Google’s Chrome Incognito mode can keep browsing history off a device, but it was never designed to make users anonymous online. A class-action lawsuit over the feature exposed how far that distinction could be misunderstood, with Google agreeing to delete or remediate billions of private-browsing records and change how it explains Incognito to users.
The lawsuit, Brown v. Google, was filed in 2020 and alleged that Google continued collecting information about users while they browsed through Chrome’s Incognito mode and other browsers’ private-browsing modes.
The plaintiffs initially sought billions of dollars in damages, with their claims eventually putting at least $5 billion at stake. However, Google did not ultimately agree to pay $5 billion. Under the settlement, there was no class-wide monetary payout. Instead, Google agreed to data deletion and remediation measures, changes to its privacy disclosures, and additional restrictions on data collection. Plaintiffs’ lawyers valued the settlement’s non-monetary relief at more than $5 billion, with estimates reaching $7.8 billion.
The case nevertheless exposed a fundamental problem with private browsing: preventing a browser from retaining a user's history is not the same thing as preventing websites, network operators or online services from observing that user's activity.
Google employees raised concerns about Incognito
The legal dispute became particularly notable after internal Google communications surfaced during litigation.
In one email, Google Chief Marketing Officer Lorraine Twohill told CEO Sundar Pichai that the company should make Incognito "truly private." She also warned that Google could not market the feature too strongly because it was "not truly private," requiring what she described as "fuzzy, hedging language."
Other internal communications were even more critical of the feature. According to material cited in the litigation, Google employees described Incognito as "misleading" and "effectively a lie," while another employee argued that Google should stop using the Incognito name and its spy-themed icon because users could misunderstand the protection it provided. Another recommendation suggested replacing the messaging with a warning that users were not protected from Google.
These discussions mattered because the lawsuit was not simply about whether Incognito stored browsing history locally. It questioned whether users were being given a sufficiently accurate understanding of what happened to their data after it left the browser.
Google disputed the allegations and maintained that the limitations of Incognito had been communicated to users. A Google spokesperson said the company believed the lawsuit was without merit and argued that Incognito was intended to provide a private browsing experience, rather than prevent websites and services from collecting information.
What Incognito actually does
Chrome's Incognito mode does provide a real privacy function, but that function is primarily local.
When a user opens an Incognito window, Chrome starts a separate browsing session. Once all Incognito windows are closed, Chrome does not retain the browsing history, cookies and site data, or information entered into forms from that session in the normal browser profile. Third-party cookies are also blocked by default in current versions of Chrome, although users can temporarily allow them for particular sites.
This makes Incognito useful in situations where the concern is another person accessing the same device.
Someone using a shared computer, for example, can browse for a gift without leaving the visited pages in Chrome's ordinary history. It can also provide a separate browsing session when a user does not want existing cookies and account sessions to carry over.
But there is an important limitation.
Incognito does not erase everything created during a session. Downloads remain on the device, and bookmarks saved during the session remain available after Incognito is closed. Signing into a website can also allow that service to associate activity with the account being used.
The key distinction is therefore simple: Incognito primarily limits what Chrome stores locally. It does not turn the internet connection into a private tunnel.
Your ISP and network administrator can still see activity
Opening an Incognito window does not prevent an internet service provider from observing network activity.
Google's own documentation states that organizations managing a network, including schools, employers and internet service providers, may be able to observe activity while a user is browsing in Incognito. Incognito also does not hide activity or location from the websites being visited.
This is an important distinction from encryption.
Chrome's HTTPS protections can encrypt traffic between a browser and an HTTPS-enabled website, helping prevent someone monitoring the connection from reading the contents of that traffic. Chrome also warns users when they are about to load sites without HTTPS, while Secure DNS can encrypt DNS lookups in supported configurations.
But HTTPS does not make the user anonymous.
The network still has visibility into connection metadata, while the destination website receives the request and can process information available to it.
In other words, Incognito and HTTPS solve different problems. Incognito reduces local traces. HTTPS protects communications in transit. Neither one, by itself, is an anonymity system.
Websites can still identify and track users
The privacy boundary becomes even clearer once a user reaches a website.
Google's current Chrome documentation explicitly states that Incognito does not change how websites collect data or how the services those websites use collect information. Sites can continue gathering information even when a user is not signed in.
Websites can also use first-party technologies and other mechanisms to understand activity within a session. Third-party cookies are only one part of the tracking ecosystem. Google itself notes that websites can use different mechanisms to personalize content and advertising and learn about activity across sites.
This is also where the distinction between an IP address and browser history matters.
Incognito can prevent a local Chrome profile from retaining the list of pages a user visited. It does not automatically conceal the network address from the websites receiving the connections.
And if a person voluntarily signs into a service while using Incognito, the service has an obvious account-level identifier with which to associate the activity. Google's own documentation warns that signing into a Google service or another website during an Incognito session can allow that site to remember the activity.
The lawsuit forced changes to Incognito
The settlement went further than simply changing a warning message.
According to the court filing, Google agreed to delete or remediate billions of records reflecting class members' private browsing activities. The company also agreed to continue blocking third-party cookies in Incognito for five years.
The filing provides an unusually detailed picture of why the cookie change mattered.
Google had historically collected its own third-party cookies when users visited non-Google websites. After the lawsuit was filed, Google implemented third-party-cookie blocking for Incognito users. Under the settlement, that protection had to remain in place for five years. The plaintiffs' filing said blocking data associated with Google's third-party cookies in Incognito could reduce Google's global annual revenue by nearly $500 million.
Google also agreed to remove four identified private-browsing detection signals. According to the plaintiffs' filing, those signals could reveal that a user had chosen private browsing and were then used to label the resulting data as private. The settlement required Google to delete those signals and agree not to use such detection mechanisms to identify or track private browsing.
The class covered an estimated 136 million users, according to court-related filings.
Google eventually changed the warning
The dispute also changed the language presented to Chrome users.
Chrome's current Incognito documentation now makes the limitation explicit. It says that Incognito does not change how data is collected by websites users visit and the services those websites use, including Google. Google also says that websites, network administrators and ISPs may still be able to observe activity during an Incognito session.
That clarification is arguably more important than the Incognito icon itself.
The familiar private-browsing interface can create an intuitive association between the words "Incognito" and anonymity. Technically, however, the feature is much narrower. Chromium describes Incognito as a window-level mode in which pages are not persisted to browsing history and a temporary cookie store is used for the session.
That is a local privacy mechanism, not an invisibility cloak.
So, is Incognito worth using?
Yes, if the objective is local privacy.
If you share a computer with other people, do not want a particular browsing session stored in your ordinary history, or want a temporary browser session separated from your normal cookies, Incognito remains useful.
It is also useful for testing how a website behaves without the cookies and account state associated with a normal session.
But users should not treat the Incognito icon as a guarantee that their online activity is hidden.
It does not prevent an ISP or network administrator from observing activity. It does not stop websites from collecting information. It does not automatically hide an IP address. It does not prevent a user from being identified after signing into an account. And it does not protect files downloaded to the device after the session ends.
Users seeking stronger privacy need to think in layers rather than relying on a single browser setting.
A privacy-focused browser can reduce tracking at the browser level. Tracker and content blockers can limit third-party collection. A properly configured VPN can conceal the user's IP address from the websites they visit and hide destination traffic from the ISP, although the VPN provider itself becomes part of the trust model. Keeping the browser, operating system and extensions updated remains essential because privacy controls cannot compensate for an unpatched security vulnerability.
Chrome itself should also not be treated as static. Google continues to modify its privacy and security architecture. Third-party-cookie protections in Incognito are already part of the browser's privacy model, while Google has also explored additional protections for IP addresses in Incognito.
The larger lesson from the Incognito lawsuit is therefore not that private browsing is useless.
It is that privacy has layers, and the word "private" can mean very different things depending on where the data is stored, who controls the network and which services receive the user's requests.
Incognito can hide your browsing history from someone checking the same device.
It cannot make you disappear from the internet.
When people think about a cyberattack, they usually picture stolen passwords, malware, ransomware or someone exploiting a vulnerability to break into a system.
Side-channel attacks work differently. Instead of directly stealing a secret, an attacker studies the traces a computer produces while carrying out normal operations. Tiny differences in processing time, electricity consumption, electromagnetic signals, sounds or hardware activity can reveal clues about what is happening inside the machine.
Think of a locked safe. A thief may not know its combination or be able to break the lock, but if turning the dial produces different clicks or pauses, listening closely could reveal information about the combination. The safe is not deliberately revealing anything. Its physical behavior is simply giving away clues.
Computers can do much the same thing.
A problem that is decades old
Side-channel attacks are not a new phenomenon.
In 1985, Dutch researcher Wim van Eck demonstrated that electromagnetic emissions from video display units could be captured and decoded, potentially revealing what was being displayed. The screen was not intentionally broadcasting its contents, but its normal operation produced signals that could be observed externally.
The technique became particularly important in cryptography during the 1990s. In 1996, researcher Paul Kocher showed that measuring tiny differences in the time taken by cryptographic operations could reveal information about private keys. In 1999, Kocher, Joshua Jaffe and Benjamin Jun demonstrated that measuring power consumption could similarly expose information from cryptographic devices.
Researchers later showed that sound could become another source of leakage. Experiments demonstrated that acoustic emissions from laptops performing cryptographic operations could be analyzed to recover a 4,096-bit RSA key under controlled conditions.
These discoveries changed the way security engineers evaluated systems. A cryptographic algorithm could be mathematically secure while its implementation still leaked information through timing, power, sound or electromagnetic radiation.
When processor performance became a security problem
The rise of modern CPUs created another class of side channels.
Processors use speculative execution to predict which instructions a program will need and execute them ahead of time, improving performance. In 2018, researchers disclosed Meltdown and Spectre, demonstrating that traces left by speculative execution could allow malicious code to infer information that should have remained protected.
The attacks challenged an important assumption in computing: that programs running on the same machine can be reliably isolated from one another. They also demonstrated that security problems could originate from performance features built deep inside the processor rather than from conventional software bugs.
Researchers have continued finding similar problems in newer hardware.
In 2022, Hertzbleed showed that dynamic voltage and frequency scaling, a feature used to manage processor power and performance, could become a timing side channel. Because processor frequency can vary with the computation being performed, an attacker could potentially infer information remotely without directly measuring power consumption. The researchers demonstrated implications for cryptographic key extraction on modern Intel and AMD processors.
In 2023, Downfall exposed another weakness in certain Intel processors through the Gather instruction, while Zenbleed affected AMD's Zen 2 architecture and could expose information from another execution context under particular conditions.
The pattern is becoming difficult to ignore: features designed to make computers faster or more efficient can also create unexpected paths for information leakage.
Side channels are spreading beyond CPUs
Researchers are now finding these channels in other parts of the computing stack.
GPU.zip demonstrated how hardware-based graphics compression could create a side channel capable of exposing visual information processed by graphics processors. The research showed that the problem could extend beyond the CPU and into the way GPUs handle graphical data.
In 2024, GoFetch exposed another hardware-level problem in Apple processors. The attack targeted a feature called a data memory-dependent prefetcher, which predicts future memory requirements to improve performance. Researchers demonstrated that this behavior could undermine protections in cryptographic software and help extract secret keys.
These attacks illustrate why simply securing software is not always enough. Hardware underneath the software can produce information that applications never intended to expose.
The SSD can become a side channel too
The latest research pushes the idea even further.
In 2026, researchers at Graz University of Technology introduced FROST, short for "Fingerprinting Remotely using OPFS-based SSD Timing." The attack targets the browser's Origin Private File System, or OPFS, a feature that allows websites to store and access files within their own sandboxed storage area.
FROST does not give a malicious website direct access to another application's files.
Instead, it measures delays caused when multiple programs compete for the same SSD.
The concept is similar to traffic on a shared road. A driver does not need to see another vehicle to know that it is there. If traffic suddenly makes the journey slower, the delay itself provides information.
FROST applies the same principle to storage. A malicious webpage can repeatedly perform storage operations through OPFS and measure tiny changes in how long they take. Those changes can reveal patterns in other activity occurring on the same computer.
The researchers found that the technique could be used to fingerprint websites and applications. In their evaluation, FROST achieved an F1 score of 88.95% for website fingerprinting and 95.83% for application fingerprinting on tested systems. It can also operate remotely through JavaScript without requiring native code execution.
That does not mean websites can simply read a user's files or see everything happening on a computer. FROST is an inference attack. It identifies activity from the timing patterns produced by shared hardware resources.
A specialised threat, but an important warning
Side-channel attacks are not currently the everyday attack method most users are likely to encounter. Cybercriminals generally have easier options, including phishing, credential theft, malware, ransomware and exploiting vulnerable software.
But their importance extends beyond how frequently criminals use them.
Side-channel research repeatedly reveals that security boundaries can be weaker than they appear. A processor, GPU, browser or storage device may never intentionally disclose sensitive information, yet its normal operation can leave behind measurable clues.
From electromagnetic emissions and cryptographic timing to speculative execution, processor frequency, GPU compression and SSD activity, the side channel keeps changing as computing technology evolves.
Computers do not always need to be hacked for them to leak secrets.
Sometimes, all an attacker needs is to listen to what the machine reveals while it is doing its job.
A new Linux botnet named Evooo1Bot is turning internet-facing routers and other gateway devices into SOCKS5 traffic relay nodes, giving attackers a way to route malicious connections through compromised systems while retaining the ability to steal credentials, brute-force SSH accounts, exploit vulnerable devices and launch DDoS attacks.
FortiGuard Labs said it has been tracking the Mirai-based malware since at least July 2026, with activity observed against devices from Alcatel, NETGEAR, Tenda, Mitsubishi Electric, Telesquare and D-Link across multiple regions. Rather than relying on a single attack function, Evooo1Bot combines several capabilities within a modular Linux malware framework.
The malware retains the DDoS engine from the publicly leaked Mirai source code, but expands on the older botnet's approach with encrypted command-and-control communications, an SSH brute-force scanner, a SOCKS5 relay, a credential sniffer and an exploitation module targeting known vulnerabilities.
Mirai's original success was closely tied to internet-connected devices such as routers, cameras and DVRs, many of which were exposed with weak or default credentials. Fortinet previously documented how Mirai could scan for vulnerable systems, brute-force credentials and recruit them into a remotely controlled botnet.
Evooo1Bot takes that model further by adding more ways to use a compromised device after the initial infection.
Its exploit arsenal covers a wide range of internet-facing technologies. Newer builds have been found with modules targeting Hikvision cameras, Atlassian Confluence, Zyxel firewalls, TP-Link routers, D-Link NAS devices, WSO2 products, Kubernetes ingress-nginx and vulnerable PHP-CGI installations. FortiGuard noted, however, that some of the embedded exploits are incorrectly implemented and fail to compromise their intended targets.
When exploitation succeeds, the malware downloads a build suited to the victim's CPU architecture. FortiGuard identified 12 available builds, allowing the operators to target different Linux-based hardware rather than relying on a single binary.
The malware then attempts to make the compromise harder to trace. It clears Bash history and establishes persistence through mechanisms including systemd, SysV init, shell profiles and "rc.local". A cron job also attempts to download the payload again every five minutes, providing another way to restore the malware if it is removed.
Evooo1Bot also checks its surroundings before fully activating. It searches for debuggers, security software, sandboxes, virtual machines, containers and honeypots, indicating that the operators are attempting to distinguish ordinary victims from environments where the malware could be analyzed.
Its encrypted C2 communications operate over port 443, while an interactive shell gives operators direct control over infected systems. The malware also supports file uploads and downloads and uses a 28-command interface for remote operations.
The SOCKS5 component is where Evooo1Bot moves beyond the conventional DDoS-botnet model.
A SOCKS5 proxy can relay network connections through another system. In this case, the infected router becomes the intermediary, allowing attackers to send traffic through the victim's connection. Evooo1Bot supports both direct-listening and reverse-relay modes, which could help operators conceal the origin of malicious traffic, bypass geographic restrictions or reach networks accessible through compromised devices.
Multiple proxy sessions can operate independently, raising another possibility if the botnet expands: monetizing compromised residential connections as proxy infrastructure.
The malware also monitors "/proc/net/tcp" for network activity and attempts to capture HTTP Basic Authentication and Cookie headers. Alongside its shell and file-transfer functions, this gives operators additional opportunities to obtain information from systems positioned behind the compromised gateway.
SSH provides another route into vulnerable systems. Evooo1Bot uses 150 username and password combinations aimed at enterprise-oriented accounts and performs checks after successful authentication to identify possible honeypots.
DDoS remains part of the malware's toolkit, with 16 flood methods inherited from Mirai, including UDP, DNS, SYN, ACK, GRE, fragmented TCP and customizable HTTP floods.
The result is a botnet in which a compromised router can serve several purposes at once: it can participate in DDoS attacks, relay traffic, collect authentication material, provide remote shell access and help operators compromise additional vulnerable systems.
For users and organizations, securing these devices starts with applying firmware and security updates, replacing default administrator credentials and disabling unnecessary remote-access interfaces. Unsupported equipment that no longer receives security updates should also be replaced.
Network defenders should additionally watch for unexpected outbound connections, unusual proxy traffic and unauthorized changes to cron jobs, startup services or shell profiles.
Evooo1Bot shows why internet-facing routers and gateways cannot be treated simply as passive networking equipment. Once compromised, they can become operational infrastructure for an attacker, extending the intrusion far beyond the device itself.
Trezor said its own infrastructure was not compromised and that the incident was discovered after the company was informed of the attack on August 10. The affected customers are located in the US, UK, Sweden, Colombia, Brazil, Italy and Portugal and placed orders between May 10 and August 8.
According to Trezor, the breach exposed the names, phone numbers, email addresses and shipping addresses of 11,742 customers. Information belonging to another 1,947 customers included their names, cities and email addresses. The data had been provided to ShipMonk solely to facilitate order fulfillment and delivery.
“We’re extremely sorry to inform our community that customer personal information, including full names, phone numbers, email addresses, and shipping addresses, has been accessed by an unauthorized actor during this breach,” Trezor said in its security notice.
The company attributed the limited scope of the exposure to its 90-day data retention policy, which it said is also followed by its fulfillment partners. However, Trezor warned that older orders may have been accessible for some of the customers whose information was partially exposed.
Trezor stressed that the incident did not affect its internal systems or the security of its hardware wallets. “To be clear, our systems were not compromised, and your Trezor device is secure, but the affected customers might be targeted by more sophisticated phishing attempts,” the company said.
All customers believed to be affected have been contacted directly by email. Trezor urged them to remain cautious of unexpected messages, particularly those asking for personal details, cryptocurrency information or immediate action.
The company is working with ShipMonk to establish when the compromise occurred and determine the complete extent of the incident.
Reports indicate that ShipMonk informed customers that the attackers gained access to its systems by exploiting a vulnerability in Metabase, a data analytics platform. The incident may be connected to a recently patched SQL injection zero-day affecting Metabase.
The cybercrime group ShinyHunters has also claimed responsibility for an attack on Metabase and subsequently published data it alleged was stolen from the analytics provider. However, the connection between that incident and the ShipMonk breach has not been independently established.
ShipMonk has not publicly confirmed the breach. It also remains unclear whether other organizations or individuals were affected, how much information may have been accessed, and who was ultimately responsible for the attack.
The US Department of Justice’s recent case against GrapheneOS user Sam Tunick has renewed discussions about mobile privacy, digital security and the limits of law enforcement access to personal devices. The GrapheneOS Foundation has responded by defending its open-source operating system and clarifying how its security mechanisms handle deleted information.
The Toronto-based non-profit organization said GrapheneOS is a lawful operating system and rejected any suggestion that the software itself is connected to illegal activity. The foundation emphasized that it has no responsibility to weaken features intended to protect users and their data.
Based on Android and currently designed for Google Pixel devices, GrapheneOS incorporates several security and privacy protections. The foundation argues that developing, distributing or using the operating system is protected under US constitutional principles and that legislation specifically targeting its security capabilities could face constitutional challenges.
One of the features at the centre of the case is GrapheneOS’s "duress password." Tunick reportedly provided the password to a US Customs and Border Protection officer. The feature is designed to trigger an immediate wipe of a device when a specific password or PIN is entered under coercion.
When activated, the process removes the phone’s stored information, including eSIM data. According to the foundation, the wipe occurs immediately, cannot be interrupted and cannot subsequently be reversed. As a result, data erased through the feature cannot be recovered from the device.
Despite the attention surrounding the duress password, the GrapheneOS Foundation has stressed that it represents only one small component of the operating system’s broader security architecture. The organization also cautioned that using such a feature could potentially have physical or legal consequences, meaning users need to consider the risks before relying on it during encounters with authorities or other coercive situations.
The legal dispute is also focused on Tunick’s treatment during the encounter. His attorney has alleged that the border officer did not provide Miranda warnings and disregarded Tunick’s requests to consult a lawyer.
Tunick’s legal team is seeking the exclusion of evidence obtained during the incident. The attorney has argued that the evidence should be dismissed because the authorities allegedly violated Tunick’s constitutional rights.
The case has consequently raised broader questions about the balance between individual privacy, device security and government authority, while putting renewed attention on how privacy-focused operating systems handle data deletion and compelled device access.
Russia-aligned cyberespionage group Laundry Bear, also tracked as Void Blizzard and TA488, is exploiting a Microsoft Exchange Outlook Web Access (OWA) vulnerability to deploy a browser-based backdoor capable of maintaining access to victims' mailboxes even after credentials are changed or systems are reimaged.
Email security firm Proofpoint said it observed the campaign targeting government organizations in the US and Europe, as well as telecommunications, financial, hospitality and aerospace organizations. The activity uses OWAReaper, a sophisticated backdoor delivered through malicious emails exploiting CVE-2026-42897.
CVE-2026-42897 is a cross-site scripting vulnerability caused by inadequate HTML sanitization in OWA. A specially crafted email can contain malicious JavaScript that executes when the recipient opens the message in OWA. Proofpoint calls the technique a "half-click" exploit because opening the email can be enough to trigger the attack, without requiring the victim to click a link or open an attachment. Microsoft disclosed the vulnerability on May 14, 2026, and confirmed active exploitation.
Proofpoint found that infrastructure associated with the campaign had been established as early as March, nearly two months before Microsoft's disclosure, suggesting TA488 may have exploited the vulnerability as a zero-day. The group used ordinary-looking subjects concerning supply chains, research updates, tourism, gas markets and other industry-related information, making the messages less likely to be treated as malicious.
The emails contained JavaScript loaders and Base64-encoded payload fragments hidden within URLs associated with social-media-style icons. Once triggered, the code assembled and executed the OWAReaper payload.
OWAReaper operates entirely within the OWA reading pane. It can collect the victim's email address, username and Outlook configuration, while also attempting to capture credentials by creating invisible DOM elements that allow the browser's autofill mechanism to populate usernames and passwords.
The backdoor's most concerning capability is its persistence. It searches for Outlook add-ins with "ReadWriteMailbox" permissions and can use the "GetClientAccessToken" operation to obtain OAuth tokens. It then abuses Exchange's "UpdateFolder" operation to grant Owner-level permissions to the "Default" user across the victim's mail folders.
Because these permissions are stored server-side, changing the victim's password or reinstalling the compromised computer does not necessarily remove the attacker's access. OWAReaper also enables browser caching and places a malicious iframe into messages stored in OWA's offline IndexedDB database, allowing the payload to execute again when a poisoned message is opened from the cache.
The malware uses multiple channels for command and control. It periodically searches GitHub commit messages for encrypted commands containing the victim's email address and can also receive commands through specially formatted emails stored in OWA's cache.
For data theft, OWAReaper primarily uses HTTPS with encrypted URI paths that can be routed through image CDN services. It also has a direct-server fallback and a DNS-based exfiltration mechanism that encrypts and Base32-encodes stolen data before transmitting it through DNS queries.
Proofpoint linked OWAReaper to TA488 based on behavioral similarities with ZimReaper, malware previously used by the group against Zimbra email servers. In that campaign, TA488 exploited another XSS flaw, CVE-2025-66376, to steal emails, passwords, application passcodes and two-factor authentication codes.
The latest campaign therefore represents an evolution of the group's "half-click" approach, shifting from compromising individual webmail sessions toward establishing persistent access within the victim's mailbox environment.
Microsoft has since released security updates addressing CVE-2026-42897. The July 2026 Exchange Server update states that the code fix is available, while organizations that previously applied Microsoft's mitigation must follow Microsoft's guidance to remove it after installing the update. The vulnerability affects on-premises Exchange Server deployments, while Exchange Online is not affected.
Proofpoint has published indicators of compromise for the campaign, including malicious domains and the HTML message body containing the exploit and OWAReaper payload. Organizations using affected on-premises Exchange deployments should therefore investigate not only compromised endpoints, but also mailbox permissions, OAuth tokens and OWA browser storage when responding to suspected exploitation.