Google’s Chrome Incognito mode can keep browsing history off a device, but it was never designed to make users anonymous online. A class-action lawsuit over the feature exposed how far that distinction could be misunderstood, with Google agreeing to delete or remediate billions of private-browsing records and change how it explains Incognito to users.
The lawsuit, Brown v. Google, was filed in 2020 and alleged that Google continued collecting information about users while they browsed through Chrome’s Incognito mode and other browsers’ private-browsing modes.
The plaintiffs initially sought billions of dollars in damages, with their claims eventually putting at least $5 billion at stake. However, Google did not ultimately agree to pay $5 billion. Under the settlement, there was no class-wide monetary payout. Instead, Google agreed to data deletion and remediation measures, changes to its privacy disclosures, and additional restrictions on data collection. Plaintiffs’ lawyers valued the settlement’s non-monetary relief at more than $5 billion, with estimates reaching $7.8 billion.
The case nevertheless exposed a fundamental problem with private browsing: preventing a browser from retaining a user's history is not the same thing as preventing websites, network operators or online services from observing that user's activity.
Google employees raised concerns about Incognito
The legal dispute became particularly notable after internal Google communications surfaced during litigation.
In one email, Google Chief Marketing Officer Lorraine Twohill told CEO Sundar Pichai that the company should make Incognito "truly private." She also warned that Google could not market the feature too strongly because it was "not truly private," requiring what she described as "fuzzy, hedging language."
Other internal communications were even more critical of the feature. According to material cited in the litigation, Google employees described Incognito as "misleading" and "effectively a lie," while another employee argued that Google should stop using the Incognito name and its spy-themed icon because users could misunderstand the protection it provided. Another recommendation suggested replacing the messaging with a warning that users were not protected from Google.
These discussions mattered because the lawsuit was not simply about whether Incognito stored browsing history locally. It questioned whether users were being given a sufficiently accurate understanding of what happened to their data after it left the browser.
Google disputed the allegations and maintained that the limitations of Incognito had been communicated to users. A Google spokesperson said the company believed the lawsuit was without merit and argued that Incognito was intended to provide a private browsing experience, rather than prevent websites and services from collecting information.
What Incognito actually does
Chrome's Incognito mode does provide a real privacy function, but that function is primarily local.
When a user opens an Incognito window, Chrome starts a separate browsing session. Once all Incognito windows are closed, Chrome does not retain the browsing history, cookies and site data, or information entered into forms from that session in the normal browser profile. Third-party cookies are also blocked by default in current versions of Chrome, although users can temporarily allow them for particular sites.
This makes Incognito useful in situations where the concern is another person accessing the same device.
Someone using a shared computer, for example, can browse for a gift without leaving the visited pages in Chrome's ordinary history. It can also provide a separate browsing session when a user does not want existing cookies and account sessions to carry over.
But there is an important limitation.
Incognito does not erase everything created during a session. Downloads remain on the device, and bookmarks saved during the session remain available after Incognito is closed. Signing into a website can also allow that service to associate activity with the account being used.
The key distinction is therefore simple: Incognito primarily limits what Chrome stores locally. It does not turn the internet connection into a private tunnel.
Your ISP and network administrator can still see activity
Opening an Incognito window does not prevent an internet service provider from observing network activity.
Google's own documentation states that organizations managing a network, including schools, employers and internet service providers, may be able to observe activity while a user is browsing in Incognito. Incognito also does not hide activity or location from the websites being visited.
This is an important distinction from encryption.
Chrome's HTTPS protections can encrypt traffic between a browser and an HTTPS-enabled website, helping prevent someone monitoring the connection from reading the contents of that traffic. Chrome also warns users when they are about to load sites without HTTPS, while Secure DNS can encrypt DNS lookups in supported configurations.
But HTTPS does not make the user anonymous.
The network still has visibility into connection metadata, while the destination website receives the request and can process information available to it.
In other words, Incognito and HTTPS solve different problems. Incognito reduces local traces. HTTPS protects communications in transit. Neither one, by itself, is an anonymity system.
Websites can still identify and track users
The privacy boundary becomes even clearer once a user reaches a website.
Google's current Chrome documentation explicitly states that Incognito does not change how websites collect data or how the services those websites use collect information. Sites can continue gathering information even when a user is not signed in.
Websites can also use first-party technologies and other mechanisms to understand activity within a session. Third-party cookies are only one part of the tracking ecosystem. Google itself notes that websites can use different mechanisms to personalize content and advertising and learn about activity across sites.
This is also where the distinction between an IP address and browser history matters.
Incognito can prevent a local Chrome profile from retaining the list of pages a user visited. It does not automatically conceal the network address from the websites receiving the connections.
And if a person voluntarily signs into a service while using Incognito, the service has an obvious account-level identifier with which to associate the activity. Google's own documentation warns that signing into a Google service or another website during an Incognito session can allow that site to remember the activity.
The lawsuit forced changes to Incognito
The settlement went further than simply changing a warning message.
According to the court filing, Google agreed to delete or remediate billions of records reflecting class members' private browsing activities. The company also agreed to continue blocking third-party cookies in Incognito for five years.
The filing provides an unusually detailed picture of why the cookie change mattered.
Google had historically collected its own third-party cookies when users visited non-Google websites. After the lawsuit was filed, Google implemented third-party-cookie blocking for Incognito users. Under the settlement, that protection had to remain in place for five years. The plaintiffs' filing said blocking data associated with Google's third-party cookies in Incognito could reduce Google's global annual revenue by nearly $500 million.
Google also agreed to remove four identified private-browsing detection signals. According to the plaintiffs' filing, those signals could reveal that a user had chosen private browsing and were then used to label the resulting data as private. The settlement required Google to delete those signals and agree not to use such detection mechanisms to identify or track private browsing.
The class covered an estimated 136 million users, according to court-related filings.
Google eventually changed the warning
The dispute also changed the language presented to Chrome users.
Chrome's current Incognito documentation now makes the limitation explicit. It says that Incognito does not change how data is collected by websites users visit and the services those websites use, including Google. Google also says that websites, network administrators and ISPs may still be able to observe activity during an Incognito session.
That clarification is arguably more important than the Incognito icon itself.
The familiar private-browsing interface can create an intuitive association between the words "Incognito" and anonymity. Technically, however, the feature is much narrower. Chromium describes Incognito as a window-level mode in which pages are not persisted to browsing history and a temporary cookie store is used for the session.
That is a local privacy mechanism, not an invisibility cloak.
So, is Incognito worth using?
Yes, if the objective is local privacy.
If you share a computer with other people, do not want a particular browsing session stored in your ordinary history, or want a temporary browser session separated from your normal cookies, Incognito remains useful.
It is also useful for testing how a website behaves without the cookies and account state associated with a normal session.
But users should not treat the Incognito icon as a guarantee that their online activity is hidden.
It does not prevent an ISP or network administrator from observing activity. It does not stop websites from collecting information. It does not automatically hide an IP address. It does not prevent a user from being identified after signing into an account. And it does not protect files downloaded to the device after the session ends.
Users seeking stronger privacy need to think in layers rather than relying on a single browser setting.
A privacy-focused browser can reduce tracking at the browser level. Tracker and content blockers can limit third-party collection. A properly configured VPN can conceal the user's IP address from the websites they visit and hide destination traffic from the ISP, although the VPN provider itself becomes part of the trust model. Keeping the browser, operating system and extensions updated remains essential because privacy controls cannot compensate for an unpatched security vulnerability.
Chrome itself should also not be treated as static. Google continues to modify its privacy and security architecture. Third-party-cookie protections in Incognito are already part of the browser's privacy model, while Google has also explored additional protections for IP addresses in Incognito.
The larger lesson from the Incognito lawsuit is therefore not that private browsing is useless.
It is that privacy has layers, and the word "private" can mean very different things depending on where the data is stored, who controls the network and which services receive the user's requests.
Incognito can hide your browsing history from someone checking the same device.
It cannot make you disappear from the internet.
A new Linux botnet named Evooo1Bot is turning internet-facing routers and other gateway devices into SOCKS5 traffic relay nodes, giving attackers a way to route malicious connections through compromised systems while retaining the ability to steal credentials, brute-force SSH accounts, exploit vulnerable devices and launch DDoS attacks.
FortiGuard Labs said it has been tracking the Mirai-based malware since at least July 2026, with activity observed against devices from Alcatel, NETGEAR, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric, Telesquare and D-Link across multiple regions. Rather than relying on a single attack function, Evooo1Bot combines several capabilities within a modular Linux malware framework.
The malware retains the DDoS engine from the publicly leaked Mirai source code, but expands on the older botnet's approach with encrypted command-and-control communications, an SSH brute-force scanner, a SOCKS5 relay, a credential sniffer and an exploitation module targeting known vulnerabilities.
Mirai's original success was closely tied to internet-connected devices such as routers, cameras and DVRs, many of which were exposed with weak or default credentials. Fortinet previously documented how Mirai could scan for vulnerable systems, brute-force credentials and recruit them into a remotely controlled botnet.
Evooo1Bot takes that model further by adding more ways to use a compromised device after the initial infection.
Its exploit arsenal covers a wide range of internet-facing technologies. Newer builds have been found with modules targeting Hikvision cameras, Atlassian Confluence, Zyxel firewalls, TP-Link routers, D-Link NAS devices, WSO2 products, Kubernetes ingress-nginx and vulnerable PHP-CGI installations. FortiGuard noted, however, that some of the embedded exploits are incorrectly implemented and fail to compromise their intended targets.
When exploitation succeeds, the malware downloads a build suited to the victim's CPU architecture. FortiGuard identified 12 available builds, allowing the operators to target different Linux-based hardware rather than relying on a single binary.
The malware then attempts to make the compromise harder to trace. It clears Bash history and establishes persistence through mechanisms including systemd, SysV init, shell profiles and "rc.local". A cron job also attempts to download the payload again every five minutes, providing another way to restore the malware if it is removed.
Evooo1Bot also checks its surroundings before fully activating. It searches for debuggers, security software, sandboxes, virtual machines, containers and honeypots, indicating that the operators are attempting to distinguish ordinary victims from environments where the malware could be analyzed.
Its encrypted C2 communications operate over port 443, while an interactive shell gives operators direct control over infected systems. The malware also supports file uploads and downloads and uses a 28-command interface for remote operations.
The SOCKS5 component is where Evooo1Bot moves beyond the conventional DDoS-botnet model.
A SOCKS5 proxy can relay network connections through another system. In this case, the infected router becomes the intermediary, allowing attackers to send traffic through the victim's connection. Evooo1Bot supports both direct-listening and reverse-relay modes, which could help operators conceal the origin of malicious traffic, bypass geographic restrictions or reach networks accessible through compromised devices.
Multiple proxy sessions can operate independently, raising another possibility if the botnet expands: monetizing compromised residential connections as proxy infrastructure.
The malware also monitors "/proc/net/tcp" for network activity and attempts to capture HTTP Basic Authentication and Cookie headers. Alongside its shell and file-transfer functions, this gives operators additional opportunities to obtain information from systems positioned behind the compromised gateway.
SSH provides another route into vulnerable systems. Evooo1Bot uses 150 username and password combinations aimed at enterprise-oriented accounts and performs checks after successful authentication to identify possible honeypots.
DDoS remains part of the malware's toolkit, with 16 flood methods inherited from Mirai, including UDP, DNS, SYN, ACK, GRE, fragmented TCP and customizable HTTP floods.
The result is a botnet in which a compromised router can serve several purposes at once: it can participate in DDoS attacks, relay traffic, collect authentication material, provide remote shell access and help operators compromise additional vulnerable systems.
For users and organizations, securing these devices starts with applying firmware and security updates, replacing default administrator credentials and disabling unnecessary remote-access interfaces. Unsupported equipment that no longer receives security updates should also be replaced.
Network defenders should additionally watch for unexpected outbound connections, unusual proxy traffic and unauthorized changes to cron jobs, startup services or shell profiles.
Evooo1Bot shows why internet-facing routers and gateways cannot be treated simply as passive networking equipment. Once compromised, they can become operational infrastructure for an attacker, extending the intrusion far beyond the device itself.
Cybersecurity researchers have identified ongoing cyber-espionage campaigns targeting government departments, academic institutions, and strategically important organizations across South Asia. The activity has been attributed to two established threat actors, Transparent Tribe and Patchwork, both known for maintaining long-term access to compromised systems.
Transparent Tribe, also tracked as APT36, has been active since at least 2013 and is associated with repeated intelligence-gathering operations against Indian organizations. In its latest campaign, the group used spear-phishing emails carrying ZIP archives that contained Windows shortcut files disguised as legitimate PDF documents. These shortcut files included real PDF content to appear harmless.
When opened, the shortcut launches a hidden process using the Windows utility mshta.exe, which runs an HTML Application script. This script decrypts and loads the final remote access trojan directly into system memory while simultaneously opening a decoy PDF to avoid alerting the victim. The script also interacts with Windows through ActiveX components, such as WScript.Shell, allowing it to analyze the environment and adjust execution behavior.
The malware adapts its persistence strategy based on the antivirus software installed. On systems with Kaspersky, it creates a working directory under C:\Users\Public\core and uses startup shortcuts to relaunch the malicious script. If Quick Heal is detected, it relies on batch files and startup entries. On machines running Avast, AVG, or Avira, the payload is copied directly into the Startup folder. If no recognized antivirus is found, the malware combines batch execution, registry-based persistence, and delayed payload deployment.
A second-stage component includes a malicious DLL named iinneldc.dll, which functions as a fully featured RAT. It allows attackers to remotely control the system, manage files, steal data, capture screenshots, monitor clipboard activity, and manipulate running processes.
Researchers also identified a separate APT36 campaign using a shortcut file disguised as a government advisory PDF. This file retrieves an installer from a remote server, extracts multiple malicious files, displays a legitimate advisory issued by Pakistan’s national CERT, and establishes persistence through registry modifications. One DLL communicates with a hard-coded command-and-control server using reversed strings to hide command endpoints and supports system registration, heartbeat signals, command execution, and anti-virtual-machine checks.
In a related disclosure, researchers linked Patchwork, also known as Maha Grass or Dropping Elephant, to espionage campaigns targeting Pakistan’s defense sector. These attacks used phishing emails with ZIP attachments containing MSBuild project files that abuse msbuild.exe to install a Python-based backdoor. The malware can communicate with command servers, execute Python modules, run commands, and transfer files.
Patchwork has also been associated with a previously undocumented trojan named StreamSpy. Delivered through ZIP archives hosting an executable named Annexure.exe, StreamSpy collects system information, establishes persistence through registry entries, scheduled tasks, or startup shortcuts, and communicates using both WebSocket and HTTP. WebSocket channels are used for command delivery and result transmission, while HTTP handles file transfers. Researchers observed technical similarities between StreamSpy, Spyder, and other malware families, indicating shared infrastructure and continued collaboration among related threat groups.
Browser isolation is a widely used cybersecurity tool designed to protect users from online threats. However, a recent report by Mandiant reveals that attackers have discovered a novel method to bypass this measure by utilizing QR codes for command-and-control (C2) operations.
Browser isolation is a security technique that separates a user's browsing activity from their local device. It streams only visual content from web pages into the user's browser, preventing direct interaction with potentially harmful sites or exploits. This can be implemented through cloud-based, on-premises, or local solutions.
Traditionally, attackers rely on HTTP requests to communicate with a C2 server and issue commands to compromised systems. However, browser isolation disrupts this process by streaming only webpage pixels, effectively blocking HTTP-based attack methods.
To bypass browser isolation, Mandiant researchers devised a technique that embeds command data within QR codes. The process works as follows:
This approach exploits browser isolation’s reliance on transmitting visual data, allowing the QR code to be captured and decoded without triggering traditional security defenses.
Mandiant demonstrated the attack using tools like Puppeteer and Chrome in headless mode. They further integrated the technique with Cobalt Strike’s External C2 feature, showcasing its practicality. However, the technique has certain limitations:
Despite this new attack vector, browser isolation remains a valid and essential security measure. Mandiant recommends a layered defense strategy to mitigate such threats:
This novel attack demonstrates the evolving nature of cybersecurity threats and the need for constant vigilance. Organizations should adopt a comprehensive approach, including education and robust protection strategies, to defend against emerging threats effectively. Browser isolation remains an important tool when integrated into a layered security framework.