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Showing posts with label BlackNevas. Show all posts

Ransomware Group Wiped an Entire VMware Estate in Ten Days Without Exploiting a Single Vulnerability




A ransomware group called BlackNevas dismantled a company's entire virtualization infrastructure over ten days, destroying four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine running on them, two vCenter Server Appliances, and the backup systems meant to recover from exactly this kind of attack. The findings, published by Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team, detail how attackers moved through one of the most common enterprise environments without triggering a single exploit alert, because they never used one.

The core finding is uncomfortable for organizations that have treated patching as the main line of defense: every action the attackers took against ESXi ran through legitimate VMware management interfaces. The group obtained valid administrative credentials, used VMware's own tools to push configurations, and triggered ransomware detonation through supported remote access channels.

Ransomware made up 39.4 percent of all incidents Kaspersky's response team handled in 2025. The ESXi segment of that is growing, partly because of a decision made in 2021. When the Babuk ransomware source code leaked, it included a working ESXi version, and at least ten ransomware families have since reused that codebase. BlackNevas is one of them.


How the Attack Unfolded

BlackNevas, first observed in November 2024 and also tracked as a Trigona family variant, operates across Windows, Linux, NAS devices, and ESXi hypervisors. The group runs double extortion, stealing data before encrypting it and threatening public leaks to pressure victims. Known targets include organizations in healthcare, finance, manufacturing, legal services, and telecom across Asia, Europe, and North America.

In this incident, the attackers got in through credential reuse. Valid administrative credentials from non-virtualization systems were used to reach the vCenter Server Appliances, which manage the ESXi hosts. This is the same access path defenders often overlook because they focus on preventing vulnerability exploitation rather than limiting what happens when credentials are already compromised.

Forty-three seconds after logging into the VCSA via SSH as root, the attackers deployed MeshAgent, part of the open-source MeshCentral remote management platform. The entire SSH session lasted two minutes and 26 seconds. Four hours later, they returned through MeshAgent and installed Ligolo-ng, a tunneling tool, as a systemd service disguised under the name `vmware-vdma.service` to blend in with legitimate VMware components.

The next step exploited a feature few organizations think to restrict. VMware's Host Profiles allow administrators to push consistent configurations to ESXi hosts from vCenter. The attackers used this to enable Tech Support Mode SSH across the hosts. Ten minutes and 18 seconds after the configuration was pushed, the TSM-SSH service was running. SSH sessions to ESXi then originated from the vCenter appliance IP, which most environments treat as a trusted internal source.


Taking Out Backups First

Before touching the ESXi layer, the attackers disabled antivirus on the backup infrastructure, stopped backup services, and encrypted the recovery systems. This sequence is deliberate. Ransomware operators have learned that organizations with clean backups can often recover without paying, so the backup environment is now treated as part of the primary attack surface.

Two Veeam vulnerabilities are worth noting here. CVE-2024-40711, which CISA has added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, has been directly linked to ransomware campaigns. CVE-2025-23120 is not on that list yet, but affects domain-joined backup servers and represents a less-patched exposure in many environments.


Detonation and Partial Recovery

The ransomware payload was uploaded to ESXi hosts via SFTP. Roughly three hours before detonation, it ran a self-test lasting about 16 seconds. The final command processed virtual machine storage directories with options to wipe and detach volumes. On one host, all virtual machines stopped within 23 seconds. The ransomware overwrote approximately the first two kilobytes of virtual disk files. Kaspersky notes that a valid backup GPT header may allow partial recovery in some cases, though this is not a reliable path.

A crucial detection problem runs through the entire attack. ESXi writes logs to a RAM disk by default, meaning a reboot erases them. If forensic investigators arrive after a reboot, the evidence of how attackers moved through the environment is gone. Kaspersky recommends configuring remote syslog to preserve ESXi logs outside the virtualization trust domain.


What Organizations Should Change

Kaspersky's recommendations center on treating vCenter as a Tier 0 asset, the same classification given to domain controllers. That means separate administrative identities for virtualization management, phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, and limiting SSH and ESXi Shell access through Lockdown Mode. Network filtering on the management interface, combined with logs stored outside the virtualization environment, closes the two gaps this attack exploited most effectively.

The practical lesson from this incident is that a patched VMware environment is not a protected one if the credentials managing it are shared with less-secured systems.