A cyber operation believed to be linked to Iranian threat actors has been identified targeting Microsoft 365 environments, with a primary focus on organizations in Israel and the United Arab Emirates. The activity comes amid ongoing tensions in the Middle East and is still considered active.
According to research from Check Point, the campaign was carried out in three separate waves on March 3, March 13, and March 23, 2026. More than 300 organizations in Israel and over 25 in the U.A.E. were affected. Investigators also observed limited targeting in Europe, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia.
The attackers focused on cloud-based systems used across a wide range of sectors, including government bodies, municipalities, transportation services, energy infrastructure, technology firms, and private companies. This broad targeting indicates an effort to access both public-sector systems and critical commercial operations.
The primary method used in the campaign is known as password spraying. In this technique, attackers attempt a small number of commonly used passwords across many accounts instead of repeatedly targeting a single account. This approach increases the chances of finding weak credentials while avoiding detection systems such as account lockouts or rate-limiting controls.
Security researchers noted that similar techniques have previously been associated with Iranian groups such as Peach Sandstorm and Gray Sandstorm. The current activity appears to follow a structured sequence. It begins with large-scale scanning and password attempts routed through Tor exit nodes to conceal the origin of the traffic. This is followed by login attempts, and in successful cases, the extraction of sensitive data, including email content from compromised accounts.
Analysis of Microsoft 365 logs revealed patterns consistent with earlier operations attributed to Gray Sandstorm. Investigators observed the use of red-team style tools and infrastructure, as well as commercial VPN services linked to hosting providers previously associated with Iran-linked cyber activity in the region.
To reduce risk, organizations are advised to monitor sign-in activity for unusual patterns, restrict authentication based on geographic conditions, enforce multi-factor authentication for all users, and enable detailed audit logs to support investigation in the event of a breach.
Renewed Activity from Pay2Key Ransomware Operation
In a related development, a U.S.-based healthcare organization was targeted in late February 2026 by Pay2Key, an Iran-linked ransomware group with connections to a broader threat cluster known by multiple aliases. The group operates under a ransomware-as-a-service model and was first identified in 2020.
The version used in this attack represents an upgrade from campaigns observed in July 2025, incorporating improved techniques for evasion, execution, and anti-forensic activity. Reports from Beazley Security and Halcyon indicate that no data was exfiltrated in this instance, marking a shift away from the group’s earlier double-extortion strategy.
The intrusion is believed to have begun through an unknown access point. Attackers then used legitimate remote access software such as TeamViewer to establish a foothold. From there, they harvested credentials to move laterally across the network, disabled Microsoft Defender Antivirus by falsely indicating that another antivirus solution was active, and interfered with system recovery processes. The attackers then deployed ransomware, issued a ransom note, and cleared logs to conceal their activity.
Notably, logs were deleted at the end of the attack rather than at the beginning, ensuring that even the ransomware’s own actions were removed, making forensic analysis more difficult.
The group has also adjusted its affiliate model, offering up to 80 percent of ransom payments, compared to 70 percent previously, particularly for attacks aligned with geopolitical objectives. In addition, a Linux variant of the ransomware has been identified in the wild. This version is configuration-driven, requires root-level access to execute, and is designed to navigate file systems, classify storage mounts, and encrypt data using the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm in either full or partial modes.
Before encryption begins, the malware weakens system defenses by stopping services, terminating processes, disabling security frameworks such as SELinux and AppArmor, and setting up a scheduled task to execute after system reboot. These steps allow the ransomware to run more efficiently and persist even after restarts.
Further developments point to coordination among pro-Iranian cyber actors. In March 2026, operators associated with another ransomware strain encouraged affiliates to adopt an alternative tool known as Baqiyat 313 Locker, also referred to as BQTLock, due to a surge in participation requests. This ransomware, which operates with pro-Palestinian motives, has been used in attacks targeting the U.A.E., the United States, and Israel since July 2025.
Cybersecurity experts note that Iran has a long history of using cyber operations as a response to political tensions. Increasingly, ransomware is being integrated into these efforts, blurring the line between financially motivated cybercrime and state-aligned cyber activity. Organizations need to adopt continuous monitoring, strong authentication measures, and proactive defense strategies to counter emerging threats.
After the U.S and Israel’s “pre-emptive” strikes against Iran last month, research firm Kpler found vessels in the Persian Gulf going off course. The location data from ships in the Gulf showed vessels maneuvering over land and taking sharp turns in polygonal directions. Disruptions to location-based features have increased across the Middle East. This impacts motorists, aircraft, and mariners.
These disturbances have highlighted major flaws in the GPS. GPS is an American-made system now similar to satellite navigation. For a long time, Kpler and other firms have discovered thousands of instances of oil vessels in the Persian Gulf disrupting the onboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals, a system used to trace vessels in transit, to escape sanctions on Iranian oil exports.
This tactic is called spoofing; the manipulation of location signals permits vessels to hide their activities. Hackers have used this tool to hide their operations.
Since the start of attacks in the Middle East, GPS spoofing in the Persian Gulf has increased. The maritime intelligence agency Windward found over 1,100 different vessels in the Gulf facing AIS manipulation.
The extra interference with satellite navigation signals in the region comes from Gulf states trying to defend against missile and drone strikes on critical infrastructure by compromising the onboard navigational systems of enemy drones and missiles.
These disruptions are being installed as defensive actions in modern warfare.
Aircraft have appeared to have traveled in unpredictable, wave-like patterns due to interference; food delivery riders have also appeared off the coast of Dubai due to failed GPS systems on land.
According to Lisa Dyer, executive director of the GPS Innovation Alliance, the region's ongoing jamming and spoofing activity also raises serious public safety issues.
Foreign-flagged ships from nations like China and India are still allowed to pass via the Persian Gulf, despite the fact that the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has drastically decreased shipping activity.
Iranian strikes have persisted despite widespread meddling throughout the region, raising questions about the origins of Iran's military prowess.
The apparent accuracy of Iranian strikes has also been linked to the use of China's BeiDou, according to other analysts reported in sources such as Al Jazeera.
For targeting, missiles and drones frequently combine satellite-based navigation systems with other systems, such as inertial navigation capabilities, which function independently of satellite-based signals.
Cyberattacks are increasingly being used alongside conventional military actions in the ongoing conflict involving Iran, with both state-linked actors and loosely organised hacker groups targeting systems in the United States and Israel.
A recent incident involving Stryker illustrates the scale of this activity. On March 11, the company confirmed that a cyberattack had disrupted parts of its global network. Employees across several offices reportedly encountered login screens displaying the symbol of Handala, a group believed to have links to Iran. The attack affected systems within Microsoft’s environment, although the full extent of the disruption and the timeline for recovery remain unclear.
Handala has claimed responsibility for the operation, stating that it exploited Microsoft’s cloud-based device management platform, Intune. According to data from SOCRadar, the group alleged it remotely wiped more than 200,000 devices across 79 countries. These claims have not been independently verified, and attempts have been made to seek confirmation from Microsoft. The group described the attack as retaliation for a missile strike in Minab, Iran, which reportedly killed more than 160 people at a girls’ school.
This breach is part of a broader surge in cyber activity following Operation Epic Fury, with multiple pro-Iranian actors directing attacks against American and Israeli systems.
State-linked groups target essential systems
A cybersecurity assessment indicates that several groups associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including CyberAv3ngers, APT33, and APT55, are actively targeting critical infrastructure in the United States.
These operations focus on industrial control systems, which are specialised computers used to manage essential services such as electricity grids, water treatment plants, and manufacturing processes. In some instances, attackers have gained access by using unchanged default passwords, allowing them to install malicious software capable of interfering with or taking control of these systems.
CyberAv3ngers has reportedly accessed industrial machinery in this way, while APT33 has used commonly reused passwords to infiltrate accounts at US energy companies. After gaining entry, the group attempts to weaken safety mechanisms by inserting malware into operational systems. APT55, meanwhile, has focused on cyber-espionage, targeting individuals connected to the energy and defence sectors to gather intelligence for Iranian operations.
Other groups linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, including MuddyWater and APT34, are also involved in these campaigns. MuddyWater has targeted telecommunications providers, oil and gas companies, and government organisations. It functions as an initial access broker, meaning it breaks into networks, collects login credentials, and then passes that access to other attackers.
Handala has also claimed additional operations beyond the Stryker incident. These include deleting more than 40 terabytes of data from servers at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and breaching systems linked to Verifone in Israel. However, Verifone has stated that it found no evidence of any compromise or service disruption.
Cyber operations are also being carried out by the United States and Israel.
General Dan Caine stated on March 2 that US Cyber Command was one of the first operational units involved in Operation Epic Fury. He said these efforts disrupted Iran’s communication and sensor networks, leaving it with reduced ability to monitor, coordinate, or respond effectively. He did not provide further operational details.
On March 13, Pete Hegseth confirmed that the United States is using artificial intelligence alongside cyber tools as part of its military approach in the conflict.
Separate reporting suggests that Israeli intelligence agencies may have used data obtained from compromised traffic cameras across Tehran to support planning related to Iran’s leadership, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Hacktivist networks operate with fewer constraints
Alongside state-backed actors, hacktivist groups have played a significant role. More than 60 such groups reportedly mobilised in the early hours of Operation Epic Fury, forming a coalition known as the Cyber Islamic Resistance.
This network coordinates its activity through Telegram channels described as an “Electronic Operations Room.” Unlike state-directed groups, these actors operate based on ideological motivations rather than central command structures. Analysts note that such groups tend to be less disciplined, more unpredictable, and more likely to act without regard for civilian impact.
Within the first two weeks of the conflict, the coalition claimed responsibility for more than 600 distinct cyber incidents across over 100 Telegram channels. These include attacks targeting Israeli defence-related systems, drone detection platforms such as VigilAir, and infrastructure affecting electricity and water services at a hotel in Tel Aviv.
The same group also claimed to have compromised BadeSaba Calendar, a widely used religious mobile application with more than five million downloads. During the incident, users reportedly received messages such as “Help is on the way” and “It’s time for reckoning,” based on screenshots shared online.
Some analysts assess that these groups may be using artificial intelligence tools to compensate for limited technical expertise, allowing them to scale operations more effectively.
Global actors join the conflict
Cyber intelligence findings suggest that participation in these operations is expanding geographically. Ongoing internet restrictions within Iran appear to be limiting the involvement of domestic hacktivists by disrupting Telegram-based coordination.
As a result, increased activity has been observed from pro-Iranian groups based in Southeast Asia, Pakistan, and other parts of the Middle East.
The Islamic Cyber Resistance in Iraq, also known as the 313 Team, has claimed responsibility for attacks on websites belonging to Kuwaiti government ministries, including defence-related institutions, according to a separate threat intelligence briefing. The group has also reportedly targeted websites in Romania and Bahrain.
Another group, DieNet, has claimed cyber operations affecting airport systems in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Russian-linked actors have also entered the landscape. NoName057(16), previously involved in cyber campaigns related to Ukraine, has launched distributed denial-of-service attacks, a technique used to overwhelm websites with traffic and render them inaccessible. Targets include Israeli municipal services, political platforms, telecommunications providers, and defence-related entities, including Elbit Systems, as noted by a threat intelligence monitoring platform.
The group is also reported to be collaborating with Hider-Nex, a North Africa-based collective that has claimed attacks on Kuwaiti government domains.
Some pro-Israeli hacktivist groups are active, including Anonymous Syria Hackers. One such group recently claimed to have breached an Iranian technology firm and released sensitive data, including account credentials, emails, and passwords.
However, these groups remain less visible. Analysts suggest that Israel primarily conducts cyber operations through state-controlled channels, reducing the role and visibility of independent actors. In addition, these groups often do not appear in alerts issued by agencies such as the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, making their activities harder to track.
These developments suggest how cyber operations are becoming embedded in modern warfare. Such attacks are used not only to disrupt infrastructure but also to gather intelligence, impose financial strain, and influence perception.
The growing use of artificial intelligence, combined with the involvement of decentralised and ideologically driven groups, is making attribution more complex and the threat environment more difficult to manage. As a result, cyber capabilities are now a central component of how conflicts are conducted, extending the battlefield into digital systems that underpin everyday life.
The cyberattacks included hijacking the various news sites to show messages and also hacking BadeSaba, a religious calendar application over 5 million downloads, which showed messages warning users “It’s time for reckoning” and telling armed forces to give up and quit.
The U.S Cyber Command spokesperson didn't comment on the issue.
Internet connectivity in Iran has dropped significantly at 0706 GMT, with minimum connectivity remaining, according to Kentik’s director of internet analysis. It was a smart move to launch a cyberattack on BadeSaba as pro-government people use it and are more religious, said Hamid Kashfi, a security expert and founder of DarkCell, a cybersecurity firm.
Cyberattacks also hit various Iranian military targets and government services to restrict a coordinated Iranian response, according to the Jerusalem Post. Reuters hasn't verified the claims yet. Sophos director of threat intelligence said that “As Iran considers its options, the likelihood increases that proxy groups and hacktivists may take action, including cyberattacks, against Israeli and U.S.-affiliated military, commercial, or civilian targets,” said Rafe Pilling, the director of threat intelligence with cybersecurity firm.”
These cyber operations may include old data breaches reported as new, vain efforts to breach interne-exposed industrial systems, and may also redirect offensive cyber operations.
Cynthia Kaiser, a senior vice president at the anti-ransomware company Halcyon and a former top FBI cyber official, stated that activity has escalated in the Middle East.
According to Kaiser, the company has also received calls to action from well-known pro-Iranian cyber personalities who have previously carried out ransomware attacks, hack-and-leak operations, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, which overload internet services and make them unavailable. He stated, "CrowdStrike is already seeing activity consistent with Iranian-aligned threat actors and hacktivist groups conducting reconnaissance and initiating DDoS attacks.”
Experts also believe that state-sponsored Iranian hacking gangs already launched “wiper “ attacks that remove data on Israeli targets before the strikes.
Apart from a brief disruption of services in Tirana, the capital of Albania, there was little indication of the disruptive cyberattacks frequently mentioned during discussions about Iran's digital capabilities in June following the U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear targets, according to media sources.
Earlier this month, the failed cyberattack against Shamir Medical Center on Yom Kippur leaked emails that contained sensitive patient information. The directorate found it to be an Iranian attack disrupting the hospital's functions.
Fortunately, the attack was mitigated before it could do any damage to the hospital's medical record system.
The directorate found that threat actors used stolen data to get access to the targeted infrastructure. Most attacks didn't do any damage, some however, caused data leaks. Due to immediate communications and response, the incidents were addressed quickly. “In the case of Shamir Medical Center, beyond the data leak, the very attempt to harm a hospital in Israel is a red line that could have endangered lives,” the directorate said.
First, a ransomwware gang based out of Eastern Europe claimed responsibility and posted a ransom demand with a 72-hour window. But Israeli officials later discovered that Iranian threat actors launched the attack.
According to officials, the incident was connected to a wider campaign against Israeli organisations and critical service providers recently. Over 10 forms suffered cyberattacks and exploited bugs in digital service providers inside supply chains.
According to Jerusalem Post, "Since the start of 2025, Israel has thwarted dozens of Iranian cyberattacks targeting prominent civilians, including security officials, politicians, academics, journalists, and media professionals. The Shin Bet security agency said these operations aim to collect sensitive personal data that could later be used in physical attacks within Israel, potentially carried out by locally recruited operatives."
Good news for people affected by the DarkBit ransomware: experts from Profero have cracked the encryption process, allowing victims to recover their files for free without paying any ransom.
However, the company has not yet released the decryptor. The National Cyber Directorate from Israel connected the DarkBit ransomware operation to the Iran-nexus cybercriminal gang called “MuddyWater APT.”
After a DarkBit ransomware attack in 2023, Profero encrypted various VMware ESXi servers, which were believed as retaliation for Iranian drone attacks. The threat actors did not negotiate the ransom and emphasized disrupting operations and campaigns to damage the target’s reputation.
The gang posed as pro-Iran hackers and had a history of attacking Israeli agencies. In this incident, the gang asked for 80 Bitcoins and had anti-Israel messages in ransom notes. Profero, however, cracked the encryption, allowing free recovery.
While studying DarkBit ransomware, experts discovered that its AES-128-CBC key generation tactic gave weak and predictable keys. Profero used file timestamps and a known VMDK header to limit the keyspace to billions of probabilities, allowing effective brute-force.
“We made use of an AES-128-CBC key-breaking harness to test if our theory was correct, as well as a decryptor which would take an encrypted VMDK and a key and IV pair as input to produce the unencrypted file. The harness ran in a high-performance environment, allowing us to speed through the task as quickly as possible, and after a day of brute-forcing, we were successful!” according to the Profero report.
The experts had proven that it was possible and got the key. They continued brute-forcing another VMDK. This method, however, was not scalable for the following reasons:
“While expensive, it ended up being possible. We decided to once again take a look at any potential weaknesses in the crypto,” Proffero experts said.
The experts made a tool to check all possible seeds and create key and IV pairs to match them against VMDK headers. This allowed them to restore the decryption keys. Profero also leveraged the scarce VMDK files, where most of the content was unencrypted, as the ransom was partially encrypted. The experts then directly recovered the most needed files, avoiding brute-force decryption for most of the data.
A newly identified malware, IOCONTROL, is causing widespread alarm as it targets critical infrastructure in Israel and the United States. Developed by Iranian hackers, IOCONTROL is specifically designed to attack Internet of Things (IoT) devices and operational technology (OT) systems, posing a severe risk to essential services.
This highly sophisticated and adaptive malware can infect a wide range of industrial devices, including routers, programmable logic controllers, human-machine interfaces, IP cameras, firewalls, and systems for managing fuel operations. These devices often serve as the backbone of critical infrastructure, such as fuel supply chains and water treatment facilities.
The malware’s modular design allows it to adapt its behavior based on the targeted manufacturer. Security researchers from Claroty’s Team82 uncovered IOCONTROL and classified it as a nation-state cyberweapon capable of causing large-scale disruptions. Among the manufacturers affected are D-Link, Hikvision, Unitronics, and Phoenix Contact.
IOCONTROL boasts several advanced features that make it exceptionally dangerous:
IOCONTROL is designed to perform a variety of malicious tasks, making it one of the most dangerous malware targeting critical infrastructure. Its key functions include:
These capabilities allow IOCONTROL to destroy systems, steal sensitive information, and propagate to other devices within a network.
Claroty’s analysis reveals that IOCONTROL has been used to breach 200 fuel stations in the United States and Israel. In one attack, hackers infiltrated Gasboy fuel systems and point-of-sale terminals, potentially giving them control over fuel pumps and connected devices.
The hacking group CyberAv3ngers, linked to these attacks, has previously claimed responsibility for targeting water treatment facilities. These incidents underscore the malware’s ability to disrupt vital services, such as fuel and water supply, which are critical to daily life and economic stability.
The IOCONTROL malware appears to be part of a larger effort by Iranian hackers to exploit vulnerabilities in industrial systems, particularly in nations perceived as adversaries. These attacks align with escalating geopolitical tensions and the growing prevalence of cyber conflicts between nations.
The malware’s modular structure makes it especially threatening, as it can be customized to target devices from multiple manufacturers. Its combination of stealth, persistence, and adaptability poses a significant challenge to global cybersecurity efforts.
To mitigate the risks posed by IOCONTROL, Claroty’s report recommends the following measures for organizations managing critical infrastructure:
The rising number of attacks on critical infrastructure highlights the urgent need for vigilance and proactive defense measures. Organizations must take immediate steps to secure their systems against the evolving threat posed by IOCONTROL, which has already demonstrated its potential for widespread disruption.
The threat actors tried to bait targets into downloading infected apps that would give them access to victim devices and leak personal data like location history and residential addresses.
The targeted senior officials include academicians, politicians, media professionals, and others
ShinBet said the stolen information would be used by Iran to launch attacks against Israeli nationals “through Israeli cells they have recruited within the country.” The targets were reached out with an “individually tailored cover story for each victim according to their area of work, so the approach doesn’t seem suspicious.”
In one case, the attacker disguised as a Cabinet Secretary lured the target saying he wanted to coordinate with PM Benjamin Netanyahu. Shin Bet has tracked the targets involved in the campaign and informed them about the phishing attempts.
“This is another significant threat in the campaign Iran is waging against Israel, aimed at carrying out assassination attacks. We request heightened awareness, as cyberattacks of this type can be avoided before they happen through awareness, caution, suspicion, and proper preventative behavior online,” said a Shin Bet official.
Shin Bet “will continue to act to identify Iranian activity and thwart it in advance.” It believes the motive behind the attacks was to manage future attacks on Israeli nationals using information given by Israeli cells recruited by Iran. The campaign is a sign of an escalation between Iran and Israel, the end goal being assassination attempts.
The recent discovery of phishing campaigns is part of larger targeted campaigns against Israel. In September 2024, 7 Jewish Israelis were arrested for allegedly spying on IDF and Israeli security figures for Iran.
The Times of Israel reports, “Also in September, a man from the southern city of Ashkelon was arrested on allegations that he was smuggled into Iran twice, received payment to carry out missions on behalf of Tehran, and was recruited to assassinate either Israel’s prime minister, defense minister, or the head of the Shin Bet.”