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319 Chrome Extensions Have Been Quietly Routing Your Searches Through Private Servers for Years

 




For roughly a decade, a cluster of Chrome browser extensions has been siphoning users' search queries through private servers before delivering results, letting their operators collect advertising revenue on every search conducted. Security firm Socket has identified 319 such extensions that accumulated 13.4 million installs, many of which remained on the Chrome Web Store through a deliberate distribution strategy designed to avoid scrutiny.

The report, led by Socket researcher John Tuckner, builds on an earlier April 2025 finding of 57 extensions affecting around 6 million users. The latest analysis added 264 more extensions tied to 8.7 million additional installs, pushing the total picture into one of the more crucial browser-based surveillance operations found in recent years.


An Intentionally Simple Design

What makes this operation technically notable is how little code these extensions actually contain. Many of them are nearly empty. No background scripts, no content scripts, and in some cases just a manifest file and an icon. Rather than writing code to intercept traffic, the operators exploited a legitimate Chrome feature called `chrome_settings_overrides`, which allows extensions to replace a browser's default search provider. That single setting is enough to redirect every search a user types directly through the operators' own proxy servers.

Chrome does display a prompt when an extension tries to change the default search engine. But that prompt does not explain that searches will pass through the operator's infrastructure before reaching any search engine. Users who accepted the installation were effectively agreeing to have their queries logged without being told that was happening.

Searches typically end up at Bing or Yahoo. The operators collect referral payments from both platforms under syndication partner IDs, earning a cut every time a user clicks an ad in those results. Researchers also suggested the proxy layer may allow operators to verify that their payments match the actual volume of referrals they're sending.


Unlisted and Promoted Through Ads

None of these extensions appeared in Chrome Web Store search results. The operators used the store's "unlisted" feature, which makes an extension accessible only through a direct link. This meant standard browsing of the Web Store would never surface them. Instead, users encountered them through pop-over and pop-under advertising on other websites, where the extensions were promoted as PDF converters, manual finders, safe search tools, or AI-powered search assistants.

That promotional pathway explains why most users had no idea what they were installing or who made it.


Two Groups Dominate

Of the 319 extensions, about 200 were tied to operators Socket could identify. The remaining 119, covering roughly 7.8 million users, have unknown operators. Two clusters account for the most reach.

The largest is a group Socket calls "SecuryBrowse," which includes 58 extensions and around 4.9 million users. Its extensions carry names like Fire Shield, Securify, and WatchTower, all framed around the idea of keeping users safer online. The second-largest is a cluster tied to 37 extensions and approximately 2.2 million users, promoted through an ad network called Bidbrain.

Socket says the activity has been running continuously since at least 2016, with new domains and luring techniques appearing quickly after takedowns, making it difficult to fully eradicate.


Where Searches Can End Up

Beyond the ad revenue angle, the proxy-based architecture creates a risk that Socket was careful to describe as theoretical rather than confirmed. Because operators control the redirect in real time, they could send users to phishing pages or sites pushing malicious downloads based on specific search terms or the user's location. No such behavior was observed in the extensions studied.

But testing on one extension, Predator Search, showed how unpredictable the destination can be even without malicious intent. Six identical searches made in sequence reached four different endpoints, including Yahoo, a landing page on searchlio.net, a chain through searchtosearch.com to mcftink.com, and a Cloudflare error page. As Tuckner put it: "The extension never changed; the proxy chose each destination as the search came in."


How to Check Your Browser

Most of the flagged extensions had already been removed from the Chrome Web Store by the time Socket published its findings. Google did not respond to requests for comment from multiple outlets covering the story.

For anyone who wants to review their current setup, Chrome's extension manager is reachable through the three-dot menu under Extensions and then Manage Extensions. Any extension that is unfamiliar or no longer needed can be removed from that screen. Separately, checking the default search engine under Chrome's Search Engine settings will show whether any extension has swapped it out. If an unexpected provider is listed there, changing it back will also help identify whether something altered the browser's configuration.



Drupal Patches Critical RCE Flaw, Urges Immediate Updates

 

Drupal has released urgent security updates after patching a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability that could allow attackers to take control of vulnerable websites. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-132165, affects Drupal’s core installer and can potentially be exploited by unauthenticated users under specific conditions. Drupal is widely used by government bodies, universities, major research institutions, media organisations and large enterprises, often across complex multi-site installations. That broad deployment makes the vulnerability particularly concerning for organisations that manage sensitive data or operate high-traffic public websites. 

The vulnerability exists in Drupal’s install.php file, which is used to set up a new Drupal installation. Under certain conditions, an attacker can use the installer to attempt to reinstall Drupal, potentially leading to a full site takeover or remote code execution. Drupal’s security team said some attack paths are mitigated when the web server cannot write to, or change permissions on, the settings.php configuration file. However, that protection is not guaranteed across all hosting environments, making prompt patching essential. The issue was discovered by Anthropic’s OSS Scanner and has been rated critical because it can be exploited by anonymous users.

Administrators should update immediately to Drupal 10.6.22, 11.3.22, or 11.4.13. Sites using the paid Drupal Steward web application firewall are already protected against known attack vectors, but Drupal still recommends upgrading because additional attack paths may emerge. Organisations unable to update immediately should block external access to /core/install.php through their web-server configuration or the .htaccess file in the web root. This temporary measure reduces exposure while a full upgrade is scheduled. Security teams should also identify all exposed Drupal installations, prioritise internet-facing systems, and review server logs for suspicious requests to the installer endpoint.

Drupal also patched a separate moderately critical gadget-chain vulnerability, CVE-2026-132166, which could allow administrators to achieve RCE if the application deserialises untrusted data through another flaw. Although this second issue requires an administrator account, it still represents a serious risk in environments where privileged accounts may be compromised or misused. The company warned that exploits may be developed “within hours or days,” reflecting the speed at which attackers often weaponise critical web-application vulnerabilities. This warning is especially relevant because Drupal has previously disclosed actively exploited flaws, including an SQL injection issue and a Commerce Core access-bypass vulnerability. 

For organisations running Drupal, the immediate priority is clear: apply the available security releases, restrict installer access where patching is delayed, and monitor logs for suspicious activity. CISA has flagged five Drupal vulnerabilities as exploited in the wild since 2021, underlining why delayed patching can leave organisations exposed to real attacks rather than theoretical risks. A fast, coordinated response—covering updates, access restrictions, logging and incident monitoring—can substantially reduce the likelihood that this critical RCE flaw is exploited before attackers develop working exploit chains.

China-Linked Hackers Exploit VMware vCenter Zero-Day to Steal Data

 

A China-linked hacking group, previously named UNC5221, and now known as Armory Castle, has exploited a zero-day vulnerability in VMware vCenter Server to gain administrative privileges and exfiltrate data. 

The vulnerability, which has been assigned the identifier CVE-2026-123890, has a CVSS score of 9.8 and affects VMware Directory Service. It can be exploited by unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication by leveraging a vulnerability in SRP-6a session keys in DCE/RPC. If exploited, attackers can gain administrative privileges within the system, allowing them to run commands and access sensitive files. 

Within the attack, the hackers used a custom tool written in Golang known as BONESAW. This can be used to extract database files, take control of VMware’s Security Token Service, and establish admin accounts for Single Sign-On. As part of a wider attack, the same threat actors exploited a zero-day (CVE-2026-102764) within BeyondTrust Remote Support. 

Once inside the system, they performed reconnaissance, established persistence, and deployed a proxy tunneling tool (BARECLAW). From here, they moved into an internal Linux appliance and increased their access. Several other tools were used in the attack. These included SLIMSAVAGE, CAGEMATCH (web shells), SAWSNAKE (to bypass SAML authentication), BEARBONES (to collect plaintext credentials), and LAZYBONES (backdoor using Slack for C2). 

The tools allowed the threat actors to run commands, masquerade as users, persist within systems and move between systems. Once inside vCenter, the threat actors set up a local admin account, enabled SSH access, and investigated ESXi file systems. They mounted virtual machine storage volumes, and added an SSH key to the root account. Data was collected, and stored and passed through the compromised Remote Support appliance for later exfiltration. 

The BONESAW binary had a build date of July 13 2026, which may suggest that the threat actors were aware of the vulnerability prior to it being made public. However, this information can be changed, and does not confirm at what point in time the tool was developed. On 19th November 2026, Broadcom released patches for affected products. 

These include VMware vCenter, Cloud Foundation, vSphere Foundation, and Telco Cloud. Patches should be applied to prevent exploitation. This is the second zero-day vulnerability exploited by Armory Castle in 2026. Previously, in CVE-2026-41709, the group exploited a poor logging vulnerability within VMware ESX to make their actions less visible. 

In this attack, it can be seen that Armory Castle can use zero-day vulnerabilities in combination with bespoke malware to compromise enterprise infrastructure.

FastUnlock Windows Vulnerability Allows Code Execution from the Lock Screen


Using a newly disclosed Windows zero-day vulnerability, dubbed FastUnlock, individuals with physical access to a locked computer can launch programs without entering valid login information. It bypasses certain lock screen restrictions by exploiting Windows' Narrator screen reader and Microsoft account recovery options. There has been no security update from Microsoft that addresses the issue. 

The vulnerability was discovered on November 19 by a security researcher operating under many aliases, including Nightmare Eclipse and MSNightmare. On GitHub, the researcher provided proof-of-concept demonstrations that illustrated how the technique could allow users access to Windows systems without requiring them to complete a normal login process.

ThreatLocker, an endpoint security firm, independently tested the method on the same day and confirmed that it is effective. FastUnlock does not provide complete control over the compromised computer. Instead, successful exploitation allows programs to run under a restricted Windows account designated as WsiAccount that does not possess administrator privileges. Even so, the capability to execute programs from a locked session presents a security risk, particularly when devices are left unattended or become accessible to unauthorized individuals. 

To conduct the attack, physical access to the target computer and a Microsoft account are required. These accounts can be reached through the recovery options on the lock screen of the computer. Windows Narrator is used to facilitate this process, which is an accessibility feature that reads on-screen content aloud and assists users in navigating the operating system. 

Using an attacker's manipulation of the recovery environment's interface, an attacker may have access to system settings and components normally unavailable without authentication by manipulating its interface. A Windows 11 26H2 system with November security updates was used to demonstrate the technique. There has yet to be a comprehensive testing of other Windows versions, and an official list of affected versions has not yet been published. 

ThreatLocker however has confirmed that its independent testing was successful in gaining access to the restricted account and executing a program. Microsoft's built-in drive encryption technology BitLocker has also been cited as a concern by this technique. Even though BitLocker protects data stored on a device, its effectiveness against FastUnlock depends largely on how the drive is configured to unlock when the drive is powered on. 

Automatic TPM-based unlocking involves releasing the encryption key at boot time without the need for a separate PIN by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Thus, the drive may already be accessible when the Windows lock screen appears. Rather than cracking BitLocker encryption directly or retrieving its encryption keys, FastUnlock operates after the system has completed its normal startup process and unlocked the drive. 

The technical concern underlying FastUnlock is in how Windows handles accessibility features prior to requesting the authentication of users. A hidden background window that should not be accessible during a locked session has been accessed by the attack, allegedly by utilizing Narrator's ability to interact with system interfaces from the lock screen. In order to initiate the process, the researcher explained that the process begins by opening the Microsoft account recovery option and activating Narrator using a shortcut provided by Windows. 

By using keyboard navigation, an attacker is able to access Narrator's settings and open Windows Settings without logging in. Once there, changing the AutoPlay settings can cause a USB drive to open in File Explorer, enabling a program stored on the drive to be launched under the restricted WsiAccount context. Narrator's interface changes may have caused the underlying issue. 

Microsoft redesigned the accessibility feature without properly restricting its new interface to operate within the lock screen environment, according to the researcher. As a result of this, an inconsistency exists between protections meant to prevent unauthorized access and accessibility tools. However, the restricted account does not necessarily reflect the full extent of the potential impact. Earlier in November, the researcher revealed SignDrop, another zero-day privilege-escalation technique for Windows. 

Using both vulnerabilities together, the researcher claims that on systems that are susceptible to both flaws, access could be elevated beyond the WsiAccount privileges. For laptops using BitLocker's automatic TPM-based unlocking feature, FastUnlock is particularly concerning since physical access to an unattended computer may significantly increase the consequences of physical access. 

By bypassing the Windows sign-in screen once the drive is unlocked during startup, users may expose sensitive data that they expect encryption to protect. However, this technique does not constitute a remote attack, and its reported capabilities should not be construed as a complete compromise of all affected systems. 

In the absence of a patch or official assessment by Microsoft, the researcher's claims and independent testing remain significant references. In addition to being tested with Windows 11 26H2 version, FastUnlock is not confirmed to be compatible with Windows 10. It is also unknown whether FastUnlock has been used in active attack campaigns. It will be necessary for organizations and individuals to take additional precautions until Microsoft releases an official security update to reduce the risk posed by FastUnlock. 

As a result, physical security must be strengthened and additional authentication must be required before Windows devices can reach an unlocked operating environment. This is the most effective method. With BitLocker startup PIN enabled, in conjunction with TPM-based protection, an additional layer of security can be provided for systems running Windows 11 Pro, Enterprise or Education. This configuration requires a PIN before Windows starts and the encrypted drive becomes accessible as opposed to automatic TPM unlocking. 

Additionally, when carrying a device during travel or using it in a shared work environment, computers should be completely shut down or hibernated prior to being left unattended. Users of Windows 11 Home will have fewer choices due to the fact that its Device Encryption feature does not offer the same setup of startup PINs. It is therefore particularly important to keep laptops under physical supervision and to prevent unattended devices. 

Organizations may also consider restricting Narrator using tools such as Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to review application-control policies. The blocking of Narrator could result in adverse consequences for users who use accessibility features, making careful assessment prior to deployment essential. 

The research indicates that the USB-based execution route described in the study can also be reduced by disabling AutoPlay for removable media, although it should not be considered a complete fix. Chaotic Eclipse, also known as Abdelhamid Naceri, has previously disclosed vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Defender, BitLocker, and other Windows components as a result of this disclosure. 

The vulnerability of YellowKey, which had previously been related to BitLocker, was later assigned a CVE and addressed by Microsoft's security updates. Despite the requirement for physical access to FastUnlock, it remains a security concern rather than a verified actively exploited threat at present. 

Although remote exploitation is limited by the requirement for physical access, unattended laptops and poorly protected workstations may be vulnerable to cyberattacks since they can bypass normal sign-in barriers. Microsoft users and IT administrators should monitor official security advisories and apply patches as soon as they become available.

Cyberattack on Wellington IT Exposes Payee Information Across 40 Irish Credit Unions

 



A cybersecurity incident involving Belfast-based technology provider Wellington IT has exposed sensitive financial information associated with members of approximately 40 Irish credit unions, raising concerns about third-party security risks and delayed breach disclosures within the financial sector.

Wellington IT provides banking software and technology services to approximately 50 credit unions, including 43 institutions in Ireland. The company reportedly became the target of an attack that exploited an authorization vulnerability in its infrastructure, allowing an unauthorized actor to retrieve saved payee records from its CU Online platform.

Ireland's Minister of State with responsibility for Credit Unions, Robert Troy, confirmed to RTÉ that Wellington IT was the third-party service provider involved in the incident. Approximately 40 of Ireland's 172 credit unions are believed to have been affected.


Authorization Flaw Exploited Through Automated Requests

According to breach notifications reviewed by the Irish Examiner, Wellington IT informed affected credit unions that an automated script generated approximately five million requests between October 2 and October 4, 2026, exploiting an authorization flaw within its systems.

The requests reportedly originated from an automated client using valid member login credentials. The attacker subsequently accessed saved payee records without authorization.

However, the precise scope of the intrusion remains undetermined. Wellington IT acknowledged that the activity logs required to establish which individual records were requested and retrieved were unavailable. Consequently, the company cannot currently identify every affected member or verify the exact information accessed.

There is also a discrepancy in publicly reported activity figures. Irish League of Credit Unions CEO David Malone told RTÉ that approximately 1.4 million activities were attempted during the attack window. The five-million figure comes from Wellington IT's reported notification to customers. The difference has not yet been reconciled.

The incident reportedly went undetected as a data breach until November 15, when Wellington IT identified the potential compromise. Credit unions were notified on November 16, more than six weeks after the reported attack. Minister Troy criticized the delay, describing it as unacceptable and seeking an explanation from the provider.


Financial and Personal Information Potentially Exposed

At least six credit unions have independently acknowledged their involvement: Capital Credit Union, Phoenix Credit Union, St. Canice's Credit Union, First South Credit Union, Malahide Credit Union, and Limerick & District Credit Union.

The compromised information concerns saved payment beneficiaries rather than the account holders' own banking credentials. Depending on the records involved, exposed information may include:

  • Payee names and associated bank account names.
  • Nicknames assigned to saved beneficiaries.
  • International Bank Account Numbers (IBANs).
  • Bank Identifier Codes (BICs).
  • Bank account numbers and sort codes.
  • Payee addresses.
  • Payment references associated with saved beneficiaries.

The records could also establish which credit union member had saved a particular beneficiary within the online banking platform.

Importantly, the affected credit unions have indicated that members' passwords, PINs, payment card information, online banking credentials, account balances, and funds were not compromised.

Nevertheless, the exposed information creates opportunities for targeted social engineering. Attackers possessing legitimate payment details could impersonate credit union representatives, familiar beneficiaries, or financial service providers to convince members to disclose additional information or redirect legitimate payments.

Such attacks could involve fraudulent emails, text messages, and telephone calls containing accurate financial details to establish credibility.


Wellington IT Responds to the Incident

In a statement provided on November 19, Wellington IT CEO Colin Mitchell confirmed that the company had notified its credit union customers about a cybersecurity incident potentially involving information maintained within its CU Online platform.

Mitchell stated that the company had implemented measures to address the issue and engaged external cybersecurity specialists to investigate the incident and determine its full scope.

The investigation remains ongoing, with Wellington IT working alongside the Data Protection Commission (DPC), National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and Garda National Cyber Crime Bureau (GNCCB).

The company also stated that it is assisting affected credit unions in assessing potential exposure and meeting their regulatory obligations.


Regulatory Scrutiny and Third-Party Security Concerns

The incident has prompted scrutiny from Irish authorities, with the Data Protection Commission receiving multiple breach notifications from affected credit unions. The Central Bank of Ireland has also been notified, while the Department of Finance is engaging with relevant stakeholders.

Under Article 33 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), organizations must notify the relevant supervisory authority of qualifying personal data breaches without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of them. Data processors must also notify their controllers without undue delay after discovering a breach.

The incident additionally raises questions about third-party oversight within financial institutions. The Central Bank's credit union outsourcing guidance requires institutions to conduct appropriate due diligence, monitor service providers, and maintain controls addressing operational risks associated with outsourced activities.

Credit union members have been advised to remain particularly cautious about unexpected communications requesting payments, banking information, or changes to beneficiary details. Any suspicious communication should be verified directly with the relevant credit union.

While investigations have yet to establish the total number of affected individuals, the incident demonstrates how a vulnerability within a shared technology provider can expose information across multiple financial institutions.

Critical Cisco Expressway Vulnerability Exploited By Hackers Shortly After Public PoC Release

 

A Russian organisation was compromised via a vulnerability in Cisco Expressway. Shortly after public exploit code was published, attackers exploited this vulnerability to gain access to Internet facing systems within the organisation. Once in the network, attackers gained root access. Custom tools were then created to allow lateral movement within the network, and to search for sensitive data. 

Cisco Expressway is a collaboration gateway which allows remote employees, partners and third parties to access enterprise communications such as video calling, phone calling and instant messaging. As external users can connect to internal systems, vulnerabilities within these systems can pose a significant risk. The vulnerability was assigned the ID CVE-2026-76466, and has a CVSS score of 9.8. It allows unauthenticated attackers with network access to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. 

This affects Expressway Core and Expressway Edge systems, both in virtual and hardware appliance form. However, this is only applicable to systems which are in ‘cluster’ configurations. This vulnerability was disclosed by Cisco on 21st October 2026. It exists within the Expressway database service component and relates to cookies being stored persistently. If an attacker can gain access to these cookies, they can access the database service and execute certain remote procedure call commands. 

This allows command execution with root privileges within the underlying operating system. Cisco published a patched version of Expressway (X15.5.20). No workarounds are available. Customers using versions before X15 should upgrade to a patched version to resolve this vulnerability. Although Cisco’s initial advisory stated that there was no public announcement of exploit code or exploitation, exploit code was published on GitHub. The incident detailed by F6 occurred shortly after this exploit code was published. 

Attackers exploited two Internet facing Cisco Expressway systems running version X15.5.3. Attackers then laterally moved to two other cluster nodes within the internal network, using one compromised system. Once root access had been obtained, attackers began creating tools to allow lateral movement. Custom tools were created in Python to allow scanning of network infrastructure, discovery of Server Message Block (SMB) resources, and interacting with Microsoft SQL Server and Windows Remote Management (WinRM). 

The tools were also used to search GitLab repositories. This suggests attackers were attempting to find credentials or sensitive data within the system. Throughout the attack, F6 observed that attackers made changes to their scripts. Comments within the code, and descriptions of changes made within the scripts, suggest that an AI assistant may have been used to create/modify the tools. F6 has not identified which organisation was impacted, or linked this incident to any known threat actors. 

They have however provided some indicators of compromise (IPs and file paths) to assist defenders in investigating whether they may have been compromised. F6 also recommends checking the Erlang system log on Expressway systems for evidence of exploitation. If organisations cannot apply the patch immediately, F6 recommends limiting access to TCP ports 4371 and 4372 in the firewall. Only trusted cluster node IPs should be allowed to connect. This is not an officially recommended workaround from Cisco. In the long term, it is recommended to upgrade to a patched version.

Major Financial Firms Disclose Data Exposure Following Third-Party Security Breach


After a cyberattack on a third-party service provider, JPMorgan Chase, Visa, and Mastercard disclosed a customer data exposure incident. A spokesperson from each company stated on Thursday, November 19, that attackers gained access to limited customer information, including names and email addresses, stored by an external vendor. However, it is noted that their internal systems and payment networks have not been compromised. 

A preliminary investigation by JPMorgan Chase indicates that attackers accessed marketing-related information maintained by certain of the company's service providers. The exposed data may include customer names and email addresses. As a result of the incident, the bank has clarified that it did not impact its banking services and that customers' transactions were not disrupted. 

According to a spokesperson for the bank, affected customers will be contacted directly. Further assistance will also be provided, including complimentary credit monitoring services, where appropriate. Furthermore, the company clarified that the data exposure was unrelated to technical problems reported by some customers earlier in the week, which were caused by a software defect that affected the transaction processing process. 

According to Visa, the allegations are related to a security breach involving a third-party service provider in Asia-Pacific. The company maintained that its own infrastructure remained secure and that no payment-related information, including card numbers, had been accessed. Mastercard also confirmed that it had recently been made aware of an incident involving an external service provider. 

According to the company, a limited number of email addresses belonging to a small group of cardholders enrolled in a particular benefit program were exposed as a result of the breach. This information was classified by MasterCard as non-payment data and the payment network remained unaffected. The disclosures followed the announcement of the hacker group N0n's claim to responsibility on November 16, 2017. 

In its leak website, the group claims to have published files containing customer-related information related to all three financial institutions. There is rumored information that the attackers offered for download was accompanied by a list of three companies as organizations that had not paid. As a result of the incident, financial institutions are exposed to security risks associated with third-party service providers, particularly when external companies are involved in marketing activities and customer information management.

It is reported that the exposed data does not include payment credentials, but it is still possible to target targeted phishing campaigns and conduct social engineering attacks based on customer contact information. Especially within the financial services industry, where external providers often manage customer engagement, marketing campaigns and benefit programs, this incident has highlighted the risks associated with third-party data handling. 

The exposed information did not contain payment credentials, but the availability of customer contact information and email addresses could still provide attackers with an opportunity to commit targeted fraud. A sample of the alleged information has been published on a dark web leak site by the ransomware group N0n, who claims responsibility for the intrusion. 

In the material, according to cybersecurity firm SOCRadar, customer and employee email addresses are reported, along with some telephone numbers and postal codes for some records. However, no independent determination has been made regarding whether N0n was responsible for the attack or whether the published data is authentic. There was a reasonable probability that SOCRadar's available evidence suggests that the breach involved a third-party vendor and information related to marketing and cardholder benefits. 

According to the cybersecurity firm, targeted phishing is the most immediate concern for customers affected by this breach. In some cases, attackers may use exposed contact information to send phishing emails or messages impersonating JPMorgan, Visa or Mastercard, which may trick recipients into divulging information such as passwords, banking credentials, or other sensitive information. 

In most cases, attacks are carried out through social engineering rather than exploiting technical vulnerabilities in banking infrastructure. A fraudulent message can appear more credible if it uses legitimate customer details, thus making it difficult for recipients to differentiate genuine communications from malicious ones. 

The information may also be used to prepare follow-up scams, impersonate customer service representatives, and direct victims to fraudulent login pages. Additionally, the breach raises questions concerning the management of information shared with external suppliers by financial institutions. 

Vendor services such as customer communication, promotional campaigns, and loyalty programmes are frequently used by organizations, creating additional places for sensitive information to be protected. It is therefore possible to expose information related to several major companies through a security failure at one supplier, even if their internal networks remain secure.

Security specialists have also stressed how such incidents could negatively affect the reputation of the company. The financial institution itself is generally regarded as liable for protecting customers' information, regardless of whether compromised systems are the property of an external provider. This incident highlights the importance of performing rigorous vendor security assessments, limiting customer access to information, and strengthening authentication procedures to reduce identity-based fraud risks. This incident also emphasizes the importance of protecting personal contact information, especially telephone numbers and email addresses that can be used to perpetrate follow-up scams. 

Cybercriminals may use these details to impersonate banks, credit card providers, or customer support teams and send convincing messages to steal credentials and financial information by impersonating banks, card providers and customer service representatives. Whenever possible, customers are advised to be alert to emails, text messages, and telephone calls claiming to be from JPMorgan, Visa, or Mastercard, especially those requesting account details, passwords, or one-time verification codes. This breach also raises concerns regarding the increasing reliance on external service providers by financial institutions.

The outsourcing of marketing and customer engagement activities can increase operational efficiency, however it also increases security risks beyond the capabilities of the organization itself. Financial companies must ensure that vendors adhere to strict data protection policies, limit access to customer information, and maintain adequate safeguards to prevent unauthorised access to customer information. It is also essential to conduct regular security assessments of third-party systems and monitor them more closely in order to identify vulnerabilities before attackers can exploit them. 

There are still uncertainties regarding the extent of the incident, since the companies have not disclosed the identities of the affected service providers or the exact number of customers affected. Neither the authenticity of the leaked files nor the claims made by the N0n group have been independently verified. 

While the incident had significant consequences for numerous major financial institutions, it illustrates how a security breach at a single external supplier can result in severe data exposure risks, even in the case of secure core banking systems and payment systems.

Ukraine and FBI Arrest Ransomware Gang Linked to $40M Ransom

 

Ukrainian authorities, working with the FBI, have arrested four suspected members of an international ransomware organization allegedly responsible for extorting more than $40.5 million from at least 28 companies worldwide. The arrests followed a two-year joint investigation into a cybercrime network involving at least 27 people from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia, and other countries. Investigators believe the group was connected to a larger network of more than 60 members operating across eight jurisdictions, including former members of the notorious Conti ransomware gang. 

The organization targeted companies in oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, logistics, finance, and critical infrastructure. Before attacking, the suspects reportedly researched each victim’s finances, assets, employees, and IT weaknesses. They then stole sensitive corporate data, encrypted systems with ransomware, and demanded cryptocurrency payments, threatening to publish stolen information if victims refused to pay. According to Ukrainian police, the 28 identified companies paid more than $40.5 million in ransoms, or roughly UAH 1.8 billion. 

Court records cited in the report identify several alleged victims, including Warren Oil Company, Maxxis International-USA, Newpark Resources, and Quantum Health. In the Warren Oil attack, hackers allegedly copied 1.4 terabytes of data and received an 84.5 BTC ransom payment, worth about $5 million at the time. In another incident, the attackers initially demanded $10 million but ultimately received $5 million after negotiations. The report also links the group to the BlackSuit ransomware operation and the Chaos ransomware strain, although authorities have not confirmed the arrested suspects’ individual affiliations. 

A particularly concerning element of the operation was its use of artificial intelligence to impersonate IT support staff. The suspects allegedly used a custom platform that generated AI voice messages and placed fraudulent calls to employees, posing as technical-support personnel. Workers were persuaded to reveal login credentials or install remote-access software such as TeamViewer and AnyDesk. In one case, an attacker reportedly kept an employee on the phone while another accessed the company’s systems, ending the call only after confirming the breach. The group also used fake corporate VPN pages and spoofed phone numbers to obtain credentials and two-factor authentication codes. 

Ukrainian police carried out 66 simultaneous searches across Kyiv and 11 regions, seizing computers, mobile phones, bank cards, nearly $370,000 in cash, and €20,000. Four alleged key members have been formally notified of suspicion and remain in custody, facing charges related to participation in a criminal organization and unauthorized interference with information systems. If convicted, they could receive up to 15 years in prison. The investigation remains ongoing as authorities work to identify additional members of the network and determine their involvement in other cyberattacks.

Docker Hub Leaked Cloud Credentials Exploited Within 8 Seconds of Image Publication

 



Attackers are extracting and exploiting exposed cloud credentials from publicly accessible Docker images within seconds of their publication, according to a four-month experiment conducted by researchers at Stony Brook University. The fastest observed exploitation occurred just 7.86 seconds after an image containing a planted AWS key was uploaded to Docker Hub.

Researchers Billy Tsouvalas and Nick Nikiforakis investigated the activity by publishing 300 instrumented honeypot images across eight public container registries. The experiment examined how quickly automated scanners discover credentials embedded in container images and whether they subsequently attempt to use them.

Conducted over four months, the study involved planting AWS, OpenAI, and Anthropic API keys alongside decoy SSH credentials and database passwords. The researchers also deployed monitoring mechanisms designed to detect different interactions with their images, including image builds, container execution, and shell access.

The findings, presented at the 2026 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), revealed extensive automated credential harvesting.


AWS Credentials Exploited Within Seconds

Across the experiment, the researchers recorded more than 75,000 image pulls. The planted AWS credentials alone attracted over 140,000 API requests originating from approximately 5,000 unique IP addresses.

The observed requests ranged from preliminary authentication checks to attempts to enumerate available cloud resources. Some interactions progressed further, indicating attempts to consume resources using the exposed credentials.

The earliest recorded AWS API request occurred just 7.86 seconds after an image was published on Docker Hub. The median time between publication and the first API request was 51.19 seconds. Furthermore, all 100 planted AWS keys had been accessed within 15 minutes of publication.

The OpenAI and Anthropic credentials experienced similar abuse. Automated activity rapidly consumed the balances associated with the researchers' test accounts, demonstrating that exposed AI service tokens can also become targets for immediate financial exploitation.

Docker Hub generated almost all observed AWS credential activity, although the researchers also recorded instances of abuse involving Harbor, another container registry included in the experiment.


Automated Scanners Extract Credentials Without Running Containers

The researchers collectively referred to the automated scanning activity as "ContainerBots." However, the designation does not establish that all observed scanners belonged to one threat actor or operated through a centrally coordinated infrastructure.

An important finding concerned how these bots accessed the exposed credentials.

Monitoring systems rarely detected attempts to execute the planted containers, suggesting that attackers generally did not need to run an image to retrieve its contents. Instead, they relied on static inspection techniques, including unpacking image layers and querying registry APIs to retrieve filesystem contents.

This approach allows scanners to examine files stored within container images without launching the applications themselves.

Container images package application code, dependencies, configuration files, and other resources into reusable layers. Consequently, credentials accidentally included during image creation can remain accessible through those layers even when developers do not intend to distribute them.

The researchers explained that their observations overwhelmingly involved static analysis rather than actual container execution.


Docker Hub Secret Exposure Is an Established Problem

The latest findings add to previous research documenting widespread credential exposure across public container repositories.

In December 2025, researchers at cybersecurity company Flare identified 10,456 Docker Hub images containing exposed secrets. These included approximately 4,000 AI-related API keys, alongside credentials capable of providing access to cloud environments, databases, Git repositories, and CI/CD infrastructure.

An earlier 2023 investigation involving 337,171 Docker images identified 52,107 valid private keys and 3,158 distinct API secrets across 28,621 images.

Such exposures create substantial remediation challenges. Removing an affected image or deleting a credential from its configuration does not invalidate copies already retrieved by automated scanners. Organizations must revoke compromised credentials, issue replacements, examine access logs, and assess whether unauthorized access occurred.


Researchers Recommend Additional Docker Hub Defenses

Tsouvalas and Nikiforakis recommend introducing automated secret detection before container images become publicly accessible. Docker Hub could scan uploaded images for embedded credentials and notify publishers when potentially sensitive information is discovered.

They also propose restricting or rate-limiting access to Docker Hub's public feed of recently published or updated images, making large-scale automated collection more difficult.

The researchers told BleepingComputer that they submitted their findings and the complete research paper to Docker in May 2026. Although the company acknowledged receiving the disclosure, they reportedly received no subsequent response.

A smaller experiment conducted in August to determine whether Docker had introduced additional protections did not identify any changes.

Docker's existing documentation already recommends using BuildKit secret mounts rather than passing credentials through Dockerfile "ARG" or "ENV" instructions, which can leave sensitive information in image contents. Secret mounts make credentials temporarily available during specific build operations without automatically persisting them in the resulting image.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in its SP 800-190 Application Container Security Guide, similarly recommends keeping secrets outside container images and supplying them dynamically when required.

The research demonstrates that publishing an image containing an active credential can expose it to automated collection almost immediately. Developers and organizations should therefore treat any credential embedded in a publicly accessible image as compromised, revoke it promptly, and ensure that replacement credentials are not retained in subsequent image layers.

Apache Roller RCE Vulnerability Actively Exploited in Attacks

 

Apache has issued an urgent warning for administrators running Apache Roller after confirming that attackers are actively exploiting a critical remote code execution flaw. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-129448, affects Roller versions 4.0.0 through 6.1.4 and allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable server. Apache has released Roller 6.1.6 to address the issue, and organizations that cannot update immediately are being urged to apply temporary mitigation steps. 

The flaw affects Apache Roller, an open-source, Java-based group-blogging server. Although it has a smaller user base than mainstream content-management systems, the issue is serious because it can give attackers full control over affected servers. The vulnerability involves the deserialization of untrusted data through the platform’s XML-RPC endpoint. 

Roller accepts vendor extension types and deserializes them before authenticating the requester, allowing an attacker to send malicious data that the server processes before checking whether the sender is authorized. This unsafe sequence can lead to arbitrary code execution, enabling attackers to run commands, install malware, steal data, or use the compromised server for further attacks. 

Apache has confirmed that CVE-2026-129448 is being exploited in the wild, although it has not disclosed details about the attackers, the scale of the campaign, or how many systems have already been compromised. The company also noted that the flaw is the same underlying issue as CVE-2026-82384, which had previously listed only Apache Roller 6.1.5 as affected. The confirmation of active exploitation raises the urgency considerably. Organizations running Roller should assume that internet-facing instances may be targeted and should prioritize patching over routine maintenance. 

The most effective response is to upgrade to Apache Roller 6.1.6 or later. The updated release disables the vulnerable extension types and rejects malicious XML-RPC requests after turning off the XML-RPC feature, closing the path attackers are using to exploit the flaw. Administrators who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by setting enabledForExtensions to false in WEB-INF/web.xml, removing the /roller-services/xmlrpc servlet mapping, and restarting Roller. These steps block the vulnerable functionality while a permanent update is prepared.

Apache specifically warns that disabling XML-RPC through the administration interface is not enough on older versions, because affected Roller builds deserialize incoming requests before checking whether the XML-RPC setting has been turned off. This means an administrator may believe the service is disabled while the server remains exploitable. 

The Roller flaw arrives amid a broader run of Apache security issues, including a recent critical vulnerability in the HTTP/2 module of Apache HTTP Server that could also allow unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution. Since November 2021, CISA has added 41 Apache flaws to its catalog of vulnerabilities exploited in the wild, and eight of those have also been abused by ransomware gangs. Organizations should inventory their systems, identify any Roller installations, and treat this vulnerability as an immediate security priority.

How Do Spam Callers Get Your Phone Number? The Hidden Sources Behind Unwanted Calls

Many smartphone users are experiencing unwanted calls from unknown numbers, ranging from promotional messages and automated marketing calls to fraudster scams designed to steal money and personal information. 

The majority of calls originate from databases containing telephone numbers collected from online and offline sources, although some are generated by random dialing systems. There is a growing market for the collection, organization, and sharing of personal information among businesses and third parties as consumer information becomes increasingly valuable. 

When users register on a website, complete online forms, install mobile applications, shop online, or enter promotional contests, you can reveal your contact information to several organizations. There is also the possibility that this information may circulate through third-party data-sharing arrangements or be made available following a data breach. 

As one of the lesser-known players in this ecosystem, data brokers are able to collect information from multiple sources and create consumer profiles that can then be sold to advertisers, marketing firms, and other interested parties. It is therefore possible to reach businesses and individuals through a number shared for ordinary services or registrations without any direct connection to the original source, for example. Cybercriminals can use such information to conduct targeted spam campaigns, impersonation scams, and financial fraud. 

How Phone Numbers Find Their Way Into Spam Lists

The majority of spam calls are not the result of stolen databases. Some are reached using automated dialing systems that generate and call random combinations, while others are acquired from publicly available records, such as business directories, property documents, and online listings. 

The commercial distribution of consumer information remains an important source of unwanted phone numbers, however. A number of methods are commonly employed to collect phone numbers, including registration forms, online purchases, loyalty programs, surveys, promotional offers, and account sign-ups. 

If a user provides their contact information, the company may share it with advertising partners or other third parties in accordance with the company's data sharing policy. There are instances where consent is buried in lengthy terms and conditions or presented in confusing opt-in settings, causing confusion about where the information will end up. As part of this process, data brokers play a key role. They combine information gathered from various sources including websites, public records, purchase histories, social media activity, and commercial databases to create consumer profiles. 

Marketing agencies, businesses, and other organizations can purchase or license the resulting lists. Despite the fact that most of this activity occurs within the advertising industry, poorly controlled data-sharing practices can also make contact information available to scammers. It is also possible to expose customer information through breaches of security and phishing attacks. 

When a security breach occurs, customer records may include telephone numbers, names, email addresses, and other personal information when an online service suffers a security incident. As an alternative to using legitimate websites, cybercriminals can also retrieve information through the use of fake job advertisements, fake login pages, and malicious applications. 

By using automated tools known as web scrapers, some phone numbers can also be harvested directly from websites and social media platforms. Once a number has been scanned and extracted in bulk, it can be added to calling lists or combined with other personal information to make fraudulent calls appear more convincing. 

Although it is important to distinguish between legitimate data collection and criminal activity, these two concepts can intersect when personal information is shared widely, inadequately protected, or exposed by security flaws. 

Ultimately, a number that was originally provided to register for a shopping account or service may become part of a database that is used to sell unsolicited information or perpetrate targeted scams. 

How to Keep a Phone Number Away From Spammers

A person can minimize their chances of receiving unwanted calls and targeted scams by limiting the exposure of their personal contact information, even though preventing every spam call may not be possible. The first step to preventing unwanted calls and targeted scams is to be selective when sharing personal contact information. It is important to be cautious when dealing with unfamiliar websites, suspicious registration pages, fraudulent job portals, and promotional offers requesting unnecessary personal information. 

When submitting information to a website, you should check the reputation and privacy policies to identify questionable services. Public exposure should also be considered. It is important to remove phone numbers from public social media profiles, online directories, and other platforms whenever possible. Mobile users should review application permissions on a regular basis, particularly access to contact information, location, photographs, and other personal information. 

A user can revoke unnecessary permissions through the privacy settings on Android and iOS devices. Reviewing account privacy options as well as avoiding unnecessary third party sign-ups can also help limit data sharing. For users already receiving frequent unwanted calls, built-in spam detection features and call-blocking services can assist in filtering out suspicious numbers. 

In order to avoid answering unknown calls immediately, you can place them into voicemail. It is important to avoid giving passwords, banking information, OTPs, or remote access to devices to suspicious callers, regardless of their claim to represent a trustworthy organization. A user should also check whether their personal information has been exposed in known data breaches. 

Services such as Have I Been Pwned can be used to identify exposed email addresses corresponding to compromised accounts, while searching online may reveal information that can be accessed by the public. The primary cause of spam calls is not always careless sharing. Random dialing, commercial data collection, and security breaches can expose numbers without the owner being aware of them. 

Spammers and cybercriminals may have a harder time converting ordinary contact information into opportunities for fraud if privacy practices are strengthened, app permissions are handled carefully, and unsolicited calls are made more aware.

Hackers Exploit Critical Puppet Vulnerability Allowing Remote Code Execution on Enterprise Servers

 

Cybercriminals are exploiting a critical security vulnerability in Perforce Puppet. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) database on 17th November and is urging organisations to apply patches. 

The vulnerability (CVE-2026-115731) has been assigned a severity rating of 9.4/10. It exists within the reporting function of Perforce Puppet and allows remote code execution. If an attacker has access to an agent certificate signed by the certificate authority (CA), they can create a malicious report and send it to the server using a PUT request. Processing this report can result in arbitrary code execution on the Puppet server with the privileges of the service account. 

If certificates are being automatically approved by the certificate authority with insufficient validation, an attacker can gain access to a valid certificate via network access. This means that they can exploit this vulnerability without authentication. This vulnerability affects multiple versions of Puppet Enterprise and Core. The affected versions are: Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.0, 2025.0.0, 2023.8.0 (before patching). Puppet Core 9.0.0 (before 9.1.3) and 8.x (before 8.22.2). 

The vulnerability was resolved by Perforce Software on 3rd November 2026. Patches have been included in Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1, 2023.8.13 and Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.2. However, OpenVox (an open source implementation of Puppet) is also affected. Developers of this product have released patches for the following versions: OpenVox Agent 9.3.0, 8.32.0, OpenVox Server 9.2.0, 8.18.0. The vulnerability was discovered by Alain Rödel of German cybersecurity firm Neodyme. 

A further vulnerability (CVE-2026-115732) was also discovered in Puppet and OpenVox, allowing certificate name authorisation to be bypassed. This vulnerability, which has a CVSS score of 9.0, was discovered using AI. The research was very specific and followed clear instructions. Attackers exploiting these vulnerabilities may be able to do more than just attack the Puppet server. If an attacker is able to perform remote code execution on a Puppet server, they may be able to get access to signing keys for the certificate authority. This would allow them to imitate other machines. 

As Puppet can be used to manage large numbers of systems across a corporate network, if an attacker is able to get access to a Puppet server, they may be able to deploy ransomware, collect large amounts of data and transfer it to other areas of the organisation. The effect of this vulnerability will depend on configuration and orchestrations protocols implemented on the server.  

Whilst CISA has confirmed this vulnerability is being exploited, little is known about how it is being exploited. However, one user on Reddit reported an exploit using this vulnerability on 4th November. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies are required to implement patches for this vulnerability by 1st December 2026. This is detailed in Binding Operational Directive 26-04, which prioritises patches based on risk.

Hackers Hijacked Optimizely’s CDN to Push Card Skimmers and iOS Exploits to CNN, BBC, and Zoom Visitors

 




Visitors to some of the world's most recognizable websites spent roughly 17 hours on Monday exposed to malicious code that could steal their payment cards, swap their cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and attempt to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in their iPhones, after attackers quietly modified JavaScript snippets served by marketing platform Optimizely.

The campaign, which researchers at Cynet and StepSecurity have named OPTIMJACK, touched at least 178 organizations including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock. Optimizely's own main site and login page were also affected.


How the Attack Got In

Optimizely Web Experimentation works by having client websites load a small JavaScript file, known as a snippet, from cdn.optimizely.com. Each snippet then executes what Optimizely calls "Project JavaScript," a customizable field that site operators can populate with their own code for A/B testing and personalization experiments. The attacker used a flaw in Optimizely's account signup flow, according to the company's incident notice, to gain write access to that field across unrelated customer projects and planted a loader inside it.

Because the modified snippets still came from Optimizely's own domain over a valid certificate, nothing about the delivery chain flagged the change. Organizations that cached and served the snippet from their own infrastructure were also affected, since the payload content came from the same compromised project fields.

The loader itself came in three forms: one that fetched the payload directly, one that encoded the payload domain in base64 to avoid string-matching detection, and a third that bundled a full copy of the payload inline as a contingency if the domain was blocked.


A Tight, Eventful Timeline

The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC on Monday in the BBC's snippet, loading a domain researchers identified as webshell[.]lol, an injector already linked to this actor. That same injector had previously appeared through scripts belonging to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media starting the prior week, and first showed up on Turkish websites as far back as September 17.

The card skimmer component went live at 13:43 UTC. Between 17:13 and 17:57, every visitor arriving from iOS 18.6 or earlier was served a hidden iframe pointed at known exploit kits. Mass cleanup began around 20:40. TalkTalk's snippet was the last to be cleared, at 21:52.


What the Payload Actually Did

The injected code carried four distinct capabilities. The crypto address swapper monitored page text, form fields, links, the clipboard API, and outgoing network requests. When it found a valid wallet address near payment-related words like "wallet," "deposit," or "send," it replaced that address with one controlled by the attacker. The swap was precise enough to pass checksum validation for each blockchain, meaning it only substituted addresses that the page or the user's application would have accepted as legitimate.

The card skimmer captured payment card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs submitted through a site's own form fields, then transmitted them to 1688360[.]cc. It could not read card data entered into cross-origin payment iframes, which covers hosted fields from providers like Stripe and Adyen.

After any crypto address swap, the payload also harvested the page's cookies and took a screenshot of the visible content, sending both to the attacker's server. HttpOnly cookies, which are inaccessible to JavaScript by design, were not captured.

The iOS component loaded a second-stage script that checked the device's software version and routed it to one of three exploit chains: Coruna targeting iOS 13 through 17.2.1, DarkSword targeting iOS 18.4 through 18.7, and a third chain for iOS 26 that researchers say currently only collected device fingerprints. Affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, a behavior that observant users might have noticed. No confirmed device compromises on physical iPhones have been reported.


The Money

By 19:25 UTC Monday, the attacker's cryptocurrency wallets had received roughly $7,040 across a window of about nine hours, according to Report URI. StepSecurity put the figure at approximately $6,600. Researchers noted that two of the wallet addresses were already in use before Monday's injections started, so it is not possible to attribute every incoming transfer directly to victims of this campaign.


What to Do Now

Security firms advise anyone who entered payment card details on Monday on a major commercial website to treat the card as potentially compromised. Crypto payments made that day should be compared against intended recipient addresses on a hardware wallet screen rather than from copied text, since clipboard contents may have been silently altered.

Site operators using Optimizely should inspect every Project JavaScript field for strings like "1688360", `atob(`, or scripts they do not recognize, and audit all users and API tokens with write access to their projects.

iPhone and iPad users on iOS 18.6 or earlier who visited any of the affected sites on Monday should update to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 immediately.

Optimizely has said the flaw has been patched and the injected code removed, though the company's incident notice did not specify how many projects were altered or confirm whether attacker access has been fully revoked.



Fandango Warns Customers of Potential Payment Card Data Exposure Following Security Incident

 

A security incident may have caused customers’ payment card information and email addresses to be compromised via Fandango’s online ticket purchasing system between 8 and 11 October 2026. 

Fandango has conducted an investigation into the incident with the help of third-party information security experts. It has found evidence that unauthorised access may have occurred to payment card information for customers purchasing tickets during this period. Fandango has identified customers who may have been affected by this incident and is informing them. Payment card numbers, CVV numbers, card expiry dates, ZIP codes and email addresses may have been compromised.

However, customer names, Social Security numbers, government issued ID information, and further account information were not compromised. Fandango has not given any details on how unauthorised access occurred. It has confirmed that the issue has been resolved and additional security measures have been implemented within the company. Fandango has stated that it is not aware of any fraudulent activity occurring with customer data related to this incident. 

However, it has recommended that impacted customers take precautions. The notice is being sent out to inform customers that they may have been impacted by this incident. Those customers who may have been impacted will be offered two years free identity protection from IDX. This includes credit monitoring, dark web monitoring, identity theft insurance, and managed identity recovery. This should allow customers to monitor for unusual activity and take steps to protect themselves if personal/financial data has been misused. 

Fandango has not published the total number of customers potentially impacted. However, information given to state regulators gives an indication of the scale. In Oregon, 913 residents have been identified as having been impacted. In Vermont, 18 residents have been identified. Fandango has also made a notice to the office of the Attorney General of California. 

If over 500 residents of California are impacted by a data breach, businesses must submit a copy of their notice to the state. Fandango, a brand under Versant Media Group, offers a large online ticket purchasing service within the US. The platform allows customers to purchase tickets to over 31,000 screens across the country. The company also runs Rotten Tomatoes, a popular review site for films and TV. 

This incident demonstrates the risk of online payment systems. Even if other account information is secure, unauthorised access to payment information may mean that customers face financial fraud.

GitDoor and GraphDoor Exploit GitHub and SharePoint for Cyberespionage

 

Government organizations across Asia and Africa are facing a cyberespionage campaign that turns familiar cloud platforms into channels for covert communication. Discovered by Kaspersky in early 2026 and named Operation ShadowCloud, the campaign deploys two previously undocumented backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. These tools abuse GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint, and the Ably messaging service to disguise malicious communications as ordinary enterprise activity. Their modular design allows attackers to download additional capabilities and execute code in memory, making the operation adaptable while complicating detection and analysis efforts. 

The investigated attack chain begins with MeshCentral Agent, a legitimate utility normally used for remote administration, including desktop access and file management. Researchers traced one intrusion to an unnamed Taiwanese organization, although how the agent initially reached the system remains unknown. Evidence suggests attackers may have reused an existing infection. The agent retrieves legitimate executable files, malicious loader libraries, and encrypted payloads. Through DLL sideloading, trusted applications load malicious code, which decrypts and launches the backdoors inside process memory rather than through conventional execution. 

GitDoor uses GitHub repositories to separate incoming instructions from outgoing results. Commands arrive through a public repository called Havo, while execution results are uploaded to a private repository named Trix. Repository creation dates indicate preparations began by late 2024. Supporting 26 commands, GitDoor enables file management, keylogging, proxy operation, and additional code execution. Downloadable modules expand its reach to screenshots, browser cookie theft, credential dumping, scheduled tasks, and Windows account management, giving operators extensive surveillance and control capabilities across compromised systems within targeted networks. 

GraphDoor instead communicates through Microsoft Graph and SharePoint. It authenticates through a malicious application, obtains an access token, and uses cloud storage to exchange information and retrieve instructions. After collecting system details, it downloads plugins that capture screenshots, list processes, and record keystrokes. Other components provide proxy services, including a SOCKS5 tunnel carried through Ably infrastructure. Like GitDoor, GraphDoor can execute additional code, allowing attackers to extend functionality without replacing the entire implant or relying exclusively on files stored locally on the infected machine. 

Attribution remains uncertain. Kaspersky identified overlaps with Bronze Sandcastle and tactical similarities involving FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle, also known as BlackTech. Some implants appeared in shared staging directories within one day of GitDoor deployment, but researchers stressed that this does not establish a direct connection. The broader significance lies in the abuse of trusted infrastructure: legitimate cloud destinations can carry hostile instructions. Operation ShadowCloud illustrates how attackers combine remote administration software, concealed payloads, and flexible plugins to sustain espionage while blending into routine organizational traffic.

Cyberattack Disrupts Lithuanian Customs Services, Raising Concerns Over Data Breach


Several national and European Union customs systems have been disrupted by a cyberattack, resulting in partial restoration of Lithuania's Customs agency's online services. Additionally, the incident, which was detected on November 10, raised concerns regarding the possibility of a data breach involving the personal information of hundreds of individuals and businesses. 

A temporary shutdown of the agency's Common User Management Portal (BAP) as a result of the attack was prompted, which serves as an access point for Lithuanian customs services as well as certain European Commission platforms for individuals and businesses. As a result, the systems responsible for processing import declarations and checking the status of imported goods entered the European Union were disrupted.

The Lithuanian Customs Department confirmed on November 16 that some affected services had been reopened through the country's electronic government portal. However, users were still unable to authenticate using digital certificates, indicating that a restoration was not yet complete. Investigations conducted by the agency confirmed unauthorized access to BAP portals, and found that personal information belonging to users who logged into the portal between November 9 and 10 may have been exposed. 

Several hundred individuals and businesses, mostly located in Lithuania, may be affected, according to Vygantas Paigozinas, Chief of Customs. However, the authorities have not confirmed whether the information was actually accessed, copied, or stolen. Media reports indicate that individuals' names, residential addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, and Lithuanian personal identification numbers may have been potentially accessed, copied, or stolen.

A notification has been sent directly to potential affected users advising them to be vigilant in the event of suspicious communications requesting personal or financial details. Paigozinas described the incident as a targeted and sophisticated cyberattack. 

According to preliminary findings, the attackers were able to gain access to the portal by exploiting a poorly secured technical function. It was also determined that the intrusion attempt extended beyond the BAP and that attackers may have attempted to gain access to additional government systems containing much more sensitive information.

The chief of customs reported that the attackers appeared to have attempted to cause wider damage by reaching deeper into different components of the agency's information infrastructure. It has not been disclosed which specific vulnerability was exploited or who was responsible for the attack. 

Several European Commission customs platforms were also affected by the attack, including the Import Control System 2 (ICS2), which collects and evaluates information regarding goods entering the European Union. There were significant disruptions that affected individuals and small businesses that rely on BAP to authenticate themselves when accessing these systems. 

Services used by customs intermediaries continued to function normally Lithuanian Customs has taken several measures to contain the incident and prevent further unauthorized access. In addition to limiting connections to the affected infrastructure, isolating compromised systems and preserving relevant data for forensic analysis. The response was assisted by external infrastructure and cybersecurity specialists, as well as supported by the secure restoration of services.

In addition to Lithuanian National Cyber Security Centres and State Digital Solutions Agency, as well as the State Data Protection Inspectorate and relevant European Union institutions, the incident was reported to the authorities. Further investigations have been launched into the possibility of personal information being exposed to the public. It was warned to potentially affected users of the possibility of follow-up scams involving stolen or exposed personal information. 

Individuals were warned not to trust unanticipated email, text message, and telephone calls that request personal or financial information. In addition, customs officials advised users not to share sensitive information via suspicious links or to verify the website address before sharing sensitive information, as exposed contact details could be misused for phishing and impersonation. Increasing concerns have been raised concerning the safety of Lithuanian government information systems following the latest incident. 

Over 600,000 records held by the country's Centre of Registers, which manages property and corporate registries, have been accessed unauthorized by unidentified attackers in May 2026. The Real Estate and Legal Entities Registers may have been exposed to personal and property-related information as a result of this incident. 

The authorities, however, have not established a connection between the May breach and the attack on Lithuanian Customs. Investigations into the latest incident continue, and the agency is continuing to assess whether any potentially exposed data has been accessed and is working to restore its affected systems.