When the Los Angeles Police Department started feeding decades of arrest records into predictive algorithms, it believed it was upgrading how it approached crime. What it actually did, researchers now argue, was automate its existing prejudices.
The growing use of artificial intelligence in law enforcement is raising alarms among criminologists and legal scholars who say these systems absorb the biases already embedded in historical police data and repeat them at scale. Far from offering a neutral, data-driven view of crime, the tools risk entrenching the same inequalities they claim to transcend.
At the core of the problem is how these systems learn. AI tools for predictive policing are trained on past arrest and crime records, which means they begin with a picture of crime shaped by previous policing decisions rather than by crime itself. Areas that received heavier patrol in earlier decades show more recorded incidents. The algorithm reads that density as a future risk signal and directs officers back to those same neighborhoods. More arrests follow. The data is updated. The cycle repeats.
Sarah Brayne, a sociologist at the University of Texas at Austin, spent time inside the LAPD studying how the department used big data systems. In research published in the *American Sociological Review*, she found the department was increasingly using data to predict crime rather than respond to it. The data flowing into those systems was skewed from the start: crimes in public places were more likely to be recorded, and patrol resources were disproportionately concentrated in Black neighborhoods. Once that history was absorbed by the algorithm, Brayne wrote, "the predictions appear impartial." They were not. The models, she concluded, create "a feedback loop in which they not only predict events such as crime or police contact, but also contribute to their future occurrence."
The problem sharpens when that underlying data was produced under conditions of institutional misconduct. Researchers at New York University's AI Now Institute studied 13 jurisdictions across the US and found that in nine of them, police departments had trained predictive systems on records gathered during documented periods of unlawful or biased policing. Chicago is the starkest case. The city's police department was under federal investigation for discriminatory practices at the same moment it adopted a risk-flagging algorithm to identify people likely to be involved in shootings. The residents federal investigators had identified as targets of biased policing overlapped substantially with those the algorithm flagged. The list eventually grew to more than 400,000 names, 56 percent of them Black men.
Chicago shut down the program in 2019 after its own inspector general raised concerns about its effectiveness. Los Angeles scrapped a similar initiative, Operation LASER, the same year. A 2023 analysis of Geolitica, formerly known as PredPol, one of the most widely deployed predictive policing tools in the country, found a success rate below half a percent across more than 23,000 predictions made in Plainfield, New Jersey.
Not everyone in the field believes the technology is fundamentally broken. Dr. Dimitrios Kollias, an associate professor in multimodal artificial intelligence at Queen Mary University of London, argues that modern AI systems do not simply replay their training data. "They can combine learned information in new ways and generate outputs that were not explicitly present in those examples," he told the BBC. He acknowledges dirty data is a genuine concern but argues systems can be tested for unfair outcomes and redesigned when they fail. As those systems grow more autonomous, he adds, ensuring they remain under meaningful human control becomes a priority in its own right.
The consequences of algorithmic bias run well beyond law enforcement. A 2019 study published in the journal Science examined a healthcare AI tool used to allocate additional patient support across US hospitals. The system measured patient need by predicting the cost of their care. Because less was already being spent on Black patients than on equally sick white patients, often due to poorer access to care, the algorithm systematically directed resources toward white patients. When researchers recalibrated it to predict illness directly rather than cost, the share of Black patients selected for extra support would have risen from roughly 18 percent to 47 percent. The fix was straightforward once someone looked for the problem. That is precisely the case researchers make for independent oversight.
Legislators are beginning to respond. In January 2024, seven US Congress members asked the Justice Department to pause grant funding for predictive policing programs until their discriminatory impact could be assessed. A White House policy from March 2024 requires federal agencies to independently test rights-impacting AI tools, though the mandate does not extend to state and local police departments. In Britain, 17 civil society organizations called the same year for a full ban on predictive policing.
Dr. Carolyn McKay, an associate professor in digital justice at the University of Sydney Law School, says cleaning up biased data is not a matter of removing a few stray errors. The corrupted records are not sitting at the edges of an otherwise sound dataset. They run through the foundation the algorithm was built on. Even systems redesigned to flag locations rather than individual people can produce the same outcomes, she warns, because the neighborhoods they target were shaped by years of concentrated policing long before any algorithm got involved.
The root of the problem, most researchers agree, is not the machine. It is the human judgment baked into the data the machine inherited. The algorithm did not decide what suspicious behavior looked like, or which crimes were worth recording. People did. Until those decisions are independently examined, AI will keep reflecting them back.
The vulnerabilities, tracked as CVE-2026-116606 and CVE-2026-111560, affect Barracuda's email-filtering appliance and could allow remote attackers to bypass security restrictions and gain complete control of vulnerable systems.
According to cybersecurity firm watchTowr, which published its technical analysis, the attack chain combines an authorization bypass flaw with a command injection vulnerability. Barracuda released security patches for the issues earlier this week.
The first vulnerability, CVE-2026-116606, is an authorization bypass flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to access a configuration restoration function and modify the appliance's global settings. The second, CVE-2026-111560, is a command injection vulnerability that enables commands to execute with root privileges.
Mandiant assigned CVSS severity scores of 9.3 and 8.6 to the two vulnerabilities, respectively.
In its technical investigation, watchTowr discovered that the authorization bypass stems from the appliance's password-change process. When a password change request fails, the system incorrectly returns a low-privilege user role instead of terminating the request completely.
The researchers also found that Barracuda's backup verification mechanism relies on a secret embedded within the appliance's code. Since this secret is not securely protected, attackers can generate a valid checksum for a specially crafted configuration backup and restore it on the targeted device.
The uploaded configuration can contain a manipulated timezone value. When the appliance processes this setting, it passes the value to a shell command that executes with root privileges.
watchTowr demonstrated the attack by successfully writing a file to the appliance with root-level permissions.
CVE-2026-116606 affects Barracuda Email Security Gateway, while CVE-2026-111560 impacts five additional products, including Load Balancer Application Delivery Controller (ADC), Message Archiver, WAF Control Center, Web Application Firewall (WAF), and Web Security Gateway (WSG).
However, the complete unauthenticated attack chain applies specifically to Email Security Gateway. Exploitation of the command injection vulnerability on the other affected products requires administrator access.
Barracuda has released security updates addressing both vulnerabilities and recommends that customers install the appropriate patches or upgrade to the latest fixed firmware versions.
As of the disclosure, neither vulnerability had been listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, and no publicly reported incidents linked the flaws to active exploitation.
The Federal Communications Commission moved this month to block two consumer gadgets from the American market, not because of who made them, but because of a chip buried inside. A dashcam and a wireless video transmitter both contained components manufactured by HiSilicon, a Huawei subsidiary, putting them on the wrong side of a rule that took effect October 13 and extends Washington's existing tech blacklist deep into the supply chain.
The same day those products were pulled, October 22, the FCC handed Intel a one-year reprieve for the foreign-built robots running in its semiconductor factories. The two decisions landed together, and together they sketch the shape of a problem that will follow this policy for years.
What Changed and Why It Matters
The FCC has maintained what it calls the Covered List since 2021, a register of foreign technology companies whose products are deemed national security risks. Placement on the list means a company's equipment cannot receive radiofrequency authorization in the United States, which amounts to a ban on importing and selling it here. For years, the restriction was straightforward: it applied to products built by listed companies. Huawei was on the list; Huawei routers were blocked.
The new Third Report and Order changed the terms. It bars RF authorization for any device that incorporates logic-bearing components from a Covered List entity, so long as the end product itself would have been blocked. The two gadgets flagged on October 22 were the first to be caught under this framework, but they will not be the last.
The FCC's characterization of the HiSilicon chips is worth noting. The agency called them "foreign surveillance chips" and cited their "built-in detection algorithms for human faces," a feature sold to consumers as a way to identify strangers near a home. HiSilicon is a Huawei subsidiary, and Huawei is already on the Covered List, which is what triggered the rule. FCC Chairman Brendan Carr praised the enforcement action and said more would follow.
"Manufacturers must now conduct their own supply chain audits to determine whether any of their parts trigger the rule, with limited guidance on where to look."
A Rule With Gaps
The logic is clean on paper. If a company is considered a threat, its chips should not enter American products regardless of who assembles them. But applying that logic requires knowing what is inside a device, and that is harder than it sounds.
No authoritative list currently exists identifying which companies manufacture covered components. Huawei itself did not name HiSilicon in a 2023 subsidiary disclosure filing to the FCC. That gap means the burden of compliance falls on manufacturers who must audit their own supply chains, often without clear guidance on which subsidiaries or affiliates to look for. A separate FCC proceeding that would require Covered List entities to submit complete subsidiary and affiliate disclosures is still pending and not yet in effect.
The rule's reach also has limits. It applies only to components made by entities actually named on the Covered List. Unnamed manufacturers of foreign industrial robots or consumer routers, for instance, do not fall under it, even if those products are covered under the separate "sector-based" rules the FCC introduced for certain product categories starting in December 2025.
Intel's Narrow Escape, and Its Clock Problem
When the FCC added humanoid robots, quadrupeds, and other industrial robotic devices to the Covered List in July 2026, it created an immediate operational problem for Intel. The company's semiconductor fabrication plants run on automated guided vehicles, or AGVs, purpose-built machines that shuttle materials across factory floors. Intel says these machines have been in continuous operation for roughly two decades and that no American-made alternatives meet its technical requirements.
Intel applied for relief before it was clear the rule even applied to its machines, flagging the uncertainty in its filing. The FCC granted a one-year hardware waiver on October 22, the first of its kind in the robotics category. Intel committed to keeping the vehicles on-site under its control, making no changes that would improve their RF characteristics, and not introducing new capabilities.
The problem is the timeline. The hardware waiver expires in October 2027. A separate waiver covering software and firmware updates on the same machines runs through January 2029, leaving a 15-month gap between the two deadlines. Replacing industrial robots typically requires years of commissioning, procurement evaluation, and integration work, a timeline that does not fit inside 12 months. At least one industry analyst has described the arrangement as "a temporary fix for a long-term problem." Intel will need to identify domestic alternatives, pursue an extension, or seek a longer-term exemption well before next fall's deadline.
What Comes Next
The FCC's Covered List has been moving in one direction: more products, more companies, more components. Drones, consumer-grade routers, power inverters, and now industrial robots have all been added to sector-based restrictions that cover foreign-produced products across entire categories, regardless of which specific company made them. Companies operating in those sectors can apply to the Department of Homeland Security or the Department of War for conditional approval, which requires committing to a domestic manufacturing onshoring plan.
The two decisions on October 22 sit on opposite ends of that spectrum. The HiSilicon enforcement shows the new component rule starting to bite, pulling products off the market that passed previous scrutiny because the finished gadget was not made by a listed company. The Intel waiver shows how far the domestic alternative market still has to go before the restrictions can hold without exceptions. The list is getting sharper. The supply chain it assumes into existence is still being assembled.
The exposed information included customers' names, business email addresses, phone numbers and business addresses. In some cases, the records also contained personal identification documents, including driver's licences, passports and utility bills.
DigiCert has started notifying affected customers about the incident. The company is also reviewing archived identification documents to identify the individuals whose personal documents may have been accessed.
According to an incident report published on Mozilla's Bugzilla platform, the security issue originated in February 2025, when DigiCert migrated an internal business system to a different availability zone. The migration inadvertently made the system accessible from the public internet, although it was previously restricted to users connected through a virtual private network (VPN).
The exposed system contained a self-registration feature designed for other applications. This feature allowed external users to create accounts without requiring the usual internal authorization.
Although these newly created accounts were not assigned to any particular application, an authorization vulnerability allowed them to access archived customer information in read-only mode.
DigiCert discovered unauthorized accounts on the exposed system in June 2026. However, the company initially believed that these accounts could not access customer records because they had not been assigned to an application.
The company received a report through its managed security research program highlighting the possibility of external users creating accounts on the system.
DigiCert implemented security measures to restrict access and address the authorization issue. However, it did not immediately recognize that customer information had already been accessed.
An investigation confirmed that an unauthorized account had accessed archived customer records between June 27 and July 2, 2026. DigiCert confirmed the data breach on October 19, 2026.
The company acknowledged that the incident was initially treated as an account-creation issue rather than a potential data-access incident.
The compromised records primarily contained business contact information shared with DigiCert during customer verification and other business processes.
However, some archived records also included sensitive identification documents submitted by customers. These documents could include government-issued identification, such as passports and driver's licences, as well as utility bills containing personal information.
DigiCert stated that the unauthorized account had read-only access and could not modify customer records, approve certificate validations or issue digital certificates.
After the investigation, DigiCert disabled the self-registration feature, restricted access to the affected system and introduced additional access controls to prevent unauthorized users from accessing archived information.
The company also confirmed that its core certificate authority services, including CertCentral and DigiCert ONE, were not compromised. Customer login credentials and previously issued digital certificates also remain secure.
The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways has directed India's national cybersecurity agency to conduct a forensic security audit of four of its core digital portals, following reports that personal data of vehicle owners was being sold through Telegram bots and mobile applications for as little as ₹5 per lookup.
The ministry ordered the Computer Emergency Response Team of India, commonly known as CERT-In, to audit VAHAN, SARATHI, e-Challan, and the Pollution Under Control Certificate portal. These four platforms collectively hold some of the most sensitive civic data in the country, covering vehicle registrations, driving licences, traffic challans, and vehicle fitness records for hundreds of millions of Indians.
The trigger for the audit was a report documenting an active Telegram-based service that allowed anyone to query a vehicle registration number and receive the owner's full name, father's name, present and permanent addresses, PIN code, and mobile number. The same service also offered driving licence details, challan history, FASTag information, and downloadable copies of registration certificates and driving licences. A cybersecurity firm, Cyderes, traced the service's backup channel to 21,329 subscribers before it was taken down. It rebuilt itself under new handles within weeks.
The scale of commercial access to these government databases is not incidental. As of the latest available figures, 25,314 private corporate entities held active credentials for the four portals, collectively running 1.708 crore searches over a 33-month period. Officials are now reviewing whether daily search limits and usage guidelines were actually enforced during this period or simply existed on paper.
The concern does not stop at the portals themselves. On the Unified Logistics Interface Platform, managed by the National Industrial Corridor Development Corporation, some authorized entities reportedly logged more than five million data transactions in a single month. The National Informatics Centre has been directed to audit these access patterns. Under revised protocols, any government body seeking data through this logistics platform will now require explicit authorization from the Transport Secretary, with requesting officers verified through Aadhaar-based digital signature certificates or video-based KYC procedures.
The ministry has also written to app store operators, including Google, requesting the removal of applications that surface vehicle owner details without adequate safeguards. Two apps drew particular attention: Vehicle Information App, with roughly 10 million downloads, and VehicleSetu, with about 1 million. The largest vehicle information app on the Play Store reportedly carries over 100 million downloads. MoRTH is also reviewing its data-sharing arrangements with the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology in light of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.
What makes this episode harder to dismiss as a simple breach is that no government database was hacked in the traditional sense. Investigators found no sign of a backend intrusion. Instead, Cyderes traced the data flow to credentials held by licensed identity verification companies, with lookups routed through authentication tokens on a third-party platform. As recently as August 4, 2026, one such route was still returning full VAHAN records including mobile numbers. This points less to a technical failure and more to systemic gaps in how credential use is monitored and how downstream sharing by licensed entities is controlled.
The government's relationship with vehicle data predates this episode by several years. In 2019, Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari told the Rajya Sabha that the government had earned ₹65 crore from selling VAHAN and SARATHI data to 87 private companies and 32 government bodies under a bulk data sharing policy. By February 2021, that revenue figure had grown to over ₹111 crore, with more than 170 recipient entities. Recipients included automakers, insurance firms, and second-hand vehicle dealers. The Internet Freedom Foundation noted at the time, and has reiterated since, that the Motor Vehicles Act contains no provision authorising the commercial transfer of this data to private companies.
IFF sent a formal representation to MoRTH, the NIC, and CERT-In on September 23, 2026, asking for the incident to be registered as a cyber incident, for server logs to be preserved, and for a comprehensive forensic audit. It also asked the ministry to publish a register of all entities currently holding access credentials, introduce technical controls to cap and monitor search volumes, and notify affected individuals.
The ministry says "controlled private access will continue to support commercial efficiency," language that suggests the government is not planning to end third-party access to these databases altogether. What it has not yet addressed publicly is how it will verify that the access controls now being introduced will hold in practice, given that the previous framework apparently operated without meaningful enforcement for years.
India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act places compliance obligations on data fiduciaries starting May 2027, with penalties reaching ₹250 crore for violations. The forensic audit ordered by MoRTH will now determine whether the exposure was a question of technical vulnerability, policy failure, or both.
In an update published recently, the company disclosed that an unidentified attacker had gained unauthorized access to its systems and internal tools, exposing customer information that included names, usernames, password hashes and active authentication tokens.
Chainalysis initially reported the security incident on October 30 but said at the time that it had found no evidence of unauthorized access to authentication credentials or session tokens.
Chainalysis has not identified the attacker or provided technical details about how the intrusion was carried out. The company previously said it detected an external actor using “offensive agentic techniques” to access its infrastructure.
Such techniques generally involve AI-powered systems capable of carrying out multiple tasks with limited human intervention, potentially helping attackers automate different stages of a cyber intrusion.
The latest disclosure indicates that the impact of the breach was more extensive than initially understood. Chainalysis did not clarify whether every category of information was exposed for every user or disclose the total number of affected accounts.
The company serves more than 1,500 customers, including law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, cryptocurrency businesses, regulators and national security organizations.
Chainanalysis also confirmed that some customer accounts associated with its Know Your Transaction (KYT) service appeared to have been accessed without authorization. The platform is used by organizations to monitor cryptocurrency transactions and identify suspicious financial activities.
In addition to the exposure of password hashes and authentication tokens, Chainalysis disclosed a separate security issue involving an on-path attack.
In this type of attack, a malicious actor intercepts communications between users and an online service, potentially capturing sensitive information.
The company said the interception method had been contained and remediated, while affected accounts were being locked. However, it remains unclear whether these incidents were connected to the original intrusion or involved the same attacker.
The breach has also impacted several Chainalysis services. The company temporarily took its KYT user interface and application programming interface (API), Address Screening products and login page offline after detecting abnormal activity. Its Reactor investigation platform and Data Solutions product had also been taken offline earlier as a precaution.
A Russia-aligned hacking group that researchers had not previously named or documented has been running a systematic intelligence campaign against Ukrainian institutions since at least February 2025, targeting courts, prosecutors, local government bodies, and a major foreign military aid hub, according to a report published Tuesday by cybersecurity firm ESET.
The group, which ESET has labeled Gorbag, operates with a focused mandate: collect documents and credentials that give Russian intelligence visibility into how Ukraine is tracking war crimes, where foreign weapons are arriving, and how effectively Russian strikes are degrading infrastructure near the front lines. ESET said the group "demonstrates precise targeting and operational intent to contribute to Russia's broader strategic goals in the war with Ukraine."
About a quarter of Gorbag's known targets are law enforcement and judicial institutions. ESET researchers say this pattern points to Russian efforts to monitor ongoing war crimes investigations, including which soldiers and officers have been identified, what evidence has been gathered, and which individuals face prosecution. Courts and prosecutors hold precisely that case material, and the Kremlin would have an obvious interest in knowing what investigators know.
Another quarter of the group's victims are local government bodies, concentrated among city councils operating near active fighting. These are not high-profile targets on their own, but they hold something specific: internal damage assessments from Russian airstrikes, including infrastructure repair estimates that have never been publicly released. For Russian military planners evaluating whether strikes are achieving their intended effect, that internal accounting is far more useful than what appears in news reports.
ESET also identified a major transportation hub for foreign military aid as a Gorbag target, one that had been previously struck in Russian airstrikes. Its inclusion in the campaign fits a third intelligence priority the firm attributes to the group: tracking inbound weapons deliveries and mapping the logistics infrastructure that moves military equipment into Ukraine from abroad.
Getting in through the mailbox
Gorbag's entry method is phishing, specifically emails carrying malicious attachments formatted to look like official correspondence about administrative penalties or outstanding taxes. The choice of lure is deliberate. Administrative staff in Ukrainian municipal offices process exactly these kinds of documents, and a notice framed as an overdue government fine is designed to generate urgency without triggering immediate suspicion.
Once a machine is compromised, Gorbag deploys a custom info-stealer ESET calls BeautyStealer. The tool searches the infected computer, removable drives, and connected network shares for files of value, then attempts to erase itself after sending the data out, limiting what forensic investigators would find. The group also uses a remote access tool called Prime ReverseShell, built on publicly available code, that allows operators to issue commands to a compromised machine directly.
What BeautyStealer collects is a combination of credentials and documents. Saved browser passwords, authentication cookies, VPN configuration files, Microsoft Office documents, email archives, and compressed files all fall within scope. That mixture is significant: credentials open doors to systems the attacker has not yet reached, while the documents provide the raw intelligence. ESET notes Gorbag may pass stolen credentials to separate groups for follow-on intrusions, though this relationship has not been confirmed.
An old flaw put to new use
Starting in early 2026, Gorbag added another technique. The group began exploiting CVE-2025-8088, a path traversal vulnerability in WinRAR that lets an attacker write files outside an intended extraction folder by abusing NTFS Alternate Data Streams. The flaw was patched in July 2025, but systems running older versions remained open. WinRAR is used extensively across Ukrainian organizations, making it a consistent point of interest for Russia-aligned actors. RomCom, another Russian-linked group, had exploited the same vulnerability before Gorbag adopted it.
"As long as the war in Ukraine continues, we expect groups such as Gorbag to remain a persistent threat to Ukrainian government, justice, and defense entities." [ESET researchers]
ESET characterizes Gorbag as less technically sophisticated than elite Russian state hacking units. The group shows little interest in deep persistence or careful lateral movement through networks over time. Its posture is transactional: access a machine, harvest whatever is reachable, and exit. That approach may reflect a division of labor inside Russia's intelligence apparatus, where collection-focused units gather raw material and pass it upstream to actors with more specialized capabilities.
The targeting reinforces that reading. Gorbag is not hitting central government ministries or high-value military command networks in Kyiv. It is operating at the administrative layer of a country at war, the city councils, the courts, the logistics checkpoints, the bureaucratic infrastructure that underpins both civilian governance and military operations near the contact line. That is exactly where granular, operational intelligence lives, and exactly where it is least expected to be a target.