Hackers are exploiting a Chinese-language malware-as-a-service (MaaS) platform known as SuperCard X to conduct near-field communication (NFC) relay attacks, enabling the theft of payment card data and real-time fraudulent transactions at point-of-sale (PoS) systems and ATMs. According to mobile security firm Cleafy, SuperCard X diverges from traditional banking malware by weaponizing the contactless features of modern payment cards, transforming infected Android devices into relay tools for instant cash-outs.
“Effectively turning any infected Android handset into an NFC relay station,” said mobile security firm Cleafy.
Cybercriminals can access preconfigured Reader and Tapper apps—used to capture and relay NFC card data—via Telegram channels, offering low-barrier entry into NFC fraud without the need to build custom tools.
The attack typically begins with spoofed messages sent via SMS or WhatsApp, impersonating a bank and warning of suspicious activity. Victims are urged to call a provided number, where scammers—posing as bank representatives—manipulate them into disabling card security settings through social engineering. Eventually, victims are sent a link to download the SuperCard X Reader, disguised as a legitimate security utility.
Once installed, the Reader app requests minimal NFC and system permissions, allowing it to evade standard antivirus detection. Cleafy’s research identified that SuperCard X reuses code from NFCGate and NGate, open-source frameworks that facilitate NFC relay functionalities.
Victims are tricked into tapping their payment cards against the infected Android device. This initiates silent harvesting of sensitive NFC data—such as Answer To Reset (ATR) messages—which are then transmitted via a secure HTTP-based command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, protected through mutual TLS encryption.
On the attacker’s side, the Tapper app—running on a separate Android phone—emulates the victim’s card using Host-based Card Emulation (HCE) mode. This allows the attacker to make contactless transactions at PoS terminals and ATMs, treating the emulated card as legitimate, especially after the victim has removed spending limits.
“SuperCard X distinguishes itself from conventional Android banking Trojans by omitting complex features such as screen overlays, SMS interception or remote desktop controls. It instead focuses on an NFC relay and streamlined permission model, granting it a low fingerprinting profile and allowing it to remain undetected by the vast majority of antivirus engines and behavioral monitors.”
In certain campaigns targeting users in Italy, Cleafy observed customized app versions distributed by affiliates. These variants had stripped-down interfaces—removing sign-up screens and Telegram links—and replaced them with benign app icons and names. During calls, fraudsters provide victims with pre-set credentials, eliminating the need for registration and further reducing the chance of user suspicion.