Cisco Systems has confirmed that attackers are actively exploiting two security flaws affecting its Catalyst SD-WAN Manager platform, previously known as SD-WAN vManage. The company disclosed that both weaknesses are currently being abused in real-world attacks.
The vulnerabilities are tracked as CVE-2026-20122 and CVE-2026-20128, each presenting different security risks for organizations operating Cisco’s software-defined networking infrastructure.
The first flaw, CVE-2026-20122, carries a CVSS score of 7.1 and is described as an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability. If successfully exploited, a remote attacker with authenticated access could overwrite files stored on the system’s local file structure. Exploitation requires the attacker to already possess valid read-only credentials with API access on the affected device.
The second vulnerability, CVE-2026-20128, has a CVSS score of 5.5 and involves an information disclosure issue. This flaw could allow an authenticated local user to escalate privileges and obtain Data Collection Agent (DCA) user permissions on a targeted system. To exploit the vulnerability, the attacker must already have legitimate vManage credentials.
Cisco released fixes for these issues late last month. The patches also addressed additional vulnerabilities identified as CVE-2026-20126, CVE-2026-20129, and CVE-2026-20133.
The company provided updates across multiple software releases. Systems running versions earlier than 20.9.1 should migrate to a patched release. Fixes are available in the following versions:
According to Cisco’s Product Security Incident Response Team, the company became aware in March 2026 that CVE-2026-20122 and CVE-2026-20128 were being actively exploited. Cisco did not disclose how widespread the attacks are or who may be responsible.
Additional insights were shared by researchers at watchTowr. Ryan Dewhurst, the firm’s head of proactive threat intelligence, reported that the company observed exploitation attempts originating from numerous unique IP addresses. Investigators also identified attackers deploying web shells, malicious scripts that allow remote command execution on compromised systems.
Dewhurst noted that the most significant surge in attack activity occurred on March 4, with attempts recorded across multiple global regions. Systems located in the United States experienced slightly higher levels of activity than other areas.
He also warned that exploitation attempts are likely to continue as additional threat actors begin targeting the vulnerabilities. Because both opportunistic and coordinated attacks appear to be occurring, Dewhurst said any exposed system should be treated as potentially compromised until proven otherwise.
Security experts emphasize that SD-WAN management platforms function as centralized control hubs for enterprise networks. As a result, vulnerabilities affecting these systems can carry heightened risk because they may allow attackers to manipulate network configurations or maintain persistent access across multiple connected sites.
In response to the ongoing attacks, Cisco advises organizations to update affected systems immediately and implement additional security precautions. Recommended actions include restricting administrative access from untrusted networks, placing devices behind properly configured firewalls, disabling the HTTP interface for the Catalyst SD-WAN Manager administrator portal, turning off unused services such as HTTP or FTP, changing default administrator passwords, and monitoring system logs for suspicious activity.
The disclosure follows a separate advisory issued a week earlier in which Cisco reported that another flaw affecting Catalyst SD-WAN Controller and SD-WAN Manager — CVE-2026-20127, rated 10.0 on the CVSS scale had been exploited by a sophisticated threat actor identified as UAT-8616 to establish persistent access within high-value organizations.
This week the company also released updates addressing two additional maximum-severity vulnerabilities in Secure Firewall Management Center. The flaws, tracked as CVE-2026-20079 and CVE-2026-20131, could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication protections and execute arbitrary Java code with root-level privileges on affected systems.
The operation starts with an email sent from an address hosted on ukr[.]net, a famous Ukrainian provider earlier exploited by the Russia based hacking group APT28 in older campaigns.
Experts at ClearSky have termed the malware “BadPaw.” The campaign starts when a receiver opens a link pretending to host a ZIP archive. Instead of starting a direct download, the target is redirected to a domain that installs a tracking pixel, letting the threat actor to verify engagement. Another redirect sends the ZIP file.
The archive pretends to consist of a standard HTML file, but ClearSky experts revealed that it is actually an HTA app in hiding. When deployed, the file shows a fake document related to a Ukrainian government border crossing request, where malicious processes are launched in the background.
Before starting, the malware verifies a Windows Registry key to set the system's installation date. If the OS is older than ten days, deployment stops, an attack tactic that escapes sandbox traps used by threat analysts.
If all the conditions are fulfilled, the malware looks for the original ZIP file and retrieves extra components. The malware builds its persistence via a scheduled task that runs a VBS script which deploys steganography to steal hidden executable code from an image file.
Only nine antivirus engines could spot the payload at the time of study.
After activation within a particular parameter, BadPaw links to a C2 server.
The following process happens:
Getting a numeric result from the /getcalendar endpoint.
Gaining access to a landing page called "Telemetry UP!” through /eventmanager.
Downloading the ASCII-encoded payload information installed within HTML.
In the end, the decrypted data launches a backdoor called "MeowMeowProgram[.]exe," which offers file system control and remote shell access.
Four protective layers are included in the MeowMeow backdoor: runtime parameter constraints, obfuscation of the.NET Reactor, sandbox detection, and monitoring for forensic tools like Wireshark, Procmon, Ollydbg, and Fiddler.
Incorrect execution results in a benign graphical user interface with a picture of a cat. The "MeowMeow" button only displays a harmless message when it is clicked.
According to a report published by Radware, 149 separate DDoS attack claims were documented between February 28 and March 2, 2026. These incidents targeted 110 distinct organizations spanning 16 countries. Twelve different groups participated in the activity. Three of them, Keymous+, DieNet, and NoName057(16), were responsible for 74.6 percent of the total claims. Radware further noted that Keymous+ and DieNet alone accounted for nearly 70 percent of activity during that period.
The earliest attack in this wave was attributed to Hider Nex, also known as the Tunisian Maskers Cyber Force, on February 28. Information shared by Orange Cyberdefense describes Hider Nex as a Tunisian hacktivist collective aligned with pro-Palestinian causes. The group reportedly employs a dual strategy that combines service disruption with data theft and public leaks to amplify political messaging. Researchers trace its emergence to mid-2025.
Geographically, 107 of the 149 DDoS claims were directed at organizations in the Middle East, where government bodies and public infrastructure entities were disproportionately affected. Europe accounted for 22.8 percent of the global targeting during the same timeframe. By sector, government institutions represented 47.8 percent of all affected entities worldwide. Financial services followed at 11.9 percent, while telecommunications organizations accounted for 6.7 percent.
Within the Middle East, three countries experienced the highest concentration of reported activity. Kuwait accounted for 28 percent of regional attack claims, Israel represented 27.1 percent, and Jordan comprised 21.5 percent, according to Radware’s analysis.
Threat intelligence from Flashpoint, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, and Radware identified additional groups engaged in disruptive campaigns, including Nation of Saviors, Conquerors Electronic Army, Sylhet Gang, 313 Team, Handala Hack, APT Iran, Cyber Islamic Resistance, Dark Storm Team, FAD Team, Evil Markhors, and PalachPro.
The cyber activity extended beyond DDoS operations. Pro-Russian hacktivist collectives Cardinal and Russian Legion publicly claimed breaches of Israeli military networks, including the Iron Dome missile defense system. These assertions have not been independently verified.
Separate threat reporting identified an active SMS-based phishing operation distributing a counterfeit version of Israel’s Home Front Command RedAlert mobile application. Victims were reportedly persuaded to install a malicious Android package disguised as a wartime update. Once installed, the application displayed a functional alert interface while covertly deploying surveillance and data-exfiltration capabilities.
Flashpoint also reported that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targeted energy and digital infrastructure sectors in the Middle East, including Saudi Aramco and an Amazon Web Services data center in the United Arab Emirates. Analysts assessed that the intent was to impose broader economic pressure in response to military losses.
Researchers at Check Point observed that Cotton Sandstorm, also known as Haywire Kitten, revived a previous online identity called Altoufan Team and claimed responsibility for website compromises in Bahrain. The firm described the activity as reactive and warned of the likelihood of further involvement across the region.
Data from Nozomi Networks shows that the Iranian state-linked group UNC1549, also tracked as GalaxyGato, Nimbus Manticore, and Subtle Snail, ranked as the fourth most active threat actor in the second half of 2025. Its campaigns focused on defense, aerospace, telecommunications, and government entities in support of national strategic objectives.
Economic signals have also reflected the instability. Major Iranian cryptocurrency exchanges remain operational but have introduced adjustments such as batching or temporarily suspending withdrawals and issuing advisories about potential connectivity disruptions. Ari Redbord, Global Head of Policy at TRM Labs, stated that the situation does not yet indicate large-scale capital flight, but rather market volatility managed under connectivity constraints and regulatory intervention. He noted that Iran has long relied in part on cryptocurrency infrastructure to circumvent sanctions, and current conditions represent a real-time stress test of that system.
Despite heightened online activity, Sophos reported observing an increase in hacktivist operations without a corresponding escalation in confirmed impact. The firm cited DDoS attacks, website defacements, and unverified compromise claims attributed largely to pro-Iran personas, including Handala Hack and APT Iran.
The National Cyber Security Centre has warned organizations of elevated Iranian cyber risk and advised strengthening defenses against DDoS campaigns, phishing activity, and threats targeting industrial control systems.
Cynthia Kaiser of Halcyon, formerly Deputy Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Division, stated that Iran has historically used cyber operations to retaliate against perceived political provocations and has increasingly incorporated ransomware into its playbook. She added that Tehran’s tolerance of private cybercriminal actors provides strategic options when responding to geopolitical events.
SentinelOne assessed with high confidence that organizations in Israel, the United States, and allied nations are likely to face direct or indirect targeting, particularly across government, critical infrastructure, defense, financial services, academic, and media sectors.
Nozomi Networks further emphasized that Iranian threat actors have a history of blending espionage, disruption, and psychological operations to achieve strategic objectives. During periods of instability, such campaigns often intensify and extend beyond immediate conflict zones.
To mitigate risk amid the ongoing conflict, security experts recommend continuous monitoring aligned with elevated threat conditions, updating threat intelligence signatures, minimizing external exposure, conducting comprehensive reviews of connected assets, enforcing strict segmentation between information technology and operational technology networks, and isolating Internet-of-Things devices.
Adam Meyers, head of Counter Adversary Operations at CrowdStrike, noted that Iranian cyber actors have historically synchronized digital campaigns with broader strategic goals. He added that these adversaries have evolved beyond traditional network intrusions, expanding into cloud and identity-focused operations capable of operating rapidly across hybrid enterprise environments with greater scale and impact.
As tensions persist, analysts caution that cyberspace is likely to remain an active parallel arena of confrontation, requiring sustained vigilance from organizations across affected and allied regions.
The increasing regulatory data collection is now mixing with bitcoin’s on-chain transparency, making a trove of identity linked data that hackers can abuse for forced, real-world attacks.
Physical attacks against cryptocurrency holders are on the rise due to a number of factors, including social engineering, frequent major data breaches, KYC requirements, and regulatory data collection.
These occurrences, which are frequently referred to as "wrench attacks," entail coercion to gain private keys or force transactions by threats or physical violence. With France emerging as a focus point, this movement is highlighting a weakness in the industry's regulation.
Threats has become the rule rather than the exception, with at least 47.2% of cases involving verified torture or physical assault and 51.5% including firearms. There were 19 fatal occurrences, which resulted in 24 deaths overall and a 6.2% fatality rate. 2025 was the most violent year on record in terms of recorded cases, but analysts warn that the actual number of occurrences is probably greater because of underreporting. All numbers are based on cases that were publicly available at the time of reporting.
The risk profile for Bitcoin holders is very harsh. Transactions are irreversible once private keys are turned over under duress. Chargebacks, account freezes, and institutional recovery procedures are nonexistent. When coupled with actual compulsion, the protocol's famed finality becomes a liability.
France serves as an example of how rapidly this risk might increase. In France, there were twenty bitcoin-related physical attacks in 2025, compared to a total of just four between 2017 and 2024. Eight more cases had already been reported by early February 2026, indicating that the rise is continuing rather than leveling down. Europe now accounts for around 40% of all events worldwide, up from about 22% in 2024.