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Browsers Revoke Trust in Eight eMudhra Certificates After Private Key Compromise

 

Major browser vendors and certificate trust stores have blacklisted eight intermediate certificates issued by Indian certificate authority eMudhra following the discovery of recoverable private keys. The compromised keys could have been used to create fraudulent HTTPS certificates and impersonate secure websites on affected systems. 

The affected certificates were issued in April 2025, and blocked in Firefox and Chrome on October 17 by Mozilla and Google, followed by Apple on October 19 and Microsoft on October 20. Sectigo took revocation action, and Cloudflare updated its services in response. 

Google stated the keys had been generated with insufficient entropy, allowing an attacker to reconstruct them and use them to create fraudulent, but otherwise valid, certificates. Although eMudhra has revoked the certificates in question and informed downstream trust stores, some systems may require software updates before ceasing to trust the compromised certificate authorities.  

Mozilla’s Dennis Jackson has published a tool to help users check whether their systems trust the affected certificates, warning that “reconstructing the private keys [was] actually kind of easy” due to a severe flaw in the certificate creation process. 

Jackson revealed that, aside from the final byte, all the keys were zero, and therefore could be reconstructed almost instantly using the baby-step giant-step algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem. He added that several people had independently managed to recover the keys. 

Certificate Transparency logs have revealed no evidence of abuse of the compromised keys, but this cannot guarantee that they were not used to compromise HTTPS sites, as not all clients enforce Certificate Transparency policies. Anyone whose systems trust the compromised certificates could be at risk, as the keys could have been used to impersonate secure websites without detection.  

eMudhra stated that the error was caused by a script used in the key generation ceremony which resulted in a second, weaker key pair being created. This was used to generate certificate signing requests because the labels on the keys were similar enough to mislead the process. 

The company stated that the certificates in question were created for export to its data centres in the United States and Europe to satisfy data sovereignty requirements, and were not in production use, with the exception of one.  

eMudhra identified human errors at several points during the process, but stated that it was investigating potential coding issues and process weaknesses, including maker-checker controls, which are meant to prevent errors by ensuring that no single individual has control over any critical process. eMudhra has undertaken to recheck all key generation ceremonies it has performed during the coming week. 

The incident demonstrates the critical importance of key generation security, internal controls and certificate revocation, and the need for organisations to update their software and trust stores following a security incident to prevent further compromises.

SBI Probes Suspected Exposure of 3,897 Customer Records

 

State Bank of India (SBI) is investigating a suspected data exposure after identifying personal information in 3,897 customer records reportedly found on the dark web. The country’s largest lender said it received alerts about the issue last week and has initiated cyber incident response procedures. The bank has also appointed an independent cybersecurity agency to assess the suspected compromise and determine the source, scope, and potential impact of the exposure. 

According to SBI’s October 21 stock-exchange filing, the bank first received alerts on October 16 from its Threat Intelligence Service Provider, the Defence Cyber Agency, and the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In). Its initial review covered around 375,000 records found on the dark web. Of these, 3,897 records were found to contain personal customer information. SBI is now verifying whether the exposed records are genuine and complete, while also attempting to trace their origin and assess the risks for affected customers and the bank. 

The exposed records reportedly included customers’ names, dates of birth, gender, registered mobile numbers, email addresses, and home addresses. They also contained branch and Customer Information File identifiers, lead IDs, and metadata linked to loan and lead records. Although the information does not appear to include banking passwords or transaction credentials, personal and loan-related details can still be misused for phishing, identity fraud, targeted scams, and social-engineering attacks. 

SBI said it activated its cyber incident response and containment procedures after receiving the alerts. The bank has engaged a CERT-In-empanelled independent cybersecurity agency to investigate the matter and is working on remedial and preventive measures in line with regulatory requirements. SBI added that it is continuing to monitor the situation and will take appropriate steps to prevent similar incidents in the future. 

The bank has sought to reassure customers that the incident has not materially affected its financial performance, core business operations, or ability to continue services. Core banking functions are reportedly running normally, with no disruption reported. However, customers should remain cautious: avoid clicking unexpected links claiming to be from SBI, never share OTPs, passwords, or card details, and verify suspicious communications directly through the bank’s official app, website, or customer-care channels. The investigation is ongoing, and further clarity is expected once SBI confirms whether the dark-web data is authentic and identifies how it was exposed.

Second Zeabur Breach Exposes Cloud Infrastructure Weaknesses


Zeabur, a cloud development platform, has announced plans to shut down their services following a second major security breach in less than two months. A malicious attack occurred on October 14-15, 2026, which resulted in unauthorized access to internal systems, compromised hosting infrastructure, and the reading of sensitive information belonging to more than 321,000 accounts. 

As stated by Zeabur's preliminary incident report, the attacker was able to gain access to shared hosting clusters in nine regions as well as several dedicated servers by using leaked administrator credentials and cloud access keys. An internal configuration repository contained plaintext credentials, and administrator tokens were still active without expiration and had not been rotated since January 2024. 

Approximately 3.2 million environment-variable records including application settings, API keys, and other secrets were exposed in the breach, along with account information for 321,810 users. Zeabur further confirmed that 92 Google Cloud Platform (GCP) servers were accessed unauthorizedy by root accessers. In addition to adding their own SSH keys to 50 servers, hackers attached 16 copies of customer server disks to virtual machines that were under their control with their own SSH keys. 

During the investigation, records indicate that the attacker compromised both shared infrastructure as well as dedicated servers, and gained access to the production database through their internal network. Insufficient audit logs, Zeabur observed, prevent the full extent of data exposure from being confirmed. The attacker read service configurations, searched for API keys, and accessed data within hundreds of database services. 

Security Failures Linked to Earlier Breach

A separate security breach occurred in August 2026, when attackers exploited a vulnerability in the NextChat application of a customer, then migrated through internal systems that were insufficiently isolated. 

In the incident, Amazon Web Services credentials, API keys, and other sensitive information were exposed Zeabur believes the credentials used in the latest attack may have been obtained during the earlier breach, although a connection has not been confirmed. In its August response, the company acknowledged that not all affected credentials were addressed, resulting in the activation of certain administrator tokens and cloud keys.

As part of the investigation, the investigator identified public administrator interfaces, plaintext storage of sensitive credentials, and excessive cloud permissions as factors contributing to the severity of the attack. 

The attack began on October 14, but was only identified following a user report on October 15. In response to discovery, the company revoked compromised access tokens and cloud keys, blocked public SSH access to affected GCP servers, and restricted internal access to internal systems. 

Users have been advised to replace passwords, API keys, and other secrets, revoke existing sessions, and rebuild compromised servers. There is also concern about the security of shared cloud hosting environments following the breach, which can expose multiple customer workloads with only a single compromised set of credentials. 

Zeabur's shutdown program will commence on December 1, when renewals are disabled and services running on shared clusters are paused. However, all remaining infrastructure is scheduled to cease operation by December 31, 2026, despite remaining dedicated servers remaining available until their respective expiration dates.

As the company has not yet provided a final date for data export or deletion, customers who need additional time to migrate their data are advised to contact customer service for further assistance. During the investigation, Zeabur also revealed gaps in its monitoring and incident response systems. It took 36 hours for the investigation to begin after the attacker's first known use of credentials on October 14 was revealed.

During that time, no alerts were triggered; a user report was the cause of the investigation. A two-part attack converged within Zeabur's internal network as the attacker gained access to shared clusters and Google Cloud servers managed by customers. The attacker is believed to have acquired root passwords stored in plaintext in server initialization settings by using an older Google Cloud key.

It was then the attacker's responsibility to add SSH keys to 50 servers to maintain access, as well as attach copies of customer disks to virtual machines within Zeabur's own cloud project. These disk copies have since been deleted by Zeabur, which believes the credentials used in October were obtained during the August incident, during which an attacker accessed Zeabur's GitHub private key. 

With that key, access was granted to code repositories, including a private repository containing the exposed credentials and administrator tokens. Despite Zeabur replacing the GitHub App key on August 31st, the credentials stored in the repository were not altered, making it possible to retrieve previously copied secrets. 

There is no evidence of a direct connection between the two incidents, nor did the IP addresses of the attackers overlap. All users were notified that Zeabur has revoked their access tokens in response to the latest security breach. Customers were advised to replace credentials and secrets stored on the platform, including those changed after the August incident, and to re-create their access tokens. 

The owners of affected Google Cloud servers were also advised to make a backup of their data and rebuild their systems to prevent any unauthorized access remaining. Following 3.5 years of growth, the company decided to close after citing increasing operational complexity and difficulty maintaining its platform as factors. 

As a result of these two breaches, credential management, infrastructure isolation, and security monitoring vulnerabilities were also exposed, raising concerns concerning the potential risks associated with maintaining sensitive deployment secrets across shared cloud environments. Zeabur's incidents highlight the risks associated with unrotated credentials, publicly exposed administrative interfaces, and inadequate security monitoring in cloud computing facilities. 

A shutdown like this also emphasizes the importance of securing resources, managing secrets securely, and detecting incidents promptly in order to ensure that customer data is protected.

FBI Flags SafePay Ransomware as One of 2026’s Most Active Threats After 600 Victims

 



The FBI, alongside cybersecurity authorities in Germany and the United Kingdom, issued a joint advisory this week warning that a ransomware group called SafePay has compromised at least 600 organizations across the United States and Europe since it surfaced in late 2024, placing it among the most active extortion operations active right now.

The advisory, which draws on FBI and German law enforcement investigations, marks a significant escalation in attention for a group that operated in relative obscurity before racking up victims at a pace that rivals far better-known criminal networks. The most recent incident cited in the advisory occurred in August.


A Group Built on Borrowed Code

SafePay is not a ransomware-as-a-service operation, meaning it does not rent out its tools to outside affiliates the way groups like RansomHub do. Instead, it runs as a centralized crew, which security researchers say likely keeps operations tighter and reduces the risk of internal leaks.

Its malware, however, did not emerge from nothing. Analysts at Bitdefender and others found that SafePay's ransomware binary closely mirrors a late-2022 version of LockBit's code, with additional elements borrowed from ALPHV and INC Ransom. The group surfaced around the same period that law enforcement actions gutted LockBit in early 2024, and some researchers suspect its members include former Conti or LockBit operators who reconstituted under a new name. A telling technical detail: the ransomware includes a kill switch that deactivates itself on systems with Russian or Cyrillic as the default language, a pattern commonly associated with Eastern European criminal groups trying to avoid prosecution at home.


Getting In and Moving Fast

SafePay gets into networks through a combination of methods. The advisory lists password guessing, phishing, and exploitation of known vulnerabilities, including flaws in Cisco VPN products and Veeam backup software, as primary entry points. The group also buys stolen credentials from initial access brokers on dark web markets and uses automated scripts to scan the internet for exposed systems.

Once inside, the group moves quickly. Attacks have been documented going from initial access to full ransomware deployment in under 24 hours. Operators create new accounts or hijack existing ones, use Windows' own built-in tools to map the network, and disable security software using living-off-the-land techniques that avoid dropping obvious malware. Data is archived with WinRAR or 7-Zip and transferred out via FileZilla or RClone before encryption begins. In some cases, attackers change user passwords to lock out IT staff and slow down the response.

The group has also adopted a social engineering playbook that goes well beyond a simple phishing link. In several documented attacks, SafePay flooded employees with thousands of spam messages to overwhelm their inboxes, then followed up by impersonating IT support over Microsoft Teams or through direct phone calls. Vishing specialists, sometimes hired as a third-party service, would then convince employees to hand over remote access through Microsoft Quick Assist or approve multi-factor authentication prompts.


A Pattern of High-Profile Hits

Three incidents stand out in terms of impact. Government technology contractor Conduent confirmed an attack that disrupted Medicaid payments, child support disbursements, food assistance programs, and roadway tolls in multiple U.S. states. Conduent recently agreed to an $80 million class action settlement over the breach. British transport technology firm Microlise was hit in October 2024, disrupting DHL delivery operations and security systems installed in UK Ministry of Justice prisoner transport vans. In July 2025, researchers linked SafePay to an attack on Ingram Micro, one of the world's largest IT distributors, with analysts estimating the disruption cost the company at least $136 million in daily sales while order fulfillment was offline.


Germany as a Primary Target

Among the countries SafePay has focused on, Germany stands out. During the first quarter of 2025, Check Point Research found that 24 percent of all publicly reported ransomware victims in Germany were attributed to SafePay, the highest concentration of any single ransomware group in any single country during that period. The advisory confirms that dozens of German companies appear on SafePay's dark web leak site alongside government organizations across Latin America and the United States.


Ransom Demands Framed as a Business Transaction

SafePay's ransom notes describe the payment demand as "a subset of company revenue," typically falling between one and three percent of the victim's annual revenue. The group uses cryptocurrency for payments and, according to the advisory, sometimes employs third parties to make phone calls to pressure victims into paying. In cases where paying could expose a victim to regulatory penalties, the group has reportedly offered reduced demands.

The joint advisory stops short of attributing SafePay to any specific country or naming individual suspects.



OVHcloud CLI Packages on GitHub Were Replaced With Secret-Stealing Malware

 



Attackers replaced the binary releases of OVHcloud's open-source CLI tool on GitHub with malicious builds designed to harvest secrets from developer machines, the company confirmed this week. The incident, which affected versions v0.11.0 through v0.15.0, went live on October 19 and was only caught after a customer raised an alarm about a suspicious release.

The malicious files were live for roughly 94 minutes. A customer's CI pipeline, which had a pinned SHA-256 checksum for the v0.15.0 Linux binary, failed when the hash no longer matched, and the customer opened issue #300 on the public GitHub repository. OVHcloud pulled the replaced assets at 14:21 UTC and shipped a clean replacement, v0.16.0, three hours later.


A Compromised Account, Months in the Making

The attack traced back to a single GitHub account: `HassenBF`, belonging to a legitimate OVHcloud contributor who had write access to the release repository. According to the security research group OpenSourceMalware, the account was compromised roughly seven months before the attack, with evidence pointing to early March 2026.

On March 5 and 6, four personal repositories on the account were force-pushed within a scripted window. Three of those rewrites embedded a `preinstall.js` loader file containing a payload hidden inside invisible Unicode variation-selector characters. A fourth repository inlined the same decoder into a React source file. The push cadence for the first three repositories was 42 seconds, which OpenSourceMalware interpreted as automated rather than manual activity.

After that, the account went quiet on the CLI project. It continued contributing to `ovh/ovhcloud-docs` through May to September 2026, with several pull requests merged normally. That cover of normalcy made the account hard to flag.


How the Malicious Binaries Were Built

The attacker did not touch OVHcloud's CI/CD pipeline. Instead, they built the infected packages locally and uploaded them directly using the GitHub Releases API, replacing the macOS (Intel and ARM), Linux (x86_64 and ARM64), and Windows x86-64 binaries across five versions. The i386, Windows ARM64, and WASM builds were left alone, which OpenSourceMalware read as deliberate targeting of developer and operations workstations.

Critically, the attacker also replaced the `checksums.txt` file last, so the new hashes matched the malicious binaries. Anyone who verified the checksum would still get a false sense of security.

OVHcloud CEO Octave Klaba confirmed that GitHub's release immutability setting had been turned off on the repository, which is what allowed an account with write access to silently overwrite already-published releases without triggering any CI checks. Since the incident, OVHcloud has re-enabled that setting. The v0.16.0 release is now marked immutable, meaning its files cannot be replaced.

A forensic check of the malicious binary using `go version -m` revealed it was built from a git checkout with uncommitted changes (`vcs.modified=true`), a dead giveaway that it came from a local workstation build rather than the official GoReleaser pipeline.


The Payload: A Solana Dead Drop and GlassWorm Fingerprints

OpenSourceMalware dug into the `preinstall.js` file loaded into the compromised account's repositories back in March. The loader uses a two-stage design. The first stage AES-256-CBC decrypts a hex blob, and the resulting second-stage script checks whether the victim machine appears to be based in Russia by testing language and timezone settings; if it is, the script exits after 10 seconds.

Otherwise, it contacts public Solana RPC endpoints, queries transactions from a specific wallet address, and reads a JSON memo embedded in the blockchain. That memo carries a base64-encoded URL pointing to the next-stage payload. This "dead drop" technique lets the attacker swap out the payload URL anytime without touching any code repository.

The Solana wallet in question, `BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC`, appears in public indicator lists for GlassWorm, a threat actor that has been running campaigns since late 2025 targeting VS Code, OpenVSX, GitHub, and npm. OpenSourceMalware attributes this attack to GlassWorm with moderate confidence.


Who Is Affected and What to Do

Any developer or CI pipeline that downloaded or ran the CLI through `install.sh`, the Homebrew cask, or a direct GitHub release between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC on October 19 may have been exposed. Klaba said the malware's goal was to collect secrets sitting on disk, and while he described the binary as low quality, he warned it was still capable of doing real damage.

Affected users should update to v0.16.0 or roll back to v0.10.0 immediately, but updating the tool alone is not enough. Any machine that ran a compromised version should be treated as having all its readable secrets exposed. That means rotating OVHcloud API keys, cloud credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes configs, package registry tokens, and anything stored in `.env` files, from a separate, clean machine. Users on macOS should also check for an `~/init.json` file in the home directory, which the second-stage script writes as a throttle marker.

OVHcloud has said a full post-mortem is coming. Key questions remain open: how the developer account credentials were first stolen, whether the same actor maintained access for the entire seven months, and exactly what the final payload did before OVHcloud deleted the files.



Nigerian Hacker Sentenced To Eight Years For Fraud And Identity Theft

 

A Nigerian man has been sentenced to eight years in a U.S. prison for his role in wide-ranging hacking, tax fraud, identity theft, and investment fraud schemes. Chukwuemeka Victor Amachukwu, also known as “Chukwuemeka Victor Eletuo” and “So Kwan Leung,” pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit computer intrusions and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The sentence was announced by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York on October 19, 2026. 

According to U.S. prosecutors, Amachukwu and Nigeria-based co-conspirators began targeting U.S. tax preparation businesses around 2019. They used spearphishing emails to gain access to the companies’ electronic systems, then stole tax and identity information belonging to at least about 800 customers. The affected businesses were located in New York, Texas, and other U.S. states. 

The stolen data was allegedly used to file fraudulent tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service and state tax authorities. Prosecutors said the group sought fraudulent refunds of at least approximately $8.4 million and successfully obtained at least $2.5 million. The conspirators also used stolen identities to submit fraudulent claims under the Small Business Administration’s Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, receiving about $819,000 in additional payouts. 

Amachukwu was also accused of participating in a separate investment fraud scheme. Prosecutors said he posed as a wealthy overseas financier to persuade U.S. victims to invest in purportedly valuable standby letters of credit. The investments did not exist, and Amachukwu and his co-conspirators allegedly pocketed more than $7 million in fraudulent proceeds. 

In addition to the eight-year prison term, the 40-year-old was sentenced to one year of supervised release. He was ordered to pay $3,647,629.39 in restitution and forfeit $10,846,634.39. U.S. Attorney Jamie McDonald said the case demonstrated that offenders cannot assume they can operate safely from abroad, while the FBI was credited for its investigative work.

Russia-Linked Hackers Target NATO Defense Contractors in European Espionage Campaign

 

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered an espionage operation targeting defense-related organizations in Europe, including a naval shipbuilder, a military aircraft engine manufacturer and a law enforcement agency. The campaign has been attributed to APT28, a hacking group associated with Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU. According to cybersecurity firm Symantec, the affected organizations were located in two NATO member countries, although their identities and locations have not been disclosed. 

The operation relied on a backdoor called Hookedge, which enables attackers to access compromised systems, collect login credentials and investigate internal networks. The malware was documented by Recorded Future’s Insikt Group in August, adding to concerns about the group’s continued efforts to obtain information from strategically important organizations. 

One documented intrusion began in July after an employee at a naval shipbuilding company opened a malicious Microsoft Word document delivered through an email attachment. Following the initial compromise, the attackers began examining the organization’s internal network and attempting to obtain credentials that could help them access additional resources. 

The activity continued over the following weeks. Investigators found that the hackers repeatedly revisited an infected computer and introduced a previously undocumented tool capable of decrypting and executing malicious code directly in system memory. Researchers have not yet determined the tool’s ultimate purpose, leaving questions about the full scope of the operation unanswered. 

The first confirmed infection was recorded on July 24, while associated malicious activity continued to appear as late as September 24. This indicates that the campaign extended across at least two months. However, researchers could not confirm whether the attackers maintained continuous access to the compromised environment throughout that period. Symantec intelligence analyst Dick O’Brien told Recorded Future News that investigators were unable to establish whether sensitive information had been successfully exfiltrated. 
Nevertheless, the nature of the affected organizations suggests that defense-related intelligence may have been a primary objective. O’Brien noted that prolonged access could have provided attackers with opportunities to collect valuable information. The selection of targets also points toward a wider intelligence-gathering effort involving European government and defense interests. The continued activity observed in September, after the campaign was documented in August, suggests that the operation may still be underway. 

APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, BlueDelta and Forest Blizzard, has conducted cyber-espionage operations against military, government and defense organizations across Europe and North America for more than a decade. The group attracted international attention in 2016 following its association with the hacking of the Democratic National Committee ahead of the U.S. presidential election. Western cybersecurity agencies have repeatedly linked the group to operations involving defense infrastructure, military logistics and organizations supporting Ukraine. 

In April, British security officials warned that APT28 had exploited internet router vulnerabilities to redirect web traffic and conduct surveillance. Other reported campaigns have targeted maritime, transportation and diplomatic organizations in Poland, Slovenia, Turkey, Greece and the United Arab Emirates. Last year, more than 20 Western intelligence and cybersecurity agencies jointly warned that the group had targeted logistics providers and technology companies involved in delivering foreign assistance to Ukraine. The latest findings add to continuing concerns about cyber-espionage against organizations connected to European defense and security.

Researchers Identify Spyware Attacks Targeting Two Serbian Opposition Figures


There have been allegations of spyware targeting two prominent Serbian figures, raising new concerns about digital surveillance in advance of the country's parliamentary elections scheduled for October 25, 2026. As part of a partnership with Serbia's SHARE Foundation, Citizen Lab researchers confirmed that Vladan Đokić, rector of the University of Belgrade, had his iPhone compromised by Pegasus spyware earlier this year. 

A former prosecutor, Rade Baji, was identified as a potential target by the investigation. According to Reuters, Apple notified Baji on August 13 that his phone had been infiltrated with spyware targeting mercenaries. The forensic investigators, however, have not yet determined whether his device was successfully compromised or identified the method used in the suspected attack. 

Pegasus is a highly sophisticated spyware program developed by the Israeli surveillance technology company NSO Group that can be used to obtain extensive access to a targeted computer system. Depending on the circumstances of an infection, such access can expose private communications and other sensitive information stored on the phone Đokić has drawn attention for its support of Serbian student-led protest movement, which has organized anti-corruption demonstrations against the government since November 2024. 

The positions he holds have also brought him into conflict with the authorities According to Citizen Lab, Serbian authorities raided his offices in March and seized computers and servers as a result of tensions surrounding the student protests. The former prosecutor was involved in proceedings against senior government officials alleged to have engaged in irregularities in connection with a proposed redevelopment project at the protected historic military site in Belgrade. 

The development was planned by a company affiliated with Jared Infected devices are known as zero-click exploits. They are a method of compromise that does not require a user to click a link, open an attachment, or take any other action. As of yet, researchers have not publicly identified those responsible for the attack, and the investigation continues.

There is less conclusive evidence regarding Baji's case despite Apple's August threat notification indicating mercenary spyware might have been used to target him, but investigators have not determined whether he successfully received the malware. Despite Apple's confirmation that threat alerts were sent to users on August 13, the company has not commented specifically on the two incidents reported. These incidents have renewed concern about the use of commercial surveillance tools by public institutions against their employees. 

According to the SHARE Foundation, targeting university officials and judges could result in weakened institutional independence, restrictions on freedom of expression and discouraged investigations into public interest matters. In addition, the organization highlighted the broader pattern of surveillance allegations in Serbia. 

There have been reports of at least 14 students, activists, and opposition figures having been targeted with spyware in September. A student activist, Jelena Kontić, filed a criminal complaint on October 6 with Serbia's Prosecutor's Office for High-Tech Crime regarding the alleged installation of Pegasus on her cellphone. Attempts to identify the individuals or organizations behind the latest suspected attacks have not been successful. 

Both the Serbian Interior Ministry and NSO Group have not responded to requests for comment. According to the company's previous statements, its technology is marketed to government agencies and commercial relationships involving serious misuse may be terminated. According to the US government, NSO Group was placed on its trade blacklist in 2021 after allegations of human rights abuse involving its surveillance technology were raised. 

In preparation for the upcoming parliamentary election on October 25, the latest findings have intensified the scrutiny of spyware used against individuals associated with Serbia's protest movement. Furthermore, these cases raise questions regarding the safeguards surrounding powerful surveillance tools and whether independent researchers are able to identify responsible individuals when such technology appears to be employed against civil society representatives. 

A number of recent attacks have raised concern about commercial spyware targeting civil society and public institutions. As Serbia prepares for parliamentary elections, these findings raise further questions regarding surveillance practices, accountability, and safeguards to prevent cyberespionage tools from being misused.

Millions of Routers Running Broadcom Wi-Fi Chips Have an Unpatched Flaw That Hands Attackers Root Access Over the Air

 




A security researcher has demonstrated working exploits against a class of Wi-Fi gateways running Broadcom chips, showing that an attacker within radio range can gain root-level code execution on the device without knowing the Wi-Fi password or completing any kind of pairing process. As of this writing, no patch has been deployed to affected routers, and no CVE identifier has been assigned.

Quentin Kaiser published his findings on October 16, 2026, after a disclosure process that effectively went nowhere. The vulnerability sits inside Broadcom's own implementation of Wi-Fi Protected Setup, the handshake protocol designed to simplify connecting new devices to a network. Kaiser found that the code mishandles the reassembly of fragmented WPS messages. By sending carefully crafted fragments, an attacker can corrupt the device's memory and redirect execution, all through the air, from a position outside the building.


Two Working Exploits, Two Different Outcomes

Kaiser demonstrated the attack against two Belgian ISP-supplied gateways. On an Orange Belgium device, an Askey TCG3000, the exploit read the Wi-Fi pre-shared key directly from stored settings and transmitted it back to the attacker, effectively handing over the network password. On a Proximus gateway, the Sagemcom BBOX3V+, the exploit did something more severe: it opened a reverse shell transported entirely over Wi-Fi frames, without requiring the attacker to have an external server or any prior foothold on the network.

Both attacks required no credentials and no interaction from anyone inside the network. Distance helps the attacker, not the defender.


The Code Is Old, and So Is Broadcom's Awareness

The vulnerable code traces back to at least 2010. Broadcom issued a partial fix in 2018 and simultaneously told downstream customers to migrate to the hostapd Wi-Fi software package instead of relying on Broadcom's own WPS implementation. That guidance went unheeded across a large portion of the device ecosystem, and the underlying flaw was never fully resolved.

Kaiser says Broadcom was informed about the issue again through his disclosure process and declined to assign a CVE or comment publicly. CERT/CC, which typically coordinates vulnerability disclosures between researchers and vendors, closed his case the day it was opened, citing the fact that Broadcom holds its own CVE numbering authority.

The result is a vulnerability without an identifier, without a patch, and without any official acknowledgment from the company whose code is responsible.


Which Hardware Is Affected

Kaiser sorted the affected chips into two groups. Older eCos-based chips, the BCM3380, BCM3383, and BCM33834, cannot receive a practical fix given their architecture. He described these as a "forever day," meaning a vulnerability that will remain open for the functional life of the hardware. Newer Linux-based chips, including the BCM3390, BCM65xx, and BCM68xx series, are technically fixable if device makers choose to replace the WPS software stack.

Among confirmed deployments in Belgium, Proximus, Orange Belgium, and VOO gateways are affected. Kaiser was unable to test Telenet devices but considers them potentially in scope. His broader analysis, which involved automated firmware scanning, identified vulnerable code across Cisco small-business access points, Huawei gear, and ARRIS routers, among others. He estimates the total number of affected devices runs into the millions globally, though some entries in his published list are flagged as "likely vulnerable" rather than confirmed.


Detection Tools, but No Mitigation

For organizations trying to assess their exposure, Kaiser published YARA detection rules and a scanning script on GitHub at github.com/qkaiser/broadcom-wps. Both are intended as triage tools to identify firmware containing the vulnerable code. He notes that patched devices may still trigger the YARA rules, so a positive result requires additional verification rather than automatic remediation.

For devices that fall into the "forever day" category, the practical answer is replacement.


Why Proximity Attacks Are Getting More Attention

The threat model here matters beyond the technical details. Kaiser noted that this vulnerability is particularly useful to attackers who can position themselves in physical range of a target rather than approaching through the internet. That scenario is no longer theoretical.

In November 2024, Volexity documented how a Russian state-sponsored group, tracked as GruesomeLarch and linked to APT28, compromised organizations near a high-value target in Washington, D.C., and then used dual-homed systems inside those neighboring buildings to connect to the actual target's corporate Wi-Fi. The attacker never needed to be in the same room or even the same building. They just needed a wireless network with weak enough controls to reach from the street.

A flaw that lets anyone within radio range become root on the router, without a password, without a handshake, fits neatly into that playbook. The attack surface is wherever the signal reaches.



New MITRE Framework Tracks AI Attacks and Water Utility Breaches

 

MITRE has released ATT&CK v20, expanding its widely used cybersecurity framework to reflect how attackers now exploit artificial intelligence, evade multi-factor authentication (MFA), and target operational technology in critical infrastructure. The update adds nine new Enterprise techniques and sub-techniques, alongside significant changes to the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) domain. 

The most notable Enterprise additions focus on AI abuse. MITRE now distinguishes between direct prompt injection, where malicious instructions are typed into an LLM interface, and indirect prompt injection, where harmful instructions are hidden in content the model processes. The framework also documents attackers using an organization’s own AI agents to steal data, poisoning web content to manipulate AI search or assistant recommendations, and disrupting LLM-based malware analysis. 

Defenses must evolve with new threats

ATT&CK v20 also addresses authentication and bot defenses. A new technique covers the theft of application-specific passwords, which can let attackers sign in without triggering an MFA prompt. Another tracks CAPTCHA bypass, including automated solving and methods for avoiding the checks altogether. MITRE additionally expanded coverage of compromised software dependencies and development tools to include IDE and coding-agent configuration files.

In the ICS domain, MITRE added a campaign involving attacks on internet-exposed programmable logic controllers at more than 30 water and wastewater utilities in Minnesota, which locked operators out of their systems. Although some reporting has linked the broader activity to Iranian-affiliated actors, MITRE says attribution for the Minnesota intrusions remains unconfirmed. A second campaign describes an AI-assisted breach of Mexican government institutions that crossed IT and OT environments and reached a municipal water utility. 

The release also refreshes threat-actor intelligence and detection guidance. MITRE added Nimbus Manticore, an IRGC-associated espionage group targeting aerospace, defense, and telecom organizations, while updating entries for Salt Typhoon and APT38. Defenders receive 15 new detection strategies—six for Enterprise and nine for ICS—supported by 38 analytics, with the ICS analytics designed to avoid flagging routine engineering and maintenance activity.

Anthropic Acquires Opaque Systems to Strengthen Confidential and Verifiable AI

 

Anthropic has acquired Opaque Systems, which focuses on developing technologies that enable artificial intelligence systems to process sensitive information, while keeping it confidential with the help of the underlying hardware infrastructure. The details of the deal were not disclosed, and the startup confirmed that they will join Anthropic, as its separate operations will be shut down. 

Opaque announced the transaction last week, adding that their previous research output and engineering efforts concentrated on confidential computing and recently evolved towards solutions that can help organizations audit the behavior of AI systems and agents. The company was formed based on a research project at UC Berkeley’s RISELab about ten years earlier. Its co-founders are Ion Stoica, one of the co-founders of Databricks and Anyscale, and Raluca Ada Popa, a Google DeepMind researcher who works on encryption and systems security. 

Aaron Fulkerson was hired as the chief executive officer of Opaque in October 2023. Previously, Opaque worked on solutions that applied confidential computing research to production AI, making sure that the data they process and the models themselves were protected by hardware. However, as the technology matures, Opaque pointed out that there is a need for organizations to ensure that they can audit AI systems. 

According to Opaque, the company observed that the trustworthiness of AI is a critical concern for many businesses. Therefore, Opaque’s engineers and scientists took their expertise in cryptographic solutions and expanded the research to make verifiable AI the company’s specialization. They provide cryptographic guarantees that specify what computations happened, where, and under what policy. 

Moreover, the startup has made significant contributions to open-source projects that share tools, training, and experience for building trustworthy and secure AI agents and models, such as the Agent Governance Toolkit, TRACE, Confidential MCP, and Weight Custody Manifest. In early 2026, Opaque raised $24 million in a Series B funding round at a reported valuation of $300 million in funding, and Anthropic was one of their first customers, along with ServiceNow and Accenture. 

After the acquisition was announced, Opaque’s website stated that all of its employees would transfer to Anthropic to continue their work, while Opaque itself would shut down. However, it did not comment on what this means for current customers, and how transactions with organizations will be handled after the acquisition is completed.

The acquisition highlights Opaque’s technology areas and expertise, which fits Anthropic’s strategy to develop more secure and trustworthy AI systems. However, Anthropic and Opaque have not yet released any information about how the technology can be adapted to Anthropic’s solutions and products.

Millions of Student Records Exposed After a Single Login Is Compromised


An educational assessment management company, Educational Testing Service (ETS), has disclosed personal information about millions of current and former California public school students as a result of a data breach. 

A secure file transfer system has been accessed by an unauthorised individual, using compromised login credentials, and files containing student records have been copied by that individual. During the early morning hours of September 25, 2026, ETS noticed suspicious activity on its secure file transfer protocol server (SFTP), resulting in the discovery of the incident.

A CDE report indicates that multiple instances of unauthorised access occurred between May 22 and September 18, allowing the attackers to gain access to student information for several months before the incident was discovered. It is not known how many individuals were affected by the breach. 

The compromised records, however, contain information about all students registered in California schools over the past three years, and the potential impact extends to students whose records date back to 2006. As of the 2025–2026 academic year, California reported more than 5.7 million students enrolled in its public schools, suggesting that the incident may be of a large scale. This information includes names, dates of birth, home addresses, school and district details, grade levels, and state or local identification numbers for students. 

There may also be information regarding gender, race, ethnicity, primary language, country of origin, and English learner status included in the records. A variety of sensitive educational information, including information regarding disabilities, accommodations for testing, English proficiency, and assessment results, may also be accessed. 

Education databases are under considerable threat from security breaches and compromised credentials pose a number of risks. Although the attacker reportedly used one compromised login to access the system, the breach affected student records maintained by a third-party service provider responsible for handling sensitive student information. Additionally, students with school records going back more than three years are affected by the breach. 

A California Department of Education representative stated that former students who left public schools as early as 2006 may also be affected if their transfer to another school has not been confirmed. Neither the department nor the Department of Education have released a final number of victims, and the information exposed varies from individual to individual. 

Social Security numbers, passwords, financial account information or payment card information were not contained in the stolen records. However, exposing disability-related information, demographic details, and academic results presents privacy concerns, particularly since these records are based on minors. Following the discovery, ETS disabled the account used to access the files and took the SFTP site offline. 

In order to strengthen security, a replacement system is being developed by the organization. Moreover, it has enhanced its monitoring processes, tightened access controls, and arranged additional third-party reviews of its security practices. However, the company has not disclosed how the login credentials were compromised nor identified the attacker. In order to limit the risk that the stolen information might become publicly accessible, ETS has worked with law enforcement and cybersecurity specialists. 

There has been no evidence of the files being published online as of yet, however, the absence of such confirmation does not imply that the data has been deleted or that it will not be abused later. In addition to disrupting education-related operations, ETS suspended routine enrollment processing and paused certain assessment activities while security checks were conducted on its systems.

In a statement issued by the California Department of Education, it stated that it was working to restore affected services and minimize disruption to schools and assessment programs. On October 16, 2026, notification will begin for affected students and families, and will continue throughout early November. In addition to two years of free identity protection services, eligible current and former students can be enrolled by parents or legal guardians. 

There is an increased risk associated with relying on third-party providers to handle large volumes of sensitive educational information, as highlighted by this breach. Although the initial access was linked to compromised credentials rather than a publicized software vulnerability, the incident demonstrates the difficulty in preventing unauthorised activity from occurring when access controls and monitoring fail to prevent access to extensive records. 

It illustrates the potential threats associated with compromised credentials and inadequate access controls in systems that handle sensitive student information. Stronger authentication, continuous monitoring, and regular security reviews remain important in order to protect educational data and prevent similar incidents from occurring again.

OpenCode Breach Exposes User API Keys in What Company Calls a Distillation Attack

 



An intruder broke into a legacy system at OpenCode late on October 16, gaining access to third-party AI provider API keys that users had stored inside OpenCode Console, the company's optional hosted service. The open-source coding platform disclosed the incident on October 17 and said 1.4% of its Console users were affected, all of whom had linked at least one external AI provider to their account.

OpenCode connected the breach to what it described as "a large-scale distillation attack," a method where someone collects outputs from frontier AI models to train a separate, competing model. Rather than building costly infrastructure or licensing training data, attackers use someone else's API access to query high-end models at scale, then feed those responses into their own system. The stolen asset in this case was not personal data but model access, specifically the ability to run queries against Claude, GPT-4, and Gemini on someone else's tab.


What Got Taken and What Did Not

OpenCode co-founder Dax Raad drew a line between accounts that stored keys in Console and those that used the local CLI or desktop app. Keys saved locally sit inside a SQLite database on the user's own machine and, as Raad noted, "never come to us." Those were not touched. Only keys that users explicitly uploaded to Console, which OpenCode stores server-side to route requests through its gateway, were within reach of the compromised system.

OpenCode has not specified what the legacy system was, how long the attacker had access, or how many users 1.4% translates to in real numbers. As of October 18, Raad said the company's systems had been under sustained pressure, with attackers attempting to get in "non stop" for 48 hours.


Users Report Charges Running Into Hundreds of Dollars

Reports on X and Reddit painted a more concrete picture of the damage. One user, Colin Parsons, said his accounts had been charged $281 on OpenAI and $168 on Anthropic. Another, Preston Zeller, reported a bill of $1,700. A Reddit thread gathered additional accounts, including roughly $400 in Anthropic usage and around 200 euros in Google Cloud charges that prompted Google to suspend the associated project.

OpenCode has not confirmed these figures as part of its own findings, and it has not addressed whether affected users will be reimbursed. The three providers, Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google, are working with OpenCode on remediation, according to the company, but none has publicly stated a policy for charges tied to stolen keys.

The mechanics of the situation make quick action important. An API key works for whoever holds it. Removing the key from inside OpenCode Console does nothing if the attacker already copied it. Console's built-in spend limits also cannot cap usage that happens outside OpenCode's own gateway, which means a copied key used directly against a provider's API bypasses those guardrails entirely.


The Distillation Attack Context

The technique OpenCode referenced is not new, and its scale in recent months has drawn attention from the companies whose models are being targeted. In February 2026, Anthropic flagged industrial-scale distillation activity, naming specific actors it said had extracted outputs from its models to train cheaper alternatives. Separately, U.S. officials noted that Chinese AI companies had pulled billions of tokens from frontier models through similar methods, a practice that lets firms skip large portions of the compute and research costs normally required to reach competitive performance levels.

What makes the OpenCode breach notable in this context is the method. Rather than scraping public interfaces or using their own accounts in violation of terms of service, the attackers here appear to have acquired legitimate credentials through a third-party breach, letting them operate under real user accounts with established billing relationships. That separation from direct account creation makes automated detection harder.


What Affected Users Should Do Now

OpenCode has advised affected users to rotate their keys immediately, but the precise steps matter. Rotating a key inside OpenCode Console alone is not sufficient. Users need to revoke the key from inside each provider's dashboard, where the credential is actually authenticated, then generate a new one and update every application or script that referenced the old key. Reviewing billing history going back to at least October 16 is also advisable, as any charges from queries the user did not make would show up in the provider's usage logs, not only inside OpenCode.

Security researchers have used the incident to argue against concentrating multiple provider keys inside a single third-party tool. Storing separate keys for separate platforms limits what any single breach can reach, and using keys with restricted permissions or lower spending thresholds reduces the potential damage if one is taken.

OpenCode says the investigation is ongoing.



AI Use in Connecticut Utilities Faces Security Review

 

Artificial intelligence is rapidly entering the computer networks that help run and protect the United States’ electric grid, and federal regulators are warning that this shift could create new openings for hackers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) said its cybersecurity auditors found increasing use of advanced AI tools—including chatbots, digital assistants, and automated analytics—inside protected network environments linked to the bulk power system. While these tools can improve efficiency, FERC cautioned that poorly controlled AI access could allow attackers to move through utility networks and reach critical systems.

FERC’s 2026 cybersecurity audit report says AI systems may mimic normal user behavior, making it harder for security teams to distinguish legitimate activity from malicious use. The agency also warned that commercially available AI tools already installed on utility systems could be used to map networks, identify routes toward critical infrastructure, accelerate reconnaissance, and automate exploitation attempts. If access is not properly authorized, verified, and monitored, AI could create “lateral-movement vectors,” meaning hackers could use one compromised system to reach deeper parts of the grid. 

The warning has prompted action in Connecticut. Attorney General William Tong and Consumer Counsel Claire Coleman have asked the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) to review how the state’s utilities use artificial intelligence. They said the exact scope of AI deployment by Eversource and Avangrid remains unclear, even though both companies have publicly acknowledged using the technology. Tong said the issue is not whether utilities are using AI, but where, why, and how it is deployed—and what safeguards protect the state’s critical energy infrastructure. 

The proposed review would require utilities to identify their AI systems, explain each system’s purpose, disclose the level of human oversight, and provide the policies governing its use. It would cover storm response, customer systems, asset management, energy-load and water-demand forecasting, equipment procurement, grid and power-plant operations, third-party vendors, and advanced metering infrastructure. The petition also asks PURA to examine cybersecurity protections and breaches, including those connected to AI and those arising outside AI systems. 

Experts say the central issue is the difference between AI assisting human operators and AI taking actions that affect the grid. University of New Haven researcher Vahid Behzadan said that as AI gains more authority, it should face stronger independent testing, human oversight, and tested fallback procedures. Coleman acknowledged that AI could improve utility operations and reduce costs for customers, but argued those benefits must not come at the expense of safety, reliability, or consumer protection.

AI-Powered Fraud Puts 9 in 10 Americans at Risk as Cyber Scams Become More Sophisticated

 

Digital fraud is becoming increasingly difficult to recognize as artificial intelligence enables criminals to develop more convincing scams and exploit personal information at scale. A report from Consumer Reports, Aspen Digital and the Global Cyber Alliance reveals that 90% of Americans surveyed had encountered a cyberattack or digital scam, while 17% said they had lost money following a digital security breach. 

The findings are based on a Consumer Reports survey of nearly 5,000 U.S. adults conducted in March and April. They highlight the widespread exposure of consumers to online threats, alongside growing concerns about the security of personal information and the possibility of unauthorized access to financial accounts. Artificial intelligence is changing how fraudsters operate by reducing the time, expense and technical effort required to target potential victims. Criminals can use information gathered from data breaches to create personalized messages that appear credible and relevant to individual recipients. 

This approach makes fraudulent communications harder to distinguish from legitimate requests, even for people who are familiar with common online threats. Stacey Higginbotham, a cybersecurity fellow at Consumer Reports, warned that scams are increasingly affecting people across different backgrounds. She also emphasized that AI could increase both the number of fraudulent messages reaching consumers and the sophistication of those attempts. Consumer Reports CEO Phil Radford has called for stronger corporate accountability, government safeguards and coordinated efforts to address the growing problem. 

Traditional phishing attempts often contain suspicious links, spelling mistakes or unfamiliar sender details. However, AI-assisted fraud can make these warning signs less obvious. Scammers who obtain personal details, including someone’s home address, may impersonate financial institutions and send tailored offers designed to gain trust or obtain sensitive information. Deepfake technology can further complicate efforts to identify fraudulent communications. 

According to Higginbotham, approximately one in five scams already involves some form of personalization, a proportion expected to increase as AI tools become more accessible. Colin Ferris, a cybersecurity expert at Silverfort, explained that creating individually tailored phishing messages previously required considerable effort. AI makes it easier to customize communications for large numbers of potential victims, increasing the reach of these schemes.

Security specialists recommend strengthening account protection as these threats evolve. Two-factor authentication and other forms of multifactor authentication can provide an additional barrier against unauthorized access. Consumers should also be cautious when opening attachments, clicking links or responding to unexpected requests involving financial information. However, individual vigilance cannot address every weakness in online security. 

Brian Cute, president and CEO of the Global Cyber Alliance, has highlighted the need for cooperation among technology companies, governments and philanthropic organizations to address vulnerabilities involving insecure internet routing and maliciously registered domains. One initiative, called Take9, encourages people to wait nine seconds before acting on suspicious messages. 

This brief pause gives recipients an opportunity to reconsider a request, verify its legitimacy and take protective steps, such as changing banking passwords when necessary. As AI continues to reshape digital fraud, combining cautious online behavior with stronger security measures and broader institutional safeguards will be increasingly important.

US Cybersecurity Job Postings Drop 26% as AI Security Demand Surges


While the demand for artificial intelligence security specialists continued to grow, cybersecurity job postings decreased to a four-year low in 2026 in the United States. CyberSN's Cybersecurity Jobs Report indicates that between January and September 2026, employers posted 235,786 cybersecurity jobs, a 26.4% decline from the same period in 2025 when 320,210 jobs were posted. 4

Using JobSpikr job listings, CyberSN categorizes the listings into 45 cybersecurity functional roles across ten groups based on the skills and responsibilities required rather than the job title assigned. While overall job openings declined, some AI-related positions experienced significant growth. In 2015, AI Security Engineer positions grew by 268.3% year over year, while listings for Cyber Data Scientists increased by 203.5%. 

These figures indicate that the demand for professionals with expertise in artificial intelligence, data analysis, and cybersecurity is growing. Additionally, AI-related skills are becoming increasingly commonplace in a wide range of cybersecurity positions. 

The use of AI was mentioned in approximately 15% of cybersecurity job postings during the first nine months of 2026, roughly matching the 15.1% that was mentioned in the previous year. However, this share reached 20% in September, which indicates that AI is increasingly common in job postings. 

AI Skills Gain Ground Across Cybersecurity Roles

According to the report, AI was most commonly mentioned in research positions, with 32.7% of listings in that category mentioning AI mentions, an increase of 11.7% over the previous year. A 23.3% increase over last year was observed in offense-related jobs, an increase of 4.8 points. AI was mentioned in 19.8% of GRC listings, while planning-related positions accounted for 18.9%. 

While several established cybersecurity positions experienced substantial decreases during the period, postings for Cyber Insider Threat Analysts decreased by 55.6% to 1,088, while Cyber Risk Analysts accounted for a 51.5% decline to 4,031 positions. Postings for penetration testers decreased 45.9% to 3,063 while postings for threat hunters decreased by 40%, reaching 1,013 positions. There was a 38.9% decline in CISO-related positions, including Chief Security Officer and Information Security Officer roles. 

The figure, however, was close to the 2,808 level of 2024, suggesting that the sharper comparison may partly reflect unusually high demand for CISOs in 2025. As of the second quarter of 2026, CISO-related jobs also increased by 19.5%. It remains possible to work remotely in many categories, particularly Sales, where 32.8% of listings offer remote work, followed closely by GRC at 31.2%. 

The report does not determine the reasons for the changing figures, since it measures advertisements rather than completed hires. It should be noted, however, that the contrast between decline in vacancies overall and rapid growth in AI-focused positions indicates that employers are seeking a significant shift in the skills that cybersecurity professionals possess. 

Remote Work Remains Available Across Several Security Functions

A number of cybersecurity job categories continued to feature remote opportunities, with Sales registering 32.8% of remote listings, Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) posting 31.2%. 24.7% of remote postings were related to offensive roles, while 22.9% were related to product security. Educating, researching, and defending also contributed notable shares, respectively, containing 22.8%, 21.9%, and 21.3%.

Although remote work remains available across different cybersecurity functions, its availability varies from role to role. According to the report, these proportions do not appear to reflect changes in employer policies or changes in the types of positions being advertised. 

Report Highlights Limits of Job Market Data

A CyberSN analysis measures not only posted positions, but also confirmed hires and the number of individuals entering or leaving the profession. It does not also explain why postings have declined or why AI-focused positions are in high demand. In this respect, the figures provide an overview of employer requirements during the reporting period rather than providing an exhaustive analysis of the factors influencing cybersecurity employment in general. 

While the report indicates uncertainty regarding senior leadership opportunities, the number of CISO-related postings in 2026 was close to what it was in 2024, and listings increased from the second to the third quarters. Thus, the year-over-year decline must be considered in conjunction with the unusually high level recorded the prior year as well. 

Cybersecurity professionals should monitor changes in skills requirements as the contrasting figures highlight the importance of monitoring these changes. As AI-related expertise appears in increasing numbers of job listings, several established roles have been reduced substantially. However, the available data does not indicate that AI demand is directly correlated with other job losses. It will be important to determine whether growth in AI security roles continues in the next quarter, as well as whether senior cybersecurity positions remain stable. 

According to the report, there are fewer cybersecurity vacancies overall but a strong demand for specialized AI and data skills in the coming quarters. As evidenced by the latest figures, the cybersecurity job market is changing, with AI-related skills taking on increased significance even as overall job openings decline. Future hiring data will be able to provide insight into whether this trend continues and how demand for traditional security jobs is anticipated.

Compromised ConnectWise OAuth App Exposes Over 170 Microsoft 365 Tenants in Supply Chain Attack

 




A compromised credential tied to a ConnectWise cloud backup application has allowed threat actors to access more than 170 Microsoft 365 environments managed by the company's partners and customers, with security researchers and Microsoft all tracking what they describe as an active supply chain attack.

The affected application, ConnectWise Cloud Backup, was formerly known as SkyKick before ConnectWise acquired it. The tool is designed for managed service providers (MSPs) and handles backup duties across Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace environments, covering mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams chats, and directory data for every tenant where it is installed. That built-in breadth of access is precisely what made the compromise so damaging.

Security firm Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins across 173 partner and customer tenants. Researchers traced the suspicious activity to a single IP address, 144.172.64.128, which obtained tokens on October 15, 2026, between 6:13 and 8:34 UTC. The movement across tenants was methodical: the actor worked through environments in sorted GUID order, hitting each one a few seconds apart, a pattern consistent with an automated script running through a pre-built target list. Before that, the same IP address was used to password-spray four law firm tenants on October 13 and 14, though no successful user sign-ins were logged during that activity.

The attack went further than reconnaissance. In at least one partner tenant, a separate ConnectWise application called Cloud Management for Teams elevated itself to the Global Administrator role. From there, the actor added client secrets to an MSP management app and to Huntress's own app, using a Python-urllib/3.12 user agent. That kind of credential insertion is a classic backdoor move, designed to maintain persistent access even after the initial intrusion is addressed.

Huntress also noted that some of the access, particularly directory reads through Microsoft Graph, does not generate an audit trail, which complicates the task of establishing the full scope of what was seen or copied.

Security company Todyl, which also investigated the activity, pointed out that the inherited consent model made the damage difficult to contain quickly. Because the Cloud Backup application had been granted permission by tenant administrators, it could read and write to mail via Exchange Web Services, access OneDrive and SharePoint files, and reach Teams chats, including restoration capabilities. Revoking user sessions had no effect on the attack, since the access did not depend on user sign-ins. Disabling the application entirely stops new tokens from being issued, but tokens already in circulation remain valid for up to 90 minutes.

Microsoft confirmed it is tracking the campaign as an active supply chain attack, identifying it by the Cloud Backup application's OAuth App ID (506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae). The company said the actor likely abused Directory.ReadWrite.All permissions granted by customers, and observed follow-on activity including Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add credentials to service principals as a persistence mechanism.

ConnectWise responded by shutting off Cloud Backup application access entirely and stated it found no evidence that partner backup data stored within the platform was copied or exfiltrated.

For organizations trying to determine whether they were affected, the key step is checking service principal sign-in logs in the Entra Admin Center, filtered by the Cloud Backup App ID. The default User sign-ins tab will not show this activity. Administrators should flag any sign-ins originating from IP addresses outside expected Microsoft or Azure ranges, since the application's normal outbound traffic uses Azure private IPv6. A full audit of any credentials added to applications since October 13 is also recommended, along with a review of Entra audit logs for any ConnectWise or SkyKick apps that added themselves to directory roles.

The ConnectWise incident surfaced alongside a separate supply chain campaign reported by Google Mandiant, Google Threat Intelligence Group, and ManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab. That operation, attributed to a previously undocumented threat cluster called UNC7017, repeatedly tampered with update servers belonging to backup software maker AOMEI. Between April and July 2026, attackers redirected downloads to malicious ZIP packages during short five-to-ten-minute windows. The payloads included a downloader called CROSSROAD and a modular backdoor named SHINYROAD, deployed through DLL sideloading. The campaign hit organizations in IT services, telecommunications, and higher education across roughly 11 countries, including the United States, Brazil, India, and Spain.

Together, the two incidents reinforce a pattern security researchers have flagged for years: backup tools and management platforms carry privileged access across dozens or hundreds of environments simultaneously, making them attractive targets for attackers looking to move laterally at scale without touching endpoint defenses.