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U.S. Security Expert Sentenced for Aiding BlackCat Ransomware Gang

 

A cybersecurity professional has become the third U.S. security expert sentenced to prison for aiding a ransomware gang, marking a significant escalation in insider threat cases involving incident response firms. Angelo Martino, a 41-year-old from Florida, pleaded guilty to providing confidential victim information to the BlackCat/Alphv cybercrime group while ostensibly working to help companies negotiate with attackers. 

Modus operandi 

Martino worked as a ransomware negotiator for DigitalMint, a Chicago-based incident response company hired by victims to minimize damage and negotiate lower payouts. Instead, he fed critical details to BlackCat operators, including insurance policy limits and negotiation strategies, enabling the gang to maximize ransom demands across five separate incidents. Prosecutors revealed that Martino also assisted co-conspirators Kevin Martin and Ryan Goldberg in deploying BlackCat ransomware against U.S. victims for six months in 2023, effectively becoming an affiliate of the criminal group. The trio earned more than $1.2 million from a single victim during this period. 

Martino faces up to 20 years in prison at his sentencing hearing scheduled for July 2026, following guilty pleas from Martin and Goldberg in late 2025, who each received four-year sentences in April 2026. Federal authorities have already seized $10 million worth of assets from Martino as part of the investigation. The Justice Department emphasized that Martino's actions directly assisted ransomware actors and increased the financial burden on victim organizations, undermining trust in the cybersecurity incident response ecosystem. 

Lessons for the Industry 

This case highlights a concerning trend of cybersecurity professionals exploiting their trusted positions to facilitate cybercrime, raising questions about vetting processes and oversight within incident response firms. Organizations are now urged to conduct thorough background checks on security personnel and implement strict compliance measures to prevent similar insider threats. The BlackCat/Alphv gang, once a dominant ransomware outfit, has been linked to numerous high-profile attacks, and this collusion scheme demonstrates how criminal groups increasingly target the defenders themselves. 

As the cybersecurity field grapples with this breach of trust, the Martino case serves as a stark reminder that even those hired to protect can become perpetrators. Companies must strengthen internal controls, monitor negotiator activities, and ensure transparency in ransomware response engagements. With sentencing underway and more cases potentially emerging, the industry faces a critical moment to restore confidence in its ability to defend against evolving ransomware threats without internal compromise.

Six U-Boot Vulnerabilities Could Enable Pre-Boot Code Execution and Persistent Firmware Attacks

 



Security researchers have identified six vulnerabilities in the widely deployed U-Boot bootloader that could allow attackers to execute malicious code during the earliest stages of a device's startup process. If successfully exploited, the flaws could enable firmware-level attacks capable of bypassing security protections before the operating system loads and establishing malware designed to remain on affected systems.

As one of the most widely used open-source bootloaders, U-Boot plays a fundamental role in the startup sequence of embedded Linux devices by initializing hardware and loading the operating system. It is integrated into a broad range of technologies, including enterprise server Baseboard Management Controllers (BMCs), networking equipment, industrial control systems, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and numerous other embedded appliances.

Because the bootloader executes before the operating system and endpoint security tools become active, vulnerabilities at this stage can have far-reaching consequences. An attacker who gains control during the boot process may be able to interfere with the system's trusted startup sequence before conventional security controls have an opportunity to detect or prevent malicious activity.

One of U-Boot's primary security mechanisms is Verified Boot, which uses cryptographic signatures to verify the authenticity of firmware and operating system images before they are executed. During startup, only images signed with a trusted cryptographic key are intended to be loaded, helping prevent unauthorized or modified firmware from running on the device.

In a technical report published this week, firmware security company Binarly disclosed six vulnerabilities affecting U-Boot's Flattened Image Tree (FIT) signature verification code. The FIT framework is responsible for validating firmware images during the boot process, making it a critical component of the platform's chain of trust.

According to Binarly, researchers examined the verification logic because of its importance in maintaining firmware integrity during startup. Their analysis uncovered six distinct vulnerabilities ranging from denial-of-service conditions that can interrupt the boot process to flaws capable of enabling arbitrary code execution while processing untrusted firmware images.

The researchers said two of the vulnerabilities could potentially allow arbitrary code execution during firmware verification, while the remaining four can be exploited to trigger crashes during the boot process. Since these weaknesses affect the validation of firmware before the operating system starts, a successful exploit could allow malicious instructions to execute before higher-level security mechanisms become operational.

The disclosed vulnerabilities include a flaw identified as BRLY-2026-037 that can cause U-Boot to crash when processing a specially crafted firmware image and, under certain conditions, may also permit arbitrary code execution. BRLY-2026-038 is a memory corruption vulnerability that could enable attackers to execute malicious code during firmware signature verification. BRLY-2026-039 involves an out-of-bounds read that may force U-Boot to access memory beyond the firmware image, resulting in a system crash. BRLY-2026-040 is a null pointer dereference vulnerability that allows crafted firmware images to terminate the bootloader unexpectedly. BRLY-2026-041 stems from insufficient validation of externally stored firmware data and can also be used to crash vulnerable systems. The sixth flaw, BRLY-2026-042, involves unbounded recursion that can exhaust available stack memory and prevent the bootloader from completing the startup process.

Binarly noted that much of the affected code has been present since U-Boot version 2013.07, meaning the vulnerabilities could impact more than 50 stable releases of the project. Because many hardware manufacturers maintain customized downstream versions of U-Boot within their own firmware, the potential exposure extends beyond the upstream project to a large number of commercial products deployed across multiple industries.

If the arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities are successfully exploited, attackers could gain execution during one of the earliest phases of system initialization. Operating at this level may allow threat actors to alter the boot sequence, disable firmware security mechanisms, deploy persistent firmware malware, or perform other privileged actions before the operating system begins loading.

Firmware-based attacks can also be considerably more difficult to identify than malware operating within the operating system. Since malicious activity occurs before the operating system initializes, traditional endpoint security software and many monitoring tools may have limited visibility into the compromise, allowing malicious modifications to remain undetected for extended periods.

Binarly also noted that exploitation does not necessarily require physical access to a device. Systems equipped with Baseboard Management Controllers that support remote firmware updates could become vulnerable if an attacker first compromises the management interface. In such cases, a specially crafted firmware image could be uploaded and processed during the update process, potentially triggering the identified vulnerabilities.

The researchers reported all six vulnerabilities to the U-Boot maintainers and submitted patches addressing each issue. Those fixes have since been accepted into the project's upstream codebase. However, because U-Boot is incorporated into firmware by individual hardware manufacturers, vendors must integrate the patches into their own firmware releases before updates become available to customers.

Organizations operating embedded systems should monitor firmware advisories issued by their hardware vendors and apply security updates as they become available. Restricting access to firmware management interfaces, securing remote administration services such as BMCs, and verifying firmware authenticity before deployment can further reduce exposure while patches are being distributed.

Devices that have reached end-of-life or no longer receive firmware updates may remain permanently vulnerable, underscoring the long-term security challenges posed by legacy embedded systems that continue operating long after vendor support has ended.

Meta Faces Privacy Questions After Employee Data Exposure Report


 

After sensitive employee information was reportedly made available throughout the organization, Meta has suspended an internal employee monitoring initiative intended to assist in the development of artificial intelligence systems. 

Initially introduced in April, the Model Capability Initiative was intended to collect workplace activity data to assist Meta in improving its artificial intelligence models through the collection of work activity data. The system was reportedly used by employees to monitor interactions across various workplace applications including Gmail, Google Chat, and Meta’s AI assistant, as well as capture screenshots and usage patterns. 

In response to concerns about privacy and consent, the initiative quickly drew criticism from employees. More than 1,600 Meta employees, including engineers, researchers, and designers, have signed a petition advocating the discontinuation of this program. Prior to the latest incident, the monitoring initiative had already been under scrutiny. A Reuters report reported that the program collected more information than originally indicated and stored some of the data unencrypted, raising concerns among employees about privacy. 

In internal discussions, employees were also concerned that personal information, including tax and medical records accessed from work devices, could be disclosed, despite assurances that the data would be protected and used solely for legitimate business purposes. According to the petition, employees argued that responsible AI development should not be compromised by individual privacy concerns. 

A company's stated commitment to building trustworthy and responsible artificial intelligence systems is in conflict with the company's collection of workplace data without meaningful consent. Following reports that sensitive employee information had been accessed internally by employees, the controversy became more intense. 

According to information cited in media reports, the exposed data could have included private communications, AI prompts, transcriptions, as well as performance data. The incident has sparked an internal investigation, though there is no evidence of the information being improperly accessed or misused. Meta, according to Reuters, suspended the initiative after filing an internal security incident (SEV) in response to employee data being widely accessible within the organization. 

As indicated in internal documentation, this information included artificial intelligence prompts and transcriptions, private conversations, personnel records, and classifications of data sensitivity. This incident raised new concerns regarding the collection, storage, and protection of employee information. The Meta program has been suspended while the matter is being investigated. 

A company spokesperson confirmed the initiative was designed with privacy safeguards and stressed the absence of any indication of unauthorized access during the investigation. As of the time of the investigation, Meta had not announced when the initiative might resume, and executives of Meta indicated that it would remain halted while the investigation continued. As Meta stated, the Model Capability Initiative will be suspended gradually and might not reach all employees immediately. 

A source familiar with the matter told Reuters that the monitoring tool was still recording employee activity on Monday afternoon while the company attempted to disable it across all its systems. An additional clarification of the incident was provided by Meta Chief Technology Officer Andrew Bosworth in a later interview, in which he stated that the incident was not the result of an external security breach. Bosworth reported that employee information generated through the program initially could only be accessed by a small number of authorized employees, but was accidentally stored in an internal location incorrectly by a researcher. 

According to Meta, there was no evidence of malicious activity found, and the incident was an internal error that caused the company to suspend the initiative while investigating the matter. The development indicates growing tensions between rapid advancement of artificial intelligence and employee privacy rights. The majority of technology companies are exploring new sources of training data to enhance the performance of their models, as well as investing heavily in artificial intelligence. 

Despite increasing competition in the AI industry, Meta is expected to spend more than $135 billion on infrastructure in 2018. According to leaked audio from an internal Meta meeting, Mark Zuckerberg was in favor of using employee-generated data for AI training, asserting that highly skilled employees could serve as valuable examples for AI systems. It has been criticized by privacy advocates, however. 

Digital rights experts have argued that extensive workplace monitoring raises serious concerns about employee consent and transparency. According to the incident report, maintaining employee trust and protecting sensitive information are critical challenges that organizations should not overlook as they accelerate the development of artificial intelligence. 

A growing concern is how to strike a balance between rapid AI innovation and employee privacy and data security, as exemplified by the incident. As Meta continues its internal investigation, the outcome will likely influence how organizations approach AI training, workplace monitoring, and responsible data governance in the years to come.

Hackers Target Industries in Japan, Attacks Share One Pattern


Four big Japan cyberattacks point to a common trend: threat actors are getting access via third-party infrastructure and subsidiaries, not from corporate headquarters. 

While the attacks impacted companies from varying industries such as telecommunications, manufacturing, insurance, and brewing, the breaches have one same characteristic.

Attacks share same patterns

Instead of directly disrupting corporate headquarters, hackers gained access via third-party infrastructure, subsidiaries, and overseas operations. 

The impacted organizations are Nidec, KDDI, Aflac Japan, and Sapporo Holdings. While the attacks involved different contexts, the incidents hint towards an increasing attack surface that expands well beyond a company’s primary network.

About KDDI incident 

KDDI, a telecommunications provider, reported illegal access to an email platform used by various Japanese internet service providers.

KDDI reported the incident surfaced from a bug in third-party software, revealing around 14.22 million email account records throughout six ISPs.

The attack shows how a single bug inside shared infrastructure can impact various organizations continuously.

Aflac Japan incident

On June 30, Aflac Japan revealed that between June 15 and June 25, hackers gained access to its Japanese operations. The company claims that some 4.38 million clients and agents were impacted, and a portion of the documents included bank account details used to pay insurance premiums.

According to the insurance, the incident only affected its company in Japan and had no bearing on its operations in the United States.

The alleged tactics are similar to social engineering strategies previously linked to Scattered Spider, even though the business has not linked the attack to any particular threat organization.

Sapporo Holdings and Nidec incident

Sapporo Holdings revealed possible illegal access involving two foreign subsidiaries, Canadian brewer Sleeman and Singapore-based Pokka. After identifying suspicious activity, the company shut down the impacted systems and started an investigation to find out if any data had been taken or accessed.

Nidec, a manufacturing company, has revealed that its Taiwanese subsidiary, Nidec Chaun Choung Technology, was the subject of a ransomware attack.

More than two gigabytes of firm data, including personnel, financial, procurement, manufacturing, legal, and IT information, were allegedly taken by the BlackField ransomware organization, which claimed responsibility for the attack. A $2 million ransom was allegedly demanded by the organization.

Injective Labs GitHub Compromise Distributes Malicious npm Package Targeting Crypto Wallet Keys

 

Cybersecurity researchers have detected a software supply chain attack in which threat actors compromised the Injective Labs SDK GitHub repository and utilized it to distribute a backdoored version of the npm package containing cryptocurrency wallet credentials stealing capabilities. Researchers at security company Socket have identified that the attackers distributed the malicious code in the @injectivelabs/sdk-ts version 1.20.21 after compromising the GitHub account of one of the trusted maintainers. 

The compromised package was published to the npm registry on July 8, 2026, and subsequently deprecated. Nevertheless, the distribution channel for the malicious artifacts remained available on GitHub at the time of publication. The attackers distributed the backdoored SDK to 17 other @injectivelabs packages, including the wallet, utility, networking, and crypto modules. Since the packages include various apps as dependencies, developers who did not directly install the SDK might also be affected. 

Unlike traditional supply chain malware that typically persists in the compromised software at installation time, the detected backdoor was not activated when the developers installed the package. Rather, the malicious code was designed to exfiltrate the cryptographic assets when the developers used the SDK’s wallet generation feature. 

Thus, the threat actors could hide the malicious payload’s presence by avoiding the use of suspicious scripts typically associated with malware. The detected malware consisted of modified cryptographic functions that replaced the legitimate implementation with the backdoor, which the attackers masked as a performance telemetry component. The additional function exfiltrated the cryptographic assets, including the mnemonic seed phrase and private key generation details, required to recreate the cryptocurrency wallet. 

Researchers noted that the malware persisted in the compromised repositories by sending the collected data to the remote server in aggregated fashion to avoid suspicion by grouping multiple exfiltration requests into one encrypted HTTPS session. The security analysts at OX Security stated that the detected threat was capable of intercepting the master recovery phrase used to seed cryptocurrency wallets. Since the mnemonic seed phrase gives the adversary full access to the wallet funds, threat actors could reproduce the cryptographic assets to gain unauthorized access to the blockchain assets. 

The malware’s distribution channel was compromised using the trusted publishing infrastructure and OpenID Connect (OIDC) publishing pipeline. The detected threat utilized the legitimate account of one of the maintainers, which implies that the attackers did not have to use supply chain malware or impersonate the project on a third-party registry. The developers who installed the affected package should switch to the latest version, 1.20.23, which has been released. 

The security analysts advise the developers to consider all private keys and mnemonic phrases generated with the compromised version of the code as compromised and take the appropriate actions to rotate the cryptographic assets. Moreover, the developers should review their project dependencies to ensure that they do not use the affected versions of the packages indirectly. 

The incident demonstrated how the threat actors could target the software supply chain to compromise the cryptocurrency ecosystem and gain unauthorized access to the crypto assets by compromising the open-source developer infrastructure.

Injective SDK Supply Chain Attack Exposed Developers to Cryptocurrency Wallet Theft


 

InjectiveLabs/SDK-TS, a widely used package, was briefly published on Node Package Manager (npm) as a malicious version after attackers gained access to a legitimate contributor's GitHub account, exposing developers to the theft of cryptocurrency wallet credentials. Several security researchers from Socket, Ox Security, and StepSecurity identified the supply chain attack as targeting Injective Labs' TypeScript/JavaScript SDK, which is used to develop applications based on Injective's blockchain.

The SDK is widely adopted by developers who create cryptocurrency wallets, decentralized finance (DeFi) applications, decentralized exchanges, trading bots, and payment platforms, with approximately 50,000 downloads per week on NPM. 

A significant security issue is the responsibility of the SDK when it comes to creating and importing cryptocurrency wallets, as it occupies a critical position in the development process. Developers and end users alike are particularly vulnerable to any compromise of the SDK because the wallet creation functions are crucial to the handling of users' mnemonic recovery phrases and private keys. 

Researchers have determined that hackers gained access to a legitimate contributor's GitHub account on June 8 and introduced malicious code, which was later released as version 1.20.21 for the @injectivelabs/sdk-ts package. Additionally, 17 additional Injective-related packages were referenced by the compromised release, resulting in a significant impact on downstream projects. According to security researchers, attackers compromised a legitimate maintainer's account after exploiting the trust-worthy GitHub publishing workflow of the project. 

As opposed to stealing an NPM publishing token or creating a fake package, the malicious version was distributed through the repository's normal release process, making the compromise appear genuine. Package maintainers detected the malicious activity within minutes, reverting the unauthorized changes and releasing a version that is free of malicious activity, 1.20.23. 

Nevertheless, systems that downloaded or updated the compromised package during the brief exposure window may still have been affected. In contrast to conventional malware that is executed during installation, the injected code is activated when developers create or import cryptocurrency wallets using SDK functions. 

When this was achieved, the malware captured private wallet keys and mnemonic seed sentences, encoded the information, and sent it via HTTP POST request to what appeared to be an official Injective Labs infrastructure endpoint in order to blend into normal network traffic. As a method of minimizing detection, the malware disguised its outbound communication as legitimate injective network traffic in order to prevent detection. 

By capturing multiple wallet secrets temporarily, encoding them, and transmitting them as a single request, the malicious activity was able to blend in with blockchain-related communications, avoiding detection. The malware, according to StepSecurity researchers, collected wallet secrets for approximately two seconds before bundling them into a single request to minimize suspicion while maximizing the amount of data stolen. 

In a recent report, Socket reported that 310 malicious packages had been downloaded before they were deprecated, but there is reportedly still availability of the associated malicious GitHub release artifacts. As a consequence of Ox Security's warning, the compromised SDK is dependent on 87 direct NPM packages, accounting for more than 112,000 cumulative downloads, illustrating the risk to a larger supply chain.

Researchers noted that even though the malicious payload was contained within @injectivelabs/sdk-ts, the compromised release affected 17 additional injective packages that depended on the infected SDK version. This could have resulted in developers installing the backdoored package unknowingly through normal project dependencies, thereby significantly expanding the attack's impact. 

It is advised that developers who suspect they may have installed the affected version transfer cryptocurrency assets immediately into new wallets, replace compromised private keys and seed phrases, and rotate any sensitive credentials stored within their development environment immediately. The incident underlines the growing threat posed by software supply chain attacks, particularly within the cryptocurrency ecosystem where a compromised development dependency may result in a significant financial loss to both developers and end users.

Due to the increasing sophistication of software supply chain attacks, organizations and developers must strengthen dependency verification, monitor package integrity, and respond quickly to compromised components so that credential theft and downstream compromise can be reduced.


QIZ Security Raises $17 Million to Expand Cryptographic Security and Post-Quantum Readiness Platform

 

Israeli cybersecurity startup QIZ Security has raised $17 million in seed funding to fuel the development of its cryptographic security management solution and post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) readiness platform. The Israeli cybersecurity company has seen rising demand for its service, which assists firms in inventorying their cryptography assets in preparation for the transition to post-quantum cryptography algorithms. 

The round was led by Bessemer Venture Partners and Merlin Ventures, with Evolution Equity Partners, Qbeat Ventures, Singtel Innov8, and Qino Cyber Capital also participating. The funding will support the company’s expansion and product development, with the company’s QIZ Security cryptographic governance platform’s research and development being the main focus. 

The startup was founded in 2022 by Ben Volkow, Lenny Ridel, and Itan Barmes, and its cybersecurity solution allows organizations to manage and inventory all cryptographic assets in on-premises, cloud, and hybrid environments without the need to scan their networks. Using industry standard APIs, QIZ Security’s cryptographic governance platform enables enterprises to detect and assess the risk of all certificates, encryption assets, security controls, protocols, cipher suites, and cryptographic keys. 

These details are automatically correlated to the organization’s applications and business processes discovered across hybrid cloud infrastructure environments. Moreover, the application detects vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and exposures to outdated encryption technologies that put enterprise data at risk in both transit and at rest. 

In addition, the company’s solution helps enterprises prioritize risks according to their technical and business significance and guides enterprises in responding to each identified risk. This empowers security operations and compliance teams to coordinate and accelerate activities and responses to cryptographic risks, ensuring that application owners and security stakeholders reduce exposure to business-specific threats. 

Modern cryptographic infrastructure governance is necessary for enterprises to inventory and better understand their cryptography assets, identify risks, and respond to them in a timely and cost-effective manner. With the upcoming quantum computing era, enterprises and government agencies are preparing to migrate their cryptographic infrastructure to post-quantum algorithms. This migration requires organizations to fully understand where their cryptography is, which encryption technologies put them at risk, and how best to respond. 

According to Chief Executive Officer Ben Volkow, enterprises are unable to effectively plan their transition to modern cryptography without gaining continuous visibility into their cryptography assets. Organizations need to take a step back and understand the overall state of cryptography in their IT environments to be prepared for upcoming changes. With the quantum era of computing arriving, businesses need to ensure they are taking the right steps now to safeguard their sensitive data. 

The news comes as governments and enterprises worldwide are beginning to acknowledge the need to inventory cryptographic assets to develop migration plans for post-quantum cryptography algorithms. Additionally, with increased concerns over the implications of quantum computing, multiple cybersecurity startups are positioning their services to assist enterprises in preparing their cryptography infrastructure for the transition to post-quantum cryptography algorithms.

OpenMandriva Accuses Former Contributor of Project Sabotage

 

OpenMandriva Linux is facing a serious internal security dispute after it said a former contributor abused administrative access to damage the project’s infrastructure. The alleged actions included deleting GitHub repositories and publishing an empty package that could have broken desktop systems for users of GNOME and COSMIC. 

According to the project, the problem did not begin with code but with conflict inside the community. OpenMandriva says an abusive incident in its Matrix chat led to one contributor being removed, which then triggered a chain of resignations and escalating anger among some members. 

The most damaging part of the incident involved repository access. Long-time maintainer AngryPenguin said the contributor had admin privileges because he had previously helped migrate and mirror project repositories to a private OneDev instance, and that access was later used to delete part of a repository the team had maintained for nearly 10 years. 

OpenMandriva also says the contributor pushed an empty package into its Cooker development branch. That package obsoleted the GNOME and COSMIC packages, meaning it could have caused real disruption for people relying on those desktop environments if the issue had not been caught quickly. 

The accused contributor, Davide Beatrici, rejects the sabotage allegation and says his goal was not to harm users or the distro itself. He argues that his actions were tied to a dispute over the project’s direction, including disagreement about OpenMandriva’s support for GNOME and COSMIC alongside KDE and LXQt. OpenMandriva says it is now restoring deleted repositories, repairing affected packages, and conducting a full audit to confirm that nothing else was altered. 

The project has also said the incident may meet the threshold of a criminal offense, though it has chosen not to pursue legal action at this stage. This case is a reminder that open-source projects do not only face technical threats from outside attackers. Internal access, trust, and governance can become just as dangerous when disputes turn personal and administrative privileges are misused.

Why Apple, Meta and Snap Want You to Stop Looking at Your Phone

 



The technology industry's next computing platform may not fit in your hand. Instead, it could rest on your ears, sit on your face or hang around your neck.

Apple is reportedly exploring AirPods equipped with cameras that would give Siri the ability to interpret a user's surroundings, according to a Bloomberg report. The cameras are not expected to function like traditional smartphone cameras for photography or video recording. Instead, they would provide visual context that allows Apple's AI assistant to respond more intelligently to spoken requests. Apple has not commented on the report.

The development reveals a comprehensive industry effort to move everyday computing beyond smartphone screens. For decades, displays have served as the primary interface between people and their devices. Advances in artificial intelligence, computer vision and voice assistants are now encouraging technology companies to develop wearable devices that can understand a user's environment and respond without requiring constant screen interaction.

Snap recently expanded that vision with its latest augmented reality smart glasses, Specs, priced at £1,995 in the UK and $2,195 in the US. Unlike many existing smart glasses, the device is designed to operate independently rather than relying on a connected smartphone. Digital content appears only when needed, overlaying information onto the wearer's view of the real world instead of replacing it. Snap Chief Executive Evan Spiegel said the goal is to let users remain engaged with their surroundings while accessing digital experiences.

Meta is also increasing its investment in wearable AI. The company has reportedly sold around seven million pairs of its Ray-Ban Meta smart glasses and recently introduced more affordable models. Reports also indicate Meta is evaluating audio-only smart glasses that could reduce some of the privacy concerns associated with built-in cameras.

Those concerns remain one of the biggest obstacles to wider adoption. Camera-equipped wearables have faced criticism after users were found recording people without their knowledge, despite recording indicator lights intended to alert those nearby. Privacy advocates continue to question whether visible indicators alone provide sufficient transparency in public spaces.

Apple could attempt to distinguish itself by relying heavily on on-device processing, allowing visual information to be analyzed locally rather than stored or transmitted to cloud servers. Such capabilities could enable users to identify objects, receive navigation guidance, ask questions about nearby landmarks or generate recipe suggestions based on ingredients already in their kitchen through simple voice interactions.

Analysts believe AI-powered wearables could gradually shift some everyday computing tasks away from smartphones. Even so, most expect the smartphone to remain central to digital life for the foreseeable future, with wearable devices evolving as complementary tools rather than direct replacements. Whether they ultimately reduce screen time or simply expand the ways people interact with technology remains an open question.

AI Agents Built to Detect Malware Can Be Manipulated Into Running It


 

AI agents capable of identifying malicious software can be manipulated by the AI Now Institute to execute it, according to new research. The proof-of-concept attack, known as "Friendly Fire," demonstrates that autonomous AI coding agents, such as Claude Code from Anthropic and Codex from OpenAI, can be deceived into running malicious code while performing open-source security reviews. 

AI agents can approve and execute commands independently of the user without requiring user confirmation for every action, which is what this attack targets. Researchers contend that the vulnerability does not lie in the software version used by these agents, but rather in the way they interpret and react to instructions embedded within untrusted repositories rather than exploiting a software vulnerability. 

A comparison with conventional supply-chain attacks that hide malicious code within a repository was made by the researchers, who noted that when static analysis and manual review are performed, the repository itself can appear to be completely free of malicious code. By introducing the malicious payload at execution time, the AI agent follows embedded instructions, so traditional security tools cannot detect this technique.

By adding a seemingly harmless README.md instruction to an open-source project that recommended running a script entitled security.sh before submitting a pull request, attackers modified it. By launching a malicious binary hidden within a legitimate compiled Go file, the script silently executed on the host computer without triggering security warnings or approval prompts, allowing the malicious binary to execute on the system. 

According to the researchers, the attack is successful because the AI agent recognizes the instructions as a legitimate step in the process of installing software rather than an attempt to exploit the system maliciously. Once the recommended script has been executed, the payload will run under the same permissions that were provided for the developer or AI agent, potentially exposing credentials, environment variables, and other sensitive information. 

The procedure differs from previous prompt injection attacks, which relied on configuration files and often generated trust warnings, as this technique hides instructions inside standard documentation that is regularly read by developers and AI agents. It has been reported that both Claude Code and OpenAI Codex followed the embedded instructions during testing, while newer AI models executed the disguised binary upon detecting differences between the source file and the compiled executable. 

A laboratory proof-of-concept has been demonstrated, with no evidence of active exploitation in the field. In addition to excluding the malicious payload, the publicly released demonstration code does not attempt privilege escalation or lateral movement. These findings indicate that autonomous AI agents pose a greater challenge in terms of design rather than a problem that can be resolved by simply updating software. 

It is becoming more common for organizations to employ AI-powered coding assistants to review third-party software. Researchers recommend treating AI coding agents as privileged software, rather than simply assistants. Autonomous agents should not be permitted to execute commands on untrusted repositories, least-privilege access policies should be enforced, AI workflows should be isolated in sandboxed environments, and human approval should be required before running scripts or binaries recommended by project documentation. 

In accordance with the researchers, the issue is not related to any particular AI model, but a broader trust problem affecting autonomous coding assistants capable of executing shell commands. In addition to creating new attack surfaces if they are unable to reliably distinguish legitimate instructions from content controlled by the attacker, AI agents are becoming increasingly capable of cloning repositories, installing dependencies, and resolving setup issues independently. 

As autonomous AI systems are increasingly adopted in the software development and cybersecurity sectors, prompt injection attacks remain a major security threat. This study adds to a growing body of evidence that prompt injection attacks remain one of the greatest security risks. In light of the increasing autonomy of AI agents, organizations must balance automation and strong oversight in order to balance automation and security workflows. 

AI-driven attack techniques cannot be effectively countered until artificial intelligence (AI) systems can reliably discriminate between trusted and malicious instructions. Human verification and secure execution environments will therefore remain critical safeguards.

GhostApproval Symlink Codes Could Run Malicious Codes in AI Coding Agents


Cyber security experts at Wiz discovered that a bug in six famous AI coding assistants allows a booby-trapped code project to silently take over a developer’s system. The assistant can ask access to edit one innocent-looking file, but the write takes over a sensitive file.

The impacted tools are Windsurf, Google Antigravity, Cursor, Amazon Q Developer, Claude Code by Anthropic, and Augment. Wiz has termed the technique GhostApproval and posted it recently.

Three of the six AI assistants have addressed, two did not, while Anthropic argues if it is a bug. The most vulnerable are the tools that modify file before you can notice.

Attack tactic

The threat actors exploit an old Unix feature called symlink (or symbolic link), that AI assistants cannot check. 

A symlink silently directs to other files somewhere else on disk, hence writing to it particularly writes to the victim. 

“Symbolic links have been a security headache since the early days of Unix. From /tmp race conditions to privilege escalation exploits, symlinks have a long history of bypassing security boundaries by making one path silently resolve to another. It's a well-documented attack primitive - CWE-61 dates back decades,” Wiz said.

Research model

Wiz made a malicious repository with a symbolic link called project_settings.json that really directs to target’s SSH login file, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys. The repo’s README commands the assistant to put “a line” to project_settings.json, and this line is the hacker’s SSH key mimicking an innocent setting. “

If you ask the agent to “set up the workspace” or “follow the README,” it writes the key directly via the symlink into the login file. Following this, if the machine plays an SSH  service the threat actor can access, they can sign in without password. 

The second variant

Another variant of the attack writes to your shell startup file, ~/.zshrc, which the shell runs the next moment you open a terminal without needing an SSH. There are no indications that any of this has been abused in real-time operations, Wiz has only demonstrated it as their research.

“Symlinks have been exploited for decades – in race conditions (CVE-2018-15664), in package managers (CVE-2021-32803), in container escapes (CVE-2024-21626). Any time a tool writes to a user-controlled path without resolving it first, symlinks become a weapon,” Wiz wrote in its blog. 

Phishing Campaign Targets Marketing Professionals Using Fake Job Interviews from Top Global Brands

 

A sophisticated phishing campaign is targeting marketing professionals by posing as recruiters from more than 30 globally recognized brands, including Adobe, Netflix, Coca-Cola, OpenAI, Adidas, and Marriott. The attackers aim to steal Google account credentials by luring victims into fake job interview processes.

According to cybersecurity intelligence and threat hunting company Team Cymru, the operation exploits legitimate cloud-based platforms such as PeopleForce, a human resources service, and domains linked to Salesforce Marketing Cloud before redirecting users to malicious websites. To make the scam appear authentic, the threat actors are also using the names and profile pictures of actual recruiters from the companies they impersonate.

Will Thomas, senior advisor at Team Cymru, investigated the campaign and found that the phishing emails present themselves as recruitment messages. As he noted, the emails appear to be from “a recruiter looking to hire people for marketing roles.”

The investigation revealed that attackers have registered at least 34 domains designed to mimic prominent organizations across multiple industries. These include airlines and travel companies such as American Airlines, Booking.com, Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines; food and beverage giants Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and Red Bull; fashion and luxury brands Adidas, Louis Vuitton, Sephora, and Levi’s; consulting and technology firms including Adobe, Aquent, ManpowerGroup, McKinsey & Company, and OpenAI; hospitality and marketing companies Marriott and Omnicom Group; as well as entertainment and sports brands like FIFA and Netflix.

Researchers found that the attackers rely on a technique known as nested redirects, where users are routed through several legitimate online services before ultimately reaching a fraudulent webpage. Although the phishing emails appear to originate from PeopleForce, the embedded links resolve to the exct[.]net domain, which is operated by Salesforce following its acquisition of ExactTarget, now known as Salesforce Marketing Cloud.

From there, victims are redirected through Wise Agent, a cloud-based customer relationship management (CRM) platform for real estate professionals, before arriving at the phishing website.

BleepingComputer reported that the campaign has been active for at least five months. Earlier versions reportedly used Outlook email addresses carrying the names of the companies being impersonated.

In one example, a phishing email claiming to be from Adidas recruiter Paulina Manzo invited recipients to schedule a discussion regarding a potential job opportunity. Clicking the scheduling link redirected users to the fraudulent domain adidas-hiring[.]com.

To proceed with booking the interview, victims are instructed to sign in with their Google accounts. Selecting the “Continue with Google” option launches what appears to be a genuine Google authentication window. However, the pop-up is actually created using HTML and CSS within the phishing page itself, a deception technique known as browser-in-the-browser (BitB).

By leveraging modern web development methods, attackers can closely replicate legitimate authentication prompts, making it difficult for users to distinguish fake login windows from real ones.

Researchers emphasized that the misuse of legitimate platforms does not necessarily indicate those services have been compromised. Instead, threat actors may have created valid accounts specifically for the campaign or used compromised credentials to configure redirect chains and phishing pages.

A complete list of the malicious domains associated with the campaign has been published in Will Thomas' GitHub analysis.

Mount Royal University says hackers stole and deleted files following June cyberattack





Mount Royal University (MRU) has confirmed that threat actors stole data and deleted files after breaching the university's network in a cyberattack that continues to affect recovery efforts weeks after the incident.

In an update published on its website, the Calgary-based public university said the attack occurred on June 17 and that internal technical teams are working alongside external cybersecurity specialists to investigate the intrusion, determine its full scope, and restore affected systems.

The cyberattack disrupted a wide range of university services, including internet connectivity, online platforms, and several internal systems used across campus. Recovery efforts remain ongoing, with the university warning that restoring all affected services may take several weeks or, in some cases, months.

According to the university's investigation, attackers gained unauthorized access to data stored on the institution's "H drive," a file storage system used by students and employees. Investigators have confirmed that files stored within certain folders were accessed and exfiltrated before the attackers deleted the original copies, a move that has further complicated recovery operations.

"We regret to inform our community that our investigation has now shown that data within certain folders on the University's 'H drive' was accessed and taken by an unauthorized actor," the university said in its advisory.

MRU said the affected folders contained information relating to current and former students, current and former employees, as well as other individuals whose data was stored within the impacted environment. The university has not yet disclosed the exact categories of information exposed or the total number of people affected.

The investigation also found that attackers deleted data stored on a separate departmental file storage system known as the "J drive." While the university said there is currently no evidence that information from the J drive was accessed or copied before it was erased, officials cautioned that recovering the deleted data remains an ongoing process and acknowledged that a complete restoration may not be possible.

The university has reported the incident to the Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner and notified law enforcement authorities. Officials added that determining the precise impact for each affected individual will take time because the deletion of files has made forensic analysis more complex. Individuals whose information is confirmed to have been affected will receive direct notifications as the investigation progresses.

Responsibility for the attack has been claimed by the cybercrime group CMD Organization, which has published samples of what it alleges is stolen university data, including passport scans and other sensitive documents.

The group is demanding a ransom of 30 Bitcoin, valued at approximately $1.9 million at current exchange rates, and has reportedly given the university six days to respond before releasing additional data. CMD Organization also appears to operate an auction-based extortion model, advertising exclusive access to stolen datasets for the highest bidder through both clear web and dark web leak sites. At the time of writing, the group lists approximately 30 organizations on its extortion portal.

Founded more than a century ago, Mount Royal University currently serves about 11,560 students, including roughly 12,500 undergraduate learners.

As recovery work continues, the university said it will provide additional updates as more information becomes available. MRU is also offering two years of credit monitoring and identity theft protection to current employees and individuals who have worked at the university within the past five years.

AI Agent Executes End-to-End Ransomware Attack Without Human Intervention, Researchers Say

 

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered what they believe is the first ransomware attack conducted by an autonomous artificial intelligence agent which they named JADEPUFFER. It is notable because the AI performed all stages of the attack, from targeting and compromising the system to installing and using ransomware, without requiring any human input. 

The researchers noted that JADEPUFFER targeted a vulnerability in the open-source application Langflow which was used to design and build various AI applications and tools. The vulnerability was already patched but many internet-facing instances of the application remained unpatching, giving the AI agent an entry point. Many such instances host API keys, cloud service credentials, and database tokens, making them an attractive target for bad actors.

After compromising the target, the AI agent began scanning the system for any valuable information, including cloud service credentials, wallet addresses, API keys, and database passwords. It also located a storage server which had default administrator credentials. Researchers noted that JADEPUFFER used this server as a foothold to pivot to other systems on the network. 

The AI agent managed to establish persistence on the compromised system by implanting a backdoor which sent out requests to a remote command and control server. It then lateraled to the production database server and used the administrative privileges to exploit another vulnerability in the system configuration service. 

It then created its own administration account in the server using a default signing key and altered other configurations in the system. JADEPUFFER proceeded to encrypt over 1300 configuration entries, deleting them before encrypting more data and displaying a ransom note demanding payment in Bitcoins. However, the researchers noted that the ransomware used a randomly generated encryption key which was only viewable once. 

In addition, the ransomware did not store or transmit the decryption key in any way, meaning that the victims would be unable to recover their data even if they paid the ransom. In addition to encrypting data, JADEPUFFER also deleted several databases after claiming that it had backed up the data elsewhere. However, researchers at Sysdig found no evidence that the data had been successfully backed up or transferred. This indicated that the attackers might have been trying to extort more money from the victims, potentially by threatening to delete all data or hinder recovery efforts. 

The researchers concluded that the ransomware attack was performed by an artificial intelligence due to the nature of certain observed behaviors. They noted that most of the ransomware’s behaviors were documented in natural language within the malware’s code, a practice common in many large language models. Additionally, the AI was able to resolve some of its own errors, such as failed authentication attempts, without requiring human intervention. The researchers estimated that over 600 discrete actions had been taken by the AI during the attack. 

The researchers added that while many of the techniques used by JADEPUFFER had been seen in other ransomware attacks, the fact that an autonomous AI agent had been able to use them in succession to launch a major ransomware attack was notable. They believe that such an attack has significant implications for the future of ransomware attacks, as it reduces the level of expertise needed to launch such an attack and allows attacks to occur at a much faster rate than would otherwise be possible. 

The researchers recommended that organizations reduce the risk of falling victim to similar attacks by ensuring that all software is updated to the latest versions, keeping administration systems offline when possible, protecting cloud service credentials, and monitoring systems for signs of unauthorized automated activity. Sysdig noted that JADEPUFFER was a warning about the potential threat posed by agentic AI ransomware in the future as the technology becomes more advanced.

Fake Paysafe and Skrill SDKs on npm and PyPI Steal Developer Credentials

 

A coordinated supply-chain attack has compromised developers by distributing 17 malicious packages on npm and PyPI that impersonate legitimate SDKs for Paysafe, Skrill, and Neteller payment services. These packages were designed to silently exfiltrate sensitive credentials, including API keys, AWS tokens, GitHub secrets, and npm tokens, to a command-and-control server hosted on Amazon Web Services. 

The threat actor published these fake SDKs with names closely resembling official payment integration libraries, such as paysafe-checkout, skrill-payments, and paysafe-api. While the packages expose expected APIs and return fake success responses to avoid detection, their real purpose is credential theft. The embedded malware scans the compromised environment for secrets and exfiltrates them to the attacker's server. 

Security researchers at Socket identified 13 malicious npm packages and four PyPI packages in this campaign. The npm packages were released in four versions (1.0.0 to 1.0.3), while the PyPI packages had only one malicious version (1.0.0). The full list includes well-known names like paysafe-js, paysafe-fraud, skrill-sdk, neteller, and paysafe-kyc. Developers who installed any of these packages risked having their secrets stolen, especially if they were working on payment integration projects for these services. The data theft module in the npm packages attempts exfiltration only if a Paysafe API key is present and activates when the fake SDK is called. The PyPI packages automatically activate the data theft routine upon initialization and do not require a Paysafe API key to be present at all. 

The malware incorporates basic anti-analysis features to avoid detection in sandboxed or virtualized environments. For instance, it halts execution if it detects fewer than two CPU cores or if the hostname or username suggests a virtual machine. To detect potential compromise, organizations should search their dependency trees for the listed package names and scan CI/CD logs for PAYSAFE_API_KEY in combination with these packages. Denying requests for these packages at the registry proxy level is also recommended to prevent accidental installation. If any of the listed packages were installed, developers are recommended to immediately rotate all secrets on any machine that imported or executed this package. 

The researchers also advise searching dependency trees for the package names used in the campaign and deny any requests for them at the registry proxy level. It is also recommended to look in the logs of Continuous Integration (CI) systems for PAYSAFE_API_KEY in combination with any of the listed package names. Additionally, teams should audit their project dependencies and CI/CD pipelines to ensure no traces of these malicious packages remain. Staying vigilant and verifying package sources before installation remains crucial to avoiding similar supply-chain attacks in the future. This incident highlights the growing sophistication of attackers targeting open-source repositories and the critical need for robust software supply-chain security practices. 

Developers must remain cautious when integrating third-party libraries into their projects, especially those related to financial services and payment processing. The use of automated dependency scanning tools and regular security audits can help identify and mitigate risks associated with malicious packages. Furthermore, organizations should implement strict access controls and monitoring for their CI/CD environments to detect and respond to potential credential theft attempts quickly. By adopting a proactive security posture and staying informed about emerging threats, the developer community can better protect itself against evolving supply-chain attacks.

Rogue Agent Bug Could Have Let Attackers Hack AI Conversations


A critical vulnerability in Google’s Dialogflow could have let a hacker exploit other Code-Block-enabled agents via one Code Block-power agent, in one Google Cloud project.

After this, the attacker could read chats, steal user data, and command bots to send hacker-written texts such as re-entering a password.

Discovery of the bug

Cyber security firm Varonis discovered the tactic and called it ‘Rogue Agent.’ The bug impacted only businesses that make agents with custom Code Blocks and Dialogflow’s Playbooks, which allows hackers to add their own Python. The attack was not remote, or unauthorized.

For the attack to happen, it required the dialogflow.playbooks.update green light one such agent, which restricts the hacker to an infected insider or a breached developer account, not some stranger on the web. From that point, the reach extended to every agent inside the project.

Google has patched the bug, and Varonis and Google have said there are no signs that the flaw was deployed in a real attack or campaign.

Single writable file prompted each agent Code Blocks

Dialogflow’s Code Blocks allows developers to add custom Python to a chatbot’s flow to test input, invoke defined tools, and control behavior. 

The code runs within a Google-operated Cloud Run environment, and every agent that uses Code Blocks in the similar Google Cloud project shares one incident of it. The customer cannot control or see the environment that Google runs, meanwhile Varonis discovered no real separation between the agents within it.

Attack tactic

When the agent runs a Code Block, the code is added to internal setup code and sent to Python’s exec()function. The functions and variables that block can touch are defined by the setup. 

Functions consist(), which makes the bot reply with a given string, whereas variables consist of a history of full chats and state for session information such as the session ID.

Varonis discovered code_execution_env.py, the file that does this wrapping, lying in the shared environment with write access. 

As the file was writable, a single Code Block could change it. The block downloads an altered code_execution_env.py from a threat actor-controlled server and overwrites the original within the running container.

After that, the attacker’s variant commands every Code Block deployment throughout every agent that shares the environment. The attacker’s code sits in the same place as the real code, with similar access to respond(), state, and history, 

Accenture Confirms Cyber Breach as Hacker Lists Alleged Company Data


 

Accenture, a global IT services firm, has confirmed experiencing a cybersecurity breach as a threat actor claimed to have stolen company data and was offering it for sale on a cybercrime forum. The breach claim was made in relation to the dataset which was offered for sale on July 6 on a cybercrime forum for the cryptocurrency Monero (XMR).

According to the listing, the stolen documents originated from Accenture's internal environment, and were described as an "Accenture Data Breach." A threat actor claiming to be "888" reported that in July 2026, more than 35 gigabytes of data were exfiltrated from Accenture's systems. This confirmation follows the allegations by the threat actor. It is possible that the exposed source code and cloud credentials could pose broader security risks if they are authentic, giving unauthorized access to development environments, cloud infrastructures, or software repositories. 

However, no public evidence is available to indicate whether the alleged credentials remain valid or have been misused. An Azure DevOps repository associated with an Accenture domain has been claimed to be accessed by the threat actor, according to a screenshot that the threat actor has published to support this claim. However, the extent and authenticity of the alleged data have not been independently verified. 

Accenture confirmed the security incident, but did not verify the threat actor's claims regarding the reported 35 gigabytes of stolen data or the alleged content of the dataset. Additionally, the company has not disclosed how the attackers gained access, whether any customer information was compromised, or whether any of the credentials exposed remain active.

In addition, Accenture declined to disclose how the attackers gained access to the company or whether customer information had been compromised. This incident follows prior claims of cybersecurity breaches involving Accenture. The same threat actor claimed in 2024 that employee data had been compromised as a result of a third-party breach. 

Accenture later dispute the scale of these claims, stating its review revealed that only limited employee information had been discovered and no evidence of compromises to its own systems or customer environments. It was also targeted by the LockBit ransomware group in 2021. Earlier, in 2021, the company announced a breach following a LockBit ransomware attack. 

Cybercriminals are increasingly using underground marketplaces to monetize stolen corporate data, which highlights the continued risks organizations face from credential theft and source code exposure. Additional information regarding the extent of the breach and potential consequences for customers remains unknown as investigations continue.

Investigations are ongoing, but it remains unclear what the full scope of the incident is. Accenture has confirmed that a security breach occurred but has stated that operations remain unaffected. However, questions remain regarding the authenticity of the alleged dataset, the means by which the data was compromised, and any potential impacts on customers.

Microsoft 365 Users Targeted in New Device Code Phishing Campaign

 



Cybersecurity researchers have revealed a phishing campaign that is exploiting Microsoft's legitimate device authentication process to seize control of Microsoft 365 accounts, reflecting a broader shift in how cybercriminals are conducting identity-focused attacks. Rather than stealing passwords through counterfeit login pages, the operation manipulates victims into completing a genuine Microsoft authentication process, allowing attackers to obtain valid authentication tokens that grant direct access to compromised accounts.

The campaign, tracked by email security firm ZeroBEC, was observed between the final week of June and early July 2026. Investigators found that the attackers relied on collaboration-themed phishing lures that directed recipients to Microsoft's authentic device login experience instead of fraudulent credential harvesting websites. Behind the scenes, a backend broker generated Microsoft device authentication codes and continuously polled the authentication process until victims completed the sign-in sequence, enabling the attackers to capture valid authentication tokens without ever collecting passwords.

Researchers noted that the activity closely resembles techniques previously documented by Microsoft in its investigation of the threat cluster known as Storm-2372. That campaign, first disclosed in February 2025, used fake Microsoft Teams invitations and messaging-themed social engineering to persuade victims to enter attacker-generated device codes. Once authentication was completed, the attackers received valid access tokens that allowed them to take over Microsoft 365 accounts. Microsoft said Storm-2372 had targeted organizations across government, defense, healthcare, telecommunications, higher education, information technology, energy, and non-governmental sectors spanning Europe, North America, Africa, and the Middle East. The company also stated that the attacks abused legitimate authentication functionality rather than exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft products.

Although the latest campaign mirrors many of Storm-2372's tactics, ZeroBEC believes the operation is powered by a reusable phishing framework called DEBULL rather than the original threat actor itself. The researchers concluded that techniques once associated with advanced threat groups are now being packaged into reusable infrastructure that enables multiple operators to launch similar attacks with far less effort. This evolution reflects the continuing commercialization of identity-focused phishing operations, where sophisticated attack methods are increasingly offered through phishing-as-a-service platforms instead of being developed independently by individual threat actors.

At the center of the campaign is device code phishing, an attack technique that abuses the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant, a legitimate authentication mechanism designed for devices that cannot easily support traditional browser-based sign-ins. The workflow is commonly used by devices such as smart televisions, printers, conference room equipment, and other systems with limited input capabilities. Instead of entering credentials directly on those devices, users receive a short verification code that must be entered on another device through Microsoft's official authentication portal to complete the login process.

Threat actors exploit the separation between the device requesting authentication and the browser used to authorize it. Rather than creating counterfeit Microsoft login pages, attackers initiate their own device authentication session, obtain a legitimate verification code from Microsoft, and deliver that code to victims through convincing phishing emails. When recipients unknowingly enter the supplied code into Microsoft's authentic login page and complete the sign-in process, they authorize the attackers' session instead of their own, handing over valid authentication tokens that can be used to access Microsoft 365 resources. Because the victim is interacting with a genuine Microsoft service, traditional indicators of phishing, such as suspicious URLs or fake login portals, are largely absent.

Security researchers have increasingly warned that device code phishing represents a natural evolution of identity attacks. As organizations strengthened defenses against conventional credential phishing and adversary-in-the-middle attacks, threat actors shifted toward abusing trusted authentication workflows that require no password theft and can effectively circumvent multi-factor authentication protections by obtaining legitimate session tokens directly from users. Proofpoint recently reported a sharp increase in device code phishing activity during 2026, attributing the growth to publicly available criminal toolkits and the rapid expansion of phishing-as-a-service platforms that have made these techniques accessible to a wider range of cybercriminals.

ED Charge Sheet Maps Sriki's Darknet Crypto Laundering Network

 

The Enforcement Directorate (ED) has filed a sprawling 3,500-page prosecution complaint before a special PMLA court in Bengaluru, laying out what it calls a “sophisticated network” blending high-level hacking, darknet operations, cyber extortion and multi-crore cryptocurrency laundering. The charge sheet names serial hacker Srikrishna Ramesh, alias “Sriki”, crypto trader Robin Khandelwal, businessman Sunish Hegde, a private IT firm and two of its officials as accused in a case that spans breached government portals, crypto exchanges and online gaming platforms. 

From government portals to poker sites: the alleged breach chain 

According to the ED, Sriki, described as a highly skilled software programmer, exploited vulnerabilities in national and international cryptocurrency exchanges, online gaming and poker platforms, and corporate servers. He is accused of breaching the Karnataka government’s e-procurement portal and siphoning off about ₹11.5 crore in two transactions, besides hacking the Unocoin exchange and several major online poker platforms. The agency alleges that stolen virtual digital assets such as Bitcoin were then “layered” and offloaded through multiple international crypto platforms to obscure their origin.

The prosecution complaint details how Robin Khandelwal allegedly acted as a key conduit, converting illicit digital assets into fiat currency through over-the-counter deals and crypto-trading channels. Investigators claim Sunish Hegde conspired with Sriki to extort money from hacked companies by negotiating with them after the breaches, while Infinzy Solutions and two officials are accused of facilitating the transfer of funds stolen from a poker site. The three main accused were arrested in May and are in judicial custody at Parappana Agrahara Central Prison, with the ED citing digital evidence, blockchain analysis and bank records to support its case. 

 Darknet links and ongoing money trail probes 

The 3,500-page document reportedly sketches connections between Sriki’s hacking operations and darknet marketplaces, building on earlier investigations that noted his use of the darknet to purchase drugs using Bitcoin. About ₹7 crore of the ₹11.5 crore siphoned from the e-procurement portal has been traced, with around ₹2 crore formally attached and another ₹5 crore frozen in various bank accounts; the remaining ₹4.5 crore is still being tracked. The ED says its probe into the movement and use of the alleged proceeds of crime is continuing, even as the prosecution complaint functions as the equivalent of a police charge sheet under PMLA. 


For regulators, the Sriki case underscores how advanced technical skills, weak spots in government and corporate platforms, and an evolving crypto ecosystem can intersect to create large-scale financial crime. The dossier highlights the need for stronger blockchain forensics capacity, tighter oversight of informal crypto-OCT channels, and better coordination between cybercrime units, the ED and financial intelligence agencies. As India’s digital economy expands, securing e-governance portals, exchanges and gaming platforms is becoming not just an IT issue, but a core element of financial integrity and national cybersecurity strategy.