During a video interview with Information Security Media Group at the RSAC Conference 2026, Ghali further highlighted several key developments. He explained that the automotive supply chain is increasingly investing in cryptographically secure processors to gain a competitive edge.
He also pointed out that threat modeling in the automotive sector is expanding beyond traditional IT considerations to address safety, operational continuity, and environmental impact. Additionally, he emphasized that maintaining supply chain integrity will likely emerge as the most significant long-term cybersecurity challenge for the automotive industry.
Ghali brings over seven years of expertise in automotive cybersecurity, specializing in ethical hacking, penetration testing, training, and product security. He is an active contributor to the global cybersecurity community, leads outreach initiatives for the DEF CON Car Hacking Village, and plays a key role in raising awareness about vehicle security risks.
Cyber criminals possibly linked with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been found using GitHub as a C2 infrastructure in multi-stage campaigns attacking organizations in South Korea.
The operation chain involves hidden Windows shortcut (LNK) files that work as a beginning point to deploy a fake PDF document and a PowerShell script that triggers another attack. Experts believe that these LNK files are circulated through phishing emails.
Once the payloads are downloaded, the victim is shown as the PDF document, while the harmful PowerShell script operates covertly in the background.
The PowerShell script does checks to avoid analysis by looking for running processes associated with machines, forensic tools, and debuggers.
If successful, it retrieves a Visual Basic Script (VBScript) and builds persistence through a scheduled task that activates the PowerShell payload every 30 minutes in a covert window to escape security.
This allows the PowerShell script to deploy automatically after every system reboot. “Unlike previous attack chains that progressed from LNK-dropped BAT scripts to shellcode, this case confirms the use of newly developed dropper and downloader malware to deliver shellcode and the ROKRAT payload,” S2W reported.
The PowerShell script then classifies the attacked host, saves the response to a log file, and extracts it to a GitHub repository made under the account “motoralis” via a hard-coded access token. Few of the GitHub accounts made as part of the campaign consist of “Pigresy80,” "pandora0009”, “brandonleeodd93-blip” and “God0808RAMA.”
After this, the script parses a particular file in the same GitHub repository to get more instructions or modules, therefore letting the threat actor to exploit the trust built with a platform such as GitHub to gain trust and build persistence over the compromised host.
According to Fortnet, LNK files were used in previous campaign iterations to propagate malware families such as Xeno RAT. Notably, last year, ENKI and Trellix demonstrated the usage of GitHub C2 to distribute Xeno RAT and its version MoonPeak.
Kimsuky, a North Korean state-sponsored organization, was blamed for these assaults. Instead of depending on complex custom malware, the threat actor uses native Windows tools for deployment, evasion, and persistence. By minimizing the use of dropped PE files and leveraging LolBins, the attacker can target a broad audience with a low detection rate,” said researcher Cara Lin.
A cyber operation believed to be linked to Iranian threat actors has been identified targeting Microsoft 365 environments, with a primary focus on organizations in Israel and the United Arab Emirates. The activity comes amid ongoing tensions in the Middle East and is still considered active.
According to research from Check Point, the campaign was carried out in three separate waves on March 3, March 13, and March 23, 2026. More than 300 organizations in Israel and over 25 in the U.A.E. were affected. Investigators also observed limited targeting in Europe, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia.
The attackers focused on cloud-based systems used across a wide range of sectors, including government bodies, municipalities, transportation services, energy infrastructure, technology firms, and private companies. This broad targeting indicates an effort to access both public-sector systems and critical commercial operations.
The primary method used in the campaign is known as password spraying. In this technique, attackers attempt a small number of commonly used passwords across many accounts instead of repeatedly targeting a single account. This approach increases the chances of finding weak credentials while avoiding detection systems such as account lockouts or rate-limiting controls.
Security researchers noted that similar techniques have previously been associated with Iranian groups such as Peach Sandstorm and Gray Sandstorm. The current activity appears to follow a structured sequence. It begins with large-scale scanning and password attempts routed through Tor exit nodes to conceal the origin of the traffic. This is followed by login attempts, and in successful cases, the extraction of sensitive data, including email content from compromised accounts.
Analysis of Microsoft 365 logs revealed patterns consistent with earlier operations attributed to Gray Sandstorm. Investigators observed the use of red-team style tools and infrastructure, as well as commercial VPN services linked to hosting providers previously associated with Iran-linked cyber activity in the region.
To reduce risk, organizations are advised to monitor sign-in activity for unusual patterns, restrict authentication based on geographic conditions, enforce multi-factor authentication for all users, and enable detailed audit logs to support investigation in the event of a breach.
Renewed Activity from Pay2Key Ransomware Operation
In a related development, a U.S.-based healthcare organization was targeted in late February 2026 by Pay2Key, an Iran-linked ransomware group with connections to a broader threat cluster known by multiple aliases. The group operates under a ransomware-as-a-service model and was first identified in 2020.
The version used in this attack represents an upgrade from campaigns observed in July 2025, incorporating improved techniques for evasion, execution, and anti-forensic activity. Reports from Beazley Security and Halcyon indicate that no data was exfiltrated in this instance, marking a shift away from the group’s earlier double-extortion strategy.
The intrusion is believed to have begun through an unknown access point. Attackers then used legitimate remote access software such as TeamViewer to establish a foothold. From there, they harvested credentials to move laterally across the network, disabled Microsoft Defender Antivirus by falsely indicating that another antivirus solution was active, and interfered with system recovery processes. The attackers then deployed ransomware, issued a ransom note, and cleared logs to conceal their activity.
Notably, logs were deleted at the end of the attack rather than at the beginning, ensuring that even the ransomware’s own actions were removed, making forensic analysis more difficult.
The group has also adjusted its affiliate model, offering up to 80 percent of ransom payments, compared to 70 percent previously, particularly for attacks aligned with geopolitical objectives. In addition, a Linux variant of the ransomware has been identified in the wild. This version is configuration-driven, requires root-level access to execute, and is designed to navigate file systems, classify storage mounts, and encrypt data using the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm in either full or partial modes.
Before encryption begins, the malware weakens system defenses by stopping services, terminating processes, disabling security frameworks such as SELinux and AppArmor, and setting up a scheduled task to execute after system reboot. These steps allow the ransomware to run more efficiently and persist even after restarts.
Further developments point to coordination among pro-Iranian cyber actors. In March 2026, operators associated with another ransomware strain encouraged affiliates to adopt an alternative tool known as Baqiyat 313 Locker, also referred to as BQTLock, due to a surge in participation requests. This ransomware, which operates with pro-Palestinian motives, has been used in attacks targeting the U.A.E., the United States, and Israel since July 2025.
Cybersecurity experts note that Iran has a long history of using cyber operations as a response to political tensions. Increasingly, ransomware is being integrated into these efforts, blurring the line between financially motivated cybercrime and state-aligned cyber activity. Organizations need to adopt continuous monitoring, strong authentication measures, and proactive defense strategies to counter emerging threats.
India plans to change its financial landscape as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) brings new security measures for all electronic payments. The new rules take effect on 1 April 2026. Every digital payment will be verified through a compulsory two-factor authentication process. The new rule aims to address the growing number of cybercrimes and phishing campaigns that have infiltrated India’s mobile wallets and UPI. Traditionally, security relied on text messages, but now, it has started adopting a versatile security model. The regulators are trying to stay ahead of threat actors and scammers.
The new directive mandates that at least one of the two authentication factors must be dynamic. The authentication has to be generated particularly for a single transaction and cannot be used twice. Fintech providers and banks can now freely choose from a variety of ways, such as hardware tokens, biometrics, and device binding. This shift highlights a departure from the traditional era, where OTPs via SMS were the main line of defence.
To make security convenient, banks will follow a risk-based approach.
Low-risk: Payments from authorized devices or standard small transactions will be quick and seamless.
High-risk: Big payments or transactions from new devices may prompt further authentication steps.
The framework with “RBI’s new digital payment security controls coming into force represent a significant recalibration of India’s authentication framework – from a prescriptive OTP-based regime to a more principle-driven, risk-based standard,” experts said.
The RBI no longer manages the particular technology used for verification. Currently, it focuses more on the security of the outcome.
The technology-neutral stance permits financial institutions to use sophisticated solutions like passkeys or facial recognition without requiring frequent regulatory notifications. The central bank will follow the principle-driven practice by boosting innovation while holding strict compliance. According to experts, “By recognising biometrics, device-binding and adaptive authentication, RBI has created interpretive flexibility for regulated entities, while retaining supervisory oversight through outcome-based compliance.”
The RBI has increased accountability standards, making banks and payment companies more accountable for maintaining safe systems.
Institutions may be obliged to reimburse users in situations when fraud results from system malfunctions or errors, which could expedite the resolution of grievances.
The goal of these regulations is to expedite the resolution of complaints pertaining to fraud.
Malware that can automatically spread between systems, commonly referred to as worms, has long been a recurring threat in cybersecurity. What makes the latest campaign unusual is not just its ability to propagate, but the decision by its operators to deliberately destroy systems in a specific region. In this case, machines located in Iran are being targeted for complete data erasure, alongside the use of an unconventional control architecture.
The activity has been linked to a relatively new group known as TeamPCP. The group first appeared in reporting late last year after compromising widely used infrastructure tools such as Docker, Kubernetes, Redis, and Next.js. Its earlier operations appeared focused on assembling a large network of compromised systems that could function as proxies. Such infrastructure is typically valuable for conducting ransomware attacks, extortion campaigns, or other financially driven operations, either by the group itself or by third parties.
The latest version of its malware, referred to as CanisterWorm, introduces behavior that diverges from this profit-oriented pattern. Once inside a system, the malware checks the device’s configured time zone to infer its geographic location. If the system is identified as being in Iran, the malware immediately executes destructive commands. In Kubernetes environments, this results in the deletion of all nodes within a cluster, effectively dismantling the entire deployment. On standard virtual machines, the malware runs a command that recursively deletes all files on the system, leaving it unusable. If the system is not located in Iran, the malware continues to operate as a traditional worm, maintaining persistence and spreading further.
The decision to destroy infected machines has raised questions among researchers, as disabling systems reduces their value for sustained exploitation. In comments reported by KrebsOnSecurity, Charlie Eriksen of Aikido Security suggested that the action may be intended as a demonstration of capability rather than a financially motivated move. He also indicated that the group may have access to a much larger pool of compromised systems than those directly impacted in this campaign.
The attack chain appears to have begun over a recent weekend, starting with the compromise of Trivy, an open-source vulnerability scanning tool frequently used in software development pipelines. By gaining access to publishing credentials associated with Node.js packages that depend on Trivy, the attackers were able to inject malicious code into the npm ecosystem. This allowed the malware to spread further as developers unknowingly installed compromised packages. Once executed, the malware deployed multiple background processes designed to resemble legitimate system services, reducing the likelihood of detection.
A key technical aspect of this campaign lies in how it is controlled. Instead of relying on conventional command-and-control servers, the operators used a decentralized approach by hosting instructions on the Internet Computer Project. Specifically, they utilized a canister, which functions as a smart contract containing both executable code and stored data. Because this infrastructure is distributed across a blockchain network, it is significantly more resistant to disruption than traditional centralized servers.
The Internet Computer Project operates differently from widely known blockchain systems such as Bitcoin or Ethereum. Participation requires node operators to undergo identity verification and provide substantial computing resources. Estimates suggest the network includes around 1,400 machines, with roughly half actively participating at any given time, distributed across more than 100 providers in 34 countries.
The platform’s governance model adds another layer of complexity. Canisters are typically controlled only by their creators, and while the network allows reports of malicious use, any action to disable such components requires a vote with a high approval threshold. This structure is designed to prevent arbitrary or politically motivated shutdowns, but it also makes rapid response to abuse more difficult.
Following public disclosure of the campaign, there are indications that the malicious canister may have been temporarily disabled by its operators. However, due to the design of the system, it can be reactivated at any time. As a result, the most effective defensive measure currently available is to block network-level access to the associated infrastructure.
This campaign reflects a convergence of several developing threat trends. It combines a software supply chain compromise through npm packages, selective targeting based on inferred geographic location, and the use of decentralized technologies for operational control. Together, these elements underline how attackers are expanding both their technical methods and their strategic objectives, increasing the complexity of detection and response for organizations worldwide.
After the U.S and Israel’s “pre-emptive” strikes against Iran last month, research firm Kpler found vessels in the Persian Gulf going off course. The location data from ships in the Gulf showed vessels maneuvering over land and taking sharp turns in polygonal directions. Disruptions to location-based features have increased across the Middle East. This impacts motorists, aircraft, and mariners.
These disturbances have highlighted major flaws in the GPS. GPS is an American-made system now similar to satellite navigation. For a long time, Kpler and other firms have discovered thousands of instances of oil vessels in the Persian Gulf disrupting the onboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals, a system used to trace vessels in transit, to escape sanctions on Iranian oil exports.
This tactic is called spoofing; the manipulation of location signals permits vessels to hide their activities. Hackers have used this tool to hide their operations.
Since the start of attacks in the Middle East, GPS spoofing in the Persian Gulf has increased. The maritime intelligence agency Windward found over 1,100 different vessels in the Gulf facing AIS manipulation.
The extra interference with satellite navigation signals in the region comes from Gulf states trying to defend against missile and drone strikes on critical infrastructure by compromising the onboard navigational systems of enemy drones and missiles.
These disruptions are being installed as defensive actions in modern warfare.
Aircraft have appeared to have traveled in unpredictable, wave-like patterns due to interference; food delivery riders have also appeared off the coast of Dubai due to failed GPS systems on land.
According to Lisa Dyer, executive director of the GPS Innovation Alliance, the region's ongoing jamming and spoofing activity also raises serious public safety issues.
Foreign-flagged ships from nations like China and India are still allowed to pass via the Persian Gulf, despite the fact that the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has drastically decreased shipping activity.
Iranian strikes have persisted despite widespread meddling throughout the region, raising questions about the origins of Iran's military prowess.
The apparent accuracy of Iranian strikes has also been linked to the use of China's BeiDou, according to other analysts reported in sources such as Al Jazeera.
For targeting, missiles and drones frequently combine satellite-based navigation systems with other systems, such as inertial navigation capabilities, which function independently of satellite-based signals.