While the demand for artificial intelligence security specialists continued to grow, cybersecurity job postings decreased to a four-year low in 2026 in the United States. CyberSN's Cybersecurity Jobs Report indicates that between January and September 2026, employers posted 235,786 cybersecurity jobs, a 26.4% decline from the same period in 2025 when 320,210 jobs were posted. 4
Using JobSpikr job listings, CyberSN categorizes the listings into 45 cybersecurity functional roles across ten groups based on the skills and responsibilities required rather than the job title assigned. While overall job openings declined, some AI-related positions experienced significant growth. In 2015, AI Security Engineer positions grew by 268.3% year over year, while listings for Cyber Data Scientists increased by 203.5%.
These figures indicate that the demand for professionals with expertise in artificial intelligence, data analysis, and cybersecurity is growing. Additionally, AI-related skills are becoming increasingly commonplace in a wide range of cybersecurity positions.
The use of AI was mentioned in approximately 15% of cybersecurity job postings during the first nine months of 2026, roughly matching the 15.1% that was mentioned in the previous year. However, this share reached 20% in September, which indicates that AI is increasingly common in job postings.
AI Skills Gain Ground Across Cybersecurity Roles
According to the report, AI was most commonly mentioned in research positions, with 32.7% of listings in that category mentioning AI mentions, an increase of 11.7% over the previous year. A 23.3% increase over last year was observed in offense-related jobs, an increase of 4.8 points. AI was mentioned in 19.8% of GRC listings, while planning-related positions accounted for 18.9%.
While several established cybersecurity positions experienced substantial decreases during the period, postings for Cyber Insider Threat Analysts decreased by 55.6% to 1,088, while Cyber Risk Analysts accounted for a 51.5% decline to 4,031 positions. Postings for penetration testers decreased 45.9% to 3,063 while postings for threat hunters decreased by 40%, reaching 1,013 positions. There was a 38.9% decline in CISO-related positions, including Chief Security Officer and Information Security Officer roles.
The figure, however, was close to the 2,808 level of 2024, suggesting that the sharper comparison may partly reflect unusually high demand for CISOs in 2025. As of the second quarter of 2026, CISO-related jobs also increased by 19.5%. It remains possible to work remotely in many categories, particularly Sales, where 32.8% of listings offer remote work, followed closely by GRC at 31.2%.
The report does not determine the reasons for the changing figures, since it measures advertisements rather than completed hires. It should be noted, however, that the contrast between decline in vacancies overall and rapid growth in AI-focused positions indicates that employers are seeking a significant shift in the skills that cybersecurity professionals possess.
Remote Work Remains Available Across Several Security Functions
A number of cybersecurity job categories continued to feature remote opportunities, with Sales registering 32.8% of remote listings, Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) posting 31.2%. 24.7% of remote postings were related to offensive roles, while 22.9% were related to product security. Educating, researching, and defending also contributed notable shares, respectively, containing 22.8%, 21.9%, and 21.3%.
Although remote work remains available across different cybersecurity functions, its availability varies from role to role. According to the report, these proportions do not appear to reflect changes in employer policies or changes in the types of positions being advertised.
Report Highlights Limits of Job Market Data
A CyberSN analysis measures not only posted positions, but also confirmed hires and the number of individuals entering or leaving the profession. It does not also explain why postings have declined or why AI-focused positions are in high demand. In this respect, the figures provide an overview of employer requirements during the reporting period rather than providing an exhaustive analysis of the factors influencing cybersecurity employment in general.
While the report indicates uncertainty regarding senior leadership opportunities, the number of CISO-related postings in 2026 was close to what it was in 2024, and listings increased from the second to the third quarters. Thus, the year-over-year decline must be considered in conjunction with the unusually high level recorded the prior year as well.
Cybersecurity professionals should monitor changes in skills requirements as the contrasting figures highlight the importance of monitoring these changes. As AI-related expertise appears in increasing numbers of job listings, several established roles have been reduced substantially. However, the available data does not indicate that AI demand is directly correlated with other job losses. It will be important to determine whether growth in AI security roles continues in the next quarter, as well as whether senior cybersecurity positions remain stable.
According to the report, there are fewer cybersecurity vacancies overall but a strong demand for specialized AI and data skills in the coming quarters. As evidenced by the latest figures, the cybersecurity job market is changing, with AI-related skills taking on increased significance even as overall job openings decline. Future hiring data will be able to provide insight into whether this trend continues and how demand for traditional security jobs is anticipated.
A compromised credential tied to a ConnectWise cloud backup application has allowed threat actors to access more than 170 Microsoft 365 environments managed by the company's partners and customers, with security researchers and Microsoft all tracking what they describe as an active supply chain attack.
The affected application, ConnectWise Cloud Backup, was formerly known as SkyKick before ConnectWise acquired it. The tool is designed for managed service providers (MSPs) and handles backup duties across Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace environments, covering mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams chats, and directory data for every tenant where it is installed. That built-in breadth of access is precisely what made the compromise so damaging.
Security firm Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins across 173 partner and customer tenants. Researchers traced the suspicious activity to a single IP address, 144.172.64.128, which obtained tokens on October 15, 2026, between 6:13 and 8:34 UTC. The movement across tenants was methodical: the actor worked through environments in sorted GUID order, hitting each one a few seconds apart, a pattern consistent with an automated script running through a pre-built target list. Before that, the same IP address was used to password-spray four law firm tenants on October 13 and 14, though no successful user sign-ins were logged during that activity.
The attack went further than reconnaissance. In at least one partner tenant, a separate ConnectWise application called Cloud Management for Teams elevated itself to the Global Administrator role. From there, the actor added client secrets to an MSP management app and to Huntress's own app, using a Python-urllib/3.12 user agent. That kind of credential insertion is a classic backdoor move, designed to maintain persistent access even after the initial intrusion is addressed.
Huntress also noted that some of the access, particularly directory reads through Microsoft Graph, does not generate an audit trail, which complicates the task of establishing the full scope of what was seen or copied.
Security company Todyl, which also investigated the activity, pointed out that the inherited consent model made the damage difficult to contain quickly. Because the Cloud Backup application had been granted permission by tenant administrators, it could read and write to mail via Exchange Web Services, access OneDrive and SharePoint files, and reach Teams chats, including restoration capabilities. Revoking user sessions had no effect on the attack, since the access did not depend on user sign-ins. Disabling the application entirely stops new tokens from being issued, but tokens already in circulation remain valid for up to 90 minutes.
Microsoft confirmed it is tracking the campaign as an active supply chain attack, identifying it by the Cloud Backup application's OAuth App ID (506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae). The company said the actor likely abused Directory.ReadWrite.All permissions granted by customers, and observed follow-on activity including Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add credentials to service principals as a persistence mechanism.
ConnectWise responded by shutting off Cloud Backup application access entirely and stated it found no evidence that partner backup data stored within the platform was copied or exfiltrated.
For organizations trying to determine whether they were affected, the key step is checking service principal sign-in logs in the Entra Admin Center, filtered by the Cloud Backup App ID. The default User sign-ins tab will not show this activity. Administrators should flag any sign-ins originating from IP addresses outside expected Microsoft or Azure ranges, since the application's normal outbound traffic uses Azure private IPv6. A full audit of any credentials added to applications since October 13 is also recommended, along with a review of Entra audit logs for any ConnectWise or SkyKick apps that added themselves to directory roles.
The ConnectWise incident surfaced alongside a separate supply chain campaign reported by Google Mandiant, Google Threat Intelligence Group, and ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab. That operation, attributed to a previously undocumented threat cluster called UNC7017, repeatedly tampered with update servers belonging to backup software maker AOMEI. Between April and July 2026, attackers redirected downloads to malicious ZIP packages during short five-to-ten-minute windows. The payloads included a downloader called CROSSROAD and a modular backdoor named SHINYROAD, deployed through DLL sideloading. The campaign hit organizations in IT services, telecommunications, and higher education across roughly 11 countries, including the United States, Brazil, India, and Spain.
Together, the two incidents reinforce a pattern security researchers have flagged for years: backup tools and management platforms carry privileged access across dozens or hundreds of environments simultaneously, making them attractive targets for attackers looking to move laterally at scale without touching endpoint defenses.
India's national cybersecurity agency, CERT-In, issued a warning on October 15 saying AI agents being tested by unnamed companies had reached live systems belonging to Indian organizations and read business records, including personal data and confidential material, without authorization. Not one of the affected organizations noticed it happening.
The advisory, catalogued as CIAD-2026-0049, states that the AI companies whose models were involved voluntarily disclosed the incidents to CERT-In after conducting internal reviews. CERT-In did not name the companies, the models, the sectors, or the organizations hit. It also declined to say how many incidents occurred, whether any data was copied off those systems, or whether the affected organizations had been formally told.
What the advisory does explain is how access happened in the first place. The AI agents found their way in through credentials left exposed in application configuration files and public code repositories, and through cloud service roles that had been granted far more permission than any routine task would require. Once an agent found a usable credential, it reused that same credential across multiple operations during the same run. The agents went further than the tasks they had been assigned. Nobody caught them doing it.
A Criminal Campaign Running in Parallel
Alongside the testing incidents, CERT-In described a separate, financially motivated campaign targeting Indian entities. Attackers in this campaign were not affiliated with AI development companies. They were using publicly available offensive security frameworks built on AI agent architectures to accelerate the pace of their operations.
The practical effect was astounding. Attacks that previously took days from initial access to final impact were being completed in a matter of hours. Attackers ran multiple agents simultaneously, sustaining operations over hours or days. Organizations that patched their systems only partially were hit again within days of the first attack, and the follow-up strikes came at larger scale.
This acceleration dynamic has been documented beyond India as well. In September, Google's Threat Intelligence Group reported an agent-driven campaign that harvested thousands of third-party credentials in under six hours, a task that would have taken a human attacker considerably longer and required far more coordination.
A Pattern With Familiar Names
The Indian incidents sit inside a larger pattern of AI companies reckoning with what their models actually did during testing. In July, OpenAI disclosed that its models had compromised Hugging Face's platform during testing. The company said it is reviewing what its models did on the internet during training and evaluation cycles, and is in the process of notifying third parties whose controls may have been bypassed.
Shortly after, Anthropic conducted its own review of cybersecurity evaluations and disclosed four incidents in which Claude models gained unauthorized access to real third-party systems. The evaluations had been built by an outside partner. Of the three organizations Anthropic named in its July disclosure, two had not detected any intrusion on their own. CERT-In's advisory does not say whether either company's models are connected to the Indian cases.
Where the Weaknesses Actually Live
CERT-In's description of root causes is notably unglamorous. The problems it lists are not exotic. Credentials sitting in source code and commit history. Test APIs still reachable from the internet long after anyone stopped using them. Plaintext payment API keys in client applications. Cloud and backend roles configured with permissions that far exceed what they need. Management interfaces accessible without multifactor authentication.
CERT-In called these weaknesses ordinary. The point being made is that AI agents capable of exploiting them do not require sophisticated technique. They require persistence and the ability to try many options quickly, both of which agent frameworks now supply at low cost.
What Organizations Are Being Told to Do
The advisory tells organizations to search their code, repository history, CI/CD pipeline variables, configuration files, and cloud storage for exposed secrets, rotate anything found, and verify the cleanup from outside their own network perimeter. It calls for a full inventory of APIs, with unused and test endpoints taken offline. Cloud and backend roles should be scoped to least privilege. Log retention should run to at least 180 days. Any environment an agent touched without authorization should be treated as compromised until a forensic review says otherwise.
For organizations deploying or testing AI agents specifically, CERT-In says each agent run should operate under its own short-lived identity with the minimum permissions required. Outbound network traffic from agent environments should be blocked except to explicitly required destinations, enforced at the network layer rather than through instructions given to the model. Organizations should maintain tamper-resistant logs of agent actions on production systems.
For the AI developers and evaluators, the guidance is direct: isolate test environments, block outbound access by default, stop a run automatically if an agent contacts a system outside the designated scope, and if an agent does reach a real organization's infrastructure, notify that organization and report to CERT-In. Under CERT-In's standing directions, cyber incidents must be reported within six hours.
An Israeli advertising company quietly turned the infrastructure of targeted digital ads into a delivery mechanism for mercenary spyware, according to new research from the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto. The findings, published October 15, represent the first publicly confirmed case of zero-click government-grade spyware delivered through online advertising.
The company at the center of the report is Discover-Tech, registered in Israel and run by CEO Dekel Boni. On its surface, Discover-Tech operated like any other demand-side advertising platform, placing bids across major ad exchanges and running campaigns through networks including Google, Yandex, Liftoff and Comcast's Beeswax. Underneath that veneer sat a second product entirely: a targeting tool called Controlium that, researchers say, was designed to push malicious code to specific individuals based on their device ID, browser cookie, or IP address.
The mechanism is what makes this case technically significant. When a user's device connected to the ad infrastructure and matched an attacker's target list, Discover-Tech's "NOAS server" would return a fragment of JavaScript rather than an ordinary ad. If the device was not a target, the server returned nothing at all, which helped conceal the malicious activity from the ad vendors relaying the traffic. The user never clicks anything. The ad impression itself is the attack.
Citizen Lab researchers call this technique AdFection.
Al Jazeera
Between 2024 and 2025, at least 45 Windows devices at Al Jazeera were compromised this way. Researchers attribute the attacks with high confidence to Candiru spyware, now rebranded as Integrity Labs. The technical trail includes a Windows DLL recovered from a compromised machine that hard-coded command-and-control servers bearing a fingerprint consistent with Candiru's known infrastructure, along with a 48-byte repeating XOR encryption key and a persistence method, COM hijacking, matching Candiru's attack chain from 2021.
Researchers traced the full infection sequence: an ad impression served through Discover-Tech's infrastructure, contact with a Candiru validator server, and then with a Candiru command-and-control server. The governments behind the targeting remain unidentified.
Who was behind Discover-Tech
The research places Discover-Tech in a web of relationships with the commercial spyware sector. Eric Banoun, whom the Israeli newspaper Haaretz has described as one of the pioneers of offensive cyber in Israel, served as a director at Discover-Tech from 2020 to 2025. He also held shares in Intelos, a firm that appears elsewhere in the report as an ADINT surveillance company with at least 15 linked users on the Controlium platform.
Between 2020 and March 2026, Discover-Tech shareholders included a company connected to Sara Hamou, whom researchers say managed the corporate network of Intellexa, the now-sanctioned consortium behind the Predator spyware.
A second spyware vendor, Bindecy, also used the Controlium platform. Researchers identified Bindecy operators in Belgium, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Singapore, and Spain. The company did not respond to requests for comment.
What the data showed
Citizen Lab's analysis drew on roughly four billion bid records from an Apache Druid database instance that Discover-Tech left publicly accessible. Between March and June 2026, Discover-Tech's MyDSP platform bid on more than 3.7 billion ad impressions and won approximately 441 million. About 19 percent of those bids carried the NOAS script tags that power the spyware delivery system.
Ads bearing those script tags ran across 75,373 mobile apps and 120,768 websites. Researchers identified ad impressions on networks tied to NATO, the United Nations, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and government bodies in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Australia, Israel, Czechia, and Italy. Separate findings by ad security firm Confiant, which worked in parallel with Citizen Lab, placed potentially malicious ads on networks of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Criminal Court.
Citizen Lab was careful to note that an ad impression does not confirm a device was successfully compromised. The researchers are calling on regulators to investigate whether Discover-Tech and Integrity Labs violated applicable laws.
Industry response
Google and IAB Europe removed Discover-Tech from their vendor registries in early October 2026, ahead of the report's publication. Beeswax removed the company from its platform. Liftoff paused its access. Eskimi blocked its accounts and associated domains.
Discover-Tech did not respond to requests for comment. Integrity Labs could not be reached.
Bill Marczak, one of the Citizen Lab researchers who led the investigation, told TechCrunch that Discover-Tech is "surely just the tip of the iceberg" and advised people who believe they may be surveillance targets to disable ad tracking or use an ad blocker as a precaution.
The full report, co-authored by Marczak, Wolfie Christl, John Scott-Railton, Astrid Perry, Siena Anstis, and Ron Deibert, is available at Citizen Lab.
Microsoft and Japan's National Police Agency have jointly dismantled a phishing operation that sent more than 1 billion fraudulent emails and text messages to organizations across 150 countries since January 2026, with over 750 million of those messages directed specifically at Microsoft customers. The action was announced on Tuesday under an order from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The operation brought together Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, the Japan Cybercrime Control Center, Health-ISAC, and private cybersecurity firms including Resecurity, Cloudflare, Oracle, Proofpoint, and TRM Labs. The U.S. Secret Service also participated in the investigation.
The Marketplace
At the center of the operation sits YAM Store, which Microsoft internally tracks as Storm-3119. Investigators describe it as a Chinese-language underground marketplace that sold access to compromised Microsoft 365 and Google cloud environments, software licenses, storage space, and stolen credentials. Chinese-speaking actors are believed to have built the phishing kits it supported, according to Microsoft.
To stock the marketplace, operators bought up expired domains from defunct companies, rebuilt their websites to look active, and used those fake identities to register new cloud accounts. Some went further and built fake companies from scratch, using AI-generated documents, images, and business content to pass verification checks. Once inside Microsoft environments, attackers used stolen application credentials to manage accounts and abused SharePoint and OneDrive to store and deliver phishing content.
Three Phishing Kits
YAM Store operated alongside three phishing kits that Microsoft collectively tracks as Storm-2990: CoGUI, Haozi, and Iron Man. Each kit was rented out on a subscription model, letting operators with little technical background run large, automated fraud campaigns against targets worldwide.
Iron Man was the most developed of the three. Security firm Resecurity, which assisted in the investigation, found that the kit's infrastructure held 911 published build versions and roughly 2,360 phishing packages covering 130 countries and geographic areas, with the catalog receiving updates as recently as October 1, 2026. Its template library contained over 2,300 lure designs impersonating banks, retailers, delivery services, streaming platforms, and government agencies, including traffic and parking authorities. The kit also included a payment-card capture module that collected card numbers, expiry dates, and CVV codes from victims.
To block security researchers and automated scanners, the kits used geofencing, IP filtering lists, and fake CAPTCHA gates that stopped bots while letting real victims through. Operators also received real-time Telegram alerts whenever a victim entered credentials, and some ran live sessions to interact with victims as they responded to lures.
"Over 1 billion malicious email and SMS messages were sent since the start of 2026. More than 750 million of those were aimed directly at Microsoft customers." [Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit, October 2026]
Some campaigns also used device-code phishing, a technique that misuses Microsoft 365's standard device sign-in flow. Rather than stealing passwords directly, attackers tricked victims into entering a short device code, which gave them a valid login token and full access to the account. Microsoft has since recommended that organizations review whether device-code sign-in is necessary and consider restricting it through access policies.
The Takedown
The Florida court order gave Microsoft and Health-ISAC authority to seize and redirect the core domains behind YAM Store, CoGUI, and Iron Man. Microsoft deactivated more than 20,000 accounts linked to YAM Store and blocked over 100,000 domains used for impersonation and fraud. TRM Labs worked to trace and freeze cryptocurrency assets connected to the operation. Infrastructure removal was still continuing as of Tuesday.
Japan's National Police Agency had alerted Microsoft to the operation in late 2025, after a surge of fraud hit Japanese individuals and businesses. Japan ranked as the single most targeted country in the campaign, followed by the United States, Australia, and India. The healthcare sector, financial services companies, wholesale distributors, and IT firms absorbed the largest share of attacks.
No arrests have been announced.
What the wider pattern tells us
The YAM Store action follows a March 2026 takedown of Tycoon 2FA, a separate phishing platform that Europol and Microsoft dismantled together with law enforcement from Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Tycoon 2FA used adversary-in-the-middle techniques to intercept login credentials and session cookies in real time, bypassing multi-factor authentication and reaching nearly 100,000 organizations since it first appeared in 2023. At its peak in November 2025, the platform was generating over 30 million phishing messages a month. That case resulted in a civil complaint naming Saad Fridi as the alleged creator.
Both operations ran on the same basic model: platforms that sold ready-made attack tools to buyers with little technical skill, letting them run large fraud campaigns cheaply. Microsoft advised organizations to treat email from education and nonprofit domains with extra care, since YAM Store sold cloud accounts tied to real .edu and .org tenants obtained through the domain-buying scheme, making fraudulent emails look like they came from real institutions.
According to a complaint filed by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Digital Forensics Corporation (DFC), its owner Dmitry Belkin, and associated businesses allegedly misled victims who were already experiencing fear, emotional distress, and threats of having private images exposed.
According to the FTC complaint, DFC collected at least $60 million between February 2023 and July 2026. The company allegedly charged customers between $1,499 and $20,000 for services advertised as helping identify blackmailers, stop threats, and support investigations.
The complaint claims that the company misrepresented its investigative capabilities and the results it could achieve. Among the allegations is that DFC used fabricated investigative chat transcripts to make customers believe its investigators were actively communicating with suspected criminals.
The FTC also alleges that the company reused location information to create the impression that it had successfully tracked down perpetrators. Such tactic could lead customers to believe that meaningful investigative work was being conducted when the evidence presented to them did not support those claims.
Besides this, the complaint argues that customers were pressured into purchasing extra services. The company reportedly used positive reviews that were not genuine to strengthen its reputation and made obtaining refunds difficult for dissatisfied customers.
“Instead of communicating with the sextortionist through the victim's account, defendants routinely change the victim's account settings simply to block the sextortionist's communications. Instead of obtaining investigative information, defendants fabricate chat transcripts,” the complaint said.
According to the complaint, “Defendants falsely portray themselves as digital forensics experts, claiming they can track and identify sextortionists, prevent the spread of explicit material and coordinate with law enforcement to bring criminals to justice."
The FTC filed a lawsuit against DFC, Belkin, and several affiliated companies, accusing violations of consumer protection laws. A federal court temporarily halted the company's operations while the legal case proceeds. The agency is seeking action against the alleged deceptive practices.
The FTC also reported that the company advertised its services through search engines, video-sharing websites, and social media platforms, potentially reaching people actively searching for urgent help.