The timing of the breach coincided with escalating tensions between Israel and Iran, following drone strikes on an Iranian Defense Ministry weapons facility, raising suspicions that the ransomware attack had political motivations.
The attackers behind the campaign claimed to represent DarkBit, a group that had previously posed as pro-Iranian hacktivists and had targeted Israeli universities. Their ransom messages included strong anti-Israel rhetoric and demanded payments amounting to 80 Bitcoin.
Israel’s National Cyber Command later attributed the operation to MuddyWater, a well-known Iranian state-backed advanced persistent threat group that has a history of conducting espionage and disruption campaigns. Unlike conventional ransomware operators who typically pursue ransom negotiations, the DarkBit actors appeared less concerned with money and more focused on causing business disruption and reputational harm, signaling motivations that aligned with state-directed influence campaigns.
When the attack was discovered, no publicly available decryptor existed for DarkBit. To overcome this, Profero researchers analyzed the malware in detail and found flaws in its encryption process. DarkBit used AES-128-CBC keys created at runtime, which were then encrypted with RSA-2048 and appended to each locked file. However, the method used to generate encryption keys lacked randomness. By combining this weakness with encryption timestamps gleaned from file modification data, the researchers were able to shrink the possible keyspace to just a few billion combinations—far more manageable than expected.
The team further capitalized on the fact that Virtual Machine Disk (VMDK) files, common on ESXi servers, include predictable header bytes. Instead of brute forcing an entire file, they only needed to check the first 16 bytes to validate potential keys. Profero built a custom tool capable of generating key and initialization vector pairs, which they tested against these known file headers in a high-powered computing environment. This method successfully produced valid decryption keys that restored locked data.
At the same time, Profero noticed that DarkBit’s encryption technique was incomplete, leaving many portions of files untouched. Since VMDK files are sparse and contain large amounts of empty space, the ransomware often encrypted irrelevant sections while leaving valuable data intact. By carefully exploring the underlying file systems, the team was able to retrieve essential files directly, without requiring full decryption. This dual approach allowed them to recover critical business data and minimize the impact of the attack.
Researchers noted that DarkBit’s strategy was flawed, as a data-wiping tool would have been more effective at achieving its disruptive aims than a poorly implemented ransomware variant. The attackers’ refusal to negotiate further reinforced the idea that the campaign was intended to damage operations rather than collect ransom payments. Profero has chosen not to release its custom decryptor to the public, but confirmed that it is prepared to help any future victims affected by the same malware.
The case illustrates how weaknesses in ransomware design can be turned into opportunities for defense and recovery. It also highlights how cyberattacks tied to international conflicts often blur the line between criminal extortion and state-backed disruption, with groups like DarkBit using the guise of hacktivism to amplify their impact.
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