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Docker Hub Leaked Cloud Credentials Exploited Within 8 Seconds of Image Publication

 



Attackers are extracting and exploiting exposed cloud credentials from publicly accessible Docker images within seconds of their publication, according to a four-month experiment conducted by researchers at Stony Brook University. The fastest observed exploitation occurred just 7.86 seconds after an image containing a planted AWS key was uploaded to Docker Hub.

Researchers Billy Tsouvalas and Nick Nikiforakis investigated the activity by publishing 300 instrumented honeypot images across eight public container registries. The experiment examined how quickly automated scanners discover credentials embedded in container images and whether they subsequently attempt to use them.

Conducted over four months, the study involved planting AWS, OpenAI, and Anthropic API keys alongside decoy SSH credentials and database passwords. The researchers also deployed monitoring mechanisms designed to detect different interactions with their images, including image builds, container execution, and shell access.

The findings, presented at the 2026 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), revealed extensive automated credential harvesting.


AWS Credentials Exploited Within Seconds

Across the experiment, the researchers recorded more than 75,000 image pulls. The planted AWS credentials alone attracted over 140,000 API requests originating from approximately 5,000 unique IP addresses.

The observed requests ranged from preliminary authentication checks to attempts to enumerate available cloud resources. Some interactions progressed further, indicating attempts to consume resources using the exposed credentials.

The earliest recorded AWS API request occurred just 7.86 seconds after an image was published on Docker Hub. The median time between publication and the first API request was 51.19 seconds. Furthermore, all 100 planted AWS keys had been accessed within 15 minutes of publication.

The OpenAI and Anthropic credentials experienced similar abuse. Automated activity rapidly consumed the balances associated with the researchers' test accounts, demonstrating that exposed AI service tokens can also become targets for immediate financial exploitation.

Docker Hub generated almost all observed AWS credential activity, although the researchers also recorded instances of abuse involving Harbor, another container registry included in the experiment.


Automated Scanners Extract Credentials Without Running Containers

The researchers collectively referred to the automated scanning activity as "ContainerBots." However, the designation does not establish that all observed scanners belonged to one threat actor or operated through a centrally coordinated infrastructure.

An important finding concerned how these bots accessed the exposed credentials.

Monitoring systems rarely detected attempts to execute the planted containers, suggesting that attackers generally did not need to run an image to retrieve its contents. Instead, they relied on static inspection techniques, including unpacking image layers and querying registry APIs to retrieve filesystem contents.

This approach allows scanners to examine files stored within container images without launching the applications themselves.

Container images package application code, dependencies, configuration files, and other resources into reusable layers. Consequently, credentials accidentally included during image creation can remain accessible through those layers even when developers do not intend to distribute them.

The researchers explained that their observations overwhelmingly involved static analysis rather than actual container execution.


Docker Hub Secret Exposure Is an Established Problem

The latest findings add to previous research documenting widespread credential exposure across public container repositories.

In December 2025, researchers at cybersecurity company Flare identified 10,456 Docker Hub images containing exposed secrets. These included approximately 4,000 AI-related API keys, alongside credentials capable of providing access to cloud environments, databases, Git repositories, and CI/CD infrastructure.

An earlier 2023 investigation involving 337,171 Docker images identified 52,107 valid private keys and 3,158 distinct API secrets across 28,621 images.

Such exposures create substantial remediation challenges. Removing an affected image or deleting a credential from its configuration does not invalidate copies already retrieved by automated scanners. Organizations must revoke compromised credentials, issue replacements, examine access logs, and assess whether unauthorized access occurred.


Researchers Recommend Additional Docker Hub Defenses

Tsouvalas and Nikiforakis recommend introducing automated secret detection before container images become publicly accessible. Docker Hub could scan uploaded images for embedded credentials and notify publishers when potentially sensitive information is discovered.

They also propose restricting or rate-limiting access to Docker Hub's public feed of recently published or updated images, making large-scale automated collection more difficult.

The researchers told BleepingComputer that they submitted their findings and the complete research paper to Docker in May 2026. Although the company acknowledged receiving the disclosure, they reportedly received no subsequent response.

A smaller experiment conducted in August to determine whether Docker had introduced additional protections did not identify any changes.

Docker's existing documentation already recommends using BuildKit secret mounts rather than passing credentials through Dockerfile "ARG" or "ENV" instructions, which can leave sensitive information in image contents. Secret mounts make credentials temporarily available during specific build operations without automatically persisting them in the resulting image.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in its SP 800-190 Application Container Security Guide, similarly recommends keeping secrets outside container images and supplying them dynamically when required.

The research demonstrates that publishing an image containing an active credential can expose it to automated collection almost immediately. Developers and organizations should therefore treat any credential embedded in a publicly accessible image as compromised, revoke it promptly, and ensure that replacement credentials are not retained in subsequent image layers.

Apache Roller RCE Vulnerability Actively Exploited in Attacks

 

Apache has issued an urgent warning for administrators running Apache Roller after confirming that attackers are actively exploiting a critical remote code execution flaw. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-129448, affects Roller versions 4.0.0 through 6.1.4 and allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable server. Apache has released Roller 6.1.6 to address the issue, and organizations that cannot update immediately are being urged to apply temporary mitigation steps. 

The flaw affects Apache Roller, an open-source, Java-based group-blogging server. Although it has a smaller user base than mainstream content-management systems, the issue is serious because it can give attackers full control over affected servers. The vulnerability involves the deserialization of untrusted data through the platform’s XML-RPC endpoint. 

Roller accepts vendor extension types and deserializes them before authenticating the requester, allowing an attacker to send malicious data that the server processes before checking whether the sender is authorized. This unsafe sequence can lead to arbitrary code execution, enabling attackers to run commands, install malware, steal data, or use the compromised server for further attacks. 

Apache has confirmed that CVE-2026-129448 is being exploited in the wild, although it has not disclosed details about the attackers, the scale of the campaign, or how many systems have already been compromised. The company also noted that the flaw is the same underlying issue as CVE-2026-82384, which had previously listed only Apache Roller 6.1.5 as affected. The confirmation of active exploitation raises the urgency considerably. Organizations running Roller should assume that internet-facing instances may be targeted and should prioritize patching over routine maintenance. 

The most effective response is to upgrade to Apache Roller 6.1.6 or later. The updated release disables the vulnerable extension types and rejects malicious XML-RPC requests after turning off the XML-RPC feature, closing the path attackers are using to exploit the flaw. Administrators who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by setting enabledForExtensions to false in WEB-INF/web.xml, removing the /roller-services/xmlrpc servlet mapping, and restarting Roller. These steps block the vulnerable functionality while a permanent update is prepared.

Apache specifically warns that disabling XML-RPC through the administration interface is not enough on older versions, because affected Roller builds deserialize incoming requests before checking whether the XML-RPC setting has been turned off. This means an administrator may believe the service is disabled while the server remains exploitable. 

The Roller flaw arrives amid a broader run of Apache security issues, including a recent critical vulnerability in the HTTP/2 module of Apache HTTP Server that could also allow unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution. Since November 2021, CISA has added 41 Apache flaws to its catalog of vulnerabilities exploited in the wild, and eight of those have also been abused by ransomware gangs. Organizations should inventory their systems, identify any Roller installations, and treat this vulnerability as an immediate security priority.

How Do Spam Callers Get Your Phone Number? The Hidden Sources Behind Unwanted Calls

Many smartphone users are experiencing unwanted calls from unknown numbers, ranging from promotional messages and automated marketing calls to fraudster scams designed to steal money and personal information. 

The majority of calls originate from databases containing telephone numbers collected from online and offline sources, although some are generated by random dialing systems. There is a growing market for the collection, organization, and sharing of personal information among businesses and third parties as consumer information becomes increasingly valuable. 

When users register on a website, complete online forms, install mobile applications, shop online, or enter promotional contests, you can reveal your contact information to several organizations. There is also the possibility that this information may circulate through third-party data-sharing arrangements or be made available following a data breach. 

As one of the lesser-known players in this ecosystem, data brokers are able to collect information from multiple sources and create consumer profiles that can then be sold to advertisers, marketing firms, and other interested parties. It is therefore possible to reach businesses and individuals through a number shared for ordinary services or registrations without any direct connection to the original source, for example. Cybercriminals can use such information to conduct targeted spam campaigns, impersonation scams, and financial fraud. 

How Phone Numbers Find Their Way Into Spam Lists

The majority of spam calls are not the result of stolen databases. Some are reached using automated dialing systems that generate and call random combinations, while others are acquired from publicly available records, such as business directories, property documents, and online listings. 

The commercial distribution of consumer information remains an important source of unwanted phone numbers, however. A number of methods are commonly employed to collect phone numbers, including registration forms, online purchases, loyalty programs, surveys, promotional offers, and account sign-ups. 

If a user provides their contact information, the company may share it with advertising partners or other third parties in accordance with the company's data sharing policy. There are instances where consent is buried in lengthy terms and conditions or presented in confusing opt-in settings, causing confusion about where the information will end up. As part of this process, data brokers play a key role. They combine information gathered from various sources including websites, public records, purchase histories, social media activity, and commercial databases to create consumer profiles. 

Marketing agencies, businesses, and other organizations can purchase or license the resulting lists. Despite the fact that most of this activity occurs within the advertising industry, poorly controlled data-sharing practices can also make contact information available to scammers. It is also possible to expose customer information through breaches of security and phishing attacks. 

When a security breach occurs, customer records may include telephone numbers, names, email addresses, and other personal information when an online service suffers a security incident. As an alternative to using legitimate websites, cybercriminals can also retrieve information through the use of fake job advertisements, fake login pages, and malicious applications. 

By using automated tools known as web scrapers, some phone numbers can also be harvested directly from websites and social media platforms. Once a number has been scanned and extracted in bulk, it can be added to calling lists or combined with other personal information to make fraudulent calls appear more convincing. 

Although it is important to distinguish between legitimate data collection and criminal activity, these two concepts can intersect when personal information is shared widely, inadequately protected, or exposed by security flaws. 

Ultimately, a number that was originally provided to register for a shopping account or service may become part of a database that is used to sell unsolicited information or perpetrate targeted scams. 

How to Keep a Phone Number Away From Spammers

A person can minimize their chances of receiving unwanted calls and targeted scams by limiting the exposure of their personal contact information, even though preventing every spam call may not be possible. The first step to preventing unwanted calls and targeted scams is to be selective when sharing personal contact information. It is important to be cautious when dealing with unfamiliar websites, suspicious registration pages, fraudulent job portals, and promotional offers requesting unnecessary personal information. 

When submitting information to a website, you should check the reputation and privacy policies to identify questionable services. Public exposure should also be considered. It is important to remove phone numbers from public social media profiles, online directories, and other platforms whenever possible. Mobile users should review application permissions on a regular basis, particularly access to contact information, location, photographs, and other personal information. 

A user can revoke unnecessary permissions through the privacy settings on Android and iOS devices. Reviewing account privacy options as well as avoiding unnecessary third party sign-ups can also help limit data sharing. For users already receiving frequent unwanted calls, built-in spam detection features and call-blocking services can assist in filtering out suspicious numbers. 

In order to avoid answering unknown calls immediately, you can place them into voicemail. It is important to avoid giving passwords, banking information, OTPs, or remote access to devices to suspicious callers, regardless of their claim to represent a trustworthy organization. A user should also check whether their personal information has been exposed in known data breaches. 

Services such as Have I Been Pwned can be used to identify exposed email addresses corresponding to compromised accounts, while searching online may reveal information that can be accessed by the public. The primary cause of spam calls is not always careless sharing. Random dialing, commercial data collection, and security breaches can expose numbers without the owner being aware of them. 

Spammers and cybercriminals may have a harder time converting ordinary contact information into opportunities for fraud if privacy practices are strengthened, app permissions are handled carefully, and unsolicited calls are made more aware.

Hackers Exploit Critical Puppet Vulnerability Allowing Remote Code Execution on Enterprise Servers

 

Cybercriminals are exploiting a critical security vulnerability in Perforce Puppet. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added the vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) database on 17th November and is urging organisations to apply patches. 

The vulnerability (CVE-2026-115731) has been assigned a severity rating of 9.4/10. It exists within the reporting function of Perforce Puppet and allows remote code execution. If an attacker has access to an agent certificate signed by the certificate authority (CA), they can create a malicious report and send it to the server using a PUT request. Processing this report can result in arbitrary code execution on the Puppet server with the privileges of the service account. 

If certificates are being automatically approved by the certificate authority with insufficient validation, an attacker can gain access to a valid certificate via network access. This means that they can exploit this vulnerability without authentication. This vulnerability affects multiple versions of Puppet Enterprise and Core. The affected versions are: Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.0, 2025.0.0, 2023.8.0 (before patching). Puppet Core 9.0.0 (before 9.1.3) and 8.x (before 8.22.2). 

The vulnerability was resolved by Perforce Software on 3rd November 2026. Patches have been included in Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1, 2023.8.13 and Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.2. However, OpenVox (an open source implementation of Puppet) is also affected. Developers of this product have released patches for the following versions: OpenVox Agent 9.3.0, 8.32.0, OpenVox Server 9.2.0, 8.18.0. The vulnerability was discovered by Alain Rödel of German cybersecurity firm Neodyme. 

A further vulnerability (CVE-2026-115732) was also discovered in Puppet and OpenVox, allowing certificate name authorisation to be bypassed. This vulnerability, which has a CVSS score of 9.0, was discovered using AI. The research was very specific and followed clear instructions. Attackers exploiting these vulnerabilities may be able to do more than just attack the Puppet server. If an attacker is able to perform remote code execution on a Puppet server, they may be able to get access to signing keys for the certificate authority. This would allow them to imitate other machines. 

As Puppet can be used to manage large numbers of systems across a corporate network, if an attacker is able to get access to a Puppet server, they may be able to deploy ransomware, collect large amounts of data and transfer it to other areas of the organisation. The effect of this vulnerability will depend on configuration and orchestrations protocols implemented on the server.  

Whilst CISA has confirmed this vulnerability is being exploited, little is known about how it is being exploited. However, one user on Reddit reported an exploit using this vulnerability on 4th November. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies are required to implement patches for this vulnerability by 1st December 2026. This is detailed in Binding Operational Directive 26-04, which prioritises patches based on risk.

Hackers Hijacked Optimizely’s CDN to Push Card Skimmers and iOS Exploits to CNN, BBC, and Zoom Visitors

 




Visitors to some of the world's most recognizable websites spent roughly 17 hours on Monday exposed to malicious code that could steal their payment cards, swap their cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and attempt to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in their iPhones, after attackers quietly modified JavaScript snippets served by marketing platform Optimizely.

The campaign, which researchers at Cynet and StepSecurity have named OPTIMJACK, touched at least 178 organizations including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock. Optimizely's own main site and login page were also affected.


How the Attack Got In

Optimizely Web Experimentation works by having client websites load a small JavaScript file, known as a snippet, from cdn.optimizely.com. Each snippet then executes what Optimizely calls "Project JavaScript," a customizable field that site operators can populate with their own code for A/B testing and personalization experiments. The attacker used a flaw in Optimizely's account signup flow, according to the company's incident notice, to gain write access to that field across unrelated customer projects and planted a loader inside it.

Because the modified snippets still came from Optimizely's own domain over a valid certificate, nothing about the delivery chain flagged the change. Organizations that cached and served the snippet from their own infrastructure were also affected, since the payload content came from the same compromised project fields.

The loader itself came in three forms: one that fetched the payload directly, one that encoded the payload domain in base64 to avoid string-matching detection, and a third that bundled a full copy of the payload inline as a contingency if the domain was blocked.


A Tight, Eventful Timeline

The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC on Monday in the BBC's snippet, loading a domain researchers identified as webshell[.]lol, an injector already linked to this actor. That same injector had previously appeared through scripts belonging to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media starting the prior week, and first showed up on Turkish websites as far back as September 17.

The card skimmer component went live at 13:43 UTC. Between 17:13 and 17:57, every visitor arriving from iOS 18.6 or earlier was served a hidden iframe pointed at known exploit kits. Mass cleanup began around 20:40. TalkTalk's snippet was the last to be cleared, at 21:52.


What the Payload Actually Did

The injected code carried four distinct capabilities. The crypto address swapper monitored page text, form fields, links, the clipboard API, and outgoing network requests. When it found a valid wallet address near payment-related words like "wallet," "deposit," or "send," it replaced that address with one controlled by the attacker. The swap was precise enough to pass checksum validation for each blockchain, meaning it only substituted addresses that the page or the user's application would have accepted as legitimate.

The card skimmer captured payment card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs submitted through a site's own form fields, then transmitted them to 1688360[.]cc. It could not read card data entered into cross-origin payment iframes, which covers hosted fields from providers like Stripe and Adyen.

After any crypto address swap, the payload also harvested the page's cookies and took a screenshot of the visible content, sending both to the attacker's server. HttpOnly cookies, which are inaccessible to JavaScript by design, were not captured.

The iOS component loaded a second-stage script that checked the device's software version and routed it to one of three exploit chains: Coruna targeting iOS 13 through 17.2.1, DarkSword targeting iOS 18.4 through 18.7, and a third chain for iOS 26 that researchers say currently only collected device fingerprints. Affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, a behavior that observant users might have noticed. No confirmed device compromises on physical iPhones have been reported.


The Money

By 19:25 UTC Monday, the attacker's cryptocurrency wallets had received roughly $7,040 across a window of about nine hours, according to Report URI. StepSecurity put the figure at approximately $6,600. Researchers noted that two of the wallet addresses were already in use before Monday's injections started, so it is not possible to attribute every incoming transfer directly to victims of this campaign.


What to Do Now

Security firms advise anyone who entered payment card details on Monday on a major commercial website to treat the card as potentially compromised. Crypto payments made that day should be compared against intended recipient addresses on a hardware wallet screen rather than from copied text, since clipboard contents may have been silently altered.

Site operators using Optimizely should inspect every Project JavaScript field for strings like "1688360", `atob(`, or scripts they do not recognize, and audit all users and API tokens with write access to their projects.

iPhone and iPad users on iOS 18.6 or earlier who visited any of the affected sites on Monday should update to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 immediately.

Optimizely has said the flaw has been patched and the injected code removed, though the company's incident notice did not specify how many projects were altered or confirm whether attacker access has been fully revoked.



Fandango Warns Customers of Potential Payment Card Data Exposure Following Security Incident

 

A security incident may have caused customers’ payment card information and email addresses to be compromised via Fandango’s online ticket purchasing system between 8 and 11 October 2026. 

Fandango has conducted an investigation into the incident with the help of third-party information security experts. It has found evidence that unauthorised access may have occurred to payment card information for customers purchasing tickets during this period. Fandango has identified customers who may have been affected by this incident and is informing them. Payment card numbers, CVV numbers, card expiry dates, ZIP codes and email addresses may have been compromised.

However, customer names, Social Security numbers, government issued ID information, and further account information were not compromised. Fandango has not given any details on how unauthorised access occurred. It has confirmed that the issue has been resolved and additional security measures have been implemented within the company. Fandango has stated that it is not aware of any fraudulent activity occurring with customer data related to this incident. 

However, it has recommended that impacted customers take precautions. The notice is being sent out to inform customers that they may have been impacted by this incident. Those customers who may have been impacted will be offered two years free identity protection from IDX. This includes credit monitoring, dark web monitoring, identity theft insurance, and managed identity recovery. This should allow customers to monitor for unusual activity and take steps to protect themselves if personal/financial data has been misused. 

Fandango has not published the total number of customers potentially impacted. However, information given to state regulators gives an indication of the scale. In Oregon, 913 residents have been identified as having been impacted. In Vermont, 18 residents have been identified. Fandango has also made a notice to the office of the Attorney General of California. 

If over 500 residents of California are impacted by a data breach, businesses must submit a copy of their notice to the state. Fandango, a brand under Versant Media Group, offers a large online ticket purchasing service within the US. The platform allows customers to purchase tickets to over 31,000 screens across the country. The company also runs Rotten Tomatoes, a popular review site for films and TV. 

This incident demonstrates the risk of online payment systems. Even if other account information is secure, unauthorised access to payment information may mean that customers face financial fraud.

GitDoor and GraphDoor Exploit GitHub and SharePoint for Cyberespionage

 

Government organizations across Asia and Africa are facing a cyberespionage campaign that turns familiar cloud platforms into channels for covert communication. Discovered by Kaspersky in early 2026 and named Operation ShadowCloud, the campaign deploys two previously undocumented backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor. These tools abuse GitHub, Microsoft SharePoint, and the Ably messaging service to disguise malicious communications as ordinary enterprise activity. Their modular design allows attackers to download additional capabilities and execute code in memory, making the operation adaptable while complicating detection and analysis efforts. 

The investigated attack chain begins with MeshCentral Agent, a legitimate utility normally used for remote administration, including desktop access and file management. Researchers traced one intrusion to an unnamed Taiwanese organization, although how the agent initially reached the system remains unknown. Evidence suggests attackers may have reused an existing infection. The agent retrieves legitimate executable files, malicious loader libraries, and encrypted payloads. Through DLL sideloading, trusted applications load malicious code, which decrypts and launches the backdoors inside process memory rather than through conventional execution. 

GitDoor uses GitHub repositories to separate incoming instructions from outgoing results. Commands arrive through a public repository called Havo, while execution results are uploaded to a private repository named Trix. Repository creation dates indicate preparations began by late 2024. Supporting 26 commands, GitDoor enables file management, keylogging, proxy operation, and additional code execution. Downloadable modules expand its reach to screenshots, browser cookie theft, credential dumping, scheduled tasks, and Windows account management, giving operators extensive surveillance and control capabilities across compromised systems within targeted networks. 

GraphDoor instead communicates through Microsoft Graph and SharePoint. It authenticates through a malicious application, obtains an access token, and uses cloud storage to exchange information and retrieve instructions. After collecting system details, it downloads plugins that capture screenshots, list processes, and record keystrokes. Other components provide proxy services, including a SOCKS5 tunnel carried through Ably infrastructure. Like GitDoor, GraphDoor can execute additional code, allowing attackers to extend functionality without replacing the entire implant or relying exclusively on files stored locally on the infected machine. 

Attribution remains uncertain. Kaspersky identified overlaps with Bronze Sandcastle and tactical similarities involving FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle, also known as BlackTech. Some implants appeared in shared staging directories within one day of GitDoor deployment, but researchers stressed that this does not establish a direct connection. The broader significance lies in the abuse of trusted infrastructure: legitimate cloud destinations can carry hostile instructions. Operation ShadowCloud illustrates how attackers combine remote administration software, concealed payloads, and flexible plugins to sustain espionage while blending into routine organizational traffic.

Cyberattack Disrupts Lithuanian Customs Services, Raising Concerns Over Data Breach


Several national and European Union customs systems have been disrupted by a cyberattack, resulting in partial restoration of Lithuania's Customs agency's online services. Additionally, the incident, which was detected on November 10, raised concerns regarding the possibility of a data breach involving the personal information of hundreds of individuals and businesses. 

A temporary shutdown of the agency's Common User Management Portal (BAP) as a result of the attack was prompted, which serves as an access point for Lithuanian customs services as well as certain European Commission platforms for individuals and businesses. As a result, the systems responsible for processing import declarations and checking the status of imported goods entered the European Union were disrupted.

The Lithuanian Customs Department confirmed on November 16 that some affected services had been reopened through the country's electronic government portal. However, users were still unable to authenticate using digital certificates, indicating that a restoration was not yet complete. Investigations conducted by the agency confirmed unauthorized access to BAP portals, and found that personal information belonging to users who logged into the portal between November 9 and 10 may have been exposed. 

Several hundred individuals and businesses, mostly located in Lithuania, may be affected, according to Vygantas Paigozinas, Chief of Customs. However, the authorities have not confirmed whether the information was actually accessed, copied, or stolen. Media reports indicate that individuals' names, residential addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, and Lithuanian personal identification numbers may have been potentially accessed, copied, or stolen.

A notification has been sent directly to potential affected users advising them to be vigilant in the event of suspicious communications requesting personal or financial details. Paigozinas described the incident as a targeted and sophisticated cyberattack. 

According to preliminary findings, the attackers were able to gain access to the portal by exploiting a poorly secured technical function. It was also determined that the intrusion attempt extended beyond the BAP and that attackers may have attempted to gain access to additional government systems containing much more sensitive information.

The chief of customs reported that the attackers appeared to have attempted to cause wider damage by reaching deeper into different components of the agency's information infrastructure. It has not been disclosed which specific vulnerability was exploited or who was responsible for the attack. 

Several European Commission customs platforms were also affected by the attack, including the Import Control System 2 (ICS2), which collects and evaluates information regarding goods entering the European Union. There were significant disruptions that affected individuals and small businesses that rely on BAP to authenticate themselves when accessing these systems. 

Services used by customs intermediaries continued to function normally Lithuanian Customs has taken several measures to contain the incident and prevent further unauthorized access. In addition to limiting connections to the affected infrastructure, isolating compromised systems and preserving relevant data for forensic analysis. The response was assisted by external infrastructure and cybersecurity specialists, as well as supported by the secure restoration of services.

In addition to Lithuanian National Cyber Security Centres and State Digital Solutions Agency, as well as the State Data Protection Inspectorate and relevant European Union institutions, the incident was reported to the authorities. Further investigations have been launched into the possibility of personal information being exposed to the public. It was warned to potentially affected users of the possibility of follow-up scams involving stolen or exposed personal information. 

Individuals were warned not to trust unanticipated email, text message, and telephone calls that request personal or financial information. In addition, customs officials advised users not to share sensitive information via suspicious links or to verify the website address before sharing sensitive information, as exposed contact details could be misused for phishing and impersonation. Increasing concerns have been raised concerning the safety of Lithuanian government information systems following the latest incident. 

Over 600,000 records held by the country's Centre of Registers, which manages property and corporate registries, have been accessed unauthorized by unidentified attackers in May 2026. The Real Estate and Legal Entities Registers may have been exposed to personal and property-related information as a result of this incident. 

The authorities, however, have not established a connection between the May breach and the attack on Lithuanian Customs. Investigations into the latest incident continue, and the agency is continuing to assess whether any potentially exposed data has been accessed and is working to restore its affected systems.

New Linux Malware Uses Tor, Ethereum Blockchain, and Falsified GPU Data to Run Cryptomining Operations Undetected

 



A financially motivated threat actor has been running a sophisticated cryptomining operation against Linux GPU servers, using a custom toolkit that routes commands through Tor, conceals mining activity by falsifying GPU sensor readings, and pulls its own controller's address from the Ethereum blockchain. Researchers at Elastic Security Labs, who published their findings November 16, identified the campaign as REF3364 and named the central malware component SANSAR.

The attack, observed between October 22 and 25, started at an exposed Ray job agent. Ray is an open-source distributed computing framework widely used in AI and machine learning environments, and its job API accepted submissions without authentication in the affected deployment. The Ray dashboard was restricted to loopback, but the job agent remained internet-reachable, giving the attacker a direct path to run arbitrary jobs on the target hosts.

The initial jobs ran `nvidia-smi` to collect GPU inventory from the compromised machines and send it outward, before switching to a Python-based reverse shell. Once that foothold was established, an SSH key was inserted into the account that owned the Ray session. The attacker then escalated to root and staged the full toolkit under `/opt/vadi_`.

The toolkit has six components. SANSAR, written in Rust and versioned at 0.1.3, acts as the orchestrator. It connects to a Tor onion service through Arti, Tor's Rust-based client implementation, and receives commands covering miner start and stop, configuration updates, interactive shells, and SYN traffic tasks. Authentication relies on an HMAC-SHA256 digest tied to an embedded key, and the binary checks for debuggers at startup by reading the TracerPid field and exiting if the value is non-zero. The miners SANSAR manages are XMRig 6.25.0 for CPU workloads and SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9 for GPU, with no hardcoded pool or wallet address in the binary itself.

The most technically elaborate piece of the toolkit is a modified NVIDIA Management Library wrapper. NVML is the library that tools like `nvidia-smi` call to query GPU utilization, temperature, and power draw. The malware swaps in a replacement `libnvidia-ml.so.1` that calls the legitimate library internally but intercepts results before they reach the caller. It reports GPU utilization as zero percent while substituting temperature readings with random values between 36 and 46 degrees Celsius and power draw figures between 100 and 200 watts. Any process tied to mining is filtered out of the response entirely, so standard monitoring tools display an idle card while it runs at full capacity.

Kernel-level concealment comes from `acpi_thermal_mgr.ko`, a rootkit loaded as a kernel module through DKMS with an initramfs hook that ensures it reloads after every reboot. It taps into the Linux ftrace subsystem to intercept syscalls including `getdents64`, `openat`, and `kill`, returning "No such file or directory" or "No such process" errors for files and processes it is configured to hide. The module parameters governing what gets hidden, including target process names and filename prefixes, are adjustable.

A separate backdoor called netns, registered as a systemd service, handles resilient command-and-control. Rather than storing its controller's IP address in the binary or on a fixed server, netns queries the Ethereum blockchain through public RPC endpoints. It sends calls to a hardcoded smart contract at address 0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349, reads an IPv4 address out of the contract state, and connects to that address on TCP port 8080. Once connected, it waits for a `SHELL <host> <port>` command that spawns a Bash session pointing to an arbitrary destination. Elastic noted the command loop has no authentication or integrity protection.

Turkish-language comments in the rootkit's source code offer a loose geographic signal, though Elastic stopped short of firm attribution.

The Ray framework has drawn similar attention before. In 2025, Oligo Security documented the ShadowRay 2.0 campaign, in which attackers exploited CVE-2023-48022 to submit malicious jobs to Ray clusters and spread miners across nodes using Ray's own scheduling features. At the time, researchers estimated more than 230,000 Ray servers were exposed to the internet.

Elastic's recommendations focus on restricting job submission access to GPU infrastructure, verifying that monitoring libraries have not been swapped by comparing `libnvidia-ml.so.1` against a known-good copy, auditing `authorized_keys` files and systemd units for unauthorized additions, and reviewing DKMS modules and initramfs images for unexpected entries. YARA rules and file hashes for all six components are included in the full report.


Rising Internet Access Exposes First-Time Users to Growing Threat of Online Scams and Cybercrime

 

With more developing areas gaining internet access, millions of new users are being exposed to the internet. Due to their lack of knowledge, they face higher risks of falling prey to online scams. There are around 2.6 billion people who do not have internet access globally. If this trends continue, 2 billion more people will gain internet access by 2030. 

However, many countries lack education and protection against cybercrime. Anicet Etekpo, a security officer in Benin, lost money after clicking a link from Facebook that he believed to be coming from a friend in 2022. The link led to a fake website asking for personal information including bank details. He became worried about his financial and personal data. 

Zeki Turedi, field chief technology officer at CrowdStrike, a cyber security company, said cybercrime has become a professional industry. Criminals have begun to use technology such as automation, AI and social engineering to target their victims. Scammers are using increasingly personalised messages in local languages and cultures. They are pretending to be banks, government agencies and reliable services. They are also using fake help schemes and realistic apps on mobile phones with spyware. 

Criminals are also providing 'off the shelf’ tools to create phishing messages and stealing login details through underground forums and encrypted communications. This makes it easier for people to get into cybercrime. As more AI content and deepfakes become available, fake messages will become harder to spot. Africa is one of the least connected continents in the world. 

Whilst some countries such as South Africa and Seychelles have internet access of almost 80%, many rural areas in Benin and busy countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo lack internet access. Lack of infrastructure, high costs of satellite internet and unreliable broadband makes it challenging for many. There are over 280 million new users expected in Africa in the next 4 years. Financial losses caused by cybercrime have increased over 200% since 2024, rising to $484 million. 

International investigations, training for police and cybercrime awareness have been implemented. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime have created detection technology and security measures. The FBI have specialist teams to combat cybercrime. The UK’s National Crime Agency have also done international investigations. However, these may not be helping those who lack experience with the internet. Governments are looking to try and help. 

The African Union have made cybercrime a priority within their Agenda 2063. Interpol are also helping police forces in Africa. Myanmar have previously provided digital safety awareness campaigns to new users. Nigeria have updated their Cybercrimes Act in 2024. India have also set up a national helpline to help those who have fallen victim to scams. Education is very important. Robert Anderson, founder of non-profit IT partner Telecom4Good, said cybersecurity should be ongoing. 

However, governments often restrict communications when there are elections, protests or emergencies. Many tech companies have also provided tools to help keep users safe online. Google offer password managers, two-step verification, passkeys and their Advanced Protection Program. Microsoft created the Cybersecurity Tech Accord in 2018, bringing together technology companies to improve digital security. 

With over 38 billion connected devices globally by 2030, the number of possible entry points for cybercrime will increase. New users will need more than just internet access. Education, easy to use security, improved infrastructure and fraud prevention will need to be improved.

TSMC Confirms Employee Data Breach Linked to Cloud Provider

 

TSMC has confirmed that personal information belonging to some current and former employees was exposed following a breach linked to an unnamed cloud service provider. The company says its own internal systems were not compromised and that customer and operational data were unaffected. The incident came to light after employee data appeared on an external website without authorization, prompting TSMC to investigate the source of the exposure. 

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company disclosed the incident in a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Its investigation found that the exposed records matched information stored in the systems of a cloud service provider. However, TSMC did not identify the provider, explain how the attacker gained access, or specify the exact number of employees affected. 

The breach became public after a cybercriminal forum post on November 8 offered 6.9 GB of alleged TSMC employee data for sale. The seller claimed the dataset included contact information, identification details, and banking information, and demanded 3 Bitcoin, valued by The Record at approximately $200,000. TSMC has not independently confirmed every detail of the seller’s claims, but it verified that the exposed data matched records held by the cloud provider. 

TSMC stated that it has begun notifying affected personnel and is providing them with necessary support. Chief Financial Officer Wendell Huang said the company is working with the cloud vendor, relevant investigating authorities, and a third-party cybersecurity agency to establish the facts and take appropriate action. The company’s decision to involve external specialists suggests that it is treating the matter as a serious security and privacy issue. 

The case highlights the growing importance of third-party risk management. Even when an organization secures its own networks, sensitive data may still be stored or processed by vendors, cloud platforms, payroll providers, and other external partners. Employee records are particularly attractive to cybercriminals because they can contain names, contact details, government identification numbers, and financial information that can be used for identity theft, fraud, or phishing. 

For TSMC, the incident is another reminder that cybersecurity cannot depend on internal defenses alone. The company supplies major technology firms including Nvidia, Apple, Broadcom, and Qualcomm, and reported revenue of $122 billion last year. Although TSMC says customer data was not involved, the exposure of employee information may still affect trust and raise questions about vendor security practices. The company has faced several cyberattacks in recent years, including a 2023 ransomware incident involving an IT hardware supplier. Moving forward, stronger vendor assessments, encryption, access controls, continuous monitoring, and transparent communication will be essential to reducing similar risks.

Amazon Detects Campaign Targeting AI Infrastructure and Developer Credentials


Using autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents, Amazon Threat Intelligence has identified cybercrime campaigns that identified vulnerable AI applications, stole API keys, and reused the credentials to support further attacks utilizing the same credentials. 

It was likely that credentials from multiple AI providers could be exposed as a result of these operations, which targeted internet-exposed platforms such as LiteLLM, One API, Dify, Langflow, RAGFlow, and Open WebUI. Using the MadPot network, a globally distributed system of decoy servers designed to monitor suspicious interactions, Amazon's MadPot network provided the basis for these findings.

A request from an AI agent operating through the open-source ARTEX penetration testing framework was sent to the sensors between October 3 and November 5, 2026. These requests contained operational instructions, task histories, and reports of findings, which permitted researchers to examine how the campaigns were conducted. With moderate confidence, Amazon determined that ARTEX was employed for the operations and that separate China-linked threat groups were involved. 

Based on the evidence, the assessment was made, which included simplified Chinese-language prompts, China-based time zone configurations, targeting patterns, and tooling associated with Chinese-nexus actors. In Amazon's view, the agents operate through a coordinated structure that is comprised of planners, workers, verification agents, and compression agents. 

Each component shared a persistent knowledge graph, which allowed agents to access previous findings, coordinate tasks, and continue operations without repeatedly initiating reconnaissance efforts. Various activities were described in the records, including the discovery of vulnerabilities, the theft of credentials, the expansion of cloud access, and the compromise of cryptocurrency exchange identity verification systems. 

In the primary campaign, API keys were harvested to access large language models (LLMs). Agents searched for internet-based AI applications, extracted provider credentials from those applications, tested whether the credentials remained functional, and added valid credentials to a pool of available credentials. 

It was subsequently determined that the stolen keys could be transferred to the framework's own model gateway, which enabled the agents to use AI services to search for additional credentials. Due to the fact that compromised applications could expose several sets of credentials, the campaign focused on platforms that manage connections to multiple AI providers. This study identified gateways and proxy services such as LiteLLM, One API, New API, Veloera, and Sub2API as well as artificial intelligence applications such as Dify, FastGPT, Langflow, RAGFlow, LobeChat, Open WebUI, and Ollama as possible targets. 

An attacker prepared a playbook containing identified vulnerabilities associated with these products in order to attack them. Entry points identified included default administrator credentials, incomplete installations, and management interfaces that were not accessible by authentication. There were also references to LiteLLM's default master key, an authentication bypass involving the isCliRequest header in One API family systems, and known Langflow and RAGFlow vulnerabilities. 

To access cloud metadata services, additional techniques included exploiting server-side request forgery (SSRF) through URL-fetching features. Furthermore, the agents looked for exposed credentials in JavaScript, source maps, debugging endpoints, environment files, and publicly accessible code repositories as well. 

Deepfake Campaigns and Cloudflare Incident Reveal Wider ARTEX Threat

The company has also identified an attempt by ARTEX agents to bypass Know Your Customer (KYC) verification systems at two cryptocurrency exchanges in a separate campaign. To avoid detection, the operation involved generating real-time deepfake videos to pass live selfie checks, and modifying identity documents to avoid detection. 

According to reports, agents examined one verification provider's protocol for checking liveness, including instructions for tracking facial features and moving. However, the provider's server-side verification system rejected every deepfake attempt recorded by Amazon, even though the face was positioned within seven pixels of the target.  Meanwhile, the agents developed a video-generation pipeline capable of producing 11.5 frames per second through the use of a consumer grade graphics processor.

Many agent sessions were involved in the operation, which included bypassing identity checks, preparing deepfake videos, clearing account balances, and identifying methods of cashing out. However, the recorded attempts did not defeat the provider's liveness tests, but they demonstrated that artificial intelligence agents may be able to coordinate multiple stages of a fraud operation with minimal human involvement. 

Cloud environments are also being exposed to a wider threat. During an eight-week period, Cloudflare reported investigating several incidents involving ARTEX and related tools. In one instance, attackers gained access to an account-level API token that was used for continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD). In addition to the token not having IP restrictions and rate limits, investigators also discovered the creation of Cloudflare Worker scripts whose names were associated with ARTEX operations within an hour. 

There has been no confirmation by the company whether its database requests exposed information or whether its efforts to persist were successful. The FBI's November 13 FLASH alert provided further evidence of the framework's widespread usage in a variety of sectors. Earlier, a campaign against South Korean financial institutions exposed approximately 67,000 people's personal information. 

More than 2,250 downstream Microsoft tenants were affected by a September supply chain attack involving ConnectWise Cloud Backup. As a result of ARTEX, some intrusions progress from initial targeting to privileged access in less than three hours, according to the FBI. 

The original GitHub repository for the framework was suspended in October, however, community forks, archive copies, and the commercial ARTEX PRO version remain accessible. According to Censys, 1,465 ARTEX console hosts were exposed to the internet on November 4, with additional deployments most likely operating behind private networks. 

Security Measures to Limit Exposure

A major portion of Amazon's campaigns relied on existing security weaknesses rather than newly discovered attack techniques, according to Amazon. The use of AI gateways and application building platforms should be accompanied by replacing default credentials, completing or removing unfinished installations, limiting management interfaces to trusted networks, and implementing available security updates. 

A patch for CVE-2025-3248 must be applied to Langflow version 1.3.0 or later. In light of the advisory cited by The Hacker News, which does not contain a patch for CVE-2026-28797, organizations using RAGFlow should review exposure to CVE-2026-28797 and follow the project's security guidance. 

The exposed API keys and cloud credentials should be revoked and replaced, as well as the repository, deployment files, container images, and continuous integration/continuous delivery pipelines for embedded secrets must be examined. It is important to apply expiration dates and IP restrictions to API tokens, monitor unexpected consumption of artificial intelligence services, and investigate suspicious Worker deployments or unusual database activity, among other tasks. 

Amazon has shared indicators of compromise to facilitate further investigation and notified AWS customers of potential risks. According to the findings, agentic artificial intelligence is changing the pace of cybercrime. Security teams must consider not only automated vulnerability discovery, but also attackers who may validate stolen credentials, coordinate parallel operations, and leverage compromised resources to finance additional attacks in addition to automated vulnerability discovery. 

This study highlights the increasing security risks associated with autonomous artificial intelligence agents as well as exposed artificial intelligence infrastructure. In order to avoid exploitation at scale by attackers, organizations should strengthen access controls, secure API credentials, monitor unusual activity, and address vulnerabilities as these tools become increasingly widespread.

Ransomware Group Wiped an Entire VMware Estate in Ten Days Without Exploiting a Single Vulnerability




A ransomware group called BlackNevas dismantled a company's entire virtualization infrastructure over ten days, destroying four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine running on them, two vCenter Server Appliances, and the backup systems meant to recover from exactly this kind of attack. The findings, published by Kaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team, detail how attackers moved through one of the most common enterprise environments without triggering a single exploit alert, because they never used one.

The core finding is uncomfortable for organizations that have treated patching as the main line of defense: every action the attackers took against ESXi ran through legitimate VMware management interfaces. The group obtained valid administrative credentials, used VMware's own tools to push configurations, and triggered ransomware detonation through supported remote access channels.

Ransomware made up 39.4 percent of all incidents Kaspersky's response team handled in 2025. The ESXi segment of that is growing, partly because of a decision made in 2021. When the Babuk ransomware source code leaked, it included a working ESXi version, and at least ten ransomware families have since reused that codebase. BlackNevas is one of them.


How the Attack Unfolded

BlackNevas, first observed in November 2024 and also tracked as a Trigona family variant, operates across Windows, Linux, NAS devices, and ESXi hypervisors. The group runs double extortion, stealing data before encrypting it and threatening public leaks to pressure victims. Known targets include organizations in healthcare, finance, manufacturing, legal services, and telecom across Asia, Europe, and North America.

In this incident, the attackers got in through credential reuse. Valid administrative credentials from non-virtualization systems were used to reach the vCenter Server Appliances, which manage the ESXi hosts. This is the same access path defenders often overlook because they focus on preventing vulnerability exploitation rather than limiting what happens when credentials are already compromised.

Forty-three seconds after logging into the VCSA via SSH as root, the attackers deployed MeshAgent, part of the open-source MeshCentral remote management platform. The entire SSH session lasted two minutes and 26 seconds. Four hours later, they returned through MeshAgent and installed Ligolo-ng, a tunneling tool, as a systemd service disguised under the name `vmware-vdma.service` to blend in with legitimate VMware components.

The next step exploited a feature few organizations think to restrict. VMware's Host Profiles allow administrators to push consistent configurations to ESXi hosts from vCenter. The attackers used this to enable Tech Support Mode SSH across the hosts. Ten minutes and 18 seconds after the configuration was pushed, the TSM-SSH service was running. SSH sessions to ESXi then originated from the vCenter appliance IP, which most environments treat as a trusted internal source.


Taking Out Backups First

Before touching the ESXi layer, the attackers disabled antivirus on the backup infrastructure, stopped backup services, and encrypted the recovery systems. This sequence is deliberate. Ransomware operators have learned that organizations with clean backups can often recover without paying, so the backup environment is now treated as part of the primary attack surface.

Two Veeam vulnerabilities are worth noting here. CVE-2024-40711, which CISA has added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, has been directly linked to ransomware campaigns. CVE-2025-23120 is not on that list yet, but affects domain-joined backup servers and represents a less-patched exposure in many environments.


Detonation and Partial Recovery

The ransomware payload was uploaded to ESXi hosts via SFTP. Roughly three hours before detonation, it ran a self-test lasting about 16 seconds. The final command processed virtual machine storage directories with options to wipe and detach volumes. On one host, all virtual machines stopped within 23 seconds. The ransomware overwrote approximately the first two kilobytes of virtual disk files. Kaspersky notes that a valid backup GPT header may allow partial recovery in some cases, though this is not a reliable path.

A crucial detection problem runs through the entire attack. ESXi writes logs to a RAM disk by default, meaning a reboot erases them. If forensic investigators arrive after a reboot, the evidence of how attackers moved through the environment is gone. Kaspersky recommends configuring remote syslog to preserve ESXi logs outside the virtualization trust domain.


What Organizations Should Change

Kaspersky's recommendations center on treating vCenter as a Tier 0 asset, the same classification given to domain controllers. That means separate administrative identities for virtualization management, phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, and limiting SSH and ESXi Shell access through Lockdown Mode. Network filtering on the management interface, combined with logs stored outside the virtualization environment, closes the two gaps this attack exploited most effectively.

The practical lesson from this incident is that a patched VMware environment is not a protected one if the credentials managing it are shared with less-secured systems.



Meta Fined €805 Million in Italy Over Facebook’s Access to Android Photo Galleries Without Consent

 

Meta has been fined €805 million by Italy’s data protection authority for using the gallery suggestions feature on Facebook, which was activated by default, to access users’ images, videos and metadata. 

The Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante) has told Meta to remove the feature from being active by default. This means that it will need to ensure the feature does not appear as an active option for users who have previously allowed access to their phone galleries. It will also need to make sure that the feature cannot be used without an additional opt-in, with clear information about what the feature does and how to turn it off. 

During the investigation it was discovered Facebook had used a blanket permission to give access to multiple functions within the app. There was no clear explanation to users that the permission would allow the app to suggest photos and videos from their private galleries. Once users had given the permission Facebook could gain access to a whole photo album. The authority said it was difficult to know exactly what information the application was gaining access to. 

Garante concluded that this breached Article 122 of the Italian Privacy Code. This article was introduced to bring the ePrivacy Directive of the European Union into national law. It means that any information stored on users’ devices as part of their private life must be given free and informed consent before applications are allowed to access it. Meta has appealed the fine. A spokesperson said the fine was unfair as the feature cannot be used unless users have allowed it in their device settings. They added that users can revoke or change their permission at any time. 

The authority has also told Meta that it must provide an initial report on how it will comply with the ruling within 30 days and a final report within 90 days. If they fail to comply within the 60-day timeframe then the feature cannot be active for users who haven’t given valid consent. This comes after a complaint from consumer protection organisation Centro Tutela Consumatori Utenti in Bolzano. In July 2025, they advised users of Facebook to turn off the gallery suggestions and check the app’s permissions. The investigation did not look into whether the content from Facebook’s galleries were used to train AI models. Meta has denied this. 

However, Garante may investigate whether the new feature introduced this year, which allows processing of gallery content in the cloud, has breached any rules. Meta had claimed that the Irish data protection regulator should be responsible for this issue. However, this was rejected by Garante as the ePrivacy framework does not use the EU’s one stop shop system. The feature has been active since 2023 and the investigation started in July 2025. 

The fine of €805 million equates to around 0.47% of Meta’s worldwide revenue. The authority took into consideration the potential impact on around 20 million Android users in Italy, how long the breach had been occurring, a previous ruling in 2019 against Meta and Meta’s lack of cooperation. However, they also took into consideration that Meta had made changes following the complaint. Regulators felt these changes were late and not enough.

US Disrupts North Korean Crypto-Theft Campaign

 

The United States has disrupted FaceStealer, a North Korean cyber campaign that allegedly stole more than $400 million in cryptocurrency through deepfakes, hijacked messaging accounts, and fake technical “fixes.” The operation targeted crypto and Web3 professionals as well as open-source developers, showing how social engineering can be as damaging as a conventional software exploit. 

According to the FBI, attackers hijacked accounts on Telegram, LinkedIn, Slack, and Discord and used them to invite victims to video meetings. During those calls, they displayed recordings of people the targets knew—including people who had already been compromised—to create a convincing sense of trust and urgency. While a victim waited for a meeting to begin, the hackers secretly recorded webcam footage. Those recordings could then be reused in later meetings, sometimes alongside footage of multiple familiar people, making the deception increasingly difficult for the next target to recognize. 

After building trust, the attacker claimed that a technical problem had occurred and displayed a fake error message. The victim was then directed to a link offering a supposed update, installer, or repair—effectively a ClickFix-style lure designed to make running malicious code seem routine. The malware stole cryptocurrency-related data and credentials for video-meeting services such as Zoom, Google Meet, and Microsoft Teams. 

It also exposed victims’ contact lists, social media accounts, communication applications, and webcam videos, giving attackers material to expand the campaign. Researchers attributed FaceStealer to the North Korean-linked BlueNoroff group. The campaign reportedly identified 677 targets across 58 countries, with a strong focus on founders and senior executives in the cryptocurrency and Web3 sectors. 

The attackers sometimes waited months, or even more than a year, before exploiting an initial compromise—likely allowing victims’ cryptocurrency holdings to grow. The FBI also highlighted attempted attacks against maintainers of widely used npm and Rust packages, underscoring the risk to the broader open-source supply chain. 

The U.S. government seized the cloud infrastructure supporting the campaign after it had operated for 18 months. Authorities also identified more than 900 secretly recorded webcam videos of technology workers, illustrating the scale of surveillance and social manipulation involved. In a related action, the U.S. Department of Justice said it froze more than $2.7 billion connected to a $6.4 billion Binance crypto heist, with court authorization to seize or restrain more than $1.2 billion of that amount. These actions show that disruption can involve both infrastructure takedowns and financial countermeasures. 

Users should join meetings only through official applications and invitation codes, independently verify unexpected meeting invitations, and keep webcams off unless they are genuinely needed. Most importantly, they should never run scripts, updates, or “fixes” prompted by an unexpected technical error during a call. FaceStealer demonstrates that cybercriminals no longer need to break through technical defenses first; they can exploit human trust, familiar faces, and urgency. For crypto holders, executives, and developers, verification before action is now a core security control.

Falcon C2 Malware Turns Web Browsers Into Espionage Tools


The Falcon cyberespionage framework, formerly known as XG, targets government systems by exploiting web browsers to exploit sensitive information and maintain covert access to compromised systems. By utilizing malicious JavaScript and deceptive browser extensions, the framework monitors user activity, collects credentials and has access to confidential communications without relying on conventional malware execution. 

It is reported in Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 report published on November 11, 2026 that Falcon was used between March and May of 2026 in campaigns targeting government entities in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries. Ministry of foreign affairs, defense and interior, police departments, intelligence agencies, military entities, and government email systems were affected by the vulnerability. 

As it operates within the browser environment, the framework is difficult to identify through traditional endpoint security monitoring, which makes its activities more difficult to detect. Instead of using suspicious executable files, attackers inject malicious JavaScript into legitimate web applications and webmail portals in an effort to conceal their activities. 

In the case of a compromised website, the browser retrieves the malicious script from the Falcon command-and-control (C2) infrastructure when the targeted user visits the compromised site. Researchers have observed that the framework generates an implant separately for each browser session. This implant consists of two JavaScript components containing configuration details and functions for communicating and executing commands. 

An XOR operation of a single byte is performed to obfuscate the combined script before delivery, converting its contents into a series of numerical values that are decoded and executed within the browser. A 32-character session identifier, stored locally in the browser, and in cookies, is also used for persistent tracking. In order to blend in with ordinary browser data, the malicious entries employ a naming convention mimicking Baidu Analytics identifiers. 

Falcon extensions are equipped with the capability of storing the identifier within their extension storage when installed. For command-and-control communication, the implant establishes a WebSocket connection to the attacker's server while the compromised webpage is available. In order to maintain the connection, a periodic heartbeat message is sent to maintain the connection and an AES-256-CBC encryption system is used to protect data exchanged with RSA-based key negotiation. 

In addition to the framework's built-in features, the Comet communication method provides a fallback mechanism for executing arbitrary JavaScript commands, transmitting collected information, and managing compromised browser sessions once connected. Through its built-in functions, attackers are able to control infected browsers effectively by exfiltrating data, labeling sessions, and receiving operator notifications via Telegram.

It was also found that Falcon and PeckBirdy, a scripting framework previously described by Trend Micro, share many similarities. In light of the shared URL structures, payload delivery methods, communication protocols and session storage conventions, Unit 42 concluded with high confidence that both frameworks are variants of the same underlying toolset. 

Falcon Extension Expands Surveillance Across Browsers and Internal Systems As part of Falcon's broader control over compromised browsers, the company uses dedicated Chrome and Firefox extensions, which in turn conceal itself as a legitimate PDF viewer called "PDF Viewer" and request 40 permissions. These permissions include access to browser credentials, cookies, browsing histories, downloads, and network activity, among others. 

There is no indication as to how these extensions are installed by the operators, however the management panel appeared to contain tools for silent installation. As soon as the extension is activated, it tracks activity across visited websites and collects information through background processes. It is capable of capturing Gmail, Discord, Zalo chat databases, and X direct messages. 

The system can also monitor clipboard activity as well as intercept web requests containing text or JSON data. Collected information is temporarily stored and sent to the command server. Another noteworthy feature allows attackers to use the victim's browser as a proxy. 

Operators can send requests using session cookies and stored credentials to authenticate a browser session and gain access to internal resources under the victim's name by using stored credentials. Moreover, Falcon is capable of intercepting selected downloads, cancelling the original request, and redirecting the user to an attacker-controlled file while retaining the original filename. These capabilities increase the risk of account hijacking and further malware delivery. Between March and May of 2026, Unit 42 has identified several government-oriented campaigns. 

One Middle Eastern country has been compromised by attackers who inserted malicious scripts into the header of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Roundcube webmail portal. Researchers have identified 39 Roundcube instances within the country which are affected. A police entity was targeted by attackers who harvested user names through an internal application in a Southeast Asian country. 

After the fake Adobe Flash Player update prompt, selected users received an implant referred to as Antino. As part of a separate attack against a Justice Department-affiliated organization, a malicious Chrome extension remained active for more than three weeks. Operational personnel captured credentials and screenshots of sensitive internal documents during the intrusion. 

By adding a Windows-based capability, Antin adds a new capability to the framework. A Rust-based implant, authored by the researcher, uses Microsoft OneDrive to communicate with the framework, uploading system information, and receiving commands via JSON files. As well as executing shell and PowerShell commands, file transfers, collecting system information, and executing programs, it establishes persistence via the Windows Registry Run key. 

It is recommended that Unit 42 examine unauthorized browser extensions, suspicious script injections in internal web applications, and unusual browser storage entries utilizing the Hm_lvt_ naming convention in order to identify potential infections. Security teams should also investigate unexpected OneDrive activity, particularly repeated JSON file transfers that utilize paths such as antino/heartbeat and antino/antino_upload. 

It is demonstrated that Falcon combines conventional Windows malware capabilities with browser surveillance to provide attackers with multiple methods for maintaining access to government information and gathering sensitive data. As a result of the discovery of Falcon, browser-based espionage frameworks pose increasing threats. 

Through a combination of malicious extensions, JavaScript implants, and Windows-based malware, attackers are able to monitor user activity and access sensitive government information. Several steps can be taken to reduce the risk of similar intrusions, including strengthening browser security, auditing installed extensions, monitoring suspicious script injections, and investigating unusual cloud storage activity.