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Docker Fixes Critical Sandboxes Flaw That Could Expose Host Files

 




Docker has patched two vulnerabilities in Docker Sandboxes that could allow malicious code running inside an isolated sandbox to cross its intended workspace boundary and interact with resources on the host system.

The more severe issue, tracked as CVE-2026-77179, affects Docker Sandboxes versions 0.28.0 through versions before 0.42.0 on macOS and is rated Critical. Docker fixed the vulnerability in Sandboxes 0.42.0, released September 7. The company disclosed the security issues publicly on September 15.

Docker Sandboxes are designed to give AI coding agents their own microVM environment where they can execute code, install packages and use development tools without directly accessing the host. The security architecture treats the microVM as the primary trust boundary, with the agent receiving full control, including "sudo", inside that environment. Resources such as a developer's project directory are selectively exposed across the boundary.

The problem in CVE-2026-77179 occurs in the virtio-fs host server, which handles filesystem sharing between the macOS host and the sandbox. Docker said the component could follow a symbolic link when reopening an unlinked file through a previously stored pathname.

A malicious process inside the VM could exploit this behavior by changing a parent directory into a symbolic link after the original path had been accepted. When the host subsequently reused the stored path, the operation could be redirected to a different location outside the authorized workspace.

This creates a path traversal condition across the VM boundary. Docker said an attacker could consequently read or modify arbitrary host files available to the account running the virtual machine monitor. Depending on what files can be changed, the access could potentially be turned into host-side code execution.

The requirement for malicious code to already be executing inside the sandbox does not eliminate the security concern. Docker Sandboxes are intended to contain precisely the type of untrusted code that an autonomous coding agent might encounter through a compromised repository, malicious dependency, poisoned package or manipulated instruction. If that code can alter host-visible filesystem paths, the microVM's isolation boundary becomes vulnerable at the point where the host performs the subsequent filesystem operation.

The second vulnerability, CVE-2026-79994, affects versions 0.37.0 through versions before 0.42.0. Docker rates it High with a CVSS 4.0 score of 8.7.

This issue affects the guest-to-host relay used for Unix domain sockets. The relay initially verified that a requested socket was located inside an authorized workspace, but later established the connection by using the pathname again. A malicious guest could change an intermediate directory into a symlink during that interval, causing the host to connect to an AF_UNIX socket outside the permitted workspace.

The vulnerability is classified as a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition, because the security decision is made against a pathname whose meaning can change before the privileged operation occurs. The resulting connection could expose data or host-side capabilities provided by the targeted socket.

Together, the two flaws expose different host interfaces through a similar underlying weakness: trusting a pathname after an attacker-controlled environment has had an opportunity to alter what that pathname resolves to.

The risk is amplified by how Sandboxes share development workspaces. Docker says "sbx run" normally mounts the current directory into the sandbox with read-write access, meaning an agent can directly modify the developer's working tree. Docker also warns that files such as Git hooks, CI configuration, IDE task definitions and project scripts can affect subsequent host-side development activity.

For users unable to update immediately, Docker recommends clone mode and advises against additional read-write host mounts. Clone mode mounts the repository read-only at "/run/sandbox/source" while the agent works from a private clone inside the VM. However, it is not a confidentiality boundary: files available in the mounted repository, including untracked files such as ".env", may still be readable by the agent.

Docker has reported no exploitation of either vulnerability. Neither issue was listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog at the time of disclosure.

The company credited Oren Yomtov of accomplish.ai with discovering CVE-2026-77179 and Jurre van Bergen of ThreatNotify with finding CVE-2026-79994.

The fixes arrived amid wider security scrutiny of AI coding environments. Earlier research from Cyera Research Labs demonstrated how a prompt-injected coding agent operating inside a Docker-based environment could be used as part of an attack chain against the host through a separate Docker Engine vulnerability. The latest disclosures reinforce the importance of treating autonomous coding agents as potentially hostile workloads, even when they are placed inside purpose-built isolation mechanisms.

Users running affected Sandboxes versions should upgrade to 0.42.0 or later. Docker Sandboxes 0.43.0, released September 15, is the latest stable release as of September 18.

FBI Seizes NightmareStresser DDoS-for-Hire Domains in Global Crackdown

 

The U.S. Department of Justice has announced the court-authorized seizure of internet domains linked to “NightmareStresser,” one of the world’s longest-running Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) for-hire services. The operation, led by the FBI Anchorage Field Office with support from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, targets so-called “booter” and “stresser” platforms that enable paying customers to launch powerful cyberattacks against individuals, organizations, and critical online infrastructure across Alaska and globally. 

According to the seizure warrant affidavit, NightmareStresser was used to carry out hundreds of thousands of actual or attempted DDoS attacks worldwide since 2022. These services lower the barrier to entry for cybercrime by allowing users with minimal technical expertise to disrupt internet connections, knock targeted devices offline (“booting”), and degrade or completely interrupt access to websites and online services. Victims have included schools, government agencies, gaming platforms, and millions of everyday users whose connectivity was affected by these coordinated attacks.

The takedown forms part of Operation PowerOFF, an ongoing international law enforcement initiative aimed at dismantling criminal DDoS-for-hire infrastructures and holding both administrators and users accountable. Over the past eight years, federal prosecutors and investigators in Anchorage and Los Angeles have charged twelve defendants involved in facilitating DDoS-for-hire services and seized more than 100 associated domains. This latest action expands on those efforts by targeting all known booter sites, shutting down as many as possible, and coupling enforcement with a public education campaign on the harms caused by illegal DDoS activity. 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Adam Alexander and Ainsley McNerney are prosecuting the case in the District of Alaska. The Justice Department emphasizes that booter and stresser services not only harm direct targets but also undermine broader internet reliability and safety. As digital dependence grows, such crackdowns signal a sustained push to disrupt the ecosystem enabling low-cost, high-impact cyberattacks—and to deter would-be offenders by removing the domains and infrastructure these services rely on to operate.

Unbound 1.26.1 Patches Critical RCE, DoS, and DNSSEC Flaws

 

A major security update has been issued for Unbound, the widely used validating DNS resolver developed by NLnet Labs. On September 16, 2026, the project disclosed a batch of high-severity vulnerabilities affecting versions up to and including 1.26.0, with fixes released in version 1.26.1. These flaws range from heap buffer overflows and use-after-free bugs to DNSSEC validation bypasses, any of which could allow attackers to crash servers or, in some cases, achieve remote code execution. 

RCE and denial-of-service risks 

Among the most serious issues is a heap buffer overflow in Unbound’s DNSSEC validator that can be triggered by a malicious DNSKEY record containing a self-referential compression pointer. This bug, credited to researchers from Nankai University, can lead to denial of service and potential remote code execution because the digest buffer overflows when processing such crafted records. Two additional memory-corruption bugs were also reported: one in DNSSEC canonicalization that affects long query names over TCP, and another in CNAME synthesis that can progressively corrupt heap memory and, under specific conditions, allow code execution. All three vulnerabilities are fixed in the 1.26.1 release, and manual patches are available for administrators who cannot immediately upgrade. 

Unbound’s support for encrypted DNS transports is also affected. A use-after-free bug in the DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) implementation can be triggered by a malicious client that sends a RESET_STREAM and withholds ACKs, eventually causing the server to exit abnormally after as few as 20 queries. Similarly, a use-after-free in the DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) cleanup path can be exploited when RPZ drops queries or under heavy traffic, potentially leading to process termination on hardened allocators. In addition, a degradation-of-service flaw in TCP/DoT handling allows an attacker to monopolize a worker’s event loop by streaming distinct uncached queries over a single connection, with no limit on consecutive reads. Fixes for these issues adjust stream shutdown behavior, correct DoH mesh accounting, and introduce read limits similar to those already used for UDP. 

Beyond memory safety, several logic errors undermine Unbound’s security guarantees. A ZONEMD verification bypass creates a window where tampered zone data can be served or written to disk before integrity checks complete, affecting zones below a trust anchor. A cross-zone cache-poisoning bug allows a malicious actor controlling one delegated zone under an NSEC-signed parent to inject insecure wildcard DS records for unrelated sibling domains, effectively forging delegations. Another flaw lets the “serve-expired” feature bypass the wait-limit counter introduced for the DNSBomb mitigation (CVE-2024-33655), enabling pulsing DoS amplification attacks from a single IP. The “ReTrap” family of algorithmic-complexity attacks (TagTrap, DelegationTrap, NsecTrap, AdditionalTrap) can also degrade service by forcing excessive DNSSEC validation work; Unbound 1.26.1 adds throttles and disables validation of the additional section by default to mitigate this. 

Role of administrators 

All users running Unbound 1.26.0 or earlier are urged to upgrade to version 1.26.1 as soon as possible, especially on internet-facing resolvers or those handling DNSSEC-validated traffic. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, NLnet Labs provides individual patches for each CVE that can be applied manually to the source tree. Operators should also review configurations for features like DNS-over-QUIC, DNS-over-HTTPS, DNSCrypt, response-ip/RPZ, and serve-expired, since several vulnerabilities require these options to be enabled. Given Unbound’s role in the DNS infrastructure of countless networks, prompt patching is critical to prevent outages and exploitation in the wild.

Cyberattack Knocks International Meteor Organization Website Offline

 

A cyberattack has forced the International Meteor Organization (IMO), one of the leading providers of meteor observation, to take much of the website offline. Founded in 1988, the Belgium-based independent organization reported that the cyberattack caused severe damage to the aging infrastructure and left the organization dealing with several weeks of partial downtime as it transitions to new infrastructure. 

The organization has replaced its website with a static notice informing the visitors about the incident and warning that features will return gradually. “We recently suffered a cyberattack that dealt a critical blow to aging infrastructure, taking much of our site offline,” the organization said. It explained that it expects several weeks of partial downtime while transitioning to new infrastructure and services. The IMO has prioritized restoring its fireball reporting system which is already available for users to submit their observations. The organization also shared its meteor and asteroid-related information on its Facebook page. 

The IMO was formed to bring amateur and professional meteor observers and scientists together. The organization has played an essential role in the development of international standards for meteor observations and the maintenance of a global database of meteor and fireball reports containing photographs, videos and telescopic observations. The organization has not publicly identified those responsible for the attack, and no hacking group had claimed responsibility as of Wednesday afternoon. The organization also did not respond to requests for additional comment. The incident comes shortly before the IMO’s annual international conference that is set to take place next week in France. 

It is unclear if the cyberattack will impact the event or the organization’s other activities. The incident also shows the growing interest of cybercriminals in targeting organizations involved in space and scientific research. U.S. agencies have warned that the rising economic importance of the space industry can attract attackers and organizations that engage in space-related activities can become potential targets. Attackers have targeted the National Science Foundation’s National Optical-Infrared Astronomy Research Laboratory in Hawai’i and the Atacama Large Millimeter Array observatory in Chile in 2023. 

The American Meteorological Society was also targeted by ransomware in the same year. For now, the IMO is focused on rebuilding its infrastructure and restoring the services after the attack, with additional website features expected to return as the transition progresses.

Brevo Breach Exposes Customer Websites to ClickFix Malware


Email marketing and customer relationship management platform Brevo, formerly known as Sendinblue, suffered a supply chain attack in which malicious code was able to reach Brevo's own websites as well as customers' websites utilizing embedded Brevo services. 

Researchers at Sansec discovered that the incident was much more extensive than the six accounts previously revealed. When Brevo infrastructure was compromised on September 14, 2026, malicious JavaScript began to be served. In addition, Sansec found evidence that more than 100,000 customer websites utilizing Brevo components may have been exposed as a result of the attack. 

There were two main infection paths used in the campaign: a malicious WordPress plugin that targeted site administrators and a ClickFix overlay that was displayed to visitors. 

Malicious Code Reached Embedded Brevo Components

Brevo-hosted pages as well as JavaScript resources commonly embedded in customer websites were identified as containing the injected code. These included Brevo trackers, Conversations chat widgets, as well as other forms hosted on Brevo servers. 

Modified versions of the JavaScript assets directed browsers to infrastructure controlled by attackers, which served the malicious malware loader. Sansec identified several malicious subdomains under the Brevo domain sendibt1.com. A number of hostnames were affected, including cdn.sendibt1.com, cdn2.sendibt1.com, cdn3.sendibt1.com, cdn4.sendibt1.com, cdn9.sendibt1.com, cdn10.sendibt1.com, and cdn11.sendibt1.com. 

A SSL certificate for cdn.sendibt1.com was also discovered on August 25, which indicates that the attackers had gained access to Brevo's DNS records. A malicious content display was observed on September 14 from approximately 16:05 until 20:13 UTC, which was observed by researchers. 

A total of 2,549 breaches of Content Security Policy were reported across 12 sites during and after the attack window. These hosts stopped resolving on September 15, while the affected files were reported clean at the site of origin. 

ClickFix Campaign Targeted Website Visitors

Injected malware delivered different payloads depending on the visitor. When a visitor was detected as a WordPress administrator, it attempted to install a plugin from a Brevo subdomain controlled by the attacker. A fake verification prompt was displayed using the ClickFix technique to visitors, instructing them to copy a command and execute it under the pretext of demonstrating their humanity. According to Sansec, the malware did not activate for crawlers, developers, or automated scanners, therefore preventing it from being detected during routine inspections. 

WordPress Sites Faced a Deeper Threat 

A more significant risk was posed to WordPress administrators by the attack. When the compromised Brevo script identified an administrator already logged into a WordPress site, it attempted to download and install plugins from attacker-controlled infrastructure. 

BleepingComputer examined a copy of the plugin, which was disguised as Web Media Optimizer, but was actually a JavaScript loader and persistent backdoor. Installing this plugin allowed it to hide from the normal WordPress plugin list and copy itself into the must-use plugins directory, making its removal more difficult. Additionally, the plugin contacted attacker-controlled infrastructure to obtain additional JavaScript, allowing malicious content to continue loading even if the remote server was unavailable, as researchers discovered. 

A critical feature of the plugin was that it contained a hardcoded authentication mechanism capable of creating a valid administrator session without requiring the legitimate administrator password. This allowed attackers to continue access to a compromised WordPress installation beyond Brevo's original exposure period. 

Brevo Took Down the Malicious Infrastructure

After detecting the intrusion, Brevo removed the malicious Cloudflare Worker and associated routes. As a result of the compromise, Brevo revoked its API key and credentials, removed attacker-controlled hostnames and purified edge caches. Additionally, the hardcoded Cloudflare credential was removed from the source code of the company. 

Sansec reports that malicious hosts began to cease resolving on September 15 and Brevo's affected files were restored to their original versions. Although the delivery window ended, the malware was not removed from WordPress sites where the rogue plugin had already been installed. Additionally, Brevo SSO security incident reported on September 10 also occurred following the incident. It was reported that six customer accounts were accessed unauthorised and were used for phishing, as well as contact data exported from 43 other accounts in that incident. 

A public connection has not been established between Brevo's earlier incident and Cloudflare's subsequent compromise. The Brevo incident illustrates the threat of third-party services that extend beyond the infrastructure of the provider and affect websites which utilize embedded scripts. Additionally, the combination of ClickFix lures and persistent WordPress backdoors creates a higher risk for website administrators and visitors alike.

Cyberattack on Tanker Prompts Coast Guard-FBI Security Boarding

 

A tanker crossing the Gulf of Mexico was boarded by U.S. Coast Guard and FBI personnel last month after its onboard network came under attack from hackers, the Coast Guard has confirmed. The confirmation followed a Wall Street Journal report indicating that at least two U.S.-bound tankers had been targeted in separate cyber incidents. Bloomberg News named one of the affected vessels as VL Prosperity, while Iran's state-backed outlet Mehr reported the ship went dark for a day and a half after losing its communications systems. Neither the FBI nor several other federal agencies contacted for comment addressed the incident directly, instead referring inquiries to the Coast Guard. 

A spokesperson there said the boarding was carried out to verify that the ship's technology systems remained intact after signs emerged that the network had been infiltrated by actors operating from outside the country. The operation took place on August 21 and involved a joint team: Coast Guard law enforcement officers, a cyber protection unit, a vessel inspector, and cyber specialists from the FBI. The spokesperson emphasized that no disruptions to the ship's operations, structural stability, crew safety, or the surrounding environment had been identified so far. Coast Guard officials declined to elaborate on how the breach occurred, who may have been responsible, or whether the tanker boarded that day was in fact VL Prosperity. 

A second vessel was reportedly boarded three days later, on August 24, per the Journal's reporting. Mehr's account places the origin of the attack earlier, on August 7, while the Liberian-flagged VL Prosperity was passing through the Strait of Gibraltar en route from Egypt to a U.S. port. One crew member described to Mehr how the intruders were reportedly able to remotely increase engine speed and shut down tanks holding fuel and engine oil. Analysts cited by the outlet, without offering direct evidence, tied the episode to broader tensions between the U.S. and Iran, though no group has publicly claimed involvement. Bloomberg later placed the tanker off the Texas coastline. The Coast Guard said it remains in contact with port operators, ship owners, and regional maritime partners to keep operations running smoothly. 

A separate incident struck just a day earlier, when North Carolina Ports disclosed that an external hacker or group had breached its IT infrastructure, pushing staff to switch to manual processes. The organization said it activated emergency protocols and looped in both state agencies and the Coast Guard. Maritime infrastructure worldwide has increasingly become a target for ransomware operators over the past several years, a trend tied to the sector's growing reliance on connected systems. 

The Port of Seattle famously refused to pay hackers who disrupted its airport and seaport operations around Labor Day in 2024. Similar attacks hit European ports and shipping firms Royal Dirkzwager and DNV in 2023, while Oiltanking and Mabanaft both declared force majeure after 2022 cyber incidents. Freight company Expeditors International also spent months recovering operational systems following its own attack.

Parallels Desktop Vulnerability Gives Any Local Mac User Full Root Access, Intel Mac Users Left Without a Clear Fix

 




Security researchers at JFrog disclosed the vulnerability on Tuesday, assigning it the identifier CVE-2026-90894 and the nickname "ParaShells." JFrog rates the flaw 7.8 out of 10 on the CVSS severity scale. The bug does not allow remote attacks over a network. An attacker needs code already running on the machine as an ordinary local user, but once that condition is met, exploitation does not require administrator rights, a signed Parallels client, or an active virtual machine. 


What Parallels Desktop Is and Why This Matters

Parallels Desktop runs Windows and Linux inside virtual machines on a Mac. It installs a background service called prl_disp_service that runs as root, because its work includes setting up host networking and unpacking virtual machine packages. The flaw is on the Mac side of the product, so the machine at risk is the Mac itself rather than the virtual machines on it. 

That distinction is important. Many Mac users who run Parallels think of security risks as something that might affect the virtual Windows or Linux environment inside. ParaShells skips the guest entirely and compromises the Mac host directly.


How the Attack Works

The exploit chains together three separate weaknesses, none of which would be enough on its own.

The vulnerability combines three security weaknesses: a world-writable Unix socket, weak local client authentication, and argument injection during appliance extraction. On a default installation, prl_disp_service listens through /var/run/prl_disp_service.socket. JFrog researchers found that the socket could have 0777 permissions, allowing any local process to connect. 

The login call that follows, PrlSrv_LoginLocal, checks only the credentials the kernel reports for the connecting process. It needs no Parallels code signature and works for an account that is not an administrator. 

The third piece is where things get technically interesting. To install a virtual machine appliance, the service builds its unpack command as one line of text, tar -xf "%1" -C "%2". It then splits that text back into separate arguments using Qt's QProcess::splitCommand. The caller chooses part of that text, because it picks the folder the new virtual machine goes into. A double quote inside the folder name closes the quoting early, so whatever the attacker put after it becomes extra options for tar instead of part of a path. 

The option JFrog used was --use-compress-program, which tells macOS tar to hand the archive to another program first. Because tar is running as root here, that program runs as root too. JFrog's test script wrote a passwordless sudo rule and opened a root shell. 

In the lab demonstration, the sequence plays out in seconds: connect to the socket, send a crafted appliance install request with a poisoned directory path, and watch the compression program execute as uid 0. JFrog assembled this into a one-liner but has chosen not to publish that script, releasing the technical breakdown without the ready-to-fire weapon.

Yuval Moravchick, JFrog's vulnerability research team lead, explained: "The chain is short: A world-writable Unix socket, a login that trusts peer credentials rather than a Team ID, and an appliance unpack path that builds tar arguments using Qt string splitting. A quote in the parent path injects --use-compress-program=, and macOS tar runs the attacker's script as uid 0." 


Who Is Most at Risk

The danger is highest on developer laptops, where a single poisoned Homebrew formula or malicious npm preinstall script can go from local user to full control, and on shared university and corporate machines that have many local accounts. 

The threat model here is real and not hypothetical. Software developers routinely run third-party tools through package managers like Homebrew or execute npm scripts from projects they pull from the internet. Every one of those code paths represents a potential entry point for an attacker who knows the machine has Parallels installed. On a shared training lab or university computer lab Mac with a dozen local accounts, a single weak password or compromised student account is all it takes.

"From root, the attacker can replace system software, read other users' data, and persist via launchd," Moravchick noted. That last point about launchd persistence is particularly concerning because an attacker who establishes root access through this chain can survive a reboot by registering their own background processes with macOS's system daemon manager. 

JFrog also confirmed no virtual machine needs to be actively running. The vulnerable service, prl_disp_service, starts automatically via a launch daemon at load, runs as root, and exposes the socket regardless of whether any VM is open. Simply having Parallels Desktop installed is enough to create the exposure. 


The Patch Is Out, With a Catch

JFrog reported CVE-2026-90894 to Parallels maker Alludo, which fixed it in Parallels Desktop v27.0.0, released at the beginning of September 2026. The fix is real, but getting to it is not straightforward for a meaningful portion of Parallels' user base. 

Parallels Desktop 27 needs a Mac with an Apple silicon chip. Its system requirements list Apple silicon only for the processor and macOS Sonoma 14.7 or newer for the operating system. On earlier releases of macOS, including Ventura 13, the installer sets up an older version of the product instead. Parallels removed Intel Mac support in version 27 and says the change follows Apple's plans rather than its own. 

For Intel Mac users, the situation is murky. Intel users are told to stay on Parallels Desktop 26. "Parallels Desktop 26 fully supports Intel-based Mac computers today, and that will not change," the company wrote on 25 August, three weeks before this flaw became public, adding that Intel users can keep using version 26 and "expect future security and maintenance updates." 

The problem is that according to JFrog, "Hosts that stay on the 26.x line, including 26.4.2, do not have that extract change." JFrog does not say it tested 26.4.1 or 26.4.2, and its writeup says it did not check older builds. 

Parallels has not published a statement about CVE-2026-90894, and its list of security fixes, which maps each flaw to the version that repairs it, has not been reviewed since May 2025 and does not include this one. That leaves Intel Mac users running Parallels in a difficult position: a confirmed flaw, a fix that requires hardware they do not have, and no public acknowledgment from the vendor about plans for their platform. 

The release notes for Parallels Desktop 26.4.2, which shipped on September 8, describe a single change related to Enterprise edition deployment and say nothing about a security fix for the extract path.


What Organizations Should Do Now

JFrog's immediate guidance comes in three parts: find every Mac in your environment running Parallels Desktop, restrict who can log in to those machines locally, and upgrade to version 27.0.0 or later where possible.

Two commands can confirm exposure without making any changes to the system. Running defaults read "/Applications/Parallels Desktop.app/Contents/Info" CFBundleShortVersionString reports the installed version, and ls -l /var/run/prl_disp_service.socket shows the socket permissions. JFrog says a socket showing srwxrwxrwx on a build at or near 26.4.0 should be treated as exposed until a patched build is confirmed. 

Administrators using device management to push updates should check version rules before pushing anything. Parallels warns that a policy which sends out new major versions automatically will try to install version 27 on Intel Macs and fail. 

One more complication: none of the published material says whether installing a fixed build removes access an attacker has already taken. JFrog notes that an attacker who reaches root can keep a foothold through launchd, which a product update would not clear. For any machine where compromise is suspected, an update alone is not enough. 


Vercel Sandbox Challenge Uncovers Linux Kernel Flaws


 Vercel has conducted a two-week security challenge that has uncovered numerous vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel networking stack that is used by its Firecracker microVM sandbox. This program, supported by a $1 million reward pool, examined researchers' abilities to break out of an environment that isolates untrusted artificial intelligence-agent code from other software. There were 1,285 vulnerability reports generated as a result of the challenge running from August 18 to September 1. 


There have been about $325,000 in payouts to date for one critical, seven high-severity, 15 medium-severity, 49 low-severity and 19 informative findings validated by Vercel. Even though there were many submissions, none of them demonstrated access to actual customer data. Two separate flaws were found in the Linux kernel networking stack rather than Vercel's own sandbox code that were the most significant. 

Various issues can lead to memory leaks from the host kernel, while others can cause a host system crash deterministically. It is particularly relevant to cloud environments since Linux kernel isolation layers are used by many infrastructure platforms. Therefore, a vulnerability that crosses the boundary between a microVM and its host may result in consequences that extend beyond a single deployment or service. 

There were roughly two weeks before the Linux kernel maintainers were informed about the kernel issues, according to Vercel. Details remain undisclosed while fixes are in private review, with CVEs expected to be assigned after public disclosure. In addition to white-box testing, Trail of Bits engineers reported 20 findings after participating in the challenge. 

The assessment did not only identify individual vulnerabilities but also highlighted architectural concerns related to the data movement between the host control plane and the guest environment. It was recommended that all values generated within the microVM be treated as untrusted guest input. Vercel acknowledged that certain values returned by software running within a guest had been accepted by its control plane, creating an architectural risk at the boundary of the sandbox. 

AI-Assisted Triage Handles Report Surge 

A separate challenge for Vercel was also presented during the two-week program: handling the staggering number of vulnerability reports generated. When 1,285 submissions were received within a short period of time, the original review process, involving a human assessment of each report, soon became challenging to scale.

Vercel developed the Eve framework as a means of implementing an agentic triage system. Using Vercel Sandbox, the system can evaluate submitted reports against program rules, identify duplicates, access relevant source code, and execute researchers’ proof-of-concept code. This approach was implemented to alleviate the manual workload that was created by the unusually high number of submissions. 

The volume itself was partly influenced by the challenge structure, which encouraged researchers to actively seek ways to avoid the sandbox boundaries. As Vercel noted, the experience also demonstrated the effectiveness of AI-assisted security research in facilitating the discovery of new vulnerabilities more quickly. 

The white box assessment, in addition to identifying technical vulnerabilities, also revealed architectural findings concerning the trust relationship between microVM guest hosts and control planes. According to the assessment, some values returned by software running inside a microVM were accepted by the control plane.

A Vercel representative stated that such values should not be treated as trusted data, but rather as tenant-controlled inputs. This company recommends obtaining sensitive values from the server end or encrypting them with cryptographic signatures with keys that cannot be accessed from the guest environment in order to protect them. According to the company, the findings have resulted in changes to the security controls and sandbox architecture. 

While the Linux kernel issues remain under coordinated disclosure, technical details and CVE identifiers will be kept confidential until the fixes are published publicly. There was no evidence of customer data access as a result of the challenge, however, the kernel findings remain significant as the affected networking layer sits beneath isolation mechanisms in many cloud environments. 

After patches are released and technical disclosures are made, the scope of affected systems will be determined and remediation requirements will be determined for Linux-based infrastructures.

US Lawmakers Raise Alarm Over Alleged Hacking by India-Based Firms


Three Indian-based companies have been accused of conducting hacking campaigns and stealing data from thousands of Americans and US businesses, according to a bipartisan group of US senators. As part of the request, the lawmakers sought restrictions that could limit companies' access to American technology and services in a letter to U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. 

Among the companies named in the letter are Sunkissed Organic Pvt Ltd, BellTrox Ltd, and CyberRoot Ltd. Democratic Senator Ron Wyden and Sheldon Whitehouse, along with Republican Senator Pat Harrigan, allege that the groups had engaged in targeted espionage activities against US citizens, businesses and legal professionals over the past fifteen years. 

A number of senators cited investigations conducted by Reuters and The Citizen Lab, in which they claimed that the companies had been involved in hacking campaigns targeting pharmaceutical companies, private equity firms, and attorneys employed by major law firms. It was stated in the letter that the groups operated under the direction of the Qatari government and some of these operations were intended to influence ongoing litigation. 

According to the senators, the alleged activities included targeting individuals who oppose Qatar's bid for the World Cup, as well as the family members of the former Republican Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 

A number of allegations go beyond the hacking activities themselves, as well. A number of foreign legal actions were taken by legislators that were intended to restrict public reporting of the alleged activities. One such case involved Appin, in which executives related to the company obtained a global court order from an Indian court requiring Reuters to cease investigating the company. The order was subsequently lifted, allowing the investigation to be republished by Reuters. According to the senators, the episode illustrates the possibility of restricting the availability of American information through foreign legal proceedings. Additionally, previous reporting has documented legal threats to media outlets that cover alleged hack-for-hire operations related to Appin. The US Commerce Department has now requested that BellTroX, CyberRoot, and Sunkissed Organic Farms be added to the Entity List by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the US Commerce Department. By making such a designation, US companies may not export or transfer certain technologies, software, and other controlled items to these listed entities without a license. The requested restrictions would specifically target access to American software, cloud infrastructure, and cybersecurity tools. This move remains a request from Congress, and any Entity List designation requires the Commerce Department to take action. US authorities are now considering possible restrictions on the three firms' access to American technology and services in light of the lawmakers' request for the three firms to be under renewed scrutiny.

Acronis Discloses Actively Exploited Privilege Escalation Bug in Its cPanel Backup Plugin

 




Acronis has confirmed that attackers are actively exploiting a high-severity security flaw in its backup plugin for cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM), urging system administrators to install available patches without delay.

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-87886 and rated high severity, allows local privilege escalation through insecure file permissions. Classified under CWE-276 (incorrect default permissions), the flaw affects Linux-based installations of the Acronis backup plugin and, if exploited successfully, could allow a threat actor to compromise system confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 

The flaw received its CVE designation on Tuesday, September 16, after Acronis quietly published a brief initial advisory over the weekend. The company assigned it a CVSS severity score of 7.8.


What the Plugin Does

To understand the risk here, it helps to know what this software actually sits on top of. The Acronis Backup plugin for WHM and cPanel gives hosting providers and web professionals cloud backup capabilities and granular, self-service recovery for end clients, including the ability to back up an entire cPanel server to cloud storage. 

Acronis is a cybersecurity and data protection technology company that is popular among web hosting providers and managed service providers, since its platform lets them offer backup and security to their clients under their own branding. Its backup add-ons connect cPanel and Plesk to Acronis' cloud infrastructure, letting administrators back up and recover sites, databases, and mailboxes. 

That puts the plugin in a particularly sensitive position on any server it runs on. An attacker who can escalate privileges inside this kind of environment has a direct path to the backup data of every customer account on that server.

The market footprint here is worth noting. According to the 2026 Web Hosting Trends Report by WebPros, cPanel/WHM leads the hosting control panel market with 64% adoption, while Plesk accounts for 31%. Both platforms are affected by this vulnerability, though active exploitation so far appears confined to cPanel and WHM deployments. 


How the Attack Works

CVE-2026-87886 stems from insecure file permissions and allows authenticated attackers to achieve local privilege escalation without any user interaction. The vulnerability's CVSS string indicates that it can be exploited in low-complexity attacks, meaning the attack does not require special conditions or circumstances beyond the attacker's control to succeed. 

In plain terms: an attacker who already has a low-level foothold on a vulnerable Linux server running this plugin can use this flaw to climb to higher privilege levels, without needing to trick a user or wait for any specific system event. Depending on the access gained, this could allow sensitive data to be accessed or modified and could potentially disrupt the server. 

The type of data at risk includes backup data, system files, and customer account data. 


Targeted Attacks, Limited Disclosure

Acronis' advisory language around the exploitation is measured but direct. The company stated that "exploitation of this vulnerability has been detected in the wild in limited, targeted attacks against Acronis Backup plugin for cPanel and WHM deployments." 

However, the disclosure comes with some important caveats. BleepingComputer reported that Acronis based that assessment on a single report from a potentially affected customer. That is enough to justify urgent patching, but it is not the same as evidence of broad, automated exploitation across hosting providers. 

There are currently no signs of active exploitation on Plesk deployments. Still, the extension for Plesk remains vulnerable and should be patched regardless. 

Acronis has not published detailed technical information about the flaw, saying it wants to give system administrators time to apply available patches before sharing further details. The company has also identified no specific indicators of compromise and has not disclosed when the activity occurred or what attackers achieved beyond the privilege escalation impact described in the advisory.


What Needs to Be Patched

Acronis pushed out security updates for the affected plugins before the CVE was formally assigned. The versions administrators need to be on are:

Acronis Backup plugin for cPanel and WHM builds earlier than 1.9.3.1021, now fixed in version 1.9.3 HF3, and Acronis Backup extension for Plesk builds earlier than 1.8.11.638, fixed in version 1.8.11. 

For shared hosting providers, the guidance is to check every server image and automation path, rather than assuming the version on one control-plane node represents the entire fleet. Once patched, administrators should also focus review on systems where initial access was plausible: servers hosting compromised sites, accounts with recent credential resets, and hosts that allow customers to upload or execute code. 

One additional note worth flagging: a cPanel or Plesk server without the Acronis plugin or extension is outside the scope of CVE-2026-87886. This is an Acronis integration issue, not a blanket advisory for every cPanel, WHM, or Plesk installation. 


Acronis is a Swiss cybersecurity company headquartered in Schaffhausen and operates a global network of cloud data centers, supporting over 20,000 service providers that protect approximately 750,000 businesses worldwide. That scale makes vulnerabilities in its hosting integrations a high-priority concern for the managed service provider community, where a single compromised server can cascade into customer data across dozens or hundreds of accounts. 

The company has not indicated whether it plans to release a more detailed post-mortem on the exploitation activity once patching rates improve, which is a common practice after actively exploited flaws. For now, the immediate priority is getting affected installations onto the fixed builds before whatever foothold attackers have found gets wider use.

Spanish Data Watchdog Publicises First AI Agent-Linked Data Breach Report

Spain's data protection watchdog said it has received the first reported notification of a personal data breach allegedly carried out by an artificial intelligence agent, a case suggesting autonomous systems are beginning to play a direct role in cyberattacks. The Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) said in a blog post Monday that the incident involved an AI agent using a widely known large language model to identify vulnerabilities, gain access to a system, and subsequently modify personal data and access invoices. 

The agency said the alleged breach was reported by the affected organization and remains under review. It clarified that the use of a particular AI model does not imply the model itself or its provider's infrastructure was compromised, nor that the technology was built for malicious purposes. AEPD did not immediately respond to a request for comment and did not identify the large language model or the targeted organization. 

According to AEPD, the case is significant because a third party allegedly used an AI agent to carry out multiple stages of an attack with limited human intervention, underscoring the growing role autonomous systems are playing in cybersecurity incidents. The notification submitted by the affected organization indicated that the agent successfully logged into the system, autonomously searched for application weaknesses, and after identifying a vulnerability, altered personal information and viewed billing records. 

The incident emerges as regulators and cybersecurity authorities across the United States and Europe intensify scrutiny of risks posed by increasingly capable AI systems, even as businesses continue adopting the technology at a rapid pace. Spain has positioned itself as one of Europe's most vocal advocates for a "trustworthy AI" model — one that prioritizes protecting privacy, democracy, minors, and public safety over speed or industry profit. 

While AEPD acknowledged that a single case is insufficient to establish a broader trend, it said the notification suggests AI-assisted attacks are moving beyond the theoretical stage and beginning to affect real-world processing of personal data. The watchdog did not indicate when it would complete its review of the reported breach. 

AEPD noted that AI does not create fundamentally new threats but increases the speed, scale, and adaptability of existing malicious techniques, thereby reducing the time available to detect and contain them. The agency added that data controllers, processors, and data protection officers must prepare for a scenario in which the speed of attacks will continue to accelerate.

Homebrew 7.0.0 Ships With Fixes for Eight Security Advisories

 

Homebrew, a popular package manager for installing command-line tools and desktop apps on macOS and Linux, released version 7.0.0 on Sunday, with eight security advisories closed in the process. The most severe of the 18 reported issues is an unsigned removal metadata vulnerability for a cask, a formula in Homebrew's format for prebuilt app installs, allowing arbitrary sudo commands.

Homebrew removed the vulnerable recovery code and associated API accessors. Seven of the advisories were addressed in earlier 6.0.x releases, which means auto-updating machines already carry those fixes. The eighth is new and would let a malicious cask execute code outside the sandbox of a macOS via LaunchServices. Homebrew classified the issues as one High, two Moderate, and five Low. The High severity sudo path issue was fixed in 6.0.12, where a Moderate was also addressed for preventing the installer from reading Git config owned by the Homebrew prefix, which could run programs as root. 

The second Moderate is the LaunchServices escape mentioned earlier, which is fixed in 7.0.0 by restricting launching of applications, Mach services, and Unix socket connection. The five Low-level issues were fixed earlier and involved redirects and file paths pointing to unintended locations, including headers leaks, tap-restriction bypasses, and files being written outside of staged source trees. The new 7.0.0 brings a built-in scanner (`brew vulns`) that checks for known vulnerabilities in installed formulae, with flags such as `--severity=high` and `--fix-available` to narrow the results, against a database of known vulnerabilities in formulae versions that have been shipped. 

It includes backported fixes for some issues and minimizes false positives, with Homebrew's data on vulnerabilities being in the OSV format with a CC0 license and published through the Homebrew API. Provenance checks are now performed for third-party tap bottles, in addition to the Homebrew core tap, with new taps publishing these by default. Homebrew notes that tap trust remains the primary defense against malicious casks, with sandboxing not making "untrusted software safe to run" due to apps running with the user's privilege and a vendor's installer not running inside the sandbox. 

Nonetheless, 7.0.0 provides sandboxing of formula and cask operations, provides setup instructions as signed data instead of arbitrary Ruby code, and deprecates old post-install blocks in favor of declaring steps. On Linux, Bubblewrap sandboxing is replaced with Landlock, a new kernel feature that requires no additional dependencies. Intel Macs are moved to Tier 3 status following the end of reliable build infrastructure and cessation of routine Intel bottles, with support continuing until September 1, 2027, and MacPorts suggested as an alternative. macOS 10.15 is dropped with the release, while Sonoma 14 is moved to Tier 3.

A $159 Circuit Board Just Broke Cloud Computing's Strongest Security Guarantee

 




Security researchers have found a way to defeat the memory protections that Intel and AMD sell to cloud customers as their last line of defense against an untrusted host. The tool required costs less than a decent pair of headphones.

A team from KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google published details Sunday of an attack called DDRop, which exploits a fundamental design flaw in the memory encryption hardware powering confidential computing services at Amazon, Microsoft, and Google. It breaks protections in Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX), Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization-Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP), the three technologies that allow cloud customers to run workloads that even the cloud provider cannot read.

The method does not require a software exploit. It requires a small custom-built circuit board, a brief window of physical access to the server, and knowledge of how DDR5 memory commands work. The researchers built their device for $159 in parts.


The Gap Nobody Patched

Confidential computing encrypts a server's working memory at all times. Even a cloud provider's own administrator sees only scrambled data. The problem DDRop exposes is that encryption is not the same thing as freshness. The processor can confirm that data in memory is encrypted. It cannot confirm that data is current. Stale data, so long as it was encrypted legitimately at some point in the past, will still decrypt correctly and raise no alarm.

DDRop turns that gap into an attack. A small interposer board sits between the processor and a DDR5 memory module. When the attacker wants to cancel a specific memory write, the interposer forces a parity error on the command bus. The memory module silently discards the write. The interposer then cuts the wire used to report that error, so the processor is never notified. Old data stays in memory. The system has no way to know the latest update never arrived.

This is the first active interposer attack to run on DDR5 at full bus speed. Earlier DDR5 research required slowing the memory bus down and could only listen passively. Previous active attacks that altered memory contents only worked on older DDR4 hardware, DDR5's redesigned command format blocked them. DDRop routes around that entirely by dropping writes rather than redirecting them.


What the Researchers Pulled Off

On an Intel TDX server, the team demonstrated four outcomes. By dropping writes to page tables during setup, they mapped an attacker's virtual machine onto any physical memory address, then read a victim machine's private memory in full. They also flipped a victim machine into debug mode, copied its memory in plaintext, and restored everything afterward with no trace of tampering.

The most consequential result was attestation forgery. Attestation is the mechanism a hospital or bank uses to verify that the virtual machine handling their data is the one they approved and has not been altered. With DDRop, an attacker's machine can pass that check as though it were a trusted one. A customer could be convinced they are talking to a secure, verified environment when they are not.

On AMD SEV-SNP, results were narrower the researchers copied the contents of one victim memory page into another but the underlying exposure is the same. Neither platform checks whether memory is fresh.


No Patch, No Timeline

Both Intel and AMD acknowledged DDRop through coordinated disclosure before publication and issued security advisories on September 14. Neither offered a mitigation timeline. Both drew the same line: because the attack requires physical access, it falls outside their published threat model for confidential computing. Intel said it will not assign a CVE.

The researchers are direct about why a software fix cannot solve this. The freshness check was deliberately left out. Scalable memory encryption trades freshness for the ability to protect the large amounts of memory that cloud servers require. A lasting fix would need new memory-encryption hardware capable of providing both integrity and freshness at scale. Intel has discussed a future proposal called cache-line versioning, but has not committed to a timeline and researchers say it is unclear whether it would stop DDRop anyway.

Short-term software measures restricting the memory management interfaces DDRop abuses, checking that critical writes completed, scanning for interposers at boot, can raise the bar without removing the root cause.


The researchers have no evidence DDRop has been used outside a lab. But the significance is what it proves is possible. Confidential computing is the technical promise that certain workloads stay private regardless of who owns the physical hardware. DDRop shows that promise has a physical boundary that can be crossed with $159 in components, a few minutes of access, and knowledge that a rogue data center employee, supply chain tamperer, or government compulsion order could all plausibly provide.

The full paper is scheduled for presentation at ACM CCS 2026 in November. Hardware designs, firmware, and proof-of-concept code are already on GitHub.

Pro-Ukraine Hacking Cat Group Deploys New Malware Against Russian Targets

 

A pro-Ukraine hacktivist group known as Hacking Cat has significantly escalated its cyber operations against Russian targets by deploying newly developed malware, marking a strategic shift from simple website defacements to sophisticated data destruction campaigns. Researchers at Kaspersky uncovered two previously undocumented malware families—Gorilla RAT and Monkey Ransomware—being used in coordinated attacks that exploit server vulnerabilities and encrypt critical files across compromised networks. This evolution demonstrates how hacktivist groups are becoming increasingly capable of mounting technically advanced and sustained campaigns in the ongoing cyberwar between Ukraine and Russia. 

Hacking Cat first emerged around February 2024, initially focusing on low-impact operations such as defacing Russian websites and leaking stolen documents to embarrass adversaries and spread pro-Ukraine messaging. However, by summer 2025, the group began executing more destructive campaigns designed to encrypt and permanently destroy data on targeted systems rather than merely exposing information. This tactical evolution reflects a broader trend among Ukraine-aligned hacktivists, who are increasingly collaborating and sharing custom-built tools to maximize disruption against Russian infrastructure, state-linked organizations, and entities supporting Moscow's war efforts. 

The newly identified Gorilla RAT serves as a remote-access trojan that can tunnel network traffic, enabling attackers to move laterally within victim networks after exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange servers. Monkey Ransomware, which appends a ".monkey" extension to encrypted files, has appeared in multiple variants written in different programming languages since its debut in late 2025. Kaspersky researchers noted that the unusually rapid iteration of the ransomware could suggest the use of generative AI tools to accelerate malware development, though the hackers may also be experimenting with different coding approaches to evade detection and improve effectiveness against diverse targets. 

Joint operations and shared toolkits

Hacking Cat frequently coordinates with other pro-Ukraine groups, including the Cyber Anarchy Squad and the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance, to execute high-impact attacks that cause maximum disruption. In March 2026, the group claimed responsibility for breaching a contractor working for Rosatom, Russia's state nuclear energy corporation, demonstrating its ability to penetrate sensitive industrial networks. Later, in June, it participated in a destructive operation against Donbassteploenergo, a heating provider in Russian-occupied Donetsk, using Nemo Wiper—a tool designed specifically to erase data and disrupt critical infrastructure rather than collect ransom payments from victims. 

The sharing of malware among hacktivist collectives has complicated efforts to attribute specific attacks to individual groups, as multiple organizations now use identical multi-stage infection chains and custom-developed tools. Kaspersky's report linked several tools to Hacking Cat, but the group pushed back in a Telegram statement, acknowledging ownership of "a couple of the tools" while denying responsibility for the ransomware variants. Hacking Cat accused the cybersecurity firm of incorrectly associating unrelated malware with its operations and criticized the quality of its reverse-engineering analysis, highlighting the challenges researchers face in tracking decentralized hacktivist ecosystems. 

Despite these attribution disputes, the overlap in toolkits underscores a maturing cyberwar ecosystem in which Ukraine-aligned hackers are pooling resources, expertise, and custom malware to sustain pressure on Russian targets. The deployment of AI-assisted development tools, coordinated joint operations, and increasingly destructive capabilities signal that hacktivist groups are no longer peripheral actors but integral components of Ukraine's broader resistance strategy. As the conflict continues, cybersecurity experts warn that similar collaborations could emerge elsewhere, reshaping how non-state actors participate in modern warfare through digital means.

Japan Digital Agency Data Breach Linked to VPN Vulnerability


Government Solution Service (GSS) of Japan's Digital Agency was compromised by a vulnerability in a VPN device, resulting in unauthorized access to the shared government platform through an exploit of a vulnerability in the VPN device. In this incident, 246,000 records containing information regarding employees, public officials, contractors, and other individuals connected to organizations using the service may have been exposed. 

Upon discovering unusually large-scale access to files on a server through an account belonging to a maintenance and operations staff member on June 25, the agency first detected the breach. Following an investigation, the agency determined that the account activity was linked to an unauthorized access to a network-connected VPN device. 

By July 9, the agency determined that an external party had accessed the system by exploiting a vulnerability in the VPN equipment. Immediately after the incident, the maintenance account was suspended, and communication between the equipment and external networks was restricted to prevent further access. 

The investigation, conducted with the assistance of an external security company, revealed that some files that contained personal information could have been transferred outside the system. The VPN product used and the specific vulnerability that was exploited have not been disclosed by the agency. Through shared IT infrastructure, 23 Japanese ministries and government agencies are served by the affected GSS environment, which can have a greater impact on the incident. 

The exposed information consists of approximately 236,000 names, 231,000 e-mail addresses, 94,000 telephone numbers, and 1,000 physical addresses. The records relate to personnel and officials who work with GSS user organizations, as well as businesses and individuals who support those organizations. 

Data containing information belonging to the general public was not included in the affected data, according to the agency. Additionally, the compromised dataset is lacking My Number identification numbers, bank account information, or pension number information. Despite the fact that no confirmed cases of misuse have been identified, the exposed contact information could still be used for impersonation, phishing, or other forms of social engineering. 

VPN exposures were categorized as medium severity and were not zero-day vulnerabilities; however, the agency has failed to provide details regarding when the vulnerability was fixed or why the device was still exposed at the time of the intrusion. 

Known VPN Flaw Left Unpatched

Due to the fact that the Digital Agency was already aware of a VPN flaw when the breach occurred, but had not applied the required patch, the incident raises concerns about vulnerability management. According to the agency, the vulnerability has a medium severity and has been confirmed as not a zero-day, indicating that attackers exploited a known vulnerability rather than a newly discovered vulnerability. 

The information accessed is approximately 246,000 records. Over 189,000 of these people are government employees, public officials, or other personnel working for GSS-related organizations, while approximately 57,000 are private companies and individuals involved in government-related activities. 

A total of 236,000 names, 231,000 emails, 94,000 telephone numbers, and 1,000 physical addresses were included in the data. In addition, duplicate entries may be present in the data. More sensitive identifiers are not included in the dataset, such as My Number information, bank account details, and pension information.

Investigation Finds No Confirmed Misuse

The Digital Agency has not received any confirmations of misuse of the exposed information, however, the combination of names and contact information could facilitate targeted phishing or impersonation attempts against affected employees. Messages or phone calls from individuals pretending to represent the government have been warned by the agency, and official personnel will not contact affected parties via email or telephone for passwords or payment information. 

Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission was made aware of this incident on July 15. During the investigation, the agency determined that potentially affected information was likely to be identified and the individuals and organizations involved required a considerable amount of time, which contributed to the delay in public disclosure. 

Digital Agency officials indicated the impact was limited to the affected GSS environment with no evidence of other government systems being compromised or disrupted. As part of its effort to strengthen vulnerability management and review how external connections to the system are handled, the agency is also expected to provide direct notifications to the affected individuals. 

To prevent unauthorized access to sensitive government information and limit unauthorized access, VPN patches should be implemented on time, strict access controls should be implemented, continuous monitoring should occur, and rapid isolation should be instituted.

$13 Billion in Losses Since 2023, Treasury Asks Banks to File Cyber Scam Reports


The federal government has asked financial organizations to be more careful in detecting and reporting scams done by overseas scammers. 

The Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) launched and alert to the financial industry besides a detailed study of over 33,000 cyber fraud cases reported between September 2023 and December 2025. According to the report, around $12.7 billion was stolen in a cryptocurrency investment scam from American victims in the US.

As per Treasury Department official Gene Lange, “The transnational criminal organizations behind these scams exploit both emerging technologies and human vulnerabilities, resulting in devastating financial losses for innocent American victims.”

The report is prepared on the basis of reports given by around 1,300 financial organizations and is linked to a 2023 alert from the Treasury about pig butchering scams. FinCen discovered that the rate of scam operations is rising as the schemes go beyond centers in Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. 

Scammers use distinct profiles, from financial adviser to romantic partner, and force people into sending money, either via cryptocurrency or with traditional bank transfers.

Significant reports were received from cryptocurrency firms, which found around $5.5 billion in suspicious scam activity. 

Traditional banks reported around $6.4 billion in possible friends, saying they “often detected schemes when a victim sent funds to an [financial institution] in the digital asset sector to purchase digital assets, or when a customer sent a wire transfer to a scam-affiliated beneficiary, frequently referencing digital asset investments.”

The report finds that few victims sent applications for second mortgages and loans as part of their involvement in a scam.

More financial institutions note thousands of incidents where targets liquidated their investment accounts to try wiring transfers or fund digital assess to scammer-related accounts. According to the report, “[A financial institution] involved in the digital assets sector reported an older adult victim transferred nearly $640,000 from her retirement fund to send to a suspected scammer in connection with an apparent digital asset investment scheme.”

“The victim stated she met an individual over social media who instructed her to invest in an apparently fictitious digital asset-related company.”

Another victim took out around $150,000 from his retirement account, withdrew credit on his home, and withdrew a personal loan to send the money to a scammer who pretended to be his digital romantic partner, and wanted to invest the money in a venture.

The filings noted the use of coins like USD Coin (USDC), Ethereum, and Tether (USDT), but 18 more coins were found in the reports.

Your Company's Phishing Tests Are Measuring the Wrong Thing

 



When a phishing simulation returns a low click rate, security teams tend to relax. Leadership checks a compliance box. The program gets renewed. But a major new study suggests that sense of relief may be completely misplaced.

Oslo-based cybersecurity firm Pistachio released its Phishing Behaviour Report 2026 this week, built from 2.47 million simulated phishing attacks sent to more than 123,000 employees across 1,200-plus organizations between June 2025 and May 2026. The finding that runs through all of it: the click rate, which most phishing programs live and die by, is the wrong thing to measure.

"A low click rate can create a false sense of security," said Joe Jones, CEO and co-founder of Pistachio. "What matters more is what happens next: does the employee hand over credentials, recognize the attack and stop, or report it so the wider business can act?"

A click alone does nothing. Credentials do.

Clicking a phishing link causes no damage on its own. The actual risk begins when an employee submits a password or other sensitive information into a fake login page after clicking. That is the moment a simulated test becomes a real-world breach scenario, and it is largely what most phishing programs do not track.

On their very first simulated phishing exercise, more employees in the Pistachio study reported the suspicious email than clicked it. That sounds like good news. The problem is that 1.57% handed over their credentials anyway. In a company with 500 employees, that works out to roughly eight people who will submit login details to a convincing enough lure with zero prior exposure. Click rate metrics would not flag any of them.


Tech workers are not the safe bet they are assumed to be

One of the more uncomfortable findings in the report concerns employees who are expected to know better. Tech development workers clicked at least one simulated phishing attempt at a rate of 30.27%. IT workers were not far behind at 28.53%.

The assumption that technical employees carry lower phishing risk because they understand how attacks work does not hold up against the data. Understanding how phishing operates and catching a convincing one under inbox pressure are two different things.

Construction carries the most risk. Financial services carry the least.

The gap between industries was wider than most organization-wide risk scores would suggest. Construction workers showed the highest click rate of any department at 41.31% and the highest credential leak rate at 16.47%. Design workers, by contrast, clicked at just 26.35%.

Financial services employees topped every resilience category in the study, which carries some irony. Financial services accounted for 27.7% of all observed phishing attempts in 2025, making it one of the most targeted sectors on the internet. That sustained pressure, combined with strict regulatory requirements and mandatory security training, appears to have produced genuinely more vigilant employees at the individual level.

Health workers showed the lowest reporting rate of any department at 13.17%, despite a relatively low click rate. Logistics workers combined an above-average click rate with a below-average reporting rate of 17.11%. In both cases, the click rate alone would present a more reassuring picture than the full data supports.


Things get worse before they get better

Organizations running 12-month programs saw click rates and credential submission rates both rise through the first six months before declining. That initial rise reflects harder and more frequent testing rather than employees regressing. At the six-month mark, employees were receiving an average of 3.5 simulations per person, with 50.4% classified as hard difficulty.

From that six-month peak to the 12-month stage, clicks declined by 27% and credential leaks by 41%. The report-to-click ratio increased from 1.3 at three months to 1.8 at 12 months, indicating that suspicious messages were reported nearly twice as often as they were clicked by the end of the program. 

Organizations that run a single phishing simulation and judge the program from that result are drawing conclusions from the noisiest and least reliable moment in the entire training cycle.


What to track instead

The report does not argue that click rates should be dropped entirely. It argues they should sit alongside credential submission rates and reporting rates, which together give a far more accurate picture of actual resilience. Making it easy for employees to report suspicious emails, through one-click tools and fast confirmation, converts the workforce into an active detection channel rather than a passive one.

NIST research found that 72% of organizations use phishing simulation click rates to gauge training effectiveness. By that measure, nearly three quarters of corporate security awareness programs are optimizing for an incomplete signal, in a threat environment where AI-driven phishing has pushed click rates among untrained employees to a record high of 54% in 2026. 

The click rate was never the whole story. At this point, relying on it alone is a liability.