the breach.

Total spending on the operation's infrastructure is estimated at just under $24,000.



FBI Flags SafePay Ransomware as One of 2026’s Most Active Threats After 600 Victims

 



The FBI, alongside cybersecurity authorities in Germany and the United Kingdom, issued a joint advisory this week warning that a ransomware group called SafePay has compromised at least 600 organizations across the United States and Europe since it surfaced in late 2024, placing it among the most active extortion operations active right now.

The advisory, which draws on FBI and German law enforcement investigations, marks a significant escalation in attention for a group that operated in relative obscurity before racking up victims at a pace that rivals far better-known criminal networks. The most recent incident cited in the advisory occurred in August.


A Group Built on Borrowed Code

SafePay is not a ransomware-as-a-service operation, meaning it does not rent out its tools to outside affiliates the way groups like RansomHub do. Instead, it runs as a centralized crew, which security researchers say likely keeps operations tighter and reduces the risk of internal leaks.

Its malware, however, did not emerge from nothing. Analysts at Bitdefender and others found that SafePay's ransomware binary closely mirrors a late-2022 version of LockBit's code, with additional elements borrowed from ALPHV and INC Ransom. The group surfaced around the same period that law enforcement actions gutted LockBit in early 2024, and some researchers suspect its members include former Conti or LockBit operators who reconstituted under a new name. A telling technical detail: the ransomware includes a kill switch that deactivates itself on systems with Russian or Cyrillic as the default language, a pattern commonly associated with Eastern European criminal groups trying to avoid prosecution at home.


Getting In and Moving Fast

SafePay gets into networks through a combination of methods. The advisory lists password guessing, phishing, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities, including flaws in Cisco VPN products and Veeam backup software, as primary entry points. The group also buys stolen credentials from initial access brokers on dark web markets and uses automated scripts to scan the internet for exposed systems.

Once inside, the group moves quickly. Attacks have been documented going from initial access to full ransomware deployment in under 24 hours. Operators create new accounts or hijack existing ones, use Windows' own built-in tools to map the network, and disable security software using living-off-the-land techniques that avoid dropping obvious malware. Data is archived with WinRAR or 7-Zip and transferred out via FileZilla or RClone before encryption begins. In some cases, attackers change user passwords to lock out IT staff and slow down the response.

The group has also adopted a social engineering playbook that goes well beyond a simple phishing link. In several documented attacks, SafePay flooded employees with thousands of spam messages to overwhelm their inboxes, then followed up by impersonating IT support over Microsoft Teams or through direct phone calls. Vishing specialists, sometimes hired as a third-party service, would then convince employees to hand over remote access through Microsoft Quick Assist or approve multi-factor authentication prompts.


A Pattern of High-Profile Hits

Three incidents stand out in terms of impact. Government technology contractor Conduent confirmed an attack that disrupted Medicaid payments, child support disbursements, food assistance programs, and roadway tolls in multiple U.S. states. Conduent recently agreed to an $80 million class action settlement over the breach. British transport technology firm Microlise was hit in October 2024, disrupting DHL delivery operations and security systems installed in UK Ministry of Justice prisoner transport vans. In July 2025, researchers linked SafePay to an attack on Ingram Micro, one of the world's largest IT distributors, with analysts estimating the disruption cost the company at least $136 million in daily sales while order fulfillment was offline.


Germany as a Primary Target

Among the countries SafePay has focused on, Germany stands out. During the first quarter of 2025, Check Point Research found that 24 percent of all publicly reported ransomware victims in Germany were attributed to SafePay, the highest concentration of any single ransomware group in any single country during that period. The advisory confirms that dozens of German companies appear on SafePay's dark web leak site alongside government organizations across Latin America and the United States.


Ransom Demands Framed as a Business Transaction

SafePay's ransom notes describe the payment demand as "a subset of company revenue," typically falling between one and three percent of the victim's annual revenue. The group uses cryptocurrency for payments and, according to the advisory, sometimes employs third parties to make phone calls to pressure victims into paying. In cases where paying could expose a victim to regulatory penalties, the group has reportedly offered reduced demands.

The joint advisory stops short of attributing SafePay to any specific country or naming individual suspects.



Fake Ransomware Recovery Firm Charged Over $11M Decryption Markup

 

The owner of a US cybersecurity company has been charged with running a ransomware recovery fraud that allegedly involved secretly paying attackers for decryption keys and then charging victims a large markup. Zohar Pinhasi, 50, owner of MonsterCloud and also known as “Zack Silver” and “Zack Green,” appeared in a New York court on wire fraud charges. Prosecutors say his company claimed it could recover encrypted data without paying ransom, while it actually relied on ransom payments obtained from the same criminal groups.

According to the indictment, Pinhasi marketed MonsterCloud as a ransomware remediation service that used proprietary tools and advanced decryption techniques. He reportedly warned victims not to pay ransomware operators directly, positioning his firm as a safer alternative. In reality, investigators allege that he contacted the ransomware groups responsible for the attacks, paid them for decryption keys, and then used those keys to restore clients’ files while charging them for supposedly independent recovery work.

The alleged financial gap was substantial. Pinhasi is accused of paying more than $8 million in ransoms while billing clients over $19 million, creating an estimated $11 million markup. In one example, he allegedly paid a ransomware affiliate about $8,200 for a decryption key and then charged the affected client approximately $150,000. Prosecutors say the scheme effectively caused victims to pay twice—first through inflated recovery fees and indirectly through the ransom payments made on their behalf.

The case highlights a serious trust problem in the ransomware incident-response market. Organizations under pressure to restore operations may accept claims of “guaranteed decryption” without verifying the technical basis for those claims. Genuine recovery can sometimes be possible through free decryptors, backups, or known flaws in ransomware strains, but no legitimate provider can promise recovery for every attack. Businesses should therefore ask providers for transparent methods, written scopes of work, references, and clear pricing before signing emergency contracts.

Pinhasi has been charged with wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy and could face decades in prison if convicted. The allegations remain accusations until proven in court, but the case is a warning to ransomware victims: recovery services should be scrutinized as carefully as the original cyberattack. Independent legal counsel, cyber insurance guidance, law-enforcement reporting, and verified incident-response specialists can help organizations avoid becoming victims a second time 


Japan Arrests Suspected Qilin Ransomware Hacker, Extradites Him to Germany


A suspected member of the Qilin ransomware group has been arrested in Japan and extradited to Germany, where he is expected to face charges related to cyberattacks and ransomware extortion. The case is important as it reveals a growing international effort to identify and prosecute individuals involved in major ransomware operations.

According to a report by SecurityWeek, the suspect is a 28-year-old Russian national who was arrested in Osaka, Japan, in May 2026. German authorities accuse him of playing a role in the Qilin ransomware operation, which has targeted organizations in several countries.

The suspect was extradited to Germany on October 2, 2026, following legal proceedings in Japan. German investigators allege that he was involved in an attack against a logistics company in September 2024.

Ransomware attack

Investigators say the targeted logistics company had its computer systems encrypted during the attack. The attackers allegedly demanded more than $160,000 in cryptocurrency in exchange for restoring access to the affected systems.

The incident is believed to have been connected to the Qilin ransomware operation, also known as Agenda. Qilin emerged as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation in 2022. Under this model, ransomware developers provide malware and infrastructure to affiliates, who conduct attacks against victims and share the proceeds with the operators.

This business model has allowed ransomware groups to expand their operations without every attacker needing to develop their own malware or infrastructure.

Qilin's global activity

Qilin has become one of the more active ransomware groups in recent years. It has targeted organizations across different industries, including healthcare, manufacturing, professional services and other critical sectors.

The group attracted international attention after attacks linked to it disrupted healthcare services in the United Kingdom. It was associated with the 2024 attack against Synnovis, a medical services provider whose systems were used by several London hospitals. The incident caused significant disruption to healthcare operations.

Qilin has also been linked to attacks against major companies in other countries, demonstrating the international reach of the ransomware operation.

Experts have continued to track the group's activities and techniques. In 2026, Qilin was also reported to have exploited a critical vulnerability affecting Check Point security products as part of its attack activity.

Former Engineer Jailed for Ransomware-Style Cyberattack

 

A former employee of a New Jersey-based industrial company has been sentenced to 32 months in federal prison for launching a computer network attack and attempting to extort his former employer. Daniel Rhyne, 59, of Kansas City, Missouri, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Michael A. Shipp on September 28, 2026, at federal court in Trenton, New Jersey. The sentence followed his guilty plea to charges involving extortion through a threat to damage a protected computer and intentional damage to a protected computer. 

According to court documents and statements made during the proceedings, Rhyne previously worked as a core infrastructure engineer for the U.S.-based industrial company, identified in court records as Victim-1. While he was living in New Jersey in November 2023, he allegedly began preparing a plan to disrupt the company’s computer network and force it to pay a ransom. His position reportedly gave him technical knowledge and access that allowed him to plan the attack against the company’s critical systems. 

As part of the scheme, Rhyne initiated unauthorized remote desktop sessions and scheduled tasks designed to damage the company’s network. The planned actions included deleting network administrator accounts, changing passwords linked to other employee accounts and shutting down several company servers. These steps could have seriously disrupted business operations by preventing authorized staff from accessing systems and interrupting essential digital services. 

On November 25, 2023, Rhyne sent an extortion email to employees of the industrial company. In the message, he threatened to continue shutting down servers unless the company paid approximately 20 bitcoin. At the time, the cryptocurrency demand was valued at about $750,000. The case highlights how former employees with detailed knowledge of internal infrastructure can pose a significant cybersecurity risk, especially when access controls and administrative privileges are not promptly reviewed after employment ends. 

The investigation was conducted by special agents from the FBI’s Newark Field Office, with assistance from the FBI’s Kansas City Field Office. U.S. Attorney Robert Frazer announced the sentence, while Assistant U.S. Attorney Taj Moore of the Cybercrime Unit prosecuted the case. The conviction demonstrates that unauthorized access, deliberate disruption of computer networks and ransom demands can result in substantial federal prison sentences. It also underlines the importance of removing former employees’ access, monitoring remote sessions and protecting administrator accounts against misuse.

Hacker vs. Hacker: ShinyHunters Outsmarts Clop Ransomware Gang

 




The extortion group ShinyHunters hacked the dark web leak site run by Clop, one of the most active ransomware operations in the world, defaced it with their own branding, and is now threatening to put Clop through the same extortion process Clop runs on its corporate victims.

The attack happened Friday night, September 19. ShinyHunters found an unauthenticated file upload flaw in Grav CMS, the content management system Clop was running its leak site on, and used it to push a text file directly onto the server. The file read: "THIS SITE HAS BEEN PWN3D BY SHINYHUNTERES #Skids10p - Maybe don't try to threaten us next time." It also linked back to ShinyHunters' own Tor site. The file was confirmed live and downloadable directly from Clop's server.

Hours later, ShinyHunters said they had gone further. A visit to Clop's site showed the entire page replaced with ASCII art of Umbreon, the Pokemon ShinyHunters uses as its logo, and the line "rooting your systems since '19 ;)". The same Umbreon artwork had appeared when ShinyHunters defaced HackForums back in August 2020. Clop's defaced page was still live at the time of writing.

ShinyHunters claimed full access to the server and said they took source code, Grav CMS plugins, and everything stored in the server's /var/log directory, which typically holds authentication logs, system activity records, and the IP addresses of everyone who connected to it. They also claim to have pulled the private keys for Clop's Tor onion service. Those keys are what tie a .onion address to its server. With them, ShinyHunters could host a copy of Clop's site at the exact same onion URL, on infrastructure they control. "We have their onion keys. So if they kick us out it wouldn't matter at all because we control the private keys to host the same exact onion URL," the group said.

The plan is to post an extortion message on their own site and give Clop 72 hours to respond.

The defacement and the uploaded file are independently confirmed. The claims about stolen source code, server logs, and Tor private keys come only from ShinyHunters and have not been independently verified. Clop has not commented.

The dispute behind this attack goes back about a year. In August 2025, Clop quietly began exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Oracle E-Business Suite, tracked as CVE-2025-61882, a server-side request forgery flaw that gave attackers remote access to enterprise systems without authentication. Oracle did not patch it until October 2025, after Mandiant confirmed active exploitation. By then, Clop had already sent mass extortion emails to executives at dozens of companies, including Cox Enterprises, The Washington Post, Logitech, Michelin, and Estee Lauder.

ShinyHunters says that exploit was originally theirs and that Clop used it without authorization. In October 2025, ShinyHunters, operating under the name "Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters," leaked the proof-of-concept publicly. Oracle confirmed it matched the exploit used in the Clop attacks. ShinyHunters said the leak was deliberate, intended to disrupt Clop's campaign and expose what had been taken from them.

What followed, according to ShinyHunters, was a direct threat from a Clop representative. "During the Oracle EBS campaign they ran and stole from me last year, someone from cl0p personally messaged me and said, and I quote (translated from Russian): I have more money than you and all of your people combined, I'll kill you soon," the group said. Those allegations have not been independently verified.

This is not the first time criminal groups have turned on each other. In March 2025, DragonForce defaced the leak sites of rival operations BlackLock and Mamona. Later in 2026, two groups called 0APT and KryBit hacked and leaked each other's operational data until both were left severely damaged. The difference in the Clop case is the scale of the target. Clop's leak site is the operational center of its entire extortion model, the platform it uses to name victims and apply public pressure when ransoms go unpaid. Losing control of it, and potentially the keys that anchor its onion address, is not a minor disruption.

ShinyHunters' own Tor site went offline shortly after the attack. No connection to Clop has been established.

Ransomware Affiliate Pretends to be Recovery Service for Extortion


An alleged ransomware affiliate is pretending to be a ransomware recovery service named “Ransom Busters,” reaching out to victims before the attacks become public and claims it can delete stolen data and provide decryption keys for some fees.

Fake ransomware recovery service

The activity was discovered by GuidePoint Security’s Research and Intelligence Team (GRIT) after it responded to various cases where targets got emails apparently from Ransom Busters, contacting to provide help in recovering from the ransomware attack. 

This seems suspicious because cybersecurity firms usually contact ransomware victims to offer recovery services or consulting after the attack has happened and becomes public knowledge. But in this case, Ransom Busters’ knowledge about the attack that was not yet public raises questions.

GRIT believes Ransom Busters to be working across various ransomware operations, and have taken a new extortion approach. 

The group contacted victims via emails, requesting to get in touch with their CEO or IT leadership. 

According to GRIT, the email said “I am a representative of a project that assists victims of cyberattacks. We have been identifying vulnerabilities and infiltrating the servers of criminal groups for over three years. On the server we recently accessed, we discovered data stolen from your company [...] We can return your files to you and destroy all backups held by the group. Additionally, we have gained access to the encryption key storage and can help you regain access to your encrypted files.”

Extortion tactic

In the communications after this mail, Ransom Busters said they found the flaws in the admin panels of various ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operations. It offered to remove the stolen data from ransomware servers such as Settra, DragonForce, and Anubis, for a fee of $20,000 to $60,000.

But evidence from the two incidents has led GRIT to suspect that Ransom Busters is the group responsible for the attacks.

In both incidents, the threat actors used the same software such as s5cmd, Remotely remote monitoring tool, and SoftPerfect Network Scanner. The group also used the same approach to create a local backdoor account via the same threat actor-controlled hostname 'DESKTOP-BBETH6K' and password Numlock!123'. 

The attacker claimed this access gave them command over “almost all of their infrastructure,” according to GRIT. The aim of Ransom Busters seems to be financial, like other RaaS groups.

Impact on ransomware victims

Ransomware groups such as Ransom Busters cannot be trusted as they use deceptive tactics for extortion payments. In these incidents, it is observed that even payments to these gangs does not guarantee recovery of stolen data and if it will be deleted. If your organization receives such mails, it should be immediately reported to the response team.

Ransomware Attacks Fall as Business Defenses Improve

 

Ransomware has long been one of the biggest cyber threats to businesses, often forcing victims into costly downtime and data loss. Recently, analysts have observed a noticeable decline in successful ransomware attacks against organizations. This shift is not happening by chance. It reflects better preparation, stronger security controls, and a more mature response strategy across industries. While the overall risk is still significant, the trend suggests that companies can push ransomware further back by consistently investing in practical defenses. 

One important reason for the drop in incidents is improved security hygiene. Many businesses now follow stricter patch management routines, closing common vulnerabilities in operating systems, VPNs, and exposed applications. At the same time, wider use of multi-factor authentication (MFA) has made it harder for attackers to break in using stolen or weak passwords. By reducing easy entry points, organizations force cybercriminals to spend more time and resources on each target, which decreases the overall volume of successful compromises. 

Another key factor is better visibility into networks and endpoints. Security teams increasingly deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools and extended detection and response (XDR) platforms to monitor suspicious activity in real time. Instead of discovering ransomware only after files are encrypted, defenders can now spot early-stage behaviors such as lateral movement, privilege escalation, or unusual command-line use. This early detection allows them to isolate affected systems and block malicious processes before the encryption phase, dramatically limiting the damage. 

Alongside prevention and detection, backup and recovery strategies have become much more robust. Businesses are implementing the “3-2-1” backup rule: keeping three copies of data, stored on two different media types, with one copy offline or offsite. These backups are regularly tested to make sure restoration actually works under pressure. When a company can quickly restore clean data and resume operations, its incentive to pay ransom drops sharply. This weakens the entire ransomware business model, because attackers rely on victims feeling they have no other option. 

Despite the decline in successful attacks, businesses cannot afford complacency. Ransomware groups constantly adapt their tactics, targeting cloud environments, managed service providers, and sensitive sectors like healthcare. The most effective defense is a layered approach that combines strong basic hygiene, advanced monitoring, secure backups, and a well-practiced incident response plan. Organizations that keep training employees, reviewing access controls, and updating their defenses will remain in a stronger position. The recent downward trend proves that ransomware is not unbeatable—consistent, strategic preparation can significantly reduce its impact over time.

Hackers Linked to China Install StormEncryptor Ransomware


Threat actor links to China

Microsoft has revealed that a financially motivated hacker linked to China, called Storm-1175 has installed an earlier undocumented ransomware strain known as StormEncryptor. Storm-1175 is believed to exploit a critical flaw in a cybersecurity supply-chain campaign where threat actors can install custom ransomware throughout large list of target networks.  

Storm-1175 began installing a new ransomware strain, Microsoft Threat Intelligence warned this week. Threat actors earlier deployed Medusa ransomware to take money from finance organizations, healthcare providers, and professional services in the US, Australia, and Britain. 

About the attack

In April 2026, the threat actors operated  “high-velocity ransomware campaigns,” abusing both recently revealed zero-day exploits and flaws, “in some cases a full week before public vulnerability disclosure.” Microsoft warned it had observed the gang transition from initial access to full encryption in less than 24 hours.

In the recent campaign, according to Microsoft, the group may be exploiting CVE-2026-18577- a flaw in the N-central, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) console used by various service providers to supervise client endpoints. 

Attack tactic

Microsoft has not officially verified the access vector, but found that StormEncryptor installations started the same day the bug was revealed. The flaw allows threat actors “unauthenticated, ‘god-mode’ access,” warned cybersecurity firm Huntress.

The flaw permits threat actors with no credentials to get full administrative command over the N-central server to handle clients’ machines remotely’. The single hacked server becomes an entry point to every endpoint it commands. A single provider can offer dozens of ransomware incidents throughout its entire client base. 

A similar supply-chain attack on an RMM tool in 2021 from software provider Kaseya permitted Revil ransomware group to hack 60 of Kaseya’s direct consumers before attacking 1,500 downstream organizations. 

In 2024, another supply chain attack on an RMM, affected ConnectWise’s ScreenConnect product. It resulted in various downstream ransomware campaigns. According to Microsoft, Storm-1175 was amid the various gangs attacking ScreenConnect during that phase.

Estimates of impacted firms have not been confirmed. Parent company N-central’s N-able software company said it reached out to a limited number of impacted customers. Huntress has acknowledged few of its own consumers were affected and posted a timeline demonstrating how the threat actors travelled across downstream hosts in two cases, but Huntress did not verify the number of downstream organizations impacted from the ransomware attacks.

Canadian Hacker Pleads Guilty for Stealing Data and Extortion


A Canadian man recently pleaded guilty in a U.S. federal court in planning one of the largest data theft campaigns in recent times, to his involvement in retrieving organization accounts at cloud storage provider company Snowflake. He stole data from 165 companies in an attempt to extort millions of dollars from the targets. 

Connor Riley Moucka is 26-yr old, and also worked under aliases Waifu and Alexander Moucka, was arrested on October 30, 2024, for stealing information from millions of people from organizations that used Snowlake’s storage features. Moucka admitted to four charges: computer fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and a related conspiracy count, out of an original 11-count indictment.

How did the attacks happen?

Between February and October 2024, Moucka and his partner John Erin Binns, also arrested for these attacks, accessed Snowflake accounts. Rather than exploiting a flaw in Snowflake's platform itself, the pair relied on credentials harvested through infostealer malware to log into customer accounts. They stole accounts that were not secured by multi-factor authentication (MFA) via login credentials through an infostealer malware.

Without MFA protection, the hackers only needed the right usernames and passwords to sign into customer accounts. After gaining access, the hackers only needed custom-built software to sail through cloud storage incidents for important information.

The illegal access was used for identifying important information such as user roles, IP addresses, and organization name in cloud storage incidents that used Snowflake services.

The accused tried to blackmail various firms after stealing TBs of data from their Snowflake user accounts and got around $2.5 million in bitcoin from three targets.

Scale of the campaign

According to the prosecutors, the campaign exploited data linked to over 100 million individuals and resulted in $9.5 million losses for organizations. The list of impacted companies include: Ticketmaster, Santander, AT&T, Advance Auto Parts, Los Angeles Unified School District, Pure Storage, QuoteWizard/LendingTree, and Neiman Marcus.

Moucka allegedly stole around $495,000 from ransom payments. AT&T paid around $370,000 to avoid future leaks of text records and customer calls. 

“In at least one instance, Moucka re-extorted a victim with threats of further disclosure of the victim’s stolen data,” the US Department of Justice said in a press release. 

“Moucka used the stolen data of a government officer and members of a then-former government officer’s immediate family in this re-extortion attempt.” 

AI Is Fueling a New Wave of Cybercrime

 

Cybercriminals are increasingly turning to artificial intelligence, and the biggest barriers that once slowed adoption are rapidly disappearing. According to a recent Axios report, restricted access to models, high costs, and limited incentive to change old hacking methods are no longer holding attackers back. Open-weight AI models are becoming powerful enough to rival mainstream systems in some cyber tasks, while underground marketplaces are offering jailbroken tools, custom-built models, and AI-powered hacking services. That mix is making AI more practical for criminal use than ever before. 

The shift matters because hackers are no longer just experimenting with AI in isolated tests. They are now weaving it into existing workflows to speed up ransomware, fraud, phishing, and cloud intrusions. Axios cites recent cases showing how attackers are using AI to generate exploit code, steal data, and even negotiate with victims. In one example, a lone hacker used AI agents to automate most of a ransomware attack. In another, AI helped compress a cloud attack that would normally take weeks into just 72 hours. 

Researchers also say the threat is spreading across different types of crime. A separate case described by Axios involved a bank fraud scheme targeting Mexico-based financial organizations, where AI-generated malware played a role in the attack chain. These incidents suggest criminals are learning how to blend AI with traditional tactics instead of replacing human hackers entirely. That makes the attacks harder to predict, because AI is being used as an accelerator rather than a standalone weapon. 

For defenders, the most serious problem is time. AI is helping attackers move faster, which leaves organizations with fewer hours to detect suspicious behavior, investigate compromises, and patch weak spots before damage spreads. Security teams that once had days or weeks to respond may now have only a narrow window. That raises the pressure on companies to monitor systems more closely, strengthen access controls, and prepare for attacks that are increasingly automated and adaptive.

The broader message is clear: AI is lowering the cost and complexity of cybercrime while increasing the scale and speed of attacks. What once required a skilled team and long preparation can now be compressed into a shorter, more efficient operation. As criminal adoption grows, the cybersecurity industry will need to match that pace with faster detection, stronger resilience, and better incident response.

Ransomware activity climbs in Q2 2026 as leading gangs consolidate attacks and AI streamlines extortion efforts

 


Ransomware groups claimed responsibility for 2,279 attacks worldwide during the second quarter of 2026, marking a 7% increase from the previous quarter and a 43% jump compared with the same period last year, according to GuidePoint Security's latest quarterly ransomware report. Researchers also recorded the highest number of active ransomware groups seen in a single quarter, reflecting an ecosystem that continues to attract new threat actors even as attacks remain concentrated among a relatively small number of established operations.

Despite the growing number of ransomware groups, a handful of operators continue to dominate victim claims. GuidePoint found that the five most active groups were collectively responsible for more than 40% of all publicly reported ransomware incidents during the quarter, suggesting that while new groups continue to emerge, only a few have achieved sustained operational scale.

Qilin remained the most active ransomware operation during Q2, accounting for approximately 13% of all recorded victim claims. It was closely followed by The Gentlemen, a comparatively new group that has expanded rapidly in recent months. Together with Akira and DragonForce, the two groups make up what GuidePoint describes as a "four-headed monster," representing the most prolific ransomware operations currently shaping the threat landscape.

Rather than relying on a single dominant ransomware syndicate, today's ransomware ecosystem is distributed across several highly active groups capable of absorbing affiliates from disrupted operations. Researchers noted that this structure could reduce the long-term impact of law enforcement takedowns, as affiliates displaced from one ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) platform may quickly transition to another established operation without substantially disrupting attack activity.

The United States remained the country most frequently targeted by ransomware groups during the quarter, accounting for 40% of publicly claimed victims. Germany ranked second with 32%. However, GuidePoint observed a noticeable shift in targeting patterns, with the U.S. accounting for a smaller proportion of victims than in previous quarters, when roughly half of all reported incidents involved American organizations.

Researchers linked this broader geographic distribution to increased activity from groups including Qilin, The Gentlemen and LockBit, each of which claimed a larger share of victims outside the United States during Q2. The findings suggest that ransomware affiliates are expanding their operations across a wider range of regions instead of concentrating primarily on U.S.-based organizations.

Alongside changes in victim targeting, the report examined how artificial intelligence is being incorporated into ransomware operations. While concerns have grown around the possibility of AI creating entirely new forms of cyberattacks, GuidePoint found little evidence to support that scenario. Instead, threat actors are primarily using large language models (LLMs) to accelerate tasks that previously required significant manual effort, allowing them to improve efficiency without fundamentally changing their attack methods.

One case study highlighted in the report involved the data extortion group FulcrumSec. After obtaining a large volume of stolen information, the group reportedly used an LLM to examine complex databases and identify individuals appearing across multiple datasets. According to researchers, completing this level of analysis manually would have required either extensive knowledge of the victim's database architecture or a substantial investment of time by human operators.

The information extracted from the stolen data was then paired with AI-generated negotiation messages written in English. By demonstrating a detailed understanding of the compromised information, FulcrumSec strengthened its position during ransom negotiations, providing victims with evidence of the data in its possession while using those findings to justify its ransom demands.

GuidePoint also documented DragonForce's use of large language models during extortion negotiations. Researchers said the group generated convincing messages that sought to increase pressure on victims, including claims that it had legal counsel available to advise its operations. Although the report describes that assertion as almost certainly false, it illustrates how AI can help cybercriminals produce persuasive communications intended to exploit concerns around regulatory obligations, legal consequences and reputational damage.

According to the researchers, the effectiveness of these messages does not necessarily depend on their accuracy. Instead, their value lies in presenting information in a manner that appears credible enough to influence decision-making during negotiations. Large language models, which are capable of generating fluent and convincing text within seconds, are increasingly being used to support these psychological tactics.

Taken together, the findings indicate that AI is currently serving as an operational force multiplier rather than introducing an entirely new category of ransomware attacks. Tasks such as analyzing stolen data, organizing information, preparing victim communications and drafting negotiation messages can now be completed more quickly, enabling threat actors to devote more time to other stages of their operations.

At the same time, the continued concentration of attacks among a small group of highly active ransomware operations suggests that scale, organization and affiliate networks remain key drivers of today's ransomware economy. While new groups continue to enter the ecosystem, a limited number of established operators continue to account for a disproportionate share of publicly claimed attacks, reinforcing their influence across the global ransomware ecosystem.

AI Agent Runs First End-to-End Ransomware Attack

 

Security researchers have long warned that AI would lower the barrier to cybercrime, but the latest case makes that threat tangible. In the operation described by Sysdig and covered by Forbes, an autonomous agent carried out the technical steps of a ransomware attack from initial access to encryption and ransom-note generation. The group’s analysis suggests the attack was not a simple script; it adapted when it hit obstacles, corrected its own mistakes, and kept moving without a human at the keyboard. 

The campaign reportedly began with an exposed Langflow incident, which the attacker used to gain access through a known vulnerability. From there, the agent searched for secrets, including credentials and cloud keys, then expanded into a production environment and escalated privileges. Researchers said it encrypted more than 1,300 configuration records and generated its own ransom note with a Bitcoin address, showing how an AI system can combine reconnaissance, exploitation, and extortion in one chain. 

What makes the story unsettling is not only the automation, but the speed. One reported login failure was fixed in 31 seconds, a reminder that AI can iterate much faster than a human operator can type, think, or troubleshoot. That kind of responsiveness matters because ransomware succeeds by compressing the defender’s reaction time. If attackers can use agents to scan, pivot, and encrypt at machine speed, security teams will need similarly automated detection, containment, and recovery tools to keep up. 

Still, the incident also shows that “fully autonomous” cybercrime may be more complicated than the headline suggests. Later reporting said humans may have still chosen the target, prepared infrastructure, or supplied stolen credentials, even if the AI handled the intrusion itself. That distinction matters, because it means defenders are not just facing smarter malware, but a new hybrid model in which human planning and AI execution reinforce each other. The lesson for businesses is clear: reduce exposed services, enforce strong credential hygiene, segment critical systems, and assume that the next serious attack may be built and operated with far less human effort than before.

JadePuffer: First AI-Agent Ransomware Automates Entire Attack

 

Security researchers have identified JadePuffer as the first ransomware operation conducted entirely by an AI agent, marking a watershed moment in automated cyberattacks. Discovered by cloud security firm Sysdig, this incident demonstrates how large language model (LLM) agents can now execute complex intrusion campaigns without human intervention during the attack itself. 

Attack methodology 

The attack began by exploiting CVE-2025-3248, a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Langflow, an open-source platform for building LLM applications. Once inside the initial server, the AI agent systematically gathered intelligence, harvested credentials, and mapped the network to identify higher-value targets. It then pivoted to a production server running MySQL and Nacos configuration management, where it leveraged another known authentication bypass vulnerability to gain administrative access. 

What made JadePuffer particularly notable was its ability to detect and correct errors autonomously during the attack. When the agent's first attempt to create an administrator account failed, it analyzed the error and launched a corrected procedure just 31 seconds later, successfully modifying its credential generation approach. Sysdig researchers emphasized that this rapid self-correction capability is a strong indicator of genuine agentic behavior rather than a human operator using conventional automation tools. 

After securing access, JadePuffer encrypted more than 1,300 configuration elements in the database, deleted the original tables, and left a ransom note with a Bitcoin address and contact email. However, analysis revealed a disturbing detail: the encryption key was never stored or transmitted to any attacker-controlled server, suggesting victims could not recover their data even if they paid. Researchers believe this indicates the attack was oriented more toward data destruction than financial extortion, with claims of external backups appearing to be psychological pressure tactics without evidence of actual exfiltration. 

Security implications 

While JadePuffer has drawn attention to AI's role in cybercrime, experts stress that the fundamental vulnerability was poor security hygiene rather than the AI itself. Exposed credentials, unpatched vulnerabilities, default configurations, and excessive privileges enabled the agent to traverse the infrastructure within minutes. This incident underscores the urgent need for organizations to harden their AI application deployments, implement zero-trust architectures, and maintain rigorous patch management, as autonomous agents will increasingly exploit any weakness they encounter at machine speed.

Operation Endgame Disrupts Global Cyber Crime Assembly Line


Private companies and international authorities have disrupted a malicious “assembly line” that let hackers steal millions of login details and theft of $47 million in ransom payments via extortion. The operation aimed at catching two tools that are used in online scams.

The first tool is called Amadey, a malware-as-a-service platform for disrupting devices and deploying infected payloads for ransomware and related attacks. Amadey was first discovered in 2018 and in 2025, it exploited GitHub as it stored system info from malicious devices and deployed custom payloads.

The second tool is called StealC, it is an infostealer-as-a-service tool that steals cryptocurrency wallets, browser extensions, authentication cookies, and login credentials.

Disrupting a crucial link in the cyberattacks chain

Amadey and StealC are distinct tools that function autonomously. They are widely used, but many people use them in their personal cybercrime operations. 

The tools depend on the same infrastructure to function. Microsoft made this link after analyzing the tools using AI. The discovery allowed Microsoft to stop both tools simultaneously.

“This action goes after the cybercrime ‘assembly line,’ where coordinated tools drive ransomware, financial fraud, and disruptions to public services. Amadey and StealC are often used alongside each other: Amadey helps attackers gain access to devices, while StealC steals passwords and sensitive information. Together, they form a critical link in the chain,” Microsoft said.

About the investigation

Companies gathered proof that the tools shared the same infrastructure and invoked RICO statutes against organized crime. This resulted in treating the two tools as part of a single scam. 

Microsoft has disrupted over 200 C2 servers and shut down criminal control of over 18,000 compromised computers. Europol also assisted in the operation to track down the culprits and recovered around 27 million stolen login details and found $47 million worth of crypto assets tied to cybercriminals.

“During this action, 326 servers and 142 domains were actioned by law enforcement and the private sector partners, severely crippling the malware’s distribution network. By taking down these tools simultaneously, the collaboration between law enforcement and private parties has increased friction for cybercriminals, making it harder for attacks to succeed, spread, or recover,”  Europol said.

Operation Endgame

Other firms that helped in “Operation Endgame” are ESET, IBM X-Force, ESET, Mitsui Bussan Secure Directions, and Bitsight. 

According to Europol, another tool that disrupted Operation Endgame was SocGholish. It is a malware installer tied to the Russian cybercrime group Evil Corp. that distributes via hacked websites. If you visit such sites, you will be tricked into installing malware apps mimicking as browser extensions or genuine software.  

U.S. Secures Extradition of 19-Year-Old Linked to Scattered Spider


US authorities have intensified their pursuit of individuals linked to the financially motivated hacking collective Scattered Spider, and the extradition of a 19-year-old suspect marks another significant development. 

Peter Stokes, who is a dual citizen of the United States and Estonia, is accused of taking part in coordinated cyber intrusions, ransomware extortion, and fraud operations linked to the group, which disrupted more than 100 organizations across critical industries and generated more than $100 million in extortion payments for the group. 

After Stokes was arrested in Finland on a Red Notice from Interpol, he was transferred to the United States to be tried on several federal charges, which included conspiracy, computer intrusion, and extortion, demonstrating the increasing international cooperation being deployed for the dismantling of one of the most persistent cybercrime groups. 

In describing the prosecution, Federal officials said it is part of an ongoing effort to combat increasingly sophisticated cybercrime activities that target U.S. organizations across a range of industries. In his remarks, Andrew S. Boutros, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, co-chair of the Acting Attorney General's White Collar, Cyber, and Crypto Subcommittee Advisory Committee, stated that the allegations of the Scattered Spider attack caused widespread disruption to businesses nationwide and highlighted the increased capabilities of cybercriminals operating across international borders driven by financial gain. 

The Justice Department has demonstrated its commitment to pursuing technologically advanced threat actors regardless of where they are located with the charges, he stressed. In support of this position, Brett Leatherman, Assistant Director of the FBI's Cyber Division, stated that the group has consistently used employee-focused extortion and network compromise campaigns, which have resulted in millions of dollars of financial losses and disruptions to critical business operations. 

According to him, the investigation illustrates the importance of coordinating the efforts of domestic and international law enforcement to identify, disrupt, and prosecute cybercriminals, wherever they operate. The superseding criminal complaint alleges that Stokes is associated with several cyber intrusions allegedly conducted by his online alias "Bouquet," including activities that date back to his 16th year of age. 

A prosecutor contends that these activities were part of Scattered Spider's overall intrusion campaign, which also includes Octo Tempest, UNC3944, and 0ktapus, which are also tracked by security researchers. According to the investigation, the group compromised more than 100 networks by using highly targeted social engineering techniques, enabling the deployment of ransomware, data theft, and extortion schemes that collectively resulted in over $100 million in ransom payments as well as millions more in recovery costs for the organizations affected.

The complaint details a number of incidents in which Stokes and his co-conspirators allegedly breached a luxury jewelry retailer's network in May 2025, exfiltrating sensitive corporate data and demanding approximately $8 million in cryptocurrency. According to reports, the company declined to negotiate with the attackers, removed them from its environment, and incurred remediation expenses ranging from $2 million to $3 million. 

Stokes was reportedly apprehended at Helsinki Airport as he attempted to board a flight to Japan, where Finnish law enforcement officials confiscated two 2-terabyte hard drives as part of the investigation. According to investigators, Scattered Spider is not a traditional hierarchical cybercrime syndicate, but rather a decentralized, English-speaking network of young threat actors operating throughout the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe. 

In order to gain initial access, the attackers utilize sophisticated social engineering techniques rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities. In their investigations, investigators assert that Scattered Spider has consistently focused on human manipulation rather than technical exploitation. It has been reported that members impersonate legitimate employees when contacting corporate IT support desks, convincing them to reset their credentials or authorize their account access before moving laterally through compromised environments, exfiltrating sensitive data, and demanding payment under the threat of publication.

After the high-profile compromises of MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment in 2023, the group's techniques have come under scrutiny. The intrusion at MGM severely disrupted casino and hotel operations. Several security researchers have observed a sector-focused targeting strategy since then, connecting the collective with multiple campaigns against major UK retailers, including Marks & Spencer, Harrods, and Co-op before it moved on to target American insurance companies, followed by the aviation industry. 

A. Tysen Duva, assistant attorney general, pointed out that the collective was responsible for over 100 network intrusions resulting in over $100 million in ransom payments. It is important to note that Stokes' case also represents the culmination of a broader international law enforcement campaign that has relentlessly dismantled the individuals operating under the pseudonym Scattered Spider. 

During recent prosecutions, Scottish national Tyler Buchanan, 24, admitted to fraud and identity theft by admitting to his role in phishing campaigns targeting Twilio and LastPass. As a result, prosecutors stated that $8 million in cryptocurrency was stolen and carries a maximum sentence of 22 years in prison.

In addition, Florida-based member Noah Urban was sentenced in August 2025 to 10 years in prison as well as a $12 million fine, while U.K. citizens Thalha Jubair and Owen Flowers pleaded guilty in June 2026 in connection with the Transport for London hack in 2024. As indicated in court documents, Flowers admitted to conspiring to compromise the networks of U.S. healthcare providers SSM Health and Sutter Health, demonstrating how far prosecutions have spread in an effort to dismantle the group's international cybercrime network. 

Despite successive arrests disrupting Scattered Spider's operations, cybersecurity researchers caution that the group's tactics continue to affect the wider threat landscape. As a result of the law enforcement actions of 2025, Mandiant observed a temporary drop in activity; however, it also stated that other financially motivated threat groups have begun replicating the collective's social engineering approach. 

An important defensive lesson of the assessment is that identity verification processes are often the primary attack surface rather than perimeter security measures. It is recommended that assistance desk authentication procedures be strengthened and that phishing-resistant authentication methods, such as hardware-backed passkeys or security keys, be adopted as effective measures for limiting unauthorized access through credential reset abuse. 

According to a joint advisory issued by U.S. and international cybersecurity authorities, once the attackers gained initial access, they have reportedly been observed monitoring internal collaboration platforms and taking part in incident response calls as a way of tracking defensive actions in real-time and evading containment measures.

Researchers believe the digital evidence recovered during Stokes' arrest in Helsinki may provide valuable information about the group's broader infrastructure as well as potential associates. Even though Stokes remains presumed innocent until proven guilty in court, this latest extradition highlights a growing international enforcement effort that is demonstrating the inability of geographical distance, decentralized operations, and youth to provide reliable barriers to coordinated cybercrime prosecution. 

International authorities are increasingly combining cross-border investigations with coordinated prosecutions to pursue individuals behind sophisticated intrusion campaigns that can disrupt businesses and disrupt lives. Increasing sophistication in identity-based attacks requires organizations to strengthen authentication controls, harden help desk verification processes, and continuously monitor privileged access in order to reduce the impact of increasingly sophisticated social engineering tactics.

Europol Dismantles AudiA6 Crypto Laundering Network Used by Ransomware Gangs

 

Europol has disrupted a major cryptocurrency laundering operation known as AudiA6, which investigators say acted as a financial backbone for ransomware gangs and other cybercriminal networks. According to the agency, the service laundered more than EUR 336 million between 2022 and 2025 by helping criminals hide stolen digital assets and break the money trail. The takedown is significant because it targets not just attackers, but the payment infrastructure that allows cybercrime to stay profitable. 

The operation was carried out by law enforcement partners including the United States Secret Service, IRS Criminal Investigation, Polish Police, Europol, Eurojust, and other international agencies. During the coordinated action on 10 June, authorities arrested two alleged administrators in Georgia, searched three properties, seized more than 30 servers, and took down 25 domains connected to the laundering network. Investigators also froze EUR 692,000 in cryptocurrency and seized more than EUR 86,000, while Telegram accounts used by the group were blocked. 

Europol describes AudiA6 as an industrial-scale laundering service built around thousands of fraudulent exchange accounts created with stolen or purchased identities. The platform allegedly offered criminals fast “cleaning” of stolen crypto, returning funds in about an hour after charging commissions of 3% to 10%. The network was also linked to the dark web forum Dark2Web, which prosecutors say was used to advertise illegal services and connect cybercriminals worldwide. 

One of the most important findings in the investigation was the scale of identity abuse behind the scheme. Europol says more than 6,000 Know Your Customer records tied to money-mule accounts were identified, showing how criminals exploited exchange verification systems to move funds across borders. Many of those accounts were reportedly linked to Russian-speaking intermediaries recruited specifically to move proceeds through cryptocurrency exchanges. Europol also linked the service to more than 15 investigations worldwide involving ransomware attacks and major crypto thefts. 

The AudiA6 case highlights how professionalized crypto laundering has become a core part of the cybercrime economy. Europol warns that criminal groups increasingly rely on mixing services, chain-hopping, and mule networks to move money quickly and avoid detection. By striking this service, law enforcement has not ended ransomware, but it has made it harder for criminals to turn stolen data and extortion into usable cash.