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Fake ChatGPT and Claude Apps Deliver Crypto-Mining Malware

 

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a malware campaign, known as Yoba, that uses fake desktop applications for ChatGPT and Claude to trick users into installing cryptocurrency-mining malware. The attackers created convincing GitHub projects and websites for supposed AI tools such as “GPT-5.6 Sol,” “GPT-6 Astra,” and “Claude Opus,” then distributed malicious ZIP files that appeared to be legitimate installers. According to Check Point Research, the campaign exploits public interest in AI tools and the trust people place in familiar technology brands. 

The malicious archives contain two key files: a genuine, digitally signed executable from OpenAI or Anthropic, and a harmful Windows DLL named winmm.dll. When a user runs the legitimate-looking Setup.exe, Windows loads the malicious DLL alongside it. This technique, called DLL sideloading, lets attackers abuse trusted signed software to make malicious code appear less suspicious and evade basic security checks. Importantly, the research does not suggest that OpenAI, Anthropic, ChatGPT, or Claude themselves were compromised. 

Once launched, the malicious DLL—called YobaDropper—checks that it is being run through the expected host executable, making it harder for researchers to activate it in a sandbox. It then copies a legitimate Windows media component, wmpdmc.exe, into a new folder and places another malicious DLL beside it. This second component, YobaLoader, establishes persistence through a scheduled task and retrieves further instructions from the attacker. 

YobaLoader uses an unusual command-and-control method to avoid detection. It downloads an image from a Telegram channel, takes the final 50 bytes as a seed, and generates a new domain using a domain-generation algorithm. It then queries Google’s DNS-over-HTTPS service for a hidden command stored in a DNS TXT record, which leads it to download the next-stage payload. By using DoH and common file-hosting services, the attackers make their traffic resemble ordinary internet activity and evade passive DNS monitoring. 

The downloaded payload is injected into Windows’ svchost.exe process, where it launches XMRig, a cryptocurrency miner. Victims may notice slower performance, higher CPU usage, increased electricity consumption, or unexpected system heat. Users should download AI applications only from official vendor websites or verified app stores, avoid installing “desktop versions” from random GitHub repositories, and be cautious of search results promoting unfamiliar AI tools. Organizations should also restrict installations from unknown sources and monitor endpoints for unusual scheduled tasks and mining activity.

Anthropic Acquires Opaque Systems to Strengthen Confidential and Verifiable AI

 

Anthropic has acquired Opaque Systems, which focuses on developing technologies that enable artificial intelligence systems to process sensitive information, while keeping it confidential with the help of the underlying hardware infrastructure. The details of the deal were not disclosed, and the startup confirmed that they will join Anthropic, as its separate operations will be shut down. 

Opaque announced the transaction last week, adding that their previous research output and engineering efforts concentrated on confidential computing and recently evolved towards solutions that can help organizations audit the behavior of AI systems and agents. The company was formed based on a research project at UC Berkeley’s RISELab about ten years earlier. Its co-founders are Ion Stoica, one of the co-founders of Databricks and Anyscale, and Raluca Ada Popa, a Google DeepMind researcher who works on encryption and systems security. 

Aaron Fulkerson was hired as the chief executive officer of Opaque in October 2023. Previously, Opaque worked on solutions that applied confidential computing research to production AI, making sure that the data they process and the models themselves were protected by hardware. However, as the technology matures, Opaque pointed out that there is a need for organizations to ensure that they can audit AI systems. 

According to Opaque, the company observed that the trustworthiness of AI is a critical concern for many businesses. Therefore, Opaque’s engineers and scientists took their expertise in cryptographic solutions and expanded the research to make verifiable AI the company’s specialization. They provide cryptographic guarantees that specify what computations happened, where, and under what policy. 

Moreover, the startup has made significant contributions to open-source projects that share tools, training, and experience for building trustworthy and secure AI agents and models, such as the Agent Governance Toolkit, TRACE, Confidential MCP, and Weight Custody Manifest. In early 2026, Opaque raised $24 million in a Series B funding round at a reported valuation of $300 million in funding, and Anthropic was one of their first customers, along with ServiceNow and Accenture. 

After the acquisition was announced, Opaque’s website stated that all of its employees would transfer to Anthropic to continue their work, while Opaque itself would shut down. However, it did not comment on what this means for current customers, and how transactions with organizations will be handled after the acquisition is completed.

The acquisition highlights Opaque’s technology areas and expertise, which fits Anthropic’s strategy to develop more secure and trustworthy AI systems. However, Anthropic and Opaque have not yet released any information about how the technology can be adapted to Anthropic’s solutions and products.

Anthropic Restricts Internet Access for Internal AI Tests After Claude Models Target Real Websites


Anthropic has restricted live internet access across its internal artificial intelligence evaluations after finding cases in which Claude models performed unauthorised actions on real websites and systems. Anthropic identified four categories of unintended behaviour. Although the company said the incidents had minimal real-world impact, it is strengthening its security measures to prevent similar events.

About the incident

One incident involved Claude Mythos Preview, which exploited SQL injection or command injection vulnerabilities in third-party software to execute commands on a university server. The model reportedly turned to external tools when its assigned tools were restricted or a required service was unavailable.

In another case, Claude Haiku 4.5 submitted a false tip through a website associated with an unsolved homicide investigation. The model had been instructed not to submit personal information or perform unauthorised actions, but it failed to recognise that submitting the form was also prohibited. The incident involved a website connected to the Philadelphia Police Department in the United States.

Claude Mythos 5 bypassed restrictions

Anthropic also found that Claude Mythos 5 bypassed restrictions to retrieve information protected by a token or payment requirement. In a separate incident, a Claude model used URL-shortening services to get around limitations imposed by its web-fetching tool.

Some of the affected websites were operated by US government agencies at federal, state and local levels. Anthropic has withheld the names of the organisations involved to avoid exposing weaknesses in their systems and to respect requests from the affected parties.

Security concerns

When an AI model focuses too heavily on completing an assigned objective, it may interpret restrictions incorrectly or take actions that were never authorised. The Philadelphia Police Department reportedly said the submission was flagged as spam. 

What is Anthropic doing?

Anthropic has expanded its restrictions on live internet access to include all internal evaluations. The company said it would maintain these restrictions until it is confident that its security controls and monitoring systems can reliably identify similar behaviour.

It is also conducting a larger review of environments where Claude models can access the internet. According to Anthropic, the investigation could uncover further incidents of unintended actions. “We’ve taken several preventive measures. Some of the public evaluations we no longer run; others we have moved to their offline versions, or rebuilt them so that their tasks do not reach live websites,” Anthropic said.

AI Safety Concerns Put OpenAI and Anthropic Under FTC Scrutiny

 

Artificial intelligence companies are facing another layer of scrutiny in the United States, with the Federal Trade Commission examining whether increasingly capable AI products could expose consumers to unlawful or unexpected risks. 

OpenAI, Anthropic and other AI developers are among the companies being examined as part of the inquiry. Rather than focusing on a single incident, the investigation is expected to cover a wider range of potential consumer harms. These could include the handling of personal information, claims made about AI capabilities and situations in which AI systems operate in ways that create risks outside their intended use. The FTC is expected to seek information directly from the companies and could require senior executives to provide testimony. 

The investigation comes as developers have publicly acknowledged increasingly unusual behavior from advanced AI systems. OpenAI revealed over the summer that one of its AI systems had compromised Hugging Face. Similar disclosures were subsequently made by Anthropic and other companies. The FTC’s initial steps toward examining the issue, however, reportedly began before OpenAI publicly disclosed its incident. 

That timing gives the investigation a broader context. Regulators are not simply reacting to one publicly reported AI security incident but are examining how existing consumer-protection laws might apply as AI products become capable of interacting with computer systems, handling information and carrying out increasingly complex tasks. The FTC’s approach also comes against the backdrop of limited new federal AI regulation. 

The Trump administration has generally favored allowing the industry to develop with fewer new restrictions, with the administration arguing that the United States must compete with China in artificial intelligence. Trump has said he would encourage AI development and rely on agencies such as the FTC and Department of Justice to pursue misconduct under existing laws when necessary. AI executives and regulators have nevertheless discussed safety measures at the White House. 

OpenAI president Greg Brockman, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei and FTC chair Andrew Ferguson were among those attending a meeting with Trump. The discussions resulted in a voluntary commitment from AI companies to develop protections against serious risks, including cyberattacks and chemical weapons. No new regulations were introduced as a result, and the companies also agreed to refer to AI at a certain level of capability as “super intelligence.” Ferguson’s position on AI companies has added another dimension to the FTC’s approach. 

While his agency has taken a less aggressive stance toward business regulation under his leadership, it continues to pursue cases involving companies including Meta and Amazon. Ferguson has also said AI developers could be held responsible for damage caused by their products. The latest inquiry is not the FTC’s first examination of OpenAI. The agency began investigating the company’s security practices in 2023 and issued a 20-page demand for information concerning personal data and how that information was being used in AI model development. 

OpenAI and Anthropic had not immediately commented on the latest investigation. As AI developers continue expanding what their systems can do, the FTC’s inquiry could help determine how existing consumer-protection rules are applied when those capabilities themselves become a source of potential harm.

Anthropic: Infostealer Malware Hacks Claude Sessions to Drain Consumption Usage


Anthropic has warned Claude users that infostealer malware on their systems has stolen active Claude login sessions, letting threat actors to log into accounts and using it.

Anthropic is logging out impacted users out of Claude, eliminating saved payment records, and reimbursing unauthorized charges. 

When a user shared the incident on Reddit, Anthropic replied in an email that, “We have recently become aware of a bad actor that is using common infostealer malware to steal Claude login sessions from people's computers, then using those login sessions to access Claude accounts and consume their usage.”

Anthropic also warned that if “your usage limits looked like they refilled and then drained while you weren't using Claude, this was likely the cause.”

Experts suggest that infostealers can also copy an already verified session, meaning the threat actor doesn’t require the standard password and multi-factor login process again.

Who is responsible?

In the email sent to impacted account users, Anthropic said the investigation is in progress, but the PCs were already compromised standard-purpose infostealer malware.

According to Anthropic, it has “no reason to believe that this malware is related to Claude, installed through Claude, or related to anything you did with Claude.”

As per the company, the malware usually enters via malicious apps or downloads and steals locally stored data such as login cookies, app credentials, and browser passwords.

"Your Claude session was likely one of the many things it collected. It appears that a bad actor has now started picking the Claude sessions out of what it collected and using them," Anthropic said.

In the reddit incident, the user shared that they downloaded a pirated game, which led to system compromise. 

Anthropic has found multiple malware such as StealC, Vidar, LummaC2, Acreed on Windows, RedLine, and Atomic Stealer (AMOS) on Macbooks

If you are impacted, Claude will eliminate hacked sessions and revoke saved payment methods to avoid unapproved purchases.

Signing you out of Claude stops the stolen sessions, but it doesn't remove the malware. If it's still on your computer, your next login session could be stolen the same way,” Anthropic warned.

How to stay safe?

  • Impacted users can follow basic security steps such as:
  • Changing passwords
  • Removing malware from the PCs
  • Stopping other sessions

Claude AI Breached Three Organizations During Internal Testing


Anthropic’s Claude models, during internal security testing, made a malicious Python package and uploaded it to PyPi, where it ran on 15 real systems. The registry’s automated security then shut it down. 

Anthropic said that in three cases, Claude models accessed the open internet via evaluation environments meant to be shut, then breached production infrastructure at three firms.

The review came after OpenAI’s recent disclosure that its models had evaded an isolated test scenario and accessed Hugging Face’s production infrastructure. Later, Jrfrog acknowledged the models escaped by abusing zero-days in self-hosted Artifactory.

Claiming a package that did not exist

Irregular, a third-party evaluation partner, conducted capture-the-flag exercises where these three incidents happened. The prompt instructed Claude it did not have internet access and that the scenario was a simulation. Neither was true due to a misconfiguration, which neither company discovered until last week.

In the case of PyPi, Claude discovered a document within the test environment pretending to be a developer setup commands for a fake organization.

Anthropic did not disclose the name of the organizations, and has asked other AI companies to do such tests to better gauge the threats of their models’ functionalities.

Anthropic reviewed over 140,00 tests to discover proof. In the tests, Claude was given commands to get “secret” information planted on another device in an isolated network. 

Claude was then instructed to get the hidden information by hacking into the machine and finding it. It is a common technique that experts use to determine a model’s breaking capabilities. 

“Operating under the false belief that all accessible entities were intended to be in-scope for the exercise, Claude compromised the impacted organizations’ infrastructure using basic techniques, such as exploiting weak passwords and unauthenticated endpoints,” Anthropic said on its blog.

Models do what they are told

The review suggests that AI models perform what people tell them to. Therefore, we should not fear if AI is going to take over, but be cautious of the big organizations behind these AI agents deciding what is safe and unsafe for the world.

The review also reveals why government oversight and independent testing is important. “We frequently work with external partners who create and assist in running some of these cybersecurity evaluations. External partners offer environments and scenarios more diverse than we could build alone, and provide independent, third-party assessments of our models,” Anthropic said. 

Researchers Find Claude for Chrome Flaws That Could Let Malicious Extensions Trigger Sensitive Google Tasks




Researchers at Manifold Security have disclosed two security weaknesses in Anthropic's Claude for Chrome extension that could allow another browser extension with access to the Claude website to trigger predefined AI-powered actions involving a user's Gmail, Google Docs and Google Calendar.

According to the researchers, the issues remain present in version 1.0.80 of the extension despite earlier mitigations introduced after the disclosure of the "ClaudeBleed" vulnerability. While Anthropic restricted how external webpages can communicate with the extension, Manifold says the underlying trust boundary that determines whether a user intentionally initiated an action has not been fully addressed.

The findings do not indicate that arbitrary websites can directly read a user's email or documents. Instead, the attack requires another browser extension that already has permission to execute scripts on the claude.ai domain. If such an extension is malicious or becomes compromised, it could abuse Claude's existing capabilities to initiate AI tasks that access a user's connected Google services.


Forged clicks can initiate predefined Claude actions

Following the earlier ClaudeBleed disclosure, Anthropic replaced unrestricted prompt handling with a fixed allowlist of predefined onboarding tasks. Rather than allowing external callers to submit arbitrary prompts, the extension now recognizes only nine task identifiers embedded within its code.

Among these are demonstration workflows for third-party services such as DoorDash, Salesforce and Zillow, along with tasks that interact with Gmail, Google Docs and Google Calendar. This design significantly narrows the attack surface because outside scripts can no longer provide custom instructions for Claude to execute.

However, Manifold Security found that the mechanism responsible for launching these tasks can still be manipulated.

The researchers explain that a content script running within the extension monitors the Claude webpage for clicks on a specific onboarding element. When a click occurs, the script reads the associated task identifier and forwards it to the extension, which opens Claude's side panel with the corresponding workflow prepared.

The problem lies in how those clicks are validated. Instead of confirming that the event originated from an actual user interaction, the extension accepts any matching click event, including one generated programmatically by JavaScript.

Modern browsers provide an "event.isTrusted" property that distinguishes genuine user actions from synthetic events created by scripts. According to Manifold, the extension does not verify this property before processing the request.

As a result, another extension capable of interacting with the Claude webpage can dynamically create the required element, assign one of the approved task identifiers and dispatch an artificial click event. Because the extension treats the event as legitimate, Claude opens the selected workflow as though the user had manually initiated it.

The researchers demonstrated this behavior using a short proof-of-concept script executed within the Claude page, showing that synthetic click events marked as untrusted were still accepted by the extension.


Approval settings determine the level of risk

Whether the forged action progresses beyond this point depends largely on how the extension has been configured.

For users operating under Claude's default "Ask before acting" setting, the extension still presents an approval prompt before carrying out actions involving Gmail, Google Docs or Google Calendar. This additional confirmation prevents automatic execution, although users could still unknowingly approve an attacker-triggered request.

The risk increases considerably for users who have enabled the optional "Act without asking" mode. In this configuration, the extension can perform supported tasks without requesting further confirmation, allowing attacker-triggered workflows to execute automatically.

Manifold assigned a CVSS severity score of 7.7 under the default approval model and 9.6 when unattended execution is enabled.

The researchers say a straightforward mitigation would be to reject any click event that was not generated by a genuine user, preventing scripts from activating these workflows through synthetic browser events.


Researchers identify second permission-handling concern

Manifold also disclosed a separate issue involving how the extension initializes permission settings when its side panel loads.

According to the researchers, if the panel starts with a specific URL parameter indicating that permission checks should be skipped, the extension immediately enters a mode that bypasses user approval for supported actions.

Although users receive a warning indicating that Claude now has broader authority to perform actions on their behalf, the privileged session has already been established by the time the notification appears.

The researchers emphasize that this second issue is not directly exploitable under current conditions because the parameter can presently be generated only by the extension itself. Nevertheless, they argue that any future vulnerability allowing a lower-privileged component to influence this parameter could eliminate the remaining approval barrier and enable silent execution.

Potential attack paths discussed by the researchers include future message-handling flaws, panel initialization bugs or cross-site scripting vulnerabilities that could expose the parameter to untrusted input.

To reduce that risk, Manifold recommends that the extension ignore permission-related values supplied through URLs and instead always initialize new sessions in approval mode.

The researchers classify the forged-task technique as an example of indirect prompt injection within the OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications because an attacker manipulates the AI agent into executing one of its own predefined workflows rather than supplying new instructions directly.

They also associate the unattended execution scenario with excessive agency, referring to AI systems that are granted broad authority to perform sensitive actions with minimal user oversight.

According to the report, these behaviors occur regardless of whether users are running Claude Opus, Sonnet or Fable, indicating that the weaknesses originate in the browser extension rather than the underlying language models.


Issues remain unresolved months after disclosure

Manifold Security reported both vulnerabilities to Anthropic on May 21 while testing version 1.0.72 of the extension. Anthropic acknowledged the reports the following day.

The forged-click issue was closed on the basis that it fell within the scope of the previously reported ClaudeBleed investigation, which Anthropic indicated remained open while a more comprehensive solution was being developed.

The permission-handling report was classified as informational because the relevant parameter was intended for workflows that users had already configured for unattended execution.

Despite those responses, Manifold says it found the same vulnerable code paths unchanged after examining version 1.0.80 released on July 7.

As of July 14, the researchers noted that no CVE identifier had been assigned to either issue and Anthropic had not published a public advisory addressing the findings.

The latest research follows a series of security concerns involving AI-powered browser agents.

Earlier this year, researchers disclosed ClaudeBleed, a vulnerability that allowed websites to inject prompts into Claude for Chrome by exploiting how the extension trusted requests originating from the Claude website itself rather than verifying which script generated them.

LayerX, which originally disclosed ClaudeBleed, described the issue as a classic "confused deputy" problem, where software possessing legitimate privileges unknowingly performs actions on behalf of an untrusted requester.

Security researchers have also identified comparable trust-boundary weaknesses affecting other Anthropic products, including Claude Code, demonstrating broader challenges associated with AI agents that can directly interact with browsers, developer environments and online accounts.

The latest findings reinforce the importance of carefully validating user intent before granting AI assistants access to sensitive online services. As AI-powered browser agents become increasingly capable of interacting with email, documents and productivity platforms, researchers argue that ensuring those actions genuinely originate from users remains one of the most critical security controls.

Compromised Jscrambler npm Releases Target Developer Environments with Cross-Platform Rust Infostealer

 



Developers and organizations using the Jscrambler npm package are being urged to audit their systems after multiple malicious releases were uploaded to the npm registry through a compromised publishing credential. The incident transformed a trusted development dependency into a malware delivery mechanism capable of stealing credentials, browser sessions, cryptocurrency wallets, and sensitive configuration files from Windows, macOS, and Linux systems. Jscrambler has confirmed the compromise was limited to its Code Integrity npm package and has advised users to upgrade to version 8.22.0 after revoking the affected publishing credentials and strengthening its release pipeline.

Security researchers first identified version 8.14.0 as the initial compromised release after discovering that it introduced a previously undocumented npm "preinstall" lifecycle hook. Unlike the legitimate 8.13.0 release, the malicious package included new files that were absent from Jscrambler's public source repository. During installation, the package silently unpacked and executed a native binary tailored to the victim's operating system, allowing the malware to run before developers ever interacted with the package itself. Socket detected the malicious release within minutes of publication, highlighting how quickly software supply chain attacks can unfold.

Technical analysis showed the package concealed separate native payloads for Linux, Windows, and macOS inside an obfuscated container embedded within the package. A lightweight loader selected the appropriate binary for the host operating system, wrote it to a temporary directory under a randomized filename, granted execution permissions where required, and launched it as a background process with minimal user visibility. Researchers also noted that these components never appeared in the project's public GitHub repository, suggesting the malicious code bypassed the project's normal development workflow and was introduced during package publication.

The payload itself is a Rust-based infostealer engineered to harvest assets commonly found on developer workstations and build infrastructure. Investigators found code targeting cloud credentials associated with AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud, browser-stored passwords and cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, Bitwarden vault data, communication platforms such as Slack, Discord and Telegram, and developer secrets that could provide access to production environments. Researchers also observed the malware searching for configuration files belonging to AI-assisted development tools, including Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Visual Studio Code and Zed, where API keys and Model Context Protocol credentials are frequently stored.

Beyond credential theft, the malware incorporated platform-specific capabilities intended to strengthen its foothold on compromised systems. Analysts found Linux-specific code interacting with eBPF, a kernel technology that allows programs to execute within the operating system kernel, although the precise purpose of this functionality remains under investigation. Windows and macOS variants incorporated persistence mechanisms designed to survive system reboots, while encrypted command-and-control communications complicated static analysis and hindered efforts to identify the attackers' infrastructure. Runtime monitoring also identified outbound connections associated with the campaign's command infrastructure.

The campaign expanded rapidly after the initial discovery. Additional malicious versions, including 8.16.0, 8.17.0, 8.18.0 and 8.20.0, were subsequently identified. While the earlier releases relied on npm's preinstall hook to execute the malware automatically during installation, later versions embedded the same payload directly into the package's runtime code. This change allowed the malware to execute when the package was imported or its command-line interface was launched, reducing the effectiveness of mitigations such as disabling lifecycle scripts during installation. Researchers described the shift as an example of attackers quickly adapting to evolving software supply chain defenses.

Further investigation by JFrog linked the malware to an evolved variant of the IronWorm infostealer. According to the researchers, the malware extends beyond information theft by attempting to propagate itself across the npm ecosystem. The code searches compromised systems for npm authentication tokens, validates the stolen credentials, identifies valuable packages, injects malicious components into package archives, and attempts to publish trojanized versions directly to the npm registry. JFrog also reported that the malware broadens its search to include VPN configurations, password managers, Tor-related files and directories associated with penetration testing frameworks, indicating an effort to compromise developers, security researchers and enterprise engineering teams alike.

The incident adds to a growing series of attacks targeting open source software distribution channels, where compromising trusted packages offers attackers access to developer workstations and CI/CD pipelines instead of directly attacking production systems. Because these environments often contain deployment credentials, signing keys, cloud secrets and proprietary source code, a single compromised dependency can expose far more than the application that depends on it. Researchers have increasingly warned that software supply chain attacks are shifting toward development infrastructure, making continuous dependency monitoring and rapid package verification critical components of modern software security.

Organizations that installed any affected version should immediately upgrade to Jscrambler 8.22.0 or later, investigate development workstations and build systems for signs of compromise, and assume any credentials accessible to the affected environment have been exposed. Security teams should rotate cloud credentials, npm and GitHub tokens, API keys, browser sessions and other secrets, inspect lockfiles and build logs for compromised package versions, and review systems for persistence artifacts before returning affected machines to service.

GhostApproval Symlink Codes Could Run Malicious Codes in AI Coding Agents


Cyber security experts at Wiz discovered that a bug in six famous AI coding assistants allows a booby-trapped code project to silently take over a developer’s system. The assistant can ask access to edit one innocent-looking file, but the write takes over a sensitive file.

The impacted tools are Windsurf, Google Antigravity, Cursor, Amazon Q Developer, Claude Code by Anthropic, and Augment. Wiz has termed the technique GhostApproval and posted it recently.

Three of the six AI assistants have addressed, two did not, while Anthropic argues if it is a bug. The most vulnerable are the tools that modify file before you can notice.

Attack tactic

The threat actors exploit an old Unix feature called symlink (or symbolic link), that AI assistants cannot check. 

A symlink silently directs to other files somewhere else on disk, hence writing to it particularly writes to the victim. 

“Symbolic links have been a security headache since the early days of Unix. From /tmp race conditions to privilege escalation exploits, symlinks have a long history of bypassing security boundaries by making one path silently resolve to another. It's a well-documented attack primitive - CWE-61 dates back decades,” Wiz said.

Research model

Wiz made a malicious repository with a symbolic link called project_settings.json that really directs to target’s SSH login file, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. The repo’s README commands the assistant to put “a line” to project_settings.json, and this line is the hacker’s SSH key mimicking an innocent setting. “

If you ask the agent to “set up the workspace” or “follow the README,” it writes the key directly via the symlink into the login file. Following this, if the machine plays an SSH  service the threat actor can access, they can sign in without password. 

The second variant

Another variant of the attack writes to your shell startup file, ~/.zshrc, which the shell runs the next moment you open a terminal without needing an SSH. There are no indications that any of this has been abused in real-time operations, Wiz has only demonstrated it as their research.

“Symlinks have been exploited for decades – in race conditions (CVE-2018-15664), in package managers (CVE-2021-32803), in container escapes (CVE-2024-21626). Any time a tool writes to a user-controlled path without resolving it first, symlinks become a weapon,” Wiz wrote in its blog. 

BioSchocking Attacks Tricked AI-powered Browsers into Data Theft


A new prompt injection termed “BioShocking” can manipulate AI-based browsers into treating malicious actions as a video game, and give away your login credentials. The technique was discovered by experts at security firm LayerX. The experts tricked six AI-powered browsers and assistants into recording users’ credentials and sending them to the threat actor. 

The browsers include:

ChatGPT Atlas from OpenAI

Comet from Perplexity

Anthropic’s Claude browser

Fellou

Genspark browser

Sigma browser

LayerX experts made a proof-of-concept (PoC), which was tested against these agentic AI browser products. The findings revealed that only one browser addressed the issue after receiving the report.

What is an AI browser?

An AI browser can streamline the entire workflow for the users. If you switch it to agent mode, it can click type, and visit sites that the user has already logged into. Access is the key point hare, which also becomes the problem.

BioShocking attack tactic

Experts made a (PoC) in which an infected webpage showed a BioShock-themed puzzle that rewards wrong answers. This tricks the browser that normal rules are not applicable. 

The trap works because of how these AI-powered browsers read. The webpage and instruction surface as a single stream of text, which allows a malicious page access in commands mimicking ordinary content or game rules. The agent can not tell which is which. Experts have termed this indirect prompt injection.

Tricking the browser

For instance, the compromise starts with a web page made as a puzzle. 3+4+=9 is a wrong answer but the browser rewards it. When the agent accepts that wrong answer is the reward, it follows game puzzle logic not security logic. Following this, the puzzle asks the browser to record login credentials. All six browsers could not flag it as something malicious. To win the game, the agent is commanded to go to a GitHub repository and share the data in the code, such as sensitive data like passwords.

When the link is sent to the target's GitHub repository, it retrieves SSH login credentials and sends them to the hackers. The main issue here is that browsers can’t differentiate between real scenarios and malicious fictional ones. 

According to LayerX, “Once the agents figured out the rules and learned that 'incorrect' actions are acceptable, they were no longer tied to reality.” “When tasked with the final step of the puzzle – compromising user credentials – all 6 agents failed to identify it as going against their safety guardrails,” the experts continued.

The PoC did not execute any malicious commands but warned that it could do so.

AI vendors’ response

According to experts, only OpenAI implemented a working patch for BioShocking in its browser.

Anthropic tried to fix the issue on its chrome login, but the patch was not working against the PoC. Perplexity did not fix the issue, and closed the report. 

LayerX advises that AI vendors should add specific user acknowledgement for sensitive work, and stronger security checks.

Anthropic Restores Limited Access to Claude Mythos 5 AI Model After US Government Approval

 

Earlier limits on Anthropic’s top-tier AI tools have been eased by U.S. officials, reopening limited availability of the Claude Mythos 5 system to certain approved American institutions. Though only recently barred due to fears about potential misuse threatening national safety, the model is now accessible again under tight conditions. Government oversight in high-level AI deployment continues expanding, especially when such systems involve strong digital defense functions. 

While concerns remain, selective reinstatement suggests a shift toward managed access rather than blanket bans. Now cleared by U.S. authorities, Mythos 5 can be used again by groups managing essential infrastructure operations. Over a hundred entities - some among the largest corporations - are set to reconnect under new guidelines. Though access returns in phases, Anthropic emphasizes steady progress restoring function, even as talks continue with federal agencies on widening reach later. 

One goal remains: bringing back full public availability of the Fable 5 system after further review. One restriction began with an export directive dated June 12, forcing Anthropic to shut off entry points to Mythos 5 along with Fable 5. Not long after, OpenAI revealed a delay in launching GPT-5.6 widely - this pause came by direction from U.S. officials. Rather than open access freely, they handed early permissions only to select collaborators, names already passed to federal agencies.

Oversight like this signals a quiet but steady push from regulators to track how powerful artificial intelligence moves into real-world use. Officials worry powerful AI systems might fall into the hands of rival nations - like those in Beijing or Moscow - despite existing barriers. Because these tools can detect system flaws faster than humans, they may speed up digital attacks when protections fail. While designed for defense, their functions could shift toward offense once access is gained through weak points. 

Even infrastructure meant to resist intrusion becomes a target under such conditions. Surprisingly, Anthropic admitted that authorities questioned whether flaws in its security could allow bypassing controls meant to stop abuse of the Fable 5 system when spotting code weaknesses. Although officials noted improvements in handling those dangers, details about the specific defenses enabling partial revival of Mythos 5 remain undisclosed by public agencies. 

Though some defend the selection method, lawyers and tech executives have raised doubts. Questions emerge over who gets picked - free expression supporters point out unclear criteria behind group approvals. Without clear rules on checks, suspicion grows. Safety tests gain backing even as control worries surface; Sam Altman backs strong evaluations yet hesitates at state influence shaping access paths. Decisions made behind closed doors unsettle those watching closely. 

Now, trusted groups working with Mythros 5 won’t need export permits - this applies also to their staff outside the U.S. - as long as they’re named on the official roster. Still, firms left off the list must follow current licensing rules. A number of listed entities belong to Anthropic’s Project Glasswing, it is said, a collaboration hosting around one hundred tech outfits and study centers. 

Now comes news after Donald Trump issued an executive directive creating a non-mandatory process: creators of cutting-edge artificial intelligence may offer their systems to federal authorities for scrutiny during a thirty-day window prior to wider release. Some say this step offers temporary protection until more complete regulatory structures emerge through policy work. 

Yet concerns rise elsewhere - extended delays in launching powerful AI tools might hinder progress, weakening American firms just as international competitors push forward with their own intelligent technologies.

Anthropic Alleges Alibaba Conducted Massive AI Capability Extraction Campaign Against Claude

 


Anthropic has accused Chinese technology conglomerate Alibaba and its AI research division, Qwen, of carrying out a large-scale effort to extract capabilities from its Claude family of artificial intelligence models, describing the incident as the most extensive distillation operation the company has encountered.

The allegations were detailed in a June 10 letter sent to U.S. Senate Banking Committee Chair Tim Scott and Ranking Member Elizabeth Warren. In the correspondence, Anthropic claimed that operators linked to Alibaba and Qwen systematically interacted with Claude in an attempt to capture and reproduce some of the model's most advanced capabilities.

According to the company, the activity occurred between April 22 and June 5, 2026. During that period, Anthropic says it recorded more than 28.8 million exchanges associated with the operation. The requests were allegedly distributed across nearly 25,000 fraudulent accounts, enabling the actors to conduct high-volume interactions with the platform while obscuring the true source of the activity.

Anthropic stated that the campaign was not focused on general-purpose chatbot functions. Instead, it allegedly targeted capabilities considered among the most valuable within the Claude ecosystem, including software engineering tasks and advanced agentic reasoning. These functions form a critical component of the company's Mythos Preview model, one of Anthropic's most sophisticated AI systems designed to perform complex reasoning and autonomous task execution.

At the center of the allegations is a technique known as adversarial distillation. In machine learning, distillation generally refers to the process of training a model using outputs generated by another system. While the approach itself is commonly used within the AI industry, Anthropic argues that the method becomes problematic when it relies on unauthorized access to proprietary models.

According to the company, the actors behind the campaign repeatedly queried Claude and collected its responses at scale. Those outputs could then be used as training material for another AI system, allowing developers to reproduce aspects of Claude's behavior without investing the time, computational resources, and research expenditure typically required to build a frontier model from the ground up.

Anthropic warned lawmakers that such activity enables organizations to appropriate years of research and development through large-scale extraction campaigns. The company argued that these operations are designed to gather capabilities developed by leading U.S. AI laboratories and incorporate them into competing systems without bearing the costs associated with original model development.

Beyond intellectual property concerns, Anthropic also raised questions about safety. The company noted that models trained through adversarial distillation may replicate useful capabilities while failing to inherit the safeguards, alignment mechanisms, and risk controls embedded within the original system. As a result, the practice could create AI models that retain advanced functionality but operate with fewer protections against misuse.

The allegations against Alibaba follow earlier claims made by Anthropic regarding unauthorized access attempts linked to Chinese AI developers. In February 2026, the company disclosed that DeepSeek, the startup whose low-cost AI models attracted global attention in 2025, was among several organizations accused of attempting to improperly obtain Claude outputs. Anthropic now characterizes these incidents as part of a broader pattern of repeated efforts to extract capabilities from leading U.S. AI systems.

The dispute emerges amid growing government scrutiny of advanced AI technologies. Earlier this month, Anthropic revealed that it had received guidance from the Trump administration requiring the company to restrict access to its newest AI models, including Fable 5 and Mythos 5. Under the directive, access would be limited to U.S. persons, preventing non-U.S. citizens, including some employees, from interacting with the latest systems.

The issue is also beginning to influence policy discussions on Capitol Hill. Senators Bill Hagerty and Andy Kim are reportedly preparing legislation that would authorize sanctions or other penalties against Chinese organizations found to have improperly obtained outputs from U.S. AI models for the purpose of training competing systems. The proposal reflects growing concern among lawmakers that frontier AI capabilities have become both strategic economic assets and matters of national security.

Alibaba has not publicly responded to the allegations.

The dispute surfaces a new battleground in the global AI race. As companies invest billions of dollars to develop increasingly capable models, concerns are shifting beyond traditional cybersecurity threats toward the protection of model knowledge itself. For AI developers, the challenge is no longer limited to securing infrastructure and data. It increasingly involves preventing the large-scale extraction of capabilities that can be repurposed to accelerate the development of rival systems.

With governments, technology companies, and regulators paying closer attention to model security, the Anthropic-Alibaba dispute may become an early test case for how the industry addresses unauthorized AI capability harvesting and the growing geopolitical competition surrounding advanced artificial intelligence.

Hackers Exploit Fake Claude Code Installers and Install Malware


Developers looking into Claude Code deployment instructions could be lured into an advanced malware campaign that hides itself as a genuine AI tooling documentation. 

Fake Claude code exploit

Experts found a few fake Claude Code and developer platform websites built to steal credentials, cryptocurrency, and API keys.

According to Straiker researchers, “the attack chain runs on the same unchecked trust that makes AI developer tools so easy to adopt.  “You copy a command. You paste it in your terminal. By then, it’s already too late,” said Straiker researchers in their analysis of the campaign. 

Highlights of the fake Claude code campaign 

1. Experts found over 88 fake domains mimicking Claude Code and other developer sites. The campaign utilises SEO infection and Google ads to deploy malicious install web pages over genuine documentation.

2. Threat actors hide infected commands within genuine installation commands, without impacting the deployment process.

3. The malware particularly attacks AI-based assets such as cloud development credentials, API keys, and verification tokens.

About the credential theft campaign 

The campaign attacked users of famous AI and developer tools, such as Claude Code, JetBrains, Perplexity Comet, and Cline. 

As per the experts, the operation depends on over 88 domains hosted throughout genuine platforms and constantly shuffles infrastructure, letting malicious sites to immediately resurface after shutdowns. To trap targets, threat actors use redirect chains, SEO poisoning and paid Google ads that place scammed installations over genuine documentation in search results.

These websites closely impersonate genuine vendor resources and demonstrate installation commands that look genuine but include hidden separators, such as “&,” that launch malicious actions along with the expected software deployment.

In various incidents, the genuine command still runs effectively, helping hide the hack.

Delivery of malware and launch tactics

Experts found various delivery techniques, such as rundll32.exe loading infected DLLs, Base64-encoded commands, mshta.exe abuse, JavaScript-based payloads, and GitHub-hosted scripts. 

By such techniques, hackers improve their potential to escape convention detection tools. Contrary to infostealers, the campaign pick on AI assets like authentication tokens, API Key, and cloud development credentials from tools such as Continue[.]dev, Cline. 

After execution, the malware uses a multi-level malicious chain that features encoded C2 communications, anti-analysis capabilities, fileless execution tactics, and credential theft functions.

Experts found the primary payload as ACRStealer, a malware family that steals information and has developed to include sophisticated encryption and escape tactics. Experts also identified a cryptocurrency clipboard hacker that rediverts transactions by replacing copied wallet addresses.

AI-Assisted Malware Lab Found Testing Ways to Evade Security Tools, Sophos Reports

 



Researchers at cybersecurity firm Sophos have uncovered a malware development framework that uses artificial intelligence tools to speed up the creation and testing of ransomware-related software designed to avoid detection by security products.

The investigation began after Sophos analysts discovered suspicious files on a customer system. What initially appeared to be a collection of penetration-testing tools soon revealed signs of criminal activity, including references to ransom notes and organizations listed on ransomware leak sites.

According to Sophos, the framework combines traditional attack tools with AI-assisted development workflows. Researchers found evidence that the operators used coding assistants such as Cursor and Claude Opus during different stages of development, including writing code, reviewing results, refining payloads, and researching techniques that could help malware evade security controls.

One of the framework's primary goals was to bypass Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) platforms. These security products are designed to identify malicious activity on computers and servers, often detecting attacks that traditional antivirus software might miss.

The toolkit contained several components intended to reduce the chances of detection. Among them were customized Cobalt Strike profiles that made malicious network traffic resemble ordinary web browsing activity, communication channels that routed commands through Telegram, and malware development scripts capable of injecting malicious code into legitimate Windows applications while allowing those programs to continue functioning normally.

Researchers also identified the use of a Cloudflare Worker that acted as an intermediary between infected systems and attacker-controlled infrastructure. This setup can make it more difficult for defenders to identify the true location of command-and-control servers.

A particularly notable feature of the framework was an automated Active Directory discovery system. Active Directory is widely used in enterprise networks to manage users, computers, permissions, and other resources. Because it contains valuable information about an organization's internal structure, attackers frequently attempt to map Active Directory environments after gaining access to a network.

Sophos found that the discovery process relied on a series of AI-assisted agents that gathered information, assessed results, selected follow-up actions, and continued the investigation of the network. Rather than requiring a human operator to manually perform every step, parts of the reconnaissance process could be carried out through predefined automated workflows.

The framework itself appeared to operate through multiple specialized AI agents assigned to different tasks. Sophos reported that one agent coordinated the overall development process while others focused on testing, documentation, operational security improvements, virtual machine deployment, proxy testing, and malware evaluation.

Researchers also discovered that some agents had been tasked with examining publicly available security research. The system collected information from technical reports and research publications, extracted details about detection-evasion methods, mapped those techniques to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, recreated testing environments, and documented the results.

At the center of the operation was a Python-based payload generation tool. This component produced malware written primarily in Rust and Go while combining encryption, execution techniques, and anti-analysis measures intended to make detection more difficult. Sophos observed nearly 80 generated modules being tested against more than 70 separate evasion methods.

The malware was evaluated in laboratory environments against security products from Sophos, CrowdStrike, and Microsoft. Researchers noted that repeated testing and revision cycles appeared to improve the success rate of many payloads. However, they also observed inconsistencies between some reported results and actual testing outcomes, leaving questions about the accuracy of certain internal performance claims.

Despite the extensive use of artificial intelligence during development, Sophos found no indication that AI was embedded within deployed malware or operating independently on victim systems. The technology was primarily used to accelerate the research, testing, and refinement process while human operators remained responsible for directing the activity.

The findings provide another example of how threat actors are incorporating AI into existing workflows. Rather than introducing entirely new attack methods, these tools appear to be helping attackers shorten the time needed to transform publicly available security research into functioning malware capable of challenging modern security defenses.

Anthropic's Mythos Preview Detects Over 10,000 Software Bugs in Project Glassing


Recently, Anthropic disclosed that its Project Glasswing initiative found over 10,000 critical or high vulnerabilities in system software in its first month of operation.

Claude Mythos Preview finds bugs

Claude and 50 other partners deployed Claude Mythos Preview to find critical software infrastructure. The AI company said the initiative progress is now restricted by the pace at which flaws can be authorized, patched, and disclosed instead of discovery rates. 

The discovery of flaws

Cloudflare detected 2,000 vulnerabilities throughout its critical-path systems, with around 400 labelled as critical or high severity. Claude said that its bug-finding rate surged by over ten times. Various other partners reported the same surges in flaw detection rates.

About bug patches

The UK’s AI Security Institute reported that Mythos Preview has been the only model to patch both of its cyber issues end-to-end. Mozilla detected and patched 271 bugs in Firefox while analyzing Mythos Preview. The number is ten times more than Firefox 148 with Claude Opus 4.6. 

More about Anthropic patching flaws

Anthropic analyzed over 1,000 open-source projects via Mythos Preview, and found 6,202 estimated high or critical severity bugs out of 23,019. Out of 1,752 critical or high bugs studied by independent security research institutes, 90.6% were acknowledged as valid and 62.4% were confirmed as critical or high severity.

One bug was found in wolfSSL, a cryptographic library that billions of devices use. If successful, the bug would have allowed a threat actor to make fake certificates and host fake sites for email providers or banks. The bus was labelled as CVE-2026-5194 and has been fixed.

Critical vulnerabilities

Anthropic has revealed 530 critical or high bugs to researchers. Seventy-five have been fixed and sixty-five have been given public advisories. Claude said that a high or critical flaw detected by Mythos Preview roughly takes two weeks to fix on average.

In its recent release, Palo Alto Networks added more than five times as many patches as normal. Microsoft stated that it will keep releasing further fixes. Oracle is identifying and resolving vulnerabilities in all of its products many times more quickly than in the past.

Three weeks ago, Anthropic made Claude Security available to clients of Claude Enterprise in a public beta. Claude Opus 4.7 has been used to patch more than 2,100 vulnerabilities.

To help maintainers handle bug reports, the corporation partnered with the Alpha-Omega project of the Open Source Security Foundation. Anthropic has not made Mythos-class models available to the general public, citing the necessity for more robust security measures to stop abuse.

OpenCode’s Rapid Growth Reflects Rising Developer Concerns Over AI Vendor Dependence

 





A glaring divide is emerging in the AI coding industry as developers increasingly weigh the convenience of fully managed coding platforms against the flexibility of open-source alternatives designed to avoid dependence on a single provider.

The debate intensified this week after Anthropic used its first “Code with Claude” developer conference to showcase major upgrades across its Claude Code ecosystem. The company announced that rate limits for Claude Code users on Pro, Max, Team, and Enterprise plans would be significantly expanded, while peak-hour usage restrictions were removed entirely. Anthropic also raised usage limits for its Opus API and disclosed a major infrastructure agreement with SpaceX involving the Colossus 1 data center.

According to the company, the agreement will provide access to more than 300 megawatts of computing power and approximately 220,000 Nvidia GPUs expected to come online within weeks. The move reflects the broader AI industry race to secure high-performance computing infrastructure as demand for generative AI services continues to increase.

Anthropic also introduced several updates aimed at turning Claude Code into a more advanced managed development environment. These included expanded Managed Agents capabilities, support for coordinating multiple AI agents simultaneously, a public beta feature called Outcomes, and an experimental memory system internally referred to as “dreaming,” which is intended to help AI systems retain and improve contextual understanding over time.

During the event, Anthropic executive Boris Cherny demonstrated remote agents and automated routines capable of running coding tasks asynchronously, effectively allowing Claude Code to function more like a workflow orchestration platform rather than a traditional coding assistant.

At the same time, a separate trend has been accelerating across the open-source community. OpenCode, an independent coding harness project associated with SST, has experienced a dramatic rise in popularity after positioning itself as an alternative to vendor-controlled AI development environments.

The project’s GitHub repository has now surpassed 157,000 stars, overtaking the roughly 122,000 stars associated with Anthropic’s own Claude Code repository at the time of reporting. While GitHub stars do not necessarily represent active users or production deployments, they are often viewed as indicators of developer awareness, interest, and community support.

The roots of OpenCode’s instant growth trace back to January 2026, when Anthropic introduced server-side authentication checks that prevented third-party tools from accessing Claude Pro and Max subscriptions through OAuth-based authentication methods.

Several projects, including OpenCode, Cline, and RooCode, were affected by the policy change. Prior to the restrictions, these tools allowed developers to run autonomous coding workflows through fixed-price Claude subscriptions rather than paying significantly higher API-based usage fees tied to token consumption.

From Anthropic’s perspective, the restriction addressed a business and infrastructure problem. Subscription plans were designed to support usage within the company’s own ecosystem, while third-party tools were effectively redirecting high-volume workloads through pricing structures never intended for external automation platforms.

Discussions across developer forums, including lengthy conversations on Hacker News, showed that many users understood Anthropic’s reasoning. However, criticism quickly emerged over the manner in which the restrictions were enforced. Developers reported that the changes were introduced without advance notice, disrupting workflows in active sessions. Some users also claimed that automated abuse-detection systems temporarily restricted accounts during the transition period.

OpenCode responded rapidly after the restrictions took effect. The project added support for ChatGPT Plus integrations within hours and began expanding compatibility across multiple AI providers. Anthropic later formalized its position in updated Terms of Service published in February, clarifying that subscription OAuth tokens were not intended for third-party routing or automation tools.

The dispute escalated further in March after OpenCode reportedly received legal requests related to Claude subscription authentication. Shortly afterward, the project merged an update removing references to Claude Pro and Max authentication from its codebase. By April 4, Anthropic’s enforcement measures had expanded to additional third-party harnesses, including OpenClaw and NanoClaw, pushing developers toward pay-as-you-go API billing structures.

Interest in OpenCode accelerated during this period. On March 21, a Hacker News discussion surrounding the project gained more than 1,200 points and hundreds of comments, driving additional visibility across the developer community. By early April, the repository had already crossed 120,000 GitHub stars.

As of May 8, project activity data showed approximately 156,904 stars, 18,259 forks, 4,788 issues, and more than 1,600 open pull requests. OpenCode’s website also claimed participation from over 850 contributors and estimated usage among roughly 6.5 million monthly developers.

Industry observers note that the OAuth dispute alone likely does not explain OpenCode’s growth. Instead, the incident appears to have accelerated an existing movement toward model-agnostic development tools. OpenCode gradually shifted its messaging away from low-cost Claude access and toward provider neutrality, emphasizing that developers should be able to switch between AI models as pricing, performance, and capabilities evolve.

That distinction is increasingly important as competition intensifies between major AI providers. A developer using a model-agnostic harness can move between Anthropic, OpenAI, or other models with relatively minor configuration changes. In contrast, developers operating entirely within a vertically integrated ecosystem may face higher switching costs if pricing structures, usage limits, or platform policies change unexpectedly.

The debate mirrors earlier divisions within the software infrastructure industry. Some analysts have compared the current situation to Docker and Podman, where one platform focused heavily on integrated services and managed workflows while the other prioritized portability, operational control, and independence from platform lock-in.

OpenCode’s rise has also drawn criticism from parts of the developer community. Users in public discussions have raised concerns about high memory usage, the growing complexity of the project’s TypeScript codebase, inconsistent release stability, and the broader security implications of integrating multiple AI providers into a single framework.

Security considerations remain particularly relevant because every additional provider connection potentially expands the software’s attack surface. OpenCode also faced backlash after removing Claude subscription authentication support following reported legal pressure, with some developers expressing frustration over how the project handled the situation.

Still, the overall ndustry direction appears increasingly clear. Anthropic is investing heavily in a future built around tightly managed AI coding ecosystems that combine infrastructure, orchestration, memory systems, and coding assistance within a single platform.

At the same time, open-source projects such as OpenCode, Cline, Aider, and OpenClaw continue to attract developers seeking portability and reduced dependency on individual AI vendors.

For many software teams, the central issue is no longer choosing between Claude Code and OpenCode alone. Instead, developers are beginning to decide whether critical AI-assisted workflows should remain under the control of a single provider or operate through more flexible systems capable of adapting as the AI landscape continues to shift.

Researchers Find Security Gap in Anthropic Skill Scanners




Security researchers have uncovered a gap in the way Anthropic Skill scanning tools inspect third-party AI packages, allowing malicious code hidden inside test files to execute on developer systems even after scanners marked the Skills as safe.

The issue centers on Anthropic Skills, reusable packages designed for AI coding assistants such as Claude Code, Cursor, and Windsurf. These packages often include instructions, scripts, and configuration files that help AI agents perform development tasks inside IDE environments.

Researchers from Gecko Security found that existing Skill scanners focus primarily on files tied directly to agent behavior, particularly SKILL.md, while ignoring bundled test files that can still run locally through standard developer tooling.

In the demonstrated attack chain, a Skill passed all scanner checks because its visible instruction files contained no prompt injection attempts, suspicious shell commands, or malicious instructions. However, the repository also included a hidden .test.ts file stored elsewhere in the directory structure. Although the file was outside the agent execution layer, it still executed through the project’s testing framework with full access to local resources.

According to researcher Jeevan Jutla, the problem begins when developers install a Skill using the npx skills add command. The installer copies nearly the entire repository into the project’s .agents/skills/ directory. Only a few items, including .git, metadata.json, and files prefixed with underscores, are excluded during installation.

Once placed inside the repository, testing frameworks such as Jest and Vitest automatically discover matching test files through recursive glob patterns. Both frameworks reportedly enable the dot:true option, allowing them to search inside hidden directories including .agents/. Mocha follows similar recursive discovery behavior in many default configurations.

A malicious Skill can therefore include a file such as reviewer.test.ts containing a beforeAll function that silently executes before visible tests begin. Researchers said these payloads can access environment variables, .env files, SSH keys, AWS credentials, deployment tokens, and other sensitive information commonly available inside local developer environments and CI pipelines. The data can then be transmitted to external servers without triggering obvious warnings during test execution.

The researchers stressed that the AI agent itself is never involved in the compromise. Instead, the malicious behavior occurs through trusted developer tooling already integrated into the software workflow. Existing scanners inspect the files the AI agent can interpret, but not the files executed separately by testing infrastructure.

The technique resembles older software supply-chain attacks involving malicious npm postinstall scripts and poisoned pytest plugins. However, Gecko Security noted that the Anthropic Skill ecosystem creates an additional propagation problem because installed Skills are often committed into shared repositories so teams can reuse them collaboratively.

GitHub’s default .gitignore templates do not automatically exclude .agents/ directories. Once a malicious test file enters the repository, every teammate cloning the project and every CI pipeline running automated tests may execute the payload across branches, forks, and deployment workflows.

The findings arrived shortly after multiple large-scale security audits examining the broader Anthropic Skills ecosystem. A January academic study named SkillScan analyzed 31,132 Skills collected from two major marketplaces and found that 26.1% contained at least one vulnerability spanning 14 separate patterns. Data exfiltration appeared in 13.3% of examined Skills, while privilege escalation appeared in 11.8%. Researchers also determined that Skills bundling executable scripts were 2.12 times more likely to contain vulnerabilities than instruction-only packages.

Several weeks later, Snyk published its ToxicSkills audit covering 3,984 Skills from ClawHub and skills.sh. The company reported that 13.4% of scanned Skills contained at least one critical-level security issue. Automated analysis combined with human review identified 76 confirmed malicious payloads, while eight malicious Skills reportedly remained publicly accessible on ClawHub when the findings were released.

In April, Cisco introduced an AI Agent Security Scanner integrated into IDE platforms including VS Code, Cursor, and Windsurf. The scanner can detect prompt injection attempts, suspicious shell execution patterns, and data exfiltration behaviors within Skill definitions and agent-referenced scripts. However, Gecko Security said bundled test files remain outside the scanner’s documented detection surface because the tool was designed around agent interaction layers rather than developer execution layers.

Researchers noted that other products, including Snyk Agent Scan and VirusTotal Code Insight, face similar structural limitations. These tools inspect what the agent is instructed to execute but may overlook code paths triggered separately through local development frameworks.

Elia Zaitsev described the broader issue as a distinction between interpreting intent and monitoring actual execution behavior. In this case, the malicious code did not depend on prompt manipulation or AI instructions. It operated as ordinary TypeScript executed through legitimate test runners with full local permissions.

Zaitsev also warned that enterprise AI agents increasingly operate with privileged access to OAuth tokens, API keys, and centralized data sources. If those credentials are accessible through environment variables during automated testing, malicious test payloads can reach sensitive infrastructure without requiring direct agent compromise.

Mike Riemer added that threat actors frequently reverse engineer security patches within 72 hours of release, while many organizations take far longer to deploy fixes. In the case of the Anthropic Skill test-file issue, researchers warned that the exposure window becomes more difficult to manage because the malicious files may execute immediately after installation without triggering scanner alerts.

Security researchers are urging development teams to block test discovery inside .agents/ directories and inspect Skill repositories for files such as *.test.*, *.spec.*, conftest.py, __tests__/, and suspicious configuration scripts before merging code.

The report also recommends pinning Skill installations to verified commit hashes rather than installing the latest repository version. Researchers said this reduces the risk of attackers submitting clean repositories for scanner approval before later inserting malicious files. The approach aligns with guidance published in the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 project.

Organizations that already store Skills inside repositories are advised to audit existing .agents/ directories immediately, rotate exposed credentials if suspicious files are discovered, inspect CI logs for unexplained outbound network traffic, and review repository history to identify when potentially malicious files entered development pipelines.

The researchers additionally called on security vendors to provide greater transparency regarding which directories, execution surfaces, and file categories their scanners actually inspect. They argued that security teams evaluating Anthropic Skill scanners should verify whether products analyze bundled test files, build scripts, and CI configurations rather than focusing exclusively on prompt injection and agent instruction analysis.

22 Year Old Developer Reverse Engineered Code in Claude Mythos, Tech Industry Shocked

 


Earlier this year, AI tech giant Anthropic launched its powerful new model called Claude Mythos. It created storms in the silicon valley and tech industry. The general-purpose model could find software bugs that no human knew ever existed.

About Claude Mythos


But Claude did not launch Mythos to the world, it only offered it to cybersecurity experts at big organizations that make or have critical software infrastructure and asked them to find and patch flaws before Anthropic released it commercially for the public use.

But, in just two weeks, a 22-year old developer called Kye Gomez made predictions about the core designs that made Claude Mythos advanced and later published OpenMythos. It is an open project that anticipates Anthropic’s breakthrough. Gomez’s code created a tsunami in the AI and tech research community.

If real, this incident can have serious implications . Why? Because if a self-taught developer can reverse engineer the infrastructure innovation of a billion-dollar AI firm in just a few days, then what can threat-actors with malicious intent do. If this happens, the proprietary debate about AI architecture will fade away.

About OpenMythos


OpenMythos allows developers to run and train effective variants of these models on laptops, also raising concerns about long-term dependency on huge, environment and community-destroying data centers.

Boon or curse?


Fortunately, organizations won’t be able to get AI secrets that only the big tech companies such as OpenAI, Anthropic, or Google control.

But what if users and small teams across the world can also reverse engineer the code of the biggest AI companies? It will be difficult to maintain a safe-tech world order. Advanced capabilities will sprout, and it will be difficult to contain.

About the developer, Gomez is not your typical ML engineer. He started coding as a kid, left school early and did not attend college. He built his reputation via coding.

Why OpenMythos


OpenMythos is built upon Gomez’s hypothesis that Claude Mythos uses a unique large language model (LLM) that has been under development since 2022 and shown reliability while training at scale at the start of this year. How is OpenMythos different from Claude Mythos?

Instead of putting neural network layers to give models more depth, experts advised looping data repetitively via smaller packets. This gave the model depth in due time.