Password theft operations continue to expand despite growing public awareness campaigns around online security. Infostealer malware remains active, compromised accounts continue circulating across underground marketplaces, and stolen credentials are still being used for financial fraud, ransomware attacks, and unauthorized access to online services.
New research published by Comparitech examined how stolen passwords move through cybercriminal networks after they are first compromised. The study analyzed more than 447,000 credential leaks, breach threads, and password dumps posted across four major cybercrime forums. Altogether, the dataset contained roughly 1.1 million compromised user records collected between 2013 and 2026.
The report focused on understanding where leaked passwords ultimately end up and how attackers process them before they are used in large-scale attacks.
For many users, discovering that a password has been exposed can create immediate panic, particularly because credential theft incidents have increased sharply in recent years. Previous security reporting found that nearly 2.8 billion credentials were exposed during 2025 alone. Researchers have also raised concerns about browser-stored passwords after reports that credentials saved in browsers may sometimes become accessible in plaintext form within system memory. At the same time, stolen credentials are increasingly being used to abuse retail, cloud, and subscription-based services.
According to Comparitech researcher Paul Bischoff, analysts including Mantas Sasnauskas reviewed databases from four cybercrime forums to understand how stolen passwords are accessed, redistributed, combined, and eventually weaponized in credential-stuffing campaigns, ransomware intrusions, business email compromise incidents, and account takeover attacks.
The researchers outlined a five-stage credential supply chain. The first stage, known as “origin,” refers to how passwords are initially stolen before appearing on underground forums. The report identified infostealer malware and data breaches as the two most common starting points.
Infostealer malware is designed to silently collect sensitive information from infected devices. This can include browser-saved passwords, authentication cookies, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallet information, and session tokens that attackers can later exploit to bypass login protections.
The final stage of the supply chain involves the eventual use of stolen credentials in attacks such as ransomware deployment, unauthorized account access, and corporate breaches. However, the researchers said the middle stages of the ecosystem reveal the most about how the underground password economy functions.
The wholesale stage represents the broker market for stolen access. In this phase, attackers sell compromised credentials directly to other criminals. The report pointed to the Russian-language cybercrime forum RAMP, where pre-authenticated access to corporate systems was allegedly being offered for sale using stolen login credentials. This type of access is especially valuable because it can provide immediate entry into business networks.
The next stage, trade, involves credentials being reposted, exchanged, resold, or distributed across multiple hacker forums. Some datasets are uploaded for free to build credibility inside underground communities, while others are placed behind paid marketplaces where buyers can purchase access to larger credential collections.
The aggregation stage centers around the creation of “combolists,” which are massive databases containing usernames and passwords collected from multiple breaches. The most valuable combolists are typically cleaned and deduplicated to remove repeated records and improve their effectiveness.
Attackers frequently use these combolists in credential-stuffing operations, where automated tools test stolen username-and-password combinations across many different websites. Because many users reuse passwords across platforms, one compromised credential can sometimes unlock email accounts, banking services, shopping platforms, or workplace systems tied to the same login information.
Researchers and cybersecurity analysts have repeatedly warned that the underground market for stolen credentials continues growing alongside the rise of malware-as-a-service operations and initial access brokers. In recent years, infostealer logs containing browser credentials and authentication cookies have become widely traded across dark web forums and encrypted messaging platforms.
The report also examined how users can reduce the risk of credential theft. Security professionals continue encouraging users to adopt passkeys whenever possible because passwordless authentication systems are significantly harder to steal and reuse in automated attacks.
Experts additionally recommend avoiding password reuse across websites and services, since a single breach can otherwise expose multiple accounts at once. Password managers can help users generate and store unique credentials securely, while two-factor authentication adds another layer of verification that can block unauthorized logins even if a password becomes compromised.
As cybercrime groups continue refining credential theft operations, researchers believe password-based security systems may gradually become less reliable for protecting online accounts in the long term.
Iran-linked hacking group Handala has allegedly leaked personal information belonging to thousands of U.S. Marines deployed across the Persian Gulf region, shortly after American military personnel in the Middle East began receiving threatening messages from the group.
According to posts published on Handala’s website, the hackers claim to have released the names and phone numbers of 2,379 U.S. Marines as proof of what they described as their “intelligence superiority.” The group further claimed that the exposed information represents only a small sample from a much larger collection of data allegedly tied to American military personnel stationed in the region.
Handala asserted that it possesses additional details related to military members and their families, including home addresses, movement patterns, military base affiliations, commuting routines, shopping behavior, and other personal activities. These claims have not been independently verified by U.S. authorities.
The alleged leak surfaced days after several U.S. service members reportedly received threatening WhatsApp messages warning that they were under surveillance. The messages referenced Iranian drone and missile systems and attempted to intimidate military personnel by claiming their identities and movements were being tracked. Similar threatening communications believed to be linked to Handala were also reportedly sent to civilians in Israel earlier this week, suggesting a broader psychological and cyber influence campaign connected to escalating tensions in the Middle East.
Since the regional conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intensified earlier this year, Handala has repeatedly claimed responsibility for several high-profile cyber incidents. Last month, the group allegedly leaked hundreds of emails said to have originated from the personal Gmail account of Kash Patel. The hackers have also been linked to a cyberattack targeting medical technology company Stryker, an operation that reportedly resulted in data being erased from tens of thousands of employee devices globally.
However, questions remain regarding the authenticity and quality of the newly leaked Marine data. An analysis of the published sample reportedly identified multiple inconsistencies, including incomplete phone numbers and entries that appeared to contain military contract identifiers rather than personal names. Several listed numbers reportedly connected only to automated voicemail systems.
In a limited number of cases, voicemail names reportedly matched information included in the leak. One individual contacted by reporters allegedly confirmed their identity before ending the call, while others declined to comment or redirected inquiries to military public affairs officials.
U.S. Central Command referred media questions regarding the incident to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, which had not publicly commented on the matter at the time of reporting.
The incident comes amid growing concerns over cyber-enabled psychological operations targeting military personnel and their families. Earlier this month, Navy Secretary John Phelan urged sailors to strengthen the security of their mobile devices and social media accounts amid concerns over phishing attacks and malicious online activity. In an internal warning, he noted that threat actors may attempt to manipulate military personnel into opening harmful files or clicking malicious links designed to compromise personal accounts and devices.
Handala publicly portrays itself as a pro-Palestinian hacktivist organization. However, multiple cybersecurity firms and recent assessments from the U.S. Department of Justice have alleged that the group operates as a front tied to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
Cybersecurity experts note that modern cyber campaigns increasingly combine data leaks, online intimidation, and misinformation tactics to create psychological pressure rather than relying solely on technical disruption. Analysts also caution that hacker groups sometimes exaggerate the scale or sensitivity of stolen data to amplify fear and media attention.
Although U.S. authorities have previously seized domains associated with Handala, the group continues to remain active by turning to new websites and communication platforms, including Telegram, allowing it to sustain its cyber and propaganda operations online.
Cybersecurity researchers are raising alarms over a developing pattern of cryptocurrency thefts linked to North Korean actors, with recent incidents suggesting a move from isolated breaches to a sustained and structured campaign. In a span of just over two weeks, attacks targeting the Drift trading platform and the Kelp protocol resulted in losses exceeding $500 million, pointing to a level of coordination that goes beyond opportunistic hacking.
What initially appeared to be separate security failures is now being viewed as part of a broader operational strategy, likely driven by the financial pressures faced by a heavily sanctioned state. Shortly after attackers used social engineering techniques to compromise Drift, another incident emerged involving Kelp, a restaking protocol integrated with cross-chain infrastructure.
The Kelp breach surfaces a noticeable turn in attacker behavior. Rather than exploiting traditional software bugs or stealing credentials, the attackers targeted fundamental design assumptions within decentralized systems. When examined together, both incidents indicate a deliberate escalation in efforts to extract value from the crypto ecosystem.
Alexander Urbelis of ENS Labs described the pattern as systematic rather than incidental, noting that the frequency and timing of these events resemble an operational cycle. He warned that reactive fixes alone are insufficient against threats that follow a structured tempo.
Breakdown of the Kelp exploit
Unlike many traditional cyberattacks, the Kelp incident did not involve bypassing encryption or stealing private keys. Instead, the system behaved as designed, but was fed manipulated data. Attackers altered the inputs that the protocol relied on, causing it to validate transactions that never actually occurred.
Urbelis explained that while cryptographic signatures can verify the origin of a message, they do not ensure the truthfulness of the information being transmitted. In simple terms, the system confirmed who sent the data, but failed to verify whether the data itself was accurate.
David Schwed of SVRN reinforced this view, stating that the exploit was not based on breaking cryptography, but on taking advantage of how the system had been configured.
A central weakness was Kelp’s dependence on a single verifier to validate cross-chain messages. While this approach improves efficiency and simplifies deployment, it removes an essential layer of security redundancy. In response, LayerZero has advised projects to adopt multiple independent verifiers, similar to requiring multiple approvals in traditional financial systems.
However, this recommendation has sparked criticism. Some experts argue that if a configuration is known to be unsafe, it should not be offered as a default option. Relying on users to manually implement secure settings, especially in complex environments, increases the likelihood of misconfiguration.
Contagion across interconnected systems
The impact of the Kelp exploit did not remain confined to a single platform. Decentralized finance systems are deeply interconnected, with assets frequently reused across multiple protocols. This creates a chain of dependencies, where a failure in one component can propagate across others.
Schwed described these assets as interconnected obligations, emphasizing that the strength of the system depends on each individual link. In this case, lending platforms such as Aave, which accepted the affected assets as collateral, experienced financial strain. This transformed an isolated breach into a broader ecosystem-level disruption.
Reassessing decentralization claims
The incident also exposes a disconnect between how decentralization is promoted and how systems actually function. A structure that relies on a single point of verification cannot be considered fully decentralized, despite being marketed as such.
Urbelis expanded on this by noting that decentralization is not an inherent feature, but the result of specific design decisions. Weaknesses often emerge in less visible layers, such as data validation or infrastructure components, which are increasingly becoming primary targets for attackers.
The activity aligns with a bigger change in strategy by groups such as Lazarus Group. Instead of focusing only on exchanges or obvious coding flaws, attackers are now targeting foundational infrastructure, including cross-chain bridges and restaking mechanisms.
These components play a critical role in enabling asset movement and reuse across blockchain networks. Their complexity, combined with the large volumes of value they handle, makes them particularly attractive targets.
Earlier waves of crypto-related attacks often focused on centralized platforms or easily identifiable vulnerabilities. In contrast, current operations are increasingly directed at the underlying systems that connect the ecosystem, which are harder to monitor and more prone to configuration errors.
Importantly, the Kelp exploit did not introduce a new category of vulnerability. Instead, it demonstrated how existing weaknesses remain exploitable when not properly addressed. The incident underscores a recurring issue in the industry: security measures are often treated as optional guidelines rather than mandatory requirements.
As attackers continue to enhance their methods and increase the pace of operations, this gap becomes easier to exploit and more costly for organizations. The growing sophistication of these campaigns suggests that the primary risk may not lie in unknown flaws, but in the failure to consistently address well-understood security challenges.