The wide adoption of AI agents is forcing organizations to rethink identity security as enterprises contend with an expanding population of non-human identities that increasingly outnumber employee accounts. While identity and access management programs have traditionally focused on managing people throughout their employment lifecycle, autonomous software identities are exposing governance gaps that many organizations are still struggling to address.
Unlike human users, machine identities, including AI agents, service accounts, workload identities, OAuth applications, and API credentials, are created to authenticate systems, automate processes, and enable communication between applications. As organizations embrace cloud computing, automation, and generative AI, these identities are being created at a pace that often exceeds traditional governance processes.
Human identities typically follow a predictable lifecycle. Employees are onboarded, assigned appropriate access, promoted or transferred to new roles, and eventually offboarded when they leave an organization. These lifecycle events form the foundation of identity governance, allowing security teams to periodically review permissions and revoke unnecessary access.
Machine identities operate differently. They may be generated automatically when new cloud workloads are deployed, inherit permissions from existing applications, communicate across multiple enterprise platforms, or exist only briefly before being replaced. Others remain active long after the application, automation workflow, or development project that created them has been retired. Without continuous oversight, organizations can lose visibility into who owns these identities, why they still exist, and what sensitive resources they are capable of accessing.
The scale of this challenge continues to grow. According to the Non-Human Identity Management Group, machine identities can outnumber human users by as much as 50 to one across many enterprise environments. While these identities are essential for modern business operations, security teams frequently struggle to maintain accurate inventories or establish clear ownership for every credential operating within their environments.
The security implications became evident during the UNC6395 campaign in 2025, when attackers reportedly obtained an OAuth token associated with Salesloft's Drift chat integration and leveraged the trusted credential to move across Salesforce environments used by hundreds of organizations. Rather than exploiting a software vulnerability, the attackers abused an identity that had already been authorized within enterprise systems. Investigations found that the compromised access enabled attackers to obtain additional secrets, including AWS credentials and Snowflake tokens, demonstrating how a single trusted machine identity can provide a pathway to multiple connected environments.
AI agents are not creating an entirely new category of identity risk, but they are accelerating an existing challenge. Modern AI systems increasingly perform tasks autonomously, interact with multiple business applications, retrieve sensitive information, and execute workflows without continuous human involvement. As these agents operate across cloud services, they introduce additional trusted identities, inherit permissions from existing accounts, and expand the number of credentials that organizations must secure.
This rapid growth creates a governance challenge that extends beyond simple visibility. Security teams may know that identities exist, but effective identity security also requires understanding who owns each identity, what permissions it has been granted, what sensitive data it can reach, and when that identity should no longer exist. Without continuous lifecycle management, dormant or forgotten machine identities can quietly expand an organization's attack surface.
Findings published in the 2026 Data and Identity Security Report illustrate the scale of the problem. Organizations that reported AI exponentially increasing the number of identities within their environments experienced a 43% breach rate over the previous year, compared with 11% among organizations where AI had not substantially expanded their identity footprint. Notably, many organizations affected by breaches also reported implementing stronger governance practices, suggesting that visibility alone is insufficient if identity ownership, permissions, and access reviews are not continuously maintained.
As enterprises continue integrating AI into daily operations, identity security is becoming less about managing employee accounts and more about governing a rapidly expanding ecosystem of trusted non-human identities. Maintaining comprehensive identity inventories, enforcing least-privilege access, continuously reviewing permissions, and assigning clear ownership to every human and machine identity will be essential to reducing risk. As AI agents become more autonomous, the identities organizations overlook may prove just as valuable to attackers as those they actively monitor.
Ransomware groups claimed responsibility for 2,279 attacks worldwide during the second quarter of 2026, marking a 7% increase from the previous quarter and a 43% jump compared with the same period last year, according to GuidePoint Security's latest quarterly ransomware report. Researchers also recorded the highest number of active ransomware groups seen in a single quarter, reflecting an ecosystem that continues to attract new threat actors even as attacks remain concentrated among a relatively small number of established operations.
Despite the growing number of ransomware groups, a handful of operators continue to dominate victim claims. GuidePoint found that the five most active groups were collectively responsible for more than 40% of all publicly reported ransomware incidents during the quarter, suggesting that while new groups continue to emerge, only a few have achieved sustained operational scale.
Qilin remained the most active ransomware operation during Q2, accounting for approximately 13% of all recorded victim claims. It was closely followed by The Gentlemen, a comparatively new group that has expanded rapidly in recent months. Together with Akira and DragonForce, the two groups make up what GuidePoint describes as a "four-headed monster," representing the most prolific ransomware operations currently shaping the threat landscape.
Rather than relying on a single dominant ransomware syndicate, today's ransomware ecosystem is distributed across several highly active groups capable of absorbing affiliates from disrupted operations. Researchers noted that this structure could reduce the long-term impact of law enforcement takedowns, as affiliates displaced from one ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) platform may quickly transition to another established operation without substantially disrupting attack activity.
The United States remained the country most frequently targeted by ransomware groups during the quarter, accounting for 40% of publicly claimed victims. Germany ranked second with 32%. However, GuidePoint observed a noticeable shift in targeting patterns, with the U.S. accounting for a smaller proportion of victims than in previous quarters, when roughly half of all reported incidents involved American organizations.
Researchers linked this broader geographic distribution to increased activity from groups including Qilin, The Gentlemen and LockBit, each of which claimed a larger share of victims outside the United States during Q2. The findings suggest that ransomware affiliates are expanding their operations across a wider range of regions instead of concentrating primarily on U.S.-based organizations.
Alongside changes in victim targeting, the report examined how artificial intelligence is being incorporated into ransomware operations. While concerns have grown around the possibility of AI creating entirely new forms of cyberattacks, GuidePoint found little evidence to support that scenario. Instead, threat actors are primarily using large language models (LLMs) to accelerate tasks that previously required significant manual effort, allowing them to improve efficiency without fundamentally changing their attack methods.
One case study highlighted in the report involved the data extortion group FulcrumSec. After obtaining a large volume of stolen information, the group reportedly used an LLM to examine complex databases and identify individuals appearing across multiple datasets. According to researchers, completing this level of analysis manually would have required either extensive knowledge of the victim's database architecture or a substantial investment of time by human operators.
The information extracted from the stolen data was then paired with AI-generated negotiation messages written in English. By demonstrating a detailed understanding of the compromised information, FulcrumSec strengthened its position during ransom negotiations, providing victims with evidence of the data in its possession while using those findings to justify its ransom demands.
GuidePoint also documented DragonForce's use of large language models during extortion negotiations. Researchers said the group generated convincing messages that sought to increase pressure on victims, including claims that it had legal counsel available to advise its operations. Although the report describes that assertion as almost certainly false, it illustrates how AI can help cybercriminals produce persuasive communications intended to exploit concerns around regulatory obligations, legal consequences and reputational damage.
According to the researchers, the effectiveness of these messages does not necessarily depend on their accuracy. Instead, their value lies in presenting information in a manner that appears credible enough to influence decision-making during negotiations. Large language models, which are capable of generating fluent and convincing text within seconds, are increasingly being used to support these psychological tactics.
Taken together, the findings indicate that AI is currently serving as an operational force multiplier rather than introducing an entirely new category of ransomware attacks. Tasks such as analyzing stolen data, organizing information, preparing victim communications and drafting negotiation messages can now be completed more quickly, enabling threat actors to devote more time to other stages of their operations.
At the same time, the continued concentration of attacks among a small group of highly active ransomware operations suggests that scale, organization and affiliate networks remain key drivers of today's ransomware economy. While new groups continue to enter the ecosystem, a limited number of established operators continue to account for a disproportionate share of publicly claimed attacks, reinforcing their influence across the global ransomware ecosystem.

A ransomware group known as Hyadina has been observed using a Microsoft-signed Windows kernel driver to disable endpoint security software before deploying its latest ransomware variant, GodDamn, according to researchers at Symantec. The campaign combines trusted administrative software, publicly available offensive security tools and a signed kernel driver to establish control over victim environments before encrypting systems.
Hyadina has operated as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group for approximately four years, evolving its malware from earlier variants known as Beast and Monster to its current GodDamn locker. The group primarily targets organizations in the United States while reportedly avoiding victims in former Soviet countries. Previous attacks have affected organizations across healthcare, manufacturing, education and several other industries.
Symantec was unable to determine how the attackers initially gained access to the compromised environment. The first confirmed activity appeared on May 29, when an unauthorized copy of AnyDesk was discovered inside the Music folder of an infected system. Although AnyDesk is legitimate remote access software widely used for IT support, threat actors frequently abuse remote monitoring and management applications because they provide persistent access while blending into normal administrative activity.
The following day, the attackers deployed an executable named symantec.exe, which installed a kernel-mode driver called PoisonX. Running in the Windows kernel gives a driver the highest level of system privileges, allowing it to interact directly with core operating system functions. According to Symantec, PoisonX carried a valid Microsoft Hardware Compatibility signature, enabling Windows to load the driver as trusted.
Once active, PoisonX terminated security-related processes and removed user-mode API hooks commonly used by endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor application behavior. By disabling those monitoring mechanisms, the attackers reduced the visibility of security software before carrying out the remaining stages of the intrusion.
With endpoint protections weakened, Hyadina expanded its operation using a collection of credential theft and reconnaissance utilities. Investigators observed fourteen open-source tools designed to recover credentials from web browsers, email clients and instant messaging applications, as well as utilities capable of extracting Wi-Fi credentials and capturing live network traffic. All but one of those tools originated from NirSoft, which publishes legitimate Windows administration utilities. The remaining tool, Mimikatz, is widely known for extracting credentials and authentication material from Windows systems and is frequently abused during post-compromise activity.
The attackers also relied on PsExec, Microsoft's remote administration utility, to move laterally across the victim's network. Combined with legitimate remote management software, credential theft utilities and the signed kernel driver, the attackers were able to strengthen their foothold across multiple systems before deploying the GodDamn ransomware payload.
Symantec also examined the origins of PoisonX. The driver was uploaded to GitHub on April 7 by a developer using the name oxfemale, who described it as a research tool. The developer regularly publishes offensive security projects, including exploit proof-of-concepts, credential stealers and software designed to disable antivirus products, while identifying themselves on LinkedIn as a Russian security researcher specializing in reverse engineering and penetration testing. Symantec, however, considers PoisonX to be malware because its primary function is to disable security protections rather than support legitimate defensive research. Researchers said it remains unclear how the driver obtained Microsoft's Hardware Compatibility signature or whether the signing process was manipulated.
Microsoft maintains a Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to prevent known malicious or exploitable drivers from loading, even when they possess valid signatures. However, Symantec noted that newly identified drivers are not added to the blocklist immediately. Updates can take days or, in some cases, weeks to reach enterprise systems, leaving a window during which attackers can continue using newly signed or newly discovered drivers before defensive protections are updated.
Commenting on the broader use of legitimate software during ransomware intrusions, Symantec's Brigid O Gorman noted that nearly any administrative or security tool can become malicious when misused. She said this makes behavioral and adaptive security controls particularly important because they focus on suspicious activity rather than relying solely on known malicious files or applications. In the case of Hyadina, that combination of trusted software, publicly available offensive tools and a signed kernel driver enabled the attackers to disable security protections, steal credentials, move laterally through the environment and ultimately deploy ransomware.