Google API keys, once considered harmless when embedded in public websites for services like Maps or YouTube, have turned into a serious s...
Agentic web browsers that use AI tools to autonomously do tasks across various websites for a user could be trained and fooled into phishing attacks. Hackers exploit the AI browsers’ tendency to assert their actions and deploy them against the same model to remove security checks.
According to security expert Shaked Chen, “The AI now operates in real time, inside messy and dynamic pages, while continuously requesting information, making decisions, and narrating its actions along the way. Well, 'narrating' is quite an understatement - It blabbers, and way too much!,” the Hacker News reported. Agentic Blabbering is an AI browser that displays what it sees, thinks, and plans to do next, and what it deems safe or a threat.
By hacking the traffic between the AI services on the vendor’s servers and putting it as input to a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), it made Perplexity’s Comet AI browser fall prey to a phishing attack within four minutes.
The research is based on established tactics such as Scamlexity and VibeScamming, which revealed that vibe-coding platforms and AI browsers can be coerced into generating scam pages and performing malicious tasks via prompt injection.
There is a change in the attack surface as a result of the AI agent managing the tasks without frequent human oversight, meaning that a scammer no longer has to trick a user. Instead, it seeks to deceive the AI model itself.
Chen said, “If you can observe what the agent flags as suspicious, hesitates on, and more importantly, what it thinks and blabbers about the page, you can use that as a training signal.” Chen added that the “scam evolves until the AI Browser reliably walks into the trap another AI set for it."
The aim is to make a “scamming machine” that improves and recreates a phishing page until the agentic browser accepts the commands and carries out the hacker’s command, like putting the victim’s passwords on a malicious web page built for refund scams.
Guardio is concerned about the development, saying that, “This reveals the unfortunate near future we are facing: scams will not just be launched and adjusted in the wild, they will be trained offline, against the exact model millions rely on, until they work flawlessly on first contact.”
Cybersecurity researchers have identified a previously undocumented malware strain called KadNap that is primarily infecting Asus routers and other internet-facing networking devices. The attackers are using these compromised systems to form a botnet that routes malicious traffic through residential connections, effectively turning infected hardware into anonymous proxy nodes.
The threat was first observed in real-world attacks in August 2025. Since that time, the number of affected devices has grown to more than 14,000, according to investigators at Black Lotus Labs. A large share of infections, exceeding 60 percent, has been detected within the United States. Smaller groups of compromised devices have also been identified across Taiwan, Hong Kong, Russia, the United Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, France, Italy, and Spain.
Researchers report that the malware uses a modified version of the Kademlia Distributed Hash Table (DHT) protocol. This peer-to-peer networking technology enables the attackers to conceal the true location of their infrastructure by distributing communication across multiple nodes. By embedding command traffic inside decentralized peer-to-peer activity, the operators can evade traditional network monitoring systems that rely on detecting centralized servers.
Within this architecture, infected devices communicate with one another using the DHT network to discover and establish connections with command-and-control servers. This design improves the botnet’s resilience, as it reduces the chances that defenders can disable operations by shutting down a single control point.
Once a router or other edge device has been compromised, the system can be sold or rented through a proxy platform known as Doppelgänger. Investigators believe this service is a rebranded version of another proxy operation called Faceless, which previously had links to TheMoon router malware. According to information published on the Doppelgänger website, the service launched around May or June 2025 and advertises access to residential proxy connections in more than 50 countries, promoting what it claims is complete anonymity for users.
Although many of the observed infections involve Asus routers, researchers found that the malware operators are also capable of targeting a wider range of edge networking equipment.
The attack chain begins with the download of a shell script named aic.sh, retrieved from a command server located at 212.104.141[.]140. This script initiates the infection process by connecting the compromised device to the botnet’s peer-to-peer network.
To ensure the malware remains active, the script establishes persistence by creating a cron task that downloads the same script again at the 55-minute mark of every hour. During this process, the file is renamed “.asusrouter” and executed automatically.
After persistence is secured, the script downloads an ELF executable, renames it “kad,” and runs it on the device. This program installs the KadNap malware itself. The malware is capable of operating on hardware that uses ARM and MIPS processor architectures, which are commonly found in routers and networking appliances.
KadNap also contacts a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server to retrieve the current system time and store it along with the device’s uptime. These values are combined to produce a hash that allows the malware to identify and connect with other peers within the decentralized network, enabling it to receive commands or download additional components.
Two additional files used during the infection process, fwr.sh and /tmp/.sose, contain instructions that close port 22, which is the default port used by Secure Shell (SSH). These files also extract lists of command server addresses in IP-address-and-port format, which the malware uses to establish communication with control infrastructure.
According to researchers, the use of the DHT protocol provides the botnet with durable communication channels that are difficult to shut down because its traffic blends with legitimate peer-to-peer network activity.
Further examination revealed that not every infected device communicates with every command server. This suggests the attackers are segmenting their infrastructure, possibly grouping devices based on hardware type or model.
Investigators also noted that routers infected with KadNap may sometimes contain multiple malware infections simultaneously. Because of this overlap, it can be challenging to determine which threat actor is responsible for particular malicious activity originating from those systems.
Security experts recommend that individuals and organizations operating small-office or home-office (SOHO) routers take several precautions. These include installing firmware updates, restarting devices periodically, replacing default administrator credentials, restricting management access, and replacing routers that have reached end-of-life status and no longer receive security patches.
Researchers concluded that KadNap’s reliance on a peer-to-peer command structure distinguishes it from many other proxy-based botnets designed to provide anonymity services. The decentralized approach allows operators to remain hidden while making it significantly harder for defenders to detect and block the network.
In a separate report, security analysts at Cyble disclosed a new Linux malware threat named ClipXDaemon.
The malware targets cryptocurrency users by intercepting wallet addresses that victims copy to their clipboard and secretly replacing them with addresses controlled by attackers. This type of threat is commonly known as clipper malware.
ClipXDaemon is distributed through a Linux post-exploitation framework called ShadowHS and has been described as an automated clipboard-hijacking tool designed specifically for systems running Linux X11 graphical environments.
The malware operates entirely in memory, which reduces traces on disk and improves its ability to remain undetected. It also employs several stealth techniques, including disguising its process names and deliberately avoiding execution in Wayland sessions.
This design choice is intentional because Wayland’s security architecture introduces stricter restrictions on clipboard access. Applications must usually involve explicit user interaction before they can read clipboard contents. By disabling itself when Wayland is detected, the malware avoids triggering errors or suspicious behavior.
Once active in an X11 session, ClipXDaemon continuously checks the system clipboard every 200 milliseconds. If it detects a copied cryptocurrency wallet address, it immediately substitutes it with an attacker-controlled address before the victim pastes the information.
The malware currently targets a wide range of digital currencies, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, Monero, Tron, Dogecoin, Ripple, and TON.
Researchers noted that ClipXDaemon differs significantly from traditional Linux malware families. It does not include command-and-control communication, does not send beaconing signals to remote servers, and does not rely on external instructions to operate.
Instead, the malware generates profits directly by manipulating cryptocurrency transactions in real time, silently redirecting funds when victims paste compromised wallet addresses during transfers.