Agentic web browsers that use AI tools to autonomously do tasks across various websites for a user could be trained and fooled into phishing attacks. Hackers exploit the AI browsers’ tendency to assert their actions and deploy them against the same model to remove security checks.
According to security expert Shaked Chen, “The AI now operates in real time, inside messy and dynamic pages, while continuously requesting information, making decisions, and narrating its actions along the way. Well, 'narrating' is quite an understatement - It blabbers, and way too much!,” the Hacker News reported. Agentic Blabbering is an AI browser that displays what it sees, thinks, and plans to do next, and what it deems safe or a threat.
By hacking the traffic between the AI services on the vendor’s servers and putting it as input to a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), it made Perplexity’s Comet AI browser fall prey to a phishing attack within four minutes.
The research is based on established tactics such as Scamlexity and VibeScamming, which revealed that vibe-coding platforms and AI browsers can be coerced into generating scam pages and performing malicious tasks via prompt injection.
There is a change in the attack surface as a result of the AI agent managing the tasks without frequent human oversight, meaning that a scammer no longer has to trick a user. Instead, it seeks to deceive the AI model itself.
Chen said, “If you can observe what the agent flags as suspicious, hesitates on, and more importantly, what it thinks and blabbers about the page, you can use that as a training signal.” Chen added that the “scam evolves until the AI Browser reliably walks into the trap another AI set for it."
The aim is to make a “scamming machine” that improves and recreates a phishing page until the agentic browser accepts the commands and carries out the hacker’s command, like putting the victim’s passwords on a malicious web page built for refund scams.
Guardio is concerned about the development, saying that, “This reveals the unfortunate near future we are facing: scams will not just be launched and adjusted in the wild, they will be trained offline, against the exact model millions rely on, until they work flawlessly on first contact.”
Cybersecurity researchers have identified a previously undocumented malware strain called KadNap that is primarily infecting Asus routers and other internet-facing networking devices. The attackers are using these compromised systems to form a botnet that routes malicious traffic through residential connections, effectively turning infected hardware into anonymous proxy nodes.
The threat was first observed in real-world attacks in August 2025. Since that time, the number of affected devices has grown to more than 14,000, according to investigators at Black Lotus Labs. A large share of infections, exceeding 60 percent, has been detected within the United States. Smaller groups of compromised devices have also been identified across Taiwan, Hong Kong, Russia, the United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, France, Italy, and Spain.
Researchers report that the malware uses a modified version of the Kademlia Distributed Hash Table (DHT) protocol. This peer-to-peer networking technology enables the attackers to conceal the true location of their infrastructure by distributing communication across multiple nodes. By embedding command traffic inside decentralized peer-to-peer activity, the operators can evade traditional network monitoring systems that rely on detecting centralized servers.
Within this architecture, infected devices communicate with one another using the DHT network to discover and establish connections with command-and-control servers. This design improves the botnet’s resilience, as it reduces the chances that defenders can disable operations by shutting down a single control point.
Once a router or other edge device has been compromised, the system can be sold or rented through a proxy platform known as Doppelgänger. Investigators believe this service is a rebranded version of another proxy operation called Faceless, which previously had links to TheMoon router malware. According to information published on the Doppelgänger website, the service launched around May or June 2025 and advertises access to residential proxy connections in more than 50 countries, promoting what it claims is complete anonymity for users.
Although many of the observed infections involve Asus routers, researchers found that the malware operators are also capable of targeting a wider range of edge networking equipment.
The attack chain begins with the download of a shell script named aic.sh, retrieved from a command server located at 212.104.141[.]140. This script initiates the infection process by connecting the compromised device to the botnet’s peer-to-peer network.
To ensure the malware remains active, the script establishes persistence by creating a cron task that downloads the same script again at the 55-minute mark of every hour. During this process, the file is renamed “.asusrouter” and executed automatically.
After persistence is secured, the script downloads an ELF executable, renames it “kad,” and runs it on the device. This program installs the KadNap malware itself. The malware is capable of operating on hardware that uses ARM and MIPS processor architectures, which are commonly found in routers and networking appliances.
KadNap also contacts a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server to retrieve the current system time and store it along with the device’s uptime. These values are combined to produce a hash that allows the malware to identify and connect with other peers within the decentralized network, enabling it to receive commands or download additional components.
Two additional files used during the infection process, fwr.sh and /tmp/.sose, contain instructions that close port 22, which is the default port used by Secure Shell (SSH). These files also extract lists of command server addresses in IP-address-and-port format, which the malware uses to establish communication with control infrastructure.
According to researchers, the use of the DHT protocol provides the botnet with durable communication channels that are difficult to shut down because its traffic blends with legitimate peer-to-peer network activity.
Further examination revealed that not every infected device communicates with every command server. This suggests the attackers are segmenting their infrastructure, possibly grouping devices based on hardware type or model.
Investigators also noted that routers infected with KadNap may sometimes contain multiple malware infections simultaneously. Because of this overlap, it can be challenging to determine which threat actor is responsible for particular malicious activity originating from those systems.
Security experts recommend that individuals and organizations operating small-office or home-office (SOHO) routers take several precautions. These include installing firmware updates, restarting devices periodically, replacing default administrator credentials, restricting management access, and replacing routers that have reached end-of-life status and no longer receive security patches.
Researchers concluded that KadNap’s reliance on a peer-to-peer command structure distinguishes it from many other proxy-based botnets designed to provide anonymity services. The decentralized approach allows operators to remain hidden while making it significantly harder for defenders to detect and block the network.
In a separate report, security analysts at Cyble disclosed a new Linux malware threat named ClipXDaemon.
The malware targets cryptocurrency users by intercepting wallet addresses that victims copy to their clipboard and secretly replacing them with addresses controlled by attackers. This type of threat is commonly known as clipper malware.
ClipXDaemon is distributed through a Linux post-exploitation framework called ShadowHS and has been described as an automated clipboard-hijacking tool designed specifically for systems running Linux X11 graphical environments.
The malware operates entirely in memory, which reduces traces on disk and improves its ability to remain undetected. It also employs several stealth techniques, including disguising its process names and deliberately avoiding execution in Wayland sessions.
This design choice is intentional because Wayland’s security architecture introduces stricter restrictions on clipboard access. Applications must usually involve explicit user interaction before they can read clipboard contents. By disabling itself when Wayland is detected, the malware avoids triggering errors or suspicious behavior.
Once active in an X11 session, ClipXDaemon continuously checks the system clipboard every 200 milliseconds. If it detects a copied cryptocurrency wallet address, it immediately substitutes it with an attacker-controlled address before the victim pastes the information.
The malware currently targets a wide range of digital currencies, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero, Tron, Dogecoin, Ripple, and TON.
Researchers noted that ClipXDaemon differs significantly from traditional Linux malware families. It does not include command-and-control communication, does not send beaconing signals to remote servers, and does not rely on external instructions to operate.
Instead, the malware generates profits directly by manipulating cryptocurrency transactions in real time, silently redirecting funds when victims paste compromised wallet addresses during transfers.
Cybersecurity experts have warned about a new campaign where hackers are exploiting FortiGate Next-Gen Firewall (NGFW) devices as entry points to hack target networks.
The campaign involves abusing the recently revealed security flaws or weak password to take out configuration files. The activity has singled out class linked to government, healthcare, and managed service providers.
According to experts, “FortiGate network appliances have considerable access to the environments they were installed to protect. In many configurations, this includes service accounts which are connected to the authentication infrastructure, such as Active Directory (AD) and Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP).”
"This setup can enable the appliance to map roles to specific users by fetching attributes about the connection that’s being analyzed and correlating with the Directory information, which is useful in cases where role-based policies are set or for increasing response speed for network security alerts detected by the device,” the experts added.
But the experts noticed that this access could be compromised by hackers who hack into FortiGate devices via flaws or misconfigurations.
In one attack, the hackers breached a FortiGate appliance last year in November to make a new local admin account “support” and built four new firewall policies that let the account to travel across all zones without any limitations.
The hacker then routinely checked device access. “Evidence demonstrates the attacker authenticated to the AD using clear text credentials from the fortidcagent service account, suggesting the attacker decrypted the configuration file and extracted the service account credentials,” SentinelOne reported.
After this, hacker leveraged the service account to verify the target's environment and put rogue workstations in the AD for further access. Following this, network scanning started and the breach was found, and lateral movement was stopped.
The contents of the NTDS.dit file and SYSTEM registry hive were exfiltrated to an external server ("172.67.196[.]232") over port 443 by the Java malware, which was triggered via DLL side-loading.
SentinelOne said that “While the actor may have attempted to crack passwords from the data, no such credential usage was identified between the time of credential harvesting and incident containment.”
Cybersecurity analysts have identified a phishing campaign that can quietly hand control of a Windows computer to attackers after a single click. The scam appears as a routine update notice for Google Meet, but the prompt is fraudulent and redirects victims into a device management system controlled by threat actors.
Unlike many phishing schemes, the technique does not steal passwords, download obvious malware, or display clear warning signs. Instead, the attack relies on convincing users to interact with a page that imitates a standard software update message.
A convincing but fake update message
The deceptive webpage tells visitors they must install the latest version of Meet in order to continue using the service. The design closely resembles a legitimate update notification and uses familiar colors and branding that many users associate with Google products.
However, both the “Update now” button and the “Learn more” link do not connect to any official Google resource. Instead, they activate a special Windows deep link known as ms-device-enrollment:.
This feature is a built-in Windows mechanism designed for corporate environments. IT administrators commonly use it to send employees a link that allows a computer to be enrolled in a company’s device management system with minimal effort. In the attack campaign, the same capability is redirected to infrastructure operated by the attacker.
How the enrollment process begins
Windows enrollment links such as ms-device-enrollment: are commonly used in corporate environments where organizations need to configure large numbers of laptops quickly. The link automatically opens Windows settings and connects the device to an enterprise management server.
Once enrolled, the device becomes part of a management framework that allows administrators to deploy software updates, enforce security policies, and manage system configurations remotely.
Attackers exploit this workflow because users are accustomed to seeing this setup process when joining corporate networks, making it appear legitimate.
When a victim clicks the link, Windows immediately bypasses the browser and opens the operating system’s “Set up a work or school account” dialog. This is the same interface that appears when an organization configures a new employee laptop.
The enrollment request arrives with several fields already filled in. The username displayed is collinsmckleen@sunlife-finance.com, a domain designed to resemble the financial services firm Sun Life Financial. Meanwhile, the server connection is preconfigured to an endpoint hosted at tnrmuv-api.esper[.]cloud, which is part of infrastructure operated by Esper.
The attacker’s objective is not to impersonate the victim’s account perfectly. Instead, the goal is to persuade the user to continue through the legitimate Windows enrollment process. Even if only a small portion of targeted users proceed, that is enough for attackers to gain access to some systems.
What attackers gain after enrollment
If the victim clicks Next and completes the setup wizard, the computer becomes registered with a remote Mobile Device Management (MDM) server.
MDM platforms are commonly used by organizations to manage employee devices. Once a device joins such a system, administrators can remotely install or remove applications, modify operating system settings, access stored files, lock the device, or completely erase its contents.
Because the commands come from a legitimate management platform rather than a malicious program, the operating system performs the actions itself. As a result, there may be no suspicious malware process running on the machine.
The infrastructure used in this campaign relies on Esper, a legitimate enterprise management service that many companies use to control corporate hardware.
Further analysis of the malicious link shows encoded configuration data embedded in the server address. When decoded, the data reveals two identifiers associated with the Esper platform: a blueprint ID that determines which management configuration will be applied and a group ID that specifies the device group the computer will join once enrolled.
Abuse of legitimate features
Both the Windows enrollment handler and the Esper management service are functioning exactly as designed. The attacker’s tactic simply redirects these legitimate tools toward unsuspecting users.
Because no malicious software is delivered and no login credentials are requested, the attack can be difficult for security tools to detect. The enrollment prompt displayed to the user is an authentic Windows system dialog rather than a fake webpage. This means typical browser warnings or email filters that look for credential-stealing forms may not flag the activity.
Additionally, the command infrastructure operates on a trusted cloud-based platform, making domain reputation filtering less effective. Security specialists warn that many traditional detection tools are not designed to recognize situations where legitimate operating system features are misused to gain control of a system.
This technique reflects a broader trend in cybercrime. Increasingly, attackers are abandoning conventional malware and instead exploiting built-in operating system capabilities or legitimate cloud services to carry out their operations.
Steps to take if you interacted with the page
Users who believe they may have clicked the fake update prompt should first check whether their device has been enrolled in an unfamiliar management system.
On Windows computers, this can be done by navigating to Settings → Accounts → Access work or school. If an unfamiliar entry appears, particularly one associated with domains such as sunlife-finance or esper, it should be selected and disconnected immediately.
Anyone who clicked the “Update now” link on the malicious site and proceeded through the enrollment wizard should treat the computer as potentially compromised. Running a current anti-malware scan is recommended to determine whether the management server deployed additional software after enrollment.
For organizations, administrators may also want to review device management policies. Endpoint management platforms such as Microsoft Intune allow companies to restrict which MDM servers corporate devices are permitted to join. Implementing such restrictions can reduce the risk of unauthorized device enrollment in similar attacks.
Security researchers have warned that misuse of device management systems can be particularly dangerous because they grant deep administrative control over enrolled devices.
According to analysts from Gartner, enterprise device management platforms often have privileged system access comparable to local administrators, allowing them to modify system policies, install applications, and control security settings remotely.
When such privileges fall into the wrong hands, attackers can effectively operate the device as if they were legitimate administrators.
According to a letter the business issued online, Conduent initially learned it was the victim of a "cyber incident" more than a year ago on January 13, 2025. The actual breach occurred between October 21, 2024, and January 13, 2025, and it included Conduent's data because the company offers services to health plans.
Names, social security numbers, health insurance details, and unspecified medical information were among the data. In its notice, the business stressed that "not every data element was present for every individual," which implies that some individuals may have had their health insurance information taken but not their social security number, or vice versa.
According to Bleeping Computer, the Safepay ransomware organization claimed responsibility for the attack, which allegedly captured more than 8 gigabytes of data. Conduent stated online, "Presently, we are unaware of any attempted or actual misuse of any information involved in this incident," while it is unclear if Safepay has demanded payment for the information's recovery.
10.5 million people were affected by the incident, according to Oregon's consumer protection website, although it's unknown how many people in Oregon alone were affected. According to Wisconsin, the national total is more than 25 million.
Notifications have also been sent to residents of other states, such as California, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico. According to the state's attorney general, just 374 people's data was compromised in Maine, one of the states with very tiny numbers. Conduent, a New Jersey-based company, did not reply to emails on Tuesday inquiring about the full extent of the incident and what victims could do about it.
Conduent is providing free credit monitoring and identity restoration services through Epiq to certain individuals, but those affected must join before April 30, 2026, according to a letter given to victims in California.