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Showing posts with label Cloud Security. Show all posts
XSS Mitigation
Cloud Security Cross-Site Scripting CVE-2026-1591 Enterprise Document Security Foxit eSign Foxit PDF Editor Cloud PDF Security Risks Vulnerabilities and Exploits Web Application Security XSS Mitigation

Foxit Publishes Security Patches for PDF Editor Cloud XSS Bugs


 

In response to findings that exposed weaknesses in the way user-supplied data was processed within interactive components, Foxit Software has issued a set of security fixes intended to address newly identified cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. 

Due to the flaws in Foxit PDF Editor Cloud and Foxit eSign, maliciously crafted input could be rendered in an unsafe manner in the user's browser, potentially allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution during authenticated sessions. 

The fundamental problem was an inconsistency in input validation and output encoding in some UI elements (most notably file attachment metadata and layer naming logic), which enabled attacker-controlled payloads to persist and be triggered during routine user interactions. 

Among these issues, the most important one, CVE-2026-1591, affected the File Attachments list and Layers panel of Foxit PDF Editor Cloud, thus emphasizing the importance of rigorously enforcing client-side trust boundaries in order to prevent the use of seemingly low-risk document features as attack vectors. 

These findings were supported by Foxit's confirmation that the identified weaknesses were related to a specific way in which certain client-side components handled untrusted input within a cloud environment. Affected functionality allowed for the processing of user-controlled values — specifically file attachment names and PDF layer identifiers — without sufficient validation or encoding prior to rendering in the browser. 

By injecting carefully constructed payloads into the application's HTML context, carefully constructed payloads could be executed upon the interaction between an authenticated user and the affected interface components. In response to these security deficiencies, Foxit published its latest security updates, which it described as routine security and stability enhancements that require no remediation other than ensuring deployments are up to date. 

The advisory also identifies two vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2026-1591 and CVE-2026-1592, which are both classified under CWE-79 for cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Each vulnerability has a CVSS v3.0 score of 6.3 and is rated Moderate in severity according to the advisory. 

Foxit PDF Editor Cloud is impacted by CVE-2026-1591, which has a significant impact on its File Attachments and Layers panels due to insufficient input validation and improper output encoding which can allow arbitrary JavaScript execution from the browser. 

The vulnerability CVE-2026-1592 poses a comparable risk through similar paths to data handling. Both vulnerabilities were identified and responsibly disclosed by Novee, a security researcher. However, the potential consequences of exploitation are not trivial, even if user interaction is required. In order to inject a script into a trusted browser context, an attacker would have to persuade a logged-in user to open or interact with a specially crafted attachment or altered layer configuration. 

By executing this script, an attacker can hijack a session, obtain unauthorized access to sensitive document data, or redirect the user to an attacker-controlled resource. As a result, the client-side trust assumptions made by document collaboration platforms pose a broader risk, particularly where dynamic document metadata is not rigorously sanitized. 

During the disclosure period, the source material did not enumerate specific CVE identifiers for each individual flaw, apart from those referenced in the advisory. The vulnerability involved in cross-site scripting has been extensively documented across a wide array of web-based applications and is routinely cataloged in public vulnerability databases such as MITRE's CVE repository.

XSS vulnerabilities in unrelated platforms, such as those described in CVE-2023-38545 and CVE-2023-38546, underscore the broader mechanics and effects of this attack category. This type of example is not directly related to Foxit products, but nevertheless is useful for gaining an understanding of how similar weaknesses may be exploited when web-rendered interfaces mishandle user-controlled data. 


Technically, Foxit PDF Editor Cloud is exploitable via the way it ingests, stores, and renders user-supplied metadata within interactive components like the File Attachments list and Layers dialog box. If input is not rigorously validated, an attacker may embed executable content (such as script tags or event handlers) into attachment filenames or layer names embedded within a PDF file without rigorous input validation. 

Upon presenting these values to the browser without appropriate output encoding, the application unintentionally enables the browser to interpret the injected content as active HTML or JavaScript as opposed to inert text. As soon as the malicious script has been rendered, it is executed within the security context of the authenticated user's session. 

The attacker can exploit the execution environment to gain access to session tokens and other sensitive browser information, manipulate the on-screen content, or redirect the user to unauthorized websites. Foxit cloud environments can be compromised with scripts that can perform unauthorized actions on behalf of users in more advanced scenarios. 

It is important to note that the risk is heightened by the low interaction threshold required to trigger exploitation, since simply opening or viewing a specially crafted document may trigger an injected payload, emphasizing the importance of robust client-side sanitization in cloud-based document platforms. 

These flaws are especially apparent in enterprise settings where Foxit PDF Editor Cloud is frequently integrated into day-to-day collaboration workflows. In such environments, employees exchange and modify documents sourced from customers, partners, and public repositories frequently, thereby increasing the risk that maliciously crafted PDFs could enter the ecosystem undetected. 

As part of its efforts to mitigate this broader risk, Foxit also publicly revealed and resolved a related cross-site scripting vulnerability in Foxit eSign, tracked as CVE-2025-66523, which was attributed to improper handling of URL parameters in specially constructed links. 

By enabling users to access these links with authenticated access, the untrusted input could be introduced into JavaScript code paths and HTML attributes without sufficient encoding, which could result in privilege escalation or cross-domain data exposure. A fix for this problem was released on January 15, 2026. 

Foxit confirmed that all identified vulnerabilities, including CVE-2026-1591, CVE-2026-1592, and CVE-2025-66523, have been fully addressed thanks to updates that strengthen both input validation and output encoding across all affected components. As a result of Foxit PDF Editor Cloud's automated updates or standard update mechanisms, customers are not required to perform any additional configuration changes. 

However, organizations are urged to verify that all instances are running the latest version of the application and remain alert for indicators such as unexpected JavaScript execution, anomalous editor behavior, or irregular entries in application logs which may indicate an attempt at exploitation.

Based on aggregate analysis, these issues are the result of a consistent breakdown in the platform's handling of user-controlled metadata during rendering of the File Attachments list and Layers panel. Insufficient validation controls allow attackers to introduce executable content through seemingly benign fields, such as attachment filenames or layer identifiers, through which malicious content may be introduced. This content, since it is not properly encoded, is interpreted by the browser as active code rather than plain text due to the lack of proper output encoding.

The injected JavaScript executes within the context of an authenticated session when triggered, resulting in a variety of outcomes, including data disclosure, interface manipulation, forced navigation, and unauthorised actions under the user's privilege. In addition to the low interaction threshold, the operational risks posed by these flaws are also highlighted by their limited access. 

While Foxit's remediation efforts address the immediate technical deficiencies, effective risk management extends beyond patch deployment alone. Organizations must ensure that all cloud-based instances are operating on current versions by applying updates promptly. 

In addition to these safeguards, other measures can be taken to minimize residual exposure, such as restricting document collaboration to trusted environments, enforcing browser content security policies, and monitoring application behavior for abnormal script execution.

Additional safeguards, such as web application firewalls and intrusion detection systems, are available at the perimeter of the network to prevent known injection patterns from reaching end users. Together with user education targeted at handling unsolicited documents and suspicious links, these measures can mitigate the broader threat posed by client-side injection vulnerabilities in collaborative documents.
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Fortinet
Cloud Security Cloud Server Cyber Phishing Cyber Security Cyber Security Ransomware Attacks Cyberattacks FortiGuard Fortinet

Multi-Stage Phishing Campaign Deploys Amnesia RAT and Ransomware Using Cloud Services

 

One recently uncovered cyberattack is targeting individuals across Russia through a carefully staged deception campaign. Rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities, the operation relies on manipulating user behavior, according to analysis by Cara Lin of Fortinet FortiGuard Labs. The attack delivers two major threats: ransomware that encrypts files for extortion and a remote access trojan known as Amnesia RAT. Legitimate system tools and trusted services are repurposed as weapons, allowing the intrusion to unfold quietly while bypassing traditional defenses. By abusing real cloud platforms, the attackers make detection significantly more difficult, as nothing initially appears out of place. 

The attack begins with documents designed to resemble routine workplace material. On the surface, these files appear harmless, but they conceal code that runs without drawing attention. Visual elements within the documents are deliberately used to keep victims focused, giving the malware time to execute unseen. Fortinet researchers noted that these visuals are not cosmetic but strategic, helping attackers establish deeper access before suspicion arises. 

A defining feature of the campaign is its coordinated use of multiple public cloud services. Instead of relying on a single platform, different components are distributed across GitHub and Dropbox. Scripts are hosted on GitHub, while executable payloads such as ransomware and remote access tools are stored on Dropbox. This fragmented infrastructure improves resilience, as disabling one service does not interrupt the entire attack chain and complicates takedown efforts. 

Phishing emails deliver compressed archives that contain decoy documents alongside malicious Windows shortcut files labeled in Russian. These shortcuts use double file extensions to impersonate ordinary text files. When opened, they trigger a PowerShell command that retrieves additional code from a public GitHub repository, functioning as an initial installer. The process runs silently, modifies system settings to conceal later actions, and opens a legitimate-looking document to maintain the illusion of normal activity. 

After execution, the attackers receive confirmation via the Telegram Bot API. A deliberate delay follows before launching an obfuscated Visual Basic Script, which assembles later-stage payloads directly in memory. This approach minimizes forensic traces and allows attackers to update functionality without altering the broader attack flow. 

The malware then aggressively disables security protections. Microsoft Defender exclusions are configured, protection modules are shut down, and the defendnot utility is used to deceive Windows into disabling antivirus defenses entirely. Registry modifications block administrative tools, repeated prompts seek elevated privileges, and continuous surveillance is established through automated screenshots exfiltrated via Telegram. 

Once defenses are neutralized, Amnesia RAT is downloaded from Dropbox. The malware enables extensive data theft from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, messaging apps, and system metadata, while providing full remote control of infected devices. In parallel, ransomware derived from the Hakuna Matata family encrypts files, manipulates clipboard data to redirect cryptocurrency transactions, and ultimately locks the system using WinLocker. 

Fortinet emphasized that the campaign reflects a broader shift in phishing operations, where attackers increasingly weaponize legitimate tools and psychological manipulation instead of exploiting software flaws. Microsoft advises enabling Tamper Protection and monitoring Defender changes to reduce exposure, as similar attacks are becoming more widespread across Russian organizations.
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vulnerable web applications
Cloud Security Cyber Security misconfigured cloud services penetration testing tools vulnerable web applications

Hackers Abuse Vulnerable Training Web Apps to Breach Enterprise Cloud Environments

 

Threat actors are actively taking advantage of poorly secured web applications designed for security training and internal penetration testing to infiltrate cloud infrastructures belonging to Fortune 500 firms and cybersecurity vendors. These applications include deliberately vulnerable platforms such as DVWA, OWASP Juice Shop, Hackazon, and bWAPP.

Research conducted by automated penetration testing firm Pentera reveals that attackers are using these exposed apps as entry points to compromise cloud systems. Once inside, adversaries have been observed deploying cryptocurrency miners, installing webshells, and moving laterally toward more sensitive assets.

Because these testing applications are intentionally insecure, exposing them to the public internet—especially when they run under highly privileged cloud accounts—creates significant security risks. Pentera identified 1,926 active vulnerable applications accessible online, many tied to excessive Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions and hosted across AWS, Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Microsoft Azure environments.

Pentera stated that the affected deployments belonged to several Fortune 500 organizations, including Cloudflare, F5, and Palo Alto Networks. The researchers disclosed their findings to the impacted companies, which have since remediated the issues. Analysis showed that many instances leaked cloud credentials, failed to implement least-privilege access controls, and more than half still relied on default login details—making them easy targets for attackers.

The exposed credentials could allow threat actors to fully access S3 buckets, Google Cloud Storage, and Azure Blob Storage, as well as read and write secrets, interact with container registries, and obtain administrative-level control over cloud environments. Pentera emphasized that these risks were already being exploited in real-world attacks.

"During the investigation, we discovered clear evidence that attackers are actively exploiting these exact attack vectors in the wild – deploying crypto miners, webshells, and persistence mechanisms on compromised systems," the researchers said.

Signs of compromise were confirmed when analysts examined multiple misconfigured applications. In some cases, they were able to establish shell access and analyze data to identify system ownership and attacker activity.

"Out of the 616 discovered DVWA instances, around 20% were found to contain artifacts deployed by malicious actors," Pentera says in the report.

The malicious activity largely involved the use of the XMRig mining tool, which silently mined Monero (XMR) in the background. Investigators also uncovered a persistence mechanism built around a script named ‘watchdog.sh’. When removed, the script could recreate itself from a base64-encoded backup and re-download XMRig from GitHub.

Additionally, the script retrieved encrypted tools from a Dropbox account using AES-256 encryption and terminated rival miners on infected systems. Other incidents involved a PHP-based webshell called ‘filemanager.php’, capable of file manipulation and remote command execution.

This webshell contained embedded authentication credentials and was configured with the Europe/Minsk (UTC+3) timezone, potentially offering insight into the attackers’ location.

Pentera noted that these malicious components were discovered only after Cloudflare, F5, and Palo Alto Networks had been notified and had already resolved the underlying exposures.

To reduce risk, Pentera advises organizations to keep an accurate inventory of all cloud assets—including test and training applications—and ensure they are isolated from production environments. The firm also recommends enforcing least-privilege IAM permissions, removing default credentials, and setting expiration policies for temporary cloud resources.

The full Pentera report outlines the investigation process in detail and documents the techniques and tools used to locate vulnerable applications, probe compromised systems, and identify affected organizations.
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VoidLink Framework
Advanced Persistent Threats Cloud Infrastructure Threats Cloud Security Container Security Cyber Threat Intelligence malware supply chain attacks VoidLink Framework

VoidLink Malware Poses Growing Risk to Enterprise Linux Cloud Deployments


 

A new cybersecurity threat has emerged beneath the surface of the modern digital infrastructure as organizations continue to increase their reliance on cloud computing. Researchers warn that a subtle but dangerous shift is occurring beneath the surface. 

According to Check Point Research, a highly sophisticated malware framework known as VoidLink, is being developed by a group of cyber criminals specifically aimed at infiltrating and persisting within cloud environments based on Linux. 

As much as the industry still concentrates on Windows-centric threats, VoidLink's appearance underscores a strategic shift by advanced threat actors towards Linux-based systems that are essential to the runtime of cloud platforms, containerized workloads, and critical enterprise services, even at a time when many of the industry's defensive focus is still on Windows-centric threats. 

Instead of representing a simple piece of malicious code, VoidLink is a complex ecosystem designed to deliver long-term, covert control over compromised servers by establishing long-term, covert controls over the servers themselves, effectively transforming cloud infrastructure into an attack vector all its own. 

There is a strong indication that the architecture and operational depth of this malware suggests it was designed by well-resourced, professional adversaries rather than opportunistic criminals, posing a serious challenge for defenders who may not know that they are being silently commandeered and used for malicious purposes.

Check Point Research has published a detailed analysis of VoidLink to conclude that it is not just a single piece of malicious code; rather, it is a cloud-native, fully developed framework that is made up of customized loaders, implants, rootkits, and a variety of modular plugins that allows operators to extend, modify, and repurpose its functionality according to their evolving operational requirements. 

Based on its original identification in December 2025, the framework was designed with a strong emphasis on dependability and adaptability within cloud and containerized environments, reflecting the deliberate emphasis on persistence and adaptability within the framework. 

There were many similarities between VoidLink and Cobalt Strike's Beacon Object Files model, as the VoidLink architecture is built around a bespoke Plugin API that draws conceptual parallels to its Plugin API. There are more than 30 modules available at the same time, which can be shifted rapidly without redeploying the core implant as needed. 

As the primary implant has been programmed in Zig, it can detect major cloud platforms - including Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, Alibaba, and Tencent - and adjust its behavior when executed within Docker containers or Kubernetes pods, dynamically adjusting itself accordingly. 

Furthermore, the malware is capable of harvesting credentials linked to cloud services as well as extensively used source code management platforms like Git, showing an operational focus on software development environments, although the malware does not appear to be aware of the environment. 

A researcher has identified a framework that is actively maintained as the work of threat actors linked to China, which emphasizes a broader strategic shift away from Windows-centric attacks toward Linux-based attacks which form the basis for cloud infrastructures and critical digital operations, and which can result in a range of potential consequences, ranging from the theft of data to the compromise of large-scale supply chains. 

As described by its developers internally as VoidLink, the framework is built as a cloud-first implant that uses Zig, the Zig programming language to develop, and it is designed to be deployed across modern, distributed environments. 

Depending on whether or not a particular application is being executed on Docker containers or Kubernetes clusters, the application dynamically adjusts its behavior to comply with that environment by identifying major cloud platforms and determining whether it is running within them. 

Furthermore, the malware has been designed to steal credentials that are tied to cloud-based services and popular source code management systems, such as Git, in addition to environmental awareness. With this capability, software development environments seem to be a potential target for intelligence collection, or to be a place where future supply chain operations could be conducted.

Further distinguishing VoidLink from conventional Linux malware is its technical breadth, which incorporates rootkit-like techniques, loadable kernel modules, and eBPF, as well as an in-memory plugin system allowing for the addition of new functions without requiring people to reinstall the core implant, all of which is supported by LD_PRELOAD. 

In addition to adapting evasion behavior based on the presence of security tooling, the stealth mechanism also prioritizes operational concealment in closely monitored environments, which in turn alters its evasion behavior accordingly. 

Additionally, the framework provides a number of command-and-control mechanisms, such as HTTP and HTTPS, ICMP, and DNS tunneling, and enables the establishment of peer-to-peer or mesh-like communication among compromised hosts through the use of a variety of command-and-control mechanisms. There is some evidence that the most components are nearing full maturity.

A functional command-and-control server is being developed and an integrated web-based management interface is being developed that facilitates centralized control of the agents, implants, and plugins by operators. To date, no real-world infection has been confirmed. 

The final purpose of VoidLink remains unclear as well, but based on its sophistication, modularity, and apparent commercial-grade polish, it appears to be designed for wider operational deployment, either as a tailored offensive tool created for a particular client or as a productized offensive framework that is intended for broader operational deployment. 

Further, Check Point Research has noted that VoidLink is accompanied by a fully featured, web-based command-and-control dashboard that allows operators to do a centralized monitoring and analysis of compromised systems, including post-exploitation activities, to provide them with the highest level of protection. 

Its interface, which has been localized for Chinese-language users, allows operations across familiar phases, including reconnaissance, credential harvesting, persistence, lateral movement, and evidence destruction, confirming that the framework is designed to be used to engage in sustained, methodical campaigns rather than opportunistic ones.

In spite of the fact that there were no confirmed cases of real-world infections by January 2026, researchers have stated that the framework has reached an advanced state of maturity—including an integrated C2 server, a polished dashboard for managing operations, and an extensive plugin ecosystem, which indicates that its deployment could be imminent.

According to the design philosophy behind the malware, the goal is to gain long-term access to cloud environments and keep a close eye on cloud users. This marks a significant step up in the sophistication of Linux-focused malware. It was argued by the researchers in their analysis that VoidLink's modular plug-ins extend their reach beyond cloud workloads to the developer and administrator workstations which interact directly with these environments.

A compromised system is effectively transformed into a staging ground that is capable of facilitating further intrusions or potential supply chain compromises if it is not properly protected. Their conclusion was that this emergence of such an advanced framework underscores a broader shift in attackers' interest in Linux-based cloud and container platforms, away from traditional Windows-based targets. 

This has prompted organizations to step up their security efforts across the full spectrum of Linux, cloud, and containerized infrastructures, as attacks become increasingly advanced. Despite the fact that VoidLink was discovered by chance in the early days of cloud adoption, it serves as a timely reminder that security assumptions must evolve as rapidly as the infrastructure itself. 

Since attackers are increasingly investing in frameworks built to blend into Linux and containerized environments, organizations are no longer able to protect critical assets by using perimeter-based controls and Windows-focused threat models. 

There is a growing trend among security teams to adopt a cloud-aware defense posture that emphasizes continuous monitoring, least-privilege access, and rigorous monitoring of the deployment of development and administrative endpoints that are used for bridging on-premise and cloud platforms in their development and administration processes. 

An efficient identity management process, hardened container and Kubernetes configurations, and increased visibility into east-west traffic within cloud environments can have a significant impact on the prevention of long-term, covert compromises within cloud deployments.

There is also vital importance in strengthening collaboration between the security, DevOps, and engineering teams within the platform to ensure that detection and response capabilities keep pace with the ever-changing and adaptive threat landscape. 

Modern enterprises have become dependent on digital infrastructure to support the operation of their businesses, and as frameworks like VoidLink are closer to real-world deployment, investing in Linux and cloud security at this stage is important not only for mitigating emerging risks, but also for strengthening the resilience of the infrastructure that supports them.
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data sovereignty
Aerospace Cloud Cloud Security Corporate Security cyber resilience Cyber Security data security data sovereignty

Airbus Signals Shift Toward European Sovereign Cloud to Reduce Reliance on US Tech Giants

 

Airbus, the aerospace manufacturer in Europe is getting ready to depend less on big American technology companies like Google and Microsoft. The company wants to rethink how and where it does its important digital work. 

Airbus is going to put out a request for companies to help it move its most critical systems to a European cloud that is controlled by Europeans. This is a change in how Airbus handles its digital infrastructure. Airbus is doing this to have control over its digital work. The company wants to use a cloud, for its mission-critical systems. Airbus uses a lot of services from Google and Microsoft. The company has a setup that includes big data centers and tools like Google Workspace that help people work together. 

Airbus also uses software from Microsoft to handle money matters.. When it comes to very secret and military documents these are not allowed to be stored in public cloud environments. This is because Airbus wants to be in control of its data and does not want to worry about rules and regulations. Airbus has had these concerns for a time. 

The company wants to make sure it can keep its information safe. Airbus is careful, about where it stores its documents, especially the ones that are related to the military. The company is now looking at moving its applications from its own premises to the cloud. This includes things like systems for planning and managing the business platforms for running the factories tools for managing customer relationships and software for managing the life cycle of products which's where the designs for the aircraft are kept. 

These systems are really important to Airbus because they hold a lot of information and are used to run the business. So it is very important to think about where they are hosted. The people in charge have said that the information, in these systems is a matter of European security, which means the systems need to be kept in Europe. Airbus needs to make sure that the cloud infrastructure it uses is controlled by companies. The company wants to keep its aircraft design data safe and secure which is why it is looking for a solution that meets European security standards. 

European companies are getting really worried about being in control of their digital stuff. This is a deal for them especially now that people are talking about how different the rules are in Europe and the United States. Some big American companies like Microsoft, Google and Amazon Web Services are trying to make European companies feel better by offering services that deal with these worries.. European companies are still not sure if they can really trust these American companies. 

The main reason they are worried is because of a law in the United States called the US CLOUD Act. This law lets American authorities ask companies for access to data even if that data is stored in other countries. European companies do not like this because they think it means American authorities have much power over their digital sovereignty. Digital sovereignty is a concern for European companies and they want to make sure they have control, over their own digital stuff. 

For organizations that deal with sensitive information related to industry, defense or the government this set of laws is a big problem. Digital sovereignty is about a country or region being in charge of its digital systems the way it handles data and who gets to access that data. This means that the laws of that country decide how information is taken care of and protected. The way Airbus is doing things shows that Europe, as a whole is trying to make sure its cloud operations follow the laws and priorities of the region. European organizations and Europe are working on sovereignty and cloud operations to keep their information safe. 

People are worried about the CLOUD Act. This is because of things that happened in court before. Microsoft said in a court in France that it cannot promise to keep people from the United States government getting their data. This is true even if the data is stored in Europe. Microsoft said it has not had to give the United States government any data from customers yet.. The company admitted that it does have to follow the law. 

This shows that companies, like Microsoft that are based in the United States and provide cloud services have to deal with some legal problems. The CLOUD Act is a part of these problems. Airbus’ reported move toward a sovereign European cloud underscores a growing shift among major enterprises that view digital infrastructure not just as a technical choice, but as a matter of strategic autonomy. 

As geopolitical tensions and regulatory scrutiny increase, decisions about where data lives and who ultimately controls access to it are becoming central to corporate risk management and long-term resilience.
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Russia
Amazon AWS Cloud Security Credential Theft Cyber Attacks GRU Russia

Amazon Says It Has Disrupted GRU-Linked Cyber Operations Targeting Cloud Customers

 



Amazon has announced that its threat intelligence division has intervened in ongoing cyber operations attributed to hackers associated with Russia’s foreign military intelligence service, the GRU. The activity targeted organizations using Amazon’s cloud infrastructure, with attackers attempting to gain unauthorized access to customer-managed systems.

The company reported that the malicious campaign dates back to 2021 and largely concentrated on Western critical infrastructure. Within this scope, energy-related organizations were among the most frequently targeted sectors, indicating a strategic focus on high-impact industries.

Amazon’s investigation shows that the attackers initially relied on exploiting security weaknesses to break into networks. Over multiple years, they used a combination of newly discovered flaws and already known vulnerabilities in enterprise technologies, including security appliances, collaboration software, and data protection platforms. These weaknesses served as their primary entry points.

As the campaign progressed, the attackers adjusted their approach. By 2025, Amazon observed a reduced reliance on vulnerability exploitation. Instead, the group increasingly targeted customer network edge devices that were incorrectly configured. These included enterprise routers, VPN gateways, network management systems, collaboration tools, and cloud-based project management platforms.

Devices with exposed administrative interfaces or weak security controls became easy targets. By exploiting configuration errors rather than software flaws, the attackers achieved the same long-term goals: maintaining persistent access to critical networks and collecting login credentials for later use.

Amazon noted that this shift reflects a change in operational focus rather than intent. While misconfiguration abuse has been observed since at least 2022, the sustained emphasis on this tactic in 2025 suggests the attackers deliberately scaled back efforts to exploit zero-day and known vulnerabilities. Despite this evolution, their core objectives remained unchanged: credential theft and quiet movement within victim environments using minimal resources and low visibility.

Based on overlapping infrastructure and targeting similarities with previously identified threat groups, Amazon assessed with high confidence that the activity is linked to GRU-associated hackers. The company believes one subgroup, previously identified by external researchers, may be responsible for actions taken after initial compromise as part of a broader, multi-unit campaign.

Although Amazon did not directly observe how data was extracted, forensic evidence suggests passive network monitoring techniques were used. Indicators included delays between initial device compromise and credential usage, as well as unauthorized reuse of legitimate organizational credentials.

The compromised systems were customer-controlled network appliances running on Amazon EC2 instances. Amazon emphasized that no vulnerabilities in AWS services themselves were exploited during these attacks.

Once the activity was detected, Amazon moved to secure affected instances, alerted impacted customers, and shared intelligence with relevant vendors and industry partners. The company stated that coordinated action helped disrupt the attackers’ operations and limit further exposure.

Amazon also released a list of internet addresses linked to the activity but cautioned organizations against blocking them without proper analysis, as they belong to legitimate systems that had been hijacked.

To mitigate similar threats, Amazon recommended immediate steps such as auditing network device configurations, monitoring for credential replay, and closely tracking access to administrative portals. For AWS users, additional measures include isolating management interfaces, tightening security group rules, and enabling monitoring tools like CloudTrail, GuardDuty, and VPC Flow Logs.

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Threat Intelligence
Cloud Security continuous monitoring Cyber Security Cybersecurity Endpoint Defense Incident response ransomware protection Risk Management SOC Operations Threat Intelligence

Continuous Incident Response Is Redefining Cybersecurity Strategy

 


With organizations now faced with relentless digital exposure, continuous security monitoring has become an operational necessity instead of a best practice, as organizations navigate an era where digital exposure is ubiquitous. In 2024, cyber-attacks will increase by nearly 30%, with the average enterprise having to deal with over 1,600 attempted intrusions a week, with the financial impact of a data breach regularly rising into six figures. 

Even so, the real crisis extends well beyond the rising level of threats. In the past, cybersecurity strategies relied on a familiar formula—detect quickly, respond promptly, recover quickly—but that cadence no longer suffices in an environment that is characterized by adversaries automating reconnaissance, exploiting cloud misconfiguration within minutes, and weaponizing legitimate tools so that they can move laterally far faster than human analysts are able to react. 

There has been a growing gap between what organizations can see and the ability to act as the result of successive waves of innovation, from EDR to XDR, as a result of which they have widened visibility across sprawling digital estates. The security operations center is already facing unprecedented complexity. Despite the fact that security operations teams juggle dozens of tools and struggle with floods of alerts that require manual validation, organisations are unable to act as quickly as they should. 

A recent accelerated disconnect between risk and security is transforming how security leaders understand risks and forcing them to face a difficult truth: visibility without speed is no longer an effective defence. When examining the threat patterns defining the year 2024, it becomes more apparent why this shift is necessary. According to security firms, attackers are increasingly using stealthy, fileless techniques to steal from their victims, with nearly four out of five detections categorised as malware-free today, with the majority of attacks classified as malware-free. 

As a result, ransomware activity has continued to climb steeply upward, rising by more than 80% on a year-over-year basis and striking small and midsized businesses the most disproportionately, accounting for approximately 70% of all recorded incidents. In recent years, phishing campaigns have become increasingly aggressive, with some vectors experiencing unprecedented spikes - some exceeding 1,200% - as adversaries use artificial intelligence to bypass human judgment. 

A number of SMBs remain structurally unprepared in spite of these pressures, with the majority acknowledging that they have become preferred targets, but three out of four of them continue to use informal or internally managed security measures. These risks are compounded by human error, which is responsible for an estimated 88% of reported cyber incidents. 

There have been staggering financial consequences as well; in the past five years alone, the UK has suffered losses of more than £44 billion, resulting in both immediate disruption and long-term revenue losses. Due to this, the industry’s definition of continuous cybersecurity is now much broader than periodic audits. 

It is necessary to maintain continuous threat monitoring, proactive vulnerability and exposure management, disciplined identity governance, sustained employee awareness programs, regularly tested incident response playbooks, and ongoing compliance monitoring—a posture which emphasizes continuous evaluation rather than reactive control as part of an operational strategy. Increasingly complex digital estates are creating unpredictable cyber risks, which are making continuous monitoring an essential part of modern defence strategies. 

Continuous monitoring is a real time monitoring system that scans systems, networks, and cloud environments in real time, in order to detect early signs of misconfiguration, compromise, or operational drift. In contrast to periodic checks which operate on a fixed schedule and leave long periods of exposure, continuous monitoring operates in real time. 

The approach outlined above aligns closely with the NIST guidance, which urges organizations to set up an adaptive monitoring strategy capable of ingesting a variety of data streams, analysing emerging vulnerabilities, and generating timely alerts for security teams to take action. Using continuous monitoring, organizations can discover latent weaknesses that are contributing to their overall cyber posture. 

Continuous monitoring reduces the frequency and severity of incidents, eases the burden on security personnel, and helps them meet increasing regulatory demands. Even so, maintaining such a level of vigilance remains a challenge, especially for small businesses that lack the resources, expertise, and tooling to operate around the clock in order to stay on top of their game. 

The majority of organizations therefore turn to external service providers in order to achieve the scalability and economic viability of continuous monitoring. Typically, effective continuous monitoring programs include four key components: a monitoring engine, analytics that can be used to identify anomalies and trends on a large scale, a dashboard that shows key risk indicators in real time, and an alerting system to ensure that emerging issues are quickly addressed by the appropriate staff. 

With the help of automation, security teams are now able to process a great deal of telemetry in a timely and accurate manner, replacing outdated or incomplete snapshots with live visibility into organisational risk, enabling them to respond successfully in a highly dynamic threat environment. 

Continuous monitoring can take on a variety of forms, depending on the asset in focus, including endpoint monitoring, network traffic analysis, application performance tracking, cloud and container observability, etc., all of which provide an important layer of protection against attacks as they spread across every aspect of the digital infrastructure. 

It has also been shown that the dissolution of traditional network perimeters is a key contributor to the push toward continuous response. In the current world of cloud-based workloads, SaaS-based ecosystems, and remote endpoints, security architectures mustwork as flexible and modular systems capable of correlating telemetrics between email, DNS, identity, network, and endpoint layers, without necessarily creating new silos within the architecture. 

Three operational priorities are usually emphasized by organizations moving in this direction: deep integration to keep unified visibility, automation to handle routine containment at machine speed and validation practices, such as breach simulations and posture tests, to ensure that defence systems behave as they should. It has become increasingly common for managed security services to adopt these principles, and this is why more organizations are adopting them.

909Protect, for instance, is an example of a product that provides rapid, coordinated containment across hybrid environments through the use of automated detection coupled with continuous human oversight. In such platforms, the signals from various security vectors are correlated, and they are layered on top of existing tools with behavioural analysis, posture assessment and identity safeguards in order to ensure that no critical alert goes unnoticed while still maintaining established investments. 

In addition to this shift, there is a realignment among the industry as a whole toward systems that are built to be available continuously rather than undergoing episodic interventions. Cybersecurity has gone through countless “next generation” labels, but only those approaches which fundamentally alter the behavior of operations tend to endure, according to veteran analysts in the field. In addressing this underlying failure point, continuous incident response fits perfectly into this trajectory. 

Organizations are rarely breached because they have no data, but rather because they do not act on it quickly enough or cohesively. As analysts argue, the path forward will be determined by the ability to combine automation, analytics, and human expertise into a single adaptive workflow that can be used in an organization's entirety. 

There is no doubt that the organizations that are most likely to be able to withstand emerging threats in the foreseeable future will be those that approach security as a living, constantly changing system that is not only based on the visible, but also on the ability of the organization to detect, contain, and recover in real time from any threats as they arise. 

In the end, the shift toward continuous incident response is a sign that cybersecurity resilience is more than just about speed anymore, but about endurance as well. Investing in unified visibility, disciplined automation, as well as persistent validation will not only ensure that the path from detection to containment is shortened, but that the operations remain stable over the longer term as well.

The advantage will go to those who treat security as an evolving ecosystem—one that is continually refined, coordinated across teams and committed to responding in a continuity similar to the attacks used by adversaries.
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PolarEdge Malware
Advanced Persistent Threats Cloud Security Cyber Attack Trends Cyber Attacks IoT Botnet Cybersecurity Threats Data Breach Prevention Digital Infrastructure Network Security PolarEdge Malware

Cybersecurity Alert as PolarEdge Botnet Hijacks 25,000 IoT Systems Globally

 


Researchers at Censys have found that PolarEdge is rapidly expanding throughout the world, in an alarming sign that connected technology is becoming increasingly weaponised. PolarEdge is an advanced botnet orchestrating large-scale attacks against Internet of Things (IoT) and edge devices all over the world, a threat that has become increasingly prevalent in recent years. 

When the malicious network was first discovered in mid-2023, only around 150 confirmed infections were identified. Since then, the network has grown into an extensive digital threat, compromising nearly 40,000 devices worldwide by August 2025. Analysts have pointed out that PolarEdge's architecture is very similar to Operational Relay Box (ORB) infrastructures, which are covert systems commonly used to facilitate espionage, fraud, and cybercrime. 

PolarEdge has grown at a rapid rate in recent years, and this highlights the fact that undersecured IoT environments are becoming increasingly exploited, placing them among the most rapidly expanding and dangerous botnet campaigns in recent years. PolarEdge has helped shed light on the rapidly evolving nature of cyber threats affecting the hyperconnected world of today. 

PolarEdge, a carefully crafted campaign that demonstrates how compromised Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems can be turned into powerful weapons of cyber warfare, emerged as an expertly orchestrated campaign. There are more than 25,000 infected devices spread across 40 countries that are a part of the botnet, and the botnet is characterised by its massive scope and sophistication due to its network of 140 command and control servers. 

Unlike many other distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, PolarEdge is not only a tool for distributing denial-of-service attacks, but also a platform for criminal infrastructure as a service (IaaS), specifically made to support advanced persistent threats (APT). By exploiting vulnerabilities in IoT devices and edge devices through systematic methods, the software constructs an Operational Relay Box (ORB) network, which creates a layer of obfuscating malicious traffic, enabling covert operations such as espionage, data theft, and ransomware.

By adopting this model, the cybercrime economy is reshaped in a way that enables even moderately skilled adversaries to access capabilities that were once exclusively the domain of elite threat groups. As further investigation into PolarEdge's evolving infrastructure was conducted, it turned out that a previously unknown component known as RPX_Client was uncovered, which is an integral part of the botnet that transforms vulnerable IoT devices into proxy nodes. 

In May 2025, XLab's Cyber Threat Insight and Analysis System detected a suspicious activity from IP address 111.119.223.196, which was distributing an ELF file named "w," a file that initially eluded detection on VirusTotal. The file was identified as having the remote location DNS IP address 111.119.223.196. A deeper forensic analysis of the attack was conducted to uncover the RPX_Client mechanism and its integral role in the construction of Operational Relay Box networks. 

These networks are designed to hide malicious activity behind layers of compromised systems to make it appear as if everything is normal. An examination of the device logs carried out by the researchers revealed that the infection had spread all over the world, with the highest concentration occurring in South Korea (41.97%), followed by China (20.35%) and Thailand (8.37%), while smaller clusters emerged in Southeast Asia and North America. KT CCTV surveillance cameras, Shenzhen TVT digital video recorders and Asus routers have been identified as the most frequently infected devices, whereas other devices that have been infected include Cyberoam UTM appliances, Cisco RV340 VPN routers, D-Link routers, and Uniview webcams have also been infected. 

140 RPX_Server nodes are running the campaign, which all operate under three autonomous system numbers (45102, 37963, and 132203), and are primarily hosted on Alibaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud virtual private servers. Each of these nodes communicates via port 55555 with a PolarSSL test certificate that was derived from version 3.4.0 of the Mbed TLS protocol, which enabled XLab to reverse engineer the communication flow so that it would be possible to determine the validity and scope of the active servers.

As far as the technical aspect of the RPX_Client is concerned, it establishes two connections simultaneously. One is connected to RPX_Server via port 55555 for node registration and traffic routing, while the other is connected to Go-Admin via port 55560 for remote command execution. As a result of its hidden presence, this malware is disguised as a process named “connect_server,” enforces a single-instance rule by using a PID file (/tmp/.msc), and keeps itself alive by injecting itself into the rcS initialisation script. 

In light of these efforts, it has been found that the PolarEdge infrastructure is highly associated with the RPX infrastructure, as evidenced by overlapping code patterns, domain associations and server logs. Notably, IP address 82.118.22.155, which was associated with PolarEdge distribution chains in the early 1990s, was found to be related to a host named jurgencindy.asuscomm.com, which is the same host that is associated with PolarEdge C2 servers like icecreand.cc and centrequ.cc. 

As the captured server records confirmed that RPX_Client payloads had been delivered, as well as that commands such as change_pub_ip had been executed, in addition to verifying its role in overseeing the botnet's distribution framework, further validated this claim. Its multi-hop proxy architecture – utilising compromised IoT devices as its first layer and inexpensive Virtual Private Servers as its second layer – creates a dense network of obfuscation that effectively masks the origin of attacks. 

This further confirms Mandiant's assessment that cloud-based infrastructures are posing a serious challenge to conventional indicator-based detection techniques. Several experts emphasised the fact that in order to mitigate the growing threat posed by botnets, such as PolarEdge, one needs to develop a comprehensive and layered cybersecurity strategy, which includes both proactive defence measures and swift incident response approaches. In response to the proliferation of connected devices, organisations and individuals need to realise the threat landscape that is becoming more prevalent. 

Therefore, IoT and edge security must become an operational priority rather than an afterthought. It is a fundamental step in making sure that all devices are running on the latest firmware, since manufacturers release patches frequently to address known vulnerabilities regularly. Furthermore, it is equally important to change default credentials immediately with strong, unique passwords. This is an essential component of defence against large-scale exploitation, but is often ignored.

Security professionals recommend that network segmentation be implemented, that IoT devices should be isolated within specific VLANs or restricted network zones, so as to minimise lateral movement within networks. As an additional precaution, organisations are advised to disable non-essential ports and services, so that there are fewer entry points that attackers could exploit. 

The continuous monitoring of the network, with a strong emphasis on intrusion detection and prevention (IDS/IPS) systems, has a crucial role to play in detecting suspicious traffic patterns that are indicative of active compromises. The installation of a robust patch management program is essential in order to make sure that all connected assets are updated with security updates promptly and uniformly. 

Enterprises should also conduct due diligence when it comes to the supply chain: they should choose vendors who have demonstrated a commitment to transparency, timely security updates, and disclosure of vulnerabilities responsibly. As far as the technical aspect of IoT defence is concerned, several tools have proven to be effective in detecting and counteracting IoT-based threats. Nessus, for instance, provides comprehensive vulnerability scanning services, and Shodan provides analysts with a way to identify exposed or misconfigured internet-connected devices. 

Among the tools that can be used for deeper network analysis is Wireshark, which is a protocol inspection tool used by most organisations, and Snort or Suricata are powerful IDS/IPS systems that can detect malicious traffic in real-time. In addition to these, IoT Inspector offers comprehensive assessments of device security and privacy, giving us a much better idea of what connected hardware is doing and how it behaves. 

By combining these tools and practices, a critical defensive framework can be created - one that is capable of reducing the attack surface and curbing the propagation of sophisticated botnets, such as PolarEdge, resulting in a reduction in the number of attacks. In a comprehensive geospatial study of PolarEdge's infection footprint, it has been revealed that it has been spread primarily in Southeast Asia and North America, with South Korea claiming 41.97 percent of the total number of compromised devices to have been compromised. 

The number of total infections in China comes in at 20.35 per cent, while Thailand makes up 8.37 per cent. As part of the campaign, there are several key victims, including KT CCTV systems, Shenzhen TVT digital video recorders (DVRs), Cyberoam Unified Threat Management (UTM) appliances, along with a variety of router models made by major companies such as Asus, DrayTek, Cisco, and D-Link. Virtual private servers (VPS) are used primarily to control the botnet's command-and-control ecosystem, which clusters within autonomous systems 45102, 37963, and 132203. 

The vast majority of the botnet's operations are hosted by Alibaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud infrastructure – a reflection of the botnet's dependency on commercial, scalable cloud environments for maintaining its vast operations. PolarEdge's technical sophistication is based on a multi-hop proxy framework, RPX, a multi-hop proxy framework meticulously designed to conceal attack origins and make it more difficult for the company to attribute blame. 

In the layered communication chain, traffic is routed from a local proxy to RPX_Server nodes to RPX_Client instances on IoT devices that are infected, thus masking the true source of command, while allowing for fluid, covert communication across global networks. It is the malware's strategy to maintain persistence by injecting itself into initialisation scripts. Specifically, the command echo "/bin/sh /mnt/mtd/rpx.sh &" >> /etc/init.d/rcS ensures that it executes automatically at the start-up of the system. 

Upon becoming active, it conceals itself as a process known as “connect_server” and enforces single-instance execution using the PID file located at /tmp/.msc to enforce this. This client is capable of configuring itself by accessing a global configuration file called “.fccq” that extracts parameters such as the command-and-control (C2) address, communication ports, device UUIDs, and brand identifiers, among many others. 

As a result, these values have been obfuscated using a single-byte XOR encryption (0x25), an effective yet simple method of preventing static analysis of the values. This malware uses two network ports in order to establish two network channels—port 55555 for node registration and traffic proxying, and port 55560 for remote command execution via the Go-Admin service. 

Command management is accomplished through the use of “magic field” identifiers (0x11, 0x12, and 0x16), which define specific operational functions, as well as the ability to update malware components self-aware of themselves using built-in commands like update_vps, which rotates C2 addresses.

A server-side log shows that the attackers executed infrastructure migration commands, which demonstrates their ability to dynamically switch proxy pools to evade detection each and every time a node is compromised or exposed, which is evidence of the attacker’s ability to evade detection, according to the log. It is evident from network telemetry that PolarEdge is primarily interested in non-targeted activities aimed at legitimate platforms like QQ, WeChat, Google, and Cloudflare. 

It suggests its infrastructure may be used as both a means for concealing malicious activity as well as staging it as a form of ordinary internet communication. In light of the PolarEdge campaign, which highlights the fragility of today's interconnected digital ecosystem, it serves as a stark reminder that cybersecurity must evolve in tandem with the sophistication of today's threats, rather than just react to them. 

A culture of cyber awareness, cross-industry collaboration, and transparent threat intelligence sharing is are crucial component of cybersecurity, beyond technical countermeasures. Every unsecured device, whether it is owned by governments, businesses, or consumers, can represent a potential entryway into the digital world. Therefore, governments, businesses, and consumers all must recognise this. The only sustainable way for tomorrow's digital infrastructure to be protected is through education, accountability, and global cooperation.
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