Security researchers have dismantled a substantial portion of the infrastructure powering the Kimwolf and Aisuru botnets, cutting off communication to more than 550 command-and-control servers used to manage infected devices. The action was carried out by Black Lotus Labs, the threat intelligence division of Lumen Technologies, and began in early October 2025.
Kimwolf and Aisuru operate as large-scale botnets, networks of compromised devices that can be remotely controlled by attackers. These botnets have been used to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks and to route internet traffic through infected devices, effectively turning them into unauthorized residential proxy nodes.
Kimwolf primarily targets Android systems, with a heavy concentration on unsanctioned Android TV boxes and streaming devices. Prior technical analysis showed that the malware is delivered through a component known as ByteConnect, which may be installed directly or bundled into applications that come preloaded on certain devices. Once active, the malware establishes persistent access to the device.
Researchers estimate that more than two million Android devices have been compromised. A key factor enabling this spread is the exposure of Android Debug Bridge services to the internet. When left unsecured, this interface allows attackers to install malware remotely without user interaction, enabling rapid and large-scale infection.
Follow-up investigations revealed that operators associated with Kimwolf attempted to monetize the botnet by selling access to the infected devices’ internet connections. Proxy bandwidth linked to compromised systems was offered for sale, allowing buyers to route traffic through residential IP addresses in exchange for payment.
Black Lotus Labs traced parts of the Aisuru backend to residential SSH connections originating from Canadian IP addresses. These connections were used to access additional servers through proxy infrastructure, masking malicious activity behind ordinary household networks. One domain tied to this activity briefly appeared among Cloudflare’s most accessed domains before being removed due to abuse concerns.
In early October, researchers identified another Kimwolf command domain hosted on infrastructure linked to a U.S.-based hosting provider. Shortly after, independent reporting connected multiple proxy services to a now-defunct Discord server used to advertise residential proxy access. Individuals associated with the hosting operation were reportedly active on the server for an extended period.
During the same period, researchers observed a sharp increase in Kimwolf infections. Within days, hundreds of thousands of new devices were added to the botnet, with many of them immediately listed for sale through a single residential proxy service.
Further analysis showed that Kimwolf infrastructure actively scanned proxy services for vulnerable internal devices. By exploiting configuration flaws in these networks, the malware was able to move laterally, infect additional systems, and convert them into proxy nodes that were then resold.
Separate research uncovered a related proxy network built from hundreds of compromised home routers operating across Russian internet service providers. Identical configurations and access patterns indicated automated exploitation at scale. Because these devices appear as legitimate residential endpoints, malicious traffic routed through them is difficult to distinguish from normal consumer activity.
Researchers warn that the abuse of everyday consumer devices continues to provide attackers with resilient, low-visibility infrastructure that complicates detection and response efforts across the internet.
