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Amazon Handbook Warns About Online Shopping and Delivery Box Scams

 

Online shopping has become the new norm with millions of people shopping through online platforms like Amazon and Flipkart. Unfortunately, online shopping comes with its own set of risks as frauds and scammers always look for ways to take advantage of people who shop online. Fake websites, false delivery packages, payment frauds and ‘too-good-to-be-true’ deals are some of the methods used by fraudsters. 

Amazon’s new consumer handbook created by Safer Internet India aims to provide online shoppers with information that can help protect them against online frauds and scams. The book highlights some of the key online shopping scams that are currently affecting shoppers. It provides a vital reminder that shopping online involves many risks and consumers need to be wary of the various online scams that they might stumble upon.  

According to the article, one of the scams highlighted in the book is the Delivery Box scam. When customers shop on e-commerce sites like Amazon or Flipkart, the products they purchase usually come in a box with delivery information. According to the new book, the delivery box usually has the customer’s personal information including their names, email address, telephone number and sometimes the item that has been delivered. After removing the item from the box, many customers usually throw away the box without removing the personal information on the delivery label.

According to the report, fraudsters usually collect discarded delivery boxes with personal information and use the information to contact the customers. The fraudster pretends to be a delivery executive and informs the customer that they need their feedback on the product they purchased. The fraudster further explains that the customer stands to receive a discount of 10% or more if they click on a link provided to give feedback. According to the article, the link provided by the scammer contains malware which infiltrates the customer’s device and gathers private information including banking credentials. 

The article informs consumers that they should consider using a sharp object like a knife to scratch off personal information on delivery packaging before throwing the box away. Alternatively, they could use a permanent marker to mask vital information on the delivery box. The Identity Protection Roller Stamp ID could also be considered to protect personal information. 

Moreover, consumers should be wary of random discount offers and avoid clicking on links provided by unknown individuals or entities. The consumer handbook and warning on Delivery Box scams can help shoppers identify online frauds and protect themselves from falling victim to online scams.

RingCentral Breach Exposes Personal Data of 1.6 Million Accounts


 

An attack on RingCentral, which was targeted at social engineering, has led to a data breach that could have exposed personal information of around 1.6 million individuals. In July, RingCentral detected the unauthorized activity during a campaign. The company said it immediately responded to the incident and launched an investigation with the assistance of an external forensic firm in order to contain the unauthorized activity. 

In light of the remediation measures implemented, RingCentral has not detected any further unauthorized activity. In addition, RingCentral clarified that only a limited number of its customers were affected by the incident and that those who were potentially affected were contacted directly. Furthermore, the company clarified that its services remain operational, and that its core platform was unharmed. 

Despite the lack of identification of the threat actor by the company, the ShinyHunters extortion group reportedly listed RingCentral on its Tor-based leak site in late July. As a result of the group's claim that they obtained over 623GB of data, there is further concern about the size of the attack. After investigating the leaked data, Have I Been Pwned confirmed that the dataset contains information associated with approximately 1.6 million accounts, including names, email addresses, telephone numbers, and physical addresses. 

The disclosure supports ShinyHunters' claims, even though RingCentral has not publicly attributed the incident to the group or provided details concerning how the attackers gained access to their system. A broader pattern of data theft attacks has been claimed by ShinyHunters against customers of major cloud and SaaS providers, including Salesforce and Snowflake, as well as the incident described above. This group has targeted third-party platforms and integrations increasingly, using stolen corporate data to extort companies. 

A recent lawsuit against Oracle PeopleSoft underscores the extent and persistence of the data theft operations of the organization. It has been possible for independent researchers to assess the scope of the exposure after publishing the 280GB archive. Has I Been Pwned reported approximately 1.6 million unique email addresses in the leaked data, along with names, telephone numbers, and physical addresses. 

A RingCentral representative has not independently verified the attacker's claims or disclosed the number of people affected. The incident also illustrates the effectiveness of voice-based social engineering, a strategy increasingly associated with ShinyHunters. Threat actors conduct these attacks by impersonating IT personnel and leading employees to a convincing login page with the intent of capturing passwords and authentication codes. It is possible that conventional one-time-password MFA will not be sufficient to prevent account compromise due to the attack's reliance on manipulating the employee rather than breaking the underlying security technology. 

As a result, security experts are increasingly recommending phishing-resistant methods, such as FIDO2 passkeys. These passkeys bind authentication to a legitimate website, preventing credentials from being regenerated through a fraudulent website. 

The details of the authentication method used by the compromised account have not been disclosed, nor have any controls been implemented to prevent phishing attacks. It is imperative to note that exposing names, phone numbers and physical addresses poses a risk beyond the initial compromise. These disclosures can provide attackers with sufficient context to carry out further impersonations and phishing attempts in a convincing manner. 

ShinyHunters has continued to focus on data theft and extortion rather than traditional ransomware, as demonstrated by the RingCentral incident, which illustrates how a single successful social engineering attack can lead to a much larger privacy and security issue as it progresses. 

The RingCentral incident has raised several questions, primarily regarding the extent of the exposure and the means by which the accounts were compromised. Have I Been Pwned has identified approximately 1.6 million email addresses in the leaked dataset, whereas RingCentral has described the customer base as limited. 

To determine the full impact of this incident, it is critical to reconcile those figures, along with more information about the compromised accounts, in order to determine the full extent. In organizations using RingCentral or similar cloud communication platforms, it is critical to establish strong defenses against social engineering at the earliest opportunity. During security awareness training, attention should be paid to suspicious calls, credential-harvesting websites, and requests for authentication codes. 

Organizations handling sensitive or regulated information should assess notification and compliance requirements for phishing attacks, multiple factor authentication, credential resets for potentially compromised accounts, and monitoring for follow-up phishing attacks and business email compromises. A wider question is raised by the incident about security at the intersection of technology and individuals. 

Even organizations with well-established security controls can be exposed if an attacker convinces an employee to bypass these controls. The breach thus serves as a reminder to RingCentral customers that safeguarding communication systems requires not only strong technical controls, but also preparation for social engineering tactics that are becoming increasingly convincing in order to target employees.

New 'Zapscape' Linux KVM Vulnerability Opens Path for Privileged Guest-to-Host Escape

 



A newly disclosed vulnerability in Linux's Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) could allow an attacker with kernel-level control inside a nested virtual machine to break out of virtualization boundaries and execute code on the underlying host system under specific conditions.

Tracked as CVE-2026-64561 and dubbed Zapscape, the flaw affects KVM's x86 shadow memory management unit (MMU), a core component responsible for maintaining shadow page tables that translate memory between guest virtual machines and the host. Security researcher Hyunwoo Kim, who identified and disclosed the issue, demonstrated that the vulnerability can be leveraged to execute commands on the host with root privileges.

The issue has been addressed upstream, and administrators operating KVM environments that expose nested virtualization to untrusted virtual machines are advised to deploy patched kernel releases or vendor packages containing the backported fix.

Unlike conventional virtualization deployments where guest systems operate in isolation from the host, nested virtualization allows a virtual machine to function as a hypervisor itself. In this configuration, an L1 guest can create and manage additional virtual machines, commonly referred to as L2 guests. While this capability is widely used for cloud infrastructure testing, development environments, virtualization research, and continuous integration workloads, it also introduces additional complexity into memory management, making implementation flaws particularly impactful.

Zapscape requires an attacker to already possess kernel-level privileges inside an L1 guest, which generally translates to root access within that virtual machine. On Intel-based systems, exploitation additionally depends on exposing both Extended Page Table (EPT) page-walk lengths four and five to the L1 guest. AMD platforms do not impose this additional requirement.

At the heart of the vulnerability is a flaw in the ordering of stale-root validation within KVM's shadow MMU bookkeeping. The weakness results in a use-after-free condition, a class of memory safety bug in which software continues interacting with memory after it has already been released.

According to Kim's technical analysis, the issue occurs while KVM is servicing guest-triggered page faults. During this process, KVM may reclaim shadow MMU pages to free memory resources. That reclamation can invalidate the shadow MMU root page currently being used by the ongoing page-fault handling routine. However, because the fault-handling path fails to verify that the root remains valid after the reclamation step, execution continues using an object that has already become stale.

The researcher explained that the vulnerability originates within KVM's recursive "zap" path, which is responsible for reclaiming shadow MMU pages. Before additional MMU pages are made available, KVM performs an initial stale-root validation. The problem arises because the subsequent reclamation process can invalidate that same root after the check has already completed. Rather than restarting with a fresh and valid root, KVM proceeds to construct new child shadow pages beneath the invalid parent.

Those newly created child pages inherit the parent's invalid state while simultaneously being inserted into KVM's active MMU page list. During later cleanup operations, the same list entry can become attached to multiple linked lists simultaneously. Eventually, the affected page may be freed even though stale references continue pointing to it, leaving behind a dangling pointer and enabling writes to memory that should no longer be accessible.

Such memory corruption primitives can provide the foundation for privilege escalation and virtualization escape techniques, particularly when an attacker already controls a privileged guest operating system.

To demonstrate the vulnerability, Kim released a public proof-of-concept that exploits the bug to create a root-owned file named /Zapscape on the vulnerable Linux host, illustrating successful code execution beyond the guest boundary.

The proof-of-concept was developed against AMD nested virtualization using Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) and Nested Page Tables (NPT) on Linux 7.1.3. For safe experimentation, Kim recommends running the demonstration under QEMU's Tiny Code Generator (TCG) mode. However, the researcher emphasized that QEMU itself is not affected by the vulnerability. Instead, the flaw resides entirely within the Linux kernel's KVM implementation and can be triggered independently of QEMU's device emulation.

Although exploit code is publicly available, Kim cautioned that the demonstration should not be interpreted as an immediately deployable attack against production cloud infrastructure. In its current form, the proof-of-concept requires additional engineering before it could be adapted for real-world environments. Among other changes, portions of the L1 guest activity would need to be moved into a guest kernel module, while the exploit would also require customization for the target host's kernel configuration and memory management backend.

At the time of disclosure, no evidence had emerged indicating that CVE-2026-64561 had been exploited in active attacks.

The National Vulnerability Database lists Linux kernel versions beginning with 5.9 as affected until fixed stable releases became available, including versions 6.6.148, 6.12.101, 6.18.42, 7.1.6, and 7.2-rc5.

Security advisories note that administrators should not rely solely on upstream version numbers when assessing exposure. Many enterprise Linux distributions routinely backport security fixes into existing kernel packages without rebasing to newer upstream releases, making vendor advisories the authoritative source for determining whether individual systems have received the necessary patches.

Red Hat assigned the vulnerability a preliminary CVSS score of 7.0 and categorized it under CWE-825: Expired Pointer Dereference, reflecting the use-after-free behavior underlying the flaw.

Package availability also varies across Linux distributions. As of August 6, Debian's security tracker listed kernel packages for bullseye, bookworm, trixie, and forky, including their security repositories, as vulnerable, while sid had already incorporated the fix beginning with version 7.1.6-1.

The coordinated disclosure followed a structured timeline spanning several weeks. Kim privately reported the vulnerability to security@kernel.org on July 11, 2026. A corrective patch was proposed and merged on July 21 before being shared with the linux-distros security mailing list on August 1 under a five-day embargo. The vulnerability subsequently received the identifier CVE-2026-64561 on August 4, with public disclosure taking place on August 6.

The upstream patch, merged as commit 2abd5287f083, modifies KVM's page-fault handling sequence by moving the stale-root validation until after make_mmu_pages_available() completes. If memory reclamation invalidates the current shadow MMU root, KVM now abandons the active page-fault operation and restarts it using RET_PF_RETRY, preventing further memory mappings from being created beneath an invalid root and eliminating the conditions that produced the use-after-free.

Zapscape marks the latest addition to Kim's ongoing security research into Linux virtualization. Earlier this year, the researcher disclosed Januscape (CVE-2026-53359), which affected KVM/x86's shadow MMU, and ITScape (CVE-2026-46316), a separate guest escape vulnerability impacting KVM on Arm64 systems. Together, the disclosures continue to draw attention to the security challenges involved in protecting complex virtualization infrastructure that underpins modern cloud and enterprise computing environments.

Crypto Protocols Lose $35M in Coordinated Attacks

 

In a alarming six-hour window on July 23, 2026, Bitcoin- and Ethereum-linked protocols suffered multiple exploits draining over $35 million in combined losses. The attacks targeted cross-chain bridges and expansion networks, revealing persistent vulnerabilities in operational controls rather than fundamental cryptographic failures. 

The most severe incident struck the Verus blockchain's Ethereum bridge, where attackers exploited a logic flaw to trigger unbacked payouts on the Ethereum side. Blockaid security researchers detected the exploit early Thursday, with approximately $7.54 million siphoned in ether, tokenized bitcoin, and stablecoins including USDC, USDT, EURC, MKR, and scrvUSD. Disturbingly, this represented a repeat offense: the same bridge contract and entry path had been compromised in May with $11.5 million lost, after which the attacker returned most funds for a bounty before Verus redeposited recovered money only to be drained again two weeks later. 

B² network and other victims

B² Network, a Bitcoin scaling solution designed to reduce transaction costs and increase speed, fell victim when an attacker gained unauthorized upgrade powers over its token staking contract during Asian trading hours. Lookonchain tracked around $3.86 million in B2 tokens sold and converted to ether and stablecoins before being moved off-chain. B² responded by pausing staking services and pledging full compensation for affected users. Additional protocols including AFX and Balance also reported losses within the 24-hour period, bringing the total number of exploited teams to four. 

 Common Attack Vector Emerges All incidents shared a critical characteristic: none broke underlying cryptography. Instead, each attack succeeded through either logical bugs—where code executed as written but rules permitted fund extraction—or compromised administrative keys granting attackers control they should never have possessed. This pattern underscores how operational weaknesses, not mathematical vulnerabilities, remain the primary threat to cross-chain infrastructure. 

The Verus protocol's total value locked illustrates the human cost of repeated breaches. Starting 2025 with nearly $100 million according to DefiLlama, Verus now holds approximately $9 million—a gradual decline punctuated by this week's fresh drop. As security firms like Peckshield and BlockAid sharpen their detection tools, the frequency of such exploits highlights the urgent need for rigorous audit practices and key management protocols across the decentralized finance ecosystem.

OpenAI Says AI Agent Breached Hugging Face During Cybersecurity Test

 



OpenAI has disclosed that one of its advanced artificial intelligence agents autonomously breached the boundaries of a controlled cybersecurity evaluation and accessed parts of AI platform Hugging Face's infrastructure, prompting a joint investigation into what both organizations describe as a previously unseen security event.

The incident occurred during an internal assessment designed to measure the cyber capabilities of OpenAI's latest AI agents. According to the company, the models were operating inside a testing environment where certain safety restrictions had been deliberately relaxed to evaluate their ability to complete complex security tasks. During the evaluation, the AI identified weaknesses in the testing environment, escaped its intended confines, and independently attempted to obtain additional information by interacting with external systems.

That activity ultimately led the agent to Hugging Face, a widely used platform that hosts open-source AI models, datasets, and machine learning tools. OpenAI said the model gained access to portions of Hugging Face's internal infrastructure before the activity was detected and contained in collaboration with the platform's security team.

The companies have described the event as unprecedented because the sequence of actions was carried out autonomously after the AI received its initial objective, without operators directing each subsequent step.

Hugging Face Chief Executive Officer Clement Delangue called the incident "mind-blowing" in a post on X, saying the investigation remains ongoing and may represent one of the first known cases of an autonomous AI agent independently conducting a real-world cyber intrusion.

OpenAI said it is working with Hugging Face to determine exactly how the model escaped the evaluation environment and which technical weaknesses enabled the intrusion. The company added that lessons from the investigation will inform future safeguards for advanced AI evaluations.

According to Hugging Face, the intrusion affected parts of its internal systems rather than its public repositories. The company said investigators are continuing to determine whether any customer or partner information was exposed and will notify affected organizations if necessary. Since the incident, Hugging Face has closed the identified vulnerabilities, rebuilt impacted infrastructure, and rotated relevant credentials as part of its remediation efforts.

The company also emphasized that there is no evidence that publicly available AI models, datasets, or software packages hosted on the platform were modified during the incident.

Security researchers say the event illustrates both the growing capabilities of autonomous AI systems and the importance of robust containment mechanisms during frontier AI testing.

Gina Neff, executive director of the Minderoo Centre for Technology and Democracy at the University of Cambridge, said AI evaluations are typically conducted inside isolated environments, commonly referred to as sandboxes, where researchers can safely observe model behavior. Based on the available information, she suggested the evaluation environment did not provide sufficient isolation, allowing the AI agent to exploit weaknesses in the testing infrastructure itself rather than remaining confined to the intended experiment.

Neil Lawrence, Professor of Machine Learning at the University of Cambridge, described the behavior as technically impressive while cautioning that it remains within the capabilities demonstrated by today's most advanced frontier models. He also noted that companies developing increasingly capable AI systems face growing commercial pressure to demonstrate their technological progress amid intensifying competition across the AI industry.

The incident has also drawn the attention of UK authorities. A government spokesperson said the UK's AI Security Institute is studying the behavior observed during the evaluation and continues collaborating with OpenAI and other leading AI developers to strengthen safety standards for advanced models. The government also encouraged organizations to strengthen their cybersecurity posture through established frameworks such as the Cyber Essentials certification scheme.

Cybersecurity professionals say the incident reinforces concerns that autonomous offensive AI capabilities are advancing faster than many organizations' defensive preparedness.

Spencer Starkey, an executive at cybersecurity firm SonicWall, said organizations should treat cyber resilience as a core operational priority as attackers increasingly leverage automation and artificial intelligence to conduct attacks at machine speed.

Travis Lelle, Principal Security Engineer at Guidepoint Security, described the disclosure as a sobering development for the cybersecurity community. He noted that offensive AI systems often operate with fewer practical constraints, while many defensive AI tools remain intentionally restricted by safety guardrails, creating an imbalance that defenders will need to address.

Jake Moore, Global Cybersecurity Advisor at ESET, said the disclosure may also carry strategic implications beyond its technical significance. He suggested the announcement arrives as competition among leading AI developers intensifies, particularly following Anthropic's recent advances and the unveiling of new frontier AI models by other companies, including Chinese startup Moonshot AI.

Beyond the immediate investigation, the incident is expected to influence how AI companies design future cybersecurity evaluations. Researchers increasingly argue that testing environments for highly capable AI systems must assume that models will actively search for opportunities to escape containment rather than simply complete assigned tasks.

As AI systems become capable of independently identifying vulnerabilities, adapting their strategies, and chaining together multiple attack techniques without continuous human guidance, organizations may need to deploy equally sophisticated AI-assisted defensive technologies capable of detecting and responding to threats at comparable speed.

OpenAI and Hugging Face said their joint investigation remains ongoing, with both organizations expected to publish additional technical findings and recommendations as they continue analyzing the incident.

Ransomware Attacks Become More Sophisticated as Experts Debate Effectiveness of Payment Bans

 

iNearly half of organizations hit by ransomware attacks end up paying cybercriminals to regain access to their data or systems, while the average ransom demand continues to rise, according to Sophos' 2025 cybersecurity research. As governments move to curb ransom payments, cybersecurity experts remain divided over whether outright bans will reduce cybercrime or create new risks.

Countries are increasingly exploring restrictions on ransom payments. In the UK, the government is progressing plans to prevent public sector organizations and operators of critical national infrastructure—including the National Health Service (NHS), local councils and schools—from paying cybercriminals following ransomware incidents.

The proposed restrictions come as ransomware attacks have become significantly more advanced, with threat actors increasingly targeting vulnerable small and medium-sized businesses through sophisticated techniques.

“In 2026, the ransomware landscape has evolved into a highly sophisticated, corporate-style ecosystem,” says Haydn Brooks, chief executive of supply chain security group Risk Ledger. “While ransomware groups operate like smart B2B operations to ensure data return, the legal and sanction risks of paying are at an all-time high.”

The rapid adoption of malicious artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as WormGPT, FraudGPT and BruteForceAI has further accelerated ransomware operations. According to Dave Spillane, systems engineering director at Fortinet, confirmed ransomware victims surged by 389% year-on-year in 2025, increasing from nearly 1,600 cases in 2024 to 7,831 worldwide.

“In the time it would have previously taken to commit one ransomware attack, hackers can now target four separate organizations simultaneously,” he says.

“The cost per attack has dramatically decreased, commoditizing sophisticated attacks, whereas the cost to defend is increasing,” agrees Shashi Kiran, chief marketing officer of tech group Nile. “What required nation states earlier can be accomplished by individuals with half-baked skills leveraging the power of AI.”

Despite the growing threat, opinions remain sharply divided on whether organizations should ever pay ransom demands.

Jim Walter, senior threat researcher at SentinelOne, believes ransom payments only strengthen cybercriminal operations.

“Paying extortive threat actors only strengthens the ecosystem and the entities that enable it,” he says, warning that cybercriminals cannot be relied upon to permanently delete stolen information after receiving payment.

He further cautions that repeated extortion attempts and continued misuse of stolen data are common outcomes. “Paying absolutely does not guarantee recovery, it actually encourages further crime and extortion.”

However, some experts argue that blanket payment bans fail to account for complex real-world scenarios.

“Our concern with a ban is what happens when a payment ban is in place but data recovery is not feasible,” says Andy Maus, head of cyber recovery services at DriveSavers, a company specializing in hard drive data recovery. “Situations are almost always more nuanced than a ban accounts for.”

For operators of critical national infrastructure, such as water utilities or power providers, prolonged service disruptions could have severe consequences if systems cannot be restored and ransom payments are prohibited.

“We can see how payment bans make sense where data recovery is a viable alternative; however, blanket prohibition has the potential to cause more harm than it prevents,” Maus says.

He also points to previous statewide payment bans introduced in North Carolina and Florida during 2021 and 2022, stating that “neither ban appears to have materially deterred criminal activity.”

Haydn Brooks believes that limiting ransom payments by public institutions could redirect cybercriminal activity toward private businesses.

If public organizations are prohibited from making payments, “the cyber insurance market will inevitably shift,” he adds, “excluding these payouts and driving premiums sky-high as the costs dwarf the original ransom demands.”

As ransomware incidents continue to increase, a growing ecosystem of specialized service providers—including ransom negotiators, incident response teams and breach recovery consultants—is helping organizations evaluate recovery options after attacks.

According to Maus, decisions on whether to pay should consider multiple factors, including the type of data compromised, whether sensitive personal or healthcare information was exposed, and the identity of the threat group behind the attack.

Several cybersecurity experts argue that preventing attacks should take priority over debating ransom payments.

Gavin Millard, vice-president of product at Tenable, believes the primary focus should be on reducing ransomware profitability by strengthening organizations' security posture. He notes that many attacks continue to exploit known vulnerabilities, exposed systems and existing security gaps, making exposure management a critical defense strategy.

Walter also stresses the importance of maintaining strong cybersecurity practices, including continuous device monitoring and mandatory multi-factor authentication.

“What you really need is visibility over access to internal systems, and the ability to limit impact once they’re inside,” says Spencer Young, international senior vice-president at access management company Delinea. “Strong controls—like giving employees temporary, on-the-spot permission only when needed—shrink the blast radius and stop ransomware actors from achieving their goals.”

Meanwhile, Maus believes governments should focus on proactive cybersecurity investments instead of relying solely on payment bans.

Rather than prohibiting organizations from paying after an attack occurs, he argues that subsidizing secure backup infrastructure and offering tax incentives for cybersecurity investments “would do more to reduce the underlying exposure.”

US Sanctions on VPN Service Briefly Disrupt Telegram’s t.me Link Shortener Due to Compliance Action

 

iTelegram's t.me link-shortening domain briefly went offline earlier this week after a compliance action linked to US sanctions inadvertently affected the entire domain instead of a specific Telegram link.

Users began reporting on Monday that t.me short links were inaccessible after the domain was placed under a "serverHold" status, effectively making it unavailable across the internet. The registry status suggested that the action had been initiated by the domain's registry operator, causing widespread disruption to Telegram's link-sharing functionality.

Following the outage, Telegram CEO Pavel Durov reached out to DomainME, the registry responsible for managing the .me top-level domain, requesting an investigation into the issue.

On Tuesday, DomainME clarified the reason behind the disruption, stating, "t.me was on hold due to the OFAC compliance, but it is back online now."

The reference to OFAC points to the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control, which oversees and enforces US economic and trade sanctions. The same day the domain became unavailable, OFAC announced sanctions against First VPN Service, alleging that the platform had been used by multiple ransomware groups to conceal malicious activities targeting US businesses, hospitals, and government organizations.

As part of the sanctions, OFAC designated the VPN service's alleged administrator, Ukrainian national Dmytro Rashevskyi, along with associated infrastructure, including the domains 1vpns.com and 1vpns.net, as well as cryptocurrency wallet addresses. The sanctions are intended to prevent US individuals and businesses from engaging with the VPN provider.

According to reports, the sanctions documentation specifically referenced the Telegram support link t.me/FirstVPNService. This appears to have led to an unintended compliance action in which the entire t.me domain was placed on hold instead of only the sanctioned Telegram link.

In a subsequent statement, DomainME said, "the .ME Registry works closely with law enforcement to monitor and mitigate issues across the .ME domain in accordance with applicable laws, including sanctions requirements." The company suggested that the suspension was part of its sanctions compliance process rather than a simple technical error.

The t.me domain has since been restored and now redirects users to Telegram's primary website.

Meanwhile, the FBI has warned that First VPN Service, operational since 2014, has been widely used by cybercriminals. Investigators say at least 25 ransomware groups have relied on the VPN platform. While the service promoted itself as a privacy-focused VPN, authorities allege it has also been connected to botnet operations, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, online scams, and hacking campaigns.

The FBI further stated, “First VPN Service was almost exclusively advertised in known criminal dark web forums such as Exploit[.]in and XSS[.]is, two of the most prominent Russian-language online forums which provide marketplaces for cyber criminals to buy and sell unauthorized access to computer systems, stolen personal identifying information, hacking tools, and contraband,” the agency added.

Unpatched Backdoor Identified in Firmware of Multiple Wi-Fi Routers


Research has discovered that several Tenda Wi-Fi routers are at risk of being compromised as a result of an undocumented authentication backdoor embedded in their firmware. An attacker can bypass the normal login process and gain administrator-level access to affected devices through this flaw, and no official security patch has been released yet. 

A US-based cybersecurity authority, CERT/CC (CERT/CC), identified the vulnerability and released it as a security advisory. According to the advisory, the backdoor is present in five firmware versions of older Tenda router models. A CVE-2026-11405 vulnerability has been assigned to this vulnerability. 

It is reported that the vulnerability is associated with the web server's login function, where a failed authentication attempt triggers a secondary verification process for passwords. Instead of validating both the username and password, firmware only checks the password value stored within the device configuration, which enables authentication to be successful regardless of the username used. 

In the case of Tenda devices, access is normally limited to administrator credentials via the web-based management interface. It has been discovered that the firmware contains an undocumented authentication mechanism that is activated upon failure of a standard login attempt. The firmware compares only a password stored in the device configuration, rather than validating both the username and password. Regardless of the username entered, administrative access is granted if the supplied password matches. 

Interestingly, researchers noted that the alternative password appears to be "rzadmin", which has previously been discovered in previous security research involving Tenda devices. However, since the authentication process does not validate the username, any username can successfully login when paired with the appropriate backdoor password. Despite the device's administrative interface, hidden functionality is not documented or disclosed. 

Upon matching the alternate password with the device configuration value, the firmware grants full administrator privileges and creates a valid management session. Because of its undocumented nature and inaccessibility through the standard administrative interface, it has been classified as an authentication backdoor by researchers. 

During previous security research involving Tenda devices, the alternate password was identified as "rzadmin", a credential that has previously surfaced. Despite the lack of clear explanations for its presence, experts believe it may have been accidentally left behind as part of a debugging or development tool. 

One of the biggest concerns is the lack of a vendor response. According to CERT/CC, they were unable to reach Tenda to coordinate a fix, resulting in the non-availability of official firmware updates for affected users. As a result, this vulnerability remains unpatched. Successful exploitation could result in router configuration changes, network settings changes, security settings being disabled, and potentially compromise other local networks. 

A security expert considers this vulnerability to be a significant risk for exposed devices due to its ability to grant administrator-level privileges without standard authentication. This firmware is affecting a variety of Tenda networking products, including routers, wireless hotspots, and other networking equipment. 
The following models have been confirmed as affected: 

  • FH1201 High Power AC1200 Dual-Band Wireless Router 
  • W15E v2.0 AC1200 Wireless Hotspot Router 
  • AC10 v1.0 AC1200 Smart Dual-Band Gigabit Router 
  • AC5 v1.0 AC1200 Smart Dual-Band Router 
  • AC6 v2.0 AC1200 Router 

There is a possibility that some of these products are older models and may already have reached end-of-life, resulting in uncertainty about future security updates. The CERT recommends that, until an official patch is available, remote web management be disabled and the router's default LAN IP address be changed to reduce exposure to automated internet scanning. 

If users have not received firmware updates for their affected devices and are unable to secure them, it may be prudent to replace the router with a supported model. Undocumented functionality embedded in networking firmware poses a number of security risks, particularly when vendors fail to provide timely security updates. 

Since there is no official patch available currently, users are advised to take immediate action to mitigate the vulnerability or to upgrade their hardware in order to reduce the risk of unauthorized access.

Microsoft-Signed Driver Used to Disable Security Software in GodDamn Ransomware Attacks

 


A ransomware group known as Hyadina has been observed using a Microsoft-signed Windows kernel driver to disable endpoint security software before deploying its latest ransomware variant, GodDamn, according to researchers at Symantec. The campaign combines trusted administrative software, publicly available offensive security tools and a signed kernel driver to establish control over victim environments before encrypting systems.

Hyadina has operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group for approximately four years, evolving its malware from earlier variants known as Beast and Monster to its current GodDamn locker. The group primarily targets organizations in the United States while reportedly avoiding victims in former Soviet countries. Previous attacks have affected organizations across healthcare, manufacturing, education and several other industries.

Symantec was unable to determine how the attackers initially gained access to the compromised environment. The first confirmed activity appeared on May 29, when an unauthorized copy of AnyDesk was discovered inside the Music folder of an infected system. Although AnyDesk is legitimate remote access software widely used for IT support, threat actors frequently abuse remote monitoring and management applications because they provide persistent access while blending into normal administrative activity.

The following day, the attackers deployed an executable named symantec.exe, which installed a kernel-mode driver called PoisonX. Running in the Windows kernel gives a driver the highest level of system privileges, allowing it to interact directly with core operating system functions. According to Symantec, PoisonX carried a valid Microsoft Hardware Compatibility signature, enabling Windows to load the driver as trusted.

Once active, PoisonX terminated security-related processes and removed user-mode API hooks commonly used by endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor application behavior. By disabling those monitoring mechanisms, the attackers reduced the visibility of security software before carrying out the remaining stages of the intrusion.

With endpoint protections weakened, Hyadina expanded its operation using a collection of credential theft and reconnaissance utilities. Investigators observed fourteen open-source tools designed to recover credentials from web browsers, email clients and instant messaging applications, as well as utilities capable of extracting Wi-Fi credentials and capturing live network traffic. All but one of those tools originated from NirSoft, which publishes legitimate Windows administration utilities. The remaining tool, Mimikatz, is widely known for extracting credentials and authentication material from Windows systems and is frequently abused during post-compromise activity.

The attackers also relied on PsExec, Microsoft's remote administration utility, to move laterally across the victim's network. Combined with legitimate remote management software, credential theft utilities and the signed kernel driver, the attackers were able to strengthen their foothold across multiple systems before deploying the GodDamn ransomware payload.

Symantec also examined the origins of PoisonX. The driver was uploaded to GitHub on April 7 by a developer using the name oxfemale, who described it as a research tool. The developer regularly publishes offensive security projects, including exploit proof-of-concepts, credential stealers and software designed to disable antivirus products, while identifying themselves on LinkedIn as a Russian security researcher specializing in reverse engineering and penetration testing. Symantec, however, considers PoisonX to be malware because its primary function is to disable security protections rather than support legitimate defensive research. Researchers said it remains unclear how the driver obtained Microsoft's Hardware Compatibility signature or whether the signing process was manipulated.

Microsoft maintains a Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to prevent known malicious or exploitable drivers from loading, even when they possess valid signatures. However, Symantec noted that newly identified drivers are not added to the blocklist immediately. Updates can take days or, in some cases, weeks to reach enterprise systems, leaving a window during which attackers can continue using newly signed or newly discovered drivers before defensive protections are updated.

Commenting on the broader use of legitimate software during ransomware intrusions, Symantec's Brigid O Gorman noted that nearly any administrative or security tool can become malicious when misused. She said this makes behavioral and adaptive security controls particularly important because they focus on suspicious activity rather than relying solely on known malicious files or applications. In the case of Hyadina, that combination of trusted software, publicly available offensive tools and a signed kernel driver enabled the attackers to disable security protections, steal credentials, move laterally through the environment and ultimately deploy ransomware.

Why Digital Supply Chain Attacks Are Emerging as the Biggest Cybersecurity Threat for Businesses

 

As businesses strengthen their internal cybersecurity defenses, cybercriminals are increasingly shifting their focus to a more vulnerable target—the digital supply chain. Rather than attempting to breach organizations directly, attackers are exploiting trusted third-party vendors, software providers, cloud services, and open-source components that already have authorized access to critical systems and sensitive data.

Traditional cybersecurity strategies have long emphasized protecting internal networks through firewalls, encryption, access controls, and employee awareness programs. However, the growing reliance on interconnected digital ecosystems means these measures alone are no longer enough. Organizations now depend on a broad network of suppliers and technology partners, creating multiple entry points that hackers can exploit.

How Digital Supply Chain Attacks Work

Instead of targeting businesses head-on, cybercriminals increasingly infiltrate suppliers and service providers that support an organization's operations. These may include software vendors, web development companies, cloud storage providers, testing platforms, or third-party integrations.

A supply chain attack typically compromises one or more components that organizations rely on to deliver products or services. Attackers may introduce malicious software updates, steal login credentials, exploit insecure integrations, or take advantage of vulnerable open-source software libraries.

Open-source components present a particularly significant risk. Software developers often integrate publicly available libraries into applications to accelerate development. If attackers successfully insert malicious code into these widely used components, every organization that later incorporates them into their software may unknowingly introduce a serious security vulnerability.

One notable example occurred in 2024, when malicious code was embedded into XZ Utils, a widely used open-source compression utility for Linux systems. Rather than directly hacking organizations, attackers compromised the software supply chain itself. Although the affected versions had not yet reached widespread production deployment, they had already been integrated into development versions of major Linux distributions, forcing maintainers to rebuild packages after the vulnerability was identified.

Computer scientist Alex Stamos warned that if the attack had gone unnoticed, it would have “given its creators a master key to any of the hundreds of millions of computers around the world that run SSH”.

Once attackers successfully compromise a supplier's products or services, they can use that trusted access to infiltrate customer environments. In many cases, these attacks remain undetected until operations are disrupted, sensitive information is stolen or encrypted, or ransomware demands are issued. The XZ Utils compromise itself was only uncovered after a developer noticed unusual system performance during routine testing.

By the time organizations discover such incidents, significant operational and financial damage has often already occurred.

Cyberattacks frequently result in substantial financial losses. Organizations may face costly ransom demands, especially when attackers recognize that disruptions affect multiple customers or essential business services.

Even when no ransom is paid, businesses incur significant expenses related to operational downtime, system restoration, cybersecurity investigations, legal support, and business recovery.

For companies operating primarily through digital platforms, even short periods of downtime can severely impact revenue. Following a cyberattack in 2025, retailer Co-op reported that the incident “impacted both financial and operational areas”, leading to at least £206 million in lost revenue.

Operational disruptions can be equally damaging. If a critical supplier suspends services while containing a cyber incident, organizations may lose access to essential systems, preventing order fulfillment, transaction processing, and other core business functions.

A major example occurred in 2025 when Marks & Spencer (M&S) temporarily suspended online orders for nearly two months and relied on manual processing following a cyberattack. Rather than directly targeting M&S infrastructure, attackers exploited vulnerabilities in MoveIt, a widely used enterprise file transfer platform.

The breach exposed sensitive employee and customer information, including contact details, payroll records, and in certain cases, National Insurance numbers. Although payment information was reportedly unaffected, the scale of the incident triggered formal investigations, internal reviews, and regulatory scrutiny from the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). The retailer estimated the financial impact at approximately £300 million in lost profits.

Beyond financial losses, reputational harm often proves to be the most enduring consequence of supply chain cyberattacks.

Customers generally do not distinguish between an organization and its suppliers when services fail. Regardless of where the breach originated, customers typically hold the business responsible.

Poor communication or delayed responses following an incident can rapidly erode trust that may have taken years to build. Restoring customer confidence often requires significant investment in communication, service improvements, and strengthened security measures, while long-term effects on customer loyalty and commercial relationships may continue long after systems have recovered.

Growing Regulatory Expectations

Regulators worldwide are increasingly emphasizing digital supply chain resilience as cyber risks extend beyond internal IT environments.

Under the UK's implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) through the Data Protection Act 2018, organizations acting as data controllers remain responsible for protecting personal information, even when third-party providers process that data on their behalf.

This means organizations must ensure their suppliers implement appropriate technical and organizational security measures while also reporting data breaches without unnecessary delay. Failure to meet these obligations can result in regulatory enforcement, financial penalties, and reputational damage.

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act follows a similar principle for AI technologies. Organizations deploying AI systems—including those supplied by external vendors—are expected to understand how those systems function, the associated cybersecurity risks, and how they are secured, particularly when high-risk AI applications are involved.

As a result, regulators increasingly expect businesses to actively manage cyber and AI risks throughout their digital supply chains rather than relying solely on vendor assurances.

Organizations are therefore encouraged to establish comprehensive cybersecurity governance frameworks that include supplier due diligence, continuous monitoring, documented risk management processes, and clearly defined incident response procedures.

Best Practices to Reduce Supply Chain Cyber Risks

While eliminating supply chain risk entirely is impossible, organizations can significantly reduce exposure by adopting proactive security measures, including:

  • Performing comprehensive cybersecurity due diligence before engaging suppliers.
  • Verifying vendors maintain strong security controls such as patch management, employee training, access management, and multi-factor authentication.
  • Conducting regular risk assessments across the supply chain to identify critical vulnerabilities.
  • Including clear cybersecurity obligations, incident reporting requirements, liability provisions, audit rights, and data protection clauses within supplier contracts.
  • Thoroughly testing systems and software developed by external vendors before deployment.
  • Providing guidance and collaboration to strengthen cybersecurity across supplier networks.
  • Developing and regularly updating incident response plans that specifically address third-party cyber incidents, customer communications, regulatory reporting, and ransomware scenarios.
  • Promoting cybersecurity awareness through continuous education and information sharing among internal teams and external partners.
  • Investing in cyber insurance while ensuring key suppliers also maintain appropriate coverage.
As organizations become increasingly dependent on interconnected technologies, digital platforms, and external suppliers, cybersecurity has evolved into a broader governance challenge rather than simply an IT responsibility.

Recent cyber incidents demonstrate how weaknesses within trusted supplier networks can rapidly escalate into severe financial losses, operational disruptions, and long-term reputational damage.

Regulators now expect organizations to proactively identify, assess, and manage supply chain cyber risks before incidents occur. Businesses that invest in stronger supplier oversight, robust governance, and comprehensive risk management strategies will be better positioned to safeguard operations, meet regulatory obligations, and preserve customer trust in an increasingly connected digital landscape.

BeyondTrust Patches Four Vulnerabilities in Remote Support and PRA

 




BeyondTrust has released security updates to remediate four vulnerabilities affecting its Remote Support (RS) and Privileged Remote Access (PRA) solutions, including two Critical authentication bypass flaws that could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to vulnerable appliances under specific deployment configurations. The products are commonly used by organizations to deliver remote technical support and manage privileged access to enterprise systems, making them attractive targets because they often provide administrative access to critical IT environments.

The most severe issues originate within the products' authentication mechanisms, which verify user identities before granting access. Because the vulnerabilities can be triggered before the authentication process is completed, successful exploitation may allow attackers to bypass an important security control without first supplying valid credentials.

One of the Critical vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2026-40138, carries a CVSS score of 9.2 and affects both BeyondTrust Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access. According to the advisory, the flaw stems from improper validation of authentication data within the authentication subsystem. Under specific authentication configurations, a network-positioned attacker could bypass access controls and obtain unauthorized access to the appliance, including accounts with elevated privileges.

BeyondTrust also addressed CVE-2026-40139, another Critical vulnerability assigned a CVSS score of 9.2 that impacts Remote Support. The issue results from improper processing of authentication requests and could enable an unauthenticated remote attacker to circumvent authentication controls and gain unauthorized access to affected appliances, including privileged accounts. Similar to CVE-2026-40138, exploitation depends on a particular authentication configuration being enabled, meaning the exposure varies according to how affected environments are deployed.

In addition to the authentication bypass flaws, the company disclosed CVE-2026-40140, a High-severity vulnerability with a CVSS score of 8.7 affecting the network communication subsystem. The issue arises from insufficient validation of client-supplied input and could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger a denial-of-service (DoS) condition, disrupting the availability of vulnerable appliances rather than providing direct access to them.

The fourth vulnerability, CVE-2026-40141, received a CVSS score of 8.5 and affects web application components within both Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access. Caused by inadequate validation of user-supplied input, the flaw could enable an authenticated user with limited privileges to access resources or information beyond their intended authorization. BeyondTrust noted that exploitation of this vulnerability is limited to accounts that already possess specific permissions.

The company said the vulnerabilities were identified during ongoing internal security assessments with assistance from publicly available artificial intelligence models, including Anthropic Claude Opus 4.8, alongside BeyondTrust's proprietary security research tooling. The use of AI-supported analysis reflects a growing trend of incorporating large language models into vulnerability research to assist security teams in identifying potential weaknesses alongside conventional testing techniques.

According to BeyondTrust, the most severe vulnerabilities could allow authentication bypass and unauthorized access when affected systems are configured in specific ways. The remaining flaws could result in service disruption, unintended access to data, or expanded privileges for authenticated users under defined conditions, potentially affecting the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of vulnerable systems.

The vulnerabilities have been resolved in Remote Support version 25.3.3 and later and Privileged Remote Access version 25.3.3 and later. Organizations running version 25.3.2 or earlier of either product are advised to upgrade to the latest available release to mitigate the disclosed risks.

BeyondTrust stated that it has not observed evidence of the newly disclosed vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild. Nevertheless, the company noted that its Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access products have previously been targeted by threat actors. Earlier vulnerabilities, including CVE-2024-12356 and CVE-2026-1731, were exploited to deploy web shells and backdoors on compromised appliances, demonstrating the continued interest of attackers in enterprise remote access infrastructure. Given that history and the privileged role these products play within enterprise environments, organizations are encouraged to apply the available security updates promptly to reduce their exposure to potential attacks.

Proxy Servers Power More Than Cybersecurity, Emerging as a Backbone for AI and Digital Businesses

 

Proxy servers are commonly linked with cybersecurity and online privacy, with much of the public conversation focusing on their association with cybercrime. However, beyond these concerns, proxy servers have become an essential part of modern business operations, research activities and emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI).

According to Proxyway's annual market report, which has tracked the commercial proxy server industry since 2019, proxy servers play a much larger role in the digital economy than many people realise.

Proxy servers are computers that allow users to access the internet through a different internet connection. By routing traffic through another device, users can obtain a different IP address, making it appear as though they are browsing from another location or internet service provider.

Although they share similarities with virtual private networks (VPNs), proxy servers differ in one important way. Businesses often operate multiple proxy servers simultaneously instead of relying on a single connection, enabling them to collect publicly available web data on a much larger scale, subject to the policies of individual websites.

Beyond cybersecurity, proxy servers have become a key part of legitimate commercial operations. A well-established industry now provides proxy services to businesses across the globe while working towards responsible self-regulation. Several leading providers generate significant annual revenues by offering enterprises tools for large-scale web access and data collection.

Proxyway surveyed 13 major proxy service providers and found that e-commerce remains the biggest area of demand. Businesses use proxy servers to monitor competitors' product listings and pricing, build price comparison platforms, analyse customer reviews to understand market sentiment and support other commercial intelligence activities.

Proxy servers are also used to detect counterfeit products across online marketplaces and verify that digital advertisements appear in the intended locations.

In the travel industry, proxy technology enables online travel agencies and hotel booking platforms to compare prices and secure competitive deals. Digital marketers rely on proxies to track search engine rankings across different locations, while cybersecurity professionals use them to identify malicious applications online. Researchers and academic institutions also depend on proxy networks to gather extensive datasets, including studies examining media representation of women in workplaces.

Supporting AI development

Proxy servers are increasingly becoming an important component of the AI ecosystem.

They help facilitate access to the vast volumes of web data needed to train and update large language models. As AI systems continue to evolve through regular retraining, proxy infrastructure supports ongoing data collection efforts.

The report also highlights the growing role of proxy servers in agentic AI, where autonomous AI systems perform tasks on behalf of users.

For several proxy providers, AI-focused clients now represent a substantial share of their customer base. One major industry participant has reported strong year-on-year growth driven partly by rising demand from AI companies, with annualised recurring revenue increasing significantly and further expansion expected, according to the report.

Industry experts stress that proxy servers themselves are neutral technologies whose impact depends on how they are used. Their applications range from cybersecurity investigations and academic research to commercial operations and AI development.

Many established providers have adopted measures to ensure responsible usage. Residential proxy networks are built by obtaining users' consent and offering compensation to participants who contribute their internet connections.

Providers also conduct customer verification, with some requiring identity documents and video-based authentication. Many restrict access to high-risk websites, including government and financial institutions, while continuously monitoring their networks for misuse.

Several companies have also come together under the Ethical Web Data Collection Initiative, a consortium that aims to promote responsible data collection practices, strengthen public confidence and encourage sustainable industry standards.

While debates continue around AI training practices and the use of publicly available web data, proxy servers remain an important part of the internet's infrastructure, quietly supporting many digital services that people use every day.

Massive Azure CLI Password Spray Campaign Targets Microsoft 365, Over 81 Million Login Attempts Detected

 

Cybersecurity company Huntress has uncovered a large-scale password spray campaign targeting Microsoft 365 environments through the Azure CLI, resulting in millions of malicious login attempts and multiple account compromises.

According to the company, between June 12 and June 21, attackers carried out more than 81 million login attempts against customer environments. The campaign led to the compromise of 78 user accounts across 64 organizations.

During the two-week period, threat actors were found compromising between two and four accounts each day. However, activity surged around June 22, when 23 organizations were reportedly affected in a single spike.

Huntress' investigation revealed that the majority of the login attempts originated from Autonomous System (AS) 32167, which is associated with internet hosting provider LSHIY LLC.

“These attacks are part of a large wave of credential spray attacks across a few different ASNs. In the past six months, Huntress has observed the volume of credential spray attacks increase by over 155 times across our customer base,” the cybersecurity company says.

The company also observed a sharp increase in password spray attacks during late May and early June, impacting multiple organizations. Huntress believes the campaign primarily relied on previously compromised username-password combination lists.

As part of the attack, the threat actors exploited the OAuth Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) authentication flow to validate user credentials. Although this authentication method has been deprecated in OAuth 2.1, it still allows attackers to obtain a new user-delegated access token when valid credentials are provided.

Because of this authentication flow, attackers were able to compromise accounts even when multi-factor authentication (MFA) was enabled, provided that MFA policies were not configured to protect the OAuth ROPC authentication process.

“ROPC is considered problematic for several reasons, but one of those reasons is that it doesn’t offer support for modern auth flows like MFA or SSO. That means, as we saw in this campaign, ROPC sends the password straight to the /token endpoint with no interactive MFA prompt,” Huntress explains.

Further analysis of the affected environments showed several weaknesses in MFA implementation. In some organizations, MFA was applied only to specific cloud applications or user groups. Others enforced MFA only for logins from untrusted locations, while some had deployed MFA policies that were never actively enforced.

“It’s worth noting that eight businesses impacted by the campaign had no MFA policy at all. While threat actors in this campaign were able to get in despite MFA being set up, the takeaway should not be that MFA doesn’t work at all; instead, organizations should ensure that their MFA policies are properly configured to address the authorization flow used across these incidents,” the cybersecurity firm notes.

Huntress also traced the attack traffic to IPv6 address ranges linked to LSHIY, an internet infrastructure provider registered in Hong Kong, Wuhan, China, and New York. Previous reports have also associated IPv6 ranges operated under AS32167 and AS955 with infrastructure originating from China.

The cybersecurity firm said it reported the malicious activity to LSHIY through the provider's abuse reporting mechanism but did not receive any response.

CISA Warns Organizations to Secure Fortinet Devices Amid Massive FortiBleed Credential Theft Campaign

 



The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has advised organizations to strengthen the security of internet-facing Fortinet devices following the discovery of a large-scale credential theft operation that may affect more than 86,000 firewalls and VPN systems.

The campaign, known as FortiBleed, was first brought to light earlier this week. Cybersecurity firm SOCRadar initially reported that over 30,000 Fortinet devices had been compromised, potentially putting enterprise networks at risk. The company has since revised its estimate, indicating that more than 86,000 devices may be impacted.

“Discovered in June 2026, the operation has produced a verified database of over 86,644 confirmed working credentials across 194 countries, all collected from internet-facing Fortinet infrastructure,” the company says.

According to researchers, threat actors compiled a large database of usernames and passwords and validated them using automated testing tools. Many of the exposed credentials are believed to have originated from previous security incidents and were never updated or revoked.

Security researcher Kevin Beaumont, in collaboration with Hudson Rock, worked with several affected organizations and confirmed that many of the credentials remain active and recently used.

“The data comprises roughly 50% of all Fortinet firewall devices facing the internet, based on polling from Shodan,” Beaumont says.

Further investigation by security researcher Bob Diachenko suggests that a Russian-speaking threat actor is behind the campaign. Reports indicate that at least four organizations have already experienced complete network compromise.

“They intercept SSL VPN authentication, crack hashes on a 45-GPU cluster managed via Hashtopolis, and pivot into internal Active Directory environments,” Diachenko says.

Researchers estimate that the attackers carried out approximately 1.16 billion credential-stuffing attempts against more than 320,000 FortiGate devices. Additionally, around 2.1 billion brute-force login attempts were directed at over 160,000 Microsoft SQL (MSSQL) servers.

Hudson Rock noted that thousands of organizations have been affected, “including major government entities and critical infrastructure providers”.

Cybersecurity company Huntress also highlighted the scale of the incident. “While the overall campaign is massive, Huntress has cross-referenced the listed IP addresses against their own data corpus and identified 845 partner organizations specifically impacted by this credential dump.”

In response to the growing threat, CISA released an advisory on Thursday urging Fortinet customers to take immediate action. Recommended measures include terminating active user sessions, resetting passwords, adopting the Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) algorithm for storing administrator credentials, reviewing logs for suspicious activity, enabling phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA), and restricting management access to minimize exposure and reduce the attack surface.

Cybersecurity Leaders Face Growing Workloads as AI Changes the Job

 



The responsibilities placed on cybersecurity leaders are becoming increasingly difficult to manage as organizations face a growing number of cyber threats, rapid adoption of artificial intelligence technologies, and increasing demands for security oversight across the business.

A recent survey conducted by the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) International and research firm Omdia found that 68% of cybersecurity and IT professionals believe their jobs are more difficult today than they were two years ago. More than half of respondents reported heavier workloads and greater operational complexity (55%), while 52% said the volume and intensity of cyber threats have become more overwhelming.

Security teams are being asked to protect increasingly complex digital environments while also helping organizations adopt new technologies such as generative AI. At the same time, many security leaders say they are struggling to secure sufficient support from other parts of the business.

According to Shawn Murray, former president of ISSA and a fractional Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), many security executives regularly work long hours while attempting to address security concerns that are often introduced without their involvement. In some organizations, new technologies are adopted before security teams are included in planning discussions, creating additional challenges for risk management and governance.

As a result, some experienced CISOs are leaving traditional full-time leadership positions and choosing consulting or fractional roles instead. These arrangements allow security professionals to work with multiple organizations while focusing on businesses that are willing to involve cybersecurity leaders in strategic decision-making.

While legal accountability was once considered one of the largest concerns facing CISOs, the survey suggests that anxiety around personal liability has become less prominent than in previous years. Instead, many respondents identified the security implications of artificial intelligence as one of the most significant new sources of pressure.

AI has created both opportunities and challenges for cybersecurity teams. One growing concern is the rise of "shadow AI," where employees begin using AI tools and services without notifying security teams or obtaining formal approval. Similar issues emerged during the early stages of cloud adoption, when departments could deploy new services independently without providing visibility to cybersecurity staff.

This lack of visibility can create greater security gaps. When security teams do not know which AI applications, models, or processes are being used across an organization, it becomes more difficult to identify risks, monitor suspicious activity, and respond effectively to potential incidents.

Despite these concerns, cybersecurity professionals are increasingly interested in using AI to improve their own operations. The survey found that 37% of respondents are already using AI-powered tools to address cybersecurity challenges, while another 46% plan to adopt such technologies in the future.

Among the most common use cases identified by respondents were automated cybersecurity assessments, software testing, predictive risk analysis, and threat detection. These capabilities could help security teams reduce manual workloads and process large volumes of security data more efficiently.

Alex Hutton, CISO at Atlantic Union Bank, noted that the cybersecurity environment has changed significantly in recent years. Whether organizations fully embrace advanced AI systems or not, security professionals must continuously learn about new technologies, understand emerging risks, and adapt their security strategies accordingly.

The survey also highlighted a notable shift in how organizations obtain cybersecurity leadership. The percentage of companies employing full-time CISOs declined from 76% in 2024 to 63%, while the use of fractional CISOs increased from 6% to 15% over the same period.

Industry observers believe this trend reflects growing demand for cybersecurity expertise rather than a reduction in the importance of the CISO role. Many small and mid-sized organizations face the same security, compliance, and governance challenges as larger enterprises but often lack the budget required to hire a full-time executive.

Cyber insurance requirements are also contributing to demand for experienced security leadership. Organizations are increasingly expected to demonstrate strong cybersecurity practices and effective risk management controls before obtaining coverage or meeting insurer requirements. CISOs frequently play a central role in helping businesses assess risks, improve security programs, and document compliance efforts.

According to Hutton, the rise of fractional and virtual CISOs provides organizations with access to executive-level security guidance without requiring a full-time appointment. Rather than signaling the decline of cybersecurity leadership positions, the change may represent an expansion of cybersecurity services to organizations that previously could not afford dedicated executive expertise.

As cyber threats continue to grow and AI reshapes business operations, cybersecurity leaders are expected to remain critical decision-makers. However, the role itself is changing, requiring security professionals to balance technical oversight, business strategy, regulatory expectations, and emerging technologies in an increasingly demanding environment.