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Global Encryption at Risk as China Reportedly Advances Decryption Capabilities

 


It has been announced that researchers at Shanghai University have achieved a breakthrough in quantum computing that could have a profound impact on modern cryptographic systems. They achieved a significant leap in quantum computing. The team used a quantum annealing processor called D-Wave to successfully factor a 22-bit RSA number, a feat that has, until now, been beyond the practical capabilities of this particular class of quantum processor. 

There is no real-world value in a 22-bit key, but this milestone marks the beginning of the development of quantum algorithms and the improvement of hardware efficiency, even though it is relatively small and holds no real-world encryption value today. A growing vulnerability has been observed in classical encryption methods such as RSA, which are foundational to digital security across a wide range of financial systems, communication networks and government infrastructures. 

It is a great example of the accelerated pace at which the quantum arms race is occurring, and it reinforces the urgency around the creation of quantum-resistant cryptographic standards and the adoption of quantum-resistant protocols globally. 

As a result of quantum computing's progress, one of the greatest threats is that it has the potential to break widely used public key cryptographic algorithms, including Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie-Hellman, and even symmetric encryption standards, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), very quickly and with ease.

Global digital security is built on the backbone of these encryption protocols, safeguarding everything from financial transactions and confidential communications to government and defense data, a safeguard that protects everything from financial transactions to confidential communications. As quantum computers become more advanced, this system might become obsolete if quantum computers become sufficiently advanced by dramatically reducing the time required to decrypt, posing a serious risk to privacy and infrastructure security. 

As a result of this threat looming over the world, major global powers have already refocused their strategic priorities. There is a widespread belief that nation-states that are financially and technologically able to develop quantum computing capabilities are actively engaged in a long-term offensive referred to as “harvest now, decrypt later”, which is the purpose of this offensive. 

Essentially, this tactic involves gathering enormous amounts of encrypted data today to decrypt that data in the future, when quantum computers reach a level of functionality that can break classical encryption. Even if the data has remained secure for now, its long-term confidentiality could be compromised. 

According to this strategy, there is a pressing need for quantum-resistant cryptographic standards to be developed and deployed urgently to provide a future-proof solution to sensitive data against the inevitable rise in quantum decryption capabilities that is inevitable. Despite the fact that 22-bit RSA keys are far from secure by contemporary standards, and they can be easily cracked by classical computer methods, this experiment marks the largest number of quantum annealing calculations to date, a process that is fundamentally different from the gate-based quantum systems that are most commonly discussed. 

It is important to note that this experiment is not related to Shor's algorithm, which has been thecentrer of theoretical discussions about breaking RSA encryption and uses gate-based quantum computers based on highly advanced technology. Instead, this experiment utilised quantum annealing, an algorithm that is specifically designed to solve a specific type of mathematical problem, such as factoring and optimisation, using quantum computing. 

The difference is very significant: whereas Shor's algorithm remains largely impractical at scale because of hardware limitations at the moment, D-Wave offers a solution to this dilemma by demonstrating how real-world factoring can be achieved on existing quantum hardware. Although it is limited to small key sizes, it does demonstrate the potential for real-world factoring on existing quantum hardware. This development has a lot of importance for the broader cryptographic security community. 

For decades, RSA encryption has provided online transactions, confidential communications, software integrity, and authentication systems with the necessary level of security. The RSA encryption is heavily dependent upon the computational difficulty of factorising large semiprime numbers. Classical computers have required a tremendous amount of time and resources to crack such encryption, which has kept the RSA encryption in business for decades to come.

In spite of the advances made by Wang and his team, it appears that even alternative quantum methods, beyond the widely discussed gate-based systems, may have tangible results for attacking these cryptographic barriers in the coming years. While it may be the case that quantum annealing is still at its infancy, the trajectory is still clearly in sight: quantum annealing is maturing, and as a result, the urgency for transitioning to post-quantum cryptographic standards becomes increasingly important.

A 22-bit RSA key does not have any real cryptographic value in today's digital landscape — where standard RSA keys usually exceed 2048 bits — but the successful factoring of such a key using quantum annealing represents a crucial step forward in quantum computing research. A demonstration, which is being organised by researchers in Shanghai, will not address the immediate practical threats that quantum attacks pose, but rather what it will reveal concerning quantum attack scalability in the future. 

A compelling proof-of-concept has been demonstrated here, illustrating that with refined techniques and optimisation, more significant encryption scenarios may soon come under attack. What makes this experiment so compelling is the technical efficiency reached by the research team as a result of their work. A team of researchers demonstrated that the current hardware limitations might actually be more flexible than previously thought by minimising the number of physical qubits required per variable, improving embeddings, and reducing noise through improved embeddings. 

By using quantum annealers—specialised quantum devices previously thought to be too limited for such tasks, this opens up the possibility to factor out larger key sizes. Additionally, there have been successful implementations of the quantum annealing approach for use with symmetric cryptography algorithms, including Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) cyphers such as Present and Rectangle, which have proven to be highly effective. 

In the real world, lightweight cyphers are common in embedded systems as well as Internet of Things (IoT) devices, which makes this the first demonstration of a quantum processor that poses a credible threat to both asymmetric as well as symmetric encryption mechanisms simultaneously instead of only one or the other. 

There are far-reaching implications to the advancements that have been made as a result of this advancement, and they have not gone unnoticed by the world at large. In response to the accelerated pace of quantum developments, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the first official post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards in August of 2024. These standards were formalised under the FIPS 203, 204, and 205 codes. 

There is no doubt that this transition is backed by the adoption of the Hamming Quasi-Cyclic scheme by NIST, marking another milestone in the move toward a quantum-safe infrastructure, as it is based on lattice-based cryptography that is believed to be resistant to both current and emerging quantum attacks. This adoption further solidifies the transition into this field. There has also been a strong emphasis on the urgency of the issue from the White House in policy directives issued by the White House. 

A number of federal agencies have been instructed to begin phasing out vulnerable public key encryption protocols. The directive highlights the growing consensus that proactive mitigation is essential in light of the threat of "harvest now, decrypt later" strategies, where adversaries collect encrypted data today in anticipation of the possibility that future quantum technologies can be used to decrypt it. 

Increasing quantum breakthroughs are making it increasingly important to move to post-quantum cryptographic systems as soon as possible, as this is no longer a theoretical exercise but a necessity for the security of the world at large. While the 22-bit RSA key is very small when compared to the 2048-bit keys commonly used in contemporary cryptographic systems, the recent breakthrough by Shanghai researchers holds a great deal of significance both scientifically and technologically. 

Previously, quantum factoring was attempted with annealing-based systems, but had reached a plateau at 19-bit keys. This required a significant number of qubits per variable, which was rather excessive. By fine-tuning the local field and coupling coefficients within their Ising model, the researchers were able to overcome this barrier in their quantum setup. 

Through these optimisations, the noise reduction and factoring process was enhanced, and the factoring process was more consistent, which suggests that with further refinement, a higher level of complexity can be reached in the future with the RSA key size, according to independent experts who are aware of the possible implications. 

Despite not being involved in this study, Prabhjyot Kaur, an analyst at Everest Group who was not involved, has warned that advances in quantum computing could pose serious security threats to a wide range of industries. She underscored that cybersecurity professionals and policymakers alike are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that theoretical risks are rapidly becoming operational realities in the field of cybersecurity. 

A significant majority of the concern surrounding quantum threats to encryption has traditionally focused on Shor's algorithm - a powerful quantum technique capable of factoring large numbers efficiently, but requiring a quantum computer based on gate-based quantum algorithms to be implemented. 

Though theoretically, these universal quantum machines are not without their limitations in hardware, such as the limited number of qubits, the limited coherence times, and the difficult correction of quantum errors. The quantum annealers from D-Wave, on the other hand, are much more mature, commercially accessible and do not have a universal function, but are considerably more mature than the ones from other companies. 

With its current generation of Advantage systems, D-Wave has been able to boast over 5,000 qubits and maintain an analogue quantum evolution process that is extremely stable at an ultra-low temperature of 15 millikelvin. There are limitations to quantum annealers, particularly in the form of exponential scaling costs, limiting their ability to crack only small moduli at present, but they also present a unique path to quantum-assisted cryptanalysis that is becoming increasingly viable as time goes by. 

By utilising a fundamentally different model of computation, annealers avoid many of the pitfalls associated with gate-based systems, including deep quantum circuits and high error rates, which are common in gate-based systems. In addition to demonstrating the versatility of quantum platforms, this divergence in approach also underscores how important it is for organisations to remain up to date and adaptive as multiple forms of quantum computing continue to evolve at the same time. 

The quantum era is steadily approaching, and as a result, organisations, governments, and security professionals must acknowledge the importance of cryptographic resilience as not only a theoretical concern but an urgent operational issue. There is no doubt that recent advances in quantum annealing, although they may be limited in their immediate threat, serve as a clear indication that quantum technology is progressing at a faster ra///-te than many had expected. 

The risk of enterprises and institutions not being able to afford to wait for large-scale quantum computers to become fully capable before implementing security transitions is too great to take. Rather than passively watching, companies and institutions must start by establishing a full understanding of the cryptographic assets they are deploying across their infrastructure in order to be able to make informed decisions about their cryptographic assets. 

It is also critical to adopt quantum-resistant algorithms, embrace crypto-agility, and participate in standards-based migration efforts if people hope to secure digital ecosystems for the long term. Moreover, continuous education is equally important to ensure that decision-makers remain informed about quantum developments as they develop to make timely and strategic security investments promptly. 

The disruptive potential of quantum computing presents undeniable risks, however it also presents a rare opportunity for modernizing foundational digital security practices. As people approach post-quantum cryptography, the digital future should be viewed not as one-time upgrade but as a transformation that integrates foresight, flexibility, and resilience, enabling us to become more resilient, resilient, and flexible. Taking proactive measures today will have a significant impact on whether people remain secure in the future.

Threat Actors Compromised by Security Firms Working to Protect Victims

 


An outstanding example of counter-cybercrime has been the successful penetration of the digital infrastructure associated with the ransomware group BlackLock. Threat intelligence professionals succeeded in successfully infiltrating this infrastructure. As a result of this operation, researchers were able to gain valuable insight into the operations of threat actors, according to cybersecurity company Resecurity. This breakthrough was made possible due to a vulnerability in the data leak site (DLS) of BlackLock, which enabled the breakthrough to be accomplished. 

Using this weakness, it is possible to retrieve configuration details, authentication credentials, as well as a comprehensive log of the commands that have been executed on the compromised server. The problem was triggered by an inadvertent error in the DLS that exposed the clearnet IP addresses associated with the group's back-end systems as a result of a misconfiguration. 

A rare insight into the internal network architecture of the ransomware group was provided after these systems were unintentionally revealed in conjunction with additional service-related metadata, which were typically concealed behind TOR services. Upon discovering the security flaws, Security successfully decrypted multiple BlackLock ransomware user accounts as a result of its decryption. As a result of this breakthrough, the firm was able to gain a deep insight into the gang's infrastructure, enabling it to monitor and, sometimes, even control its operations. 

The visibility obtained included a detailed record of the command-line actions used to maintain the data leak site. The group’s internal systems were further exposed by one of the threat actors who reused the same password across several related accounts, which was a critical lapse. As a result of the compromise, the group also managed to get access to email accounts that linked to MEGA cloud storage accounts, which they used to store and distribute stolen data acquired from their cyberattacks. Insights like these have made a significant contribution to ongoing intelligence gathering and mitigation efforts. 

Recently, a ransomware collective operating under the name BlackLock, which is also known by its alias El Dorado, was gaining traction as an important player within the global cybercrime ecosystem as a whole. This gang was poised to become one of the most active and disruptive threat groups on the cyber scene when a critical intervention from cybersecurity firm Security abruptly stopped its rise. It was discovered by Resecurity's threat intelligence team in late 2024 that a security flaw was discovered in BlackLock's data leak platform, which was hosted on the dark web. 

With this vulnerability, researchers gained unauthorized access to the group's backend systems, effectively invading their infrastructure. To gather extensive intelligence on the group's covert operations, Security used the exploitation of this flaw. The information collected by Resecurity exceeded the public visibility of what was publicly visible. It was possible to collect high-value assets such as authentication credentials as well as technical configurations through this access, which allowed the group to reveal its internal dynamics in a rare and detailed manner. 

Upon identifying the breach, Security disclosed that their efforts had substantially disrupted BlackLock's ability to operate, thereby neutralizing a major threat actor before it could extend its reach in the future. It is clear from the firm's actions that proactive cyber defense measures are becoming more and more important. It highlights the role ethical hacking and threat hunting can have in removing sophisticated cybercriminal networks from the system. 

During a strategic cybersecurity operation in which a security firm successfully infiltrated a ransomware syndicate's infrastructure by exploiting a vulnerability in its dark web platform, a security firm was able to successfully infiltrate it. By utilizing covert access, Security, a U.S.-based cybersecurity company, was able to monitor the threat actor's internal activities, identify potential targets, and notify affected organizations as well as law enforcement agencies as soon as possible. 

BlackLock ransomware, also known as El Dorado, is an extremely dangerous ransomware group that has been involved in numerous high-impact cyberattacks affecting at least 40 organizations from diverse sectors and regions. The operation targeted the BlackLock ransomware group. In addition to unauthorized data encryption and exfiltration, the group engaged in extortion attempts that required significant ransom payments, resulting in extortion attempts. 

Further, information gathered during the breach indicated that BlackLock was planning to recruit affiliate partners as part of the plan to expand its operations. As a result of working under a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model, these collaborators would be tasked with deploying malicious payloads to further spread the infection scope and increase the value of the profits they generated. 

With the intervention of Resecurity, not only did a threat campaign be disrupted, but it also demonstrated that proactive threat-hunting, intelligence-led defense strategies are effective for combating organized cybercrime in a way that is unavoidable. It was discovered by cybersecurity experts at Security late in 2024 that the Data Leak Site (DLS) run by the BlackLock ransomware group was vulnerable to critical vulnerabilities. 

A detailed analysis of the group’s digital infrastructure was conducted as a result of this vulnerability. The analysis revealed detailed activity logs, associated hosting services, and MEGA cloud storage accounts used to archive exfiltrated data from victims, in addition to the detailed activity logs. Security said that after the successful breach of the DLS, a vast repository of information about threat actors’ operational methodologies was made available to the public. Aside from providing insight into the group's methodology, this also provided indicators for future threats. 

Furthermore, the intelligence gathered helped the firm anticipate and thwart several planned cyber intrusions while discreetly alerting affected organizations beforehand before public exposure. As an example of Resecurity's proactive collaboration with the Canadian Center for Cyber Security earlier this year, Resecurity was able to prevent several cyber threats from occurring. It was successfully used by the company to share timely intelligence regarding an impending release of data targeting an organization in Canada – 13 days before the ransomware group revealed the information publicly. 

By intervening at an early stage and in collaboration with multiple agencies, it is essential for organizations to be aware of emerging threats and to be able to combat them effectively to protect themselves from reputational and financial harm. Research from Resecurity identified a significant Local File Include (LFI) vulnerability in BlackLock's infrastructure that caused the data leak site to malfunction. This is a significant breakthrough. 

As a result of this flaw, unauthorized users could gain access to protected server files, revealing configuration parameters as well as authentication credentials that would otherwise remain concealed from the user. This vulnerability was exploited to obtain sensitive data including plaintext server logs, SSH credentials, and command-line activity history. A recording of a proof-of-concept video demonstrates parts of retrieved information.

It is reported that these logs contained unencrypted credentials as well as detailed sequences of data exfiltration and publication that marked what was considered one of the most severe operational security failures on the part of Blacklockgroup by Security. During a recent investigation, it was found that the cybercriminals were using at least eight MEGA cloud accounts registered with disposable YOPmail addresses to store stolen data. 

To communicate with victims, the group relied on Cyberfear.com's anonymous email service. Several IP addresses linked to this operation originated from the Russian and Chinese territories, which corresponds to linguistic and regional indicators gathered from cybercrime forums. During ongoing surveillance, S Security determined that the group had instructed affiliates not to target entities within BRICS nations as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), indicating a degree of geopolitical alignment. S Security identified overlapping activities between BlackLock and other known ransomware programs, including El Dorado and Mamona, during ongoing surveillance. 

There was an ongoing monitoring of large-scale data transfers by Resecurity, and it alerted the international cybersecurity authorities in Canada, France, and other jurisdictions of impending data leaks during the operation. On February 26, 2025, a BlackLock representative who handled affiliate relations in the company directly got in contact with the firm, which in turn allowed for the acquisition of ransomware samples tailored for multiple operating systems, which contributed to the global threat intelligence effort.

Hill Briefing on Encryption Canceled Suddenly by FBI

 


Based on emails reviewed by POLITICO, the FBI abruptly cancelled two large Hill briefings scheduled for this week about encryption, without telling staffers who were invited. A two-day virtual briefing on “warrant-proof encryption” was scheduled for congressional staff last week. The FBI had invited congressional staff to the briefings last week. During the briefings, a variety of topics would have been discussed, such as how encryption could pose challenges to the FBI in its investigations of "violent crimes against children and transnational organized crime." 

According to Politico, the FBI's second series on "priority topics" for Capitol Hill staffers was scheduled to focus on how encryption has made it difficult for the FBI to investigate "violent crimes against children and transnational organized crime," as part of its priority topics series. There has been no update on the reason for the cancellation of the two briefings, which were planned for Tuesday and Thursday, since last month when the first meeting focused on the fentanyl crisis. The FBI said that they are hopeful of rescheduling the briefings to a future date. 

They are the second in a series of FBI "priority topics" briefings that will be held on the Hill for all Hill staff, as indicated by a copy of the invitation that was reviewed by POLITICO. As part of the first briefing in the series held in February, the FBI's Office of Congressional Affairs announced that the encryption event would be indefinitely delayed. The briefing was focused on fentanyl. Despite the FBI's efforts, technology companies, such as Apple, should provide a backdoor so law enforcement officers can access encrypted data legally if they have a search warrant. 

There are, however, concerns from tech companies that adding a backdoor to social media sites could lead to hackers and other cybercriminals accessing private data more easily. A report from the FBI asserts that the encryption software employed by applications such as Signal makes it much harder for criminals, including terrorists and child sex traffickers, to monitor the conversations on those apps. It has been confirmed that the FBI will hold briefings on its efforts to improve warrant-proof encryption on June 18th and June 20th. However, some circumstances are out of the FBI’s control. However, the FBI has decided to postpone the briefings. 

According to the email, the bureau will reschedule the event, however. Continuing to explain the importance of the FBI's involvement in informing Congress on a wide range of issues, the email continues, that the firm sincerely apologizes for any inconvenience this event may cause for those who are planning to attend. The postponement of the event is likely to be attributed to political pressure, according to one Republican Hill staffer who spoke candidly on condition of anonymity. The issue is politically awkward for Biden's administration, which has made it more likely for the postponement to occur. According to the aide, the briefing was cancelled out of the blue. “It is important for this administration not to let people talk about these issues in an election season which might revolve around precisely those issues.” 

The issue of encryption is a controversial one, particularly among progressives, as it is a very contentious topic. The FBI has been warning for several years now that enhanced privacy protections being implemented by popular app platforms, such as Signal, are putting them at risk of losing sight of communications from terrorists, criminal organizations, and child abuse traffickers through enhanced privacy protections. There has been a long tradition for the bureau to urge companies to develop so-called back doors so that they can lawfully access encrypted communications if a search warrant is obtained, but this trend has picked up in recent years with the proliferation of online child sexual abuse material. 

As a result, some tech companies, security researchers, and privacy advocates have argued that it is impossible to do so without introducing new vulnerabilities which can be exploited by state hackers or cybercriminals, so these companies, security researchers, and privacy advocates have resisted. As a result of a rise in commercial data brokers, smart cameras and more connected devices that hoover up private information, they claim that law enforcement agencies are now able to have access to more personal information than ever before due to the increase in connected devices. 

A wide range of technology companies, including Apple, provide encrypting platforms for communication among themselves. According to an FBI spokesperson, the DOJ will be contacted for further comment on this article. A DOJ representative told the Associated Press that political issues were not the cause behind the cancellation of the event. A spokesperson for the Department of Interior, in response to the request for a congressional staff briefing, commented that it is a ridiculous leap based on the scheduling of the briefing, given the Department's and Bureau's strong and consistent position on this issue, they added.