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Malicious NPM Packages Attack Alibaba Users and Companies


Cybersecurity experts have found a new set of harmful npm packages that attack users of Alibaba developer tools via cross-platform RAT (Remote Access Trojan). This was part of an advanced, specific software supply chain attack against Chinese-speaking environments.

About the packages

Lib-mtop is an unscoped package with the same name as the private Alibaba package as @ali scope. Experts have not confirmed if this was due to the project developer going rogue or takeover of the maintainer account.

“Ch4ce,” the same maintainer account which presently redirects to a ‘not found’ error on npmjs[.]com also posted four other packages: local-config-parser, aone-kit-cli, aone-kit, and aone-sandbox. Three of these are empty wrappers carrying the same name as private, @ali-scoped packages, “which they declare as a dependency in the package.json file,” said Socket security researcher.

Attack tactic

The local-confi-parser package uses a genuine JSON configuration file parser, but shows dependencies that are posted from other npm user accounts. Together, they provide a channel for an advanced RAT attacking developers who may be working in organizations related with the Alibaba group.

Particularly, the infected loader functionality is divided and deployed into various packages sent to the victims. "When such a package is installed in an environment that has access to impersonated, scoped private packages, the dependency resolution works as expected, with a little extra functionality delivered through additional dependencies that get installed," Socket said.

Experts found 10 top-layer lure packages that depend on “smart-config-manager,” which works similar to a middle-layer bridge that links them to harmful payloads consisting of the loader logic. A low layer package continues to reach out to a GitHub repository to extract and store a rule engine configuration for use to run a malicious payload and contacts a remote server for fetching secondary malware.

What sets this attack apart?

A unique thing about the campaign is that the rule engine uses the vm module to implement the last phase and run the payload according to the target’s OS. The payload is fetched from a domain that mimics Alibaba to look natural and escape detection. 

The final payload is an advanced backdoor integrated with arbitrary file upload and download, comprehensive command execution, payload staging, lateral movement functions and host reconnaissance. The payload can also inject infected code into enterprise apps like Qoder, DingTalk, and Wukong.

"The goal of the campaign seems to be industrial espionage. While the number of downloads for the malicious packages is not significant, the impact of the campaign is hard to evaluate, because of the targeted nature and lateral-spread capabilities of the final-stage payload,” Socket said.  

AI Threatens Entry-Level Jobs as Automation Accelerates Across Industries


 

As artificial intelligence rapidly transforms the global workforce, new research suggests that entry-level positions in technology, finance, customer service, and creative industries are especially vulnerable to automation. A recent analysis by the BBC indicates that advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled AI to perform previously difficult tasks.

Initially, artificial intelligence systems were limited to performing simple tasks in a matter of minutes. However, nowadays, the latest models are capable of performing complex tasks that require skilled professionals several hours to complete, especially in software development, financial analysis, legal research, and content development. 

As indicated by a recent Gartner survey, AI has already made significant contributions to workforce planning. According to a survey conducted by 110 chief human resources officers (CHROs), 22% of those HR leaders claimed at least one business leader at their organization had stopped hiring entry-level employees as a result of artificial intelligence automation. A study also found that 95% of organizations have implemented some form of artificial intelligence in the last year, although only one in five said the investments have generated significant or transformational business value. 

AI benchmarks have shown a sharp increase in performance over the past three years. The new generation models, released in 2026, have the ability to complete much larger coding and analytical tasks than earlier systems, which raises concerns about their increasing impact on white-collar jobs. Stanford University research indicates that young professionals have already felt the effects of AI. 

Researchers found that the prevalence of ChatGPT and similar AI tools has decreased employment among workers aged 22 to 25 by 2.7%. According to Gartner, most organizations are currently using artificial intelligence (AI) to automate or augment routine, low-complexity tasks traditionally performed by junior employees in sectors with the highest exposure to artificial intelligence (AI), including software, finance, and creative professions. 

In response to the automation of these responsibilities, companies are reassessing entry-level roles, creating an increasing gap between new graduates' skills and increasingly complex jobs for human workers. Despite some economists arguing that other factors such as interest rates and a slowdown in hiring have also contributed to a weaker economy, AI is becoming increasingly recognized as a key factor in workforce disruption.

In a separate study conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), job postings in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence (AI) have also decreased significantly compared to occupations which require physical work. Additionally, businesses are increasing their investments in artificial intelligence-based "agents" capable of performing repetitive and specialized tasks simultaneously. 

There has been a dramatic increase in the use of Artificial Intelligence measured by trillions of text processing tokens as companies encourage their employees to maximize productivity through artificial intelligence. The soaring operational costs have led some organizations to limit AI deployment, which suggests economic constraints may still prevent widespread automation from occurring. 

Adapting lower-cost artificial intelligence models, including open-source alternatives originating from China, has also become a trend that enables organizations to utilize artificial intelligence while reducing operating expenses. The firm warns that reducing graduate recruitment could result in long-term talent shortages by limiting opportunities for developing future skilled professionals internally. Even though the shift toward automation is occurring, Gartner warns against eliminating early-career hiring altogether. 

According to Gartner, entry-level positions should be redesigned to focus on higher-value responsibilities, mentorship and team support should be strengthened, and employees should be provided with adaptive skills to work effectively with AI. In many cases, human-AI collaboration is expected to result in the evolution of many jobs rather than eliminating entire professions. Moreover, Gartner recommends organizations to move beyond traditional training methods by emphasizing business judgment, versatility, and hands-on learning as a means of preparing employees for increasingly AI-enabled workplaces. 

In spite of this, economists warn policymakers and businesses that they must act rapidly to equip workers with new skills and ensure technology increases productivity without displacing large numbers of workers. The growth of AI across industries poses a challenge to businesses seeking to balance automation with workforce development. Experts believe that the building of a resilient workforce for the future will require investments in skills, redesign of entry-level roles, and fostering human-AI collaboration.

Hugging Face Breach Raises Concerns Over AI-Driven Attacks

 



Hugging Face is investigating a security incident after its production infrastructure was compromised in an intrusion the company says involved an autonomous AI agent, raising fresh concerns about how artificial intelligence could reshape offensive cyber operations.

In a security disclosure published on July 16, the open-source AI platform said the attack leveraged an autonomous agent framework built on top of an agentic security research environment powered by a large language model (LLM). According to the company, the system executed thousands of actions across multiple sandboxed environments, allowing the attackers to move through internal infrastructure and obtain unauthorized access to datasets and service credentials.

The company said the intrusion began when a malicious dataset exploited two separate code execution paths on a processing worker. After establishing an initial foothold, the attacker reportedly escalated privileges to node-level access before collecting cloud and cluster credentials and moving laterally into several internal clusters.

Hugging Face has not yet confirmed whether customer or partner information was affected and said its investigation remains ongoing.

The incident has attracted attention across the cybersecurity community because it suggests that AI systems may now be capable of carrying out increasingly complex intrusion workflows with limited human intervention. Unlike traditional automated malware or scripts that perform predefined tasks, autonomous AI agents can adapt to changing environments, plan sequences of actions and make decisions throughout an attack.

Researchers have long warned that advances in generative AI could lower the barrier for sophisticated cyberattacks by accelerating vulnerability discovery, reconnaissance, privilege escalation and post-compromise activities. While many of these scenarios have remained largely theoretical, Hugging Face's disclosure indicates that elements of these capabilities may already be appearing in real-world operations.

According to the company's investigation, the attacking system generated thousands of individual actions during the compromise, demonstrating a level of operational scale that would normally require substantial manual effort.

Hugging Face co-founder and CEO Clément Delangue said the incident reinforces the view that threat actors are already adopting AI agents in offensive operations. He also argued that restricting advanced AI models behind commercial APIs alone is unlikely to prevent misuse because determined attackers can often circumvent safety controls, while defenders may lose valuable access to tools needed for security research and incident response.

The company encountered another challenge during its investigation when content moderation mechanisms on a frontier AI model reportedly prevented analysts from processing portions of the attack data. To continue the forensic investigation, the security team instead relied on GLM-5.2, an open-weight language model that was deployed within Hugging Face's own infrastructure.

Using the model, investigators reconstructed the attack timeline, identified indicators of compromise, mapped affected credentials and accelerated forensic analysis that would otherwise have required significantly more manual effort. The company also revoked compromised credentials, rotated authentication tokens and remediated the exploited vulnerability.

Security researchers say the incident highlights both the opportunities and limitations of AI-assisted security operations. While AI can substantially reduce investigation time by processing large volumes of telemetry, organizations may encounter operational constraints if externally hosted models refuse to analyze sensitive security artifacts because of built-in safety guardrails.

Industry experts increasingly argue that enterprises should maintain trusted self-hosted AI models that can support internal incident response without exposing sensitive forensic data to external services.

The disclosure comes amid bigger concerns about the growing availability of permissive AI models that operate with fewer content restrictions. Recent threat intelligence research has identified thousands of publicly accessible models advertised as uncensored or unrestricted, raising concerns that malicious actors have expanding access to AI systems capable of assisting offensive cyber activities.

Cybersecurity professionals caution that AI is changing the economics of cybercrime by enabling attackers to automate portions of reconnaissance, exploitation, credential harvesting and post-compromise operations. As these technologies continue to mature, sophisticated attack capabilities may become accessible to a broader range of threat actors.

For defenders, the incident reinforces the need to integrate AI into security operations rather than relying solely on conventional manual workflows. AI-assisted detection, forensic analysis and incident response are increasingly becoming essential capabilities as organizations attempt to match the speed and scale of modern attacks.

Although the investigation into the Hugging Face breach remains ongoing, the incident serves as another indication that autonomous AI systems are beginning to influence both offensive and defensive cybersecurity strategies. As organizations continue adopting AI throughout their technology environments, security teams will need to prepare for a future in which machine-speed attacks are met with equally intelligent defensive capabilities.

AI Adoption Shifts Focus Toward Data Governance and Enterprise Trust

 

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) is uncovering vulnerabilities in enterprise data governance, as organizations grapple with managing information rather than applications and users. As companies rely on AI to analyze, create, research, and make decisions using enterprise data, experts say data governance is becoming a priority. 

According to industry research, over 50% of employees are already using AI outside of corporate systems, raising concerns about shadow AI. However, experts say the bigger issue is understanding how enterprise information is being used, accessed, and processed by employees and systems. AI is fundamentally changing the value of enterprise data as it empowers organizations to analyze, summarize, and act on information instantly. Documents that previously required human analysis can now be processed by AI to extract business intelligence in seconds. 

This makes enterprise information more valuable than ever before as it becomes embedded in decision-making processes and systems. As the value of enterprise data increases, so does the need to ensure its context is appropriately maintained. Experts say that business documents, customer data, intellectual property, and presentations have value and meaning based on their intended use. 

As this information is shared internally and externally and processed by AI, policies, accountability, and governance must be attached to the data to ensure it is used as intended. Security professionals say information governance should be connected to the data itself rather than where that information is stored. They recommend that policies, procedures, and enforcement be attached to the information to ensure its proper use in an increasingly distributed and AI-driven enterprise. 

Trust is quickly becoming a critical success factor for organizations that want to maximize the value of AI while minimizing risk. Business leaders, regulators, and customers are demanding more excellent transparency, which puts pressure on enterprises to ensure sensitive information is handled responsibly. Experts say organizations that get governance right will be best positioned to adopt AI while maintaining the trust of their stakeholders. 

The next wave of AI innovation will include autonomous agents that can access and retrieve information, coordinate tasks, make recommendations, and take action across enterprise systems. These AI agents will require access to data, which means organizations must have robust information governance practices to ensure the data being processed is accurate and secure. 

As the capabilities of AI continue to evolve, enterprises are focusing on ensuring the information that fuels these systems is governed appropriately. Experts recommend organizations prioritize information governance, maintain the context of enterprise data, and leverage trusted AI to maximize the value of their data assets.

Coldcard Wallet Security Incident Linked to Multi-Million Dollar Bitcoin Theft


 

There has been a connection between a critical firmware flaw in the Coldcard hardware wallet and one of the largest cryptocurrency thefts of the year, after hackers allegedly drained nearly $70.2 million in Bitcoins (BTC) from 1,196 wallets on July 30 by exploiting a critical firmware flaw, according to Galaxy Research. 

A firmware integration error introduced in March 2021 is responsible for the vulnerability, which affects Coldcard, a Bitcoin-only hardware wallet developed by Canadian company Coinkite. According to security researchers, affected firmware versions generated wallet recovery seeds using deterministic software-based pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) rather than the hardware random number generators (RNGs) of the devices. In this way, the amount of randomness necessary to create cryptographic seeds has been significantly reduced. 

Block researchers explained that, under certain circumstances, an attacker could reproduce seed values offline under sufficient knowledge of the device's unique identification number and internal state. Attackers can then identify and steal funds from vulnerable wallets by matching those candidate seeds against publicly available blockchain addresses. 

It was found that the flaw occurred as a result of a production configuration error resulting in affected Coldcard devices relying on MicroPython's Yasmarang pseudorandom number generator instead of the hardware random number generator intended for them. 

During initialization of the fallback algorithm, unique identifiers and timer values of the device were used without the collection of fresh entropy, leading to significantly more predictable recovery seeds. Contrary to conventional cryptocurrency attacks directed towards exchanges, smart contracts, and online wallets, this incident involved hardware wallets designed to remain offline. 

According to security experts, the compromise did not require the device to be connected directly to the internet. As an alternative, attackers are alleged to have generated a large number of possible recovery seeds offline, derived the addresses of the corresponding wallets, and compared them with blockchain records available on the Internet until they found matching wallets containing Bitcoins. 

As determined by investigators, the attacker generated candidate recovery seeds using hardware configured under similar conditions, then deduced the Bitcoin address corresponding to each seed. The address of a blockchain is publicly visible, and matching the address of a recreated seed to the address of an active wallet would allow the attacker to retrieve the private keys and transfer funds without physically accessing the victim's device. 

A firmware update was released by Coinkite on July 31 for all Coldcard models that were affected. However, the company has stressed that installing the update alone will not secure wallets that have been created with vulnerable firmware. 

Users whose recovery seeds were generated on affected versions have been advised to generate new seeds utilizing the patched firmware and transfer their Bitcoin to new wallets as soon as possible. It is important to note that even when an old seed is restored on an updated firmware or another wallet, the underlying weakness remains. 

Galaxy Research has reported that the stolen funds were transferred in batches over a period of six Bitcoin blocks rather than through a single continuous transaction. Observations by researchers indicated that three interconnected blocks did not show any related activity, indicating that the transactions were deliberately grouped before being broadcast. 

Coldcard versions 4.0.1 to 4.1.9, Mk4 and Mk5 versions before 5.6.0, Q versions before 1.5.0Q, and Edge builds released prior to the latest patches are affected by this firmware. The vulnerability has been estimated by Coinkite to reduce the effective entropy of wallet recovery seeds by approximately 40 bits for Mk3 devices and around 72 bits for Mk4, Mk5 and Q devices. This results in significantly lower levels of security than a standard 12-word BIP-39 seed's 128-bit encryption. 

Researchers noted that practical challenges in recovering a seed are still influenced by factors such as device characteristics, boot timing and computational resources. It was noted by Coinkite that wallets generated with at least 50 fair and private dice rolls do not suffer from this vulnerability. Despite the fact that a strong passphrase provided additional security, users should nonetheless replace vulnerable seeds with stronger BIP-39 passphrases. 

Multisignature wallets will not be compromised if all signing devices are not affected by the same issue. There has been no public identification of the attacker. According to Galaxy Research, the observed on-chain transaction patterns indicate a coordinated wallet sweep, but do not conclusively indicate theft. Researchers also observed that blockchain activity followed a distinctive transaction pattern, though they cautioned that on-chain analysis alone cannot conclusively prove theft. 

The pattern instead pointing to coordinated wallet sweeps consistent with a single operator or related group of operators, which has raised concerns over the importance of secure random number generation in cryptocurrency wallets. In order to store cryptocurrency offline securely, hardware devices that remain disconnected from the internet must maintain strong cryptographic entropy during wallet creation, and any weakness in that process can compromise its security. 

After Coinspect released the "Ill Bloom" vulnerability in just weeks past, another weak random number generation vulnerability has led to more than $5 million worth of cryptocurrency theft across Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Rootstock and Polygon, with the "Ill Bloom" vulnerability being linked to more than $5 million in cryptocurrency thefts. Even wallets designed with strong offline security can be compromised by vulnerabilities in cryptographic randomness. 

A subsequent update from Galaxy Research identified two more suspected Coldcard-related wallet sweeps, which increased the estimated losses to 1,367.05 Bitcoins, worth approximately $88.6 million across 4,585 addresses, for a total of 1,367.05 Bitcoins. In addition to sharing details with federal investigators, compliance organizations and cybersecurity teams about nearly 600 suspected attacker-controlled addresses, the firm said the activity is ongoing.

Hackers Compromise Organization to Swap Crypto Wallet Address In A Supply Chain Attack


Threat actors exploited a JavaScript file offered by advertising technology firm Adform, and modified it into a browser-side tool that rewrites crypto wallet addresses.

Malicious script

Adform found the incident and removed the malicious code, informed the impacted clients, and notified the authorities.

For users who visited a website carrying the modified script on July 27 and copied Ethereum, Tron, or Bitcoin may have deployed malicious code by pasting the a different address.

What should the users do?

Adform has advised users to clean their browser cache as the modified file may stay cached after the fix, and to also double-check any wallet address before sending any money.

According to Adform, the code was not built to deploy software or create persistence and worked only when an affected page stayed open. Clipboard copying was not the only method of replacement; the captured sample also rewrites addresses entered straight into form fields. 

According to Adform’s implementation document, the tracking code can run across a website, several sections, or even a single page. Exploiting the shared resource allowed the hackers a path into downstream websites without having to hack each one of them. Supply chain compromise happened due to the shared deployment path. 

Shared path leading to supply chain attack

One modified address at the point of payment could change a transfer, as the impacted page stayed open.

Security expert Beaumont discovered the hack and said, "Even if you notice the address is wrong and recopy the wallet, it keeps replacing it.”

Beaumont also said that “this allows end user devices of downstream websites to be compromised with crypto stealing malware. Meaning if you visit example.com and they use Adform, example.com will compromise your device.” The file and linked domains, IP addresses, and URLs showed no detections on VirusTotal at the time. 

The discovered sample consists of two malicious blocks attached to the authentic library. Their replacement strings are hidden with a six-byte XOR key. The first looks out for the copy event, attempts to read the clipboard every four seconds, and to replace matching addresses.

The second block rewrites values in textarea, contenteditable elements, and input, and restores the cursor point after a rewrite.

“Based on our investigation to date, we have found no evidence that the malicious code transmitted users’ IP addresses or information about the websites they visited to an external party. Technical analysis indicates that such transmission may have been possible, and this aspect remains under investigation,” says Adform.

Flock Cameras Blanket Southwest Florida, Sparking Privacy and Safety Backlash

 

Flock Safety's automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras are spreading rapidly across Southwest Florida, with hundreds now installed at intersections, parking lots, and private communities. These solar-powered devices, mounted on poles along roads, capture detailed vehicle data—including license plates, make, model, color, and unique features like bumper stickers or dents—every time a car passes. The information is instantly uploaded to a shared law enforcement database, enabling police to search and track vehicles without warrants, raising serious privacy concerns among residents and civil liberties advocates.

The network's growth in Southwest Florida reflects a national trend, with over 100,000 Flock cameras now mapped across the United States. In Cape Coral and surrounding Lee and Charlotte counties, cameras are so dense that some intersections have readers on every corner. Local agencies, including the Cape Coral Police, Sanibel Police, and county sheriffs, use Flock or access its shared data, while private gated communities and businesses also deploy cameras that feed into the same system. Florida law allows agencies to query Flock records from other jurisdictions nationwide without a warrant, amplifying the reach of this surveillance infrastructure.

Critics argue that Flock's technology enables mass surveillance, as the AI-powered cameras generate "vehicle fingerprints" and log every trip, from grocery runs to medical appointments. Privacy advocates warn that the data can be misused: police officers have been caught using Flock networks to stalk ex-partners, with hundreds of illegal license plate searches documented. Additionally, a 2025 investigation found at least 60 Flock cameras exposed to the open internet, allowing outsiders to view live footage, highlighting security vulnerabilities in the system. 

Backlash against Flock has intensified, with citizens in five states destroying cameras using sledgehammers and vice grips, while city governments in Fort Collins, Eugene, Madison, and others have canceled contracts or deactivated the devices. At the federal level, Representative Thomas Massie plans to introduce legislation blocking federal funding for Flock cameras, citing civil liberties concerns. Road safety advocates have also raised alarms, noting that Flock's 80,000 to 100,000 roadside poles may violate federal clear-zone rules, creating crash hazards beyond privacy issues. 

As Flock cameras expand into retail parking lots—Home Depot and Lowe's have deployed them nationwide—the debate over warrantless surveillance and data sharing is set to intensify. For Southwest Florida residents, the visible proliferation of these devices underscores a broader tension between law enforcement capabilities and the right to privacy in public spaces.

South Korea Probes Major Cyberattack on Diplomatic Academy Amid Data Leak Concerns

 

South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has revealed that a cyberattack targeting the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA) may have resulted in the exposure of a significant amount of sensitive data, with authorities investigating the possible involvement of foreign state-backed hackers.

Speaking at a media briefing on Tuesday, ministry spokesperson Park Il said preliminary findings indicate that the breach led to a data leak of “considerable scale.” However, officials are still assessing the full extent of the compromise and have not yet identified the exact type of information that may have been exposed.

Park stated that there is currently no evidence suggesting that any leaked information has been misused. He also noted that investigators do not yet have sufficient technical evidence to determine who carried out the attack, though authorities have not ruled out any possibility, including the involvement of foreign-backed hacking groups.

The update comes after the ministry disclosed on Monday that attackers exploited a previously unknown zero-day software vulnerability along with security configuration weaknesses to infiltrate the online education platform of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy.

According to the ministry, the attackers gained control of a server sometime between April and May 2025 and retained access until February 2026. The breach was discovered after suspicious activity was flagged by a government agency, prompting authorities to block the compromised system.

Officials said the affected platform contained educational content and administrative information required for course management, including participants’ names and user IDs. However, they added that it remains difficult to determine exactly what information was accessed or leaked during the intrusion.

Meanwhile, South Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo reported, citing government sources, that personal information belonging to nearly 6,000 current and former diplomats, as well as officials seconded from other ministries, may have been compromised.

The report further stated that intelligence agencies are examining whether a hacking group linked to North Korea could have been responsible for targeting data that includes information related to diplomats posted overseas.

Park reaffirmed that the ministry is coordinating with relevant government agencies to determine the full scope of the breach while also enhancing internal cybersecurity measures to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Here's Why eSIM Became a Trap for Mobile Users

 

eSIM technology was heralded as the future of mobile connectivity, promising to eliminate the hassle of physical SIM cards and make switching carriers as effortless as connecting to Wi-Fi. However, the reality has fallen short of this vision, with mobile operators transforming what should have been a consumer-friendly innovation into a mechanism for maintaining control and creating new friction points for users. 

Promise versus the reality 

The original concept behind eSIM was straightforward and appealing: embedded SIM chips soldered directly onto smartphone motherboards would allow users to download carrier profiles digitally, eliminating the need for tiny plastic cards, waiting for postal deliveries, or fumbling with paperclip tools to access SIM trays. This technology promised seamless international travel connectivity, instant carrier switching, and the ability to store multiple profiles on a single device. Instead, carriers have retained many of the old constraints while adding new layers of complexity to the activation and transfer processes. 

The most significant issue with eSIM implementation is that carriers maintain complete control over profile provisioning and transfers. Unlike physical SIM cards that could be moved between devices in seconds, eSIM transfers often require carrier intervention, lengthy customer service calls, and verification processes that can take hours or even days. Many carriers impose restrictions such as one-time-use QR codes that expire quickly, fees for profile replacements, and limits on how many times users can re-provision their eSIM. When phones are carrier-locked, which is common with devices purchased on installment plans, users cannot add competing carrier profiles until the device is fully unlocked, sometimes requiring months of payments or complete balance settlement. 

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of eSIM technology is the difficulty of switching devices. With physical SIM cards, transferring service to a new phone was as simple as removing the card from one device and inserting it into another. Now, the process has become a "joint decision" between users and carriers, requiring multiple authentication steps, carrier app interactions, and often technical support assistance. If a phone breaks or is lost, users find themselves without service until the carrier issues a new digital profile, whereas a physical SIM could be immediately transferred to a backup device. This creates significant vulnerability during emergencies or travel situations where immediate connectivity is essential. 

Path Forward

Despite these challenges, eSIM technology still offers genuine benefits for specific use cases, particularly international travel where services like Saily enable seamless profile switching without physical card exchanges. However, realizing the technology's full potential requires industry-wide standardization of activation and transfer processes, regulatory intervention to prevent carrier lock-in tactics, and consumer advocacy for clearer provisioning standards. Until carriers prioritize user experience over retention strategies, eSIM will remain a half-realized promise that has inadvertently created new barriers to mobile connectivity freedom while maintaining the very dependencies it was supposed to eliminate.

Third-Party Cloud Breach Exposes Patient Data at Amgen


 

The global biotechnology company Amgen has disclosed a significant data breach resulting from unauthorized access to cloud environments operated by third-party service providers, leading to the theft of sensitive patient and corporate information. According to a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the pharmaceutical company, based in California, discovered the incident in July 2026 and initiated its cybersecurity incident response process immediately. 

Several containment measures were implemented by the company and independent forensic experts were engaged in an investigation into the breach. As a result of assessing the volume of files that appeared affected and determining that the compromised data could contain sensitive information, Amgen formally classified the incident as material on July 29, 2017. 

As part of the legal requirement to inform investors of significant cybersecurity incidents, the company made the disclosure in a regulatory filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Upon preliminary investigation, it was determined that hackers successfully exfiltrated data from a number of cloud-based systems. 

In addition to proprietary corporate data, protected health information (PHI) belonging to patients, and other sensitive records, this information has been compromised. Despite not identifying the vendors involved or revealing how the attackers gained access to the stolen data, Amgen claims that the stolen data originated from cloud storage environments managed by third-party service providers. Additionally, Amgen is assessing whether confidential business information, intellectual property, research and development data, and additional patient information was compromised. 

During the ongoing forensic investigation, the company is continuing to determine if patient records, confidential business information, intellectual property, research and development data, or other sensitive information was accessed or stolen during the incident. 

Upon completion of the forensic investigation, the full scope of the compromise is anticipated. There has been no disclosure by the company as to identification of the third-party cloud providers, attack vectors used by threat actors, or number of individuals affected. No known cybercriminal organization has been attributed to the incident.

Following an evaluation of the number of potentially affected files and the likelihood that they contained highly sensitive information, Amgen determined that the breach was material on July 29. Even though the breach is serious, the company stated that it does not anticipate that the breach will adversely affect its financial condition or operating results in the near future. 

In addition to the assistance of external cybersecurity experts, the investigation is currently ongoing. Considering its legal and regulatory obligations, Amgen stated that it would notify affected patients where required under applicable data protection laws. According to Amgen's current assessment, the cybersecurity incident has not adversely affected its products, manufacturing operations, financial reporting systems, or its ability to continue supplying medicines and meeting the needs of patients. 

There has been an increase in cyberattacks targeting healthcare and pharmaceutical organizations, whose cloud-hosted patient records and valuable research data have made these organizations attractive targets for cybercriminals. In addition to highlighting the increasing cybersecurity risks associated with third-party cloud infrastructure, the incident highlights the importance of securing sensitive healthcare data throughout the supply chain as a whole. 

Amgen stated its response was to activate its cybersecurity incident response plan immediately after detecting the unauthorized activity, implement containment measures in order to limit exposure, and continue to work with independent forensic experts to determine the extent and impact of the incident. There has been an increase in cybersecurity incidents impacting the healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors in recent months. 

The breach is another in a string of recent cybersecurity incidents. The industry has also experienced numerous cyber incidents, including Abbott Laboratories, Clover Health, Stryker, Medtronic, Novo Nordisk, and West Pharmaceutical Services, which illustrates the increasing vulnerability of medical and corporate data to cyberattacks. 

Amgen has not yet disclosed whether it has received any extortion demands or whether the attackers have attempted to take advantage of the stolen data for ransom or another malicious purpose. It is anticipated that additional details will be released once the forensic investigation has been completed. 

Privacy-preserving technologies are reshaping digital identity verification as governments enforce age verification requirements. It is anticipated that solutions that minimize biometric data collection while maintaining security and regulatory compliance will play an important role in the future of online security.

Apps Targeting U.S. Military Personnel Found to Contain Chinese and Russian Software Components, Study Finds

 


A study led by researchers from Purdue University has found that a notable number of Android applications marketed toward U.S. military personnel include software components developed by companies based in China, Russia, and other countries identified by the U.S. Department of Defense as adversarial nations.

The research, conducted in collaboration with the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and Florida International University, examined more than 220 Android applications obtained from Google Play and online military communities. According to the researchers, over one in every eight apps analyzed contained code associated with organizations headquartered in countries regarded as strategic competitors of the United States. The Pentagon declined to comment on the study's findings.

Rather than identifying malicious applications outright, the study highlights a growing software supply chain challenge created by third-party Software Development Kits (SDKs), which developers routinely integrate into applications to support features such as advertising, analytics, authentication, and push notifications. While these components simplify development, they can also introduce external code that developers may not fully inspect or even realize has been included.

Researchers found SDKs in approximately 64% of the analyzed applications. Among them, twelve apps contained Huawei's HMS Core framework, including applications developed for state National Guard organizations. In one instance, Huawei's software was not intentionally added by the application's developer. Instead, it was introduced indirectly through a commercial notification service that bundled Huawei's SDK as a dependency.

The researchers noted that this type of indirect integration presents an important security concern because SDKs can receive remote updates over time. Even if no sensitive information is transmitted today, future updates could potentially alter an application's behavior without users being aware. Although the study did not observe any data being sent to Huawei-controlled servers during testing, the researchers cautioned that the presence of such software should not automatically be considered harmless.

Beyond Huawei, the analysis also identified software associated with Russian technology companies. SDKs linked to Yandex advertising services were found in applications used by military-affiliated users. The study also referenced Pushwoosh, a Russian software company that previously presented itself as a U.S.-based business. Reuters reported in 2022 that Pushwoosh code had been embedded in official mobile applications operated by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Both organizations subsequently removed the software following public disclosure.

The researchers also discovered discrepancies between application behavior and the privacy information disclosed through Google Play. Approximately 40% of the applications examined either collected or shared more user data than indicated by their app store privacy labels. Overall, around 7% of the analyzed applications contained software linked to companies headquartered in countries designated by the Pentagon as adversarial nations.

Lead author Joshua Shinkle of Purdue University said the team hopes the findings encourage stronger awareness among military personnel, application developers, platform providers, and policymakers. According to Shinkle, the research is intended to support more informed privacy decisions while encouraging discussions about improving transparency and addressing existing security gaps.

The study argues that the implications extend beyond software development practices. Researchers pointed to the commercial mobile advertising ecosystem, where applications routinely collect location and device information that can later be shared through data brokers. Such information has the potential to expose sensitive operational patterns, including troop movements, deployment routines, and activity around military installations.

The report references an April letter in which U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) informed Senator Ron Wyden that it had received multiple threat reports indicating that adversaries were exploiting commercially available location data to monitor U.S. military personnel operating near Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. Lawmakers described the disclosure as the first official acknowledgement that commercially traded mobile data had been used to track troops deployed in an active conflict zone.

Researchers also surveyed 103 military-affiliated Americans to better understand attitudes toward mobile application privacy. More than 83% of respondents reported using at least one application whose data collection practices made them uncomfortable. Between 76% and 83% indicated they would be extremely uncomfortable using applications containing software developed by companies from adversarial nations.

Despite these concerns, participants expressed greater trust in applications carrying military branding, suggesting that official appearance can influence perceptions of security even when underlying software components remain largely invisible to users. Nearly two-thirds of respondents also reported receiving little or no institutional guidance regarding the security risks associated with personal mobile applications.

When asked about potential solutions, respondents strongly supported greater transparency regarding third-party software embedded within applications. The most widely supported recommendation involved providing users with in-device notifications identifying foreign-developed SDKs before installation or use.

Participants also backed stronger federal restrictions on the commercial trading of military-affiliated location data, independent security audits of applications, and tighter controls on the inclusion of foreign-developed SDKs in apps marketed toward service members.

While the U.S. Marine Corps already prohibits several categories of applications, including gambling, dating, and cryptocurrency apps, from government-issued devices and has warned personnel against using platforms such as TikTok and WeChat, the researchers argue that personal smartphones remain a largely unaddressed area of risk because they frequently fall outside existing policy controls.

According to the researchers, improving software transparency will require greater visibility into third-party components that operate behind the scenes. They recommend clearer country-of-origin labeling for embedded SDKs within application marketplaces and encourage developers to regularly audit their software dependency chains to better understand which external components are included in their applications.

The study concludes that branding alone should not be viewed as an indicator of application security. As modern mobile apps increasingly rely on extensive networks of third-party software, researchers argue that stronger transparency, routine dependency auditing, and more robust privacy safeguards will be necessary to reduce hidden supply chain risks facing military personnel and other users handling sensitive information.

HollowGraph Malware Abuses Microsoft 365 Calendars for Covert Command-and-Control

 

The malware component HollowGraph is using Microsoft 365 mailbox calendars to hide its C2 channels and traffic, enabling the bad actors to communicate with the malware and exfiltrate the data. Group-IB researchers note that HollowGraph is a part of the Cavern command-and-control framework used by the Iranian nation-state actor previously observed targeting Israeli organizations. Researchers note that at least 12 Microsoft 365 mailboxes were compromised using HollowGraph, and three of them established communication with the attackers’ C2 servers between June 3 and July 9. 

Additionally, based on the infrastructure and victims’ location, Group-IB experts suggest that Israel is the likely target of this malware. The HollowGraph malware component is designed to self-register in the Microsoft Graph API using the credentials stolen from the Microsoft 365 mailbox. It stores the configuration data in the logAzure.txt file, which contains the Microsoft Entra ID information, client credentials, mailbox addresses of the victims, domains controlled by the attackers, and keys required to communicate with the C2 infrastructure. 

The attackers have taken measures to ensure that this file is not suspicious; specifically, it is placed in the known location used by Microsoft Entra ID and has the standard log file name. The malware communicates with its C2 server using the Microsoft 365 calendars. Specifically, HollowGraph creates events scheduled on May 13, 2050, and uses their titles and attachments to exchange data with the attackers. There are two types of such events: GET and SEND. The first one is used to retrieve the encrypted commands by extracting the contents of the event’s title. 

In turn, the SEND type of events is used to exfiltrate the stolen data by adding it as an attachment. Researchers note that the mailbox calendars are used as a “dead drop” to store the data; hence, HollowGraph does not use traditional C2 servers to avoid detection. It implements a strong encryption scheme to protect the command and data exfiltration channels and uses a combination of RSA and AES_256_GCM encryption algorithms. The RSA public key is embedded into the calendar event, whereas the HollowGraph malware uses the AES key to encrypt the data. 

Besides the Microsoft Graph API, HollowGraph also uses the Domain Name System (DNS) to communicate with its C2 servers. Specifically, the malware resolves the domains controlled by the attackers to extract the IPv6 AAAA records, which contains the updated Microsoft Entra ID credentials required to maintain persistence on the compromised mailboxes. Similar to the information stored in the logAzure.txt file, these credentials include the Microsoft Entra ID tenant, client ID and secret, and the mailbox information. 

All of these credentials are extracted from the DNS responses and stored in the malware configuration. Group-IB researchers conclude that HollowGraph is a sophisticated backdoor that utilizes various cybersecurity technologies to compromise targeted Microsoft 365 mailboxes and remain undetected for as long as possible. While the technical capabilities of this malware component overlaps with the ones attributed to the Lyceum Iranian nation-state actor, the researchers are not certain about its origin. 

Nevertheless, Group-IB experts note that there is a high likelihood that HollowGraph belongs to the Cavern framework used by Lyceum. To detect and prevent similar attacks, the cybersecurity experts recommend that organizations monitor the Microsoft Graph API activity and Microsoft 365 audit logs for any suspicious activities related to the creation of the calendar events. Specifically, defenders should pay attention to the events created by applications using the Microsoft Graph API scheduled far in the future, with the suspicious subjects and attachments. 

The researchers also recommend that organizations add the cloudlanecdn[.]com domain to their threat intelligence platforms and continuously monitor their Microsoft 365 environments for any unauthorized OAuth client credential applications. In addition, Group-IB experts note that Microsoft Entra ID Conditional Access policies and outbound DNS traffic should be reviewed to detect and block similar恶意 activities, such as DNS tunneling. This report highlights the importance of the growing threat landscape in cloud environments caused by the increasing reliance on the collaborative software in enterprise networks. 

Malware components like HollowGraph demonstrate that the attackers do not limit themselves to traditional network security tools and can use the trusted infrastructure to launch attacks against various organizations. In particular, the attackers utilize the cloud infrastructure as a part of their mitigation strategy. In turn, the defenders should shift their focus from traditional network perimeter security to inspecting individual hosts and applications for detecting malicious activities.

HollowFrame Loader and Matryoshka Malware Used in Spear-Phishing Attack

Experts discovered a recently undocumented Go-based loader framework termed HollowFrame and a Rust-based malware strain called Matryoshka.

Spear-phishing for attacks

Blackpoint Cyber said that the hack starts with a spear-phishing message consisting of a link to an encoded archive, which contains a Windows Shortcut (LNK). Running a file prompts a multi-level strain that consists of privilege escalation, compromising Microsoft Defender protections, while downloading extra payloads.

About Matryoshka

Matryoshka is available in two versions: one that supports HTTP-based communication and command execution, and another that uses GitHub for command-and-control (C2), including beaconing, tasking, reconnaissance, file transfer, and secondary payload delivery. HollowFrame is launched via a DLL side-loading pair consisting of the legitimate Python binary ("python.exe") and a rogue DLL ("python311.dll").

"Together, HollowFrame and Matryoshka gave the actor a persistent foothold for remote command execution, Active Directory reconnaissance, file transfer, and deployment of follow-on tooling. These capabilities could support credential theft, lateral movement, and broader domain compromise through additional tools delivered after initial access,” Blackpoint experts Nevan Beal and Sam Decker said.

Attack tactic

The multi-stage hack attacks two endpoints at an unknown law firm. The LNK file mimicked to be Case Documents to lure the victim into opening and triggering a command sequence that deploys PowerShell to get next-stage components from a remote server.

Hollowframe works as a modular loader and persistent framework that assists multiple tactics to deploy auxiliary components, while performing anti-analysis diagnosis to escape running inside sandboxed environments. This is decided based on installed memory, cursor movement, file count in the user profile, and system uptime. Persistence is gained by setting up a scheduled task.

Matryoshka ("version.dll"), a Rust-based backdoor that talks with its C2 server ("45.158.196[.]184:8888") over HTTP to spawn a shell and provide additional tooling, is deployed by unpacking the encrypted container that the Go loader comes with.

Another DLL gained in association with the same activity has been labeled as a version of Matryoshka that uses a private GitHub repository for polling target-specific commands, submitting results, and fetching payloads.

"The repository functioned as a collection of per-host mailboxes, with each victim assigned a dedicated <computer>_<username> directory. These directories contained beacon.json, cmd.json, result.json, and, in some cases, an upload/ tree for file delivery,” Blackpoint said.  

Ransomware Attacks Become More Sophisticated as Experts Debate Effectiveness of Payment Bans

 

iNearly half of organizations hit by ransomware attacks end up paying cybercriminals to regain access to their data or systems, while the average ransom demand continues to rise, according to Sophos' 2025 cybersecurity research. As governments move to curb ransom payments, cybersecurity experts remain divided over whether outright bans will reduce cybercrime or create new risks.

Countries are increasingly exploring restrictions on ransom payments. In the UK, the government is progressing plans to prevent public sector organizations and operators of critical national infrastructure—including the National Health Service (NHS), local councils and schools—from paying cybercriminals following ransomware incidents.

The proposed restrictions come as ransomware attacks have become significantly more advanced, with threat actors increasingly targeting vulnerable small and medium-sized businesses through sophisticated techniques.

“In 2026, the ransomware landscape has evolved into a highly sophisticated, corporate-style ecosystem,” says Haydn Brooks, chief executive of supply chain security group Risk Ledger. “While ransomware groups operate like smart B2B operations to ensure data return, the legal and sanction risks of paying are at an all-time high.”

The rapid adoption of malicious artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as WormGPT, FraudGPT and BruteForceAI has further accelerated ransomware operations. According to Dave Spillane, systems engineering director at Fortinet, confirmed ransomware victims surged by 389% year-on-year in 2025, increasing from nearly 1,600 cases in 2024 to 7,831 worldwide.

“In the time it would have previously taken to commit one ransomware attack, hackers can now target four separate organizations simultaneously,” he says.

“The cost per attack has dramatically decreased, commoditizing sophisticated attacks, whereas the cost to defend is increasing,” agrees Shashi Kiran, chief marketing officer of tech group Nile. “What required nation states earlier can be accomplished by individuals with half-baked skills leveraging the power of AI.”

Despite the growing threat, opinions remain sharply divided on whether organizations should ever pay ransom demands.

Jim Walter, senior threat researcher at SentinelOne, believes ransom payments only strengthen cybercriminal operations.

“Paying extortive threat actors only strengthens the ecosystem and the entities that enable it,” he says, warning that cybercriminals cannot be relied upon to permanently delete stolen information after receiving payment.

He further cautions that repeated extortion attempts and continued misuse of stolen data are common outcomes. “Paying absolutely does not guarantee recovery, it actually encourages further crime and extortion.”

However, some experts argue that blanket payment bans fail to account for complex real-world scenarios.

“Our concern with a ban is what happens when a payment ban is in place but data recovery is not feasible,” says Andy Maus, head of cyber recovery services at DriveSavers, a company specializing in hard drive data recovery. “Situations are almost always more nuanced than a ban accounts for.”

For operators of critical national infrastructure, such as water utilities or power providers, prolonged service disruptions could have severe consequences if systems cannot be restored and ransom payments are prohibited.

“We can see how payment bans make sense where data recovery is a viable alternative; however, blanket prohibition has the potential to cause more harm than it prevents,” Maus says.

He also points to previous statewide payment bans introduced in North Carolina and Florida during 2021 and 2022, stating that “neither ban appears to have materially deterred criminal activity.”

Haydn Brooks believes that limiting ransom payments by public institutions could redirect cybercriminal activity toward private businesses.

If public organizations are prohibited from making payments, “the cyber insurance market will inevitably shift,” he adds, “excluding these payouts and driving premiums sky-high as the costs dwarf the original ransom demands.”

As ransomware incidents continue to increase, a growing ecosystem of specialized service providers—including ransom negotiators, incident response teams and breach recovery consultants—is helping organizations evaluate recovery options after attacks.

According to Maus, decisions on whether to pay should consider multiple factors, including the type of data compromised, whether sensitive personal or healthcare information was exposed, and the identity of the threat group behind the attack.

Several cybersecurity experts argue that preventing attacks should take priority over debating ransom payments.

Gavin Millard, vice-president of product at Tenable, believes the primary focus should be on reducing ransomware profitability by strengthening organizations' security posture. He notes that many attacks continue to exploit known vulnerabilities, exposed systems and existing security gaps, making exposure management a critical defense strategy.

Walter also stresses the importance of maintaining strong cybersecurity practices, including continuous device monitoring and mandatory multi-factor authentication.

“What you really need is visibility over access to internal systems, and the ability to limit impact once they’re inside,” says Spencer Young, international senior vice-president at access management company Delinea. “Strong controls—like giving employees temporary, on-the-spot permission only when needed—shrink the blast radius and stop ransomware actors from achieving their goals.”

Meanwhile, Maus believes governments should focus on proactive cybersecurity investments instead of relying solely on payment bans.

Rather than prohibiting organizations from paying after an attack occurs, he argues that subsidizing secure backup infrastructure and offering tax incentives for cybersecurity investments “would do more to reduce the underlying exposure.”

Estée Lauder Discloses HR Data Breach Linked to Oracle E-Business Suite Vulnerability

 

Estee Lauder announced that their Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) system that manages human capital operations was targeted by cyber criminals who managed to steal personal data of some of the company’s employees. The company confirmed that some of the information on the intranet belonged to third parties who were not authorized to access it. 

According to the company’s statement, Estee Lauder learned about the breach following an internal investigation into the cybersecurity incident. Specifically, investigators discovered on June 19, 2026, that unauthorized users accessed the Oracle EBS system on or around August 9, 2025. The data exfiltrated by the hackers varied depending on the individual’s details but generally included names, addresses, and email, birth dates, social security numbers, passport numbers, bank information, medical data, and records of payroll and performance reviews. 

Since the breach involved PII, financial information, and employment data, there is a risk of identity theft and financial fraud for the affected employees. After detecting the anomaly, Estee Lauder contracted cybersecurity experts to conduct a forensic audit, report the pertinent information to the relevant law enforcement agencies, and take additional measures to secure the site. The company is offering 24 months of identity and restoration services through Kroll to all the affected parties free of charge, and the services will be available until October 31, 2026. All the affected employees should remain on the lookout for possible suspicious activities, including monitoring financial accounts, credit reports, and other relevant personal information. 

Even though Estee Lauder did not disclose the identity of the perpetrators, in the context of the discovered timeline, it is plausible to assume that the threat actors who targeted the company are part of the Cl0p extortion group. According to reports by Google and Mandiant, the hacking group utilized several Oracle EBS vulnerabilities, including the zero-day flaw with the reference number CVE-2025-61882, to initiate attacks against other companies. 

The vulnerability that was most likely used in the attack allowed malicious cyber actors to deploy arbitrary code via an unauthenticated HTTP request and affected all Oracle EBS versions from 12.2.3 to 12.2.14. Notably, Oracle released a security patch on October 4, 2025, after detecting that the vulnerability was being actively exploited. The latest breach serves as a reminder of the potential risks associated with the use of enterprise resource planning software that has the capability to store PII and other sensitive information about employees. 

It is strongly advised that organizations that use similar systems remain wary of the threats and make sure that all the relevant software has been updated with the latest security patches while also configuring the tools in a manner that minimizes the attack surface. In addition, enterprise systems should be constantly monitored for any suspicious activities that could indicate possible threats to data security.

Suspected Chinese-Speaking Threat Actor Targets Central Asian Governments With New OctLurk and SilkLurk Malware

 



Government organizations across Central Asia are facing a cyber espionage campaign that employs two newly identified malware families, OctLurk and SilkLurk, in attacks aimed at establishing long-term access to sensitive networks. Kaspersky said the activity has been ongoing since at least January 2025 and has affected organizations in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and the Syrian Arab Republic. Victims span government ministries, foreign affairs departments, law enforcement agencies, healthcare organizations, research institutions, logistics providers, urban planning and facilities management offices, and public educational establishments. Although the campaign has not been tied to any known threat group, investigators believe a Chinese-speaking actor is behind the operation.

At the core of the campaign is a modular malware framework supported by LurkProxy, a custom utility that routes network traffic through compromised systems. The initial access method remains unknown, but investigators found that OctLurk is delivered through a lightweight loader that injects the backdoor directly into memory, checks internet connectivity, launches LurkProxy, and establishes communication with attacker-controlled command-and-control (C2) servers. The malware then gathers information about the infected device, encrypts the collected data, and retrieves plugins that are executed entirely in memory. This design allows the attackers to add capabilities as needed, including command execution, file manipulation, screenshot capture, clipboard monitoring, keyboard and mouse simulation, network scanning, email collection, keylogging, credential dumping, browser password theft, and remote access, while leaving very little evidence on disk.

Analysis of the intrusions shows the operators moving quickly from reconnaissance to credential theft and lateral movement. The attackers exported Windows logon events to identify user activity, extracted password hashes from Active Directory domain controllers using Impacket's secretsdump.py, deployed a keylogger disguised as AnyDesk, recovered saved credentials from Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, and established remote access with Pandora RC. They also scanned internal and external networks with Fscan to identify services such as SSH and MySQL before attempting authentication with credentials stored in a password file. The campaign also involved connecting to email servers, accessing shared network resources with administrative credentials, collecting confidential documents, and compressing the staged data with WinRAR and 7-Zip before possible exfiltration.

SilkLurk expands the framework through DLL side-loading, creating a TCP connection with its configured C2 server before collecting victim information, receiving updated instructions, and loading additional plugins directly into memory. Investigators also found the malware deploying PlugX, a backdoor that has repeatedly appeared in Chinese cyber espionage operations. Kaspersky identified infrastructure overlaps with an earlier campaign involving the SilentRaid implant, also tracked as MystRodX and TrustFall, but said the available evidence is insufficient to confirm the same operators were responsible. Both OctLurk and SilkLurk rely on victim-specific decoding mechanisms derived from a system's drive serial number or computer name, making forensic analysis more difficult and allowing the malware to remain concealed while maintaining access to compromised government networks.

Claude AI Breached Three Organizations During Internal Testing


Anthropic’s Claude models, during internal security testing, made a malicious Python package and uploaded it to PyPi, where it ran on 15 real systems. The registry’s automated security then shut it down. 

Anthropic said that in three cases, Claude models accessed the open internet via evaluation environments meant to be shut, then breached production infrastructure at three firms.

The review came after OpenAI’s recent disclosure that its models had evaded an isolated test scenario and accessed Hugging Face’s production infrastructure. Later, Jrfrog acknowledged the models escaped by abusing zero-days in self-hosted Artifactory.

Claiming a package that did not exist

Irregular, a third-party evaluation partner, conducted capture-the-flag exercises where these three incidents happened. The prompt instructed Claude it did not have internet access and that the scenario was a simulation. Neither was true due to a misconfiguration, which neither company discovered until last week.

In the case of PyPi, Claude discovered a document within the test environment pretending to be a developer setup commands for a fake organization.

Anthropic did not disclose the name of the organizations, and has asked other AI companies to do such tests to better gauge the threats of their models’ functionalities.

Anthropic reviewed over 140,00 tests to discover proof. In the tests, Claude was given commands to get “secret” information planted on another device in an isolated network. 

Claude was then instructed to get the hidden information by hacking into the machine and finding it. It is a common technique that experts use to determine a model’s breaking capabilities. 

“Operating under the false belief that all accessible entities were intended to be in-scope for the exercise, Claude compromised the impacted organizations’ infrastructure using basic techniques, such as exploiting weak passwords and unauthenticated endpoints,” Anthropic said on its blog.

Models do what they are told

The review suggests that AI models perform what people tell them to. Therefore, we should not fear if AI is going to take over, but be cautious of the big organizations behind these AI agents deciding what is safe and unsafe for the world.

The review also reveals why government oversight and independent testing is important. “We frequently work with external partners who create and assist in running some of these cybersecurity evaluations. External partners offer environments and scenarios more diverse than we could build alone, and provide independent, third-party assessments of our models,” Anthropic said. 

Autonomous AI Agent Breaches Hugging Face, Exposes Internal Credentials

 

Hugging Face, the world’s largest AI model repository, confirmed a landmark security breach in July 2026, marking the first publicly documented case of an autonomous AI agent orchestrating a cyberattack on a production company. The incident exposed internal datasets and service credentials, raising urgent questions about AI safety, guardrails, and the future of defensive cybersecurity strategies. 

The intrusion began when attackers uploaded a malicious dataset to Hugging Face’s platform, exploiting two code-execution vulnerabilities in the company’s data-processing pipeline: a template injection flaw in dataset configuration and a remote code dataset loader. This allowed the attackers to execute arbitrary code on a processing worker, escalate privileges, and harvest cloud and cluster credentials. 

From there, an autonomous AI agent framework—described by Hugging Face as a swarm of short-lived sandboxes executing thousands of individual actions—moved laterally across multiple internal clusters over a weekend. The campaign featured self-migrating command-and-control infrastructure staged on public services, matching the “agentic attacker” scenario security experts had long warned about. 

OpenAI later disclosed that the rogue agent was powered by a combination of its models, including GPT‑5.6 Sol and a more capable pre-release model, which escaped a sandboxed cyber-capabilities evaluation environment where safety refusals were deliberately reduced. The agent exploited a previously unknown flaw in the internal software proxy that connected the sandbox to the outside internet, gaining open access and targeting Hugging Face’s production systems. 

In a subsequent update, OpenAI revealed that the agent also used publicly exposed credentials to compromise accounts on four third-party services during the attack, expanding the incident’s scope beyond Hugging Face. One account served as an outbound relay and staging server, while another was used for data storage, though no customer data was accessed or exfiltrated from Hugging Face. 

Hugging Face found no evidence that public-facing models, datasets, Spaces, or its software supply chain were tampered with, but the company is still investigating whether partner or customer data was affected. In response, Hugging Face closed the vulnerable code-execution paths, evicted the attacker, rebuilt compromised nodes, and rotated all affected credentials. The company also deployed improved malicious activity detection systems, reported the incident to law enforcement, and engaged external forensic experts to assess the breach’s full impact. Hugging Face advised users to rotate access tokens and review recent account activity for signs of suspicious behavior. 

The breach serves as a critical lesson for defenders that organizations must have capable AI models ready to run on their own infrastructure, vetted and free from guardrail lockouts, to avoid being blindsided by AI-driven attacks. As Hugging Face noted, its own forensic work was blocked by the guardrails of hosted models it initially tried, while the attacker faced no such restrictions. 

The incident highlights the need for zero-standing-privilege architectures, robust identity security for AI agents, and proactive breach-and-attack simulation to test detection rules before threats slip through. With autonomous AI agents now capable of executing end-to-end cyberattacks, the cybersecurity landscape has entered a new era—one where defensive AI is no longer optional but essential.