The hackers, who claimed to represent the “Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters” (SLH) group, believed they successfully compromised Resecurity, a cybersecurity firm based in the United States, by exfiltrating their data. Resecurity disputed this by saying they were only able to gain access to their honeypot, which was set up to provide fake data to potential attackers. Such differing accounts of an incident show not only the brazenness of financially driven attackers but also the increasing use of deception techniques by attackers to gain intelligence.
The SLH members propagated their allegations through Telegram, claiming “full access” to the Resecurity systems and the theft of all internal conversations and logs, employee data, threat intelligence reports, and an extensive list of clients and their information. In an attempt to prove the validity of these allegations, the SLH members shared screenshots of Resecurity’s internal “Mattermost” environment, where conversations between the company employees and Pastebin representatives about malicious data on the Pastebin platform were shown. The SLH members described the attack as retaliation against Resecurity, which they believed was trying to socially engineer them by impersonating the buyers of the stolen Vietnamese financial database in order to receive complimentary samples and more information about their activities.
Adding to this complexity, the renowned threat actor group known as ShinyHunters, known to have been part of the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters umbrella, later disclaimed their involvement in this incident. This was revealed when a representative of ShinyHunters told a local media outlet that, although they have long claimed to be part of SLH, they did not have any involvement in this incident against Resecurity. This has left many questions regarding how these overlapping groups coordinate their efforts or if SLH uses its association with ShinyHunters to magnify its efforts.
Resecurity firmly disputes any compromise of its production environment, asserting that the attackers never touched live systems or genuine client data but instead interacted with a purpose-built honeypot. According to a report filed on December 24, it was determined that the initial recon in the vulnerable environment was first spotted on November 21, 2025, with subsequent scanning activities originating from Egyptian IP addresses and utilizing Mullvad VPN. In this regard, in order to monitor the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the attacker, the Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) team set up an isolated “honeypot” account.
To make the bait more convincing, Resecurity claims the creation of more than 28,000 fake consumer records and over 190,000 fake payment transactions modeled after the official API structures defined by Stripe. Later in December, the attacker reportedly began automated data exfiltration attacks with more than 188,000 requests made between December 12th and December 24th using a wide range of residential proxy IP addresses. During this period, Resecurity claims that sporadic proxy issues temporarily revealed actual IP addresses, helping analysts identify the attacker’s back-end servers, whose details were later shared with a foreign law enforcement agency that subsequently issued a subpoena against the attacker.
After the initial coverage, the attackers contacted Dissent Doe of DataBreaches.net and provided samples of what they claimed was stolen data, seeking to reinforce their narrative. However, an independent review by DataBreaches concluded there was no evidence that SLH obtained information from any real Resecurity clients, aligning with the company’s assertion that only synthetic records were exposed. Meanwhile, the Telegram channel that originally hosted SLH’s breach claims has since been suspended for violating the platform’s policies, limiting the group’s ability to continue publishing its version of events.
