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Showing posts with label Microsoft Azure. Show all posts

Aisuru Botnet Launches 15.72 Tbps DDoS Attack on Microsoft Azure Network

 

Microsoft has reported that its Azure platform recently experienced one of the largest distributed denial-of-service attacks recorded to date, attributed to the fast-growing Aisuru botnet. According to the company, the attack reached a staggering peak of 15.72 terabits per second and originated from more than 500,000 distinct IP addresses across multiple regions. The traffic surge consisted primarily of high-volume UDP floods and was directed toward a single public-facing Azure IP address located in Australia. At its height, the attack generated nearly 3.64 billion packets per second. 

Microsoft said the activity was linked to Aisuru, a botnet categorized in the same threat class as the well-known Turbo Mirai malware family. Like Mirai, Aisuru spreads by compromising vulnerable Internet of Things (IoT) hardware, including home routers and cameras, particularly those operating on residential internet service providers in the United States and additional countries. Azure Security senior product marketing manager Sean Whalen noted that the attack displayed limited source spoofing and used randomized ports, which ultimately made network tracing and provider-level mitigation more manageable. 

The same botnet has been connected to other record-setting cyber incidents in recent months. Cloudflare previously associated Aisuru with an attack that measured 22.2 Tbps and generated over 10.6 billion packets per second in September 2025, one of the highest traffic bursts observed in a short-duration DDoS event. Despite lasting only 40 seconds, that incident was comparable in bandwidth consumption to more than one million simultaneous 4K video streams. 

Within the same timeframe, researchers from Qi’anxin’s XLab division attributed another 11.5 Tbps attack to Aisuru and estimated the botnet was using around 300,000 infected devices. XLab’s reporting indicates rapid expansion earlier in 2025 after attackers compromised a TotoLink router firmware distribution server, resulting in the infection of approximately 100,000 additional devices. 

Industry reporting also suggests the botnet has targeted vulnerabilities in consumer equipment produced by major vendors, including D-Link, Linksys, Realtek-based systems, Zyxel hardware, and network equipment distributed through T-Mobile. 

The botnet’s growing presence has begun influencing unrelated systems such as DNS ranking services. Cybersecurity journalist Brian Krebs reported that Cloudflare removed several Aisuru-controlled domains from public ranking dashboards after they began appearing higher than widely used legitimate platforms. Cloudflare leadership confirmed that intentional traffic manipulation distorted ranking visibility, prompting new internal policies to suppress suspected malicious domain patterns. 

Cloudflare disclosed earlier this year that DDoS attacks across its network surged dramatically. The company recorded a 198% quarter-to-quarter rise and a 358% year-over-year increase, with more than 21.3 million attempted attacks against customers during 2024 and an additional 6.6 million incidents directed specifically at its own services during an extended multi-vector campaign.

Researcher Finds Entra ID Weakness That Could Have Granted Global Admin Access




Two critical weaknesses recently came to light in Microsoft’s Entra ID platform could have given attackers unprecedented control over nearly every Azure cloud customer. The flaws were discovered and reported responsibly, allowing Microsoft to release fixes before attackers were able to exploit them.

Entra ID, previously known as Azure Active Directory, is the identity management system that controls how users log in, what resources they can reach, and who has administrator rights. It is a core service for businesses worldwide, which means any failure in its security could ripple across countless organizations at once.

Dutch security researcher Dirk-jan Mollema, who specializes in cloud identity security, identified the flaws while preparing material for a cybersecurity conference. What he found was alarming: the two vulnerabilities, when combined, created a path for attackers to impersonate users and escalate privileges to the highest level, effectively granting full control of customer environments.

The first weakness involved so-called “Actor Tokens,” a type of authentication token issued by an old Microsoft system known as Access Control Service. These tokens carried unusual privileges that, on their own, posed little risk but became dangerous when chained with a second issue. That second vulnerability was buried in Azure Active Directory Graph, a legacy interface used to access Microsoft 365 data. Unlike its modern replacement, Microsoft Graph, the older system did not properly check which tenant— a customer’s isolated cloud environment was sending a request. By combining the two flaws, attackers could trick the system into accepting tokens from outside tenants, opening the door to total compromise.

With administrator-level access, attackers would have been able to add new privileged accounts, alter security settings, and access sensitive information. Experts warned that such attacks could bypass common safeguards like multifactor authentication and leave minimal traces in activity logs, making them particularly dangerous.

Mollema disclosed his findings to Microsoft on July 14. The company began work the same day, deployed a fix globally within days, and later introduced additional protections. A vulnerability identifier (CVE) was issued in September, and Microsoft confirmed that no evidence of exploitation was found during its investigation.

Security researchers have compared the potential fallout to past incidents where authentication weaknesses enabled large-scale breaches. While the flaws in Entra ID never reached that point, the discovery illustrates how overlooked legacy systems can undermine modern security frameworks.

Microsoft has since retired the affected components and emphasized its commitment to phasing out outdated protocols. For organizations using Entra ID, the incident highlights the need to remain alert to vendor advisories, apply updates quickly, and watch for unusual activity in administrative accounts.

The vulnerabilities may now be closed, but they reveal how hidden dependencies in cloud infrastructure can become high-risk targets. As cloud identity systems continue to expand, the security community will likely scrutinize them even more closely for weaknesses of this scale.


Microsoft Warns Storm-0501 Shifts to Cloud-Based Encryption, Data Theft, and Extortion

 

Microsoft has issued a warning about Storm-0501, a threat actor that has significantly evolved its tactics, moving away from traditional ransomware encryption on devices to targeting cloud environments for data theft, extortion, and cloud-based encryption. Instead of relying on conventional ransomware payloads, the group now abuses native cloud features to exfiltrate information, delete backups, and cripple storage systems, applying pressure on victims to pay without deploying malware in the traditional sense. 

Storm-0501 has been active since at least 2021, when it first used the Sabbath ransomware in attacks on organizations across multiple industries. Over time, it adopted ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) tools, deploying encryptors from groups such as Hive, BlackCat (ALPHV), Hunters International, LockBit, and most recently, Embargo ransomware. In September 2024, Microsoft revealed that the group was expanding into hybrid cloud environments, compromising Active Directory and pivoting into Entra ID tenants. During those intrusions, attackers established persistence with malicious federated domains or encrypted on-premises devices with ransomware like Embargo. 

In its latest report, Microsoft highlights that Storm-0501 is now conducting attacks entirely in the cloud. Unlike conventional ransomware campaigns that spread malware across endpoints and then negotiate for decryption, the new approach leverages cloud-native tools to quickly exfiltrate large volumes of data, wipe storage backups, and encrypt files within the cloud itself. This strategy both accelerates the attack and reduces reliance on detectable malware deployment, making it more difficult for defenders to identify the threat in time. 

Recent cases show the group compromising multiple Active Directory domains and Entra tenants by exploiting weaknesses in Microsoft Defender configurations. Using stolen Directory Synchronization Accounts, Storm-0501 enumerated roles, users, and Azure resources with reconnaissance tools such as AzureHound. The attackers then identified a Global Administrator account without multifactor authentication, reset its password, and seized administrative control. With these elevated privileges, they maintained persistence by adding their own federated domains, which allowed them to impersonate users and bypass MFA entirely. 

From there, the attackers escalated further inside Azure by abusing the Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action capability, granting themselves Owner-level roles and taking complete control of the target’s cloud infrastructure. Once entrenched, they began disabling defenses and siphoning sensitive data from Azure Storage accounts. In many cases, they attempted to delete snapshots, restore points, Recovery Services vaults, and even entire storage accounts to prevent recovery. When these deletions failed, they created new Key Vaults and customer-managed keys to encrypt the data, effectively locking companies out unless a ransom was paid. 

The final stage of the attack involved contacting victims directly through Microsoft Teams accounts that had already been compromised, delivering ransom notes and threats. Microsoft warns that this shift illustrates how ransomware operations may increasingly migrate away from on-premises encryption as defenses improve, moving instead toward cloud-native extortion techniques. The report also includes guidance for detection, including Microsoft Defender XDR hunting queries, to help organizations identify the tactics used by Storm-0501.

Businesses Rely on Multicloud Security to Protect Cloud Workloads


On Thursday, cloud networking company Aviatrix unveiled its new Distribution Cloud Firewall security platform, which integrates traffic inspection and policy enforcement across multicloud environment.

According to Rod Stuhlmuller, VP of solutions marketing at Aviatrix, the company utilizes native cloud platform features and its own technology to give businesses a centralized look into the security of their cloud workloads and the flexibility to send out the same guidelines to different clouds.

"The architecture is really what's new, not necessarily the capabilities of each of the features[…]It's very different than having to reroute traffic to some centralized inspection point for whatever security capabilities you're talking about — that just becomes very complex and expensive to do," he said.

According to a survey by Flexera, “Flexera 2023 State of the Cloud Report,” a vast majority of companies (87%) have switched to a multicloud architecture, with the majority (72%) adopting a hybrid strategy that integrates both private cloud infrastructure and public cloud services. According to Flexera, managing multicloud architectures and securing cloud infrastructure are among the top concerns for businesses, with 80% and 78% of them grappling, respectively.

Security may suffer if businesses distribute workloads among numerous cloud service providers (CSPs). According to Patrick Coughlin, vice president of technical go-to-market for Splunk, a data and insights cloud platform, companies may rapidly lose visibility into the security of their cloud infrastructure because CSPs handle security policies, traffic inspection, and workload deployment differently.

The Multicloud Security Mess

Initially, many providers built virtual versions of their firewall appliances and used them as entry points to cloud infrastructure, but John Grady, principal analyst for cybersecurity at Enterprise Strategy Group, says that managing those virtual firewalls has gotten harder, especially when using multiple cloud platforms.

"Virtual firewall instances have been around for a while, but there's been an acknowledgement over the last couple of years that these deployments can be complex and cumbersome and don't take advantage of the key benefits the cloud offers[…] we've seen a general shift toward more cloud-native network security solutions," says Stuhlmuller.

Finding a solution to the expanding complexity is essential as more enterprises use numerous infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) solutions from the leading cloud providers, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform (GCP).

By employing their native security groups, Aviatrix, for instance, enables businesses to develop an abstracted policy that can be applied across all cloud platforms without the administrator having to visit each one. The number of containers and virtual machines that need to be upgraded for businesses with expanding workloads, driven by microservice-based software architecture, can soar, according to Stuhlmuller.

"It's not that we're putting firewalls everywhere, but we're putting the inspection and enforcement capability into the network into the natural path of traffic, with a [single management console] that allows us to do central creation of policy but push that distributed inspection enforcement out everywhere in the network," he says.

Forrester Research lists Palo Alto Networks, Trellix, Trend Micro, Rapid7, and Check Point Software Technologies as additional significant vendors that concentrate on cloud workload security, but with various approaches to the technologies.  

 Crucial US military Emails was Publicly Available

A US Department of Defense exposed a server that was leaking private internal military emails online Security researcher Anurag Sen discovered the unprotected server, which was "hosted on Microsoft's Azure federal cloud for Department of Defense customers," according to a TechCrunch report.

The vulnerable server was housed on Microsoft's Azure federal cloud, which is available to Department of Defense clients. Azure uses servers that are physically isolated from other commercial customers so they can be utilized to share private but sensitive government information. The exposed server was a component of an internal mailbox system that included around three terabytes of internal military emails, a lot of them regarding the USSOCOM, the US military organization responsible for carrying out special military operations.

Nevertheless, due to a misconfiguration, the server was left without a password, making it possible for anyone with access to the internet to access the server's IP address and view the server's important mailbox data.

The server was filled with old internal military emails, a few of which contained private information about soldiers. A completed SF-86 questionnaire, which is filled out by government employees seeking a security clearance and contains extremely sensitive personal and health information for screening people prior to being cleared to handle classified information, was included in one of the disclosed files.

As classified networks are unreachable from the internet, TechCrunch's scant data did not appear to be any of it, which would be consistent with USSOCOM's civilian network. In addition to details regarding the applicant's employment history and prior living arrangements, the 136-page SF-86 form frequently includes details about family members, contacts abroad, and psychiatric data.

A government cloud email server which was accessible through the web without a password was made public and the US government was notified about it. Using just a web browser, anyone could access the private email data there.






A Zero-Trust Future Encourage Next-Generation Firewalls

The future of Zero Trust security relies greatly on next-generation firewalls (NGFWs). NGFWs are classified by Gartner Research as "deep packet inspection firewalls that incorporate software inspection, intrusion prevention, and the injection of intelligence from outside the firewall  in addition to protocol inspection and blocking."  As per Gartner, an NGFW should not be mistaken for a standalone network intrusion prevention system (IPS) that combines a regular firewall and an uncoordinated IPS in the same device.

Significance of Next-Generation Firewalls

1. Substantial expense in ML and AI

As part of zero-trust security management goals, NGFW providers are boosting their assets in ML and AI to distinguish themselves from competitors or provide higher value. Analytical tools, user and device behavior analysis, automated threat detection and response, and development are all focused on identifying possible security issues before they happen. NGFWs can continuously learn and react to the shifting threat landscape by utilizing AI and ML, resulting in a more effective Zero Trust approach to defending against cyberattacks.

2. Contribution of a Zero Trust 

By removing implicit trust and regularly confirming each level of a digital transaction, the zero trust approach to cybersecurity safeguards a business. Strong authentication techniques, network segmentation, limiting lateral movement, offering Layer 7 threat prevention, and easing granular, least access restrictions are all used to defend modern settings and facilitate digital transformation. 

Due to a lack of nuanced security measures, this implicit trust means that once on the network, users, including threat actors and malevolent insiders, are free to travel laterally and access or exfiltrate sensitive data. A Zero Trust strategy is now more important than ever as digitalization accelerates in the shape of a rising hybrid workforce, ongoing cloud migration, and the change of security operations. 

3. Threat monitoring to enforce least privilege access

Device software for NGFWs, such as Patch management tasks can be handled by IT teams less frequently because updates are distributed in milliseconds and are transparent to administrators.

NGFWs that interface with Zero Trust environments has automated firmware patch updates, IPS, application control, automated malware analysis, IPsec tunneling, TLS decryption, IoT security, and network traffic management (SD-WAN) patch updates.  

NGFWs used by Microsoft Azure supply Zero Trust

By enabling businesses to impose stringent access rules and segment their networks into distinct security zones, Microsoft Azure leverages next-generation firewalls (NGFWs) to deliver zero-trust security. This enhances the overall network security posture.

Azure Firewall can be set up to monitor traffic in addition to regulating it, looking for risks and anomalies, and taking appropriate action. In an effort for this, malicious communications can be blocked, infected devices can be quarantined, and security staff can be made aware of potential dangers.


NGFW firms are investing more in AI and ML to further distinguish their solutions. Companies must continue to enhance API connections, particularly with IPS, SIEM systems, and Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions. They must also concentrate on how software-defined networking (SDN) might increase adaptability while supplying finer-grained control over network traffic. A well-implemented Zero Trust architecture not only produces improved overall security levels but also lower security intricacy and operational overhead.

Microsoft Now Permits IT Administrators to Evaluate and Deactivate Inactive Azure AD users

 

Azure Active Directory has received a handful of security updates from Microsoft. In preview, the business has unveiled a new access reviews tool that allows enterprises to delete inactive user accounts which may pose a security concern. Users who created the new Azure AD tenant after October 2019 received security defaults, however, customers who built Azure AD tenants before October 2019 did not receive security defaults. 

According to Microsoft, the Azure AD security defaults are utilized by around 30 million companies today, and the defaults will be rolled out to many more organizations, resulting in the settings protecting 60 million more accounts. IT admins could now terminate Azure AD accounts that haven't signed in for a certain number of days. 

The Azure Active Directory Identity Governance service now includes the new access review feature. It's useful for companies who don't want contractors or former employees to have access to sensitive data. Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) is a Microsoft cloud service that manages identification and authentication for on-premise and cloud applications. In Windows 2000, it was the advancement of Active Directory Domain Services. 

"The term "sign-in activity" refers to both interactive and non-interactive sign-in activities. Stale accounts may be automatically removed during the screening process. As a result, your company's security posture increases," Microsoft explained. 

According to Alex Weinert, Microsoft's director of identity security, the defaults were implemented for new tenants to ensure that they had "minimum security hygiene," including multi-factor authentication (MFA) and contemporary authentication, independent of the license. He points out that the 30 million firms which have security defaults in place are significantly less vulnerable to intrusions.

This month, Microsoft will send an email to all global admins of qualified Azure AD tenants informing them of security settings. These administrators will receive an Outlook notification from Microsoft in late June, instructing them to "activate security defaults" and warning of "security defaults will be enforced automatically for respective businesses in 14 days." All users in a tenant will be required to register for MFA using the Microsoft Authenticator app after it has been activated. A phone number is also required of global administrators.

To Mimic Microsoft, Phishing Employs Azure Static Web Pages

 

Microsoft Azure's Static Web Apps service is being exploited by phishing attacks to acquire Microsoft, Office 365, Outlook, and OneDrive passwords. Azure Static Web Apps is a Microsoft tool that allows to build and deploy full-stack web apps to Azure using code via GitHub or Azure DevOps.

MalwareHunterTeam, a security expert, uncovered the campaign. Attackers might imitate custom branding and website hosting services to install static landing phishing sites, according to the study. Users using Microsoft, Office 365, Outlook, and OneDrive services are being targeted by attackers who are actively mimicking Microsoft services. 

Several of the web pages and login pages in these phishing attempts are nearly identical to official Microsoft pages. Azure Static Web Apps is a program that uses a code repository to build and publish full-stack apps to Azure. 

Azure Static Apps has a process that is customized to a developer's everyday routine. Code changes are used to build and distribute apps. Azure works exclusively with GitHub or Azure DevOps to watch a branch of their choice when users establish an Azure Static Web Apps resource. A build is automatically done, and your app and API are published to Azure every time they post patches or allow codes into the watched branch. 

Targeting Microsoft users with the Azure Static Web App service is a great strategy. Because of the *.1.azurestaticapps.net wildcard TLS certificate, each landing page gets its own secure page padlock in the address bar. After seeing the certificate granted by Microsoft Azure TLS Issuing CA 05 to *.1.azurestaticapps.net, even the most skeptical targets will be fooled, certifying a fraud site as an official Microsoft login screen in the eyes of potential victims.

Due to the artificial veil of security supplied by the legitimate Microsoft TLS certs, such landing sites are also useful when targeting users of other platforms, such as Rackspace, AOL, Yahoo, or other email providers. 

When trying to figure out if one is being targeted by a phishing assault, the typical advice is to double-check the URL whenever we're asked to enter one's account credentials in a login. Unfortunately, phishing efforts that target Azure Static Web Apps render this advice nearly useless, since many users will be fooled by azurestaticapps.net subdomain and genuine TLS certificate.