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Third Party Risk
Cyber Risk Management Data Breach Healthcare cybersecurity Healthcare IT Systems Healthcare Ransomware Medical Data Security patient data protection ransomware attacks Third Party Risk

Cybercriminals Report Monetizing Stolen Data From US Medical Company


Modern healthcare operations are frequently plagued by ransomware attacks, but the recent attack on Change Healthcare marks a major turning point in terms of scale and consequence. In the context of an industry that is increasingly relying on digital platforms, there is a growing threat environment characterized by organized cybercrime, fragile third-party dependency, and an increasing data footprint as a result of an increasingly hostile threat environment. 

With hundreds of ransomware incidents and broader security incidents already occurring in a matter of months, recent figures from 2025 illustrate just how serious this shift is. It is important to note that a breach will not only disrupt clinical and administrative workflows, but also put highly sensitive patient information at risk, which can result in cascading operational, financial, and legal consequences for organizations. 

The developments highlighted here highlight a stark reality: safeguarding healthcare data does not just require technical safeguards; it now requires a coordinated risk management strategy that anticipates breaches, limits their impacts, and ensures institutional resilience should prevention fail. 

Connecticut's Community Health Center (CHC) recently disclosed a significant data breach that occurred when an unauthorized access to its internal systems was allowed to result in a significant data breach, which exemplifies the sector's ongoing vulnerability to cyber risk. 

In January 2025, the organization was alerted to irregular network activity, resulting in an urgent forensic investigation that confirmed there was a criminal on site. Upon further analysis, it was found that the attacker had maintained undetected access to the system from mid-October 2024, thereby allowing a longer window for data exfiltration before the breach was contained and publicly disclosed later that month. 

There was no ransomware or disruption of operations during the incident, but the extent of the data accessed was significant, including names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, health insurance details, and clinical records of patients and employees, which included sensitive patient and employee information.

More than one million people, including several thousand employees, were affected according to CHC, demonstrating the difficulties that persist in early detection of threats and data protection across healthcare networks, and highlighting the urgent need for strengthened security measures as medical records continue to attract cybercriminals. 

According to Cytek Biosciences' notification to affected individuals, it was learned in early November 2025 that an outside party had gained access to portions of the Biotechnology company's systems and that the company later determined that personal information had been obtained by an outside party. 

As soon as the company became aware of the extent of the exposure, it took immediate steps to respond, including offering free identity theft protection and credit monitoring services for up to two years to eligible individuals, which the company said it had been working on. 

As part of efforts to mitigate potential harm resulting from the incident, enrollment in the program continues to be open up until the end of April 2026. Threat intelligence sources have identified the breach as being connected to Rhysida, which is known for being a ransomware group that first emerged in 2023 and has since established itself as a prolific operation within the cybercrime ecosystem.

A ransomware-as-a-service model is employed by the group which combines data theft with system encryption, as well as allowing affiliates to conduct attacks using its malware and infrastructure in return for a share of the revenue. 

The Rhysida malware has been responsible for a number of attacks across several sectors since its inception, and healthcare is one of the most frequent targets. A number of the group's intrusions have previously been credited to hospitals and care providers, but the Cytek incident is the group's first confirmed attack on a healthcare manufacturer, aligning with a trend which is increasingly involving ransomware activity that extends beyond direct patient care companies to include medical suppliers and technology companies. 

Research indicates that these types of attacks are capable of exposing millions of records, disrupting critical services, and amplifying risks to patient privacy as well as operational continuity, which highlights that the threat landscape facing the U.S. healthcare system is becoming increasingly complex. 

As a result of the disruption that occurred in the U.S. healthcare system, organizations and individuals affected by the incident have stepped back and examined how Change Healthcare fits into the system and why its outage was so widespread. 

With over 15 years of experience in healthcare technology and payment processing under the UnitedHealth Group umbrella, Change Healthcare has played a critical role as a vital intermediary between healthcare providers, insurers, and pharmacists by verifying eligibility, getting prior authorizations, submitting claims, and facilitating payment processes. 

A failure of this organization in its role at the heart of these transactions can lead to cascading delays in prescription, reimbursement, and claim processing across the country when its operational failure extends far beyond the institution at fault. 

According to findings from a survey conducted by the American Medical Association, which documented widespread financial and administrative stress among physician practices, this impact was of a significant magnitude. There have been numerous reports of suspended or delayed claims payments, the inability to submit claims, or the inability to receive electronic remittance advice, and widespread service interruptions as a consequence. 

Several practices cited significant revenue losses, forcing some to rely on personal funds or find an alternative clearinghouse in order to continue to operate. There have been some relief measures relating to emergency funding and advance payments, but disruptions continue to persist, prompting UnitedHealth Group to disburse more than $2 billion towards these efforts. 

Moreover, patients have suffered indirect effects not only through billing delays, unexpected charges, and notifications about potential data exposures but also outside the provider community. This has contributed to increased public concern and renewed scrutiny of the systemic risks posed by the compromise of an organization's central healthcare infrastructure provider. 

The fact that the incidents have been combined in this fashion highlights a clear and cautionary message for healthcare stakeholders: it is imperative to treat cyber resilience as a strategic priority, rather than a purely technical function. 

Considering that large-scale ransomware campaigns have been running for some time now, undetected intrusions for a prolonged period of time, as well as failures at critical intermediaries, it is evident that even a single breach can escalate into a systemic disruption that affects providers, manufacturers, and patients. 

A growing number of industry leaders and regulators are called upon to improve the oversight of third parties, enhance the tools available for breach detection, and integrate financial, legal, and operational preparedness into their cybersecurity strategies. 

It is imperative that healthcare organizations adopt proactive, enterprise-wide approaches to risk management as the volume and value of healthcare data continues to grow. Organizations that fail to adopt this approach may not only find themselves unable to cope with cyber incidents, but also struggle to maintain trust, continuity, and care delivery in the aftermath of them.
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Third Party Risk
Cybercrime Groups Data Breach Employee Data Exposure enterprise cybersecurity Incident response Ransomware As A Service Ransomware attack supply chain security Third Party Risk

Ingram Micro Reveals Impact of Ransomware Attack on Employee Records


 

Ingram Micro quietly divulged all the personal details of their employees and job applicants last summer after a ransomware attack at the height of the summer turned into a far-reaching data exposure, exposing sensitive information about their employees and job applicants and illustrating the growing threat of cybercrime. 

A significant breach at one of the world's most influential technology supply-chain providers has been revealed in the July 2025 attack, in which the company confirms that records linked to more than 42,000 people were compromised, marking the most significant breach of the company's history. It is evident that in the wake of the disruptions caused by older, high-profile cybercriminals, emerging ransomware groups are swiftly targeting even the most established businesses. 

These groups are capitalizing on disrupting these older, high-profile cyber criminal operations by swiftly attacking even the most established businesses. It is a stark reminder to manufacturers, distributors, and mid-market companies that depend on Ingram Micro for global logistics, cloud platforms, and managed services to stay protected from cybersecurity risks, and the breach serves as a warning that cybersecurity risk does not end within an organization's boundaries, as third-party cyber-incidents are becoming increasingly serious and problematic. 

The largest distributor of business-to-business technology, Ingram Micro, operates on a global scale. The company employs more than 23,500 associates, serves more than 161,000 customers, and reported net sales of $48 billion in 2024, which was much greater than the previous year's gross sales of $6 billion. 

As stated in the notification letters to the Maine Attorney General and distributed to affected individuals, the attackers obtained documents containing extensive information, including Social Security numbers, that they had stolen. 

There was a security incident involving the company on July 3rd, 2025, and, in its disclosure, the company indicated that an internal investigation was immediately launched, which determined that an unauthorized third party had access to and removed files from internal repositories between July 2 and July 3rd, 2025. 

In addition to the information contained in the compromised records, there were also information regarding current and former employees and potential job applicants, including names, contact details, birthdates, and government-issued identification numbers such as Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, and passport numbers, as well as employment records in certain cases. 

A major attack on Ingram Micro's infrastructure may also have caused widespread disruptions to internal operations, as well as taking the company's website offline for a period of time, forcing the company to instruct its employees to work remotely as remediation efforts were underway. 

In spite of the fact that the company does not claim the breach was the result of a particular threat actor, it confirms that ransomware was deployed during the incident, in line with earlier reports linking the incident with the SafePay ransomware group, which later claimed responsibility and claimed to have stolen about 3.5 terabytes of data, and then published the name of the company on its dark web leaks.

In addition to drawing renewed attention to the systemic threat posed by attacks on central technology distributors, the incident also shed light on the risk that a single compromise can have a ripple effect across the entire digital supply chain as well. 

Analysts who examined the Ingram Micro intrusion claim that the ransomware was designed to be sophisticated, modular, and was modeled after modern malware campaigns that are operated by operators. The malicious code unfolded in carefully sequenced stages, with the lightweight loader establishing persistence and neutralizing baseline security controls before the primary payload was delivered.

The attackers subsequently developed components that enabled them to move laterally through internal networks by exploiting cached authentication data and directory services in order to gain access to additional privileges and harvest credentials. The attackers also employed components designed to escalate privileges and harvest credentials. 

The spread across accessible systems was then automated using a dedicated propagation engine, while at the same time manual intervention was still allowed to prioritize high-value targets using a dedicated propagation engine. As part of the attack, the encryption engine used a combination of industry-grade symmetric cryptography and asymmetric key protection to secure critical data, effectively locking that data beyond recovery without the cooperation of the attackers. 

As an extension of the encryption process, a parallel exfiltration process used encrypted web traffic to evade detection to quietly transfer sensitive files to external command-and-control infrastructure. Ultimately, ransom notes were released in order to exert pressure through both operational disruptions as well as the threat of public data exposure, which culminated in the deployment of ransom notes. 

The combination of these elements illustrates exactly how contemporary ransomware has evolved into a hybrid threat model-a model that combines automation, stealth, and human oversight-and why breaches at key nodes within the technology ecosystem can have a far-reaching impact well beyond the implications of one organization. 

When Ingram Micro discovered that its data had been compromised, the company took a variety of standard incident response measures to address it, including launching a forensic investigation with the help of an external cybersecurity firm, notifying law enforcement and relevant regulators, and notifying those individuals whose personal information may have been compromised. 

Additionally, the company offered two years of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection to all customers for two years. It has been unclear who the attackers are, but the SafePay ransomware group later claimed responsibility, alleging in its dark web leak site that the group had stolen 3.5 terabytes of sensitive data. Those claims, however, are not independently verified, nor is there any information as to what ransom demands have been made.

The attack has the hallmarks of a modern ransomware-as-a-service attack, with a custom malware being deployed through a well-established framework that streamlines intrusion, privilege escalation, lateral movement, data exfiltration, and data encryption while streamlining intrusion, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and data encryption techniques.

As such, these campaigns usually take advantage of compromised credentials, phishing schemes, and unpatched vulnerabilities to gain access to the victim. They then combine double-extortion tactics—locking down systems while siphoning sensitive data—with the goal of putting maximum pressure on them. 

During the event, Ingram Micro's own networks were disrupted, which caused delays across global supply chains that depended on Ingram Micro's platforms, causing disruptions as well as disruptions to transactions. There is an opportunity for customers, partners, and the wider IT industry to gain a better understanding of the risks associated with concentration of risk in critical vendors as well as the potentially catastrophic consequences of a relatively small breach at a central node.

A number of immediate actions were taken by Ingram Micro in the aftermath of the attack, including implementing the necessary measures to contain the threat, taking all affected systems offline to prevent further spread of the attack, and engaging external cybersecurity specialists as well as law enforcement to support the investigation and remediation process. 

As quickly as possible, the company restored access to critical platforms, gradually restoring core services, and maintained ongoing forensic analysis throughout the day to assess the full extent of the intrusion, as well as to assure its customers and partners that the company was stable. It is not only the operational response that has been triggered by the incident, but the industry has largely reflected on the lessons learned from a similar attack. 

It is apparent that security experts are advocating resilience-driven strategies such as zero trust access models, network microsegmentation, immutable backup architectures, and continuous threat monitoring in order to limit breaches' blast radius. 

It is also evident from the episode that the technology industry is becoming increasingly dependent on third-party providers, which is why it has reinforced the importance of regular incident response simulations and robust vendor risk management strategies. This ransomware attack from Ingram Micro illustrates the importance of modern cyber operations beyond encrypting data. 

It also illustrates how modern cyber operations are also designed to disrupt interconnected ecosystems, in addition to exerting pressure through theft of data and a systemic impact. As a result of this incident, it was once again reinforced that enterprise security requires preparation, layers of defenses, and supply chain awareness. 

A response of Ingram Micro was to isolate the affected servers and segments of the network in order to contain the intrusion. During this time, the Security Operations Center activated a team within its organization to coordinate remediation and forensic analysis as part of its response. This action corresponds with established incident handling standards, which include the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and ISO 27035 guidelines. 

Currently, investigators are conducting forensic examinations of the ransomware strain, tracking the initial access vectors, and determining whether data has been exfiltrating in order to determine if it was malicious or not. Federal agencies including the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency have been informed about the investigation. 

In the recovery process, critical systems are restored from verified backups, compromised infrastructure is rebuilt, and before the environment can be returned to production, it is verified that a restored environment does not contain any malicious artifacts.

It is no surprise to security specialists that incidents of this scale are increasingly causing large companies to reevaluate their core controls, such as identity and access management, which includes stronger authentication, tighter access governance, and continuous monitoring.

It is believed that these actions will decrease the risk of unauthorized access and limit the impact of future breaches to a great extent. This Ingram Micro incident is an excellent example of how ransomware has evolved into a technical and systemic threat as well, one that increasingly targets the connective tissue of the global technology economy, rather than isolated enterprises, to increasingly target. 

A breach like the one in question has demonstrated the way that attacks on highly integrated distributors can cascade across industries, exposing information, disrupting operations, and amplifying risks that extend far beyond the initial point of compromise. It is likely that the episode will serve as a benchmark for regulators, enterprises, and security leaders to evaluate resilience within complex supply chains as investigations continue and recovery efforts mature. 

During a period of time when the industry relies heavily on scale, speed, and trust, the attack serves as a strong warning that cybersecurity readiness cannot be judged solely by its internal defenses, but also by its ability to anticipate, absorb, and recover from shocks originating anywhere within the interconnected digital ecosystem as well as to measure its readiness for cybersecurity.
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Third Party Risk
API security Automotive Cybersecurity Consumer Data Exposure Credit Monitoring Data Breach identity theft protection phishing threats Supply Chain Attack Third Party Risk

Credit Monitoring Provider Discloses Breach Impacting 5.6 Million Users


A data breach usually does not lend itself to straightforward comparisons, as each occurrence is characterized by distinctive circumstances and carries different consequences for those involved. It is common for headlines to emphasize the scale of an attack, the prominence of the organization that was affected, or the attack method used by the attacker, but in reality, the real significance of a breach lies in the sensitivity of the compromised data, along with the actions that are taken to correct it. 

It was apparent from a disclosure issued by 700Credit, a U.S.-based company that provides consumer information, preliminary credit checks, identity verifications, fraud detections, and compliance solutions for auto, recreational, powersport, and marine dealerships. As a result of a third-party supply-chain attack that occurred late in October 2025, the company confirmed that personally identifiable information had been accessed by unauthorized people through the use of a third-party supply chain. 

It has been revealed that the exposed data includes names, residential addresses, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers, all collected between May and October of the year. Based on the information provided by the agency, approximately 5.6 million people are expected to have been affected by the incident, making it one of the most substantial credit-related data breaches of the year, emphasizing the risks associated with retaining data for a long period of time and relying on external service providers. 

A 700Credit representative confirmed that the compromised information was the result of a breach of a database provided by auto dealerships between May and October 2025 as a result of regular credit verification and identity verification processes. 

Despite acknowledging that the precise technical details of how the intrusion was conducted have not yet been fully determined, the company has attributed the incident to an unidentified threat actor. Although there is no official word on who is affected, it has been revealed that those individuals whose personal data was processed by 700Credit for dealership clients have been brought into focus as data-handling risks arise across the entire automotive retail ecosystem. 

There are broader concerns raised about supply-chain exposures and the downstream impact of such events on consumer confidence, particularly when it comes to sensitive financial and identity-related information that has been disclosed. 

A Michigan Attorney General said that recipients of breach notification letters should not dismiss the letters in response to the disclosure, stressing that taking swift protective measures, such as freezing the credit history and enrolling in credit monitoring services, was critical to reducing the risk of identity theft and fraud that can result from the exposure to the breach. 

However, despite moving quickly to disable the exposed application programming interface (API), 700Credit acknowledged that, in spite of taking steps to prevent threats from accessing consumer records, threat actors were able to extract a significant percentage of them. The company estimates that approximately 20 percent of the affected datasets were accessed, which comprised extremely sensitive data such as names, addresses, birthdates, and Social Security numbers. 

In spite of the fact that 700Credit confirmed that its internal systems, payment platforms, and login credentials were unhacked, cybersecurity experts noted that the stolen data, in both quantity and nature, could still be utilized by phishing and social engineering companies to conduct highly convincing scams. 

Because of this, consumers and dealership clients have been advised to be vigilant when receiving unsolicited communications, especially those that appear to be from 700Credit or its partners, as well as any messages purported to have originated with the company. In addition to the details reported by CBTNews, it is clear that the breach is the result of a compromised integrated partner not alerting 700Credit in a timely manner after they became aware of the breach. 

Researchers have determined that attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the API validation process, which allowed malicious requests to be masked as legitimate partner traffic by exploiting vulnerabilities in the API validation process. An independent forensic analysis confirmed that the intrusion did not extend into 700Credit's internal network or core operational infrastructure, but rather was confined to the application layer through third-party API integration. 

Furthermore, experts concluded that attackers had been able to carry out the majority of the damage without compromising internal systems, underscoring the persistency of security gaps in API-driven architectures, particularly in modern times. 

According to 700Credit, in response, its API inspection controls have been strengthened, the validation framework is now more secure, the insurance coverage for cybersecurity has been expanded, and external cybersecurity firms have been engaged to assess residual risks and mitigate them, all while maintaining uninterrupted service to dealership clients throughout the investigation. 

Additionally to the technical remediation, 700Credit began a coordinated regulatory notification and response involving multiple authorities as well. For compliance with federal Safeguards Rule requirements, the company reported the incident to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Trade Commission and also notified the FTC a consolidated breach notification on behalf of the affected dealer clients. 

Upon receiving written notifications of a breach of the Federal Safeguards Rule beginning December 22, 2025, impacted individuals were offered a 12-month free credit monitoring program from TransUnion and identity restoration services as part of the offer. Moreover, as part of the ongoing efforts to resolve consumer and dealer concerns, the company has also been in touch with the National Automobile Dealers Association and has notified state attorneys general throughout the country. 

A dedicated hotline was also established to address the concerns of consumers and dealers. In addition, the Michigan Attorney General issued a public consumer alert after an estimated 160,000 Michigan residents were identified as being affected by the fraud. They advised recipients to not ignore notification letters and to take immediate precautionary measures, such as putting a credit freeze on their credit report, signing up to a monitoring service, updating their passwords and enabling multifactor authentication, as soon as possible. 

Earlier this month, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel sent a consumer advisory explaining why people should not shrug off correspondence from 700Credit, emphasizing that taking prompt action can significantly reduce the risk of downstream fraud occurring as a result of this situation. 

According to her, victims should consider placing a credit freeze on their credit cards or registering for credit monitoring services, as these can serve as effective first-line defenses against identity theft, so that they may be able to protect themselves effectively. 

Moreover, Nessel emphasized the importance of being alert to potential phishing attempts, strengthening or changing passwords, removing unnecessary data stored on devices and enabling multi-factor authentication across all online services and devices. To be able to identify any suspicious activity as soon as possible, she also advised regularly reviewing credit reports from TransUnion as well as Equifax and Experian. 

As security expert Hill pointed out, the investigation revealed that the automotive retail sector was not adequately prepared in terms of cybersecurity, as highlighted by several industry perspectives. It has been discovered that several large dealerships have well-established security frameworks in place, including continuous monitoring and internal "red team" exercises which test defenses. However, smaller and mid-sized businesses lack the resources necessary to implement the same level of security measures. 

The author warned that these gaps can result in systemic risks within shared data networks, and advised dealerships to increase security awareness, better understand emerging threats, and evaluate the cybersecurity posture of third party partners that may have access to consumer information in a more detailed manner. 

As a whole, the 700Credit breach indicates how cyber risk is distributed across multiple interconnected industries, where vulnerabilities in one partner can ripple outward so that millions of individuals and hundreds of businesses are affected. 

As investigations and notifications continue, it will probably prompt an increased focus on third-party risk management, particularly in sectors which are heavily dependent on the sharing of data and the integration of real-time data. It is important for consumers to maintain vigilance, even after taking initial measures to prevent identity-based fraud, as identity-based fraud often emerges well after the original attack has been made. 

For dealerships and service providers, the breach serves as an alarming example of the need for cybersecurity governance to extend beyond internal systems to include vendors, integrations, and data lifecycle controls, in addition to internal systems. 

In addition to proactive investments in security assessments, employee training, and transparency, analysts note that proactive investments can help minimize both technical exposure and reputational damage in the automotive industry.

It is ultimately up to whether the lessons learned from the incident translate into stronger safeguards and more resilient data practices in the credit monitoring industry as well as automotive retail to determine the long-term impact of the incident.
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