Security researchers have disclosed a now-remediated flaw that could have allowed specially crafted notifications from common messaging and social networking applications to influence the behavior of Google Gemini on Android devices.
The research was conducted by SafeBreach researcher Or Yair, who found that Gemini's ability to access and process notifications could be abused to deliver hidden instructions through otherwise legitimate messages. According to the findings, the technique did not rely on malware or a rogue application being installed on a target device. Instead, any service capable of sending a notification, including WhatsApp, Slack, Signal, Instagram, Messenger, or SMS, could potentially be used to deliver malicious content.
The study builds on SafeBreach's earlier "Invitation Is All You Need" research, which demonstrated how malicious Google Calendar invitations could manipulate Gemini through indirect prompt injection. Following that disclosure, Google introduced new safeguards designed to prevent external content from influencing sensitive actions. Yair's latest work examined whether similar manipulation could still occur through a different source of user data.
At the center of the issue was Gemini's Utilities feature on Android. The functionality allows the assistant to read, manage, and respond to notifications from connected applications. Researchers found that under certain circumstances, notification text could be interpreted not only as information but also as instructions that influenced the assistant's responses and actions.
Because the feature is available on Android devices and not through Gemini's web version or iOS implementation, the attack scenario was limited to Android users who had granted Gemini access to notifications.
According to SafeBreach, the number of potential entry points was unusually large because notifications can originate from countless applications and online services. This meant attackers would not necessarily need direct access to a device. Delivering a crafted notification could be sufficient to introduce malicious instructions into Gemini's processing workflow.
One of the simpler demonstrations involved altering the information Gemini presented to users. Researchers showed that manipulated notifications could cause the assistant to relay fabricated messages while making them appear to originate from legitimate contacts. In some scenarios, Gemini could process real notifications first and then attribute attacker-controlled content to an actual sender already present in the notification queue.
The researchers noted that this type of deception could be particularly effective when users interact with Gemini through voice. For example, someone driving a vehicle may hear a message that appears to come from a manager, colleague, or trusted contact and have little opportunity to verify the information displayed on the screen.
The research also examined Google's post-Calendar security protections. According to Yair, Gemini included mechanisms intended to prevent sensitive actions from being triggered without proper authorization. These checks evaluated both the user's response and the assistant's preceding output to determine whether a requested action was consistent with the conversation.
During testing, direct attempts to inject hidden commands were repeatedly blocked. To overcome these restrictions, Yair developed a technique called "Fake Context Alignment," which sought to make a user's approval appear valid to Gemini's authorization system while obscuring the true request from the user.
One variation involved displaying a sensitive authorization prompt in a language unfamiliar to the victim. Researchers used an example where a request such as "Do you want to open the window?" appeared in Chinese while a harmless English-language question followed. If the user responded with "Yes," Gemini could potentially associate that response with the hidden authorization request rather than the visible conversation.
A second technique relied on differences between information displayed on-screen and information spoken aloud by Gemini's text-to-speech system. Researchers found that certain hidden content embedded within hyperlinks might not be read aloud. In a demonstration, the visible interface contained a sensitive authorization request while the spoken response presented a routine message, increasing the likelihood that a user would unknowingly approve an action.
SafeBreach reported that combining these techniques increased the chances of bypassing the authorization safeguards that Google had introduced after the earlier Calendar-based attack research.
Once authorization was obtained, the researchers demonstrated several potential outcomes. Through integrations with Google Home, Gemini could interact with connected smart-home devices, including windows, lighting systems, and boilers. Additional demonstrations involved opening websites that could expose a user's approximate location through IP address information or trigger file downloads.
The research also explored interactions with third-party applications. In one proof-of-concept scenario, Gemini followed a trusted web address that later redirected to a Zoom link, resulting in the device joining an online meeting. SafeBreach emphasized that this occurred within a controlled testing environment and stated that its own public domain was not configured to redirect users to Zoom. Instead, the redirect was performed through a local test server used during the demonstration.
Researchers additionally identified a persistence mechanism involving Gemini's memory capabilities. Unlike the earlier Calendar-based research, the notification technique enabled the assistant to store attacker-controlled information as long-term memory. In one demonstration, Gemini was persuaded to remember an incorrect name for the user. Because memory is associated with a Google account rather than a single device, inaccurate information could potentially appear wherever that account later accessed Gemini.
The study also demonstrated the creation of recurring automated tasks. Researchers showed that instructions could potentially be scheduled to execute repeatedly, including examples involving regular access to recent messages at specific times.
SafeBreach disclosed the findings to Google's Vulnerability Reward Program on August 17, 2025. Google classified the report as a high-priority issue and later confirmed that changes to its content-classification systems mitigated both the notification-based prompt injection technique and the related authorization bypass method. The company confirmed the remediation on November 14, 2025.
No CVE identifier was assigned to the issue, and SafeBreach stated that it found no evidence indicating the technique had been exploited in real-world attacks before the fixes were implemented.
Because Google's mitigation was deployed through server-side updates, users did not need to install a software update to receive protection. However, individuals seeking additional safeguards can restrict Gemini's access to notifications by disabling the Utilities feature through Connected Apps settings or by revoking the Google app's notification-reading permissions on Android.
The findings provide another example of the security challenges that emerge as AI assistants gain access to messages, notifications, calendars, and connected services. As these systems become increasingly capable of performing actions on behalf of users, researchers continue to examine how external content can influence AI-driven decision-making and whether existing safeguards are sufficient to prevent misuse.
Last month, cybersecurity researchers announced that they had successfully located and analyzed the project. Their investigation uncovered malware dating back to 2005 that was reportedly designed to manipulate software believed to be used by Iranian nuclear scientists, demonstrating that the Shadow Brokers leak continues to reveal new chapters in cyber espionage history.
Hackers found the stolen machine key and used it in ViewState deserialization campaigns to sign infected ViewState payloads and launch remote code execution (RCE) at the OS level.
In 2025, Mandiant responded to a campaign on a KnowledgeDeliver server and said that in the beginning, the bug was abused as a zero-day to deploy a compromised script into the web platform.
The compromise was also possible as threat actors used “identical pre-shared ASP.NET machine keys across multiple customer deployments,” the experts said.
According to Mandiant, “KnowledgeDeliver installations deployed before Feb. 24, 2026 relied on a standardized web.config file provided by the vendor. This configuration file contained hardcoded machineKey values used by the ASP.NET framework to encrypt and sign data, including ViewState payloads.”
Experts said that the code on the platform lured users to download a malicious installer, which compromised the machine with a Cobalt Strike beacon by deploying a backdoor.
The encrypted payload used a key “that used the name of the compromised organization, which indicated that the threat actor prepared this payload specifically for the targeted organization,” Mandiant report said.
In August last year, experts from ASEC also disclosed that Godzilla was planted in ASP.NET environments in ViewState deserialization attacks against firms in the finance industry.
Threat actors could modify a JavaScript file with code that asked users to run a ‘security authentication plugin’ and install a malicious script from a domain that hackers used.
In recent years, threat actors are increasingly exploiting unsafe machine keys in Viewstate deserialization attacks against web platforms for a few products.
Threat actors utilized a hardcoded machine key in March of last year to create a malicious payload that gave them access to Gladinet CenterStack's secure file-sharing servers.
After obtaining the machine key to generate signed malicious ViewState payloads, hackers gained access to 85 Microsoft SharePoint systems in July 2025.
Additionally, state-sponsored actors utilized ViewState deserialization assaults to install WeepSteel, a spying tool that revealed the ASP.NET machine key on Sitecore servers.
A security researcher has uncovered a weakness in a Lenovo-signed Windows driver that could allow attackers to disable antivirus and endpoint security tools, potentially weakening a system's defenses before carrying out additional malicious activity.
The finding involves BootRepair.sys, a driver linked to Lenovo PC Manager. According to research conducted by security researcher Jehad Abudagga, the driver contains functionality that can be exploited to terminate processes directly from the Windows kernel. Because the file is legitimately signed by Lenovo, it may appear trustworthy to operating systems and security products that rely on digital signatures when evaluating software.
At the time of the analysis, the driver, identified by the SHA-256 hash 5ab36c116767eaae53a466fbc2dae7cfd608ed77721f65e83312037fbd57c946, reportedly had no detections on VirusTotal. Security researchers note that attackers often favor signed and seemingly legitimate software components because they can help malicious activity blend into normal system operations.
The research surfaces the growing nature of this particular attack technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver, or BYOVD. In these attacks, threat actors deliberately use trusted but flawed drivers to gain elevated capabilities inside a system. Rather than exploiting security software directly, attackers abuse weaknesses in legitimate drivers to bypass protections and interfere with defensive tools.
A detailed examination of BootRepair.sys revealed several security weaknesses. The driver creates a device object called "\Device\::BootRepair" without applying a secure discretionary access control list (DACL). In practical terms, this means users with limited privileges may still be able to communicate with the driver.
The driver also creates a symbolic link named "\DosDevices\BootRepair," making the functionality accessible from user-mode applications. Researchers further found that the driver does not perform access-control validation when processing IRP_MJ_CREATE requests. As a result, any user can potentially obtain a handle to the driver without undergoing meaningful permission checks.
Analysis of the driver's input and output control functionality identified a single exposed IOCTL code, 0x222014. This control code accepts a four-byte input buffer that contains a process identifier, commonly referred to as a PID. Once received, the PID is passed to an internal routine responsible for terminating the specified process.
The underlying mechanism relies on the Windows kernel function ZwTerminateProcess. Because the operation is performed in kernel mode, the driver can terminate processes that would ordinarily be protected from interference. This includes security-sensitive services and endpoint protection products that are designed to prevent unauthorized shutdown attempts.
According to the research, these weaknesses create two primary attack opportunities. If the driver is already installed on a target system, an attacker with limited privileges could interact with it directly and terminate antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) processes. If the driver is not present, an attacker could deploy the signed driver as part of a BYOVD operation, load it into the kernel, disable security controls, and then proceed with post-compromise activities.
In a proof-of-concept demonstration, the researcher showed that even protected processes could be terminated once the driver had been loaded. The test used standard Windows APIs to communicate with the driver. The process involved opening a handle to "\\.\BootRepair," sending a target process identifier through IOCTL code 0x222014, and allowing the driver to terminate the selected process from kernel mode.
The simplicity of the proof-of-concept demonstrates how little effort may be required to exploit the functionality once access to the driver is available. Researchers warn that after security products are disabled, attackers may be able to run credential theft tools, information stealers, or other post-exploitation utilities with a lower likelihood of detection.
The findings also reinforce concerns surrounding BYOVD attacks, which have become increasingly common in ransomware operations and advanced intrusion campaigns. Because vulnerable drivers often carry legitimate digital signatures, they can sometimes evade security controls that place significant trust in signed software.
To reduce exposure, organizations are encouraged to implement Microsoft's vulnerable driver blocklist, monitor systems for unusual driver-loading activity, restrict the installation of unauthorized drivers, and watch for suspicious kernel-level behavior. Security teams should also ensure that endpoint protection platforms are configured to detect attempts to abuse legitimate drivers.
The research serves as another example of how trusted software components can become security liabilities when design weaknesses are present. As attackers continue searching for legitimate tools that can be repurposed for malicious activity, organizations will need stronger controls around driver management, behavioral monitoring, and endpoint visibility to prevent security products from being disabled before an attack fully unfolds.
A private visa assistance website used by travelers seeking permission to enter the United Kingdom left a large collection of customer records accessible online, exposing passport copies, identity verification photographs, and location information linked to applicants.
The website, known as UK Visa Portal, offers paid assistance for visa and travel authorization applications. The platform is not operated by the U.K. government, although reports indicate that some users may have mistaken it for an official government service and paid application-related fees through the site instead of using government channels.
The exposure came to light after an individual discovered a security issue affecting the platform and reported it to journalists. According to information shared by the source, the accessible records included more than 100,000 files uploaded by applicants during the visa application process. These files reportedly contained passport images and selfie photographs that users submitted to verify their identities.
Following inquiries from journalists, the exposed data was secured. However, details regarding how long the information remained accessible have not been publicly disclosed.
According to reporting on the incident, the exposed records were stored in an Amazon-hosted cloud storage repository used by UK Visa Portal. While the storage system did not openly display a list of documents to the public, individual files could still be accessed by anyone who possessed the correct web address. The individual who identified the issue stated that a flaw within the website's backend functionality made it possible to view references to files stored in the cloud environment.
Journalists investigating the incident reportedly verified the authenticity of the exposed records by contacting individuals whose documents appeared in the dataset. Those contacted confirmed that the information matched records they had submitted through the platform.
Beyond passport scans and identity photographs, some uploaded images reportedly contained embedded geolocation metadata. This information can be automatically recorded by smartphones and digital cameras when a photograph is taken. In certain cases, the metadata was reportedly detailed enough to reveal the location where the image was captured, including locations associated with applicants' residences.
The exposure of identity documents can create opportunities for fraud and impersonation. Passports, facial images, dates of birth, addresses, and other personal identifiers are frequently used during account verification processes. If obtained by unauthorized parties, such information may be used in attempts to create fraudulent accounts, bypass identity checks, or conduct targeted social engineering operations.
The handling of the incident has also left several questions unanswered. Reports indicate that journalists attempted to notify the company about the security issue but were unable to identify a dedicated vulnerability reporting channel. The website reportedly did not provide public contact information for company executives or security personnel responsible for addressing cybersecurity matters.
After initial contact was made through customer support, a manager was identified as a potential point of contact. However, reports indicate that direct engagement with company management did not occur. Instead, communication later involved representatives from a public relations firm and attorneys from a U.S.-based law firm.
Following publication of the findings, journalists sought additional information regarding the incident, including the length of time the storage repository remained exposed, whether access logs exist, whether any files were downloaded by unauthorized parties, and who oversees cybersecurity operations within the organization. Public answers to those questions have not been released.
The company is reportedly linked to an organization called Active Leadgen LLC, which is described as having connections to the United Arab Emirates. However, independent verification of the ownership structure has not been publicly established.
The incident comes amid increasing reliance on online identity verification systems by governments, financial institutions, and digital service providers. As more organizations require users to submit passports and photographs electronically, the protection of those documents has become a critical responsibility for any company handling sensitive personal information.
Applicants seeking authorization to travel to the United Kingdom are generally advised to confirm that they are using official government services before submitting identity documents or making payments. In most cases, travelers can complete the application process directly through official U.K. government channels without relying on third-party visa assistance platforms.
According to Sekoia, the attack consists of exploiting the bug CVE-2025-8088, a path traversal bug in WinRAR, to run an HTML App payload called GammaPhish, which is later used to get a VBScript payload from the C2 server. The main goal is to fingerprint the host device and update the network settings in the registry via dead drop resolvers (DDRs), retrieve and launch arbitrary VBScript payloads from the C2 servers.
“Gamaredon’s arsenal has undergone a significant transformation over the last decade, transitioning from Pteranodon custom-built framework into a fragmented and modular malware. Based on our observation, today’s Gamaredon capacities are characterised by a proliferation and a highly active development cycle of new malware variants,” said Sekoia
One payload is a VBScript worm called GammaWorm that builds persistence through scheduled tasks and is built to hide authentic directories in network shares and USB drives and replace with infected Windows Shortcut (LNK) files. This causes the launch of arbitrary code gotten from a C2 server.
To fix C2, GammaWorm starts a GET request to the public Telegram channel. Via genuine platforms such as Telegram, hackers blend with regular traffic, escape getting caught, and launch long-term spying campaigns. GammaWorm also depends on NTFS Alternate Data Streams (ADS) tactics to hide its core modules.
A different malware family deployed through GammaLoad is a modular information stealer called GammaSteel that stores files matching particular extensions and retrieves the stolen files on AWS S3 bucket or a threat-actor regulated server as a backup option. According to Sekoia, the infection chain could be used to launch different malware strains like GammaWipe or GamaWiper, this depends on the hacker’s targets.
"The exact deployment vector for GammaWorm remains ambiguous; it could be dropped concurrently by GammaLoad, or introduced independently via a user executing a weaponized USB drive," it noted. "In addition, assessing the global execution flow, we assess with high confidence that GammaPhish is designed to deploy GammaLoad first,” Sekoia said.
Russian state-sponsored actor Gamaredon associated with the official Federal Security Service (FSB) has a long history of targeting Ukraine and its government, critical infrastructures, military via spear-phishing emails that consist infected attachments in “booby-trapped RAR archives”, according to the Hacker News.
Gamaredon, a Russian state-sponsored intrusion-set officially linked to the Federal Security Service (FSB), has a history of targeting Ukraine, particularly government, military, and critical infrastructure entities, using spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments, in this booby-trapped RAR archives.