ENGIE, one of the world's largest energy companies, has notified customers in France that an unauthorized third party accessed their personal data through a marketing platform used by the company's business partners, the company confirmed this week.
The breach notification letters, dated October 23, went to affected customers after ENGIE said it detected "unusual data access activity" on the partner tool. The company has not stated exactly when the intrusion took place or how long the attacker had access before it was caught.
According to the notifications, the data the intruder obtained includes customers' first and last names, mailing addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. It also includes two types of energy infrastructure identifiers specific to the French grid: the Delivery Point identifier (PDL) and the Metering and Estimation Point identifier (PCE). Both codes are tied to a customer's physical connection to the gas and electricity supply network. Customer IDs and contract numbers were also taken.
ENGIE said no banking data was involved, and that the breach was confined to the partner-facing marketing platform rather than any of its internal systems. The scope of the incident is currently limited to its French customer base, though the company has not said how many customers received notifications.
"We have cut off the attacker's access to the platform, notified the relevant authorities, and are directly informing each affected customer," the company said in a statement.
Customers were advised to stay alert to unsolicited contact and potential phishing attempts in the wake of the exposure.
No ransomware group or extortion actor had publicly claimed responsibility for the breach at the time of publication.
A Company With a Recurring Target on Its Back
ENGIE operates across 30 countries, employs more than 90,000 people, and posted €71.9 billion in revenue last year. Its scale across utilities, renewables, and energy infrastructure makes it a high-value target for threat actors looking for customer data at volume.
This latest breach is not the first time attackers have made it inside ENGIE's wider corporate ecosystem. Approximately a year ago, the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters group claimed it had breached a Salesforce instance belonging to Engie Records, the retail energy subsidiary of ENGIE North America, and leaked records from the intrusion. Engie Records appeared on the group's leak site as the 27th of 39 organizations allegedly hit through the same Salesforce-related campaign, with around 3GB of data listed.
Before that, in August 2023, a separate incident affected roughly 110,000 French ENGIE customers. In that case, a hacker known online as "HommedeLombre" reportedly got into ENGIE's systems through an external contractor's network, a technique also used in the Pôle Emploi breach around the same period. That attacker exposed names, email addresses, and phone numbers, and later said the intrusion was meant to demonstrate that "nothing is ever secure," citing rising gas prices as a grievance. ENGIE filed a complaint with authorities following that incident and said it had brought the affected system under control.
If we look closer to understand the link here, the three incidents point to a recurring problem: ENGIE's data, whether held by internal systems, subsidiaries, or third-party partners, keeps ending up in attackers' hands.
Why Energy Sector Customer Data Is Valuable
The combination of contact information and energy-specific identifiers like PDL and PCE codes makes the stolen data more useful to attackers than a standard contact list. Those codes link a name and address to a specific gas or electricity metering point in the French national grid, which means the data could be used to convincingly impersonate ENGIE in phishing campaigns or to target customers with fraudulent offers around energy billing or contracts.
France's energy market also went through a turbulent period of price volatility in recent years, which means many customers have been actively comparing suppliers and receiving legitimate outreach about tariff changes. That context makes it easier for fraudsters to craft believable messages that reference contract numbers, delivery point details, and billing information, exactly the kind of data now in circulation.
ENGIE said it has notified the relevant authorities, as required under GDPR. French data protection rules mandate that breaches of personal data be reported to the CNIL, the national data protection authority, within 72 hours of detection, and that affected individuals be notified without undue delay when the breach poses a risk to their rights and freedoms.
As of now, ENGIE has not attributed the breach to any specific threat actor, and it is unclear whether the platform through which the data was accessed belonged to an external vendor or an internal partner system. The investigation appears to be ongoing.
Data Magecart, a Brazilian group of hackers, compromised the analytics script used by e-commerce platform Convertr, potentially revealing payment information provided by customers to dozens of Brazilian fashion brands. During the attack, which was detected by cybersecurity firm Sansec on October 24, 2026, malicious code was injected into Convertr's Plausible analytics tracker.
By modifying a JavaScript file loaded into Convertr's merchant checkouts, the attackers allowed the card skimmer to collect sensitive information during online purchases by modifying the JavaScript file. The data obtained was comprised of card numbers, expiration dates, CVV security codes, cardholder names, and Brazilian CPF taxpayer identification numbers.
The information was transmitted to a server controlled by the attacker at 1x0.is. Online shopping and checkout services are provided by Convertr to dozens of Brazilian fashion retailers. According to the platform, its merchants have processed more than R$2 billion in sales. Due to the fact that the affected analytics tracker was distributed throughout its merchant network, compromising one file created a potential supply chain risk that extends beyond one individual online store.
The malicious script was detected by Sansec after a clean version was captured earlier on October 24th. In October, the attackers modified the skimmer in order to target Convertr's payment API field names, making it more effective in capturing payment information. Researchers also reported that the compromised tracker continued to serve on October 26, despite efforts to notify Convertr.
As Sansec has been tracking the Brazilian Magecart group since July 2024, the incident represents a significant development in its activities. The group has previously targeted individual online stores using Magento, OpenCart and WooCommerce, mainly in Brazil. With the Convertr compromise, Sansec has shifted from infecting individual stores to compromising a service shared by multiple businesses, resulting in the first supply chain attack attributed to the group.
An unpatched installation of Plausible Community Edition, an open-source web analytics platform, is believed to have been the source of the attack. Versions 3.0.0 through 3.2.0 were affected by CVE-2026-8467, a critical vulnerability that could allow unauthenticated command execution through an exposed component of the /storybook component.
Convertr reported installing version 3.0 in 2025 and not updating it prior to the incident. On May 15, 2026, Plausible released version 3.2.1 which fixed the vulnerability. Since researchers were not able to access the platform’s server logs, Sansec has not confirmed that the vulnerability was exploited to gain access. Therefore, it remains unclear what specific method was used to compromise the analytics server. Furthermore, the group has consistently targeted Brazilian payment systems as a focus for their methods.
According to Sansec, its skimmers exhibit recurring characteristics, including the use of short-lived domains as recipients of stolen information, and endpoints containing Portuguese names related to card payments. Other variants have also been developed to attack payment services, including e.Rede, PagSeguro, Pagar.me and Mercado Pago.
Another version is reported to replace genuine PIX payment QR codes with malicious codes. Convertr confirmed on October 27 that Plausible had been updated with a patched version following the discovery of the malicious script. In addition to notifying affected merchants, payment providers, and relevant authorities, the company also verified that the tracker hosted on Convertr's analytics server was free of infection.
While it is important to remove malicious code, it does not necessarily eliminate all immediate risks for all shoppers. Sansec stated that browsers may retain cached copies of infected scripts for up to 24 hours following the server-side cleanup, potentially allowing the malicious code to remain active during that period.
Payments made by Brazilian customers through checkout addresses containing checkout.convertr from October 24 onward should be blocked and replaced by their banks. It is also recommended to monitor transactions for suspicious activity involving CPF identification numbers in order to identify suspicious activity.
A Sansec recommendation for organizations using Plausible Community Edition is to update the version to 3.2.1 or later and to review server access logs for requests to the exposed path of /storybook. Upon detecting evidence of exploitation, the affected server should be rebuilt, secrets rotated, tracker files checked against the official release, and a more thorough investigation conducted. The incident emphasizes the wider risks associated with shared web infrastructure.
Multiple businesses can be affected by compromised analytics scripts without the attacker having to breach each merchant individually. To reduce the risk of similar attacks, it is vital that software be updated, scripts loaded on payment pages are monitored, and unauthorized outbound connections are restricted.
This incident illustrates the dangers posed by compromised third-party scripts used on checkout pages. Preventing digital skimming attacks requires timely software updates, continuous script monitoring, and stronger protection of payment infrastructure.
A 44-year-old Chinese national has been brought to the United States from the Netherlands to answer federal charges tied to a cryptocurrency investment scheme that drained nearly $37 million from 174 American victims.
Zhen Zhao was arraigned in California after his extradition, prosecutors said, following a federal indictment handed down in August 2025 charging him with conspiracy to commit money laundering. If convicted, he faces up to 20 years in federal prison.
Zhao is accused of running what investigators call a "pig butchering" operation, a type of confidence scam that has become one of the fastest-growing financial crimes in the world. The name reflects how the fraud works: operators spend weeks or months cultivating trust with their targets before stealing everything from them at once.
How the scheme worked
According to court documents, Zhao and his co-conspirators reached victims through unsolicited text messages, social media platforms, phone calls, and online dating services. The initial contact was typically low-stakes, a misdirected text, a friendly exchange that seemed accidental, or a casual introduction through a dating app. Over time, the operators steered conversations toward investment opportunities, eventually directing victims to what appeared to be functioning cryptocurrency trading platforms.
The platforms were fabricated. Built to resemble real exchanges, they showed account balances growing steadily over time, giving victims every reason to keep putting money in. When victims eventually tried to withdraw their funds, they were blocked, hit with invented fees, or simply cut off. Their money was already gone.
The ring funneled more than $36.9 million from U.S. bank accounts into an account at Deltec Bank in the Bahamas, registered under the name Axis Digital Limited. From there, the bank was directed to convert the deposited money into Tether, a dollar-pegged stablecoin widely used in fraud for its stability and ease of transfer. That Tether was then moved to a digital asset wallet controlled in Cambodia, where it was passed up to the leaders of scam centers operating in the region.
Cambodia has become a significant hub for this type of operation. Criminal syndicates there have turned large-scale cryptocurrency fraud into core business, often staffing compound facilities with trafficked workers from across Asia who are forced to run these schemes under threat of violence. The money chain in the Zhao case reflects that geography directly.
Eight accomplices, two already sentenced
Zhao was not running the operation alone. Eight co-conspirators have already pleaded guilty in connection with the same scheme. Two have been sentenced so far, one to 51 months and another to 46 months in federal prison. The remaining cases are moving through the courts.
The extradition itself was the result of months of legal coordination between U.S. prosecutors, the State Department, and Dutch authorities. The Netherlands, which maintains a functioning extradition treaty with the United States, processed Zhao's transfer back to face trial in California.
A problem that keeps growing
This case sits inside a much larger crisis. The FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report recorded more than $8.6 billion in losses from investment scams over the course of a single year, up from $6.5 billion the year before. Those figures came from roughly 73,000 complaints, and investigators routinely note that reported numbers reflect only a portion of real losses, since many victims never file a report out of embarrassment or because they do not know where to turn.
Pig butchering has become the dominant form of cryptocurrency fraud in the United States. The FBI ran a proactive victim notification program that reached more than 4,300 pig butchering victims in a single year, warning people before they lost everything. Despite those efforts, the dollar figures keep climbing.
The Department of Justice has treated these cases as a priority. In December 2023, federal prosecutors in California charged four people with laundering more than $80 million connected to similar cryptocurrency investment scams, using shell companies and hundreds of individual banking transactions to move stolen money internationally. Prosecutors at the time described the mechanics as nearly identical to what Zhao and his network allegedly ran.
What victims should do
Anyone who believes they were targeted by a pig butchering scam can file a report with the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center at IC3.gov. Investigators ask that victims preserve all records of communications, platform names, cryptocurrency wallet addresses, transaction IDs, and any banking information they shared during the fraud.
For Zhao, the arraignment in California is the start of what will likely be a long legal process. With eight alleged co-conspirators already pleading guilty, prosecutors appear to have a functioning case built around his network. Whether he opts for trial or takes a similar path remains to be determined.
Due to a disruption of access to DreamHost's File Manager and webmail services as a result of an incident, certain email and FTP/SFTP accounts were forced to reset their passwords. Although the hosting provider described the action as a precautionary security measure, it has not yet revealed the cause of the incident or confirmed whether any accounts have been accessed without authorization.
When DreamHost first detected connectivity problems affecting its file manager on the web at files.dreamhost.com on October 23, 2026, the disruption was initially reported. As a consequence, some webmail users experienced login failures, while FTP/SFTP access was also affected by the issue. As a result, the company reset passwords for affected accounts and temporarily restricted access until new credentials could be established.
When a DreamHost account owner assigns a replacement password to the affected mailbox and file transfer users, the users cannot sign in. By the weekend, DreamHost mailed recovery instructions to all affected account holders in stages and confirmed to all affected account holders that all were notified by October 25.
In October, the company reported that engineers had deployed a fix and had restored File Manager functionality. Monitoring continued to ensure that the service continued to operate, however password changes for affected accounts continued to be required. Since limited information has been released by the company about the incident, customers have expressed concern.
Neither DreamHost nor the company has identified the root cause, disclosed the number of accounts affected, or confirmed whether any email messages, stored files, or login credentials have been compromised. Also, the provider advised users to review their mailbox forwarding settings and remove any unfamiliar destinations. This setting can be abused in order to redirect sensitive communications outside a company, thereby making it a crucial element of account security.
DreamHost has, however, not confirmed that unauthorized forwarding rules have been created in this incident. Additionally, customers have expressed concern about the lack of detailed explanations for the disruptions in service as well as mandatory password changes. Despite speculation about a possible compromise, no publicly available confirmation has been provided to indicate that an attack or data breach has occurred.
According to DreamHost, account owners should update stored credentials across connected applications and review account settings in order to complete the recovery process. Email clients, FTP/SFTP software, website backup tools, deployment systems and plugins relying on previously stored credentials may be affected by password changes.
In order to avoid the possibility of affected users losing access to their hosted mailboxes, the company recommends that replacement passwords be shared through private channels, such as telephone calls or secure text messages. The recovery guidance provided by DreamHost specifies that mailbox passwords can be changed under “Mail > Manage Email” in the control panel, and FTP/SFTP credentials can be updated under “Websites > SFTP Users & Files”.
If you changed your password before the reset process was completed, you should verify that your new password remains valid as well. Password changes may take up to 15 minutes to become effective. There is no indication that incoming email is reaching affected mailboxes, and that FTP/SFTP data is still stored on the provider's servers.
In addition to these assurances concerning service and data availability, it is also recommended that website owners conduct routine site checks to determine whether unauthorized access occurred prior to the password reset. Considering that FTP/SFTP credentials provide access to website files, it is important to identify suspicious changes by reviewing recently modified files, unfamiliar administrator accounts, and unforeseen scheduled tasks.
There has been no evidence published to indicate that DreamHost-hosted websites were altered as a result of the incident. This episode also underscores the importance of using third-party hosting providers for security reasons. When a hosting company encounters a disruption, several connected services may be affected at once, especially when email addresses and file transfer credentials are handled by the same provider.
In order to ensure that essential operations are resumed after the password change, DreamHost has repeatedly warned customers that it will never send customers passwords by email. Businesses using DreamHost may need to check integrations and automated processes reliant on these accounts. Rather than logging into the control panel through unsolicited messages, account owners should access the control panel directly.
No public explanation has yet been provided by the company as to what triggered the incident or the number of affected customers has been confirmed. In the interim, a central question remains as to whether the incident involved unauthorized access, how many accounts were affected, and if any customer information was revealed. Despite DreamHost's password reset process and restoration of File Manager access, the broader issues associated with the incident haven't been resolved.
DreamHost's restoration of File Manager access marks progress in the recovery process, but the absence of an identified root cause leaves the incident's broader security implications unresolved. While the company has yet to clarify the cause of the incident, and whether any customer accounts or data has been accessed, it remains unclear how the incident will impact the security of the company.
A security firm has found that placing a disguised instruction file inside a user's Downloads folder is enough to manipulate AI coding agents into installing malware, with one leading tool executing a known-malicious package in more than nine out of ten test runs.
The finding comes from Forever Security, which said one of its customers had an `AGENTS.md` file sitting in their Downloads folder. The file was designed to look like routine engineering notes, but its actual purpose was to instruct any coding agent that opened the folder to install `function-color`, a package tied to the MALFEX npm supply chain campaign. Forever stopped the agent before the installation completed. The firm could not determine how the file got there.
How the Malware Chain Works
`function-color` is a wrapper package. It carries no payload of its own but silently installs `function-flag` as a dependency. That package runs a postinstall script that downloads a Windows executable from a remote host, saves it as `node.exe` inside `%APPDATA%`, and executes it in the background. The download routine sits inside an empty catch block, so a failed attempt produces no error and leaves no trace in the install log. As of early October, both packages remained installable on npm with no advisory flagging either one.
The reason the attack targets the Downloads folder specifically is not arbitrary. Browsers can save files to that directory without asking the user for permission or even requiring a click. Forever built a proof-of-concept web page that silently dropped a crafted `AGENTS.md` into Downloads during a normal browsing session. The firm did not establish that an attacker used this exact method against its customer, but the capability is real and requires no special access.
Test Results Across Two Major Agents
To measure how reliably the technique works, Forever ran controlled tests against OpenAI's Codex and Anthropic's Claude Code.
For Codex, the planted file instructed the agent to register a new server entry in `~/.codex/config.toml` and install the malicious package. Because that config file applies to every session on the machine, a successful write would persist across projects. Codex followed through in more than 90 percent of the test attempts inside an isolated virtual machine.
Claude Code required a different approach. The planted `CLAUDE.md` was written to resemble internal gateway setup documentation, and its goal was to write a custom API endpoint into the project's `.claude/settings.json` file. If an attacker controls that endpoint, every API call from the agent passes through their infrastructure, along with the session token. The token can then be used to take over the account. Claude Code normally prompts the user to approve writes of that kind, and it frequently rejected requests that looked suspicious. The extended engineering-document framing, however, got the write approved roughly half the time.
Neither Vendor Has a Patch
Forever stated plainly that there is nothing for OpenAI or Anthropic to fix. Each agent was doing what it was built to do: read instruction files in the working directory and carry out the steps listed in them. The firm compared the situation to a browser rendering a phishing page. The browser is not broken; the page is malicious.
That framing shifts the responsibility to users and organizations. Forever's own telemetry adds urgency to that point. About half of its customers run a coding agent from their Downloads folder, and roughly a quarter of agent sessions involve an open browser. In many of those cases, no person is actively watching the session when a new file arrives in the directory.
What to Do
The most direct fix is to stop running coding agents from the Downloads folder entirely. Beyond that, Forever recommends reading any `AGENTS.md` or `CLAUDE.md` file you did not write yourself before running a session, including files that arrive in freshly cloned repositories.
For anyone who suspects a file may have already been processed, the firm advises checking `~/.codex/config.toml` for unrecognized server blocks and reviewing `.claude/settings.json` for API endpoints that were not intentionally set. On Windows machines, the presence of `node.exe` inside `%APPDATA%` is a strong indicator that the function-flag payload ran successfully. If a planted file is confirmed, the session's login token should be treated as compromised and rotated immediately.
Keeping approval prompts enabled and running agents inside sandboxes reduces the attack surface, though the Claude Code test results show that approval prompts alone are not a reliable barrier when the malicious instruction is written to look like legitimate documentation.
An operational security slip by affiliates of two ransomware groups left a server exposed long enough for researchers to pull 8,257 AI-generated messages documenting how the operators ran intrusions, negotiated ransoms, and managed their victim pipeline. The logs, recovered from a directory at IP address 45.227.254.43, form one of the most detailed windows into how criminal groups are now deploying artificial intelligence to execute attacks at scale.
The research, published by SOCRadar, links the activity to affiliates of INC ransomware and The Gentlemen, a data extortion group. Analysts assess the operators are Russian-speaking and function both as an intrusion team and as an infrastructure provider, leasing out their toolkit to other ransomware partners.
The Framework Behind the Operation
At the center of the operation sits a custom platform called Phantom, described in its own documentation as an "Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework." The tool ships with 18 skill modules, a routing engine, an autopilot orchestrator, and agents written in Python and Go. It connects to OpenCode, which lets the AI select attack techniques and assign tasks to remote agents. On victim machines, those agents masquerade as Windows Update components and phone home to a domain linked to the operation.
To run the AI components, operators routed prompts through OpenRouter, a commercial model aggregator, using legitimate AI models including Anthropic's claude-opus-4.6 and Moonshot AI's Kimi-K3. When models declined to help with a specific task, operators did not switch tools. They reframed the request as an "Authorized Red Team Assessment Request" and resubmitted it. That workaround appears frequently across the 133 recorded sessions.
Alongside Phantom, the group built WormGPT-MCP, a layer of 32 Model Context Protocol servers that tie the AI to purpose-built tools covering everything from reconnaissance to ransom negotiation. A partner guide found on a second server advertised "55+ tools" and access to more than 9,000 proof-of-concept exploits. The name WormGPT refers to a persona prompt layered over commercial models, not a separate AI system.
For persistence and communication, the group used Ghost C2, a family of three generations of polymorphic implants that route traffic through Cloudflare, Telegram, or DNS to avoid network-level detection.
How They Got In
The operation targeted exposed edge devices and widely used IT management software. Three vulnerabilities drove confirmed access: CVE-2024-57727, a path traversal flaw in SimpleHelp, gave the group admin passwords from 427 servers after scanning nearly 5,000; CVE-2026-35616, an authentication bypass in FortiClient EMS, allowed operators to create backdoor admin accounts across more than 4,000 managed endpoints; and CVE-2026-41940, an authentication bypass in cPanel and WHM, was used to reach small hosting providers and their clients' email servers.
Credential reuse turned single points of access into full-network compromises. In at least one documented case, a single reused password opened the door to a VPN, several servers, a remote management platform, backup infrastructure, and the organization's security management tools. To suppress endpoint detection tools, operators deployed a driver-based EDR killer that abused a vulnerable Zemana driver, a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver.
The Victim Picture
Researchers identified 62 named organizations in the operational logs, with 36 located in the United States. Industrial, manufacturing, and energy firms made up the largest share of targets at roughly 16 percent. Healthcare and pharmaceuticals came in second at about 14.5 percent. Most targeted companies were smaller businesses, with 27 of 35 classifiable organizations reporting revenue below $250 million. Some were reached indirectly through a managed service provider whose admin credentials had been stolen.
Four organizations ended up listed on public leak sites. The operation's timeline runs from mid-July 2026 through a live encryption event on September 30, 2026.
Extortion by the Numbers
The playbook prioritized data theft over encryption. Operators sifted through stolen financial records to gauge what a victim could pay, then opened contact with a text-only email carrying no ransom figure. Pressure escalated through scripted vishing calls, threats to notify customers and regulators, and hard deadlines of 24 to 72 hours before publication. Payment was planned in Monero, though researchers found no wallet or confirmed transaction records.
Demand figures from recovered case files show the range of the operation. A EUR 15 million demand sent to a company called Aidon was later revised down to EUR 4 million after the operators realized they had compromised the wrong parent company. A healthcare network in Australia received demands between AUD 3 million and AUD 8 million. The Gentlemen's communications to Leo Schachter Diamonds included a four-message sequence and a vishing plan. For Trulite Glass and Aluminum, the group set up a look-alike domain, trulitesupport[.]com, to warn the company's own customers about the breach.
Total spending on the operation's infrastructure is estimated at just under $24,000.