Attackers are extracting and exploiting exposed cloud credentials from publicly accessible Docker images within seconds of their publicati...
Many smartphone users are experiencing unwanted calls from unknown numbers, ranging from promotional messages and automated marketing calls to fraudster scams designed to steal money and personal information.
The majority of calls originate from databases containing telephone numbers collected from online and offline sources, although some are generated by random dialing systems. There is a growing market for the collection, organization, and sharing of personal information among businesses and third parties as consumer information becomes increasingly valuable.
When users register on a website, complete online forms, install mobile applications, shop online, or enter promotional contests, you can reveal your contact information to several organizations. There is also the possibility that this information may circulate through third-party data-sharing arrangements or be made available following a data breach.
As one of the lesser-known players in this ecosystem, data brokers are able to collect information from multiple sources and create consumer profiles that can then be sold to advertisers, marketing firms, and other interested parties. It is therefore possible to reach businesses and individuals through a number shared for ordinary services or registrations without any direct connection to the original source, for example. Cybercriminals can use such information to conduct targeted spam campaigns, impersonation scams, and financial fraud.
How Phone Numbers Find Their Way Into Spam Lists
The majority of spam calls are not the result of stolen databases. Some are reached using automated dialing systems that generate and call random combinations, while others are acquired from publicly available records, such as business directories, property documents, and online listings.
The commercial distribution of consumer information remains an important source of unwanted phone numbers, however. A number of methods are commonly employed to collect phone numbers, including registration forms, online purchases, loyalty programs, surveys, promotional offers, and account sign-ups.
If a user provides their contact information, the company may share it with advertising partners or other third parties in accordance with the company's data sharing policy. There are instances where consent is buried in lengthy terms and conditions or presented in confusing opt-in settings, causing confusion about where the information will end up. As part of this process, data brokers play a key role. They combine information gathered from various sources including websites, public records, purchase histories, social media activity, and commercial databases to create consumer profiles.
Marketing agencies, businesses, and other organizations can purchase or license the resulting lists. Despite the fact that most of this activity occurs within the advertising industry, poorly controlled data-sharing practices can also make contact information available to scammers. It is also possible to expose customer information through breaches of security and phishing attacks.
When a security breach occurs, customer records may include telephone numbers, names, email addresses, and other personal information when an online service suffers a security incident. As an alternative to using legitimate websites, cybercriminals can also retrieve information through the use of fake job advertisements, fake login pages, and malicious applications.
By using automated tools known as web scrapers, some phone numbers can also be harvested directly from websites and social media platforms. Once a number has been scanned and extracted in bulk, it can be added to calling lists or combined with other personal information to make fraudulent calls appear more convincing.
Although it is important to distinguish between legitimate data collection and criminal activity, these two concepts can intersect when personal information is shared widely, inadequately protected, or exposed by security flaws.
Ultimately, a number that was originally provided to register for a shopping account or service may become part of a database that is used to sell unsolicited information or perpetrate targeted scams.
How to Keep a Phone Number Away From Spammers
A person can minimize their chances of receiving unwanted calls and targeted scams by limiting the exposure of their personal contact information, even though preventing every spam call may not be possible. The first step to preventing unwanted calls and targeted scams is to be selective when sharing personal contact information. It is important to be cautious when dealing with unfamiliar websites, suspicious registration pages, fraudulent job portals, and promotional offers requesting unnecessary personal information.
When submitting information to a website, you should check the reputation and privacy policies to identify questionable services. Public exposure should also be considered. It is important to remove phone numbers from public social media profiles, online directories, and other platforms whenever possible. Mobile users should review application permissions on a regular basis, particularly access to contact information, location, photographs, and other personal information.
A user can revoke unnecessary permissions through the privacy settings on Android and iOS devices. Reviewing account privacy options as well as avoiding unnecessary third party sign-ups can also help limit data sharing. For users already receiving frequent unwanted calls, built-in spam detection features and call-blocking services can assist in filtering out suspicious numbers.
In order to avoid answering unknown calls immediately, you can place them into voicemail. It is important to avoid giving passwords, banking information, OTPs, or remote access to devices to suspicious callers, regardless of their claim to represent a trustworthy organization. A user should also check whether their personal information has been exposed in known data breaches.
Services such as Have I Been Pwned can be used to identify exposed email addresses corresponding to compromised accounts, while searching online may reveal information that can be accessed by the public. The primary cause of spam calls is not always careless sharing. Random dialing, commercial data collection, and security breaches can expose numbers without the owner being aware of them.
Spammers and cybercriminals may have a harder time converting ordinary contact information into opportunities for fraud if privacy practices are strengthened, app permissions are handled carefully, and unsolicited calls are made more aware.
Visitors to some of the world's most recognizable websites spent roughly 17 hours on Monday exposed to malicious code that could steal their payment cards, swap their cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and attempt to exploit unpatched vulnerabilities in their iPhones, after attackers quietly modified JavaScript snippets served by marketing platform Optimizely.
The campaign, which researchers at Cynet and StepSecurity have named OPTIMJACK, touched at least 178 organizations including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, and Peacock. Optimizely's own main site and login page were also affected.
How the Attack Got In
Optimizely Web Experimentation works by having client websites load a small JavaScript file, known as a snippet, from cdn.optimizely.com. Each snippet then executes what Optimizely calls "Project JavaScript," a customizable field that site operators can populate with their own code for A/B testing and personalization experiments. The attacker used a flaw in Optimizely's account signup flow, according to the company's incident notice, to gain write access to that field across unrelated customer projects and planted a loader inside it.
Because the modified snippets still came from Optimizely's own domain over a valid certificate, nothing about the delivery chain flagged the change. Organizations that cached and served the snippet from their own infrastructure were also affected, since the payload content came from the same compromised project fields.
The loader itself came in three forms: one that fetched the payload directly, one that encoded the payload domain in base64 to avoid string-matching detection, and a third that bundled a full copy of the payload inline as a contingency if the domain was blocked.
A Tight, Eventful Timeline
The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC on Monday in the BBC's snippet, loading a domain researchers identified as webshell[.]lol, an injector already linked to this actor. That same injector had previously appeared through scripts belonging to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media starting the prior week, and first showed up on Turkish websites as far back as September 17.
The card skimmer component went live at 13:43 UTC. Between 17:13 and 17:57, every visitor arriving from iOS 18.6 or earlier was served a hidden iframe pointed at known exploit kits. Mass cleanup began around 20:40. TalkTalk's snippet was the last to be cleared, at 21:52.
What the Payload Actually Did
The injected code carried four distinct capabilities. The crypto address swapper monitored page text, form fields, links, the clipboard API, and outgoing network requests. When it found a valid wallet address near payment-related words like "wallet," "deposit," or "send," it replaced that address with one controlled by the attacker. The swap was precise enough to pass checksum validation for each blockchain, meaning it only substituted addresses that the page or the user's application would have accepted as legitimate.
The card skimmer captured payment card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs submitted through a site's own form fields, then transmitted them to 1688360[.]cc. It could not read card data entered into cross-origin payment iframes, which covers hosted fields from providers like Stripe and Adyen.
After any crypto address swap, the payload also harvested the page's cookies and took a screenshot of the visible content, sending both to the attacker's server. HttpOnly cookies, which are inaccessible to JavaScript by design, were not captured.
The iOS component loaded a second-stage script that checked the device's software version and routed it to one of three exploit chains: Coruna targeting iOS 13 through 17.2.1, DarkSword targeting iOS 18.4 through 18.7, and a third chain for iOS 26 that researchers say currently only collected device fingerprints. Affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, a behavior that observant users might have noticed. No confirmed device compromises on physical iPhones have been reported.
The Money
By 19:25 UTC Monday, the attacker's cryptocurrency wallets had received roughly $7,040 across a window of about nine hours, according to Report URI. StepSecurity put the figure at approximately $6,600. Researchers noted that two of the wallet addresses were already in use before Monday's injections started, so it is not possible to attribute every incoming transfer directly to victims of this campaign.
What to Do Now
Security firms advise anyone who entered payment card details on Monday on a major commercial website to treat the card as potentially compromised. Crypto payments made that day should be compared against intended recipient addresses on a hardware wallet screen rather than from copied text, since clipboard contents may have been silently altered.
Site operators using Optimizely should inspect every Project JavaScript field for strings like "1688360", `atob(`, or scripts they do not recognize, and audit all users and API tokens with write access to their projects.
iPhone and iPad users on iOS 18.6 or earlier who visited any of the affected sites on Monday should update to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 immediately.
Optimizely has said the flaw has been patched and the injected code removed, though the company's incident notice did not specify how many projects were altered or confirm whether attacker access has been fully revoked.