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An ongoing campaign that aims to seize control of WhatsApp accounts by manipulating WhatsApp's own multi-device architecture has been revealed by cybersecurity experts in the wake of an ongoing, highly targeted attack designed to illustrate the increasing complexity of digital identity threats.
Known as GhostPairing, the attack exploits the trust inherent in WhatsApp's system for pairing devices - a feature that allows WhatsApp Web users to send encrypted messages across laptops, mobile phones, and browsers by using the WhatsApp Web client.
Through a covert means of guiding victims into completing a legitimate pairing process, malicious actors are able to link an attacker-controlled browser as a hidden companion device to the target account, without alerting the user or sending him/her any device notifications at all.
The end-to-end encryption and frictionless cross-platform synchronization capabilities of WhatsApp remain among the most impressive in the industry, but investigators warn that these very strengths of the service have been used to subvert the security model, which has enabled adversaries to have persistent access to messages, media, and account controls.
Although the encryption remains intact in such a scenario technically, it will be strategically nullified if the authentication layer is compromised, allowing attackers to read and reply to conversations from within their own account. This effectively converts a feature that was designed to protect your privacy into an entry point for silent account takeovers, effectively converting a privacy-first feature into a security-centric attack.
Analysts have characterized GhostPairing as a methodical account takeover strategy that relies on WhatsApp’s legitimate infrastructure of device linkage as a means of obtaining access to accounts instead of compromising WhatsApp’s security through conventional methods of authentication. In this technique, users are manipulated socially so that they link an external device, under the false impression that they are completing a verification process.
As a general rule, an attack takes place through messages appearing to come from trusted contacts, often compromised accounts, and containing links disguised as photos, documents, or videos. Once accessed by victims, these links lead them to fake websites meticulously modeled after popular social media platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp, where allegedly the victim will be asked to enter his or her phone number as part of an authentication process.
Moreover, the pages are designed to generate QR codes that are used to verify customer support, comply with regulations regarding KYC, process job applications, update KYC records, register promotional events, or recover account information. By scanning QR codes that mirror the format used by WhatsApp Web, users unintentionally link their accounts to those of attackers, not realizing they are scanning QR codes that are actually the same format used by WhatsApp Web.
It is important to know that once the connection is paired, it runs quietly in the background, and the account owner does not receive an explicit login approval or security alert. Although WhatsApp’s encryption remains technically intact, the compromise at the device-pairing layer allows threat actors to access private communications in a way that effectively sidesteps encryption by allowing them to enter authenticated sessions from within their own account environment, even though WhatsApp’s encryption has remained unbroken technologically.
The cybercriminals will then be able to retrieve historical chat data, track incoming messages in real time, view and transmit shared media — including images, videos, documents, and voice notes — and send messages while impersonating the legitimate account holder in order to take over the account. Additionally, compromised accounts are being repurposed as propagation channels for a broader range of targets, further enlarging the campaign's reach and scale.
The intrusion does not affect normal app behavior or cause system instability, so victims are frequently unaware of unauthorized access for prolonged periods of time, which allows attackers to maintain persistent surveillance without detection for quite a while.
The campaign was initially traced to users in the Czech Republic, but subsequent analysis has shown that the campaign's reach is much larger than one specific country.
During their investigation, researchers discovered that threat actors have been using reusable phishing kits capable of rapid replication, which allows operations to scale simultaneously across countries, languages, and communication patterns.
A victim's contact list is already populated with compromised or impersonated accounts, providing an additional layer of misplaced trust to the outreach, which is what initiates the attack chain.
In many of these messages, the sender claims that they have found a photograph and invites their recipients to take a look at it through a link intentionally designed to look like the preview or media viewer for Facebook content.
As soon as the link is accessed, users are taken to a fake, Facebook-branded verification page that requires them to authenticate their identity before they can view the supposed content.
The deliberate mimicry of familiar interfaces plays a central role in lowering suspicions, thereby encouraging victims to complete verification steps with little hesitation, according to security analysts.
A study published by Gen Digital's threat intelligence division indicates that the campaign is not relying on malware deployments or credential interceptions to execute.
This malware manipulates WhatsApp's legitimate device-pairing system instead.
As a consequence of the manipulation, WhatsApp allows users to link browsers and desktop applications together for the purpose of synchronizing messaging. Attackers can easily bind an unauthorized browser to an account by convincing the users to voluntarily approve the connection. In other words, they are able to bypass encryption by entering through a door of authentication that they themselves unknowingly open, rather than breaking it.
It has become increasingly apparent that threat actors are moving away from breaking encryption towards undermining the mechanisms governing access to it, as evidenced by GhostPairing. As part of this attack, people are using WhatsApp's unique feature: frictionless onboarding and the ability to link their devices to their account with just a phone number in order to extend your account to as many devices as they like.
The simplicity of WhatsApp, often cited as a cornerstone of the company's global success, means that users don't have to enter usernames or passwords, reinforcing convenience, but inadvertently exposing more vulnerabilities to malicious use. WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption architecture further complicates things, since it provides every user with their own private key.
Private cryptographic keys that are used to securely encrypt the content of the messages are stored only on the user's device, which theoretically should prevent eavesdropping unless an attacker is able to physically acquire the device or deploy malware to compromise it remotely if it can be accessed remotely.
By embedding an attacker's device within an authenticated session, GhostPairing demonstrates that a social engineering attack can circumvent encryption without decrypting the data, but by embedding an attacker's device within a session in which encrypted content is already rendered readable, thus circumventing the encryption.
Researchers have found that the technique is comparatively less scalable on platforms such as Signal, which supports only QR-based approvals for pairing devices, and this limitation has been noted to offer some protection against similar thematically driven device linking techniques.
The analysts emphasize from a defensive standpoint that WhatsApp provides users with an option to see what devices are linked to them through their account settings section titled Linked Devices. In this section, unauthorized connections can, in principle, be identified, as well. The attackers may be able to establish silent persistence through fraudulently linking devices, but they cannot remove or revoke their device access themselves, since the primary registered device remains in charge of revocation.
The addition of two-step PIN verification as a mitigation, which prevents attackers from making changes to an account's primary email address, adds additional hurdles for attackers. However, this control does not hinder access to messages once pairing has been completed. Especially acute consequences exist for organizations.
A common way for employees to communicate is via WhatsApp, which can sometimes lead to informal group discussions involving multiple members - many of which are conducted outside of formal documentation and oversight. It has been recommended by security teams to assume the existence of these shadow communication clusters, rather than treat them as exceptions, but as a default risk category.
A number of industry guidelines (including those that have prevailed for the past five years) emphasize the importance of continued user awareness, and in particular that users should be trained in identifying phishing attempts, unsolicited spam, and the like, even if the attempt seems to come from well-known contacts or plausible verification attempts.
The timing of the attack is difficult to determine when viewed from a broader perspective, but there are no signs that there is any relief. According to a report published by Meta in April of this year, millions of WhatsApp users had their mobile numbers exposed, and Meta confirmed earlier this year that the Windows desktop application had security vulnerabilities.
In parallel investigations, compromised Signal-based messaging tools have also been found to have been compromised by political figures and senior officials, confirming that cross-platform messaging ecosystems, regardless of whether or not they use encryption strength, are now experiencing identity-layer vulnerabilities that must be addressed with the same urgency as network or malware attacks have been traditionally addressed.
The GhostPairing campaign signals a nuanced, yet significant change in techniques for gaining access to accounts, which reflects a longer-term trend in which attackers attempt to gain access to identities through behavioral influence rather than technical subversion.
Threat actors exploit WhatsApp's ability to link devices exactly as it was intended to work, whereas they decrypt the secure communication or override authentication safeguards in a way that seems to be more effective.
They engineer moments of cooperation through the use of persuasive, familiar-looking interfaces.
A sophisticated attack can be carried out by embedding fraudulent prompts within convincingly branded verification flows, which allows attackers to secure enduring access to victim accounts with very little technical skill, relying on legitimacy by design instead of compromising the systems.
There is a warning from security researchers that this approach goes beyond regional boundaries, as scalable phishing kits and interface mimicry enable multiple countries to deploy it across multiple languages.
A similar attack can be attempted on any digital service that allows set-up via QR codes or numeric confirmation steps, irrespective of whether the system is built on a dedicated platform or not. This has an inherent vulnerability to similar attacks, especially when human trust is regarded as the primary open-source software vulnerability.
Analysts have emphasized that the attack's effectiveness stems from the convergence of social engineering precision with permissive multi-device frameworks, so that it allows adversaries to penetrate encrypted environments without any need to break the encryption at all — and to get to a session in which all messages have already been decrypted for the authenticated user.
It is encouraging to note that the defensive measures necessary to combat such threats are still relatively straightforward.
The success rate of such deception-driven compromises could be significantly reduced if regular device hygiene audits, greater user awareness, and modest platform refinements such as clearer pairing alerts and tighter device verification constraints were implemented.
Especially for organizations that are exposed to undocumented employee group chats that operate outside the formal oversight of the organization are of crucial importance for reducing risk. User education and internal reporting mechanisms are crucial components of mitigating risks.
Amidst the rapid increase in digital interactions, defenders are being urged to treat vigilance in the process not as an add-on practice, but rather as a foundational layer of account security for the future.
GhostPairing's recent appearance serves to serve as a reminder that the security of modern communication platforms is no longer solely defined by encryption standards, rather by the resilience of the systems that govern access to them, and that the security of these systems must be maintained at all times.
It is evident that as messaging ecosystems continue to grow and integrate themselves into everyday interactions — such as sharing personal media or coordinating workplace activities — the balance between convenience and control demands renewed scrutiny.
It is strongly advised for users to follow regular digital safety practices, such as verifying unexpected links even if they are sent by familiar contacts, regularly auditing linked devices, and activating two-factor safeguards, such as two-step PIN verification, to ensure that their data is secure.
As organizations become increasingly aware of threats beyond the perimeter of their organizations, they should cultivate a culture of internal threat reporting that ensures that unofficial communication groups are acknowledged in risk models rather than ignored.
Security teams are advised to conduct phishing awareness drills, make device-pairing alerts more clear at the platform level, and conduct periodic access hygiene reviews of widely used communication channels, such as encrypted messengers, for a number of reasons.
With the incidence of identity-layer attacks on the rise, researchers emphasize that informed users remain the best countermeasure against silent account compromise - making awareness the best strategic strategy in the fight against silent account compromises, not only as a reactive habit, but as a long-term advantage.
