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Showing posts with label GitHub Bug. Show all posts

Webrat Malware Targets Students and Junior Security Researchers Through Fake Exploits

 

In early 2025, security researchers uncovered a new malware family dubbed Webrat, which at that time was predominantly targeting ordinary users through fake distribution methods. The first propagation involved masking malware as cheats for online games-like Rust, Counter-Strike, and Roblox-but also as cracked versions of some commercial software. By the second half of that year, though, the Webrat operators had indeed widened their horizons, shifting toward a new target group that covered students and young professionals seeking careers in information security. 

This evolution started to surface in September and October 2025, when researchers discovered a campaign spreading Webrat through open GitHub repositories. The attackers embedded the malicious payloads as proof-of-concept exploits of highly publicized software vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities were chosen due to their resonance in security advisories and high severity ratings, making the repositories look relevant and credible for people searching for hands-on learning materials.  

Each of the GitHub repositories was crafted to closely resemble legitimate exploit releases. They all had detailed descriptions outlining the background of the vulnerability, affected systems, steps to install it, usage, and the most recommended ways of mitigation. Many of the repository descriptions have a similar or almost identical structure; the defensive advice offered is often strikingly similar, adding strong evidence that they were generated through automated or AI-assisted tools rather than various independent researchers. Inside each repository, users were instructed to fetch an archive with a password, labeled as the exploit package. 

The password was hidden in the name of one of the files inside the archive, a move intended to lure users into unzipping the file and researching its contents. Once unpacked, the archive contains a set of files meant to masquerade or divert attention from the actual payload. Among those is a corrupted dynamic-link library file meant as a decoy, along with a batch file whose purpose was to instruct execution of the main malicious executable file. The main executable, when run, executed several high-risk actions: It tried to elevate its privileges to administrator level, disabled the inbuilt security protections such as Windows Defender, and then downloaded the Webrat backdoor from a remote server and started it.

The Webrat backdoor provides a way to attackers for persistent access to infected systems, allowing them to conduct widespread surveillance and data theft activities. Webrat can steal credentials and other sensitive information from cryptocurrency wallets and applications like Telegram, Discord, and Steam. In addition to credential theft, it also supports spyware functionalities such as screen capture, keylogging, and audio and video surveillance via connected microphones and webcams. The functionality seen in this campaign is very similar to versions of Webrat described in previous incidents. 

It seems that the move to dressing the malware up as vulnerability exploits represents an effort to affect hobbyists rather than professionals. Professional analysts normally analyze such untrusted code in a sandbox or isolated environment, where such attacks have limited consequences. 

Consequently, researchers believe the attack focuses on students and beginners with lax operational security discipline. It ranges in topic from the risks in running unverified code downloaded from open-source sites to the need to perform malware analysis and exploit testing in a sandbox or virtual machine environment. 

Security professionals and students are encouraged to be keen in their practices, to trust only known and reputable security tools, and to bypass protection mechanisms only when this is needed with a clear and well-justified reason.

Vulnerability in GitHub Actions Allowed Attackers to Take Control of Victim's Device

 

Cybersecurity researchers at Cider Security have unearthed a code review bypass threat impacting organizations that had not even enabled the recently introduced GitHub Actions feature. 

To patch the loophole, Omer Gil and colleagues from security start-up Cider Security introduced multiple security mechanisms. GitHub Actions provides a mechanism to build and run software development workflows all the way from development to production systems.

The authorization bypass weaknesses make it potentially possible for either a rogue developer or threat actors to self-approve pull requests, opening the door to planting malicious software into the tributaries that feed production software, researchers explained in a blog post on Medium. 

Threat actors are only required to exploit a single user account before launching an attack, which relies on editing the permissions key in the workflow file. Last year in October, Cider Security was cleared to reveal its stance on the security loophole, weeks before GitHub patched the bug. Additionally, GitHub has introduced a new policy setting that allows system administrators to control whether GitHub Actions can approve pull requests. 

“This protects against a user using Actions to satisfy the ‘required approvals’ branch protection requirement and merging a change that was not reviewed by another user. To prevent breaking existing workflows, allow GitHub Actions reviews to count towards required approval’ is enabled by default. However, an organization admin can disable it under the organization's Actions settings,” GitHub explained. 

Additionally, GitHub recently introduced a new setting to fix this vulnerability; organization admins can now disallow GitHub Actions from approving pull requests. This is an organization-wide setting, which by default allows Actions to approve pull requests in existing organizations, and disallows it in newly created organizations. This means that any organization that was created before this setting was introduced is still vulnerable unless the default setting is changed. 

“We recommend you to use this new setting to disallow malicious actors from bypassing branch protection rules by approving their own pull requests. We recommend you to use this new setting to disallow malicious actors from bypassing branch protection rules by approving their own pull requests,” Cider Security concluded.