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Raspberry Pi Project Turns Wi-Fi Signals Into Visual Light Displays

 



Wireless communication surrounds people at all times, even though it cannot be seen. Signals from Wi-Fi routers, Bluetooth devices, and mobile networks constantly travel through homes and cities unless blocked by heavy shielding. A France-based digital artist has developed a way to visually represent this invisible activity using light and low-cost computing hardware.

The creator, Théo Champion, who is also known online as Rootkid, designed an installation called Spectrum Slit. The project captures radio activity from commonly used wireless frequency ranges and converts that data into a visual display. The system focuses specifically on the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands, which are widely used for Wi-Fi connections and short-range wireless communication.

The artwork consists of 64 vertical LED filaments arranged in a straight line. Each filament represents a specific portion of the wireless spectrum. As radio signals are detected, their strength and density determine how brightly each filament lights up. Low signal activity results in faint and scattered illumination, while higher levels of wireless usage produce intense and concentrated light patterns.

According to Champion, quiet network conditions create a subtle glow that reflects the constant but minimal background noise present in urban environments. As wireless traffic increases, the LEDs become brighter and more saturated, forming dense visual bands that indicate heavy digital activity.

A video shared on YouTube shows the construction process and the final output of the installation inside Champion’s Paris apartment. The footage demonstrates a noticeable increase in brightness during evening hours, when nearby residents return home and connect phones, laptops, and other devices to their networks.

Champion explained in an interview that his work is driven by a desire to draw attention to technologies people often ignore, despite their significant influence on daily life. By transforming technical systems into physical experiences, he aims to encourage viewers to reflect on the infrastructure shaping modern society and to appreciate the engineering behind it.

The installation required both time and financial investment. Champion built the system using a HackRF One software-defined radio connected to a Raspberry Pi. The radio device captures surrounding wireless signals, while the Raspberry Pi processes the data and controls the lighting behavior. The software was written in Python, but other components, including the metal enclosure and custom circuit boards, had to be professionally manufactured.

He estimates that development involved several weeks of experimentation, followed by a dedicated build phase. The total cost of materials and fabrication was approximately $1,000.

Champion has indicated that Spectrum Slit may be publicly exhibited in the future. He is also known for creating other technology-focused artworks, including interactive installations that explore data privacy, artificial intelligence, and digital systems. He has stated that producing additional units of Spectrum Slit could be possible if requested.

PyStoreRAT Campaign Uses Fake GitHub Projects to Target OSINT and IT Professionals

 


Cybersecurity researchers have identified a previously undocumented malware operation that leverages GitHub to distribute a threat known as PyStoreRAT. The campaign primarily targets individuals working in information technology, cybersecurity, and open-source intelligence research, exploiting their reliance on open-source tools.

The findings were published by Morphisec Threat Labs, which described the operation as a coordinated and deliberate effort rather than random malware distribution. The attackers focused on blending into legitimate developer activity, making the threat difficult to detect during its early stages.

PyStoreRAT functions as a Remote Access Trojan, a type of malware that enables attackers to maintain hidden and persistent access to an infected system. Once deployed, it can gather detailed system information, execute commands remotely, and act as a delivery mechanism for additional malicious software.

According to the research, the attackers began by reviving dormant GitHub accounts that had shown no activity for extended periods. These accounts were then used to upload software projects that appeared polished, functional, and credible. Many of the repositories were created with the help of artificial intelligence, allowing them to closely resemble genuine open-source tools.

The fake projects included OSINT utilities, decentralized finance trading bots, and AI-based applications such as chatbot wrappers. Several of these repositories gained visibility and user trust, with some rising through GitHub’s trending rankings. Only after achieving engagement did the attackers introduce subtle updates that quietly embedded the PyStoreRAT backdoor under the guise of routine maintenance.

Once active, PyStoreRAT demonstrates a high degree of adaptability. Morphisec researchers found that it profiles infected systems and can deploy additional payloads, including known data-stealing malware families and Python-based loaders. The malware also modifies its execution behavior when it detects certain endpoint protection products, reducing its exposure to security monitoring.

The threat is not limited to a single delivery method. PyStoreRAT can propagate through removable storage devices such as USB drives and continuously retrieves updated components from its operators. Its command-and-control infrastructure relies on a rotating network of servers, allowing attackers to issue new instructions quickly while complicating takedown efforts.

Researchers also identified non-English language elements within the malware code, including Russian-language terms. While this does not confirm attribution, Morphisec noted that the level of planning and operational maturity places the campaign well beyond low-effort GitHub-based malware activity.

GitHub has removed the majority of the malicious repositories linked to the campaign, though a small number were still accessible at the time of analysis. Security experts stress that developers and researchers should remain cautious when downloading tools, carefully review code changes, and avoid running projects that cannot be independently verified.

Morphisec concluded that the campaign surfaces a vastly growing trend, where attackers combine AI-generated content, social engineering, and resilient cloud infrastructure to bypass traditional security defenses, making awareness and verification more critical than ever.



PlushDaemon Group Reroutes Software Updates to Deploy Espionage Tools

 



A cyberespionage group known in security research circles as PlushDaemon has been carrying out a long-running operation in which they take advantage of software update systems to secretly install their own tools on targeted computers. According to new analysis by ESET, this group has been active for several years and has repeatedly improved its techniques. Their operations have reached both individuals and organizations across multiple regions, including areas in East Asia, the United States, and Oceania. Victims have included universities, companies that manufacture electronics, and even a major automotive facility located in Cambodia. ESET’s data suggests that this shift toward manipulating software updates has been a consistent part of PlushDaemon’s strategy since at least 2019, which indicates the group has found this method to be reliable and efficient.

The attackers begin by attempting to take control of the network equipment that people rely on for internet connectivity, such as routers or similar devices. They usually exploit security weaknesses that are already publicly known or take advantage of administrators who have left weak passwords unchanged. Once the attackers get access to these devices, they install a custom-built implant researchers call EdgeStepper. This implant is written in the Go programming language and compiled in a format that works comfortably on Linux-based router systems. After deployment, EdgeStepper operates quietly in the background, monitoring how the device handles internet traffic.

What makes this implant dangerous is its ability to interfere with DNS queries. DNS is the system that helps computers find the correct server whenever a user tries to reach a domain name. EdgeStepper watches these requests and checks whether a particular domain is involved in delivering software updates. If EdgeStepper recognizes an update-related domain, it interferes and redirects the request to a server controlled by PlushDaemon. The victim sees no warning sign because the update process appears completely normal. However, instead of downloading a legitimate update from the software provider, the victim unknowingly receives a malicious file from the attackers’ infrastructure.

This deceptive update carries the first stage of a layered malware chain. The initial file is a Windows component known as LittleDaemon. It is intentionally disguised as a DLL file to convince the system that it is a harmless library file. Once LittleDaemon runs, it connects to one of the attacker-controlled nodes and downloads the next stage, known as DaemonicLogistics. This second-stage tool is decrypted and executed directly in memory, which makes it more difficult for traditional security products to spot because it avoids writing visible files to disk. DaemonicLogistics is essentially the bridge that loads the final and most important payload.

The last payload is the group’s advanced backdoor, SlowStepper. This backdoor has been documented in earlier incidents, including a case in which users of a South Korean VPN service unknowingly received a trojanized installer from what appeared to be the vendor’s official site. SlowStepper gives the attackers broad access to a compromised machine. It can gather system information, execute various commands, browse and manipulate files, and activate additional spyware tools. Many of these tools are written in Python and are designed to steal browser data, capture keystrokes, and extract stored credentials, giving PlushDaemon a detailed picture of the victim’s activity.

ESET researchers also examined the group’s interference with update traffic for Sogou Pinyin, which is one of the most widely used Chinese input software products. While this example helps illustrate the group’s behavior, the researchers observed similar hijacking patterns affecting other software products as well. This means PlushDaemon is not focused on one specific application but is instead targeting any update system they can manipulate through the network devices they have compromised. Because their technique relies on controlling the network path rather than exploiting a flaw inside the software itself, the group’s approach could be applied to targets anywhere in the world.

The research report includes extensive technical information on every component uncovered in this campaign and offers indicators of compromise for defenders, including associated files, domains, and IP addresses. These findings suggest how imperative it is that a routine process like installing updates can become a highly effective attack vector when network infrastructure is tampered with. The case also reinforces the importance of securing routers and keeping administrator credentials strong, since a compromised device at the network level allows attackers to alter traffic without the user noticing any warning signs.




Danish Developer’s Website Sparks EU Debate on Online Privacy and Child Protection

 



In August, a 30-year-old developer from Aalborg, identified only as Joachim, built a platform called Fight Chat Control to oppose a proposed European Union regulation aimed at tackling the spread of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) online. The EU bill seeks to give law enforcement agencies new tools to identify and remove illegal content, but critics argue it would compromise encrypted communication and pave the way for mass surveillance.

Joachim’s website allows visitors to automatically generate and send emails to European officials expressing concerns about the proposal. What began as a weekend project has now evolved into a continent-wide campaign, with members of the European Parliament and national representatives receiving hundreds of emails daily. Some offices in Brussels have even reported difficulties managing the flood of messages, which has disrupted regular communication with advocacy groups and policymakers.

The campaign’s influence has extended beyond Brussels. In Denmark, a petition supported by Fight Chat Control gained more than 50,000 signatures, qualifying it for parliamentary discussion. Similar debates have surfaced across Europe, with lawmakers in countries such as Ireland and Poland referencing the controversy in national assemblies. Joachim said his website has drawn over 2.5 million visitors, though he declined to disclose his full name or employer to avoid associating his workplace with the initiative.

While privacy advocates applaud the campaign for sparking public awareness, others believe the mass email tactic undermines productive dialogue. Some lawmakers described the influx of identical messages as “one-sided communication,” limiting space for constructive debate. Child rights organisations, including Eurochild, have also voiced frustration, saying their outreach to officials has been drowned out by the surge of citizen emails.

Meanwhile, the European Union continues to deliberate the CSAM regulation. The European Commission first proposed the law in 2022, arguing that stronger detection measures are vital as online privacy technologies expand and artificial intelligence generates increasingly realistic harmful content. Denmark, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU Council, has introduced a revised version of the bill and hopes to secure support at an upcoming ministerial meeting in Luxembourg.

Danish Justice Minister Peter Hummelgaard maintains that the new draft is more balanced than the initial proposal, stating that content scanning would only be used as a last resort. However, several EU member states remain cautious, citing privacy concerns and the potential misuse of surveillance powers.

As European nations prepare to vote, the controversy continues to reflect a broader struggle: finding a balance between protecting children from online exploitation and safeguarding citizens’ right to digital privacy.



Why Businesses Must Act Now to Prepare for a Quantum-Safe Future

 



As technology advances, quantum computing is no longer a distant concept — it is steadily becoming a real-world capability. While this next-generation innovation promises breakthroughs in fields like medicine and materials science, it also poses a serious threat to cybersecurity. The encryption systems that currently protect global digital infrastructure may not withstand the computing power quantum technology will one day unleash.

Data is now the most valuable strategic resource for any organization. Every financial transaction, business operation, and communication depends on encryption to stay secure. However, once quantum computers reach full capability, they could break the mathematical foundations of most existing encryption systems, exposing sensitive data on a global scale.


The urgency of post-quantum security

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) refers to encryption methods designed to remain secure even against quantum computers. Transitioning to PQC will not be an overnight task. It demands re-engineering of applications, operating systems, and infrastructure that rely on traditional cryptography. Businesses must begin preparing now, because once the threat materializes, it will be too late to react effectively.

Experts warn that quantum computing will likely follow the same trajectory as artificial intelligence. Initially, the technology will be accessible only to a few institutions. Over time, as more companies and researchers enter the field, the technology will become cheaper and widely available including to cybercriminals. Preparing early is the only viable defense.


Governments are setting the pace

Several governments and standard-setting bodies have already started addressing the challenge. The United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has urged organizations to adopt quantum-resistant encryption by 2035. The European Union has launched its Quantum Europe Strategy to coordinate member states toward unified standards. Meanwhile, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has finalized its first set of post-quantum encryption algorithms, which serve as a global reference point for organizations looking to begin their transition.

As these efforts gain momentum, businesses must stay informed about emerging regulations and standards. Compliance will require foresight, investment, and close monitoring of how different jurisdictions adapt their cybersecurity frameworks.

To handle the technical and organizational scale of this shift, companies can establish internal Centers of Excellence (CoEs) dedicated to post-quantum readiness. These teams bring together leaders from across departments: IT, compliance, legal, product development, and procurement to map vulnerabilities, identify dependencies, and coordinate upgrades.

The CoE model also supports employee training, helping close skill gaps in quantum-related technologies. By testing new encryption algorithms, auditing existing infrastructure, and maintaining company-wide communication, a CoE ensures that no critical process is overlooked.


Industry action has already begun

Leading technology providers have started adopting quantum-safe practices. For example, Red Hat’s Enterprise Linux 10 is among the first operating systems to integrate PQC support, while Kubernetes has begun enabling hybrid encryption methods that combine traditional and quantum-safe algorithms. These developments set a precedent for the rest of the industry, signaling that the shift to PQC is not a theoretical concern but an ongoing transformation.


The time to prepare is now

Transitioning to a quantum-safe infrastructure will take years, involving system audits, software redesigns, and new cryptographic standards. Organizations that begin planning today will be better equipped to protect their data, meet upcoming regulatory demands, and maintain customer trust in the digital economy.

Quantum computing will redefine the boundaries of cybersecurity. The only question is whether organizations will be ready when that day arrives.


FBI Warns Against Screen Sharing Amid Rise in “Phantom Hacker” Scam

 



The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has issued an urgent alert about a fast-spreading scam in which cybercriminals gain access to victims’ devices through screen-sharing features, allowing them to steal money directly from bank accounts.

Known as the “phantom hacker” scheme, the fraud begins with a phone call or message that appears to come from a legitimate bank or support service. The caller warns that the user’s account has been compromised and offers to “help” by transferring funds to a secure location. In reality, the transfer moves the victim’s money straight to the attacker’s account.

Traditionally, these scams relied on tricking users into installing remote-access software, but the FBI now reports a troubling shift. Scammers are increasingly exploiting tools already built into smartphones, specifically screen-sharing options available in widely used communication apps.

One such example involves WhatsApp, a messaging service used by over three billion people worldwide. The app recently introduced a screen-sharing feature during video calls, designed for legitimate collaboration. However, this function also allows the person on the other end of the call to see everything displayed on a user’s screen, including sensitive details such as login credentials and banking information.

Although WhatsApp notifies users to only share their screens with trusted contacts, attackers often use social engineering to bypass suspicion. The FBI notes that fraudsters frequently begin with a normal phone call before requesting to continue the conversation over WhatsApp, claiming that it offers greater security. Once the victim joins the call and enables screen sharing, scammers can observe financial transactions in real time without ever needing to install malicious software.

Experts emphasize that encryption, while essential for privacy, also prevents WhatsApp or any external authority from monitoring these fraudulent activities. The FBI therefore urges users to remain cautious and to never share their screen, banking details, or verification codes during unsolicited calls.

Cybersecurity professionals advise that individuals should hang up immediately if asked to join a video call or screen-sharing session by anyone claiming to represent a bank or technology company. Instead, contact the organization directly through verified customer-care numbers or official websites. Reporting suspicious incidents can also help prevent future cases.

The scale of financial fraud has reached alarming levels in the United States. According to new findings from the Aspen Institute, scams now cost American households over $158 billion annually, prompting calls for a national strategy to combat organized online crime. More than 80 leaders from public and private sectors have urged the creation of a National Task Force on Fraud and Scam Prevention to coordinate efforts between government bodies and financial institutions.

This rise in screen-sharing scams highlights the growing sophistication of cybercriminals, who are increasingly using everyday digital tools for exploitation. As technology advances, experts stress that public vigilance, real-time verification, and responsible digital habits remain the strongest defenses against emerging threats.



Salesloft Integration Breach Exposes Salesforce Customer Data


 

A recent cyber incident has brought to light how one weak link in software integrations can expose sensitive business information. Salesloft, a sales automation platform, confirmed that attackers exploited its Drift chat integration with Salesforce to steal tokens that granted access to customer environments.

Between August 8 and August 18, 2025, threat actors obtained OAuth and refresh tokens connected to the Drift–Salesforce integration. These tokens work like digital keys, allowing connected apps to access Salesforce data without repeatedly asking for passwords. Once stolen, the tokens were used to log into Salesforce accounts and extract confidential data.

According to Salesloft, the attackers specifically searched for credentials such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) keys, Snowflake access tokens, and internal passwords. The company said the breach only impacted customers who used the Drift–Salesforce connection, while other integrations were unaffected. As a precaution, all tokens for this integration were revoked, forcing customers to reauthenticate before continuing use.

Google’s Threat Intelligence team, which is monitoring the attackers under the name UNC6395, reported that the group issued queries inside Salesforce to collect sensitive details hidden in support cases. These included login credentials, API keys, and cloud access tokens. Investigators noted that while the attackers tried to cover their tracks by deleting query jobs, the activity still appears in Salesforce logs.

To disguise their operations, the hackers used anonymizing tools like Tor and commercial hosting services. Google also identified user-agent strings and IP addresses linked to the attack, which organizations can use to check their logs for signs of compromise.

Security experts are urging affected administrators to rotate credentials immediately, review Salesforce logs for unusual queries, and search for leaked secrets by scanning for terms such as “AKIA” (used in AWS keys), “Snowflake,” “password,” or “secret.” They also recommend tightening access controls on third-party apps, limiting token permissions, and shortening session times to reduce future risk.

While some extortion groups have publicly claimed responsibility for the attack, Google stated there is no clear evidence tying them to this breach. The investigation is still ongoing, and attribution remains uncertain.

This incident underlines the broader risks of SaaS integrations. Connected apps are often given high levels of access to critical business platforms. If those credentials are compromised, attackers can bypass normal login protections and move deeper into company systems. As businesses continue relying on cloud applications, stronger governance of integrations and closer monitoring of token use are becoming essential.




Elastic Denies Serious Security Flaw in Its Defend Software

 



Elastic, the company known for its enterprise search and security products, has pushed back against recent claims of a serious vulnerability in its Defend endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool.

The controversy began after a small cybersecurity group, AshES Cybersecurity, published a blog post on August 16. In their write-up, they said they had discovered a “zero-day” bug, a term used to describe flaws that are unknown to the software maker and therefore left unpatched. According to AshES, the issue was a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Elastic Defend’s kernel driver called elastic-endpoint-driver.sys. They suggested that an attacker could exploit this flaw to avoid being monitored by the EDR system, run malicious code, and even maintain long-term access to a computer.

To support their claims, the researcher from AshES described using a custom-built driver in a controlled test to trigger the flaw. However, the group did not provide Elastic with a full proof-of-concept (PoC) — the technical demonstration usually required to verify a security bug.

Elastic quickly responded with a detailed statement. Its internal Security Engineering team said they carried out a “thorough investigation” but were unable to find any evidence that the vulnerability exists. They also noted that AshES had sent in multiple reports but that none contained sufficient detail to recreate the alleged exploit. Elastic stressed that without reproducible proof, such claims cannot be confirmed.

The company also pointed out that AshES declined to share the PoC directly with Elastic or its bug bounty team. Instead, the researchers chose to publish their findings publicly, which runs counter to the practice of coordinated disclosure: a process where researchers privately alert a company first, allowing time to investigate and fix issues before public release.

Elastic reaffirmed that it takes all security reports seriously and highlighted its long-standing bug bounty program, which has been in place since 2017. Through this program, the company has paid more than $600,000 to independent researchers who responsibly report real, verifiable vulnerabilities.

At this stage, the alleged zero-day flaw remains unconfirmed, and Elastic maintains that no evidence supports the existence of the supposed bug.