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Showing posts with label OpenVSX. Show all posts

GlassWorm Malware Exploits Invisible Unicode to Infect VS Code Extensions

 

A major and ongoing supply-chain attack is currently targeting developers through the OpenVSX and Microsoft Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension marketplaces via a self-spreading malware dubbed "GlassWorm" that has triggered an estimated 35,800 installations to date. 

The campaign leverages novel techniques, such as embedding malicious code within invisible Unicode characters, enabling it to bypass detection and make the threats literally invisible in code editors. GlassWorm not only infects extensions, but also uses compromised accounts to further propagate itself, posing an accelerating risk through the dependency and update mechanisms of these platforms.

The malware focuses on stealing credentials for GitHub, npm, and OpenVSX accounts, as well as harvesting cryptocurrency wallet information from 49 different extensions. It then escalates the compromise by deploying a SOCKS proxy on infected machines, facilitating covert malicious traffic, and by installing HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) clients for undetectable remote access. 

GlassWorm leverages a hardcoded Solana blockchain wallet that participates in transactions used to distribute base64-encoded links pointing to its next-stage payload, referred to by researchers as the obfuscated "ZOMBI" module. Once installed, ZOMBI transforms the workstation into a node of a decentralized criminal infrastructure, enabling persistent and stealthy cybercriminal operations.

Unique for its resilience, GlassWorm's operators use the Solana blockchain as the primary command-and-control channel, making takedown efforts extremely challenging due to the blockchain’s decentralized, persistent, and anonymous nature. Secondary methods for controlling infected hosts include embedding payload links in Google Calendar event titles and directly contacting specific IP addresses (e.g., 217.69.3[.]218). To ensure redundancy and robust communication, the malware also incorporates BitTorrent’s Distributed Hash Table (DHT).

Researchers at Koi Security have identified at least eleven infected extensions on OpenVSX, with some still available for download as of reporting, and one on Microsoft’s VS Code Marketplace. Notably, the auto-update feature in VS Code means users can become infected without any interaction—the malicious version of extensions is silently pushed to all endpoints. Microsoft quickly removed the compromised extension following the alert, while some extension publishers have issued security updates.

These attacks follow a wider trend, echoing last month’s Shai-Hulud worm attack that affected 187 npm packages. Koi Security warns that the sophistication, propagation methods, and resilience of GlassWorm represent a significant escalation in the threat landscape, underscoring the urgent need for enhanced supply-chain security and vigilant monitoring.

WhiteCobra Floods VSCode Market with 24 Crypto-Stealing Extensions

 

A threat actor named WhiteCobra has infiltrated the Visual Studio Code marketplace and Open VSX registry with 24 malicious extensions targeting developers using VSCode, Cursor, and Windsurf editors . 

Campaign overview

The ongoing campaign represents a sophisticated operation that researchers at Koi Security have been tracking for over a year. WhiteCobra is the same group responsible for a $500,000 cryptocurrency theft in July 2025, demonstrating their evolution from basic PowerShell miners to advanced crypto-stealing malware . 

The campaign gained significant attention when Ethereum developer Zak Cole, a security professional with a decade of experience, had his wallet drained after installing what appeared to be a legitimate extension called "contractshark.solidity-lang" for the Cursor editor . The extension featured professional design elements, detailed descriptions, and showed 54,000 downloads on OpenVSX, highlighting the sophisticated deception techniques employed . 

Attack methodology 

WhiteCobra deployed extensions across both platforms, including names like ChainDevTools.solidity-pro, kilocode-ai.kilo-code, juan-blanco.solidity, and VitalikButerin-EthFoundation.blan-co on various marketplaces . These extensions specifically target cryptocurrency-related development tools, particularly Solidity smart contract development extensions . 

The malicious extensions execute through a multi-stage payload delivery system. The main extension file appears identical to standard VSCode boilerplate code but contains a hidden call to a secondary script that downloads platform-specific payloads from Cloudflare Pages . On Windows systems, the payload executes PowerShell scripts that deploy Python code containing shellcode to run LummaStealer malware. 

This sophisticated info-stealer targets cryptocurrency wallets, browser credentials, web extensions, and messaging application data . On macOS systems, the payload deploys a malicious Mach-O binary that loads an unknown malware family, demonstrating cross-platform capabilities . 

Operational sophistication 

WhiteCobra operates with remarkable organization and persistence. The group maintains detailed playbooks with revenue targets ranging from $10,000 to $500,000, provides command-and-control infrastructure setup guides, and employs sophisticated social engineering and marketing strategies to make their extensions appear legitimate . 

The threat actors manipulate download counts, ratings, and reviews to establish credibility, making detection extremely difficult for users . When extensions are removed, WhiteCobra can deploy replacement campaigns in under three hours, demonstrating their resilience and operational efficiency . 

Ongoing threat

Despite security researchers reporting and removing malicious extensions, WhiteCobra continues uploading new malicious code weekly, making this an active and persistent threat to the developer community . The campaign's success against experienced security professionals underscores the sophisticated nature of these attacks and the urgent need for improved verification mechanisms in extension marketplaces .