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NIST Seeking Feedback for a New Cybersecurity Framework and Supply Chain Guidance

 

Addressing the SolarWinds disaster and other major third-party assaults targeting vital infrastructure, the National Institute of Standards and Technology is due to publish advice for securing organizations against supply chain breaches. [Special Publication 800-161] is the most important cybersecurity supply chain risk management guidance.' Angela Smith of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) stated. 

Angela Smith of the NIST talked at an Atlantic Council session on Tuesday about initiatives to protect information and communications technology supply chains. The first big revised version will be released by the end of next week, so stay tuned if you haven't already reviewed some of the public drafts. 

The NIST upgrade comes as the Biden administration tries to use the government's procurement power to prod contractors such as IT management firm SolarWinds and other software vendors to improve the security of their environments. 

Vendors of the underlying information and communications technology are pitching in and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency consider expanding private-sector partnerships and taking a more comprehensive approach to tackling dangers to critical infrastructure. 

Future guidelines on trying to manage cybersecurity risks that emerge through the supply chain, according to Smith, would focus more on actions for providers along the chain to address, in addition to the upcoming change. The current literature on the subject has been centered on the organizations' responsibilities for integrating supply-chain aspects into existing surroundings. 

The previous draft version, R2, which was released in October 2021, had a new appendix, Appendix F, which gave implementation assistance for Executive Order 14028 to government agencies. Following NIST's February 4, 2022, Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Recommendations, the SP 800-161 release scheduled for next week is likely to deliver more EO 14028 guidance.

The CSF was last updated by NIST in 2018. "There is no single reason causing this transition, This is a scheduled upgrade to keep the CSF current and consistent with other regularly used tools," said Kevin Stine, Chief Cybersecurity Advisor at the NIST. NIST is seeking public input on three primary topics to help guide the revision: revisions to the CSF itself, relationships and alignment between the CSF and other resources, and approaches to improve supply chain cybersecurity. President Barack Obama directed NIST to develop the CSF and directed federal agencies to use it, as well as advising the private sector to do so.

NIST should give a definition for an agency to "use" the framework, and agencies should furnish NIST with cybersecurity risk documents developed and used to comply with this requirement. For enterprises that are utilizing or considering adopting the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, seeing how it is used by US government entities would be extremely beneficial.

Latest Phishing Campaign Deploys Malware and Steals Critical Information

A phishing campaign on a massive scale is targeting Windows PC and wants to deploy malware that can hack usernames, passwords, contents of the crypto wallets, and credit card credentials. Malware named RedLine Stealer is provided as a malware-as-a-service scheme, giving amateur level cybercriminals the option to steal various kinds of critical personal information, for amounts as much as $150. The malware first surfaced in 2020, but RedLine recently added a few additional features and is widely spread in large-scale spam campaigns in April. 

The phishing email campaign includes a malicious attachment which, if active, starts the process of deploying malware. Hackers target users (mostly) from Europe and North America. The malware uses CVE-2021-26411 exploits discovered in Internet Explorer to send the payload. The vulnerability was revealed last year and patched, to limit the malware's impact on users who are yet to install the security updates. Once executed, RedLine Stealer does starting recon against the target system, looking for information that includes usernames, the type of browser that the user has, and if an antivirus is running in the system. 

After that, it finds information to steal and then extracts passwords, credit card data, and cookies stored in browsers, crypto wallets, VPN login credentials, chat logs, and information from files. Redline can be bought from the dark web, hackers are offered services on different hierarchical levels, this shows how easy it has become to buy malware. Even noob hackers can rent the software for $100 or get a lifetime subscription for $800. 

The malware is very simple, but very effective, as it can steal vast amounts of data, and inexperienced hackers can take advantage of this. ZDNet reports "it's possible to protect against Redline by applying security patches, particularly for Internet Explorer, as that will prevent the exploit kit from taking advantage of the CVE-2021-26411 vulnerability." The users should keep their operating systems updated, anti-virus and apps updated, to prevent known vulnerabilities from getting exploited for distributing malware.

Attackers Use Stolen OAuth Access Tokens to Breach Dozens of GitHub Repos

 

GitHub has shared a timeline of last month's security breach that saw an attacker using stolen OAuth app tokens to steal private repositories from dozens of organizations. 

OAuth tokens were issued to two third-party integrators, Heroku and Travis-CI but were stolen by an unknown hacker. According to GitHub's Chief Security Officer Mike Hanley, the company is yet to unearth evidence that its systems have been breached since the incident was first identified on April 12th, 2022. 

OAuth tokens are one of the go-to elements that IT vendors use to automate cloud services like code repositories and DevOps pipelines. While these tokens are useful for enabling key IT services, they are also susceptible to theft. 

“If a token is compromised, in this case, a GitHub token, a malicious actor can steal corporate IP or modify the source to initiate a supply chain attack that could spread malware or steal PII from unsuspecting customers," Ray Kelly, a researcher at NIT Application Security, explained. 

GitHub said it is in the process of sending the final notification to its customer. The firm’s examination of the hacker’s methodology includes the authentication of the GitHub API using the stolen OAuth tokens issued to accounts Heroku and Travis CI. It added that most of those affected authorized Heroku or Travis CI OAuth apps in their GitHub accounts. Attacks were selective and attackers listed the private repositories of interest. Next, attackers proceeded to clone private repositories.

“This pattern of behavior suggests the attacker was only listing organizations to identify accounts to selectively target for listing and downloading private repositories. GitHub believes these attacks were highly targeted based on the available information and our analysis of the attacker behavior using the compromised OAuth tokens issued to Travis CI and Heroku,” GitHub stated. 

GitHub also issued recommendations that can assist users in investigating logs for data exfiltration or malicious activity. This includes scanning all private repositories for secrets and credentials stored in them, checking OAuth applications authorized for a personal account, and adhering to GitHub policies to improve the security of their GitHub organizations. Others include checking their account activity, personal access tokens, OAuth apps, and SSH keys for activity or changes that may have come from the malicious actor.

Lapsus$ Targeting SharePoint, VPNs and Virtual Machines

NCC Group on Thursday released a report in which it has described the techniques and tactics of the highly unpredictable Lapsus$ attacks, along with how Lapsus$ attacks are launched and what makes it such a unique group. 

The group currently gave up its operation following the arrests of alleged members in March. The attacks launched by the group remain confusing in both their motives and their methods. The group is known for targeting world-famous companies including Microsoft, Nvidia, Okta, and Samsung. 

According to the report, Lapsus$ used stolen authentication cookies, specifically ones used for SSO applications, to initially get access into targeted systems. With this, the threat actors also scraped Microsoft SharePoint sites used by target organizations to get credentials within technical documentation. 

"Credential harvesting and privileged escalation are key components of the LAPSUS$ breaches we have seen, with the rapid escalation in privileges the LAPSUS$ group has been seen to elevate from a standard user account to an administrative user within a couple of days," the report said. 

Following the report, it has been learned that a major goal of the group is to exploit corporate VPNs, capitalizing on their increased use of them over the last few years. 

"Access to corporate VPNs is a primary focus for this group as it allows the threat actor to directly access key infrastructure which they require to complete their objectives. In our incident response cases, we saw the threat actor leveraging compromised employee email accounts to email helpdesk systems requesting access credentials or support to get access to the corporate VPN," the report further read. 

The Group has grown in just a few months from launching a handful of sensitive attacks that were designed to steal and publish the source code of multiple top-tier technology companies. Sometimes the group is referred to as a ransomware group in reports, however, Lapsus$ is also known for not deploying ransomware in extortion attempts.

345,000 People are Affected by a Data Breach at ARcare

 

ARcare announced a data breach after an unauthorized party acquired access to sensitive information stored on the company's computer servers. The names, dates of birth, financial account information, and Social Security numbers of some people were exposed as a result of the incident.

ARcare sent out data breach notices to those whose information was compromised on April 25, 2022. The Arcare breach, according to the US Department of Health and Human Services, affected 345353 people. 

ARcare, a community health clinic in Augusta, Arkansas, offers services such as chronic disease management, behavioral health, and HIV treatment. The healthcare provider discovered the personal information about individuals had been exposed on April 4 and began notifying potentially affected individuals and regulators on April 25. 345,353 people may have been infected, according to the US Department of Health and Human Services (HSS). 

ARcare learnt about a data security incident affecting its software system on February 24, 2022, according to an official document filed by the business. As a result, the corporation took steps to secure its computer systems and initiated an inquiry to discover more about the incident's origin and scale. 

The data breach alert states, "ARcare is examining and updating existing policies and procedures relevant to data protection and security.ARcare is also looking into additional security measures to minimize any risk related to this incident and to better prevent future instances."

ARcare confirmed on March 14, 2022, how an unauthorized entity had gained access to and perhaps removed sensitive data from the ARcare network. Between January 18, 2022, and February 24, 2022, an unauthorized entity got access to the system.

11 High-Severity Flaws in Security Products Patched by Cisco

 

This week, Cisco released its April 2022 bundle of security advisories for Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA), Firepower Threat Defense (FTD), and Firepower Management Center (FMC). 

The semiannual bundled advisories include a total of 19 flaws in Cisco security products, with 11 of them being classified as "high severity." 

CVE-2022-20746 (CVSS score of 8.8) is the most serious of these, an FTD security vulnerability that occurs because TCP flows aren't appropriately handled and might be exploited remotely without authentication to generate a denial of service (DoS) condition. 

“An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted stream of TCP traffic through an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the device to reload, resulting in a DoS condition,” Cisco explains in an advisory. 

With the introduction of FDT versions 6.6.5.2 and 7.1.0.1, the IT giant has addressed the problem. Fixes will also be included in FDT releases 6.4.0.15 and 7.0.2, which will be released next month. Several more DoS vulnerabilities, all rated "high severity," were fixed with the same FDT releases, including ones that affect ASA as well. They were addressed in ASA releases 9.12.4.38, 9.14.4, 9.15.1.21, 9.16.2.14, and 9.17.1.7. Other problems fixed by these software upgrades could result in privilege escalation or data manipulation when using an IPsec IKEv2 VPN channel.

Cisco also fixed an ASA-specific flaw that allowed an attacker to access sensitive information from process memory. Firepower Management Center (FMC) releases 6.6.5.2 and 7.1.0.1, as well as the future releases 6.4.0.15 and 7.0.2, resolve a remotely exploitable security protection bypass flaw, as per the tech giant. 

Cisco stated, “An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by uploading a maliciously crafted file to a device running affected software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to store malicious files on the device, which they could access later to conduct additional attacks, including executing arbitrary code on the affected device with root privileges."

Fixes for eight medium-severity vulnerabilities in these security products are included in the company's semiannual bundled publishing of security advisories. Cisco is not aware of any attacks that take advantage of these flaws.

3 Hacking Teams Working Under the Umbrella of TA410 Group

 

Recently, a campaign has been discovered wherein threat actors are noted to be victimizing a variety of critical infrastructure sectors in different regions such as Africa, the Middle East, and the United States. The group that has been identified as TA410, has been using an improved version of a remote access trojan designed with information-stealing capabilities. 

TA410 is an umbrella group comprising of three teams named FlowingFrog, LookingFrog, and JollyFrog. 

In regard to the incident, the Slovak cybersecurity firm ESET has reported that "these subgroups operate somewhat independently, but that they may share intelligence requirements, and access team that runs their spear-phishing campaigns, and also the team that deploys network infrastructure." 

Following the incident, it has been observed that the TA410 shares behavioral and tooling overlaps with APT10 (aka Stone Panda or TA429) which has a history of targeting U.S.-based organizations in the utility sector as well as diplomatic entities in the Middle East and Africa region. 

Moreover, the group has also targeted many firms in different regions all across the world including a manufacturing company in Japan, mining business in India, a charity foundation in Israel, and unnamed victims in the education and military verticals. 

Im 2019, TA410 was recorded by Proofpoint for the first  time when the members of the group executed phishing campaigns containing macro-laden documents to compromise utility providers across the U.S. with a modular malware called LookBack. 

The group made a comeback with a new backdoor codenamed FlowCloud, also delivered to U.S. utility providers that Proofpoint described as malware that gives attackers full remote control over targeted systems. 

"Its remote access trojan (RAT) functionality includes the ability to access installed applications, the keyboard, mouse, screen, files, services, and processes with the ability to exfiltrate information via command-and-control," the company reported in June 2020. 

Cybersecurity firm Dragos, which is investigating the activities of the group under the moniker TALONITE, said that the adversary has a penchant for blending techniques and tactics in order to ensure a successful intrusion. 

"TALONITE focuses on subverting and taking advantage of trust with phishing lures focusing on engineering-specific themes and concepts, malware that abuses otherwise legitimate binaries or modifies such binaries to include additional functionality, and a combination of owned and compromised network infrastructure," Dragos said in April 2021.

Cybercriminal Steals $13 Million In DEUS Finance Exploit

 

The decentralized derivatives protocol based on Fantom, DEUS Finance suffered a flash loan attack on Thursday, with the attacker making off with about $13.4 million. 

According to on-chain data, the anonymous hacker carried out the assault using a flash loan at around 2:40 AM UTC. Flash loan assaults involve attackers borrowing funds with a requirement that the borrowed sum be returned in the same transaction. These are made possible with smart contracts. While flash loans are meant for arbitrage trading and enhancing capital efficiency, attackers have abused them to manipulate DeFi price data feeds — known as oracles — and carry out attacks. 

The Deus hacker took a flash loan to manipulate the price oracle within one of its liquidity pools on Fantom, involving a token called DEI paired against the USDC stablecoin, security analysts at PeckShield explained in a post. The flash-loan assisted manipulation surged DEI's price and the inflated value was then used as collateral to borrow additional capital, within the same flash loan transaction.

This additional borrowed capital was sold for USDC stablecoin, after which the hacker repaid the flash loan — netting about $13.4 million. The perpetrator then transferred the exploited funds from Fantom to Ethereum, where they routed them via Tornado Cash, a mixing protocol used to obfuscate Ethereum transactions. This wasn't the first security incident for Deus Finance. 

Last month, the protocol lost $3 million to a flash loan exploit. The community was disappointed that the protocol had been hacked again in the same way. While the community waits for an official reaction, calls have been made to Circle to freeze the $USDC implicated in the incident. Flash loan attacks have become one of the most popular ways hackers target DeFi platforms. 

Earlier this month, hackers stole $11.2 million worth of Binance Coin from the DeFi platform Elephant Money. Cream Finance was hit with three different flash loan attacks in 2021, costing the DeFi platform $130 million in October, $37 million in February, and another $29 million in August. 

Last year, hackers stole at least $2.2 billion from DeFi protocols, Blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis said. Earlier this year in March, the Ronin Network announced that hackers stole more than $500 million worth of cryptocurrency, making it one of the largest attacks ever.

Synology Alerts Users of Severe Netatalk Bugs in Multiple Devices

Synology warned its customers that few of its network-attached storage (NAS) appliances are vulnerable to cyberattacks compromising various critical Netatalk vulnerabilities. Various vulnerabilities allow remote hackers to access critical information and may execute arbitrary code through a vulnerable variant of Synology Router Manager and DiskStation Manager (DSM). 

Netatalk is an Apple Filing Protocol (AFP) open-source platform that lets devices running on *NIX/*BSD work as AppleShare file servers (AFP) for Mac OS users for viewing files stored on Synology NAS devices. 

The development team of Netatalk fixed the patches in version 3.1.1, issued in March, following the Pwn2Own hacking competition in 2021. The vulnerabilities were first found and exploited in the competition. The EDG team of the NCC group exploited the vulnerability rated 9.8/10 severity score and tracked as CVE-2022-23121 to deploy remote code execution without verification on a Western Digital PR4100 NAS that runs on My Cloud OS firmware during the Pwn2Own competition. Synology mentioned three vulnerabilities in the latest warning- CVE-2022-23125, CVE-2022-23122, CVE-2022-0194, all three having high severity ratings. 

They are also letting malicious hackers deploy arbitrary codes on unfixed devices. The Netatalk development team released the security patches to resolve the issues in April, even then according to Synology, the releases for some affected devices are still in process. The NAS maker hasn't given any fixed timeline for future updates, according to Synology, it usually releases security patches for any impacted software within 90 days of publishing advisories. "

QNAP said the Netatalk vulnerabilities impact multiple QTS and QuTS hero operating system versions and QuTScloud, the company's cloud-optimized NAS operating system. Like Synology, QNAP has already released patches for one of the affected OS versions, with fixes already available for appliances running QTS 4.5.4.2012 build 20220419 and later," reports Bleeping Computers.

According to Europol, Deepfakes are Used Frequently in Organized Crime

 

The Europol Innovation Lab recently released its inaugural report, titled "Facing reality? Law enforcement and the challenge of deepfakes", as part of its Observatory function. The paper presents a full overview of the illegal use of deepfake technology, as well as the obstacles faced by law enforcement in identifying and preventing the malicious use of deepfakes, based on significant desk research and in-depth interaction with law enforcement specialists. 

Deepfakes are audio and audio-visual consents that "convincingly show individuals expressing or doing activities they never did, or build personalities which never existed in the first place" using artificial intelligence. Deepfakes are being utilized for malevolent purposes in three important areas, according to the study: disinformation, non-consensual obscenity, and document fraud. As technology further advances in the near future, it is predicted such attacks would become more realistic and dangerous.

  1. Disinformation: Europol provided several examples of how deepfakes could be used to distribute false information, with potentially disastrous results. In the geopolitical domain, for example, producing a phony emergency warning that warns of an oncoming attack. The US charged the Kremlin with a disinformation scheme to use as a pretext for an invasion of Ukraine in February, just before the crisis between Russia and Ukraine erupted.  The technique may also be used to attack corporations, for example, by constructing a video or audio deepfake which makes it appear as if a company's leader committed contentious or unlawful conduct. Criminals imitating the voice of the top executive of an energy firm robbed the company of $243,000. 
  2. Non-consensual obscenity: According to the analysis, Sensity found non-consensual obscenity was present in 96 percent of phony videos. This usually entails superimposing a victim's face onto the body of a philanderer, giving the impression of the victim is performing the act.
  3. Document fraud: While current fraud protection techniques are making it more difficult to fake passports, the survey stated that "synthetic media and digitally modified facial photos present a new way for document fraud." These technologies, for example, can mix or morph the faces of the person who owns the passport and the person who wants to obtain one illegally, boosting the likelihood the photo will pass screening, including automatic ones. 

Deepfakes might also harm the court system, according to the paper, by artificially manipulating or producing media to show or deny someone's guilt. In a recent child custody dispute, a mother of a kid edited an audiotape of her husband to persuade the court he was abusive to her. 

Europol stated all law enforcement organizations must acquire new skills and tools to properly deal with these types of threats. Manual detection strategies, such as looking for discrepancies, and automatic detection techniques, such as deepfake detection software uses artificial intelligence and is being developed by companies like Facebook and McAfee, are among them. 

It is quite conceivable that malicious threat actors would employ deepfake technology to assist various criminal crimes and undertake misinformation campaigns to influence or corrupt public opinion in the months and years ahead. Machine learning and artificial intelligence advancements will continue to improve the software used to make deepfakes.

Identifying Ransomware’s Stealthy Boot Configuration Edits

 

The research by Binary Defense entails the various threat hunting techniques and detections for a regularly reported Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) methodology. Using the built-in Windows programme bcdedit.exe (Boot Configuration Data Edit),  threat actors have been spotted changing boot loader configurations to: 
  • Modify Boot Status Policies 
  • Disable Recovery Mode 
  • Enable Safe Mode 
Threat actors (such as Snatch and REvil) may not need to utilise bcdedit to adjust boot loader configurations if they implement code that directly modifies the Windows registry keys that define such configurations, according to the hypothesis employed by Binary Defense to construct the hunting queries. Last year, the researcher am0nsec published a proof-of-concept code that showed how to do exactly this on Windows 10 PCs. Binary Defense wanted to make sure that they could detect such behaviour not only on Windows 7, 8.1, and 11 computers but also on systems where the necessary registry key is stored under a different Globally Unique Identifier (GUID). 

The research builds on the work of Specter Ops researcher Michael Barclay, who published an in-depth blog about hunting for such activities on Windows 10 earlier this year. Below are the bcdedit.exe commands that attackers employ to change boot configuration. Other tools, such as the Windows System Configuration Utility (msconfig.exe), can be used to change the boot configuration data as well. Alternatives, on the other hand, are not described in the study because they are not command-line apps and hence cannot be utilised without a user interface.

Boot Status Policy: The usual way to edit the boot status policy is to use bcdedit with these command line arguments:
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
If there is a failed shutdown, boot, or other error during the startup process, this will change the "boot status policy" settings and compel the system to boot normally rather than entering Windows Recovery Environment (Windows RE). Threat actors deactivate this to prevent system administrators from using the Windows RE's System Image Recovery tool.

Recovery Mode: The usual method for disabling recovery mode with bcdedit is like this:
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no
This command completely eliminates the Windows RE. Using the prior command to change the boot status policy will prevent the boot loader from loading the recovery environment when there are starting difficulties, but it will also prohibit system administrators from manually loading it.

Safeboot: To change the Safeboot options, bcdedit is used with these command line arguments:
bcdedit.exe /set {default} safeboot minimal

This command modifies the configuration that decides whether or not the system will restart in Safe Mode the next time it is powered on. Since not all Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions and Anti-Virus (AV) software will be running in Safe Mode, this is being changed to prevent identification rather than recovery. Windows Defender, for example, does not work in Safe Mode. As a result, any activities taken by a threat actor (for example, file encryption) will not be tracked, and thus will not be prevented.

Prior study into similar approaches revealed that the registry keys storing these boot loader configuration items were Windows version-specific, with only Windows 10 detections. Binary Defense simply set up VMs running Windows 7, 8.1, and 11 and ran the three aforementioned bcdedit.exe commands while doing a capture with the Windows SysInternals tool Procmon to figure out what those registry keys were for other Windows versions. The logs created by this tool are notoriously noisy, but by adding two filters, one excluding any process not named bcdedit.exe and the other excluding any operation not named RegSetValue, it was simple to filter down to the necessary logs.

In a 60-day period, the following queries were evaluated across different enterprise environments with zero false positives. Because changes to these parameters are uncommon, all of these inquiries can be surfaced to a SOC as detections.

Detections
  • Carbon Black
Windows 7:

regmod_name:(*BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\250000e0* OR *BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\16000009* OR *BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\25000080*)

Windows 8.1:

regmod_name:(*BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\250000e0* OR *BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\16000009* OR *BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\25000080*)

Windows 10:

regmod_name:(*BCD00000000\\Objects\\\{9f83643f\-4a91\–11e9\–9501\-b252ac81e352\}\\Elements\\250000E0* OR *BCD00000000\\Objects\\\{9f83643f\-4a91\–11e9\–9501\-b252ac81e352\}\\Elements\\250000E0* OR *BCD00000000\\Objects\\\{9f83643f\-4a91\–11e9\–9501\-b252ac81e352\}\\Elements\\16000009*)

Windows 11:

regmod_name:(*BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\250000e0* OR *BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\16000009* OR *BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\25000080*)

  • CrowdStrike
Windows 7:

(event_simpleName=AsepValueUpdate OR event_simpleName=SuspiciousRegAsepUpdate OR event_simpleName=RegistryOperationDetectInfo) AND (RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\250000e0*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\16000009*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\25000080*”)

Windows 8.1:

event_simpleName=AsepValueUpdate OR event_simpleName=SuspiciousRegAsepUpdate OR event_simpleName=RegistryOperationDetectInfo) AND (RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\250000e0*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\16000009*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\25000080*”)

Windows 10:

event_simpleName=AsepValueUpdate OR event_simpleName=SuspiciousRegAsepUpdate OR event_simpleName=RegistryOperationDetectInfo) AND (RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\\Objects\\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\\Elements\\25000080*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\\Objects\\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\\Elements\\250000E0*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\\Objects\\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\\Elements\\16000009*”)

Windows 11:

event_simpleName=AsepValueUpdate OR event_simpleName=SuspiciousRegAsepUpdate OR event_simpleName=RegistryOperationDetectInfo) AND (RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\250000e0*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\16000009*” OR RegObjectName=”*BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\25000080*”)

  • Microsoft Sentinel and Defender for Endpoint
Windows 7:

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
where ActionType == “RegistryValueSet”
| where RegistryKey has_any (@”BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\250000e0″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\16000009″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\25000080″)

Windows 8.1:

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ActionType == “RegistryValueSet”
| where RegistryKey has_any (@”BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\250000e0″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\16000009″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\25000080″)

Windows 10:

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ActionType == “RegistryValueSet”
| where RegistryKey has_any (@”BCD00000000\Objects\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\Elements\25000080″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\Elements\250000E0″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\Elements\16000009″)

Windows 11:

DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ActionType == “RegistryValueSet”
| where RegistryKey has_any (@”BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\250000e0″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\16000009″, @”BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\25000080″)

  • SentinelOne
Windows 7:

EventType = “Registry Value Modified” and RegistryKeyPath In Contains Anycase (“BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\250000e0”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\16000009”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{8c07be1f-21bb-11e8-9c5d-d181d62e5fbf}\Elements\25000080”)

Windows 8.1: {303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}

EventType = “Registry Value Modified” and RegistryKeyPath In Contains Anycase (“BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\250000e0”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\16000009”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{303a1187-f04f-11e7-ae97-d7affdbdc5e9}\Elements\25000080”)

Windows 10:

EventType = “Registry Value Modified” and RegistryKeyPath In Contains Anycase (“BCD00000000\Objects\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\Elements\25000080”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\Elements\250000E0”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{9f83643f-4a91–11e9–9501-b252ac81e352}\Elements\16000009”)

Windows 11: {ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}

EventType = “Registry Value Modified” and RegistryKeyPath In Contains Anycase (“BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\250000e0”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\16000009”, “BCD00000000\Objects\{ea075dc0-83af-11ec-9994-82f1525d1096}\Elements\25000080”)