Security researchers have found a way to defeat the memory protections that Intel and AMD sell to cloud customers as their last line of defense against an untrusted host. The tool required costs less than a decent pair of headphones.
A team from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google published details Sunday of an attack called DDRop, which exploits a fundamental design flaw in the memory encryption hardware powering confidential computing services at Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. It breaks protections in Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX), Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization-Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP), the three technologies that allow cloud customers to run workloads that even the cloud provider cannot read.
The method does not require a software exploit. It requires a small custom-built circuit board, a brief window of physical access to the server, and knowledge of how DDR5 memory commands work. The researchers built their device for $159 in parts.
The Gap Nobody Patched
Confidential computing encrypts a server's working memory at all times. Even a cloud provider's own administrator sees only scrambled data. The problem DDRop exposes is that encryption is not the same thing as freshness. The processor can confirm that data in memory is encrypted. It cannot confirm that data is current. Stale data, so long as it was encrypted legitimately at some point in the past, will still decrypt correctly and raise no alarm.
DDRop turns that gap into an attack. A small interposer board sits between the processor and a DDR5 memory module. When the attacker wants to cancel a specific memory write, the interposer forces a parity error on the command bus. The memory module silently discards the write. The interposer then cuts the wire used to report that error, so the processor is never notified. Old data stays in memory. The system has no way to know the latest update never arrived.
This is the first active interposer attack to run on DDR5 at full bus speed. Earlier DDR5 research required slowing the memory bus down and could only listen passively. Previous active attacks that altered memory contents only worked on older DDR4 hardware, DDR5's redesigned command format blocked them. DDRop routes around that entirely by dropping writes rather than redirecting them.
What the Researchers Pulled Off
On an Intel TDX server, the team demonstrated four outcomes. By dropping writes to page tables during setup, they mapped an attacker's virtual machine onto any physical memory address, then read a victim machine's private memory in full. They also flipped a victim machine into debug mode, copied its memory in plaintext, and restored everything afterward with no trace of tampering.
The most consequential result was attestation forgery. Attestation is the mechanism a hospital or bank uses to verify that the virtual machine handling their data is the one they approved and has not been altered. With DDRop, an attacker's machine can pass that check as though it were a trusted one. A customer could be convinced they are talking to a secure, verified environment when they are not.
On AMD SEV-SNP, results were narrower the researchers copied the contents of one victim memory page into another but the underlying exposure is the same. Neither platform checks whether memory is fresh.
No Patch, No Timeline
Both Intel and AMD acknowledged DDRop through coordinated disclosure before publication and issued security advisories on September 14. Neither offered a mitigation timeline. Both drew the same line: because the attack requires physical access, it falls outside their published threat model for confidential computing. Intel said it will not assign a CVE.
The researchers are direct about why a software fix cannot solve this. The freshness check was deliberately left out. Scalable memory encryption trades freshness for the ability to protect the large amounts of memory that cloud servers require. A lasting fix would need new memory-encryption hardware capable of providing both integrity and freshness at scale. Intel has discussed a future proposal called cache-line versioning, but has not committed to a timeline and researchers say it is unclear whether it would stop DDRop anyway.
Short-term software measures restricting the memory management interfaces DDRop abuses, checking that critical writes completed, scanning for interposers at boot, can raise the bar without removing the root cause.
The researchers have no evidence DDRop has been used outside a lab. But the significance is what it proves is possible. Confidential computing is the technical promise that certain workloads stay private regardless of who owns the physical hardware. DDRop shows that promise has a physical boundary that can be crossed with $159 in components, a few minutes of access, and knowledge that a rogue data center employee, supply chain tamperer, or government compulsion order could all plausibly provide.
The full paper is scheduled for presentation at ACM CCS 2026 in November. Hardware designs, firmware, and proof-of-concept code are already on GitHub.
The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) launched and alert to the financial industry besides a detailed study of over 33,000 cyber fraud cases reported between September 2023 and December 2025. According to the report, around $12.7 billion was stolen in a cryptocurrency investment scam from American victims in the US.
As per Treasury Department official Gene Lange, “The transnational criminal organizations behind these scams exploit both emerging technologies and human vulnerabilities, resulting in devastating financial losses for innocent American victims.”
The report is prepared on the basis of reports given by around 1,300 financial organizations and is linked to a 2023 alert from the Treasury about pig butchering scams. FinCen discovered that the rate of scam operations is rising as the schemes go beyond centers in Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia.
Scammers use distinct profiles, from financial adviser to romantic partner, and force people into sending money, either via cryptocurrency or with traditional bank transfers.
Significant reports were received from cryptocurrency firms, which found around $5.5 billion in suspicious scam activity.
Traditional banks reported around $6.4 billion in possible friends, saying they “often detected schemes when a victim sent funds to an [financial institution] in the digital asset sector to purchase digital assets, or when a customer sent a wire transfer to a scam-affiliated beneficiary, frequently referencing digital asset investments.”
The report finds that few victims sent applications for second mortgages and loans as part of their involvement in a scam.
More financial institutions note thousands of incidents where targets liquidated their investment accounts to try wiring transfers or fund digital assess to scammer-related accounts. According to the report, “[A financial institution] involved in the digital assets sector reported an older adult victim transferred nearly $640,000 from her retirement fund to send to a suspected scammer in connection with an apparent digital asset investment scheme.”
“The victim stated she met an individual over social media who instructed her to invest in an apparently fictitious digital asset-related company.”
Another victim took out around $150,000 from his retirement account, withdrew credit on his home, and withdrew a personal loan to send the money to a scammer who pretended to be his digital romantic partner, and wanted to invest the money in a venture.
The filings noted the use of coins like USD Coin (USDC), Ethereum, and Tether (USDT), but 18 more coins were found in the reports.
When a phishing simulation returns a low click rate, security teams tend to relax. Leadership checks a compliance box. The program gets renewed. But a major new study suggests that sense of relief may be completely misplaced.
Oslo-based cybersecurity firm Pistachio released its Phishing Behaviour Report 2026 this week, built from 2.47 million simulated phishing attacks sent to more than 123,000 employees across 1,200-plus organizations between June 2025 and May 2026. The finding that runs through all of it: the click rate, which most phishing programs live and die by, is the wrong thing to measure.
"A low click rate can create a false sense of security," said Joe Jones, CEO and co-founder of Pistachio. "What matters more is what happens next: does the employee hand over credentials, recognize the attack and stop, or report it so the wider business can act?"
A click alone does nothing. Credentials do.
Clicking a phishing link causes no damage on its own. The actual risk begins when an employee submits a password or other sensitive information into a fake login page after clicking. That is the moment a simulated test becomes a real-world breach scenario, and it is largely what most phishing programs do not track.
On their very first simulated phishing exercise, more employees in the Pistachio study reported the suspicious email than clicked it. That sounds like good news. The problem is that 1.57% handed over their credentials anyway. In a company with 500 employees, that works out to roughly eight people who will submit login details to a convincing enough lure with zero prior exposure. Click rate metrics would not flag any of them.
Tech workers are not the safe bet they are assumed to be
One of the more uncomfortable findings in the report concerns employees who are expected to know better. Tech development workers clicked at least one simulated phishing attempt at a rate of 30.27%. IT workers were not far behind at 28.53%.
The assumption that technical employees carry lower phishing risk because they understand how attacks work does not hold up against the data. Understanding how phishing operates and catching a convincing one under inbox pressure are two different things.
Construction carries the most risk. Financial services carry the least.
The gap between industries was wider than most organization-wide risk scores would suggest. Construction workers showed the highest click rate of any department at 41.31% and the highest credential leak rate at 16.47%. Design workers, by contrast, clicked at just 26.35%.
Financial services employees topped every resilience category in the study, which carries some irony. Financial services accounted for 27.7% of all observed phishing attempts in 2025, making it one of the most targeted sectors on the internet. That sustained pressure, combined with strict regulatory requirements and mandatory security training, appears to have produced genuinely more vigilant employees at the individual level.
Health workers showed the lowest reporting rate of any department at 13.17%, despite a relatively low click rate. Logistics workers combined an above-average click rate with a below-average reporting rate of 17.11%. In both cases, the click rate alone would present a more reassuring picture than the full data supports.
Things get worse before they get better
Organizations running 12-month programs saw click rates and credential submission rates both rise through the first six months before declining. That initial rise reflects harder and more frequent testing rather than employees regressing. At the six-month mark, employees were receiving an average of 3.5 simulations per person, with 50.4% classified as hard difficulty.
From that six-month peak to the 12-month stage, clicks declined by 27% and credential leaks by 41%. The report-to-click ratio increased from 1.3 at three months to 1.8 at 12 months, indicating that suspicious messages were reported nearly twice as often as they were clicked by the end of the program.
Organizations that run a single phishing simulation and judge the program from that result are drawing conclusions from the noisiest and least reliable moment in the entire training cycle.
What to track instead
The report does not argue that click rates should be dropped entirely. It argues they should sit alongside credential submission rates and reporting rates, which together give a far more accurate picture of actual resilience. Making it easy for employees to report suspicious emails, through one-click tools and fast confirmation, converts the workforce into an active detection channel rather than a passive one.
NIST research found that 72% of organizations use phishing simulation click rates to gauge training effectiveness. By that measure, nearly three quarters of corporate security awareness programs are optimizing for an incomplete signal, in a threat environment where AI-driven phishing has pushed click rates among untrained employees to a record high of 54% in 2026.
The click rate was never the whole story. At this point, relying on it alone is a liability.
Modu-ui stores participants’ personal details such as email addresses, names, and startup ideas, and the platform also supports a nationwide startup audition overseen by SMEs and Startups (MSS) of the South Korean Ministry.
Suspicions were already raised a month prior to the reported data breach that applicants’ personal data could be structured and exposed via API responses inside the platform. The government said it had taken prompt action but did not reveal if it had upgraded Modu-ui’s security infrastructure.
In June, the Ministry of SMEs and Startups disclosed that summaries of startup ideas and personal details had been exposed. Later, it started a detailed enquiry along with National Police Agency, National Intelligence Service, and the Cyber Security Center.
In July, the agencies confirmed that the leak of encoding keys via an API was the reason for the startup idea and personal data leak.
The exposed data had already been encoded but the encoded data needs an encoding key decoding.
In this case, the encoding key was leaked along with the API data, causing in the leak of evaluation comments, startup idea summaries and email addresses related to 5000 successful applicants.
According to the Ministry, the encoding key had been included inside the API and a third party retrieved API data via methods like web crawling, causing the exposure of the key.
Private email addresses were not shown on the public-facing interface but officials believed they could be retrieved via AI-based web crawling.
The incidents also demonstrate the dangers of hard-coding encoding keys as fixed values inside databases, application code, similar environments, or databases.
When businesses follow this method, the keys can become vulnerable in addition to the data or systems they are meant to protect. The main reason for this incident can be viewed as security infrastructure failure in incorporating robust encoding key management.
Officials found 39 IP addresses related to the access of the exposed data coming from South Korea. Authorities also said that investigations led to more details such as potential connections to AI solution providers.
GitLab on September 10 shipped emergency patches for a maximum-severity vulnerability that lets unauthenticated attackers read arbitrary files off a server and by the following morning, attackers were already hunting for unpatched instances.
The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-85706, carries a CVSS score of 10.0, the highest rating a vulnerability can receive. It sits inside GitLab's repository commits API, where improper path confinement combined with missing authentication enforcement allows an outside attacker to break out of the intended directory structure and pull files from elsewhere on the server. According to watchTowr, the firm that first flagged in-the-wild activity, those files include log entries and GitLab-specific configuration files that may contain credentials, secrets, and sensitive system details.
The requirement for exploitation is notably low. A GitLab instance needs at least one public project for the attack to work and no credentials are required at all.
"watchTowr Intel is already observing in-the-wild probes for the latest critical GitLab path traversal vulnerability, CVE-2026-85706, which allows attackers to read arbitrary files in a single HTTP request," the firm said on September 11, noting that scanning activity had begun as early as 06:00 UTC that morning, within hours of GitLab's patch publication the day before.
Jake Knott, head of threat intelligence at watchTowr, told this publication: "The appeal to attackers of GitLab is obvious, as unauthorized access allows an attacker to gain access to source code, CI/CD secrets, credentials, and the ability to inject code into build pipelines, gaining access or poisoning anything downstream of it, which as we've seen throughout this year has been a favorite of attackers."
What Gets Exposed
GitLab sits at the center of most software delivery pipelines. A server running GitLab may hold proprietary source code, container build definitions, infrastructure-as-code configurations, API keys baked into CI/CD scripts, deployment credentials, and runner access tokens. A vulnerability that lets an outside party read files off the server without logging in is effectively a master key to an organization's software supply chain.
CISA, which added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 11, noted that arbitrary file disclosure can help attackers identify credentials, configuration details, and other information useful for follow-on intrusion activity. The agency also flagged the vulnerability under Binding Operational Directive 26-04, requiring forensic triage because some affected instances may have been accessed before patches were even available.
Knott warned that full-scale exploitation is not far off: "Based on the history, the transition of this vulnerability to indiscriminate mass exploitation is likely not far away, and defenders have limited time to act."
Two More Critical Bugs in the Same Release
The patch bundle that addressed CVE-2026-85706 also closed two additional high-severity vulnerabilities, making this one of GitLab's more consequential security updates in recent memory.
The second issue, CVE-2026-87719, carries a CVSS score of 9.9. It is an insecure deserialization flaw inside the GraphQL subscription serializer that affects only GitLab Enterprise Edition. An attacker who already holds an authenticated account with Duo Chat access can submit a specially crafted GraphQL subscription argument to bypass serialization controls and trigger server-side object lookup, potentially exposing Advanced Search instance configurations and sensitive credentials. Unlike the path traversal issue, this one requires an existing foothold — but an insider, a compromised account, or an attacker who has already gained limited access could use it to escalate what they can see.
A third vulnerability, CVE-2026-88765, is a buffer overflow in GitLab EE's Unicode conversion wrapper with a CVSS score of 8.5 that could allow an authenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution by importing a specially crafted Git project export. The overflow occurs during Advanced Search indexing, which means any instance that accepts project imports is in scope.
All three vulnerabilities are fixed in GitLab versions 19.3.2, 19.2.6, and 19.1.8, released September 10. GitLab.com and GitLab Dedicated customers do not need to take action the fixes were applied on their behalf.
A Pattern That Is Getting Harder to Ignore
CVE-2026-85706 is not an isolated incident. It is the second critical GitLab vulnerability to come under active exploitation within days of disclosure in roughly six weeks.
In August, GitLab released an emergency security update outside its normal twice-monthly schedule to address CVE-2026-19478, a code injection vulnerability in its GraphQL API carrying a CVSS score of 9.4. That flaw allowed unauthenticated attackers to modify or delete publicly accessible projects and user data through a GraphQL directive, requiring no credentials and no user interaction.
WatchTowr warned at the time that it was able to reproduce that vulnerability within minutes of disclosure, armed only with GitLab's advisory details and the patch itself. Exploitation followed within roughly 48 hours.
Knott made the connection explicit: "This is the second instance of a critical-severity GitLab vulnerability in recent weeks, following the previous GraphQL code injection (CVE-2026-19478) that was almost immediately actively exploited."
Internet-wide scanning data puts the number of self-managed GitLab instances reachable on standard web ports at more than 20,000, based on Shodan and Censys lookups, with a meaningful share still running versions inside the vulnerable range days after patches ship. That pool of exposed servers gives attackers a large, persistent target and the repeated pattern of fast exploitation suggests that, at minimum, automated scanning tools are picking up GitLab advisories and moving on them within hours.
What Defenders Need to Do Now
CISA has given Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies until September 14 to apply the fix. Private sector organizations running self-managed GitLab do not have a regulatory deadline, but the window between disclosure and mass exploitation has been narrowing with each successive GitLab vulnerability this year.
Any internet-facing instance should be treated as potentially compromised until confirmed otherwise if it was exposed before September 10, because active in-the-wild probes began at 06:00 UTC on September 11, meaning any unpatched server was under active attack within hours of the patch release.
Knott recommended a specific log-hunting approach for teams that cannot patch immediately: review HTTP POST requests to /api/v4/projects/{id}/repository/commits/ URIs containing file.Path parameters. Any hits in those logs before the patch was applied are worth investigating as potential exploitation attempts.
Because successful exploitation can expose sensitive server-side files, organizations with vulnerable internet-accessible instances should also evaluate whether credentials or secrets accessible to the GitLab process require rotation.
Single-node GitLab instances will experience downtime during the upgrade because database migrations must complete before GitLab can start, while multi-node instances can apply the patch without downtime by following proper zero-downtime upgrade procedures. Version 19.3.2 also includes post-deploy migrations that run after the upgrade completes.
The vulnerability was discovered by a researcher using the handle 's3ntago' and reported through GitLab's HackerOne bug bounty program. No attribution for CVE-2026-87719 or CVE-2026-88765 has been publicly confirmed at this time.
Infoblox discovered that around 65,000 earlier previously registered domains are re-registered everyday, showing around one in five newly found domains,
When a domain is dead, the history does not vanish immediately. The domain may still consist of traffic, backlinks, search-engine visibility, and an image built when it was in legitimate use previously.
Attackers can buy these domains and exploit the existing digital footprint. This can make a malicious infrastructure less dangerous than an entirely new domain.
The tactic is usually called “dropcatchin”. Instead of making new sites from scratch, threat actors buy domains that have already created some level of visibility and trust.
One of the largest campaigns detected by Infoblox is an attacker called Sable Squirrel. According to experts, the group has control over 10,000 domains and believe that it has invested over $7 million buying expired domains.
“This actor has spent years turning other people’s domain history into its own criminal infrastructure, then using that infrastructure to run illegal sports streaming, online gambling promotion, and malware command-and-control (C2) side by side,” Infoblox said.
Majority of the domains support a large gambling operation and sports streaming aimed mostly at Asian users, But experts found that some of the same infrastructure was utilised for command and control (C2) operations.
Infoblox found over 31000 malware samples interacting with Sable Squirrel infrastructure such as njRAT, Remcos, NanoCore, DCRat, AsnycRAT, and Quasar RAT additionally with samples linked to HiddenTear ransomware. Experts confirmed 405 domains being exploited as malware command-and-control infrastructure.
Sable Squirrel was not the only group using dead domains, Infoblox also detected groups such as Swiping Squirrel, Shady Squirrel and Stuffy Squirrel. Some groups buy domains previously associated with malicious activity and exploit the existing traffic to redirect targets towards malware, advertising fraud, or scams.
Sable Squirrel’s main business is gambling, but it masks it as a streaming operation, while also doubling as an acquisition channel for the same.
“In Sable Squirrel’s hands, the domain becomes more than an address. It is the unit of trust, the traffic source, the brand surface, the routing layer, and, in some cases, the control channel,” said Infoblox.
Nintendo has issued an urgent security advisory for owners of the original Switch console, warning of a flaw that could allow an attacker in close physical proximity to run unauthorized code on the device or pull data stored on it, simply by scanning a QR code displayed on the screen.
The vulnerability, catalogued as CVE-2026-82079, sits inside the console's local wireless networking stack and is classified as a stack-based buffer overflow, a type of memory corruption flaw in which a program writes more data into a fixed-length block of memory than it can hold. According to the technical record logged on OpenCVE, an attacker within wireless range can send specially crafted network packets that overflow this buffer and hijack the execution path of the device using a technique called return-oriented programming, which chains together fragments of existing code to carry out malicious instructions.
The bug affects all Nintendo Switch consoles running firmware earlier than version 23.0.0. The Switch 2 is not affected.
Where the QR code comes in
The attack is not theoretical in isolation, but it does require a specific scenario to work. The vulnerability surfaces when the console generates a QR code as part of its "Send to Smartphone" feature inside the Album application, which players use to transfer screenshots and video clips to a mobile device. It also appears when the local wireless function is active during a session of Mario Kart Live: Home Circuit, a game that pairs a real-world physical kart with the console.
In both cases, a QR code is briefly displayed on the Switch screen or the connected TV. Nintendo's advisory states that an attacker would need to physically scan that code while it is visible. If they manage to do so, the console becomes vulnerable to arbitrary code execution or information disclosure.
Nintendo said it has no evidence the flaw has been exploited in the wild as of September 10. The company also did not say that the vulnerability could be used to steal Nintendo account credentials, though it acknowledged that more serious exploits could theoretically be built on top of it.
Update now, or take these precautions
The fix is straightforward: install system update 23.0.0. Consoles connected to the internet will pull the update automatically, but players should verify the installation has completed in the console's System Settings under System and then System Update.
For players who cannot update immediately, Nintendo recommends keeping QR codes out of sight during photo and video sharing sessions. The company also advises against using another person's smartphone when transferring media, and against letting anyone else use their kart during a Mario Kart Live: Home Circuit session, since either scenario could create an opportunity for an attacker to scan the code.
How exposed is the player base
The scope of this issue is substantial purely because of how many original Switch units are in circulation. The original Switch has shipped over 155.92 million lifetime units as of March 31, 2026, making it one of the best-selling consoles ever made. Even with the Switch 2 now in the market, tens of millions of households around the world are still running the original hardware day to day.
Nintendo said the flaw was discovered and reported by external security researchers, though it did not name them in its advisory, which was published on September 10.
The practical risk of this exploit being triggered in a real-world attack is relatively narrow. An attacker would need to be physically close to the device, see the QR code on screen, and scan it within the brief window it is displayed. That is a more demanding set of conditions than most software vulnerabilities require. But the potential consequence, unauthorized code execution on the console, is serious enough that Nintendo moved quickly to patch it, and players should move just as quickly to install that patch.