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XWorm RAT Evolves Into Advanced Surveillance Malware

Remote access trojan (RAT) XWorm has developed into an advanced surveillance threat whose capabilities extend beyond data theft and remote s...

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Xandr
Advertising Data Regulation European Union GDPR Grindr Microsoft Norway Privacy sensitive data Xandr

Microsoft's Xandr Handed Norway's Largest Privacy Fine for Funneling Grindr User Data to Thousands of Advertisers

 



Norway's data protection authority has issued its largest fine to date, hitting Microsoft-owned advertising company Xandr with a NOK 92 million ($9.6 million) penalty for passing sensitive personal data belonging to Norwegian Grindr users through automated advertising auctions without a legal basis. The decision, signed October 2 by Datatilsynet Director General Line Coll and Head of International Tobias Judin, targets one of the most contested privacy questions in digital advertising: whether ad intermediaries can claim ignorance of how consent was collected by the apps they serve.

Grindr is a location-based dating app primarily used by gay, bisexual, trans, and queer people. For nearly two years, from July 2018 to April 2020, Xandr sat at the center of the app's advertising infrastructure, operating on both the buying and selling sides of real-time bidding. The process works fast and invisibly. The moment a user opened Grindr, the app passed their data through Xandr to a pool of companies competing in a split-second auction for the right to show that person an ad. Datatilsynet found that this relay included at minimum each user's advertising ID, IP address, and the fact of their Grindr use. Under GDPR, that last detail matters enormously. The authority concluded that being identifiable as a Grindr user is itself information that indicates sexual orientation, a category that European data law places under strict protection and requires explicit consent to process.

Xandr's defense rested on the argument that it believed Grindr had already collected consent from its users. Datatilsynet rejected that reasoning on a straightforward legal basis: Xandr was not a passive conduit but a joint controller alongside Grindr. Under GDPR's joint controller framework, both parties carry independent obligations to confirm a lawful basis exists before processing sensitive data. Xandr never verified that any such basis was in place, and the authority ruled that the company had no right to treat consent as someone else's responsibility. "Xandr omitted to verify that the consents from Grindr were valid, and did not do anything to ensure they had a legal basis for their own processing," Coll stated in the decision.

The investigation turned up a complicating detail. Xandr had been notified of the probe by Datatilsynet in February 2020. Despite that, the company deleted documentation about its processing of Grindr users' data between July 2020 and February 2023, when the authority sent a second information order. Xandr told investigators the deletion had occurred as part of its routine data retention policies. Datatilsynet refused to let that explanation close the gap, noting that the company knew an active investigation was underway when the records were removed.

In setting the penalty at NOK 92 million, Datatilsynet cited the duration of the violations, the direct financial benefit Xandr drew from the unlawful sharing, and the fact that thousands of Norwegian users had their sensitive data exposed to potentially thousands of companies without their knowledge. Crucially, the fine was calculated against Xandr's own annual turnover and not Microsoft's. The authority noted that the violations took place before Microsoft completed its acquisition of Xandr in June 2022, after AT&T sold the unit it had rebranded from AppNexus in 2019.

A Microsoft spokesperson mentioned that the investigation "focused on conduct that predates Microsoft's acquisition of Xandr," adding that interpretations and applications of legal standards have continued to evolve since then. The company said it is reviewing the decision and assessing its options. Xandr, which now operates as Microsoft Advertising, has three weeks to appeal to Norway's Privacy Appeals Board.

The case has roots in January 2020, when the Norwegian Consumer Council filed complaints against Grindr and five ad tech companies: AppNexus, MoPub, OpenX, AdColony, and Smaato. Austrian privacy rights organization noyb joined the action and celebrated the outcome, calling the decision "a major blow to the online adtech industry." This week's fine against Xandr is the downstream enforcement of a broader probe that, on the Grindr side, produced a NOK 65 million penalty against the app itself in 2021. Norway's Borgarting Court of Appeal upheld that fine against Grindr in October 2025 after the company challenged it through two rounds of litigation.

Grindr's data-sharing history has had consequences beyond Norwegian borders as well. In September 2026, the dating app agreed to pay £26 million to settle a UK class action brought by roughly 12,000 users who alleged the platform had shared information including HIV status, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and location with third-party advertising firms before 2020. The London lawsuit, filed in April 2024 by law firm Austen Hays, alleged violations of UK data protection law during roughly the same period covered by the Norwegian proceedings.

The Datatilsynet decision marks one of the more pointed statements yet from a European privacy regulator on how far down an ad supply chain accountability can reach. By treating Xandr as a joint controller rather than an infrastructure provider, the authority made clear that operating the pipes through which sensitive data flows carries its own legal obligations, regardless of which company collected the data in the first place.




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TFG
Customer Data Cyber Attacks Fashion Retail IT Systems TFG

Hobbs and Whistles Owner Hit by Cyberattack

 

The owner of Hobbs, Phase Eight, and Whistles has become the latest major fashion retailer to be hit by a cyberattack. The Foschini Group (TFG) confirmed that its UK business, TFG London, discovered the incident on October 11, leaving several IT systems offline and disrupting customer orders across the three brands. 

Although physical stores remain open, the company said some website functions may be unavailable while its investigation continues. Customers have been warned that orders placed on or after Sunday could be delayed, and TFG has apologized for the disruption while promising further updates as appropriate. 

TFG says it activated its incident-response and business-continuity plans immediately, brought in external cybersecurity specialists, and notified UK authorities. The Information Commissioner’s Office confirmed it has received a breach report from TFG Brands (London) Limited and is assessing the information provided. 

There is some reassurance for shoppers: TFG London said payment processing is handled by a third party and that, based on its investigation so far, it has no reason to believe payment information is at risk. However, the company is still determining whether other personal or sensitive customer data has been compromised and says it will notify affected individuals or organizations if evidence of a breach emerges.

The company has not yet explained how attackers gained access, whether ransomware was involved, or when systems will be fully restored. TFG added that its White Stuff and Inside Story businesses, along with its African and Australian operations, are unaffected because they run on separate IT systems. 

The attack follows a difficult stretch for fashion retail. Last week, ASOS disclosed that an attacker impersonated a trusted contact to obtain an employee’s login credentials and access third-party platforms containing customer names and contact details. H&M is also reportedly investigating claims involving the ShinyHunters group, though it says it has found no indication that its systems were compromised. 

No evidence currently connects the TFG London, ASOS, and H&M incidents, and H&M has not confirmed a breach. Still, three prominent fashion businesses facing cyber trouble in just over a week suggests that retailers remain highly attractive targets for criminals seeking customer data, operational disruption, or leverage. For TFG, the immediate priority is restoring services and establishing the scope of the incident. For customers, the case is a reminder that even when payment details appear safe, retailers may hold substantial personal information whose exposure can take days or weeks to fully assess.
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Cyber Security
AI Model AI Security AI technology Anthropic AI Anthropic AI security Cyber Security

Anthropic Warns AI Worms Could Soon Spread Across IoT Devices

 

Small artificial intelligence models could soon be able to freely replicate across internet devices, forming botnets that do not require centralized computers to control them, according to an Anthropic Frontier Red Team paper. The paper’s authors explored if foundation models could be run on unknown cheap devices and execute the actions required to replicate across other interconnected devices. Anthropic bought 15 cheap Android TV boxes for $55 each to see how large an open-weight model could be before it could no longer be hosted on such devices. 

The team found that a model with 26 billion parameters could generate 0.39 tokens per second. They also found that a 9 billion parameter model could run on 8 out of 9 of the different hardware types they tried. The team then tried to see if a model could replicate across 8 emulated Android devices attached to a network. To make matters easier for the would-be-attackers, the researchers made the hacking process trivial; they only had to focus on the artificial intelligence processes. 

Only the GLM-5.2 among the open-weight models was able to fully complete the replication process, doing so on four out of five tries, and managed to infect all 8 devices on the network. Anthropic warned that the experiments should not be considered an accurate representation of how such an attack might unfold in the real world, but the results nevertheless show that attacks are becoming increasingly likely as models grow more capable. 

Models with over 30 billion parameters do not have the ability to fully perform all actions required to replicate, but they can manage single aspects of the process. If development proceeds at its historical rate, then models will be able to achieve the capability demonstrated by GLM-5.2 by 2026. Self-replicating AI models could follow soon after. The researchers also estimated the scale of such an attack. 

If there was a Kimwolf-class botnet that had already successfully infected over 2 million devices, using up all 15 of the TV boxes mentioned earlier would result in 133000 instances of the 26-billion-parameter model being created. This would amount to a combined performance of up to 40 Nvidia H100 GPUs, but it would take more than a day for all instances to be created. Such an attack surface is hard to prevent because there are no singular points of failure, but even if such a worm managed to successfully infect a network of devices, it would still be very visible to most network infrastructure. 

Large traffic volumes and unusual communications patterns between devices that would otherwise not communicate with each other will raise flags with most internet service providers. Anthropic also found that manufacturers could reduce the threat surface by replacing default passwords with more complex ones. Many previous botnets, including the infamous Mirai malware, were nearly impossible to stop because many IoT devices had default passwords that were too simple to guess. 

Anthropic warned that while a fully autonomous worm was not yet available, a continuing increase in model size and capability, along with the growing ability of models to apply knowledge between different model classes, will severely limit the time defenders have to fix vulnerabilities in Internet of Things devices.
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Technology
LG Root Access Security Flaws Smart TV Technology

Critical Flaws in LG Smart TVs Could Allow Hackers to Gain Root Access Over Local Networks


Three security vulnerabilities in LG's webOS operating system could allow attackers to gain complete control of certain LG smart TVs without authentication or any action from the owner. The flaws can be combined to obtain root access when an attacker is connected to the same local network as the television.

LG has released a firmware fix for the vulnerabilities, following their disclosure by SSD Secure Disclosure on October 12. Users are advised to check their devices for available software updates.

Models impacted

Researchers tested the vulnerability chain on two LG television models: the 32LQ636BPSA and the 27TQ600SW. Both devices were running webOS version 7.5.7-25 with firmware 04.54.40. It remains unclear whether other models or firmware versions are affected.

The attack begins by targeting a network service on port 3001, which is used by the LG ThinQ application to pair with televisions. Researchers found that an attacker could exploit a built-in application called sync-demo to bypass the normal pairing PIN requirement and obtain a privileged key.

Using this key, the attacker can launch another preinstalled application, known as cmp-client, and direct it to a webpage controlled by the attacker. The application does not properly restrict where it can navigate, allowing the malicious webpage to access an internal webOS interface called PalmServiceBridge.

This interface provides communication with system services. Researchers found that it could be used to reach pmlogd, a system logging service that operates with root privileges. Because the service does not properly validate certain input, an attacker can inject shell commands that are executed with the highest level of access on the television.

The combined vulnerabilities therefore allow an attacker to move from an unauthenticated network connection to root-level control without requiring the television owner to enter a PIN, approve a request or click a link.

What is at risk?

Root access can give attackers extensive control over an affected television. Depending on the device configuration and the attacker's actions, this could enable unauthorised software execution, system manipulation and potential exposure of information stored on the device.

The disclosure was demonstrated by an anonymous researcher who secured third place in the LG webOS category at the TyphoonPWN 2026 security competition in Seoul. No CVE identifiers have been assigned to these newly disclosed flaws, and no exploitation in the wild has been reported.

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TLS certificates Cyber Security
Certificate Renewal https Let’s Encrypt TLS certificates Cyber Security

Let’s Encrypt to Cut TLS Certificate Validity to 64 Days

 

Let’s Encrypt will reduce the default validity period of its TLS certificates from 90 days to 64 days starting February 10, 2027. The change will apply to all certificates issued or renewed after that date, while previously issued certificates will remain valid until they naturally expire. The nonprofit certificate authority says the move is the first step in a broader transition toward 45-day certificates, which it plans to introduce in 2028. 

The shorter certificate lifetime is intended to improve web security by limiting how long a compromised or misissued certificate can remain trusted. It should also make revocation more efficient, because certificates leave circulation sooner and attackers have a smaller window in which to exploit stolen credentials. Let’s Encrypt says the change follows the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements and will eventually be adopted by all publicly trusted certificate authorities. 

Website owners and administrators will need to renew certificates more often, but the impact should be manageable for organizations that already use automated renewal. Let’s Encrypt is making 64-day certificates available in its staging environment this week so customers can test their systems before the production change. The organization recommends that all users carry out similar tests to identify renewal failures, outdated scripts, or configuration problems early.

Administrators using clients that support ACME Renewal Info, or ARI, should be prepared automatically because ARI allows Let’s Encrypt to notify the client when a renewal is due. However, organizations with renewal dates hardcoded from a certificate’s expiration date should adjust those settings to approximately two-thirds of the certificate lifetime. Let’s Encrypt says the update will not affect its ACME endpoints, issuance chains, or rate limits, reducing the likelihood of broader service disruption. 

The certificate authority will also shorten its authorization reuse period to 10 days next year and to seven hours in 2028. That change is intended to comply with a 2029 reduction in maximum validation reuse periods and to remove the need for CAA rechecking when validation data becomes outdated. With the final 90-day certificate expected to expire on May 11, 2027, businesses should use the transition period to strengthen certificate automation before the industry moves to even shorter lifetimes.
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WordPress
Anthropic API Claude Code CyberXero Data Breach IABs WordPress

Russian Hacker Weaponized Claude Code to Breach 429 WordPress Sites and Steal 628,000 Ukrainian Records

 




A financially motivated cybercriminal using Anthropic's Claude Code as an AI backbone has carried out a sweeping attack campaign that compromised 429 WordPress administration panels in a 61-second window and pulled more than 628,000 personal records from four Ukrainian organizations, according to findings published by threat intelligence firm SOCRadar last week.

The threat actor, tracked under the alias CyberXero, is described as a Russian-speaking initial access broker (IAB) whose infrastructure combines commodity offensive tools like Cobalt Strike with an AI orchestration layer powered by Claude Code. Initial access brokers are criminals who break into networks and sell that foothold to other buyers rather than monetizing it directly, and CyberXero has been active since at least July 2026.

The entire operation surfaced from a single configuration error: an exposed open directory at IP address 46.21.250.135 that served the threat actor's live working directory, including more than 90,000 files across 3,000 subdirectories: AI session logs, scripts with plaintext credentials, exploitation toolkits, reconnaissance output, and raw victim database exports. That OPSEC failure let SOCRadar researchers map eight distinct infrastructure nodes tied to the operation, spanning servers in Europe and Tencent Cloud in China.


Two Campaigns Running in Parallel

CyberXero's operation runs two pipelines simultaneously: a global, automated campaign targeting WordPress and e-commerce platforms for payment data and access sales, and a more selective, manual campaign directed at Ukrainian energy providers and critical infrastructure entities.

The automated arm relied on an internally developed Python tool called wp2shell, which abuses a desynchronization flaw in the WordPress REST API batch endpoint to inject SQL, create a rogue administrator account, and plant a web shell disguised as an active plugin. A single automated execution scanned 4,708 targets, confirmed access to 429 WordPress administration panels, and deployed 32 shells, all inside a 61-second window. Each successful compromise fired a real-time notification to a Telegram bot that let the operator monitor results without staying at a terminal.

The second pipeline was considerably more deliberate. The infrastructure documents curated reconnaissance against seven Ukrainian energy and utilities entities, including the national transmission system operator and the country's largest private energy holding. One target list alone contained 95 subdomains covering those two organizations' email infrastructure, VPN gateways, network dispatch systems, and data platforms. That depth of reconnaissance is not the work of an opportunist scanning for easy targets.

The most damaging confirmed breach was a district heating provider in Kharkiv, a city currently on an active war front. A hardcoded credential in the threat actor's own script gave direct access to the provider, and a multithreaded extractor pulled 564,073 subscriber records containing personal data, home addresses, and account numbers, along with 213,340 access-log entries with timestamps and IP addresses. Because those records identify civilians in a conflict zone, the dataset carries physical risk that goes beyond a conventional data breach.


The AI Layer

CyberXero deployed AI at two independent stages. The first ran Claude Code with a cluster of 51 specialized agents on the primary workstation, handling scanning, exploit chaining, reconnaissance, and post-exploitation tasks. The second connected PentAGI, an open-source autonomous penetration testing framework, to a Cobalt Strike Team Server through an AI provider API for payload generation and hands-on pentest execution.

The 51 agents were divided into functional roles. Offensive agents covered tasks like lateral movement and SCADA attacks. Reconnaissance agents handled subdomain mapping and credential testing. Post-exploitation agents managed data exfiltration. A recovered provider configuration file assigned AI models to these roles by reasoning complexity, with the payload-generation role receiving the highest token budget.

To work around the model's safety refusals, the threat actor used context-engineering and session-reset techniques, instructing the agent that it was running an "authorized pentest on my own infrastructure." That same claim appeared verbatim across four unrelated victim engagements, marking it as a rehearsed line rather than a genuine authorization.

Because model safety controls act on session context rather than model weights, a refusal in one session does not carry into the next. When an agent refused a task, the actor opened a fresh session with the authorization framing preloaded and tried again.

The refusals themselves are notable. Across four separate iterations, the model declined to install a backdoor, disable a firewall, move laterally, and deploy a web shell. In a separate episode it refused a scan four consecutive times and correctly rejected a forged ownership token.

The CyberXero case is not the first time Claude Code has appeared in a documented criminal operation. Anthropic's own threat intelligence report earlier this year described a separate actor who used Claude Code to automate reconnaissance, credential harvesting, and network penetration across at least 17 organizations in a single month, spanning government agencies, healthcare providers, and emergency services.

Anthropic has acknowledged that cybercriminals and state-sponsored actors alike have attempted to use its Claude models to automate cyberattacks, build offensive tools, and conduct mass surveillance operations. The gap between what a single attacker can now accomplish and what previously required a full team has narrowed substantially.

For defenders, SOCRadar's most actionable indicator is simple: any WordPress administrator account whose username follows the pattern "wp2_" followed by eight hexadecimal characters was placed there by wp2shell, not a legitimate user. Organizations running WordPress, Magento, PrestaShop, or internet-exposed Redis servers are advised to check for rogue admin accounts and unexpected entries in SSH authorized key files. CyberXero was still active at the time the SOCRadar report was published.


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