In an important ruling amid surging digital financial fraud attacks, the Bombay HC sided with the customer protection norms. It directed Bank of Baroda to return Rs. 1.24 crore to the victim private firm that lost money in a SIM-swap case. The court stressed that if a consumer reports fraud promptly in time, “zero liability” is ruled, and the bank must reimburse the losses.
The order was given by a division bench of the HC, which included Justices Manjusha Deshpande and Bharati Dangre, when private company PNP Polytex (based in Mumbai) submitted a petition. Polytex alleged that Rs.1.24 crore had been stolen from its bank accounts illegally and without knowledge.
About court proceedings
As per the submissions to the court, the firm informed the bank soon after finding malicious transactions and asked the accounts to be frozen. The bank could only save Rs. 47.8 lakh, the remaining money was already stolen by the hackers. After this, the firm moved to HC for help.
Later, enquiry revealed that the scam was done using a SIM-swap tactic, where hackers get control of the target’s registered contact number. This lets the hackers intercept OTPs and do banking transactions without the account owner's consent and knowledge. The high court found that the scam was done by third-parties, and showed no evidence of negligence on consumer’s end.
During the proceedings, the court referred to the July 6, 2017 statement given by the RBI, which laid down the customer protection guidelines in incidents of illegal electronic banking transactions. According to the circular, the consumers are entitled to zero liability if they report fraud transactions within 72 hours (three days).
In the judgement, the high court stressed that if a customer informs the bank about a scam or fraud, it is the duty of the bank to return the disputed amount back to the victim’s account. The court also said that the burden of proving customer negligence is on the bank too.
The court rejected the bank's defenses that it had followed the due process and security measures, and the bench labelled the argument as a “lame excuse,” saying that such mechanisms become powerless when a SIM card is hacked. The court also attributed another ruling in an incident where HDFC bank was held liable under similar situations.
After revising the previously frozen funds, the High Court ordered the bank to return the remaining sum plus 6% interest within eight weeks.
Modern organizations rely on a wide range of software systems to run daily operations. While identity and access management tools were originally designed to control users and directory services, much of today’s identity activity no longer sits inside those centralized platforms. Access decisions increasingly happen inside application code, application programming interfaces, service accounts, and custom login mechanisms. In many environments, credentials are stored within applications, permissions are enforced locally, and usage patterns evolve without formal review.
As a result, substantial portions of identity activity operate beyond the visibility of traditional identity, privileged access, and governance tools. This creates a persistent blind spot for security teams. The unseen portion of identity behavior represents risk that cannot be directly monitored or governed using configuration-based controls alone.
Conventional identity programs depend on predefined policies and system settings. These approaches work for centrally managed user accounts, but they do not adequately address custom-built software, legacy authentication processes, embedded secrets, non-human identities such as service accounts, or access routes that bypass identity providers. When these conditions exist, teams are often forced to reconstruct how access occurred after an incident or during an audit. This reactive process is labor-intensive and does not scale in complex enterprise environments.
Orchid Security positions its platform as a way to close this visibility gap through continuous identity observability across applications. The platform follows a four-part operational model designed to align with how security teams work in practice.
First, the platform identifies applications and examines how identity is implemented within them. Lightweight inspection techniques review authentication methods, authorization logic, and credential usage across both managed and unmanaged systems. This produces an inventory of applications, identity types, access flows, and embedded credentials, establishing a baseline of how identity functions in the environment.
Second, observed identity activity is evaluated in context. By linking identities, applications, and access paths, the platform highlights risks such as shared or hardcoded secrets, unused service accounts, privileged access that exists outside centralized controls, and differences between intended access design and real usage. This assessment is grounded in what is actually happening, not in what policies assume should happen.
Third, the platform supports remediation by integrating with existing identity and security processes. Teams can rank risks by potential impact, assign ownership to the appropriate control teams, and monitor progress as issues are addressed. The goal is coordination across current controls rather than replacement.
Finally, because discovery and analysis operate continuously, evidence for governance and compliance is available at all times. Current application inventories, records of identity usage, and documentation of control gaps and corrective actions are maintained on an ongoing basis. This shifts audits from periodic, manual exercises to a continuous readiness model.
As identity increasingly moves into application layers, sustained visibility into how access actually functions becomes essential for reducing unmanaged exposure, improving audit preparedness, and enabling decisions based on verified operational data rather than assumptions.
In its efforts to better its cloud security, Microsoft has done much to remove any potential vulnerabilities and tightened the process of authenticating individuals. This comes after the tech giant saw several security breaches within the past year. Under the Secure Future Initiative launched in November 2023, Microsoft has so far purged 730,000 unused applications and deactivated 5.75 million inactive tenants in its cloud system. The initiative has been a direct response to cyber intrusions that had resulted in the revelation of sensitive data.
The firm has sought to minimise its attack surface by identifying dead or idle areas of its cloud infrastructure and is working to eliminate them. Removing hundreds of thousands of applications and millions of unused tenants works at making Microsoft shrink down the possible avenues the hackers may employ to penetrate it. Furthermore, Microsoft has sought to make the software production environment more secure by equipping the software teams with 15,000 locked-down devices. In its other security measure, the company conducted video-based identity verification for 95 percent of its production staff for further security in the identity authentication process.
Cybersecurity is one aspect where Microsoft has improved much. For instance, the identity management systems for its Entra ID and Microsoft Account (MSA) platforms have been remarkably enhanced.
These updates target better generation, storage, and rotation of access token signing keys as means to advance the protection of the public and government cloud environments. This is partly because of an incident in 2023, when hacking group Storm-0558 from China successfully accessed Exchange Online systems and penetrated the private email accounts of dozens of state officials.
The SFI project is the most ambitious cybersecurity effort Microsoft has undertaken to date, providing 34,000 engineers dedicated to bulking up the company's defences. It focuses mainly on six critical areas: identity and access control, securing cloud tenants and production systems, strengthening engineering systems, improving network security, enhancing threat detection, and perfecting incident response. By doing all of these broad strokes, the likelihood of any future breach of this scale is reduced.
Analysis by the US Department of Homeland Security's Cyber Safety Review Board had shown that a succession of security lapses at the company allowed these breaches. The inquiry, focused on the Storm-0558 intrusion, had asserted that it was time for Microsoft to strengthen its security posture, which primarily revolved around identity and authentication processes. Based on this, the company has moved very quickly to shore up weaknesses and prevent something similar from happening in the future.
Microsoft says it made strides in several areas in the latest report on SFI.
Unused applications and tenants removed reduce cloud attack surface. In network security, the firm now maintains a central inventory for more than 99% of physical assets, providing greater oversight.
Virtual networks with back-end connectivity are isolated from the corporate networks, which in turn is subjected to even more rigorous security audits. Centralised pipeline templates accounting for 85% of the production builds have been so far a part of the security. Personal access tokens now also have a much shorter life. Proof-of-presence checks are also instituted at the most sensitive points of the software development pipeline.
Beyond the technical, there have been organisations which are aimed at ensuring the executives are held responsible for security outcomes. There have been those who tied senior leadership compensation to specific security goals and that the company's threat intelligence team reports directly to the Chief Information Security Officer. This is in the way that it gives the assurance that security is top of the agenda across the organisation.
The Microsoft Secure Future Initiative is a reflection of its attempt to learn from previous failures in the area of security and succeed further in the cloud environment. The company intends to secure itself and, by extension, its customers from future cyber-attacks by enforcing identity verification, reducing attack surfaces, and having a strong network as well as engineering security. Hence, through continuous actions, Microsoft aims to ensure that such instances-where confidential and sensitive data are leaked-would not recur in the future.