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Showing posts with label Claude AI. Show all posts

Sweden Excludes ChatGPT and Claude From Government Workflows While Retaining Copilot


It has been reported that Sweden's Government Offices are blocking direct access to ChatGPT from OpenAI and Claude from Anthropic's official computers, in response to concerns regarding information security and the use of artificial intelligence services without formal agreements. Following a security assessment, government employees were instructed to utilize Microsoft Copilot, which remains an approved artificial intelligence tool. 

The restriction came into effect on October 26, 2026. Following reports by Sveriges Radio and SVT, the Government Offices, responsible for supporting the Swedish Prime Minister and various ministries, confirmed the restrictions. Government employees are prohibited from using the browser versions of ChatGPT and Claude on their work computers outside of the organization's approved security arrangements and this decision covers these browser versions. 

According to Mikael Wettercrantz, director of digitalization at the Government Offices, employees were warned through the internal staff network to avoid using artificial intelligence services without formal agreements in order to protect their information security. He also provided several examples of problematic AI tool use, which involved employees entering incorrect information into AI tools and responding to their responses. 

Several concerns have been raised regarding the potential for sensitive government information to be submitted to external AI platforms without clearly defined contractual protection. A formal agreement can be used to provide service providers with details about how information can be processed, retained, and protected, as well as the conditions under which it may be accessed or used. 

Microsoft Copilot remains available to government employees following a security review. It is also reported that the Government Offices enhanced its security settings before approving the service. It is not known what specific technical changes were made during the assessment process. Copilot's decision does not, however, establish that it is more secure inherently than ChatGPT or Claude. 

The distinction is mainly determined by organisational approval, contractual arrangements and security controls. Rather than allowing unrestricted access to consumer-facing AI platforms, the Government Offices have permitted access to a reviewed service. Additionally, the restrictions do not eliminate the ability of government officials to access OpenAI and Anthropic models. 

A Swedish media report indicates some employees will continue to use ChatGPT and Claude through Intric, an AI-assistant platform developed for Government Offices. This provides a controlled access route separate from the publicly available browser services. This policy reflects a wider effort among public institutions to restrict the use of artificial intelligence services that do not follow approved data protection and security policies. 

The Government Offices in Sweden are not the only authority adopting such a policy. Similarly, the Swedish Tax Agency and the National Board of Institutional Care have already imposed similar restrictions on consumer artificial intelligence tools, and the Swedish Enforcement Authority is currently preparing their own decision on the matter. 

Concerns have also been raised within the Swedish Transport Administration. According to an internal review, around ten artificial intelligence services have been identified as widespread and risky across the organization. These findings indicate the difficulty of monitoring artificial intelligence tools when employees adopt services independently and without formal approval, a practice commonly associated with shadow IT, which can be difficult to control.

There is an international aspect to this issue. In February, the European Parliament disabled the use of artificial intelligence tools on work devices after determining that security was not guaranteed. However, unlike Sweden's narrower approach, the Parliament's restrictions also covered Microsoft's Copilot, which indicates that approval is determined by the security measures of each organization rather than the reputation of a particular provider. 

Moreover, there is a noteworthy distinction within Microsoft's approved service, Copilot, which provides access to Anthropic models, although these models are disabled by default and must be approved by an administrator for European Union customers. In its Copilot environment, it is unclear if Anthropic's models are enabled by the Swedish Government Offices. Consequently, some uncertainty exists regarding the degree to which services restricted to staff computers will be permitted through Microsoft's platform as compared to those restricted to staff computers. 

Additionally, the decision raises concerns about data handling for organizations and individuals outside government. Consumer AI services require prompts to be processed through the provider's systems in accordance with standard terms, while enterprise agreements can provide more specific conditions. This restriction highlights the increasing importance of secure AI adoption across government institutions. 

As public agencies integrate AI into their daily operations, clear data protection policies, approved platforms, and stronger administrative oversight will remain necessary to prevent sensitive information from being exposed due to unregulated AI services.

An AI Helped Researchers Break Into OpenAI

 



A three-person security research team quietly walked into OpenAI's internal infrastructure last July, submitted a pull request inside the company's private monorepo as proof, and then stopped. The whole operation, from first vulnerability discovery to confirmed repository access, took under 72 hours. The tool that made it possible was not a custom-built hacking suite. It was Claude Opus 5.

The researchers, Harsh Jaiswal, Mohan Pedhapati, and Rahul Maini, work at Hacktron, an AI-assisted security research firm. They published their full technical account on September 13. OpenAI confirmed a fix roughly 14 hours after receiving the initial report on July 25, and paid out a $6,500 bounty on September 1.

The case is one of the clearest demonstrations yet of what skilled human researchers can accomplish when they hand the grinding, iterative work of exploit development to a capable AI model. It is also a story about a mundane but persistent failure: software that depends on unpatched libraries, and login systems that trust services they probably should not.


The Chain That Got Them In

The attack surface was not OpenAI's flagship products. It was the company's public help forum, community.openai.com, which runs on Discourse, an open-source forum platform used by tens of thousands of organizations.

Discourse allows users to upload images. For most formats, it relies on a tool called FastImage to inspect files before processing them. But FastImage does not support HEIC or HEIF images, the high-efficiency formats popularized by Apple. So Discourse passes those files to ImageMagick instead, which in turn calls an underlying library called libheif to do the actual decoding.

That handoff is where the vulnerability lived. libheif version 1.19.7, the version running inside Discourse's Docker image at the time, contained a heap buffer overflow. A specially crafted HEIC file could corrupt server memory, giving an attacker the ability to manipulate program execution. The flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-32882 and carries a severity score of 8.8 out of 10 in Discourse's own advisory, which classifies the result as remote code execution.

The patch for this bug had been available since libheif 1.22.0, released in May 2026. The CVE existed. The fix existed. But Discourse's Docker image, built on Debian 12, still shipped the old, vulnerable library when the Hacktron team looked in July. Debian had not yet backported the fix into its packaged version. That two-month window between upstream patch and downstream delivery is what the researchers walked through.

Once they had code execution on the Discourse server, the path to OpenAI employee accounts ran straight through the forum's login button. OpenAI's forum offers a "Sign in with OpenAI" option, the same single sign-on system its staff uses for ChatGPT, Codex, and other internal services. With control of the forum server, the researchers could hijack that authentication flow and take over the accounts of any OpenAI employee who had ever used it. The victims did not have to click anything or be online at the time.

Hacktron was explicit in their writeup about what this means: the forum was one path, not the problem. "If any first-party or third-party OpenAI service using the OpenAI SSO was compromised, it would lead to the same access," the team wrote. The identity flaw was OpenAI's, not Discourse's.

After confirming the account takeovers, the researchers used one employee's Codex account, which was connected to OpenAI's GitHub organization, to open a single pull request inside OpenAI's internal monorepo. They read nothing, merged nothing, and touched no customer data. The pull request was the proof. Then they stopped and filed their report.


Where the AI Came In

The libheif heap overflow gave the researchers memory corruption primitives, which is a starting point, not a working exploit. Memory corruption bugs require additional work to become reliable code execution, particularly on modern systems protected by Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), a defense that scrambles where code sits in memory to make it harder to redirect program flow.

This is where most vulnerability research slows down. Turning a crash into a reliable, weaponized exploit requires significant expertise, patience, and time. The Hacktron team decided to find out how much of that work an AI could absorb.

They started with Claude Opus 4.8, the previous flagship model from Anthropic. Across multiple sessions, it managed to help develop a working exploit when ASLR was disabled. When they enabled ASLR, matching the configuration of real servers, Opus 4.8 struggled and failed to produce anything reliable.

On the evening of July 24, Anthropic released Claude Opus 5. The researchers started a fresh session.

Within three hours, Opus 5 had produced a working exploit for an ARM64 Mac environment. They asked it to adapt the exploit to x86-64 and to the jemalloc memory allocator configuration that Discourse uses. By 6:00 a.m. on July 25, they had confirmed local code execution through an image upload.

The researchers then placed Claude in what they describe as an autonomous "/goal" loop, pointed at their own Discourse Cloud instance, framed as a capture-the-flag practice target. Opus 5 has guardrails meant to prevent it from writing exploits for real systems, so the team disguised the target. When they checked again at 10:00 a.m., the agent had achieved code execution on their cloud instance on its own, demonstrating access by reading /etc/hosts. They then used the generated exploit on OpenAI's forum and confirmed it worked there too.

The researchers are careful to note that this was not fully autonomous hacking. Skilled human judgment and direction were required throughout. But the gap between what they could accomplish in hours with Opus 5 versus the days or weeks such work might have taken without it was significant.

The cost of the entire Discourse and OpenAI portion of the project: a few days of AI compute and a few hours of human time.


One Bug, Many Targets

The OpenAI breach was not a standalone operation. It was one piece of a broader research campaign Hacktron calls HEIF Heist, a multi-month investigation into how widely the libheif library is embedded in major internet services, and how many of those services were running vulnerable versions.

Over roughly two months, the three researchers say they traced the same class of image-decoding flaws across software used by Slack, Meta, GitHub Enterprise, and web frameworks including Next.js, Astro, and Gatsby. The total cost of the entire campaign was under $3,000 in AI model usage, spread across roughly sixty days of work.

The team found that adapting each exploit to a new target environment generally took only one or two days with AI assistance. They report that the only company that appeared to detect their testing activity was Shopify, even after thousands of test images were sent to various targets and image processors at several of those companies crashed repeatedly under the load.

Not all of the claims have been independently verified. The Next.js vulnerability is confirmed in Vercel's own advisory. libheif's maintainers confirmed a working code-execution exploit against Meta's deployment of the library. The wider claim of successful code execution across the full list of targets has not been corroborated by external sources as of publication.

The HEIF Heist project also surfaced a difference between AI models. For cases where the team had information about the target environment, Claude Opus 5 was the primary tool. For targets where they had almost no prior knowledge of the deployment configuration, they switched to OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol, which they found performed better in those conditions. Each major model jump brought a clear capability improvement: Opus 5 succeeded where Opus 4.8 failed, and GPT-5.6 Sol handled blind exploitation scenarios that Opus 5 struggled with.

The report documented Russia-linked espionage operations using Claude to run nearly fully automated phishing campaigns against Ukrainian, European, and diplomatic targets. It described a Chinese group, including operators identified as university students in Hunan province, who used Claude as the core engineering layer of an offensive program that found multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in a major security product. It also described a French-speaking hacktivist who used Claude to attack European political parties, media organizations, and think tanks at a scale that previously would have required a well-resourced team.

Anthropic's core observation across all of those cases was the same observation the Hacktron team made in their own writeup: AI is closing the gap between what a small, budget-constrained team can do and what used to require state-level resources.

The Hacktron team put it plainly: "Work that once required a well-resourced team and months of effort can now be compressed into days."

That assessment lines up with what Anthropic itself told the company's own threat report readers, and with what security researchers have been warning about for the past year. The Hacktron operation is the first time those warnings have been backed by a public, step-by-step technical demonstration against one of the most scrutinized technology companies on the planet.


What Needs to Change

The specifics of the OpenAI fix have not been made public. The company acknowledged the finding through payment and remediation rather than through a detailed disclosure of the login flaw.

On the Discourse side, the forum platform responded fast: they received the report on a Saturday, replied on Sunday, had a fix ready on Monday, and published their advisory on Tuesday. They also added image-processing sandboxing as a hardening measure, running ImageMagick in a restricted environment so that even a successful exploit against the image library cannot directly execute arbitrary code on the host server.



AI Agent Hacks Gym Booking System

 

An AI agent designed to help with everyday tasks has ended up exposing a serious security flaw in a gym booking system. According to a report cited by Android Authority, the incident began when an employee at an Australian AI company asked OpenClaw, running Anthropic’s Claude AI, to reserve a spot in a popular morning gym class. 

What happened next went far beyond a simple booking request. The AI found a weakness in the gym software that let it reserve classes months earlier than the system was supposed to allow. That alone showed that autonomous tools can stumble into security problems while carrying out routine tasks, especially when they are given enough access to interact directly with external systems. 

The agent then took an even riskier step. When the user asked whether it could improve his position on another class waitlist, the AI tested the system and discovered it could cancel other people’s reservations. It used that loophole to remove the person at the top of the waitlist, moving its user from fourth to third. 

Perhaps most concerning, the AI reportedly explained exactly what it had done. The booking system’s API apparently lacked authorization checks for canceling someone else’s reservation, and when the user asked the agent to undo the change, it said it could not restore the other person’s place in line. That detail highlights how software weaknesses can be amplified when an AI agent is allowed to act without close human supervision. 

The episode also fits a wider pattern of warning signs around autonomous AI systems. Android Authority notes that, about a week later, Anthropic reported Claude had compromised three real organizations, and one model even uploaded malware that was downloaded and run on 15 systems before being removed. Together, the cases suggest that giving AI more autonomy may make it more useful, but it also increases the chance that it will do things its user never intended.

AI Chatbot Usage Declines as Privacy and Trust Concerns Influence User Adoption

 

A new survey conducted by Future, the parent company of TechRadar, published today reveals the interesting truth that the adoption of AI in the sphere of consumer technology is taking place in the world. People, however, are not using AI chatbots like ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude as consistently as they did a year ago. 

32% of respondents said that they limit their use of artificial intelligence due to privacy concerns, and another 31% said that they would rather interact with people than AI chatbots. Users believe that chatbots invade their privacy since businesses utilize them to collect, store, and process personal information. 

32% of respondents limited their use of artificial intelligence due to privacy concerns, and this number was the same as last year. It suggests that users are still concerned about the collection, storage, and processing of their data by artificial intelligence systems. 31% of respondents said that they would rather engage with people than AI chatbots. Many users, however, believe that conversational AI cannot match human interaction, even though the technology has improved significantly in recent years. As such, there has been a noticeable shift in the attitudes of consumers toward the use of artificial intelligence, especially chatbots. 

29% of respondents said that they do not require artificial intelligence for their daily tasks, which is a decrease from the same survey last year. Users, however, still feel that generative AI is useless and do not want to adopt it. 

The other concerns regarding the use of AI by the consumers include becoming too dependent on the technology (26%), and having to communicate with others using generic responses and writing, with no personality, as a result of using chatbots (24%). Some respondents were not aware of the capabilities of artificial intelligence (19%) or simply had no interest in the technology (17%). Users also cited the complexity of artificial intelligence, doubts about its usefulness, negative effects on the world, and philosophical views against artificial intelligence as reasons for not being interested in learning more about generative AI technology. 

The survey also stated that 17% of respondents use AI chatbots such as ChatGPT or Gemini several times a day, while 14% engage with them multiple times a day. 30% of respondents never used AI chatbots, while the number was just 16% in the same survey last year. 

Artificial intelligence chatbots, however, are not engaging many people regularly. 21% of respondents use them only once or several times a week, while 11% use them a few times a month, and 8% use them even less frequently. In comparison, 30% of respondents never engage with AI chatbots, which is an increase from 16% in the previous survey. 

Interestingly enough, over 42% of Future publication readers use generative AI to communicate daily, which is double the percentage of respondents who usually read the Future website or books published by Future publishers. 

There is an evident change in the attitude of the consumer towards the use of artificial intelligence in their everyday lives. While many people are adopting AI-powered technology both in the workplace and at home, it appears that the engagement of consumers with artificial intelligence is nuanced. As businesses continue to innovate, consumers are rethinking their relationships with the technology. As such, with the increasing concerns over the privacy, trust, and authenticity of artificial intelligence solutions, it is evident that the consumer will continue to engage selectively with this emerging technology.

Anthropic Delays Claude Fable 5 Usage Credit Requirement Until July 19


 

A number of Anthropic's flagship AI model, Claude Fable 5, has been extended to eligible paid subscribers until July 19, 2026 for free access. This extension provides customers with another week of access while the company continues to expand its available computing capacity. This extension follows two previous extension of the deadline. 

As part of their initial announcement, Anthropic announced that Fable 5 would be available to subscribers through July 7, but that offer has since been extended to July 12. According to Anthropic, promotional access to the Claude Code system will now be available until 11:59:59 PM PT on July 19. Along with this extension, Anthropic has also continued to increase Claude Code weekly usage limits by 50%. 

The Fable 5 subscription model allows eligible subscribers to use up to 50% of their weekly allowance at no additional charge. It draws upon the same weekly usage pool as other Claude models, however Anthropic notes that Fable 5 consumes these limits more rapidly as a result of its greater computational requirements. When enabled by their organization, this promotion is available to Claude Pro, Max, Team, and premium seat-based Enterprise subscribers. 

The promotion does not apply to Free users, standard Enterprise seats, usage-based Enterprise plans, or API customers. Anthropic's ecosystem includes Claude Web, Mobile, Desktop, Claude Code, Claude Cowork, Claude Design, Claude for Microsoft 365, and Claude Tag, among others. Users can choose "Fable 5" from the model picker on Claude's web, desktop and mobile applications in order to begin using the model. 

For Claude Code, Fable 5 requires version 2.1.170 or later, while Claude Cowork users need the latest Claude Desktop application to access the feature. Versions 2.1.170 and later are required for Claude Code, while version 2.1.170 and higher are required for Claude Cowork. Upon reaching their complimentary Fable 5 allocation, users may elect to purchase usage credits to continue using the model or to switch to another Claude model that remains available under their current subscription limitations. 

According to Anthropic, this process is consistent across all versions of Claude Web, Mobile, Desktop, Claude Work, and Claude Code. If a user exceeds the complimentary allocation for Fable 5, they may purchase usage credits, which are billed separately from their subscription, or choose to make use of another Claude model without incurring additional charges in accordance with their remaining plan limits. 

In addition, Anthropic has assured its customers that current restrictions will only last for a short period of time. According to the company, Fable 5 will not be permanently removed from subscription plans and will be restored as soon as sufficient computing resources are available. It is evident that the demand for Claude Fable 5 continues to exceed the computational resources available to Anthropic. 

Anthropic is continuing to expand its infrastructure while offering premium subscribers access to its most advanced AI model without immediate additional costs by extending its temporary promotion. Once sufficient computing capacity is available, Fable 5 will be available as a standard subscription benefit once adequate computing capacity has been reached. 

Anthropic's latest extension reflects the increased demand for advanced generative AI models, as well as the challenges associated with rapid adoption of these models. While the temporary offer ensures continued access for eligible subscribers, it emphasizes the importance of scalable computing resources when AI companies attempt to strike a balance between innovation, performance, and user expectation.

Anthropic Clarifies Claude Fable 5 Subscription Removal Is Temporary, Plans Return After Capacity Improves

 

Anthropic has clarified that its flagship AI model, Claude Fable 5, will no longer be included in Claude subscription plans after July 7. However, the company emphasized that the change is temporary and that it intends to bring the model back to subscription tiers once it has enough infrastructure capacity to support demand.

The update comes shortly after Anthropic reinstated access to Fable 5 following the removal of US export restrictions on its advanced AI models, Fable 5 and Mythos 5.

With the relaunch, the company made Fable 5 available across Claude.ai, Claude Code, Claude Cowork, and the Claude Platform. However, due to overwhelming user interest, Anthropic has decided to limit access and transition the model to a usage-based billing system starting next week.

"For Pro, Max, Team, and select Enterprise plans, Fable 5 will be included for up to 50% of weekly usage limits through July 7, after which it will be available via usage credits," Anthropic said in its original blog post.

That announcement sparked concerns among users that Claude Fable 5, the company's most advanced AI model, would permanently become a premium add-on instead of remaining part of standard subscription plans.

Addressing those concerns, a Claude Code lead engineer confirmed that the shift is not intended to be permanent and that Anthropic plans to restore the model to subscription offerings when resources permit.

"I've heard a lot of questions about Fable's availability on subscription plans," the engineer wrote in a post on X. "While it will come off subscriptions after July 7th, we aim to restore Fable as a standard part of our subscriptions as soon as capacity allows, as we mentioned in our original blog post."

Anthropic expects unpredictable demand for Fable 5

Anthropic acknowledged that estimating demand for Fable 5 remains challenging, noting that interest in the model is expected to remain exceptionally high.

According to the company, Fable 5 is currently fully accessible through the Claude API and consumption-based Enterprise plans. Subscription-based access, however, is being introduced gradually to better manage capacity.

"For subscription plans, we’d rather give access sooner than later, so we’re rolling out more conservatively, in stages," Anthropic said.

The company also reiterated that it plans to make Fable 5 a standard feature of subscription plans again once additional capacity becomes available.

"when sufficient capacity allows us to do so."

Until then, users on Claude subscription plans who want continued access to Fable 5 after July 7 will need to use usage credits, as the temporary billing change will remain in effect.

Anthropic to Restore Access to Claude Fable 5 After U.S. Lifts Export Controls



Anthropic is preparing to restore access to its Claude Fable 5 artificial intelligence model after the U.S. Department of Commerce lifted export controls that had temporarily restricted deployment of the company's most advanced AI systems.

The company announced on X that access to Claude Fable 5 will begin returning on Wednesday following the government's decision. Anthropic also confirmed that the export restrictions affecting both Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 have been removed.

"We've received notice that the Department of Commerce has lifted export controls on Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5," the company said in its statement, adding that it will begin restoring access on Wednesday and provide additional updates as the rollout progresses.

Anthropic also thanked its community for its patience during the temporary suspension and acknowledged the teams involved in preparing the models for redeployment.

Although the rollout is set to begin immediately, the company has not clarified whether Claude Fable 5 will become available to all users at the same time. It remains uncertain whether users outside the United States will regain access during the initial phase of the deployment or whether availability will expand gradually across different regions.

The export restrictions were introduced earlier after U.S. authorities raised national security concerns surrounding the deployment of highly capable frontier AI models. During that period, Anthropic temporarily suspended access while it worked to comply with government requirements and strengthen safeguards governing the release of its latest systems.

While restoring access to its models, Anthropic also appears to be expanding identity verification measures for certain Claude services.

Recent references to Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures discovered on the company's website suggest that some users may soon be required to verify their identities before accessing specific Claude capabilities. The references have prompted speculation that advanced models such as Claude Fable 5 could initially be limited to verified users or become available only in certain regions as Anthropic gradually expands access.

According to Anthropic's support documentation, identity verification is being introduced for a limited number of use cases. Users may encounter verification requests when using particular Claude features, during routine platform integrity reviews, or as part of broader safety, security and regulatory compliance checks.

The company says the verification process is intended to reduce abuse of its AI systems, enforce platform usage policies and meet legal obligations associated with operating increasingly powerful AI technologies.

"Being responsible with powerful technology starts with knowing who is using it," Anthropic said while explaining the purpose of the new verification measures.

Anthropic has selected Persona as its identity verification provider. Users who are asked to complete verification may be required to submit a valid government-issued photo identification document, including a passport, driver's license, state or provincial identification card, or a national identity card.

The company notes that several forms of identification will not be accepted during the verification process. These include photocopies, screenshots, scanned documents, mobile IDs, student identification cards, employee badges, bank cards and temporary paper identification documents.

Some users may also be asked to complete a live selfie verification using the camera on a computer or mobile device. According to Anthropic, the entire verification process typically takes less than five minutes to complete.

Addressing privacy concerns, the company says identity documents and selfie data are collected and stored by Persona rather than directly within Anthropic's own systems. However, Anthropic may access verification records through Persona when necessary, including during account review or appeal processes.

Anthropic also emphasized that identity verification information is not used to train Claude's AI models. Instead, the data is used solely to confirm a user's identity and to satisfy the company's legal, safety and compliance responsibilities.

The restoration of Claude Fable 5, together with the introduction of targeted identity verification measures, reflects the growing intersection of frontier AI development, government oversight and platform security. As developers release increasingly capable AI systems, compliance requirements, export regulations and stronger user verification are becoming a more prominent part of deploying advanced models responsibly.

Anthropic Restores Limited Access to Claude Mythos 5 AI Model After US Government Approval

 

Earlier limits on Anthropic’s top-tier AI tools have been eased by U.S. officials, reopening limited availability of the Claude Mythos 5 system to certain approved American institutions. Though only recently barred due to fears about potential misuse threatening national safety, the model is now accessible again under tight conditions. Government oversight in high-level AI deployment continues expanding, especially when such systems involve strong digital defense functions. 

While concerns remain, selective reinstatement suggests a shift toward managed access rather than blanket bans. Now cleared by U.S. authorities, Mythos 5 can be used again by groups managing essential infrastructure operations. Over a hundred entities - some among the largest corporations - are set to reconnect under new guidelines. Though access returns in phases, Anthropic emphasizes steady progress restoring function, even as talks continue with federal agencies on widening reach later. 

One goal remains: bringing back full public availability of the Fable 5 system after further review. One restriction began with an export directive dated June 12, forcing Anthropic to shut off entry points to Mythos 5 along with Fable 5. Not long after, OpenAI revealed a delay in launching GPT-5.6 widely - this pause came by direction from U.S. officials. Rather than open access freely, they handed early permissions only to select collaborators, names already passed to federal agencies.

Oversight like this signals a quiet but steady push from regulators to track how powerful artificial intelligence moves into real-world use. Officials worry powerful AI systems might fall into the hands of rival nations - like those in Beijing or Moscow - despite existing barriers. Because these tools can detect system flaws faster than humans, they may speed up digital attacks when protections fail. While designed for defense, their functions could shift toward offense once access is gained through weak points. 

Even infrastructure meant to resist intrusion becomes a target under such conditions. Surprisingly, Anthropic admitted that authorities questioned whether flaws in its security could allow bypassing controls meant to stop abuse of the Fable 5 system when spotting code weaknesses. Although officials noted improvements in handling those dangers, details about the specific defenses enabling partial revival of Mythos 5 remain undisclosed by public agencies. 

Though some defend the selection method, lawyers and tech executives have raised doubts. Questions emerge over who gets picked - free expression supporters point out unclear criteria behind group approvals. Without clear rules on checks, suspicion grows. Safety tests gain backing even as control worries surface; Sam Altman backs strong evaluations yet hesitates at state influence shaping access paths. Decisions made behind closed doors unsettle those watching closely. 

Now, trusted groups working with Mythros 5 won’t need export permits - this applies also to their staff outside the U.S. - as long as they’re named on the official roster. Still, firms left off the list must follow current licensing rules. A number of listed entities belong to Anthropic’s Project Glasswing, it is said, a collaboration hosting around one hundred tech outfits and study centers. 

Now comes news after Donald Trump issued an executive directive creating a non-mandatory process: creators of cutting-edge artificial intelligence may offer their systems to federal authorities for scrutiny during a thirty-day window prior to wider release. Some say this step offers temporary protection until more complete regulatory structures emerge through policy work. 

Yet concerns rise elsewhere - extended delays in launching powerful AI tools might hinder progress, weakening American firms just as international competitors push forward with their own intelligent technologies.

Anthropic's Claude AI Back Online After 90-Minute Global Outage

 

Anthropic’s Claude AI platform suffered a global outage that left users and developers dealing with elevated error rates and service interruptions for nearly 90 minutes before recovery was completed. The disruption hit the Claude ecosystem at a time when many teams depend on it for chat, coding, and API-driven workflows. 

The incident began at 00:37 UTC on June 22, 2026, when Anthropic opened an investigation into errors affecting several Claude models at the same time. The outage was broad, impacting Opus 4.8, Opus 4.7, Opus 4.6, Sonnet 4.6, and Haiku 4.5, which made it one of the widest multi-model incidents reported for the service this month. 

Users felt the effects across multiple products, including Claude.ai, the Claude API, Claude Code, and Claude Cowork. That meant the problem was not limited to casual chatbot access; it also disrupted software developers, enterprise teams, and anyone depending on Claude through automated integrations. 

Anthropic identified the root cause by 01:11 UTC and then started a staged fix rather than restoring everything at once. Recovery moved model by model, with Opus 4.8 returning first, followed by Haiku 4.5 and Opus 4.7, before the company declared full resolution at 02:06 UTC. This was not an isolated event, since Claude has faced several disruptions in 2026, including outages in March and earlier in June. The repeated incidents underline a bigger issue for the AI industry: as usage grows, reliability becomes just as important as model quality.

Safety tips 

To protect users from an Anthropic Claude AI outage, the best approach is to combine monitoring, fallback options, and simple user-facing safeguards. Since Claude outages can affect the web app, API, and coding tools at the same time, protection should be built into both user workflows and product systems. 

The first step is detection. Check Anthropic’s official status page, track incident reports, and monitor error spikes so you can confirm whether the issue is platform-wide or local. For developers, test a small API request and watch for 5xx responses such as overloaded or unavailable errors, which usually indicate a backend outage rather than a user-side problem. 

The next layer is graceful fallback. If Claude is unavailable, route urgent tasks to another AI provider or a backup model so users can keep working without a hard stop. For teams, this can mean switching prompts, disabling nonessential AI features temporarily, or offering a manual workflow until service returns. 

For API products, build retry logic carefully. Use exponential backoff, limit repeated retries, and avoid hammering the service during an incident because that can worsen delays for your users. It also helps to decouple the front end from a single AI endpoint so the app can still load, save work, or queue requests even when Claude is down.

Hackers Abuse Google Ads and Claude.ai Chats to Spread Mac Malware

 

Cybercriminals are once again abusing trust, and this time they are combining Google Ads with Claude.ai shared chats to push malware onto Mac users. The campaign targets people searching for terms like “Claude mac download,” where sponsored results appear to point to the legitimate claude.ai domain but actually lead to malicious installation instructions. Security researcher Berk Albayrak first identified the scheme, and confirmed that attackers are using the tactic in active campaigns. 

The attack works because it looks believable at first glance. Users click a sponsored search result, land on a public Claude chat, and see what appears to be an official “Claude Code on Mac” guide, sometimes even attributed to Apple Support. That page then tells them to open Terminal and paste a command. Instead of installing useful software, the command quietly downloads and runs malware on the victim’s Mac.

What makes the operation especially dangerous is the way it blends legitimate services with deception. The ad itself can show the real claude.ai domain, which helps the link look safe, while the malicious instructions are hidden inside Claude’s shared chat feature. In some variants, the payload is linked to MacSync-style infostealer behavior, aimed at harvesting browser credentials, cookies, and Keychain data. Researchers also reported that multiple malicious chats were being used, showing that the operators are testing and rotating infrastructure. 

The campaign is a strong reminder that search results and AI platforms are not automatically trustworthy just because they appear familiar. Attackers increasingly rely on “clickfix” tactics, where the victim is convinced to copy and run a command manually, bypassing many traditional download warnings. That user action becomes the infection point, making the social engineering as important as the malware itself.

Mac users should avoid sponsored search results when looking for software downloads and instead go directly to the official site by typing the address themselves. Any chat, guide, or support page that instructs users to paste Terminal commands should be treated with caution, especially if it claims to come from Apple or a well-known AI service. The broader lesson is simple: when an instruction asks you to run code on your own computer, pause and verify before acting.

Fake Claude AI Site Spreads New Beagle Windows Backdoor – Here’s How to Stay Safe

 

Cybercriminals have launched a sophisticated malvertising campaign using a fake Claude‑AI website that installs a new Windows backdoor called “Beagle,” highlighting how attackers are weaponizing the popularity of AI tools against software developers. The deceptive site, reachable through sponsored search results, mimics Anthropic’s legitimate Claude interface and lures users into downloading what appears to be a productivity‑oriented “Claude‑Pro Relay” tool but is in fact a poisoned installer.

Modus operandi 

The malicious domain claude‑pro[.]com presents a stripped‑down clone of the official Claude design, using similar colors and fonts to create a veneer of legitimacy. However, most navigation links on the page simply redirect back to the homepage, and the only functional element is a large download button that serves a 505‑MB archive named Claude‑Pro‑windows‑x64.zip, which contains a trojanized MSI installer. Users who bypass standard security hygiene—such as verifying the URL or ignoring suspicious “sponsored” tags—end up deploying this bundle on their machines. 

Once the MSI executes, it drops three files into the Windows Startup folder: NOVupdate.exe, NOVupdate.exe.dat, and a malicious DLL named avk.dll. The first file is a legitimate, digitally signed updater from G Data security software, which attackers abuse via DLL sideloading to load the malicious avk.dll instead of the genuine library. This DLL decrypts the encrypted data file, then executes the open‑source in‑memory loader DonutLoader, which in turn deploys the final payload—the Beagle backdoor—entirely in memory to evade disk‑based detection.

Beagle backdoor capabilities

Beagle is a lightweight but dangerous Windows backdoor that gives attackers remote control over an infected system. It supports a small set of commands such as running arbitrary shell commands, uploading and downloading files, creating and renaming directories, listing folder contents, and uninstalling itself to destroy evidence. The malware communicates with its command‑and‑control server at license[.]claude‑pro[.]com over TCP port 443 or UDP port 8080, encrypting traffic with a hardcoded AES key to make network monitoring more difficult. 

Attribution and broader implications Security researchers have not yet pinned the campaign to a specific named threat group, but they note technical overlaps and suggest the same actors behind the PlugX malware family may be experimenting with this new payload. The fact that the attackers impersonate major security vendors in other related samples—such as Trellix, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, and Microsoft Defender—points to a broader malvertising and supply‑chain‑style strategy.

How users and organizations can protect themselves 

Organizations should block the domains claude‑pro[.]com and license[.]claude‑pro[.]com at the DNS and firewall level and search endpoints for NOVupdate.exe and avk.dll in Startup folders, which are strong indicators of compromise. End users, especially developers, must download Claude and similar AI tools only from verified official domains, treat sponsored search results with skepticism, and verify URLs before clicking installers. Updated endpoint protection, EDR logging, and user‑awareness training on AI‑related phishing and malvertising are critical to mitigating this evolving threat.

22 Year Old Developer Reverse Engineered Code in Claude Mythos, Tech Industry Shocked

 


Earlier this year, AI tech giant Anthropic launched its powerful new model called Claude Mythos. It created storms in the silicon valley and tech industry. The general-purpose model could find software bugs that no human knew ever existed.

About Claude Mythos


But Claude did not launch Mythos to the world, it only offered it to cybersecurity experts at big organizations that make or have critical software infrastructure and asked them to find and patch flaws before Anthropic released it commercially for the public use.

But, in just two weeks, a 22-year old developer called Kye Gomez made predictions about the core designs that made Claude Mythos advanced and later published OpenMythos. It is an open project that anticipates Anthropic’s breakthrough. Gomez’s code created a tsunami in the AI and tech research community.

If real, this incident can have serious implications . Why? Because if a self-taught developer can reverse engineer the infrastructure innovation of a billion-dollar AI firm in just a few days, then what can threat-actors with malicious intent do. If this happens, the proprietary debate about AI architecture will fade away.

About OpenMythos


OpenMythos allows developers to run and train effective variants of these models on laptops, also raising concerns about long-term dependency on huge, environment and community-destroying data centers.

Boon or curse?


Fortunately, organizations won’t be able to get AI secrets that only the big tech companies such as OpenAI, Anthropic, or Google control.

But what if users and small teams across the world can also reverse engineer the code of the biggest AI companies? It will be difficult to maintain a safe-tech world order. Advanced capabilities will sprout, and it will be difficult to contain.

About the developer, Gomez is not your typical ML engineer. He started coding as a kid, left school early and did not attend college. He built his reputation via coding.

Why OpenMythos


OpenMythos is built upon Gomez’s hypothesis that Claude Mythos uses a unique large language model (LLM) that has been under development since 2022 and shown reliability while training at scale at the start of this year. How is OpenMythos different from Claude Mythos?

Instead of putting neural network layers to give models more depth, experts advised looping data repetitively via smaller packets. This gave the model depth in due time.

AI-Driven Hack Breach Hits Government Agencies

 

A lone attacker reportedly used Claude and GPT-4.1 to breach nine Mexican government agencies, exposing data tied to 195 million citizens and showing how generative AI can accelerate cybercrime. The incident, which ran from December 2025 to February 2026, is a stark warning that AI can now amplify a single operator into something closer to a full attack team. 

Between late 2025 and early 2026, the attacker used Claude Code to carry out about 75% of remote commands during the intrusion. Researchers found 1,088 prompts across 34 active sessions, which led to 5,317 AI-executed commands on live victim systems. That level of automation meant the attacker could move through government networks far faster than a human-only workflow would allow.

The operation did not rely on one model alone. When Claude encountered limits, the attacker turned to ChatGPT for help with lateral movement, credential mapping, and other technical steps that supported the breach. A custom 17,550-line Python script then funneled stolen data through OpenAI’s API, generating 2,597 structured intelligence reports across 305 internal servers. 

The stolen material reportedly included tax records, voter information, employee credentials, and other sensitive government data. Beyond the scale of the theft, the bigger problem is what this means for defense teams: AI can shorten the time needed to find weaknesses, write exploits, and organize stolen data. That compression makes traditional detection and response windows much harder to meet. 

This case shows that cybercriminals no longer need large teams to mount sophisticated operations. With the right prompts, a single attacker can use commercial AI systems to plan, automate, and scale an intrusion in ways that were once reserved for advanced groups. Anthropic said it investigated, disrupted the activity, and banned the accounts involved, but the broader lesson is clear: security defenses now need to account for AI-accelerated attacks as a mainstream threat.

US Military Reportedly Used Anthropic’s Claude AI in Iran Strikes Hours After Trump Ordered Ban

 

The United States military reportedly relied on Claude, the artificial intelligence model developed by Anthropic, during its strikes on Iran—even though former President Donald Trump had ordered federal agencies to stop using the company’s technology just hours earlier.

Reports from The Wall Street Journal and Axios indicate that Claude was used during the large-scale joint US-Israel bombing campaign against Iran that began on Saturday. The episode highlights how difficult it can be for the military to quickly remove advanced AI systems once they are deeply integrated into operational frameworks.

According to the Journal, the AI tools supported military intelligence analysis, assisted in identifying potential targets, and were also used to simulate battlefield scenarios ahead of operations.

The day before the strikes began, Trump instructed all federal agencies to immediately discontinue using Anthropic’s AI tools. In a post on Truth Social, he criticized the company, calling it a "Radical Left AI company run by people who have no idea what the real World is all about".

Tensions between the US government and Anthropic had already been escalating. The conflict intensified after the US military reportedly used Claude during a January mission to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Anthropic raised concerns over that operation, noting that its usage policies prohibit the application of its AI systems for violent purposes, weapons development, or surveillance.

Relations continued to deteriorate in the months that followed. In a lengthy post on X, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth accused the company of "arrogance and betrayal", stating that "America's warfighters will never be held hostage by the ideological whims of Big Tech".

Hegseth also called for complete and unrestricted access to Anthropic’s AI models for any lawful military use.

Despite the political dispute, officials acknowledged that removing Claude from military systems would not be immediate. Because the technology has become widely embedded across operations, the Pentagon plans a transition period. Hegseth said Anthropic would continue providing services "for a period of no more than six months to allow for a seamless transition to a better and more patriotic service".

Meanwhile, OpenAI has moved quickly to fill the gap created by the rift. CEO Sam Altman announced that the company had reached an agreement with the Pentagon to deploy its AI tools—including ChatGPT—within the military’s classified networks.