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AI Coding Agents AIR Security Claude Code Gemini CLI GitHub Copilot Plugin4Shell technology

Plugin4Shell: The Zero-Click Flaw That Broke Every Prominent AI Coding Agent at Once



The security promise was simple. A plugin marketplace reviews a piece of code, locks it to a specific, verified version, and every AI coding agent that installs it gets exactly what was reviewed. No surprises or swaps. That promise just got broken, simultaneously, across every major AI coding agent on the market.

On September 17, cybersecurity startup AIR Security publicly disclosed Plugin4Shell, a zero-click, high-severity remote code execution vulnerability affecting Anthropic's Claude Code, OpenAI's Codex, Microsoft's GitHub Copilot, and Google's Gemini CLI. The name is a deliberate echo of Log4Shell, the 2021 Apache flaw that shook enterprise security teams for months. This one hits a faster-moving target: the plugin ecosystems that have quietly become critical infrastructure for millions of software developers.

The researchers who found it, Or Nevo, Dor Granat, and Niv Hoffman, describe it as the first supply-chain vulnerability of the AI agent ecosystem. That is not a small claim, and the technical details back it up.


How the Attack Works

To understand Plugin4Shell, you need to understand SHA pinning, the mechanism it breaks. When a marketplace approves a plugin, it records a cryptographic commit hash, a 40-character string that uniquely identifies an exact snapshot of the plugin's code. From that point forward, every agent that installs the plugin is supposed to check out precisely that commit. Reviewed code, nothing else, forever.

The vulnerability is a single missing verification step. Affected agents fetch the pinned commit during installation but never confirm that the code they actually land on matches it. That gap opens the door to a Git reference resolution trick.

For Claude Code, Codex, and GitHub Copilot, an attacker who controls a plugin repository can create a branch whose name is the exact 40-character pinned commit hash, set it as the repository's default branch, and point it at malicious code. When the agent runs its checkout, Git resolves the branch name instead of the commit object, because Git prefers a matching reference when the name is ambiguous. The agent installs attacker-controlled code, reports a clean install at the trusted hash, and nothing looks wrong.

Gemini CLI has a slightly different variant. Its installer fetches the target commit and then checks out FETCH_HEAD, but if the repository's default branch is itself named FETCH_HEAD, that checkout resolves to the branch instead. The fetched commit gets silently discarded.

What makes this zero-click is auto-update. Claude Code and Codex update installed plugins in the background by default. When a plugin's pinned commit is swapped upstream, an already-installed, already-trusted plugin gets silently replaced with a malicious version. No prompt. No reinstall. Nothing for the user to notice or decline.

Plugins run with the permissions of the developer operating the agent. That means an attacker who succeeds here lands in the developer's machine with access to source code, cloud credentials, SSH keys, internal repositories, and production systems.


The Context Makes It Worse

Plugin4Shell is the third installment in a series of findings from AIR Security, each one showing a different layer of the AI plugin ecosystem collapsing under scrutiny.

In earlier research called "The Story of Skills," the team published a malicious skill to a trusted marketplace and watched it spread to over 26,000 agents. In SkillJacking, they found 925 skills already in active use had been quietly hijacked from their original maintainers, affecting 134,000 agents, by taking over the repositories behind them.

The industry's answer to SkillJacking was SHA pinning. Plugin4Shell is the answer to that answer. The takeovers AIR demonstrated in SkillJacking can now be combined with Plugin4Shell to bypass the exact safeguard that was supposed to contain them. The chain is proven end to end.


Vendor Responses

AIR found the vulnerability in May 2026, built working proof-of-concept exploits against all four agents, and disclosed everything to the vendors in June. What happened next drew a clear line between the companies that acted and the ones that did not.

Anthropic patched Claude Code in version 2.1.179. OpenAI patched Codex in version 0.146.0. Both confirmed fixes after disclosure.

Microsoft has not shipped a fix for GitHub Copilot. GitHub has argued that its platform blocks branch and tag names that resemble commit hashes, which limits the attack surface for GitHub-hosted plugins. AIR's counter is that Copilot also supports marketplaces hosted on Bitbucket and self-hosted git servers, which permit such names, and that GitHub's restriction does nothing for those configurations. The two positions describe different scopes. Copilot users currently have no patch.

Google's response was to deprecate Gemini CLI entirely. The company confirmed in August that no fix would ship, directing users to migrate to an alternative product called Antigravity. Every existing Gemini CLI installation remains permanently vulnerable.


What Users Should Do Now

The fix, technically, is a single line of verification that every affected agent was missing: after checkout, compare the actual HEAD commit against the pinned hash and abort if they do not match. Because the check runs inside the agent rather than at the marketplace, no marketplace can enforce this guarantee on its own. Only an agent-side fix closes it.

Claude Code users should update to version 2.1.179 or later. Codex users should update to version 0.146.0 or later. Gemini CLI users should migrate away from the product. GitHub Copilot users have no patch available and no confirmed timeline for one.

For enterprise teams that have built internal vetting processes around SHA pinning, Plugin4Shell is a harder problem. The review passed. The pin was written. Different code got installed. Every downstream security process built on that guarantee inherits the failure.

The most striking detail in AIR's disclosure is not the vulnerability itself. It is that four independent engineering teams at four separate companies all made the same mistake, building the same flawed assumption into their auto-update pipelines, and none of them caught it until an outside lab did. That is not an implementation error in one product. That is a design assumption the entire industry shared, and nobody questioned it.

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Privilege Escalation
Azure AI Cloud Security Cyber Security Microsoft Azure Privilege Escalation

Microsoft Fixes Critical Azure AI Flaw Rated CVSS 10.0

 

Microsoft has patched a maximum-severity vulnerability in Azure AI Foundry that could allow unauthorized attackers to escalate their privileges over a network. Tracked as CVE-2026-85889, the flaw carries a CVSS score of 10.0, making it one of the most serious security issues affecting Microsoft’s cloud-based artificial intelligence services. The company said the vulnerability resulted from missing authentication for a critical function within Azure AI Foundry. There is currently no evidence that the flaw has been exploited in real-world attacks. 

Azure AI Foundry, also known as Microsoft Foundry, is an enterprise platform used to build, deploy and manage generative AI applications and autonomous agents. A successful exploit could have enabled an unauthorized attacker to gain elevated privileges, potentially increasing access to sensitive resources or administrative functions. Security researcher Rémy Marot, who uses the handle @R_Marot, discovered and reported the vulnerability to Microsoft. The company has already addressed the issue across its cloud infrastructure. 

Microsoft said customers do not need to take any action because the affected cloud services have been fully mitigated. Alongside CVE-2026-85889, the company also fixed several other critical cloud vulnerabilities. These include CVE-2026-85885, a command injection flaw in Microsoft 365 Copilot rated 9.9; CVE-2026-85878, an improper authorization issue in Azure Database for PostgreSQL rated 9.9; and CVE-2026-87701, an improper neutralization vulnerability in Azure Cosmos DB rated 9.6. 

The tech giant separately released updates for two Windows vulnerabilities. CVE-2026-62721 affects the Windows User-Mode Power Service and could allow an authorized local attacker to gain SYSTEM privileges. CVE-2026-85921 is a double-free vulnerability in Windows Secure Kernel Mode that could enable privilege escalation to Virtual Trust Level 1. Both vulnerabilities were fixed through an out-of-band update for Windows 11 version 26H1, distributed as cumulative update KB5129194 for arm64 and x64 systems. 

The latest fixes arrive shortly after Microsoft patched 974 vulnerabilities across its software portfolio. Two of those flaws, affecting Windows Advanced Local Procedure Call and the Windows Update Stack, were reportedly exploited in active attacks. Proofpoint and Volexity said the ALPC flaw was chained with two Google Chrome vulnerabilities to create the BlueMoon exploit kit, which multiple espionage-linked threat actors allegedly used to deliver malicious payloads. The developments highlight the growing security risks surrounding cloud platforms, enterprise AI tools and widely deployed operating systems.
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WeaselBiscuit Stealer
BeaverTail malware Chrome Extension Security Contagious Interview DPRK Cyber Threats JavaScript Stealer Malicious Npm Packages malware Software Supply Chain Security WeaselBiscuit Stealer

WeaselBiscuit Stealer Found in 13 Malicious npm Packages


Researchers have discovered 13 npm packages carrying a previously undocumented JavaScript information stealer called WeaselBiscuit, introducing yet another malicious threat to the npm package ecosystem. In addition to linking the packages together via shared indicators, OpenSourceMalware found several similarities between BeaverTail and OtterCookie, two North Korean malware families. 


A number of packages are included, including @biz44/id10-client, @biz44/id12-client, @biz44/id44-client, @biz44/id79-client, @biz44/id95-client, @biz44/id99-client, @biz44/process-runtime-utils, @biz44/runtime-utils, @biz44/engin1, id79-client, process-lhpm, process-mite, and process-tailwind. Many were first observed between September 12 and September 16, 2026, with some versions still available on NPM at the time of analysis. 

In comparison to BeaverTail and OtterCookie, WeaselBiscuit appears much smaller. In addition to remote access and cryptocurrency theft functions, the malware focuses on profiling hosts and collecting data collected by Chrome extensions rather than carrying a broad range of remote access functions. Malware loaders are launched when a compromised package is imported, causing detached Node.js processes to begin execution.

After retrieving an encoded payload from an Npoint URL, the loader executes the decoded code directly in memory. Following execution, the malware obtains its command-and-control configuration from another Npoint endpoint before connecting to 103.170.217.184:8787. Among the data collected are hostnames, usernames, operating systems, CPUs, and memory, as well as local and public IP addresses. 

Chrome profiles are also searched for extension storage on Windows, Mac OS, and Linux platforms. Chrome's Local Extension Settings directory may contain information associated with browser extensions, including cryptocurrency wallet extensions, which makes this collection especially significant. 

Instead of relying on a specific list of wallet extensions, OpenSourceMalware reported the stealer uploads readable, non-empty files from these locations. C2 servers can also provide commands for monitoring the clipboard and logging Windows keystrokes. 

Despite these capabilities, the recovered malware does not include direct wallet draining functionality, browser password decryption, seed phrase searching, screenshots, or a remote shell access. Additionally, some BeaverTail and OtterCookie activities have a Python-based InvisibleFerret stage that is not present in any other activity. 

Possible Links to DPRK Malware

WeaselBiscuit has been compared to malware associated with the DPRK-linked Contagious Interview campaign, but the attribution has yet to be confirmed. OpenSourceMalware did not find conclusive evidence that the attack was originated by North Korea based on operational infrastructure, victimology, campaign metadata or other identifying materials. 

WeaselBiscuit employs the dead-drop technique of Npoint.io as a dead-drop service, a technique previously observed in Contagious Interview campaigns. Some of its technical indicators, however, overlap with earlier campaigns. Additionally, its code performs public IP and geolocation checks using IPify.org and IP-API.com, while parts of its command-and-control design are similar to OtterCookie's. 

Among the numeric identifiers found in the malware are 10, 12, 44, 79, 95, and 99. These identifiers are similar to campaign markers associated with PolinRider activity, however their exact purpose in WeaselBiscuit is unclear. In terms of capability, BeaverTail and OtterCookie are more closely related. 

Several features are retained in WhistlerBiscuit, including system profiling, Chrome extension data collection, clipboard monitoring, and keylogging, all of which are common to those malware families. However, several of their heavier features are removed, including remote access functions, wallet draining capabilities, screenshots, and secondary payload delivery. 

Researchers at Cisco Talos observed a similar overlap in October 2025, when they discovered that the node-nvm-ssh package contained characteristics related to both BeaverTail and OtterCookie. The findings suggest that code and techniques from these malware families have been found in a variety of combinations within npm-based malicious code. 

The WeaselBiscuit stealer should be viewed for the time being as a distinctive lightweight stealer with distinct technical similarities to DPRK-related tooling rather than a new DPRK malware family confirmed by the DPRK. For a more conclusive attribution, further evidence from infrastructure, campaigns, or code levels would be required.

With the discovery of WeaselBiscuit, security risks are highlighted within the npm ecosystem, particularly for developers utilizing third-party packages. In addition to the ability to collect Chrome extension data and similarity to BeaverTail and OtterCookie, it warrants continued investigation as researchers investigate its origins and wider activities.
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Malware attacks
AI Attacks AI technology Android Malware Android Malwares Cyber Attacks data stealing Data stealing malware Malware attacks

RatHat Android Malware Uses AI to Control Infected Devices

 

A new Android backdoor called RatHat utilizes an AI-powered system to remotely navigate compromised devices, while also stealing sensitive information and using a variety of methods to maintain its presence. Researchers at Zimperium’s zLabs found indications that RatHat may be associated with threat actors based in China after they discovered Chinese language prompts within the malware’s AI subsystem. 

The malware is reported to be distributed through malicious advertising, SMS messages and phishing websites that promote APK downloads outside Google Play. RatHat takes advantage of Android’s Accessibility permissions to obtain extensive control over infected devices. This allows it to enable Developer Options and Wireless Debugging, granting it a local shell-level execution environment without the need for a separate computer. Researchers observed similarities with this technique that have been previously seen in the ToxicPanda and RedHook Android malware families. 

The malware utilizes Android Debug Bridge (ADB) access to install a Go-based agent called liblocal-service.so. The agent can execute commands with ADB shell privileges, bypassing battery restrictions and establishing persistence. It can also restore the malware in the case that the main component is removed or stopped. The relationship works in both directions, with the malware being able to restore the agent if the agent itself is deleted. 

RatHat also makes use of a second component, libmedia_codec.so, which acts as an FRP reverse-proxy client and establishes a persistent tunnel to the attackers. The malware has the ability to display HTML overlays over targeted banking and cryptocurrency applications in order to acquire the users’ credentials. Its information-stealing capabilities include SMS messages and notifications, including one-time passwords. RatHat can also monitor text changes, extract URLs from browser address bars and capture lock-screen PINs, passwords and unlock patterns. 

One of RatHat’s most interesting features is its AI-powered interface automation engine. According to Zimperium, the malware converts the Android Accessibility tree into XML and sends the resulting information to an unnamed popular AI assistant. This system can recognize the screen coordinates of requested interface elements and determine their displayed text and provide navigation commands such as scrolling instructions. This enables the malware to navigate Android interfaces more dynamically than other malware that exclusively rely on predetermined scripts. 

Zimperium stated that the AI-driven system makes the malware more adaptable and arguably harder for security software to detect. RatHat actively prevents victims from uninstalling the malware. When an uninstall confirmation screen appears, the malware can intercept the process and cancel the removal and display a fake Google Play overlay, which shows a fraudulent error message. The malware also contains a number of anti-analysis measures, including APK container manipulation, an unusually large 61MB Android manifest and invalid DEX pseudo-instructions that are designed to confuse or disrupt the functionality of security analysis tools. 

Android users are advised to avoid downloading APK files from outside Google Play unless the publisher is explicitly trusted and to be careful when granting Accessibility permissions to applications. In addition, users should regularly scan their devices using Google Play Protect.
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vulnerabilities and exploits
Apple MacOS Docker Malicious Code microVM vulnerabilities and exploits

Docker Fixes Critical Sandboxes Flaw That Could Expose Host Files

 




Docker has patched two vulnerabilities in Docker Sandboxes that could allow malicious code running inside an isolated sandbox to cross its intended workspace boundary and interact with resources on the host system.

The more severe issue, tracked as CVE-2026-77179, affects Docker Sandboxes versions 0.28.0 through versions before 0.42.0 on macOS and is rated Critical. Docker fixed the vulnerability in Sandboxes 0.42.0, released September 7. The company disclosed the security issues publicly on September 15.

Docker Sandboxes are designed to give AI coding agents their own microVM environment where they can execute code, install packages and use development tools without directly accessing the host. The security architecture treats the microVM as the primary trust boundary, with the agent receiving full control, including "sudo", inside that environment. Resources such as a developer's project directory are selectively exposed across the boundary.

The problem in CVE-2026-77179 occurs in the virtio-fs host server, which handles filesystem sharing between the macOS host and the sandbox. Docker said the component could follow a symbolic link when reopening an unlinked file through a previously stored pathname.

A malicious process inside the VM could exploit this behavior by changing a parent directory into a symbolic link after the original path had been accepted. When the host subsequently reused the stored path, the operation could be redirected to a different location outside the authorized workspace.

This creates a path traversal condition across the VM boundary. Docker said an attacker could consequently read or modify arbitrary host files available to the account running the virtual machine monitor. Depending on what files can be changed, the access could potentially be turned into host-side code execution.

The requirement for malicious code to already be executing inside the sandbox does not eliminate the security concern. Docker Sandboxes are intended to contain precisely the type of untrusted code that an autonomous coding agent might encounter through a compromised repository, malicious dependency, poisoned package or manipulated instruction. If that code can alter host-visible filesystem paths, the microVM's isolation boundary becomes vulnerable at the point where the host performs the subsequent filesystem operation.

The second vulnerability, CVE-2026-79994, affects versions 0.37.0 through versions before 0.42.0. Docker rates it High with a CVSS 4.0 score of 8.7.

This issue affects the guest-to-host relay used for Unix domain sockets. The relay initially verified that a requested socket was located inside an authorized workspace, but later established the connection by using the pathname again. A malicious guest could change an intermediate directory into a symlink during that interval, causing the host to connect to an AF_UNIX socket outside the permitted workspace.

The vulnerability is classified as a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition, because the security decision is made against a pathname whose meaning can change before the privileged operation occurs. The resulting connection could expose data or host-side capabilities provided by the targeted socket.

Together, the two flaws expose different host interfaces through a similar underlying weakness: trusting a pathname after an attacker-controlled environment has had an opportunity to alter what that pathname resolves to.

The risk is amplified by how Sandboxes share development workspaces. Docker says "sbx run" normally mounts the current directory into the sandbox with read-write access, meaning an agent can directly modify the developer's working tree. Docker also warns that files such as Git hooks, CI configuration, IDE task definitions and project scripts can affect subsequent host-side development activity.

For users unable to update immediately, Docker recommends clone mode and advises against additional read-write host mounts. Clone mode mounts the repository read-only at "/run/sandbox/source" while the agent works from a private clone inside the VM. However, it is not a confidentiality boundary: files available in the mounted repository, including untracked files such as ".env", may still be readable by the agent.

Docker has reported no exploitation of either vulnerability. Neither issue was listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog at the time of disclosure.

The company credited Oren Yomtov of accomplish.ai with discovering CVE-2026-77179 and Jurre van Bergen of ThreatNotify with finding CVE-2026-79994.

The fixes arrived amid wider security scrutiny of AI coding environments. Earlier research from Cyera Research Labs demonstrated how a prompt-injected coding agent operating inside a Docker-based environment could be used as part of an attack chain against the host through a separate Docker Engine vulnerability. The latest disclosures reinforce the importance of treating autonomous coding agents as potentially hostile workloads, even when they are placed inside purpose-built isolation mechanisms.

Users running affected Sandboxes versions should upgrade to 0.42.0 or later. Docker Sandboxes 0.43.0, released September 15, is the latest stable release as of September 18.

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NightmareStresser
Cyber Security DDOS Attacks FBI NightmareStresser

FBI Seizes NightmareStresser DDoS-for-Hire Domains in Global Crackdown

 

The U.S. Department of Justice has announced the court-authorized seizure of internet domains linked to “NightmareStresser,” one of the world’s longest-running Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) for-hire services. The operation, led by the FBI Anchorage Field Office with support from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, targets so-called “booter” and “stresser” platforms that enable paying customers to launch powerful cyberattacks against individuals, organizations, and critical online infrastructure across Alaska and globally. 

According to the seizure warrant affidavit, NightmareStresser was used to carry out hundreds of thousands of actual or attempted DDoS attacks worldwide since 2022. These services lower the barrier to entry for cybercrime by allowing users with minimal technical expertise to disrupt internet connections, knock targeted devices offline (“booting”), and degrade or completely interrupt access to websites and online services. Victims have included schools, government agencies, gaming platforms, and millions of everyday users whose connectivity was affected by these coordinated attacks.

The takedown forms part of Operation PowerOFF, an ongoing international law enforcement initiative aimed at dismantling criminal DDoS-for-hire infrastructures and holding both administrators and users accountable. Over the past eight years, federal prosecutors and investigators in Anchorage and Los Angeles have charged twelve defendants involved in facilitating DDoS-for-hire services and seized more than 100 associated domains. This latest action expands on those efforts by targeting all known booter sites, shutting down as many as possible, and coupling enforcement with a public education campaign on the harms caused by illegal DDoS activity. 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Adam Alexander and Ainsley McNerney are prosecuting the case in the District of Alaska. The Justice Department emphasizes that booter and stresser services not only harm direct targets but also undermine broader internet reliability and safety. As digital dependence grows, such crackdowns signal a sustained push to disrupt the ecosystem enabling low-cost, high-impact cyberattacks—and to deter would-be offenders by removing the domains and infrastructure these services rely on to operate.
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Vulnerabilities and Exploits
DNSSEC RCE Unbound 1.26.1 Unbound DNS Vulnerabilities and Exploits

Unbound 1.26.1 Patches Critical RCE, DoS, and DNSSEC Flaws

 

A major security update has been issued for Unbound, the widely used validating DNS resolver developed by NLnet Labs. On September 16, 2026, the project disclosed a batch of high-severity vulnerabilities affecting versions up to and including 1.26.0, with fixes released in version 1.26.1. These flaws range from heap buffer overflows and use-after-free bugs to DNSSEC validation bypasses, any of which could allow attackers to crash servers or, in some cases, achieve remote code execution. 

RCE and denial-of-service risks 

Among the most serious issues is a heap buffer overflow in Unbound’s DNSSEC validator that can be triggered by a malicious DNSKEY record containing a self-referential compression pointer. This bug, credited to researchers from Nankai University, can lead to denial of service and potential remote code execution because the digest buffer overflows when processing such crafted records. Two additional memory-corruption bugs were also reported: one in DNSSEC canonicalization that affects long query names over TCP, and another in CNAME synthesis that can progressively corrupt heap memory and, under specific conditions, allow code execution. All three vulnerabilities are fixed in the 1.26.1 release, and manual patches are available for administrators who cannot immediately upgrade. 

Unbound’s support for encrypted DNS transports is also affected. A use-after-free bug in the DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) implementation can be triggered by a malicious client that sends a RESET_STREAM and withholds ACKs, eventually causing the server to exit abnormally after as few as 20 queries. Similarly, a use-after-free in the DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) cleanup path can be exploited when RPZ drops queries or under heavy traffic, potentially leading to process termination on hardened allocators. In addition, a degradation-of-service flaw in TCP/DoT handling allows an attacker to monopolize a worker’s event loop by streaming distinct uncached queries over a single connection, with no limit on consecutive reads. Fixes for these issues adjust stream shutdown behavior, correct DoH mesh accounting, and introduce read limits similar to those already used for UDP. 

Beyond memory safety, several logic errors undermine Unbound’s security guarantees. A ZONEMD verification bypass creates a window where tampered zone data can be served or written to disk before integrity checks complete, affecting zones below a trust anchor. A cross-zone cache-poisoning bug allows a malicious actor controlling one delegated zone under an NSEC-signed parent to inject insecure wildcard DS records for unrelated sibling domains, effectively forging delegations. Another flaw lets the “serve-expired” feature bypass the wait-limit counter introduced for the DNSBomb mitigation (CVE-2024-33655), enabling pulsing DoS amplification attacks from a single IP. The “ReTrap” family of algorithmic-complexity attacks (TagTrap, DelegationTrap, NsecTrap, AdditionalTrap) can also degrade service by forcing excessive DNSSEC validation work; Unbound 1.26.1 adds throttles and disables validation of the additional section by default to mitigate this. 

Role of administrators 

All users running Unbound 1.26.0 or earlier are urged to upgrade to version 1.26.1 as soon as possible, especially on internet-facing resolvers or those handling DNSSEC-validated traffic. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, NLnet Labs provides individual patches for each CVE that can be applied manually to the source tree. Operators should also review configurations for features like DNS-over-QUIC, DNS-over-HTTPS, DNSCrypt, response-ip/RPZ, and serve-expired, since several vulnerabilities require these options to be enabled. Given Unbound’s role in the DNS infrastructure of countless networks, prompt patching is critical to prevent outages and exploitation in the wild.
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Hacker attack
critical infrastructure attack Cyber Attacks Cybersecurity Attack cybersecurity concerns Government websites hacked Hacker attack

Cyberattack Knocks International Meteor Organization Website Offline

 

A cyberattack has forced the International Meteor Organization (IMO), one of the leading providers of meteor observation, to take much of the website offline. Founded in 1988, the Belgium-based independent organization reported that the cyberattack caused severe damage to the aging infrastructure and left the organization dealing with several weeks of partial downtime as it transitions to new infrastructure. 

The organization has replaced its website with a static notice informing the visitors about the incident and warning that features will return gradually. “We recently suffered a cyberattack that dealt a critical blow to aging infrastructure, taking much of our site offline,” the organization said. It explained that it expects several weeks of partial downtime while transitioning to new infrastructure and services. The IMO has prioritized restoring its fireball reporting system which is already available for users to submit their observations. The organization also shared its meteor and asteroid-related information on its Facebook page. 

The IMO was formed to bring amateur and professional meteor observers and scientists together. The organization has played an essential role in the development of international standards for meteor observations and the maintenance of a global database of meteor and fireball reports containing photographs, videos and telescopic observations. The organization has not publicly identified those responsible for the attack, and no hacking group had claimed responsibility as of Wednesday afternoon. The organization also did not respond to requests for additional comment. The incident comes shortly before the IMO’s annual international conference that is set to take place next week in France. 

It is unclear if the cyberattack will impact the event or the organization’s other activities. The incident also shows the growing interest of cybercriminals in targeting organizations involved in space and scientific research. U.S. agencies have warned that the rising economic importance of the space industry can attract attackers and organizations that engage in space-related activities can become potential targets. Attackers have targeted the National Science Foundation’s National Optical-Infrared Astronomy Research Laboratory in Hawai’i and the Atacama Large Millimeter Array observatory in Chile in 2023. 

The American Meteorological Society was also targeted by ransomware in the same year. For now, the IMO is focused on rebuilding its infrastructure and restoring the services after the attack, with additional website features expected to return as the transition progresses.
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WordPress Security
Brevo Cyber Attack Brevo Supply Chain Attack ClickFix Malware Cloudflare API Key Cyber Attacks malware Supply Chain Security Website Malware WordPress Backdoor WordPress Security

Brevo Breach Exposes Customer Websites to ClickFix Malware


Email marketing and customer relationship management platform Brevo, formerly known as Sendinblue, suffered a supply chain attack in which malicious code was able to reach Brevo's own websites as well as customers' websites utilizing embedded Brevo services. 

Researchers at Sansec discovered that the incident was much more extensive than the six accounts previously revealed. When Brevo infrastructure was compromised on September 14, 2026, malicious JavaScript began to be served. In addition, Sansec found evidence that more than 100,000 customer websites utilizing Brevo components may have been exposed as a result of the attack. 

There were two main infection paths used in the campaign: a malicious WordPress plugin that targeted site administrators and a ClickFix overlay that was displayed to visitors. 

Malicious Code Reached Embedded Brevo Components

Brevo-hosted pages as well as JavaScript resources commonly embedded in customer websites were identified as containing the injected code. These included Brevo trackers, Conversations chat widgets, as well as other forms hosted on Brevo servers. 

Modified versions of the JavaScript assets directed browsers to infrastructure controlled by attackers, which served the malicious malware loader. Sansec identified several malicious subdomains under the Brevo domain sendibt1.com. A number of hostnames were affected, including cdn.sendibt1.com, cdn2.sendibt1.com, cdn3.sendibt1.com, cdn4.sendibt1.com, cdn9.sendibt1.com, cdn10.sendibt1.com, and cdn11.sendibt1.com. 

A SSL certificate for cdn.sendibt1.com was also discovered on August 25, which indicates that the attackers had gained access to Brevo's DNS records. A malicious content display was observed on September 14 from approximately 16:05 until 20:13 UTC, which was observed by researchers. 

A total of 2,549 breaches of Content Security Policy were reported across 12 sites during and after the attack window. These hosts stopped resolving on September 15, while the affected files were reported clean at the site of origin. 

ClickFix Campaign Targeted Website Visitors

Injected malware delivered different payloads depending on the visitor. When a visitor was detected as a WordPress administrator, it attempted to install a plugin from a Brevo subdomain controlled by the attacker. A fake verification prompt was displayed using the ClickFix technique to visitors, instructing them to copy a command and execute it under the pretext of demonstrating their humanity. According to Sansec, the malware did not activate for crawlers, developers, or automated scanners, therefore preventing it from being detected during routine inspections. 

WordPress Sites Faced a Deeper Threat 

A more significant risk was posed to WordPress administrators by the attack. When the compromised Brevo script identified an administrator already logged into a WordPress site, it attempted to download and install plugins from attacker-controlled infrastructure. 

BleepingComputer examined a copy of the plugin, which was disguised as Web Media Optimizer, but was actually a JavaScript loader and persistent backdoor. Installing this plugin allowed it to hide from the normal WordPress plugin list and copy itself into the must-use plugins directory, making its removal more difficult. Additionally, the plugin contacted attacker-controlled infrastructure to obtain additional JavaScript, allowing malicious content to continue loading even if the remote server was unavailable, as researchers discovered. 

A critical feature of the plugin was that it contained a hardcoded authentication mechanism capable of creating a valid administrator session without requiring the legitimate administrator password. This allowed attackers to continue access to a compromised WordPress installation beyond Brevo's original exposure period. 

Brevo Took Down the Malicious Infrastructure

After detecting the intrusion, Brevo removed the malicious Cloudflare Worker and associated routes. As a result of the compromise, Brevo revoked its API key and credentials, removed attacker-controlled hostnames and purified edge caches. Additionally, the hardcoded Cloudflare credential was removed from the source code of the company. 

Sansec reports that malicious hosts began to cease resolving on September 15 and Brevo's affected files were restored to their original versions. Although the delivery window ended, the malware was not removed from WordPress sites where the rogue plugin had already been installed. Additionally, Brevo SSO security incident reported on September 10 also occurred following the incident. It was reported that six customer accounts were accessed unauthorised and were used for phishing, as well as contact data exported from 43 other accounts in that incident. 

A public connection has not been established between Brevo's earlier incident and Cloudflare's subsequent compromise. The Brevo incident illustrates the threat of third-party services that extend beyond the infrastructure of the provider and affect websites which utilize embedded scripts. Additionally, the combination of ClickFix lures and persistent WordPress backdoors creates a higher risk for website administrators and visitors alike.
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Hacker attack
Cyber Attacks cybersecurity threats FBI FBI FBI cyberattack Gulf Coast Hacker attack

Cyberattack on Tanker Prompts Coast Guard-FBI Security Boarding

 

A tanker crossing the Gulf of Mexico was boarded by U.S. Coast Guard and FBI personnel last month after its onboard network came under attack from hackers, the Coast Guard has confirmed. The confirmation followed a Wall Street Journal report indicating that at least two U.S.-bound tankers had been targeted in separate cyber incidents. Bloomberg News named one of the affected vessels as VL Prosperity, while Iran's state-backed outlet Mehr reported the ship went dark for a day and a half after losing its communications systems. Neither the FBI nor several other federal agencies contacted for comment addressed the incident directly, instead referring inquiries to the Coast Guard. 

A spokesperson there said the boarding was carried out to verify that the ship's technology systems remained intact after signs emerged that the network had been infiltrated by actors operating from outside the country. The operation took place on August 21 and involved a joint team: Coast Guard law enforcement officers, a cyber protection unit, a vessel inspector, and cyber specialists from the FBI. The spokesperson emphasized that no disruptions to the ship's operations, structural stability, crew safety, or the surrounding environment had been identified so far. Coast Guard officials declined to elaborate on how the breach occurred, who may have been responsible, or whether the tanker boarded that day was in fact VL Prosperity. 

A second vessel was reportedly boarded three days later, on August 24, per the Journal's reporting. Mehr's account places the origin of the attack earlier, on August 7, while the Liberian-flagged VL Prosperity was passing through the Strait of Gibraltar en route from Egypt to a U.S. port. One crew member described to Mehr how the intruders were reportedly able to remotely increase engine speed and shut down tanks holding fuel and engine oil. Analysts cited by the outlet, without offering direct evidence, tied the episode to broader tensions between the U.S. and Iran, though no group has publicly claimed involvement. Bloomberg later placed the tanker off the Texas coastline. The Coast Guard said it remains in contact with port operators, ship owners, and regional maritime partners to keep operations running smoothly. 

A separate incident struck just a day earlier, when North Carolina Ports disclosed that an external hacker or group had breached its IT infrastructure, pushing staff to switch to manual processes. The organization said it activated emergency protocols and looped in both state agencies and the Coast Guard. Maritime infrastructure worldwide has increasingly become a target for ransomware operators over the past several years, a trend tied to the sector's growing reliance on connected systems. 

The Port of Seattle famously refused to pay hackers who disrupted its airport and seaport operations around Labor Day in 2024. Similar attacks hit European ports and shipping firms Royal Dirkzwager and DNV in 2023, while Oiltanking and Mabanaft both declared force majeure after 2022 cyber incidents. Freight company Expeditors International also spent months recovering operational systems following its own attack.
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Parallels Desktop
Apple Device Vulnerability CVE exploits Cyber Security Developers JFrog Security Mac macOS Parallels Desktop

Parallels Desktop Vulnerability Gives Any Local Mac User Full Root Access, Intel Mac Users Left Without a Clear Fix

 




Security researchers at JFrog disclosed the vulnerability on Tuesday, assigning it the identifier CVE-2026-90894 and the nickname "ParaShells." JFrog rates the flaw 7.8 out of 10 on the CVSS severity scale. The bug does not allow remote attacks over a network. An attacker needs code already running on the machine as an ordinary local user, but once that condition is met, exploitation does not require administrator rights, a signed Parallels client, or an active virtual machine. 


What Parallels Desktop Is and Why This Matters

Parallels Desktop runs Windows and Linux inside virtual machines on a Mac. It installs a background service called prl_disp_service that runs as root, because its work includes setting up host networking and unpacking virtual machine packages. The flaw is on the Mac side of the product, so the machine at risk is the Mac itself rather than the virtual machines on it. 

That distinction is important. Many Mac users who run Parallels think of security risks as something that might affect the virtual Windows or Linux environment inside. ParaShells skips the guest entirely and compromises the Mac host directly.


How the Attack Works

The exploit chains together three separate weaknesses, none of which would be enough on its own.

The vulnerability combines three security weaknesses: a world-writable Unix socket, weak local client authentication, and argument injection during appliance extraction. On a default installation, prl_disp_service listens through /var/run/prl_disp_service.socket. JFrog researchers found that the socket could have 0777 permissions, allowing any local process to connect. 

The login call that follows, PrlSrv_LoginLocal, checks only the credentials the kernel reports for the connecting process. It needs no Parallels code signature and works for an account that is not an administrator. 

The third piece is where things get technically interesting. To install a virtual machine appliance, the service builds its unpack command as one line of text, tar -xf "%1" -C "%2". It then splits that text back into separate arguments using Qt's QProcess::splitCommand. The caller chooses part of that text, because it picks the folder the new virtual machine goes into. A double quote inside the folder name closes the quoting early, so whatever the attacker put after it becomes extra options for tar instead of part of a path. 

The option JFrog used was --use-compress-program, which tells macOS tar to hand the archive to another program first. Because tar is running as root here, that program runs as root too. JFrog's test script wrote a passwordless sudo rule and opened a root shell. 

In the lab demonstration, the sequence plays out in seconds: connect to the socket, send a crafted appliance install request with a poisoned directory path, and watch the compression program execute as uid 0. JFrog assembled this into a one-liner but has chosen not to publish that script, releasing the technical breakdown without the ready-to-fire weapon.

Yuval Moravchick, JFrog's vulnerability research team lead, explained: "The chain is short: A world-writable Unix socket, a login that trusts peer credentials rather than a Team ID, and an appliance unpack path that builds tar arguments using Qt string splitting. A quote in the parent path injects --use-compress-program=, and macOS tar runs the attacker's script as uid 0." 


Who Is Most at Risk

The danger is highest on developer laptops, where a single poisoned Homebrew formula or malicious npm preinstall script can go from local user to full control, and on shared university and corporate machines that have many local accounts. 

The threat model here is real and not hypothetical. Software developers routinely run third-party tools through package managers like Homebrew or execute npm scripts from projects they pull from the internet. Every one of those code paths represents a potential entry point for an attacker who knows the machine has Parallels installed. On a shared training lab or university computer lab Mac with a dozen local accounts, a single weak password or compromised student account is all it takes.

"From root, the attacker can replace system software, read other users' data, and persist via launchd," Moravchick noted. That last point about launchd persistence is particularly concerning because an attacker who establishes root access through this chain can survive a reboot by registering their own background processes with macOS's system daemon manager. 

JFrog also confirmed no virtual machine needs to be actively running. The vulnerable service, prl_disp_service, starts automatically via a launch daemon at load, runs as root, and exposes the socket regardless of whether any VM is open. Simply having Parallels Desktop installed is enough to create the exposure. 


The Patch Is Out, With a Catch

JFrog reported CVE-2026-90894 to Parallels maker Alludo, which fixed it in Parallels Desktop v27.0.0, released at the beginning of September 2026. The fix is real, but getting to it is not straightforward for a meaningful portion of Parallels' user base. 

Parallels Desktop 27 needs a Mac with an Apple silicon chip. Its system requirements list Apple silicon only for the processor and macOS Sonoma 14.7 or newer for the operating system. On earlier releases of macOS, including Ventura 13, the installer sets up an older version of the product instead. Parallels removed Intel Mac support in version 27 and says the change follows Apple's plans rather than its own. 

For Intel Mac users, the situation is murky. Intel users are told to stay on Parallels Desktop 26. "Parallels Desktop 26 fully supports Intel-based Mac computers today, and that will not change," the company wrote on 25 August, three weeks before this flaw became public, adding that Intel users can keep using version 26 and "expect future security and maintenance updates." 

The problem is that according to JFrog, "Hosts that stay on the 26.x line, including 26.4.2, do not have that extract change." JFrog does not say it tested 26.4.1 or 26.4.2, and its writeup says it did not check older builds. 

Parallels has not published a statement about CVE-2026-90894, and its list of security fixes, which maps each flaw to the version that repairs it, has not been reviewed since May 2025 and does not include this one. That leaves Intel Mac users running Parallels in a difficult position: a confirmed flaw, a fix that requires hardware they do not have, and no public acknowledgment from the vendor about plans for their platform. 

The release notes for Parallels Desktop 26.4.2, which shipped on September 8, describe a single change related to Enterprise edition deployment and say nothing about a security fix for the extract path.


What Organizations Should Do Now

JFrog's immediate guidance comes in three parts: find every Mac in your environment running Parallels Desktop, restrict who can log in to those machines locally, and upgrade to version 27.0.0 or later where possible.

Two commands can confirm exposure without making any changes to the system. Running defaults read "/Applications/Parallels Desktop.app/Contents/Info" CFBundleShortVersionString reports the installed version, and ls -l /var/run/prl_disp_service.socket shows the socket permissions. JFrog says a socket showing srwxrwxrwx on a build at or near 26.4.0 should be treated as exposed until a patched build is confirmed. 

Administrators using device management to push updates should check version rules before pushing anything. Parallels warns that a policy which sends out new major versions automatically will try to install version 27 on Intel Macs and fail. 

One more complication: none of the published material says whether installing a fixed build removes access an attacker has already taken. JFrog notes that an attacker who reaches root can keep a foothold through launchd, which a product update would not clear. For any machine where compromise is suspected, an update alone is not enough. 


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Vulnerability Research
AI Security Testing Cloud Sandbox Security Cloud Security Firecracker MicroVM Host Isolation Kernel Security Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities Vercel Sandbox Challenge Vulnerability Research

Vercel Sandbox Challenge Uncovers Linux Kernel Flaws


 Vercel has conducted a two-week security challenge that has uncovered numerous vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel networking stack that is used by its Firecracker microVM sandbox. This program, supported by a $1 million reward pool, examined researchers' abilities to break out of an environment that isolates untrusted artificial intelligence-agent code from other software. There were 1,285 vulnerability reports generated as a result of the challenge running from August 18 to September 1. 


There have been about $325,000 in payouts to date for one critical, seven high-severity, 15 medium-severity, 49 low-severity and 19 informative findings validated by Vercel. Even though there were many submissions, none of them demonstrated access to actual customer data. Two separate flaws were found in the Linux kernel networking stack rather than Vercel's own sandbox code that were the most significant. 

Various issues can lead to memory leaks from the host kernel, while others can cause a host system crash deterministically. It is particularly relevant to cloud environments since Linux kernel isolation layers are used by many infrastructure platforms. Therefore, a vulnerability that crosses the boundary between a microVM and its host may result in consequences that extend beyond a single deployment or service. 

There were roughly two weeks before the Linux kernel maintainers were informed about the kernel issues, according to Vercel. Details remain undisclosed while fixes are in private review, with CVEs expected to be assigned after public disclosure. In addition to white-box testing, Trail of Bits engineers reported 20 findings after participating in the challenge. 

The assessment did not only identify individual vulnerabilities but also highlighted architectural concerns related to the data movement between the host control plane and the guest environment. It was recommended that all values generated within the microVM be treated as untrusted guest input. Vercel acknowledged that certain values returned by software running within a guest had been accepted by its control plane, creating an architectural risk at the boundary of the sandbox. 

AI-Assisted Triage Handles Report Surge 

A separate challenge for Vercel was also presented during the two-week program: handling the staggering number of vulnerability reports generated. When 1,285 submissions were received within a short period of time, the original review process, involving a human assessment of each report, soon became challenging to scale.

Vercel developed the Eve framework as a means of implementing an agentic triage system. Using Vercel Sandbox, the system can evaluate submitted reports against program rules, identify duplicates, access relevant source code, and execute researchers’ proof-of-concept code. This approach was implemented to alleviate the manual workload that was created by the unusually high number of submissions. 

The volume itself was partly influenced by the challenge structure, which encouraged researchers to actively seek ways to avoid the sandbox boundaries. As Vercel noted, the experience also demonstrated the effectiveness of AI-assisted security research in facilitating the discovery of new vulnerabilities more quickly. 

The white box assessment, in addition to identifying technical vulnerabilities, also revealed architectural findings concerning the trust relationship between microVM guest hosts and control planes. According to the assessment, some values returned by software running inside a microVM were accepted by the control plane.

A Vercel representative stated that such values should not be treated as trusted data, but rather as tenant-controlled inputs. This company recommends obtaining sensitive values from the server end or encrypting them with cryptographic signatures with keys that cannot be accessed from the guest environment in order to protect them. According to the company, the findings have resulted in changes to the security controls and sandbox architecture. 

While the Linux kernel issues remain under coordinated disclosure, technical details and CVE identifiers will be kept confidential until the fixes are published publicly. There was no evidence of customer data access as a result of the challenge, however, the kernel findings remain significant as the affected networking layer sits beneath isolation mechanisms in many cloud environments. 

After patches are released and technical disclosures are made, the scope of affected systems will be determined and remediation requirements will be determined for Linux-based infrastructures.
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US Lawmakers
BellTroX Cyber Attacks cyber espionage Cyberattacks CyberRoot Data Theft Entity List Hack-For-Hire India-Based Hacking Firms US Lawmakers

US Lawmakers Raise Alarm Over Alleged Hacking by India-Based Firms


Three Indian-based companies have been accused of conducting hacking campaigns and stealing data from thousands of Americans and US businesses, according to a bipartisan group of US senators. As part of the request, the lawmakers sought restrictions that could limit companies' access to American technology and services in a letter to U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. 

Among the companies named in the letter are Sunkissed Organic Pvt Ltd, BellTrox Ltd, and CyberRoot Ltd. Democratic Senator Ron Wyden and Sheldon Whitehouse, along with Republican Senator Pat Harrigan, allege that the groups had engaged in targeted espionage activities against US citizens, businesses and legal professionals over the past fifteen years. 

A number of senators cited investigations conducted by Reuters and The Citizen Lab, in which they claimed that the companies had been involved in hacking campaigns targeting pharmaceutical companies, private equity firms, and attorneys employed by major law firms. It was stated in the letter that the groups operated under the direction of the Qatari government and some of these operations were intended to influence ongoing litigation. 

According to the senators, the alleged activities included targeting individuals who oppose Qatar's bid for the World Cup, as well as the family members of the former Republican Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

A number of allegations go beyond the hacking activities themselves, as well. A number of foreign legal actions were taken by legislators that were intended to restrict public reporting of the alleged activities. One such case involved Appin, in which executives related to the company obtained a global court order from an Indian court requiring Reuters to cease investigating the company. The order was subsequently lifted, allowing the investigation to be republished by Reuters. According to the senators, the episode illustrates the possibility of restricting the availability of American information through foreign legal proceedings. Additionally, previous reporting has documented legal threats to media outlets that cover alleged hack-for-hire operations related to Appin. The US Commerce Department has now requested that BellTroX, CyberRoot, and Sunkissed Organic Farms be added to the Entity List by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Commerce Department. By making such a designation, US companies may not export or transfer certain technologies, software, and other controlled items to these listed entities without a license. The requested restrictions would specifically target access to American software, cloud infrastructure, and cybersecurity tools. This move remains a request from Congress, and any Entity List designation requires the Commerce Department to take action. US authorities are now considering possible restrictions on the three firms' access to American technology and services in light of the lawmakers' request for the three firms to be under renewed scrutiny.
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vulnerabilities and exploits
acronis cPanel CVSS Cyber Security Linux sensitive data system files vulnerabilities and exploits

Acronis Discloses Actively Exploited Privilege Escalation Bug in Its cPanel Backup Plugin

 




Acronis has confirmed that attackers are actively exploiting a high-severity security flaw in its backup plugin for cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM), urging system administrators to install available patches without delay.

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-87886 and rated high severity, allows local privilege escalation through insecure file permissions. Classified under CWE-276 (incorrect default permissions), the flaw affects Linux-based installations of the Acronis backup plugin and, if exploited successfully, could allow a threat actor to compromise system confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 

The flaw received its CVE designation on Tuesday, September 16, after Acronis quietly published a brief initial advisory over the weekend. The company assigned it a CVSS severity score of 7.8.


What the Plugin Does

To understand the risk here, it helps to know what this software actually sits on top of. The Acronis Backup plugin for WHM and cPanel gives hosting providers and web professionals cloud backup capabilities and granular, self-service recovery for end clients, including the ability to back up an entire cPanel server to cloud storage. 

Acronis is a cybersecurity and data protection technology company that is popular among web hosting providers and managed service providers, since its platform lets them offer backup and security to their clients under their own branding. Its backup add-ons connect cPanel and Plesk to Acronis' cloud infrastructure, letting administrators back up and recover sites, databases, and mailboxes. 

That puts the plugin in a particularly sensitive position on any server it runs on. An attacker who can escalate privileges inside this kind of environment has a direct path to the backup data of every customer account on that server.

The market footprint here is worth noting. According to the 2026 Web Hosting Trends Report by WebPros, cPanel/WHM leads the hosting control panel market with 64% adoption, while Plesk accounts for 31%. Both platforms are affected by this vulnerability, though active exploitation so far appears confined to cPanel and WHM deployments. 


How the Attack Works

CVE-2026-87886 stems from insecure file permissions and allows authenticated attackers to achieve local privilege escalation without any user interaction. The vulnerability's CVSS string indicates that it can be exploited in low-complexity attacks, meaning the attack does not require special conditions or circumstances beyond the attacker's control to succeed. 

In plain terms: an attacker who already has a low-level foothold on a vulnerable Linux server running this plugin can use this flaw to climb to higher privilege levels, without needing to trick a user or wait for any specific system event. Depending on the access gained, this could allow sensitive data to be accessed or modified and could potentially disrupt the server. 

The type of data at risk includes backup data, system files, and customer account data. 


Targeted Attacks, Limited Disclosure

Acronis' advisory language around the exploitation is measured but direct. The company stated that "exploitation of this vulnerability has been detected in the wild in limited, targeted attacks against Acronis Backup plugin for cPanel and WHM deployments." 

However, the disclosure comes with some important caveats. BleepingComputer reported that Acronis based that assessment on a single report from a potentially affected customer. That is enough to justify urgent patching, but it is not the same as evidence of broad, automated exploitation across hosting providers. 

There are currently no signs of active exploitation on Plesk deployments. Still, the extension for Plesk remains vulnerable and should be patched regardless. 

Acronis has not published detailed technical information about the flaw, saying it wants to give system administrators time to apply available patches before sharing further details. The company has also identified no specific indicators of compromise and has not disclosed when the activity occurred or what attackers achieved beyond the privilege escalation impact described in the advisory.


What Needs to Be Patched

Acronis pushed out security updates for the affected plugins before the CVE was formally assigned. The versions administrators need to be on are:

Acronis Backup plugin for cPanel and WHM builds earlier than 1.9.3.1021, now fixed in version 1.9.3 HF3, and Acronis Backup extension for Plesk builds earlier than 1.8.11.638, fixed in version 1.8.11. 

For shared hosting providers, the guidance is to check every server image and automation path, rather than assuming the version on one control-plane node represents the entire fleet. Once patched, administrators should also focus review on systems where initial access was plausible: servers hosting compromised sites, accounts with recent credential resets, and hosts that allow customers to upload or execute code. 

One additional note worth flagging: a cPanel or Plesk server without the Acronis plugin or extension is outside the scope of CVE-2026-87886. This is an Acronis integration issue, not a blanket advisory for every cPanel, WHM, or Plesk installation. 


Acronis is a Swiss cybersecurity company headquartered in Schaffhausen and operates a global network of cloud data centers, supporting over 20,000 service providers that protect approximately 750,000 businesses worldwide. That scale makes vulnerabilities in its hosting integrations a high-priority concern for the managed service provider community, where a single compromised server can cascade into customer data across dozens or hundreds of accounts. 

The company has not indicated whether it plans to release a more detailed post-mortem on the exploitation activity once patching rates improve, which is a common practice after actively exploited flaws. For now, the immediate priority is getting affected installations onto the fixed builds before whatever foothold attackers have found gets wider use.

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data security
AI Agent AI agent data theft AI technology Competition Watchdogs Cyberattacks Data Breach data security

Spanish Data Watchdog Publicises First AI Agent-Linked Data Breach Report

Spain's data protection watchdog said it has received the first reported notification of a personal data breach allegedly carried out by an artificial intelligence agent, a case suggesting autonomous systems are beginning to play a direct role in cyberattacks. The Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) said in a blog post Monday that the incident involved an AI agent using a widely known large language model to identify vulnerabilities, gain access to a system, and subsequently modify personal data and access invoices. 

The agency said the alleged breach was reported by the affected organization and remains under review. It clarified that the use of a particular AI model does not imply the model itself or its provider's infrastructure was compromised, nor that the technology was built for malicious purposes. AEPD did not immediately respond to a request for comment and did not identify the large language model or the targeted organization. 

According to AEPD, the case is significant because a third party allegedly used an AI agent to carry out multiple stages of an attack with limited human intervention, underscoring the growing role autonomous systems are playing in cybersecurity incidents. The notification submitted by the affected organization indicated that the agent successfully logged into the system, autonomously searched for application weaknesses, and after identifying a vulnerability, altered personal information and viewed billing records. 

The incident emerges as regulators and cybersecurity authorities across the United States and Europe intensify scrutiny of risks posed by increasingly capable AI systems, even as businesses continue adopting the technology at a rapid pace. Spain has positioned itself as one of Europe's most vocal advocates for a "trustworthy AI" model — one that prioritizes protecting privacy, democracy, minors, and public safety over speed or industry profit. 

While AEPD acknowledged that a single case is insufficient to establish a broader trend, it said the notification suggests AI-assisted attacks are moving beyond the theoretical stage and beginning to affect real-world processing of personal data. The watchdog did not indicate when it would complete its review of the reported breach. 

AEPD noted that AI does not create fundamentally new threats but increases the speed, scale, and adaptability of existing malicious techniques, thereby reducing the time available to detect and contain them. The agency added that data controllers, processors, and data protection officers must prepare for a scenario in which the speed of attacks will continue to accelerate.
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macOS Security
Cyber Security cybersecurity vulnerability Intel Intel Security Linux Mac security updates macOS macOS Security

Homebrew 7.0.0 Ships With Fixes for Eight Security Advisories

 

Homebrew, a popular package manager for installing command-line tools and desktop apps on macOS and Linux, released version 7.0.0 on Sunday, with eight security advisories closed in the process. The most severe of the 18 reported issues is an unsigned removal metadata vulnerability for a cask, a formula in Homebrew's format for prebuilt app installs, allowing arbitrary sudo commands.

Homebrew removed the vulnerable recovery code and associated API accessors. Seven of the advisories were addressed in earlier 6.0.x releases, which means auto-updating machines already carry those fixes. The eighth is new and would let a malicious cask execute code outside the sandbox of a macOS via LaunchServices. Homebrew classified the issues as one High, two Moderate, and five Low. The High severity sudo path issue was fixed in 6.0.12, where a Moderate was also addressed for preventing the installer from reading Git config owned by the Homebrew prefix, which could run programs as root. 

The second Moderate is the LaunchServices escape mentioned earlier, which is fixed in 7.0.0 by restricting launching of applications, Mach services, and Unix socket connection. The five Low-level issues were fixed earlier and involved redirects and file paths pointing to unintended locations, including headers leaks, tap-restriction bypasses, and files being written outside of staged source trees. The new 7.0.0 brings a built-in scanner (`brew vulns`) that checks for known vulnerabilities in installed formulae, with flags such as `--severity=high` and `--fix-available` to narrow the results, against a database of known vulnerabilities in formulae versions that have been shipped. 

It includes backported fixes for some issues and minimizes false positives, with Homebrew's data on vulnerabilities being in the OSV format with a CC0 license and published through the Homebrew API. Provenance checks are now performed for third-party tap bottles, in addition to the Homebrew core tap, with new taps publishing these by default. Homebrew notes that tap trust remains the primary defense against malicious casks, with sandboxing not making "untrusted software safe to run" due to apps running with the user's privilege and a vendor's installer not running inside the sandbox. 

Nonetheless, 7.0.0 provides sandboxing of formula and cask operations, provides setup instructions as signed data instead of arbitrary Ruby code, and deprecates old post-install blocks in favor of declaring steps. On Linux, Bubblewrap sandboxing is replaced with Landlock, a new kernel feature that requires no additional dependencies. Intel Macs are moved to Tier 3 status following the end of reliable build infrastructure and cessation of routine Intel bottles, with support continuing until September 1, 2027, and MacPorts suggested as an alternative. macOS 10.15 is dropped with the release, while Sonoma 14 is moved to Tier 3.
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vulnerabilities and exploits
AMD Cloud Computing DDRop Google Hardware designs Intel TDX security researchers software vulnerabilities and exploits

A $159 Circuit Board Just Broke Cloud Computing's Strongest Security Guarantee

 




Security researchers have found a way to defeat the memory protections that Intel and AMD sell to cloud customers as their last line of defense against an untrusted host. The tool required costs less than a decent pair of headphones.

A team from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google published details Sunday of an attack called DDRop, which exploits a fundamental design flaw in the memory encryption hardware powering confidential computing services at Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. It breaks protections in Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX), Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization-Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP), the three technologies that allow cloud customers to run workloads that even the cloud provider cannot read.

The method does not require a software exploit. It requires a small custom-built circuit board, a brief window of physical access to the server, and knowledge of how DDR5 memory commands work. The researchers built their device for $159 in parts.


The Gap Nobody Patched

Confidential computing encrypts a server's working memory at all times. Even a cloud provider's own administrator sees only scrambled data. The problem DDRop exposes is that encryption is not the same thing as freshness. The processor can confirm that data in memory is encrypted. It cannot confirm that data is current. Stale data, so long as it was encrypted legitimately at some point in the past, will still decrypt correctly and raise no alarm.

DDRop turns that gap into an attack. A small interposer board sits between the processor and a DDR5 memory module. When the attacker wants to cancel a specific memory write, the interposer forces a parity error on the command bus. The memory module silently discards the write. The interposer then cuts the wire used to report that error, so the processor is never notified. Old data stays in memory. The system has no way to know the latest update never arrived.

This is the first active interposer attack to run on DDR5 at full bus speed. Earlier DDR5 research required slowing the memory bus down and could only listen passively. Previous active attacks that altered memory contents only worked on older DDR4 hardware, DDR5's redesigned command format blocked them. DDRop routes around that entirely by dropping writes rather than redirecting them.


What the Researchers Pulled Off

On an Intel TDX server, the team demonstrated four outcomes. By dropping writes to page tables during setup, they mapped an attacker's virtual machine onto any physical memory address, then read a victim machine's private memory in full. They also flipped a victim machine into debug mode, copied its memory in plaintext, and restored everything afterward with no trace of tampering.

The most consequential result was attestation forgery. Attestation is the mechanism a hospital or bank uses to verify that the virtual machine handling their data is the one they approved and has not been altered. With DDRop, an attacker's machine can pass that check as though it were a trusted one. A customer could be convinced they are talking to a secure, verified environment when they are not.

On AMD SEV-SNP, results were narrower the researchers copied the contents of one victim memory page into another but the underlying exposure is the same. Neither platform checks whether memory is fresh.


No Patch, No Timeline

Both Intel and AMD acknowledged DDRop through coordinated disclosure before publication and issued security advisories on September 14. Neither offered a mitigation timeline. Both drew the same line: because the attack requires physical access, it falls outside their published threat model for confidential computing. Intel said it will not assign a CVE.

The researchers are direct about why a software fix cannot solve this. The freshness check was deliberately left out. Scalable memory encryption trades freshness for the ability to protect the large amounts of memory that cloud servers require. A lasting fix would need new memory-encryption hardware capable of providing both integrity and freshness at scale. Intel has discussed a future proposal called cache-line versioning, but has not committed to a timeline and researchers say it is unclear whether it would stop DDRop anyway.

Short-term software measures restricting the memory management interfaces DDRop abuses, checking that critical writes completed, scanning for interposers at boot, can raise the bar without removing the root cause.


The researchers have no evidence DDRop has been used outside a lab. But the significance is what it proves is possible. Confidential computing is the technical promise that certain workloads stay private regardless of who owns the physical hardware. DDRop shows that promise has a physical boundary that can be crossed with $159 in components, a few minutes of access, and knowledge that a rogue data center employee, supply chain tamperer, or government compulsion order could all plausibly provide.

The full paper is scheduled for presentation at ACM CCS 2026 in November. Hardware designs, firmware, and proof-of-concept code are already on GitHub.

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