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Showing posts with label Claude AI. Show all posts

Hackers Abuse Google Ads and Claude.ai Chats to Spread Mac Malware

 

Cybercriminals are once again abusing trust, and this time they are combining Google Ads with Claude.ai shared chats to push malware onto Mac users. The campaign targets people searching for terms like “Claude mac download,” where sponsored results appear to point to the legitimate claude.ai domain but actually lead to malicious installation instructions. Security researcher Berk Albayrak first identified the scheme, and confirmed that attackers are using the tactic in active campaigns. 

The attack works because it looks believable at first glance. Users click a sponsored search result, land on a public Claude chat, and see what appears to be an official “Claude Code on Mac” guide, sometimes even attributed to Apple Support. That page then tells them to open Terminal and paste a command. Instead of installing useful software, the command quietly downloads and runs malware on the victim’s Mac.

What makes the operation especially dangerous is the way it blends legitimate services with deception. The ad itself can show the real claude.ai domain, which helps the link look safe, while the malicious instructions are hidden inside Claude’s shared chat feature. In some variants, the payload is linked to MacSync-style infostealer behavior, aimed at harvesting browser credentials, cookies, and Keychain data. Researchers also reported that multiple malicious chats were being used, showing that the operators are testing and rotating infrastructure. 

The campaign is a strong reminder that search results and AI platforms are not automatically trustworthy just because they appear familiar. Attackers increasingly rely on “clickfix” tactics, where the victim is convinced to copy and run a command manually, bypassing many traditional download warnings. That user action becomes the infection point, making the social engineering as important as the malware itself.

Mac users should avoid sponsored search results when looking for software downloads and instead go directly to the official site by typing the address themselves. Any chat, guide, or support page that instructs users to paste Terminal commands should be treated with caution, especially if it claims to come from Apple or a well-known AI service. The broader lesson is simple: when an instruction asks you to run code on your own computer, pause and verify before acting.

Fake Claude AI Site Spreads New Beagle Windows Backdoor – Here’s How to Stay Safe

 

Cybercriminals have launched a sophisticated malvertising campaign using a fake Claude‑AI website that installs a new Windows backdoor called “Beagle,” highlighting how attackers are weaponizing the popularity of AI tools against software developers. The deceptive site, reachable through sponsored search results, mimics Anthropic’s legitimate Claude interface and lures users into downloading what appears to be a productivity‑oriented “Claude‑Pro Relay” tool but is in fact a poisoned installer.

Modus operandi 

The malicious domain claude‑pro[.]com presents a stripped‑down clone of the official Claude design, using similar colors and fonts to create a veneer of legitimacy. However, most navigation links on the page simply redirect back to the homepage, and the only functional element is a large download button that serves a 505‑MB archive named Claude‑Pro‑windows‑x64.zip, which contains a trojanized MSI installer. Users who bypass standard security hygiene—such as verifying the URL or ignoring suspicious “sponsored” tags—end up deploying this bundle on their machines. 

Once the MSI executes, it drops three files into the Windows Startup folder: NOVupdate.exe, NOVupdate.exe.dat, and a malicious DLL named avk.dll. The first file is a legitimate, digitally signed updater from G Data security software, which attackers abuse via DLL sideloading to load the malicious avk.dll instead of the genuine library. This DLL decrypts the encrypted data file, then executes the open‑source in‑memory loader DonutLoader, which in turn deploys the final payload—the Beagle backdoor—entirely in memory to evade disk‑based detection.

Beagle backdoor capabilities

Beagle is a lightweight but dangerous Windows backdoor that gives attackers remote control over an infected system. It supports a small set of commands such as running arbitrary shell commands, uploading and downloading files, creating and renaming directories, listing folder contents, and uninstalling itself to destroy evidence. The malware communicates with its command‑and‑control server at license[.]claude‑pro[.]com over TCP port 443 or UDP port 8080, encrypting traffic with a hardcoded AES key to make network monitoring more difficult. 

Attribution and broader implications Security researchers have not yet pinned the campaign to a specific named threat group, but they note technical overlaps and suggest the same actors behind the PlugX malware family may be experimenting with this new payload. The fact that the attackers impersonate major security vendors in other related samples—such as Trellix, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, and Microsoft Defender—points to a broader malvertising and supply‑chain‑style strategy.

How users and organizations can protect themselves 

Organizations should block the domains claude‑pro[.]com and license[.]claude‑pro[.]com at the DNS and firewall level and search endpoints for NOVupdate.exe and avk.dll in Startup folders, which are strong indicators of compromise. End users, especially developers, must download Claude and similar AI tools only from verified official domains, treat sponsored search results with skepticism, and verify URLs before clicking installers. Updated endpoint protection, EDR logging, and user‑awareness training on AI‑related phishing and malvertising are critical to mitigating this evolving threat.

22 Year Old Developer Reverse Engineered Code in Claude Mythos, Tech Industry Shocked

 


Earlier this year, AI tech giant Anthropic launched its powerful new model called Claude Mythos. It created storms in the silicon valley and tech industry. The general-purpose model could find software bugs that no human knew ever existed.

About Claude Mythos


But Claude did not launch Mythos to the world, it only offered it to cybersecurity experts at big organizations that make or have critical software infrastructure and asked them to find and patch flaws before Anthropic released it commercially for the public use.

But, in just two weeks, a 22-year old developer called Kye Gomez made predictions about the core designs that made Claude Mythos advanced and later published OpenMythos. It is an open project that anticipates Anthropic’s breakthrough. Gomez’s code created a tsunami in the AI and tech research community.

If real, this incident can have serious implications . Why? Because if a self-taught developer can reverse engineer the infrastructure innovation of a billion-dollar AI firm in just a few days, then what can threat-actors with malicious intent do. If this happens, the proprietary debate about AI architecture will fade away.

About OpenMythos


OpenMythos allows developers to run and train effective variants of these models on laptops, also raising concerns about long-term dependency on huge, environment and community-destroying data centers.

Boon or curse?


Fortunately, organizations won’t be able to get AI secrets that only the big tech companies such as OpenAI, Anthropic, or Google control.

But what if users and small teams across the world can also reverse engineer the code of the biggest AI companies? It will be difficult to maintain a safe-tech world order. Advanced capabilities will sprout, and it will be difficult to contain.

About the developer, Gomez is not your typical ML engineer. He started coding as a kid, left school early and did not attend college. He built his reputation via coding.

Why OpenMythos


OpenMythos is built upon Gomez’s hypothesis that Claude Mythos uses a unique large language model (LLM) that has been under development since 2022 and shown reliability while training at scale at the start of this year. How is OpenMythos different from Claude Mythos?

Instead of putting neural network layers to give models more depth, experts advised looping data repetitively via smaller packets. This gave the model depth in due time.

AI-Driven Hack Breach Hits Government Agencies

 

A lone attacker reportedly used Claude and GPT-4.1 to breach nine Mexican government agencies, exposing data tied to 195 million citizens and showing how generative AI can accelerate cybercrime. The incident, which ran from December 2025 to February 2026, is a stark warning that AI can now amplify a single operator into something closer to a full attack team. 

Between late 2025 and early 2026, the attacker used Claude Code to carry out about 75% of remote commands during the intrusion. Researchers found 1,088 prompts across 34 active sessions, which led to 5,317 AI-executed commands on live victim systems. That level of automation meant the attacker could move through government networks far faster than a human-only workflow would allow.

The operation did not rely on one model alone. When Claude encountered limits, the attacker turned to ChatGPT for help with lateral movement, credential mapping, and other technical steps that supported the breach. A custom 17,550-line Python script then funneled stolen data through OpenAI’s API, generating 2,597 structured intelligence reports across 305 internal servers. 

The stolen material reportedly included tax records, voter information, employee credentials, and other sensitive government data. Beyond the scale of the theft, the bigger problem is what this means for defense teams: AI can shorten the time needed to find weaknesses, write exploits, and organize stolen data. That compression makes traditional detection and response windows much harder to meet. 

This case shows that cybercriminals no longer need large teams to mount sophisticated operations. With the right prompts, a single attacker can use commercial AI systems to plan, automate, and scale an intrusion in ways that were once reserved for advanced groups. Anthropic said it investigated, disrupted the activity, and banned the accounts involved, but the broader lesson is clear: security defenses now need to account for AI-accelerated attacks as a mainstream threat.

US Military Reportedly Used Anthropic’s Claude AI in Iran Strikes Hours After Trump Ordered Ban

 

The United States military reportedly relied on Claude, the artificial intelligence model developed by Anthropic, during its strikes on Iran—even though former President Donald Trump had ordered federal agencies to stop using the company’s technology just hours earlier.

Reports from The Wall Street Journal and Axios indicate that Claude was used during the large-scale joint US-Israel bombing campaign against Iran that began on Saturday. The episode highlights how difficult it can be for the military to quickly remove advanced AI systems once they are deeply integrated into operational frameworks.

According to the Journal, the AI tools supported military intelligence analysis, assisted in identifying potential targets, and were also used to simulate battlefield scenarios ahead of operations.

The day before the strikes began, Trump instructed all federal agencies to immediately discontinue using Anthropic’s AI tools. In a post on Truth Social, he criticized the company, calling it a "Radical Left AI company run by people who have no idea what the real World is all about".

Tensions between the US government and Anthropic had already been escalating. The conflict intensified after the US military reportedly used Claude during a January mission to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Anthropic raised concerns over that operation, noting that its usage policies prohibit the application of its AI systems for violent purposes, weapons development, or surveillance.

Relations continued to deteriorate in the months that followed. In a lengthy post on X, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth accused the company of "arrogance and betrayal", stating that "America's warfighters will never be held hostage by the ideological whims of Big Tech".

Hegseth also called for complete and unrestricted access to Anthropic’s AI models for any lawful military use.

Despite the political dispute, officials acknowledged that removing Claude from military systems would not be immediate. Because the technology has become widely embedded across operations, the Pentagon plans a transition period. Hegseth said Anthropic would continue providing services "for a period of no more than six months to allow for a seamless transition to a better and more patriotic service".

Meanwhile, OpenAI has moved quickly to fill the gap created by the rift. CEO Sam Altman announced that the company had reached an agreement with the Pentagon to deploy its AI tools—including ChatGPT—within the military’s classified networks.