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Surge in Skitnet Usage Highlights Evolving Ransomware Tactics

 


Today’s cyber threat landscape is rapidly evolving, making it increasingly difficult for adversaries to tell the difference between traditional malware families, as adversaries combine their capabilities to maximise their impact. Skitnet, an advanced multistage post-exploitation toolkit, is one of the best examples of this convergence, as it emerged as an evolution of the legacy Skimer malware, a sophisticated multi-stage post-exploitation toolkit. 

Skitnet, which was once used as a tool for skimming card information from ATMs, has been repurposed as one of the strongest weapons in the arsenal of advanced ransomware groups, notably Black Basta. In the last few months, it has appeared again as part of a larger tactical shift aimed at focusing on stealth, persistent access, data exfiltration, and support for double extortion ransomware campaigns that move away from singular objectives like financial theft. 

Since April 2024, Skitnet, which is also known as Bossnet in some underground circles, has been actively traded on darknet forums like RAMP, with a noticeable uptake noticed among cybercriminals by early 2025. This version has an enterprise-scale modular architecture, unlike its predecessor, which allows it to operate at an enterprise scale. 

There is no need to worry about fileless execution, DNS-based communication for command-and-control (C2), system persistence, or seamless integration with legitimate remote management tools like PowerShell or AnyDesk to use it. Through this flexibility, attackers can continue to remain covert inside targeted environments for extended periods of time without being noticed. 

In addition to being a threat to enterprises, Skitnet has also been deployed through sophisticated phishing campaigns that attempt to duplicate trusted enterprise platforms such as Microsoft Teams, thus allowing threat actors to use social engineering as a primary vector for gaining access to networks and systems. 

Moreover, this evolution demonstrates the growing commoditization of post-exploitation toolkits on underground markets, which offers a leading indicator of how ransomware groups are utilising increasingly advanced malware to refine their tactics and enhance the overall efficiency of their operations. 

According to recent threat intelligence findings, multiple ransomware groups are now actively integrating Skitnet into their post-exploitation toolkits in order to facilitate data theft, maintain persistent remote access to compromised enterprise systems, and reinforce control over compromised enterprise systems as well as facilitate after-exploitation data theft. Skitnet began circulating in underground forums like RAMP as early as April 2024, but its popularity skyrocketed by early 2025, when several prominent ransomware actors began leveraging its use in active campaigns to target consumers.

Several experts believe that Skitnet will end up being a major ransomware threat to the public shortly. The ransomware group Black Basta, for instance, was seen using Skitnet as part of phishing campaigns mimicking Microsoft Teams communications in April of 2025, an increasingly common technique that exploits the trust of employees towards workplace collaboration tools. 

The Skitnet campaign targets enterprise environments, where its stealth capabilities and modular design make it possible for the attacker to deep infiltrate and stay active for a long time. PRODAFT is tracking Skitnet as LARVA-306, the threat actor designated by the organisation. Skitnet, also known in underground circles by Bossnet, is a multi-stage malware platform designed to be versatile and evasive in nature. 

A unique feature of this malware is its use of Rust and Nim, two emerging programming languages in the malware development community, to craft payloads that are highly resistant to detection. By initiating a reverse shell via the DNS, the malware bypasses traditional security monitoring and allows attackers to remain in communication with the command-and-control infrastructure and maintain covert communications. 

Further increasing Skitnet's threat potential are its robust persistence mechanisms, the ability to integrate with legitimate remote access tools, and the ability to exfiltrate data built into its software. The .NET loader binary can also be retrieved and executed by the server, which serves as a mechanism to deliver additional payloads to the machine, thus increasing its operational flexibility. 

As described on dark web forums, Skitnet is a “compact package” comprised of a server component as well as a malware payload that is easy to deploy. As a result of Skitnet's technical sophistication and ease of deployment, it continues to be a popular choice among cybercriminals looking for scalable, stealthy, and effective post-exploitation tools. 

There is a modular architecture built into Skitnet, with a PowerShell-based dropper that decodes and executes the core loader in a centralised manner. Using HTTP POST requests with AES-encrypted payloads, the loader retrieves task-specific plugins from hardcoded command-and-control servers that are hardcoded. One of its components is skitnel.dll, which makes it possible to execute in memory while maintaining the persistence of the system through built-in mechanisms.

Researchers have stated that Skitnet's plugin ecosystem includes modules that are dedicated to the harvesting of credentials, escalation of privileges, and lateral movement of ransomware, which allow threat actors to tailor their attacks to meet the strategic objectives and targets of their attacks. It is clear from the infection chain that Skitnet is a technical advancement in the post-exploitation process, beginning with the execution of a Rust-based loader on compromised hosts. 

With this loader, a Nim binary that is encrypted with ChaCha20 is decrypted and then loaded directly into memory, allowing the binary to be executed stealthily, without the need for traditional detection mechanisms. The Nim-based payload establishes a reverse shell through a DNS-based DNS request, utilising randomised DNS queries to initiate covert communications with the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure as soon as it is activated. 

To carry out its core functions, the malware then launches three different threads to manage its core functions: one thread takes care of periodic heartbeat signals, another thread monitors and extracts shell output, and yet another thread monitors and decrypts responses received over DNS, and the third thread listens for incoming instructions. Based on the attacker's preferences set within the Skitnet C2 control panel, command execution and C2 communication are dynamically managed, using either HTTP or DNS protocols. 

Through the web-based interface, operators can view infected endpoints in real-time, view their IP address, their location, and their system status, as well as remotely execute command-line commands with precision, in real time. As a result of Skitnet's level of control, it has become a very important tool in modern ransomware campaigns as a highly adaptable and covert post-exploitation tool. 

As opposed to custom-built malware created just for specific campaigns, Skitnet is openly traded on underground forums, offering a powerful post-exploitation solution to cyber criminals of all sorts. The stealth characteristics of this product, as well as minimal detection rates and ease of deployment, make it an attractive choice for threat actors looking to maximise performance and maintain operational covertness. With this ready accessibility, the technical barrier to executing sophisticated attacks is dramatically reduced. 

Real-World Deployments by Ransomware Groups


There is no doubt in my mind that Skitnet is not just a theoretical concept. Security researchers have determined that it has been used in actual operations conducted by ransomware groups such as Black Basta and Cactus, as well as in other real-life situations. 

As part of their phishing campaigns, actors have impersonated Microsoft Teams to gain access to enterprise environments. In these attacks, Skitnet has successfully been deployed, highlighting its growing importance among ransomware threats. 

Defensive Measures Against Skitnet 


Skitnet poses a significant risk to organisations. Organisations need to adopt a proactive and layered security approach to mitigate these risks. Key recommendations are as follows: 

DNS Traffic Monitoring: Identify and block unusual or covert DNS queries that might be indicative of an activity like command and control. 

Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Use advanced EDR tools to detect and investigate suspicious behaviour associated with Rust and Nim-based payloads. Often, old antivirus solutions are unable to detect these threats. 

PowerShell Execution Restrictions: PowerShell should be limited to only be used in situations that prevent unauthorised script execution and minimise the risk of a fileless malware attack. 

Regular Security Audits Continually assess and manage vulnerabilities to prevent malware like Skitnet from entering the network and exploiting them, as well as administer patches as needed. 

The Growing Threat of Commodity Malware 


In the context of ransomware operations, Skitnet represents the evolution of commodity malware into a strategic weapon. As its presence in cybercrime continues to grow, organisations are required to stay informed, agile, and ready to fight back. To defend against this rapidly evolving threat, it is crucial to develop resilience through threat intelligence, technical controls, and user awareness. 

Often times, elite ransomware groups invest in creating custom post-exploitation toolsets, but they take a considerable amount of time, energy, and resources to develop them—factors that can restrict operational agility. Skitnet, on the other hand, is a cost-effective, prepackaged alternative that is not only easy to deploy but also difficult to attribute, as it is actively distributed among a wide range of threat actors. 

A broad distribution of incidents further blurs attribution lines, making it more difficult to identify threat actors and respond to incidents. The cybersecurity firm Prodaft has published on GitHub associated Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) related to incident response. As a result of Skitnet's plug-and-play architecture and high-impact capabilities, it is particularly appealing to groups that wish to achieve strategic goals with minimal operational overhead in terms of performance and operational efficiency. 

According to Prodaft in its analysis, Skitnet is particularly attractive for groups that are trying to maximise impact with the lowest overhead. However, in spite of the development of antivirus evasion techniques for custom-made malware, the affordability, modularity, and stealth features of Skitnet continue to drive its adoption in the marketplace. 

Despite the fact that it is a high-functioning off-the-shelf tool, its popularity in the ransomware ecosystem illustrates a growing trend that often outweighs bespoke development when attempting to achieve disruptive outcomes. As ransomware tactics continue to evolve at an explosive rate, the advent and widespread adoption of versatile toolkits like Skitnet are a stark reminder of how threat actors have been continually refining their methods in order to outpace traditional security measures. 

A holistic and proactive cybersecurity posture is vital for organisations to adopt to protect themselves from cyber threats and evade detection, one that extends far beyond basic perimeter defences and incorporates advanced threat detection, continuous monitoring, and rapid incident response capabilities. To detect subtle indicators of compromise that commodity malware like Skitnet exploits to maintain persistence and evade detection, organisations should prioritise integrating behavioural analytics and threat intelligence. 

It is also vital to foster an awareness of cybersecurity risks among employees, particularly when it comes to the risks associated with phishing and social engineering, to close the gap in human intelligence that is often the first attack vector employed by cybercriminals. Organisations must be able to protect themselves from sophisticated post-exploitation tools through multilayered defence strategies combining technology, processes, and people, enabling them to not only detect and mitigate the current threats but also adapt to emerging cyber risks in an ever-changing digital environment with rapidity.

DragonForce Asserts Dominance Over RansomHub Ransomware Network

 


A series of targeted attacks involving DragonForce, a ransomware group that has reportedly been operating in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) are reported to have been launched against companies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) amidst the escalating cyber threats throughout the region. A significant incident involving a real estate and construction company based in Riyadh, which underscored the group's commitment to targeting high-value targets within critical sectors, was one of the most significant incidents involving the group. 

In the recent past, there has been an increase in the sophistication of cyberattacks targeting major companies and vital infrastructure around the region, resulting in this recent development. In addition to demonstrating the increasing capabilities of threat actors such as DragonForce, this breach also emphasizes the need to maintain enhanced vigilance and preparedness among cybersecurity professionals and law enforcement agencies within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its surrounding countries. 

Experts are anticipating that as the group's tactics continue to be effective, they will expand beyond MENA in terms of geographic scale. This incident has wider implications than just the immediate victims. As a cautionary marker of the rapidly evolving threat landscape, this incident serves as a warning of the threats that may threaten global digital security systems in the future. 

Cyble, a cybersecurity firm, has confirmed that a threat actor known as DragonForce recently posted a message on the RAMP cybercrime forum announcing a new “project.” This announcement was later mirrored on DragonForce's onion-based data leak site (DLS), marking the beginning of a new operational infrastructure for DragonForce. A part of this initiative was the introduction of two new onion domains that DragonForce launched, both protected by CAPTCHA verification, which aligned with the group's traditional Tor-based deployment practices. 

Interestingly, both of these sites are prominently branded and emblazoned with RansomHub, a group that specializes in ransomware. While it is still unclear whether DragonForce has seized control of RansomHub in the past or has just infiltrated its systems, Cyble has observed that RansomHub's onion site has been unavailable since March 31. As a result of this prolonged downtime, there has been considerable speculation within the cyber security community as to whether DragonForce may be planning to acquire or hostilely take over the RansomHub infrastructure. 

In addition to this development, DragonForce recently formally announced its plans to expand its ransomware-as-a-service operations, which are aligned with DragonForce's broader strategy of expanding the company's ransomware-as-a-service operations. As part of this initiative, the group introduced an affiliate-based model in which third-party actors—or “franchisees”—can operate under DragonForce brand names. 

As part of the new model, affiliates will reportedly be provided with comprehensive backend support, which includes anti-DDoS defences, advanced encryption protocols, and specialized toolkits that allow them to manage infections across a range of environments, including ESXi, NAS, BSD, and Windows. A significant investment is being made into infrastructure to attract and empower partners, thereby enhancing the group's reach and impact as a whole. This is a deliberate attempt by the group to streamline operations and present a more organized and business-like ransomware platform to victims by including features like encryption status monitoring and persistent communication mechanisms. 

Despite the uncertainty that surrounds RansomHub's future, it is currently possible that it will become fully absorbed under the DragonForce brand or continue to operate independently, but current indicators suggest that a possible consolidation within the ransomware ecosystem may result in increased sophistication and coordination among cybercriminals. 

Despite the increased competition in the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) market, DragonForce is positioning itself as a prominent player by offering its affiliates one of the most attractive commission structures on the dark web. This aggressive profit-sharing model aims to attract skilled cybercriminals in an attempt to build an affiliate network that is loyal, results-driven and enables partners to keep up to 80% of ransom payments successfully extorted from victims. A key component of DragonForce's communication strategy is TOX, a Tor-based instant messaging platform that serves as the main channel for communicating with both victims and affiliates as well as serving as a secure, secure means of communicating. 

In addition to providing the public key to the group, RAMP, an underground forum used by ransomware operators and access brokers, is also available to anyone interested in further securing these exchanges. This persistent presence on the platform, especially a forum visit traced back to February 24, 2025, indicates a sustained effort by them to maintain visibility and engagement within the key cybercriminal community. In addition to serving as a recruitment hub, the DragonForce affiliate network is also highlighted in advertisements displayed on RAMP as one of the most reliable networks within the dark web. With support for multiple platforms, including Windows, Linux, and ESXi, the ransomware framework is marketed as a robust system that can deliver consistent payouts while offering extensive back-end support. 

As of January 20th, 2025, the most recent affiliate-related announcements have been posted, but the associated PGP encryption key has been generated since September 2024, further demonstrating the organization's systematic approach to security. A prior operational leak involved sensitive affiliate-facing URLs that were used for extortion from victims. DragonForce underwent significant internal reforms after this. Among these reforms was the implementation of a new vetting process that requires prospective affiliates to provide verifiable evidence of victim access, such as data volume metrics and file trees, to justify their eligibility. 

Essentially, this shift was meant to ensure that only committed and capable individuals could be onboarded, which would lead to improved operational security and integrity for the organization. Furthermore, DragonForce offers a variety of premium services to vetted affiliates, including call services, which allow direct pressure to be applied to victims, as well as advanced decryption capabilities that can be used on NTLM and Kerberos hashes. A lot of these services are especially useful when access brokers are trying to navigate post-compromise stages in environments like Active Directory that are complex. 

It is important to remember that DragonForce ransomware is an independent entity and should not be confused with the Malaysian hacktivist group that operates under the same name. This group has been known for defacing websites and launching DDoS attacks, among other things. While the two organizations share a name, they are completely different in their motivations, structures, and methods, and they are not known to be affiliated with each other. 

As ongoing speculation continues regarding the nature of a potential alliance between RansomHub and DragonForce continues to surface, Cyble reports that this latest development closely follows DragonForce's announcement of a significant expansion of its ransomware service (RaaS) operations on March 18. The DragonForce Ransomware Cartel, as part of this strategic shift, introduced the franchise-style affiliate program, whereby partners can operate and launch their own ransomware campaigns under the umbrella of DragonForce Ransomware Cartel. 

Affiliates can take advantage of this model because it allows them to maintain a high degree of operational independence while still being overseen by a central management team. Backend support is provided in a comprehensive way to all participants, including dedicated admin and client panels as well as secure data hosting environments and a resilient, always-on infrastructure that is secured with anti-DDoS mechanisms that keep the system running smoothly. This structure is designed to maintain the group's overarching operational standards as well as balance affiliate autonomy with consistency and control. 

It is worth noting that DragonForce has also introduced a series of advanced technical upgrades to its ransomware payloads targeted at ESXi, NAS, BSD, and Windows platforms along with its structural expansion. In addition, several sophisticated features have been added to the security system, including real-time encryption tracking, detached execution processes, persistent user interface messages to reinforce ransom demands, and better recovery protocols to reduce disruption. In addition, the group developed the two-pass header protection technology to enhance the cryptographic robustness of the encryption engine by using external entropy sources. This technique is also integrated with the BearSSL AES-CTR encryption protocol to enhance its cryptography. 

In addition to the technological and infrastructure advances made by DragonForce, Cyble points out that DragonForce's commitment to scale its operations at a very high level of professionalism will be reflected in these advancements. By creating a more refined and affiliate-focused ransomware ecosystem, the company hopes to attract experienced cybercriminals to collaborate with them. During the past year, DragonForce has continued to grow as a more structured and formidable player within the ransomware-as-a-service ecosystem. 

However, its recent activities indicate a broader shift in cybercriminal activity, characterized by a shift towards increasing sophistication, strategic alliances, and operational maturity in the cybercriminal underground. The apparent takeover or alignment of RansomHub with the company and the dramatic advancements in infrastructure and technology, along with the emergence of a series of threats, highlight the urgent need for the cybersecurity stakeholders to reevaluate threat models and strengthen their defensive positions. 

The most effective way for organizations, particularly those in critical sectors and high-risk regions, is to implement proactive threat intelligence strategies, enforce stringent access controls, and seriously prioritize incident response preparedness in order to counter evolving threats. With a digital landscape in which adversaries adopt business-like approaches to cause greater impact, only a cohesive and anticipatory security approach can prove robust in the face of the rising tide of cyber-extortion, which is becoming more organized and sophisticated by the day.