Inside a government building in Rome, located opposite the ancient Aurelian Walls, dozens of cybersecurity professionals have been carrying out continuous monitoring operations for nearly a year. Their work focuses on tracking suspicious discussions and coordination activity taking place across hidden corners of the internet, including underground criminal forums and dark web marketplaces. This monitoring effort forms a core part of Italy’s preparations to protect the Milano–Cortina Winter Olympic Games from cyberattacks.
The responsibility for securing the digital environment of the Games lies with Italy’s National Cybersecurity Agency, an institution formed in 2021 to centralize the country’s cyber defense strategy. The upcoming Winter Olympics represent the agency’s first large-scale international operational test. Officials view the event as a likely target for cyber threats because the Olympics attract intense global attention. Such visibility can draw a wide spectrum of malicious actors, ranging from small-scale cybercriminal groups seeking disruption or financial gain to advanced threat groups believed to have links with state interests. These actors may attempt to use the event as a platform to make political statements, associate attacks with ideological causes, or exploit broader geopolitical tensions.
The Milano–Cortina Winter Games will run from February 6 to February 22 and will be hosted across multiple Alpine regions for the first time in Olympic history. This multi-location format introduces additional security and coordination challenges. Each venue relies on interconnected digital systems, including communications networks, event management platforms, broadcasting infrastructure, and logistics systems. Securing a geographically distributed digital environment exponentially increases the complexity of monitoring, response coordination, and incident containment.
Officials estimate that the Games will reach approximately three billion viewers globally, alongside around 1.5 million ticket-holding spectators on site. This scale creates a vast digital footprint. High-visibility services, such as live streaming platforms, official event websites, and ticket purchasing systems, are considered particularly attractive targets. Disrupting these services can generate widespread media attention, cause public confusion, and undermine confidence in the organizers’ ability to safeguard critical digital operations.
Italy’s planning has been shaped by recent Olympic experience. During the 2024 Paris Summer Olympics, authorities recorded more than 140 cyber incidents. In 22 cases, attackers managed to gain access to information systems. While none of these incidents disrupted the competitions themselves, the sheer volume of hostile activity demonstrated the persistent pressure faced by host nations. On the day of the opening ceremony in Paris, France’s TGV high-speed rail network was also targeted in coordinated physical sabotage attacks involving explosive devices. This incident illustrated how large global events can attract both cyber threats and physical security risks at the same time.
Italian cybersecurity officials anticipate comparable levels of hostile activity during the Milano–Cortina Games, with an additional layer of complexity introduced by artificial intelligence. AI tools can be used by attackers to automate technical tasks, enhance reconnaissance, and support more convincing phishing and impersonation campaigns. These techniques can increase the speed and scale of cyber operations while making malicious activity harder to detect. Although authorities currently report no specific, elevated threat level, they acknowledge that the overall risk environment is becoming more complex due to the growing availability of AI-assisted tools.
The National Cybersecurity Agency’s defensive approach emphasizes early detection rather than reactive response. Analysts continuously monitor open websites, underground criminal communities, and social media channels to identify emerging threat patterns before they develop into direct intrusion attempts. This method is designed to provide early warning, allowing technical teams to strengthen defenses before attackers move from planning to execution.
Operational coordination will involve multiple teams. Around 20 specialists from the agency’s operational staff will focus exclusively on Olympic-related cyber intelligence from the headquarters in Rome. An additional 10 senior experts will be deployed to Milan starting on February 4 to support the Technology Operations Centre, which oversees the digital systems supporting the Games. These government teams will operate alongside nearly 100 specialists from Deloitte and approximately 300 personnel from the local organizing committee and technology partners. Together, these groups will manage cybersecurity monitoring, incident response, and system resilience across all Olympic venues.
If threats keep developing during the Games, the agency will continuously feed intelligence into technical operations teams to support rapid decision-making. The guiding objective remains consistent. Detect emerging risks early, interpret threat signals accurately, and respond quickly and effectively when specific dangers become visible. This approach reflects Italy’s broader strategy to protect the digital infrastructure that underpins one of the world’s most prominent international sporting events.
