On September 23, 2026, an attacker spent roughly five hours poisoning two packages belonging to MemTensor, the company behind the MemOS operating system for AI memory. By the time a researcher flagged the issue on GitHub at 4:17 AM UTC, malicious versions were already sitting at the top of the npm and PyPI registries, ready to install for any developer who ran a plain `npm install` or `pip install MemoryOS` that morning.
The packages hit were `@memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin` on npm and `MemoryOS` on PyPI. Security firm SafeDep, which flagged the incident through its threat intelligence monitoring, found that three npm versions, `0.1.21`, `0.1.23`, and `0.1.25`, and one PyPI version, `2.0.34`, all contained the same Go binary: a credential-harvesting implant the attacker internally called `sckit`, built under the module path `supplychain.local/campaign`.
How the Attacker Got Inside the Pipeline
The attacker did not need a zero-day. Instead, they exploited a well-understood weakness in how GitHub Actions jobs share environment state.
The OpenClaw plugin publishes to npm through a GitHub Actions release workflow that reads its publish token from a repository secret. The attacker, operating through a GitHub account called `Memtensor-AI`, pushed a short-lived branch named `sc/release-0.1.21-20260922-cloud`, made a three-line change to a validation script that runs earlier in the same job, then deleted the branch. They repeated this process five times between 00:48 and 02:03 UTC.
The change was precise: it wrote a `BASH_ENV` entry into `$GITHUB_ENV`, which is GitHub's mechanism for passing environment variables between steps. Because Bash reads the file named in `BASH_ENV` before running any non-interactive script, this let the attacker's shell script execute silently before the real publish step. That script called `collectStageZero()` from within the package itself, passed the `NPM_TOKEN` to the `sckit` binary, then deleted itself and exited with a failure code. The publish step failed visibly, so nothing appeared on npm from that run. The token was already gone.
The PyPI compromise used the same `BASH_ENV` trick but through a different entry point. The attacker pushed an unsigned commit to the MemOS repository that replaced the standard build backend in `pyproject.toml` with a custom wrapper called `sckit_poetry_build`. On import, that wrapper injected its own bridge script into the CI environment. The bridge ran only inside the PyPI upload action's container, captured `INPUT_PASSWORD` (the PyPI token), sent it to a server at `10729e014d0e.skyleen[.]fr`, and then exited cleanly. Two hours later, a follow-up commit removed the capture code, and the next tag push uploaded the fully malicious wheel to PyPI using MemTensor's own legitimate credentials.
What the Package Does After Install
The implant activates at runtime, not at install time, so `--ignore-scripts` offers no protection. In the npm plugin, it fires when the OpenClaw gateway starts and again on every memory recall. In the Python library, it starts the first time `configure_logging()` runs, which happens on nearly every import path. The binary launches detached in the background with no output.
Once running, `sckit` scans the entire home directory for credentials. Its target list, visible in its strings and symbol names, covers `.npmrc`, `.pypirc`, `.git-credentials`, `.netrc`, SSH private keys, HashiCorp Vault tokens, and Microsoft MSAL token caches. Two compiled regular expressions recognize both secret-like variable names and token format patterns for AWS, GitHub, npm, PyPI, HuggingFace, Slack, and Stripe. Collected data goes to subdomains of `skyleen[.]fr`, the campaign's control infrastructure, over encrypted channels using X25519 key exchange and XChaCha20-Poly1305.
The binary also carries worm logic. Functions named `findRepositories`, `prepareRemoteNode`, `prepareRemotePython`, and `recursivePublish` describe how it uses stolen credentials to inject itself into other repositories. It plants a GitHub Actions workflow named `runtime-update.yml` and a `.sckit/` directory into reachable projects, turning each victim into a potential carrier. The campaign configuration encodes an expiry date of late October 2026, suggesting the attacker planned a defined window of operation.
Developers Need to Act Now
Anyone who ran an affected version should treat every credential in their home directory as stolen. That includes cloud CLI tokens, SSH keys, and any `.env` files. SafeDep recommends pinning to `0.1.20` for the npm plugin and `2.0.33` for `MemoryOS`, killing any running `sckit` process, deleting the state directories at `$HOME/.openclaw/.cache/runtime` and `$HOME/.memos/.cache/runtime`, and checking any repository with push access for the `runtime-update.yml` workflow file.
The attack sits inside a larger pattern. The first half of 2026 alone produced 37 supply chain attack campaigns and 497 indexed malicious packages, which is 4.5 times the package volume of the entire preceding year. What separates this incident is the operational sophistication: the attacker used the target project's own CI pipeline as the delivery mechanism, left no workflow run logs behind, and built self-propagation directly into the implant. For maintainers who publish from CI, PyPI's trusted publishing removes long-lived tokens from the job entirely. Required reviewers on release environments would have blocked the MemTensor runs before they started.
A client engaged us to red team their internal network. It was fully black box: zero input, no starting credentials, and no guidance on where to begin. The only thing we were given was presence on the internal network. Everything else we would have to find.
We have been using a three-part setup for our external engagements: a large language model driving the testing, RedactProxy protecting client data, and Red Clippy keeping the record of everything the agent did. It has worked well against internet facing targets, so the obvious next question was whether the same stack could carry an internal engagement too. This article is about the first time we took it inside a client's network.
Before doing any of it, we asked the client for explicit permission to run an AI agent as part of the engagement, and we got approval to use it. That authorization mattered, because the tooling only enforces scope as a guardrail. The responsibility for what the agent does stays with the operator.
The LLM: We used GLM5.3 from z.ai as the reasoning engine, driven through an agentic coding CLI. The model reads the current state of the engagement, decides what to test next, runs tooling from its own shell, and writes up what it finds. We also evaluated Claude for the same role. We had already applied for its Cyber Use Case approval and been granted it, but in practice it repeatedly tripped its own safety guardrails mid-engagement and refused to continue, which left it effectively unusable for hands-on red team work.
RedactProxy: This is a local, two way redaction proxy from the Cyber Security and Privacy Foundation. It helps to keep a client's real data from ever reaching a third-party LLM provider. It sits between the agent and the LLM provider. On the way out it replaces real client values (domains, internal IPs, emails, credentials, hostnames) with stable fake placeholders. On the way back it swaps the placeholders for the real values before the agent sees them. The model only ever sees fakes, but the agent's own tool calls still run against real infrastructure. The same real value always maps to the same placeholder for the life of an engagement, so the model can still reason that two hosts belong to the same organization without ever learning their real names.
Red Clippy: This is a pentest management tool built to be operated by an AI agent, also from the Cyber Security and Privacy Foundation. It helps to solve a simple problem: agents forget. When the context window fills up, the engagement is gone, and the next session rescans hosts and retests things you already ruled out. Red Clippy persists assets, observations, methodology coverage and findings to a local database, and it hands the agent a red team instructions document at the start of every session. So the next run picks up exactly where the last one stopped.
We set out to deploy the stack and immediately hit a wall. The client's internal network is heavily restricted. From inside it we could not reach z.ai, or any other LLM provider, or really anything on the public internet. That is good security on their part, but it broke the obvious plan of running the agent from a machine on their network and letting it call the model directly.
This is where RedactProxy turned out to be useful in a way we had never planned for.
We built the environment so that the machine touching the client network never touches the internet, and the machine touching the internet never touches the client network. Concretely:
We set up a Linux virtual machine and put it in host only network mode, so it had no route into the internal network at all. For its internet access we used a mobile phone with USB tethering, and we tethered it to the virtual machine specifically, not to the host laptop. We deployed RedactProxy inside that virtual machine and configured it to use z.ai with GLM5.3 as the upstream provider.
On the main machine, the one with presence on the client network, we pointed the red team project's LLM provider setting at the virtual machine's IP and the RedactProxy port. From the point of view of the agent CLI on the main machine, it is simply talking to an LLM provider. In reality every request is going to RedactProxy in the VM, getting redacted, being forwarded out over the phone tether to z.ai, and coming back the same way.
So the two worlds stay separate. The client network side has no path to the internet. The internet side has no path to the client network. The only thing crossing between them is redacted API traffic.
Honestly, the tethering and network separation part could have been done with any proxy. The original point of RedactProxy for us was never connectivity, it was to avoid leaking the client's internal IP addresses and names to the LLM provider. We just had not thought about this second benefit until the restricted network forced the design, and the same tool solved both problems at once.
With the setup ready, we could finally use the LLM for the exercise. We started by fingerprinting the network, and had the agent document everything it found into Red Clippy: live hosts, services, and observations as they came in.
Then we asked the model to follow the methodology that Red Clippy delivers, and to go beyond it with its own tests where it made sense. It worked through the checklist and started turning up a steady stream of high and critical severity findings across the environment.
One of the early critical findings was a full Active Directory takeover. There was a catch: the exploitation needed at least one low privileged domain user to succeed, and at that point we did not have any credentials at all. Rather than force it, we simply documented the vulnerability in Red Clippy with its precondition noted, and let the agent keep testing everything else. This is exactly the kind of thing that gets lost in a normal agent session, and exactly why the persistent record mattered.
A couple of days later the model found another critical issue: a remote code execution vulnerability in one of the software products they were running, which let us take over one of their machines. We exploited it and gained a shell on that host. We also used the LLM to write a shell for the exploitation process, and using that shell we were able to read files from the server as well as execute commands. From there, two separate paths opened up to Domain Admin.
The compromised host held the "run as" passwords for its own scheduled tasks in Windows Credential Manager, protected by keys stored on the same disk. With code execution on the host, we read those keys and decrypted the stored secrets off the machine, which handed back the passwords in plaintext.
Two of them were domain accounts, and both authenticated successfully against a domain controller. One of the two turned out to be a member of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins and Schema Admins. Recovering that single password was already full control of the directory. Holding it, a directory replication request returned the credential material of the account that underpins Kerberos ticket issuance for the entire domain.
There is no weakness in Active Directory involved in this route. The password of a directory wide administrator was simply left readable on an application server.
The second path started from something much quieter. An application configuration file on the same host held, in plaintext, the password for one account. That account was also an Active Directory account, but it carried no special privileges in the domain at all. It was as ordinary as a domain account gets.
That was enough. Using that ordinary account, we coerced a domain controller into authenticating to our machine over the print system remote protocol. We relayed that authentication onward to the certificate enrolment web pages, which accepted Windows authentication over an unencrypted connection with nothing tying a login to the connection it actually arrived on.
The certificate authority then issued a certificate in the domain controller's own name. We used that certificate to obtain a Kerberos ticket for the domain controller itself. With that identity, we were able to get the stored password hash of the domain's built in administrator account, and that hash then authenticated successfully against a domain controller, with administrative access to the host.
This route reached the same level of control as the first one, but it started from a credential that had no privilege of its own. We combined the ordinary mail account with the AD weakness the model had documented days earlier, ran the exploit, and made the directory issue us a token. With that token we could access the domain controller and, through it, any other machine we wanted.
One thing is worth making explicit before the takeaways: both these chains were mainly carried out by the LLM. We were just guiding the tool wherever required.
A few things stood out to us after this engagement.
The persistent record earned its place. The AD takeover finding sat documented and dormant for days, waiting on a precondition we did not meet until much later. In a normal agent workflow that context would have evaporated the moment the window filled up, and we would have rediscovered the same path from scratch, if at all. Because Red Clippy held it, combining the old finding with the newly found low privileged user was a small, deliberate step rather than a lucky re-derivation.
The redaction boundary let us actually use a cloud LLM on a real client's internal estate without shipping their internal names and addresses to a third party. Every host, credential and hostname the model reasoned about was a stable placeholder. The real values only ever existed on our side of the proxy.
And the network design, born out of a restriction we did not ask for, gave us a clean separation we would happily reuse: the machine on the client network never reaches the internet, the machine on the internet never reaches the client network, and only redacted traffic crosses between them over a tether that belongs to neither the host nor the target.
This work was carried out under explicit written authorization from the client, for defensive purposes, as part of a scoped red team engagement.
BigCommerce has started alerting merchants that customer data was stolen from their stores after attackers got hold of API credentials belonging to Ribon, a third-party storefront optimization app used by retailers across the platform.
The stolen credentials gave attackers access to customer records inside merchant accounts on BigCommerce between September 13 and September 17. For those four days, they pulled data page by page until the compromised key was revoked. Names, email addresses, phone numbers, and shipping addresses were taken. Passwords and payment card details were not, because BigCommerce stores that information in a separate system.
The breach did not originate inside BigCommerce. It traced back to a system compromise at Fastr, the parent company of Be A Part Of, the firm that develops and operates Ribon and its updated version, Ribon 1.5. Fastr's internal compromise exposed the API credentials those apps held, and attackers used them to walk directly into merchant environments without triggering any alarm at BigCommerce's own infrastructure level.
"On September 17, 2026, Commerce confirmed that API credentials belonging to third-party applications Ribon and Ribon 1.5, owned and operated by 'Be A Part Of,' a Fastr company, had been compromised due to a Fastr system compromise," BigCommerce told SecurityWeek. "This was not a breach of Commerce systems or the BigCommerce platform."
Ribon's own developers noticed the key was being misused on September 16. The access was cut on September 17, and BigCommerce uninstalled the app from all affected stores the same day. Merchants started receiving notifications from BigCommerce on September 18. In some stores, attackers also injected malicious scripts, though BigCommerce has only said this affected a small number of storefronts and has not specified what those scripts were designed to execute.
UK spirits retailer Master of Malt confirmed publicly it was among the merchants notified. In a statement on its website, the company said the attacker accessed its customer database and described what happened in plain terms. "It looks like hackers were able to compromise a BigCommerce Application key held by Ribon, which they were able to use to gain access to customer data held on their system." Master of Malt has reported the incident to the UK Information Commissioner's Office and said the impact may extend to hundreds of other retailers that had Ribon installed on their stores.
That point matters. This was not a breach contained to one retailer or to one retailer's mistakes. Every merchant that had Ribon connected to its BigCommerce store shared the same exposure risk, because every one of them relied on the same third-party credentials that Fastr failed to protect. The total number of affected merchants has not been disclosed. Fastr and Be A Part Of have not issued any public statement. Neither company had responded to media requests for comment as of the time of reporting.
BigCommerce hosts over 1,200 third-party apps and integrations. It told BleepingComputer it is providing log data to support Fastr's investigation. Seattle-based law firm Emery Reddy is already seeking potential claimants, noting that several retailers have begun sending breach notifications to their customers. The firm confirmed the exposed information matches what Master of Malt reported: names, email addresses, phone numbers, and physical addresses.
This incident is not the first time BigCommerce has had to yank a third-party app after attackers used it to reach merchant customers. In late 2024, electronics accessories maker ZAGG disclosed that unknown actors had breached FreshClick, another third-party BigCommerce integration, and injected payment-skimming code into its checkout. That attack ran from October 26 through November 7, 2024, and resulted in the theft of names, addresses, and live payment card data from customers completing transactions on ZAGG's site.
The two incidents differ in method. The FreshClick attack used malicious JavaScript to capture card details at the point of entry, in real time, as customers typed. The Ribon attack used a compromised backend key to query stored customer records directly, without any customer interaction required. No payment data changed hands this time, but the attacker had persistent, authenticated access to customer databases for four consecutive days before anyone pulled the key.
For shoppers at any retailer that used Ribon, names, email addresses, phone numbers, and home addresses are now in someone else's hands. That combination is more than enough to build convincing phishing messages or to attempt account takeover on other services where those same details appear. Affected customers should treat any unsolicited emails referencing their account details or recent orders with skepticism until the full scope of the incident is established.
The issue was demonstrated by security researcher Patrick Wardle in a proof-of-concept published on September 21, which demonstrates how an attacker with code execution rights under the user logged into Muse can exploit a hidden configuration in Muse. Wardle has also emphasized that the vulnerability does not provide an initial entry point into a Mac, but rather becomes dangerous after a malicious program or attacker has already been installed on the device.
In addition, Wardle also warned that the attack may be delivered remotely via a ClickFix-style method, in which the victim is persuaded to execute a command without downloading or installing traditional malicious software. The Meta AI agent Muse was launched earlier this month as a personal AI agent capable of interacting with services and applications based on user permissions. Its capabilities include file sharing, email, messaging, calendars, shopping services, and smart-home applications. As a result of these permissions, the malicious process does not have to obtain the same access independently, making them particularly relevant to this attack.
There is a problem with an undocumented Muse preference named endo_voyager_dictation_endpoint that controls the location where voice dictation is processed. The setting can be modified by an application running under the same user account. No additional macOS permission is necessary to modify the setting so that Meta's legitimate endpoint is replaced with an attacker's endpoint.
A redirected endpoint can allow voice input intended for Muse to be sent to a service controlled by the attacker. Testing has demonstrated that both the audio and transcription can be intercepted. Once the input has been captured, the attacker can observe dictated prompts and influence Muse's instructions.
A further significant benefit of the redirected traffic is that the token associated with the user's Muse account can be accessed and used to interact directly with Muse. Wardle demonstrated that the token can be accessed and used directly to access the account's chat history. Thus, malicious code is no longer simply stealing information, but rather abusing the AI assistant itself in order to carry out actions based on the privileges that have already been assigned.
A secondary concern is how conventional endpoint security tools might interpret the activity. The Muse application is a legitimate, signed application, so actions initiated through it may appear to originate from a trusted process rather than directly from malware. Wardle's testing further revealed that access obtained through Muse tokens may extend beyond the compromised computer.
Using the token, the researcher was able to execute commands through Muse on another device since the same account can be used across multiple devices. In testing, the researcher was able to have the assistant on a smartphone report its location, scan for nearby Bluetooth devices, and identify smart home controls.
Meta Releases Hotfix for Muse Zero-Day
The vulnerability has been addressed by Meta with a hotfix for Muse on MacOS. According to David Singleton of Meta Superintelligence Labs, the issue involves a local privilege escalation rather than a remote vulnerability. Moreover, exploitation requires malicious software to have already been installed under the user's account.
By closing the configuration path that Wardle used in his proof-of-concept, the hotfix removes the ability to modify the dictation endpoint. As Meta stated, there was a limited practical risk associated with the attack since it requires the installation of local code. However, the requirement for local code execution does not necessarily exclude realistic attack scenarios. Wardle cited ClickFix-style attacks, in which victims are tricked into executing commands on their own computers.
By employing such a method, one might be able to gain a foothold without having to install conventional malware in order to exploit the Muse vulnerability. A broader concern with artificial intelligence agents that operate with extensive permissions has been highlighted by the vulnerability. As a result of Muse accessing a wide range of system resources and connected services, it may be possible for attackers to use those existing permissions once they have obtained control of the agent, rather than requiring separate access to each protected resource.
In Wardle's testing, he demonstrated that the vulnerability can be exploited for a variety of purposes beyond the theft of dictated information. As part of the proof-of-concept activity, the user was able to take images and create documents on the Mac using Muse, in some cases without being made aware of.
In addition, the research demonstrated that attackers controlling Muse sessions may interact with connected devices, although some actions are limited to the preparation of drafts during testing. This vulnerability does not imply the bypassing of macOS's underlying permission system directly, but rather the abuse of Muse once sensitive capabilities have been granted. As a result, the compromised process may be able to make requests through legitimate, signed applications, potentially making the results harder to distinguish from normal AI-aided operations. Moreover, the dictation system design of Muse contributed to the vulnerability as well. While Apple's dictation capabilities are available on device, Muse transmits voice inputs to Meta's infrastructure for processing.
Wardle argued that this architecture created an endpoint that can be redirected by another local process. Several security and isolation controls have been implemented in the context of Muse, including its dedicated Secure VM architecture and additional safeguards designed to limit agent actions. However, the flaw revealed is not in the cloud environment designed to isolate user agents but in the macOS application itself.
Personal artificial intelligence agents are increasingly being seen as sources of security concerns, particularly those that provide conversational capabilities as well as access to files, devices, accounts, and external services. In the event of an agent weakness, those permissions can be turned into an attack path. However, even if the underlying operating system enforces its normal security boundaries, the agent could potentially act as an attack vector.
Foreign actors broke into the industrial control systems of two small private water utilities in Colorado last month, altered pumping cycles, changed equipment settings, and shut off the alarms that would have told operators something was wrong. The state confirmed the incidents on Friday. It has not named the utilities or the attackers.
Both systems are privately owned and serve fewer than 200 people each. The intrusions happened in late August. According to the governor's office, the attackers disabled remote access, switched off alarms, and changed how water was being pumped before operators caught on and regained control. Water quality and treatment were not affected at either location.
"These were brief incidents and the risks were quickly addressed by the providers themselves, who subsequently alerted the state," said Ally Sullivan, a spokeswoman for Governor Jared Polis. "To our knowledge, treatment processes and water quality were not impacted at either provider."
Colorado officials did not name a suspect. Sullivan said the office "cannot confirm what foreign actors may have been involved," but pointed to a CISA-tracked Iranian-backed group that has been working to access drinking water and wastewater systems across the country. Federal authorities have made no formal attribution in the Colorado case.
Part of Something Bigger
Colorado is the latest state in a list that has now reached at least 12 reporting intrusions into water system controls this year. The EPA says more than 100 drinking water and wastewater systems have been hit in 2026, most accessed through programmable logic controllers, or PLCs, connected to the open internet via cellular modems, often without the utilities realizing it.
The summer's single worst episode came on July 26 and 27, when attackers hit more than 30 communities in Minnesota in what state IT officials called a coordinated assault. At least four cities publicly confirmed disruptions. One plant went offline entirely; others dropped to manual operation. In Georgia, hackers took down a pump station, cutting pressure enough that residents were advised to boil water before using it. No one reported getting sick.
The FBI and EPA issued a joint warning on July 30 describing attackers who remotely changed IP addresses and passwords on exposed controllers, locking operators out. In some cases, the intrusions created conditions where untreated groundwater could have entered distribution pipes.
CISA said it tracked attacks against more than 100 internet-exposed water sector systems in July alone, the majority accessed through PLCs attached directly to cellular modems.
The Group Investigators Are Watching
The most scrutinized suspect is CyberAv3ngers, a threat group formally tied to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned six of its senior officials in February 2024. The State Department has offered $10 million for information on the group's activities.
The group has run through four documented phases since 2020. It started by exploiting default passwords on Israeli-made water utility controllers, moved on to deploying custom malware called IOCONTROL against industrial and IoT devices, and this year shifted to actively exploiting an authentication bypass flaw in Rockwell Automation's widely used Logix PLCs. No vendor patch exists for that vulnerability.
Six federal agencies, CISA, the FBI, NSA, EPA, the Department of Energy, and U.S. Cyber Command, warned jointly on April 7 that Iranian-affiliated actors were actively hitting internet-facing PLCs across water, energy, government, and manufacturing sites.
Congress and Industry Push Back
Senators Adam Schiff and Amy Klobuchar introduced the Water Cyber Shield Act in August, which would give the EPA authority to audit utilities and mandate corrective action. The bill authorizes $300 million annually through existing water infrastructure funds.
At DEF CON, the National Rural Water Association launched the Water Watch Center, pairing five managed security firms with small utilities at no cost. The program targets systems serving under 10,000 people, which make up 91 percent of the country's roughly 50,000 community water systems.
Denver Water, which supplies about 1.5 million people across the metro area, told Axios it evaluated the threat after the Colorado disclosure and found its systems unaffected. Federal investigators are working with state officials to determine how the two utilities were accessed.
The extortion group ShinyHunters hacked the dark web leak site run by Clop, one of the most active ransomware operations in the world, defaced it with their own branding, and is now threatening to put Clop through the same extortion process Clop runs on its corporate victims.
The attack happened Friday night, September 19. ShinyHunters found an unauthenticated file upload flaw in Grav CMS, the content management system Clop was running its leak site on, and used it to push a text file directly onto the server. The file read: "THIS SITE HAS BEEN PWN3D BY SHINYHUNTERES #Skids10p - Maybe don't try to threaten us next time." It also linked back to ShinyHunters' own Tor site. The file was confirmed live and downloadable directly from Clop's server.
Hours later, ShinyHunters said they had gone further. A visit to Clop's site showed the entire page replaced with ASCII art of Umbreon, the Pokemon ShinyHunters uses as its logo, and the line "rooting your systems since '19 ;)". The same Umbreon artwork had appeared when ShinyHunters defaced HackForums back in August 2020. Clop's defaced page was still live at the time of writing.
ShinyHunters claimed full access to the server and said they took source code, Grav CMS plugins, and everything stored in the server's /var/log directory, which typically holds authentication logs, system activity records, and the IP addresses of everyone who connected to it. They also claim to have pulled the private keys for Clop's Tor onion service. Those keys are what tie a .onion address to its server. With them, ShinyHunters could host a copy of Clop's site at the exact same onion URL, on infrastructure they control. "We have their onion keys. So if they kick us out it wouldn't matter at all because we control the private keys to host the same exact onion URL," the group said.
The plan is to post an extortion message on their own site and give Clop 72 hours to respond.
The defacement and the uploaded file are independently confirmed. The claims about stolen source code, server logs, and Tor private keys come only from ShinyHunters and have not been independently verified. Clop has not commented.
The dispute behind this attack goes back about a year. In August 2025, Clop quietly began exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Oracle E-Business Suite, tracked as CVE-2025-61882, a server-side request forgery flaw that gave attackers remote access to enterprise systems without authentication. Oracle did not patch it until October 2025, after Mandiant confirmed active exploitation. By then, Clop had already sent mass extortion emails to executives at dozens of companies, including Cox Enterprises, The Washington Post, Logitech, Michelin, and Estee Lauder.
ShinyHunters says that exploit was originally theirs and that Clop used it without authorization. In October 2025, ShinyHunters, operating under the name "Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters," leaked the proof-of-concept publicly. Oracle confirmed it matched the exploit used in the Clop attacks. ShinyHunters said the leak was deliberate, intended to disrupt Clop's campaign and expose what had been taken from them.
What followed, according to ShinyHunters, was a direct threat from a Clop representative. "During the Oracle EBS campaign they ran and stole from me last year, someone from cl0p personally messaged me and said, and I quote (translated from Russian): I have more money than you and all of your people combined, I'll kill you soon," the group said. Those allegations have not been independently verified.
This is not the first time criminal groups have turned on each other. In March 2025, DragonForce defaced the leak sites of rival operations BlackLock and Mamona. Later in 2026, two groups called 0APT and KryBit hacked and leaked each other's operational data until both were left severely damaged. The difference in the Clop case is the scale of the target. Clop's leak site is the operational center of its entire extortion model, the platform it uses to name victims and apply public pressure when ransoms go unpaid. Losing control of it, and potentially the keys that anchor its onion address, is not a minor disruption.
ShinyHunters' own Tor site went offline shortly after the attack. No connection to Clop has been established.
A three-person security research team quietly walked into OpenAI's internal infrastructure last July, submitted a pull request inside the company's private monorepo as proof, and then stopped. The whole operation, from first vulnerability discovery to confirmed repository access, took under 72 hours. The tool that made it possible was not a custom-built hacking suite. It was Claude Opus 5.
The researchers, Harsh Jaiswal, Mohan Pedhapati, and Rahul Maini, work at Hacktron, an AI-assisted security research firm. They published their full technical account on September 13. OpenAI confirmed a fix roughly 14 hours after receiving the initial report on July 25, and paid out a $6,500 bounty on September 1.
The case is one of the clearest demonstrations yet of what skilled human researchers can accomplish when they hand the grinding, iterative work of exploit development to a capable AI model. It is also a story about a mundane but persistent failure: software that depends on unpatched libraries, and login systems that trust services they probably should not.
The Chain That Got Them In
The attack surface was not OpenAI's flagship products. It was the company's public help forum, community.openai.com, which runs on Discourse, an open-source forum platform used by tens of thousands of organizations.
Discourse allows users to upload images. For most formats, it relies on a tool called FastImage to inspect files before processing them. But FastImage does not support HEIC or HEIF images, the high-efficiency formats popularized by Apple. So Discourse passes those files to ImageMagick instead, which in turn calls an underlying library called libheif to do the actual decoding.
That handoff is where the vulnerability lived. libheif version 1.19.7, the version running inside Discourse's Docker image at the time, contained a heap buffer overflow. A specially crafted HEIC file could corrupt server memory, giving an attacker the ability to manipulate program execution. The flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-32882 and carries a severity score of 8.8 out of 10 in Discourse's own advisory, which classifies the result as remote code execution.
The patch for this bug had been available since libheif 1.22.0, released in May 2026. The CVE existed. The fix existed. But Discourse's Docker image, built on Debian 12, still shipped the old, vulnerable library when the Hacktron team looked in July. Debian had not yet backported the fix into its packaged version. That two-month window between upstream patch and downstream delivery is what the researchers walked through.
Once they had code execution on the Discourse server, the path to OpenAI employee accounts ran straight through the forum's login button. OpenAI's forum offers a "Sign in with OpenAI" option, the same single sign-on system its staff uses for ChatGPT, Codex, and other internal services. With control of the forum server, the researchers could hijack that authentication flow and take over the accounts of any OpenAI employee who had ever used it. The victims did not have to click anything or be online at the time.
Hacktron was explicit in their writeup about what this means: the forum was one path, not the problem. "If any first-party or third-party OpenAI service using the OpenAI SSO was compromised, it would lead to the same access," the team wrote. The identity flaw was OpenAI's, not Discourse's.
After confirming the account takeovers, the researchers used one employee's Codex account, which was connected to OpenAI's GitHub organization, to open a single pull request inside OpenAI's internal monorepo. They read nothing, merged nothing, and touched no customer data. The pull request was the proof. Then they stopped and filed their report.
Where the AI Came In
The libheif heap overflow gave the researchers memory corruption primitives, which is a starting point, not a working exploit. Memory corruption bugs require additional work to become reliable code execution, particularly on modern systems protected by Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), a defense that scrambles where code sits in memory to make it harder to redirect program flow.
This is where most vulnerability research slows down. Turning a crash into a reliable, weaponized exploit requires significant expertise, patience, and time. The Hacktron team decided to find out how much of that work an AI could absorb.
They started with Claude Opus 4.8, the previous flagship model from Anthropic. Across multiple sessions, it managed to help develop a working exploit when ASLR was disabled. When they enabled ASLR, matching the configuration of real servers, Opus 4.8 struggled and failed to produce anything reliable.
On the evening of July 24, Anthropic released Claude Opus 5. The researchers started a fresh session.
Within three hours, Opus 5 had produced a working exploit for an ARM64 Mac environment. They asked it to adapt the exploit to x86-64 and to the jemalloc memory allocator configuration that Discourse uses. By 6:00 a.m. on July 25, they had confirmed local code execution through an image upload.
The researchers then placed Claude in what they describe as an autonomous "/goal" loop, pointed at their own Discourse Cloud instance, framed as a capture-the-flag practice target. Opus 5 has guardrails meant to prevent it from writing exploits for real systems, so the team disguised the target. When they checked again at 10:00 a.m., the agent had achieved code execution on their cloud instance on its own, demonstrating access by reading /etc/hosts. They then used the generated exploit on OpenAI's forum and confirmed it worked there too.
The researchers are careful to note that this was not fully autonomous hacking. Skilled human judgment and direction were required throughout. But the gap between what they could accomplish in hours with Opus 5 versus the days or weeks such work might have taken without it was significant.
The cost of the entire Discourse and OpenAI portion of the project: a few days of AI compute and a few hours of human time.
One Bug, Many Targets
The OpenAI breach was not a standalone operation. It was one piece of a broader research campaign Hacktron calls HEIF Heist, a multi-month investigation into how widely the libheif library is embedded in major internet services, and how many of those services were running vulnerable versions.
Over roughly two months, the three researchers say they traced the same class of image-decoding flaws across software used by Slack, Meta, GitHub Enterprise, and web frameworks including Next.js, Astro, and Gatsby. The total cost of the entire campaign was under $3,000 in AI model usage, spread across roughly sixty days of work.
The team found that adapting each exploit to a new target environment generally took only one or two days with AI assistance. They report that the only company that appeared to detect their testing activity was Shopify, even after thousands of test images were sent to various targets and image processors at several of those companies crashed repeatedly under the load.
Not all of the claims have been independently verified. The Next.js vulnerability is confirmed in Vercel's own advisory. libheif's maintainers confirmed a working code-execution exploit against Meta's deployment of the library. The wider claim of successful code execution across the full list of targets has not been corroborated by external sources as of publication.
The HEIF Heist project also surfaced a difference between AI models. For cases where the team had information about the target environment, Claude Opus 5 was the primary tool. For targets where they had almost no prior knowledge of the deployment configuration, they switched to OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol, which they found performed better in those conditions. Each major model jump brought a clear capability improvement: Opus 5 succeeded where Opus 4.8 failed, and GPT-5.6 Sol handled blind exploitation scenarios that Opus 5 struggled with.
The report documented Russia-linked espionage operations using Claude to run nearly fully automated phishing campaigns against Ukrainian, European, and diplomatic targets. It described a Chinese group, including operators identified as university students in Hunan province, who used Claude as the core engineering layer of an offensive program that found multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in a major security product. It also described a French-speaking hacktivist who used Claude to attack European political parties, media organizations, and think tanks at a scale that previously would have required a well-resourced team.
Anthropic's core observation across all of those cases was the same observation the Hacktron team made in their own writeup: AI is closing the gap between what a small, budget-constrained team can do and what used to require state-level resources.
The Hacktron team put it plainly: "Work that once required a well-resourced team and months of effort can now be compressed into days."
That assessment lines up with what Anthropic itself told the company's own threat report readers, and with what security researchers have been warning about for the past year. The Hacktron operation is the first time those warnings have been backed by a public, step-by-step technical demonstration against one of the most scrutinized technology companies on the planet.
What Needs to Change
The specifics of the OpenAI fix have not been made public. The company acknowledged the finding through payment and remediation rather than through a detailed disclosure of the login flaw.
On the Discourse side, the forum platform responded fast: they received the report on a Saturday, replied on Sunday, had a fix ready on Monday, and published their advisory on Tuesday. They also added image-processing sandboxing as a hardening measure, running ImageMagick in a restricted environment so that even a successful exploit against the image library cannot directly execute arbitrary code on the host server.