The technology industry's next computing platform may not fit in your hand. Instead, it could rest on your ears, sit on your face or hang around your neck.
Apple is reportedly exploring AirPods equipped with cameras that would give Siri the ability to interpret a user's surroundings, according to a Bloomberg report. The cameras are not expected to function like traditional smartphone cameras for photography or video recording. Instead, they would provide visual context that allows Apple's AI assistant to respond more intelligently to spoken requests. Apple has not commented on the report.
The development reveals a comprehensive industry effort to move everyday computing beyond smartphone screens. For decades, displays have served as the primary interface between people and their devices. Advances in artificial intelligence, computer vision and voice assistants are now encouraging technology companies to develop wearable devices that can understand a user's environment and respond without requiring constant screen interaction.
Snap recently expanded that vision with its latest augmented reality smart glasses, Specs, priced at £1,995 in the UK and $2,195 in the US. Unlike many existing smart glasses, the device is designed to operate independently rather than relying on a connected smartphone. Digital content appears only when needed, overlaying information onto the wearer's view of the real world instead of replacing it. Snap Chief Executive Evan Spiegel said the goal is to let users remain engaged with their surroundings while accessing digital experiences.
Meta is also increasing its investment in wearable AI. The company has reportedly sold around seven million pairs of its Ray-Ban Meta smart glasses and recently introduced more affordable models. Reports also indicate Meta is evaluating audio-only smart glasses that could reduce some of the privacy concerns associated with built-in cameras.
Those concerns remain one of the biggest obstacles to wider adoption. Camera-equipped wearables have faced criticism after users were found recording people without their knowledge, despite recording indicator lights intended to alert those nearby. Privacy advocates continue to question whether visible indicators alone provide sufficient transparency in public spaces.
Apple could attempt to distinguish itself by relying heavily on on-device processing, allowing visual information to be analyzed locally rather than stored or transmitted to cloud servers. Such capabilities could enable users to identify objects, receive navigation guidance, ask questions about nearby landmarks or generate recipe suggestions based on ingredients already in their kitchen through simple voice interactions.
Analysts believe AI-powered wearables could gradually shift some everyday computing tasks away from smartphones. Even so, most expect the smartphone to remain central to digital life for the foreseeable future, with wearable devices evolving as complementary tools rather than direct replacements. Whether they ultimately reduce screen time or simply expand the ways people interact with technology remains an open question.
The impacted tools are Windsurf, Google Antigravity, Cursor, Amazon Q Developer, Claude Code by Anthropic, and Augment. Wiz has termed the technique GhostApproval and posted it recently.
Three of the six AI assistants have addressed, two did not, while Anthropic argues if it is a bug. The most vulnerable are the tools that modify file before you can notice.
The threat actors exploit an old Unix feature called symlink (or symbolic link), that AI assistants cannot check.
A symlink silently directs to other files somewhere else on disk, hence writing to it particularly writes to the victim.
“Symbolic links have been a security headache since the early days of Unix. From /tmp race conditions to privilege escalation exploits, symlinks have a long history of bypassing security boundaries by making one path silently resolve to another. It's a well-documented attack primitive - CWE-61 dates back decades,” Wiz said.
Wiz made a malicious repository with a symbolic link called project_settings.json that really directs to target’s SSH login file, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. The repo’s README commands the assistant to put “a line” to project_settings.json, and this line is the hacker’s SSH key mimicking an innocent setting. “
If you ask the agent to “set up the workspace” or “follow the README,” it writes the key directly via the symlink into the login file. Following this, if the machine plays an SSH service the threat actor can access, they can sign in without password.
Another variant of the attack writes to your shell startup file, ~/.zshrc, which the shell runs the next moment you open a terminal without needing an SSH. There are no indications that any of this has been abused in real-time operations, Wiz has only demonstrated it as their research.
“Symlinks have been exploited for decades – in race conditions (CVE-2018-15664), in package managers (CVE-2021-32803), in container escapes (CVE-2024-21626). Any time a tool writes to a user-controlled path without resolving it first, symlinks become a weapon,” Wiz wrote in its blog.
Mount Royal University (MRU) has confirmed that threat actors stole data and deleted files after breaching the university's network in a cyberattack that continues to affect recovery efforts weeks after the incident.
In an update published on its website, the Calgary-based public university said the attack occurred on June 17 and that internal technical teams are working alongside external cybersecurity specialists to investigate the intrusion, determine its full scope, and restore affected systems.
The cyberattack disrupted a wide range of university services, including internet connectivity, online platforms, and several internal systems used across campus. Recovery efforts remain ongoing, with the university warning that restoring all affected services may take several weeks or, in some cases, months.
According to the university's investigation, attackers gained unauthorized access to data stored on the institution's "H drive," a file storage system used by students and employees. Investigators have confirmed that files stored within certain folders were accessed and exfiltrated before the attackers deleted the original copies, a move that has further complicated recovery operations.
"We regret to inform our community that our investigation has now shown that data within certain folders on the University's 'H drive' was accessed and taken by an unauthorized actor," the university said in its advisory.
MRU said the affected folders contained information relating to current and former students, current and former employees, as well as other individuals whose data was stored within the impacted environment. The university has not yet disclosed the exact categories of information exposed or the total number of people affected.
The investigation also found that attackers deleted data stored on a separate departmental file storage system known as the "J drive." While the university said there is currently no evidence that information from the J drive was accessed or copied before it was erased, officials cautioned that recovering the deleted data remains an ongoing process and acknowledged that a complete restoration may not be possible.
The university has reported the incident to the Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner and notified law enforcement authorities. Officials added that determining the precise impact for each affected individual will take time because the deletion of files has made forensic analysis more complex. Individuals whose information is confirmed to have been affected will receive direct notifications as the investigation progresses.
Responsibility for the attack has been claimed by the cybercrime group CMD Organization, which has published samples of what it alleges is stolen university data, including passport scans and other sensitive documents.
The group is demanding a ransom of 30 Bitcoin, valued at approximately $1.9 million at current exchange rates, and has reportedly given the university six days to respond before releasing additional data. CMD Organization also appears to operate an auction-based extortion model, advertising exclusive access to stolen datasets for the highest bidder through both clear web and dark web leak sites. At the time of writing, the group lists approximately 30 organizations on its extortion portal.
Founded more than a century ago, Mount Royal University currently serves about 11,560 students, including roughly 12,500 undergraduate learners.
As recovery work continues, the university said it will provide additional updates as more information becomes available. MRU is also offering two years of credit monitoring and identity theft protection to current employees and individuals who have worked at the university within the past five years.
After this, the attacker could read chats, steal user data, and command bots to send hacker-written texts such as re-entering a password.
Cyber security firm Varonis discovered the tactic and called it ‘Rogue Agent.’ The bug impacted only businesses that make agents with custom Code Blocks and Dialogflow’s Playbooks, which allows hackers to add their own Python. The attack was not remote, or unauthorized.
For the attack to happen, it required the dialogflow.playbooks.update green light one such agent, which restricts the hacker to an infected insider or a breached developer account, not some stranger on the web. From that point, the reach extended to every agent inside the project.
Google has patched the bug, and Varonis and Google have said there are no signs that the flaw was deployed in a real attack or campaign.
Dialogflow’s Code Blocks allows developers to add custom Python to a chatbot’s flow to test input, invoke defined tools, and control behavior.
The code runs within a Google-operated Cloud Run environment, and every agent that uses Code Blocks in the similar Google Cloud project shares one incident of it. The customer cannot control or see the environment that Google runs, meanwhile Varonis discovered no real separation between the agents within it.
When the agent runs a Code Block, the code is added to internal setup code and sent to Python’s exec()function. The functions and variables that block can touch are defined by the setup.
Functions consist(), which makes the bot reply with a given string, whereas variables consist of a history of full chats and state for session information such as the session ID.
Varonis discovered code_execution_env.py, the file that does this wrapping, lying in the shared environment with write access.
As the file was writable, a single Code Block could change it. The block downloads an altered code_execution_env.py from a threat actor-controlled server and overwrites the original within the running container.
After that, the attacker’s variant commands every Code Block deployment throughout every agent that shares the environment. The attacker’s code sits in the same place as the real code, with similar access to respond(), state, and history,
Cybersecurity researchers have revealed a phishing campaign that is exploiting Microsoft's legitimate device authentication process to seize control of Microsoft 365 accounts, reflecting a broader shift in how cybercriminals are conducting identity-focused attacks. Rather than stealing passwords through counterfeit login pages, the operation manipulates victims into completing a genuine Microsoft authentication process, allowing attackers to obtain valid authentication tokens that grant direct access to compromised accounts.
The campaign, tracked by email security firm ZeroBEC, was observed between the final week of June and early July 2026. Investigators found that the attackers relied on collaboration-themed phishing lures that directed recipients to Microsoft's authentic device login experience instead of fraudulent credential harvesting websites. Behind the scenes, a backend broker generated Microsoft device authentication codes and continuously polled the authentication process until victims completed the sign-in sequence, enabling the attackers to capture valid authentication tokens without ever collecting passwords.
Researchers noted that the activity closely resembles techniques previously documented by Microsoft in its investigation of the threat cluster known as Storm-2372. That campaign, first disclosed in February 2025, used fake Microsoft Teams invitations and messaging-themed social engineering to persuade victims to enter attacker-generated device codes. Once authentication was completed, the attackers received valid access tokens that allowed them to take over Microsoft 365 accounts. Microsoft said Storm-2372 had targeted organizations across government, defense, healthcare, telecommunications, higher education, information technology, energy, and non-governmental sectors spanning Europe, North America, Africa, and the Middle East. The company also stated that the attacks abused legitimate authentication functionality rather than exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft products.
Although the latest campaign mirrors many of Storm-2372's tactics, ZeroBEC believes the operation is powered by a reusable phishing framework called DEBULL rather than the original threat actor itself. The researchers concluded that techniques once associated with advanced threat groups are now being packaged into reusable infrastructure that enables multiple operators to launch similar attacks with far less effort. This evolution reflects the continuing commercialization of identity-focused phishing operations, where sophisticated attack methods are increasingly offered through phishing-as-a-service platforms instead of being developed independently by individual threat actors.
At the center of the campaign is device code phishing, an attack technique that abuses the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant, a legitimate authentication mechanism designed for devices that cannot easily support traditional browser-based sign-ins. The workflow is commonly used by devices such as smart televisions, printers, conference room equipment, and other systems with limited input capabilities. Instead of entering credentials directly on those devices, users receive a short verification code that must be entered on another device through Microsoft's official authentication portal to complete the login process.
Threat actors exploit the separation between the device requesting authentication and the browser used to authorize it. Rather than creating counterfeit Microsoft login pages, attackers initiate their own device authentication session, obtain a legitimate verification code from Microsoft, and deliver that code to victims through convincing phishing emails. When recipients unknowingly enter the supplied code into Microsoft's authentic login page and complete the sign-in process, they authorize the attackers' session instead of their own, handing over valid authentication tokens that can be used to access Microsoft 365 resources. Because the victim is interacting with a genuine Microsoft service, traditional indicators of phishing, such as suspicious URLs or fake login portals, are largely absent.
Security researchers have increasingly warned that device code phishing represents a natural evolution of identity attacks. As organizations strengthened defenses against conventional credential phishing and adversary-in-the-middle attacks, threat actors shifted toward abusing trusted authentication workflows that require no password theft and can effectively circumvent multi-factor authentication protections by obtaining legitimate session tokens directly from users. Proofpoint recently reported a sharp increase in device code phishing activity during 2026, attributing the growth to publicly available criminal toolkits and the rapid expansion of phishing-as-a-service platforms that have made these techniques accessible to a wider range of cybercriminals.
A CVSS score of 9.5 may not be significant to a CFO, but when it demonstrates a flaw in a payment system processing $2 million, it becomes a big deal. Therefore, the data must be linked with information about operational barriers that can result in financial damages, product delays, or loop in regulatory agencies.
Periodic risk lifecycle cannot keep up with the changing threat scenario, which if further impacted by an unstable geopolitical environment and rising technology like AI and quantum computing. Thus, information risk assessment must be a continuous process that links threats, supervising controls, and the possible repercussions for the business if the controls fail.
Different risks carry different impacts, stakeholder needs, and available data. This means that analysis also changes. You need two analysis tracks for this: qualitative analysis for quick decisions with limited data, and quantitative analysis for investment decisions when they need financial backing.
The IRAM3 methodology unifies both tracks into a single framework that uses the same process and is built to be modular, so businesses can gain entry at any desirable phase they think fits their demands.
A linked risk lifecycle changes how businesses perceive organization threats. It also helps to keep activities such as interpreting threats, evaluating controls, and measuring exposure connected instead of treating each analysis as an isolated process.
Linked assets must be grouped by the business function they assist. This lets the teams conduct risk analysis that connect how the organization actually works and also helps in defining the risk appetite.
In this step, you identify the risks to your business, map related threats to critical assets, and predict how likely they will materialize. According to Security Week, “From a quantitative standpoint, a three-point frequency estimate—minimum, most likely, and maximum—is assigned instead of a rating. The number of loss events you would anticipate in a year is represented by this estimate.”
Testing control success
A business might have a MFA coverage, but if privileged accounts are not included as allowing MFA disrupted a legacy integration, the gap is a direct pathway into critical systems. Thus, these controls should be carefully mapped to particular threats, checked for implementation, and analyzed if they actually reduce risk.