When people think about a cyberattack, they usually picture stolen passwords, malware, ransomware or someone exploiting a vulnerability to break into a system.
Side-channel attacks work differently. Instead of directly stealing a secret, an attacker studies the traces a computer produces while carrying out normal operations. Tiny differences in processing time, electricity consumption, electromagnetic signals, sounds or hardware activity can reveal clues about what is happening inside the machine.
Think of a locked safe. A thief may not know its combination or be able to break the lock, but if turning the dial produces different clicks or pauses, listening closely could reveal information about the combination. The safe is not deliberately revealing anything. Its physical behavior is simply giving away clues.
Computers can do much the same thing.
A problem that is decades old
Side-channel attacks are not a new phenomenon.
In 1985, Dutch researcher Wim van Eck demonstrated that electromagnetic emissions from video display units could be captured and decoded, potentially revealing what was being displayed. The screen was not intentionally broadcasting its contents, but its normal operation produced signals that could be observed externally.
The technique became particularly important in cryptography during the 1990s. In 1996, researcher Paul Kocher showed that measuring tiny differences in the time taken by cryptographic operations could reveal information about private keys. In 1999, Kocher, Joshua Jaffe and Benjamin Jun demonstrated that measuring power consumption could similarly expose information from cryptographic devices.
Researchers later showed that sound could become another source of leakage. Experiments demonstrated that acoustic emissions from laptops performing cryptographic operations could be analyzed to recover a 4,096-bit RSA key under controlled conditions.
These discoveries changed the way security engineers evaluated systems. A cryptographic algorithm could be mathematically secure while its implementation still leaked information through timing, power, sound or electromagnetic radiation.
When processor performance became a security problem
The rise of modern CPUs created another class of side channels.
Processors use speculative execution to predict which instructions a program will need and execute them ahead of time, improving performance. In 2018, researchers disclosed Meltdown and Spectre, demonstrating that traces left by speculative execution could allow malicious code to infer information that should have remained protected.
The attacks challenged an important assumption in computing: that programs running on the same machine can be reliably isolated from one another. They also demonstrated that security problems could originate from performance features built deep inside the processor rather than from conventional software bugs.
Researchers have continued finding similar problems in newer hardware.
In 2022, Hertzbleed showed that dynamic voltage and frequency scaling, a feature used to manage processor power and performance, could become a timing side channel. Because processor frequency can vary with the computation being performed, an attacker could potentially infer information remotely without directly measuring power consumption. The researchers demonstrated implications for cryptographic key extraction on modern Intel and AMD processors.
In 2023, Downfall exposed another weakness in certain Intel processors through the Gather instruction, while Zenbleed affected AMD's Zen 2 architecture and could expose information from another execution context under particular conditions.
The pattern is becoming difficult to ignore: features designed to make computers faster or more efficient can also create unexpected paths for information leakage.
Side channels are spreading beyond CPUs
Researchers are now finding these channels in other parts of the computing stack.
GPU.zip demonstrated how hardware-based graphics compression could create a side channel capable of exposing visual information processed by graphics processors. The research showed that the problem could extend beyond the CPU and into the way GPUs handle graphical data.
In 2024, GoFetch exposed another hardware-level problem in Apple processors. The attack targeted a feature called a data memory-dependent prefetcher, which predicts future memory requirements to improve performance. Researchers demonstrated that this behavior could undermine protections in cryptographic software and help extract secret keys.
These attacks illustrate why simply securing software is not always enough. Hardware underneath the software can produce information that applications never intended to expose.
The SSD can become a side channel too
The latest research pushes the idea even further.
In 2026, researchers at Graz University of Technology introduced FROST, short for "Fingerprinting Remotely using OPFS-based SSD Timing." The attack targets the browser's Origin Private File System, or OPFS, a feature that allows websites to store and access files within their own sandboxed storage area.
FROST does not give a malicious website direct access to another application's files.
Instead, it measures delays caused when multiple programs compete for the same SSD.
The concept is similar to traffic on a shared road. A driver does not need to see another vehicle to know that it is there. If traffic suddenly makes the journey slower, the delay itself provides information.
FROST applies the same principle to storage. A malicious webpage can repeatedly perform storage operations through OPFS and measure tiny changes in how long they take. Those changes can reveal patterns in other activity occurring on the same computer.
The researchers found that the technique could be used to fingerprint websites and applications. In their evaluation, FROST achieved an F1 score of 88.95% for website fingerprinting and 95.83% for application fingerprinting on tested systems. It can also operate remotely through JavaScript without requiring native code execution.
That does not mean websites can simply read a user's files or see everything happening on a computer. FROST is an inference attack. It identifies activity from the timing patterns produced by shared hardware resources.
A specialised threat, but an important warning
Side-channel attacks are not currently the everyday attack method most users are likely to encounter. Cybercriminals generally have easier options, including phishing, credential theft, malware, ransomware and exploiting vulnerable software.
But their importance extends beyond how frequently criminals use them.
Side-channel research repeatedly reveals that security boundaries can be weaker than they appear. A processor, GPU, browser or storage device may never intentionally disclose sensitive information, yet its normal operation can leave behind measurable clues.
From electromagnetic emissions and cryptographic timing to speculative execution, processor frequency, GPU compression and SSD activity, the side channel keeps changing as computing technology evolves.
Computers do not always need to be hacked for them to leak secrets.
Sometimes, all an attacker needs is to listen to what the machine reveals while it is doing its job.
A new Linux botnet named Evooo1Bot is turning internet-facing routers and other gateway devices into SOCKS5 traffic relay nodes, giving attackers a way to route malicious connections through compromised systems while retaining the ability to steal credentials, brute-force SSH accounts, exploit vulnerable devices and launch DDoS attacks.
FortiGuard Labs said it has been tracking the Mirai-based malware since at least July 2026, with activity observed against devices from Alcatel, NETGEAR, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric, Telesquare and D-Link across multiple regions. Rather than relying on a single attack function, Evooo1Bot combines several capabilities within a modular Linux malware framework.
The malware retains the DDoS engine from the publicly leaked Mirai source code, but expands on the older botnet's approach with encrypted command-and-control communications, an SSH brute-force scanner, a SOCKS5 relay, a credential sniffer and an exploitation module targeting known vulnerabilities.
Mirai's original success was closely tied to internet-connected devices such as routers, cameras and DVRs, many of which were exposed with weak or default credentials. Fortinet previously documented how Mirai could scan for vulnerable systems, brute-force credentials and recruit them into a remotely controlled botnet.
Evooo1Bot takes that model further by adding more ways to use a compromised device after the initial infection.
Its exploit arsenal covers a wide range of internet-facing technologies. Newer builds have been found with modules targeting Hikvision cameras, Atlassian Confluence, Zyxel firewalls, TP-Link routers, D-Link NAS devices, WSO2 products, Kubernetes ingress-nginx and vulnerable PHP-CGI installations. FortiGuard noted, however, that some of the embedded exploits are incorrectly implemented and fail to compromise their intended targets.
When exploitation succeeds, the malware downloads a build suited to the victim's CPU architecture. FortiGuard identified 12 available builds, allowing the operators to target different Linux-based hardware rather than relying on a single binary.
The malware then attempts to make the compromise harder to trace. It clears Bash history and establishes persistence through mechanisms including systemd, SysV init, shell profiles and "rc.local". A cron job also attempts to download the payload again every five minutes, providing another way to restore the malware if it is removed.
Evooo1Bot also checks its surroundings before fully activating. It searches for debuggers, security software, sandboxes, virtual machines, containers and honeypots, indicating that the operators are attempting to distinguish ordinary victims from environments where the malware could be analyzed.
Its encrypted C2 communications operate over port 443, while an interactive shell gives operators direct control over infected systems. The malware also supports file uploads and downloads and uses a 28-command interface for remote operations.
The SOCKS5 component is where Evooo1Bot moves beyond the conventional DDoS-botnet model.
A SOCKS5 proxy can relay network connections through another system. In this case, the infected router becomes the intermediary, allowing attackers to send traffic through the victim's connection. Evooo1Bot supports both direct-listening and reverse-relay modes, which could help operators conceal the origin of malicious traffic, bypass geographic restrictions or reach networks accessible through compromised devices.
Multiple proxy sessions can operate independently, raising another possibility if the botnet expands: monetizing compromised residential connections as proxy infrastructure.
The malware also monitors "/proc/net/tcp" for network activity and attempts to capture HTTP Basic Authentication and Cookie headers. Alongside its shell and file-transfer functions, this gives operators additional opportunities to obtain information from systems positioned behind the compromised gateway.
SSH provides another route into vulnerable systems. Evooo1Bot uses 150 username and password combinations aimed at enterprise-oriented accounts and performs checks after successful authentication to identify possible honeypots.
DDoS remains part of the malware's toolkit, with 16 flood methods inherited from Mirai, including UDP, DNS, SYN, ACK, GRE, fragmented TCP and customizable HTTP floods.
The result is a botnet in which a compromised router can serve several purposes at once: it can participate in DDoS attacks, relay traffic, collect authentication material, provide remote shell access and help operators compromise additional vulnerable systems.
For users and organizations, securing these devices starts with applying firmware and security updates, replacing default administrator credentials and disabling unnecessary remote-access interfaces. Unsupported equipment that no longer receives security updates should also be replaced.
Network defenders should additionally watch for unexpected outbound connections, unusual proxy traffic and unauthorized changes to cron jobs, startup services or shell profiles.
Evooo1Bot shows why internet-facing routers and gateways cannot be treated simply as passive networking equipment. Once compromised, they can become operational infrastructure for an attacker, extending the intrusion far beyond the device itself.
Trezor said its own infrastructure was not compromised and that the incident was discovered after the company was informed of the attack on August 10. The affected customers are located in the US, UK, Sweden, Colombia, Brazil, Italy and Portugal and placed orders between May 10 and August 8.
According to Trezor, the breach exposed the names, phone numbers, email addresses and shipping addresses of 11,742 customers. Information belonging to another 1,947 customers included their names, cities and email addresses. The data had been provided to ShipMonk solely to facilitate order fulfillment and delivery.
“We’re extremely sorry to inform our community that customer personal information, including full names, phone numbers, email addresses, and shipping addresses, has been accessed by an unauthorized actor during this breach,” Trezor said in its security notice.
The company attributed the limited scope of the exposure to its 90-day data retention policy, which it said is also followed by its fulfillment partners. However, Trezor warned that older orders may have been accessible for some of the customers whose information was partially exposed.
Trezor stressed that the incident did not affect its internal systems or the security of its hardware wallets. “To be clear, our systems were not compromised, and your Trezor device is secure, but the affected customers might be targeted by more sophisticated phishing attempts,” the company said.
All customers believed to be affected have been contacted directly by email. Trezor urged them to remain cautious of unexpected messages, particularly those asking for personal details, cryptocurrency information or immediate action.
The company is working with ShipMonk to establish when the compromise occurred and determine the complete extent of the incident.
Reports indicate that ShipMonk informed customers that the attackers gained access to its systems by exploiting a vulnerability in Metabase, a data analytics platform. The incident may be connected to a recently patched SQL injection zero-day affecting Metabase.
The cybercrime group ShinyHunters has also claimed responsibility for an attack on Metabase and subsequently published data it alleged was stolen from the analytics provider. However, the connection between that incident and the ShipMonk breach has not been independently established.
ShipMonk has not publicly confirmed the breach. It also remains unclear whether other organizations or individuals were affected, how much information may have been accessed, and who was ultimately responsible for the attack.
The US Department of Justice’s recent case against GrapheneOS user Sam Tunick has renewed discussions about mobile privacy, digital security and the limits of law enforcement access to personal devices. The GrapheneOS Foundation has responded by defending its open-source operating system and clarifying how its security mechanisms handle deleted information.
The Toronto-based non-profit organization said GrapheneOS is a lawful operating system and rejected any suggestion that the software itself is connected to illegal activity. The foundation emphasized that it has no responsibility to weaken features intended to protect users and their data.
Based on Android and currently designed for Google Pixel devices, GrapheneOS incorporates several security and privacy protections. The foundation argues that developing, distributing or using the operating system is protected under US constitutional principles and that legislation specifically targeting its security capabilities could face constitutional challenges.
One of the features at the centre of the case is GrapheneOS’s "duress password." Tunick reportedly provided the password to a US Customs and Border Protection officer. The feature is designed to trigger an immediate wipe of a device when a specific password or PIN is entered under coercion.
When activated, the process removes the phone’s stored information, including eSIM data. According to the foundation, the wipe occurs immediately, cannot be interrupted and cannot subsequently be reversed. As a result, data erased through the feature cannot be recovered from the device.
Despite the attention surrounding the duress password, the GrapheneOS Foundation has stressed that it represents only one small component of the operating system’s broader security architecture. The organization also cautioned that using such a feature could potentially have physical or legal consequences, meaning users need to consider the risks before relying on it during encounters with authorities or other coercive situations.
The legal dispute is also focused on Tunick’s treatment during the encounter. His attorney has alleged that the border officer did not provide Miranda warnings and disregarded Tunick’s requests to consult a lawyer.
Tunick’s legal team is seeking the exclusion of evidence obtained during the incident. The attorney has argued that the evidence should be dismissed because the authorities allegedly violated Tunick’s constitutional rights.
The case has consequently raised broader questions about the balance between individual privacy, device security and government authority, while putting renewed attention on how privacy-focused operating systems handle data deletion and compelled device access.
Russia-aligned cyberespionage group Laundry Bear, also tracked as Void Blizzard and TA488, is exploiting a Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web Access (OWA) vulnerability to deploy a browser-based backdoor capable of maintaining access to victims' mailboxes even after credentials are changed or systems are reimaged.
Email security firm Proofpoint said it observed the campaign targeting government organizations in the US and Europe, as well as telecommunications, financial, hospitality and aerospace organizations. The activity uses OWAReaper, a sophisticated backdoor delivered through malicious emails exploiting CVE-2026-42897.
CVE-2026-42897 is a cross-site scripting vulnerability caused by inadequate HTML sanitization in OWA. A specially crafted email can contain malicious JavaScript that executes when the recipient opens the message in OWA. Proofpoint calls the technique a "half-click" exploit because opening the email can be enough to trigger the attack, without requiring the victim to click a link or open an attachment. Microsoft disclosed the vulnerability on May 14, 2026, and confirmed active exploitation.
Proofpoint found that infrastructure associated with the campaign had been established as early as March, nearly two months before Microsoft's disclosure, suggesting TA488 may have exploited the vulnerability as a zero-day. The group used ordinary-looking subjects concerning supply chains, research updates, tourism, gas markets and other industry-related information, making the messages less likely to be treated as malicious.
The emails contained JavaScript loaders and Base64-encoded payload fragments hidden within URLs associated with social-media-style icons. Once triggered, the code assembled and executed the OWAReaper payload.
OWAReaper operates entirely within the OWA reading pane. It can collect the victim's email address, username and Outlook configuration, while also attempting to capture credentials by creating invisible DOM elements that allow the browser's autofill mechanism to populate usernames and passwords.
The backdoor's most concerning capability is its persistence. It searches for Outlook add-ins with "ReadWriteMailbox" permissions and can use the "GetClientAccessToken" operation to obtain OAuth tokens. It then abuses Exchange's "UpdateFolder" operation to grant Owner-level permissions to the "Default" user across the victim's mail folders.
Because these permissions are stored server-side, changing the victim's password or reinstalling the compromised computer does not necessarily remove the attacker's access. OWAReaper also enables browser caching and places a malicious iframe into messages stored in OWA's offline IndexedDB database, allowing the payload to execute again when a poisoned message is opened from the cache.
The malware uses multiple channels for command and control. It periodically searches GitHub commit messages for encrypted commands containing the victim's email address and can also receive commands through specially formatted emails stored in OWA's cache.
For data theft, OWAReaper primarily uses HTTPS with encrypted URI paths that can be routed through image CDN services. It also has a direct-server fallback and a DNS-based exfiltration mechanism that encrypts and Base32-encodes stolen data before transmitting it through DNS queries.
Proofpoint linked OWAReaper to TA488 based on behavioral similarities with ZimReaper, malware previously used by the group against Zimbra email servers. In that campaign, TA488 exploited another XSS flaw, CVE-2025-66376, to steal emails, passwords, application passcodes and two-factor authentication codes.
The latest campaign therefore represents an evolution of the group's "half-click" approach, shifting from compromising individual webmail sessions toward establishing persistent access within the victim's mailbox environment.
Microsoft has since released security updates addressing CVE-2026-42897. The July 2026 Exchange Server update states that the code fix is available, while organizations that previously applied Microsoft's mitigation must follow Microsoft's guidance to remove it after installing the update. The vulnerability affects on-premises Exchange Server deployments, while Exchange Online is not affected.
Proofpoint has published indicators of compromise for the campaign, including malicious domains and the HTML message body containing the exploit and OWAReaper payload. Organizations using affected on-premises Exchange deployments should therefore investigate not only compromised endpoints, but also mailbox permissions, OAuth tokens and OWA browser storage when responding to suspected exploitation.
A cybersecurity expert with the handle q1uf3ng found the vulnerability which has not been given any CVE identifier yet.
The vulnerability exists in the jsonArrayContains functionality and permits illegal SQL injection. In few configurations, particularly where the flaw can reach a privileged database account, that path may result in remote code execution. The vulnerability has not been given any CVE identifier yet.
The flaw was publicly revealed on 12 August 2026. Soon after, watchTowr said it started noticing exploitation attempts, with hundreds of attempts coming from a few IP addresses. According to WatchTowr’s Jake Knott, “Within hours of public disclosure, we began observing exploitation attempts and have since recorded hundreds of attempts originating from a small number of source IP addresses. Yet another example of how quickly attackers move once a vulnerability enters the public domain.”
The timing is crucial here. When enough technical information or proof of concept is public, threat actors don’t have to wait for a well planned exploit. They can compare responses, scan broadly, trigger errors, and make a list of devices to visit later. It is spying with an error message as a compass.
Cyber criminals are probing the flawed GeoServer systems, but no confirmed exploit has been found yet. But experts have warned that exploitation could soon happen.
According to Knott, “However, this is unlikely to remain the case for long: GeoServer has a track record of being targeted and exploited at scale, with multiple vulnerabilities listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. With no patch currently available and exploitation already underway, organizations running GeoServer should take this vulnerability seriously and, where possible, identify exposed instances, restrict public access, and monitor for a vendor fix.”
Threat actors are triggering errors to find vulnerable targets before active exploitation, and probing GeoServer systems for unpatched zero-day.
A well-liked framework for exchanging and publishing geographic data via web services is called GeoServer. Public sector portals, environmental platforms, mapping initiatives, utilities, transportation systems, academic institutions, and internal corporate applications are some of the places where it can be found. Because of this, a remotely reachable instance becomes more than just a technical detail; it may provide credentials, backend services, geographic data, or a path to a larger network.
Hackers have stolen around 607,000 records from England's Department for Education (DfE) after compromising systems used to handle enquiries and administer international education funding.
The department confirmed the cyber incident after attackers accessed data held through the DfE's online help desk and the portal supporting the Turing Scheme. The compromised information includes telephone numbers and email addresses associated with individuals and organisations that had interacted with the department.
Reports have also identified names and job titles among the exposed information, including details belonging to school leaders, university staff and government officials. However, the DfE said the affected information was limited to customer-service contact details and that bank details and other sensitive information were not accessed.
The department has stressed that the figure of 607,000 refers to records rather than the number of individuals affected. A single person or organisation may therefore account for multiple records across the affected systems.
Social Engineering Reportedly Used Against DfE Helpdesk
The breach reportedly involved a social-engineering attack against an external-facing DfE helpdesk used by education-sector organisations and local authorities.
Computer Weekly reported that the attackers targeted the department's helpdesk and obtained more than 600,000 records containing personally identifiable information, while the affected systems were taken offline as the department investigated the incident. The Times also reported that it had verified the authenticity of some of the leaked information.
The incident illustrates why customer-facing systems can represent an attractive target. Helpdesks routinely process legitimate requests from large numbers of users and may contain historical enquiries and account-linked information. If an attacker can manipulate a support process or gain access to an account with sufficient privileges, information held outside an organisation's core systems can become exposed.
The DfE has not publicly disclosed a complete technical account of how the attackers gained access or which specific vulnerability was exploited. It would therefore be premature to attribute the breach to a particular software flaw or compromised credential without further evidence.
A group calling itself ExfilSquad has claimed responsibility for the attack and has reportedly published or advertised stolen information online. The group's claims should be treated as claims by the alleged attackers, although multiple reports have examined samples of the data and reported that some information was authentic.
DfE Moves to Contain the Incident
The DfE said it acted quickly after identifying the incident and has been working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) to establish what happened and assess the impact.
The department has also referred itself to the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO), the UK's data protection regulator.
A DfE spokesperson said the department had "robust processes" to protect information and had taken swift action to contain the incident. The department maintained that the information involved was restricted to customer-service contact details and that no other data had been accessed.
The NCA separately confirmed that it was aware of the incident and was working with partners to understand the circumstances and its impact.
The DfE has also temporarily affected the operation of the services involved while remediation work is carried out. Reports said the department switched to telephone support while the affected systems were being addressed, with normal operation expected to resume after the disruption.
The department has assessed the data-protection risk to affected individuals as low. However, the exposure of professional contact information can still create opportunities for follow-on attacks, particularly phishing and impersonation campaigns that use legitimate names, job titles, organisations or previous interactions to make fraudulent communications appear credible.
Education Sector Continues Being Prime Target
The DfE breach comes as education organisations across the UK continue to report high levels of cyber incidents.
The latest UK government's Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/26 found that 49% of primary schools, 73% of secondary schools, 88% of further-education colleges and 98% of higher-education institutions had identified a breach or cyber attack during the previous 12 months. The comparable figure for UK businesses was 43%.
The frequency of attacks was also high among colleges and universities. Around 24% of further-education colleges and 29% of higher-education institutions reported experiencing a breach or attack at least weekly. The survey found that 14% of primary schools and 20% of secondary schools experienced attacks at least weekly.
Phishing remained the dominant threat. Among institutions that had identified a breach or attack, 90% of primary schools and 96% of secondary schools reported phishing incidents. The same figure was 96% for further- and higher-education institutions combined.
The government survey also identified higher levels of other attack types across further and higher education. These included impersonation, reported by 79% of affected further- and higher-education institutions, viruses, spyware or malware at 51%, and denial-of-service attacks at 49%. Unauthorised access to files or networks by staff was reported by 29%, while 23% reported unauthorised access by students.
The consequences extend beyond the initial compromise. Almost half, or 49%, of further- and higher-education institutions that identified a breach or attack reported at least one negative outcome for their systems. Compromised accounts or systems being used for illicit purposes accounted for 23%, while 16% reported websites, applications or online services being slowed or taken down and 14% reported losing access to files or networks.
Contact Data Can Become a Launchpad for Further Attacks
Although the DfE maintains that highly sensitive information was not accessed, the exposed records still have security implications.
Names, job titles, work email addresses and telephone numbers can provide attackers with the information required to make subsequent phishing or impersonation attempts appear legitimate. A message addressed to a known employee, referencing their role or organisation, can be considerably more convincing than an unsolicited generic email.
This risk is particularly relevant in education, where senior school leaders, university staff and government officials may have access to wider organisational systems or sensitive information.
The latest government survey indicates that impersonation is already a recurring problem in the sector. Among further- and higher-education institutions that identified breaches or attacks, 79% reported attempts involving people impersonating their organisation or staff.
The DfE incident therefore demonstrates that the consequences of a data breach do not necessarily end when the initial intrusion is contained. Exposed contact information can potentially become useful in later social-engineering campaigns, while disruption to public-facing services can continue during investigation and recovery.
For organisations handling large volumes of education-sector data, securing customer support infrastructure is therefore part of protecting the wider attack surface. Access controls, strong identity verification, monitoring and rapid incident response can limit how far an attacker can move after compromising an externally accessible service.
The DfE investigation remains ongoing, with the department working alongside the NCSC and NCA and having notified the ICO. The full circumstances of the intrusion, including how the attackers gained access and the precise extent of the exposed information, are expected to become clearer as the investigation progresses.
The North Korean hacking group called Lazarus has been linked to the zero-day compromise of a recently patched vulnerability affecting Windows to deploy a new backdoor attacking aerospace and defense organizations throughout India, France, Brazil, and Germany.
According to Check Point Research, the attack is part of Operation Dream Job, a social engineering and cyber espionage campaign run by Pyongyang-backed threat actors to target job seekers globally with fake but promising job opportunities at organizations like Enveil and Lockheed Martin to steal important information and deploy malware by reaching out to professionals on forums such as LinkedIn, mimicking to be job recruiters to gain trust.
The attacks have been discovered to take use of CVE-2026-68820 (CVSS score: 7.0), a privilege escalation vulnerability that affects the Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock ("AFD.sys"), which Microsoft fixed as part of their August 2026 Patch Tuesday upgrades.
As found in earlier campaigns, targets are trapped via fake recruiter messages and lured into opening an infected PDF or deploying a malicious PDF viewer, which then deploys a new backdoor known as Troy that allows remote access to the infected system. The main aim of these hacks is to take complete command of compromised computers and escape security mechanisms.
Since 2022, Lazarus, along with Dream Job, has been using the tried-and-tested trojanized PDF viewer technique to lure victims.
Experts found two separate parallel compromise sequence:
Here, targets are asked to download SecurityPDF from a site mimicking Enveil. When the PDF is installed, it looks for any PDF document opened via it for a particular marker. If it is present, the app decodes an embedded payload that loads a backdoor called Troy straight into memory.
Here, targets are asked to download an encoded archive that launches a DLL side-loading chain. The infected DLL is used to demonstrate a fake job posting trap, while it secretly downloads and runs in memory in a lightweight downloader called MISTPEN. The downloaders work with hacker controlled infrastructure via Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive to extract and run espionage and persistence modules and run the “AFD.sys” driver exploit, before installing ForestTiger, also called ScoringMathTea, which offers remote access to hosts.
Since 2022, the Lazarus group has been using the updated version of the known-kernel-mode rootkit in its attempt to hide the presence of malicious components from security softwares deployed on the host.