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redactproxy, a tool that lets pentesters use AI without leaking client data

AI coding agents are now part of a lot of security work. They are good at the parts a tester has no time for: going through every request, e...

All the recent news you need to know

Grafana MCP Flaw Exposes Session Spoofing and SSRF Risk

 

Grafana MCP has come under security scrutiny after researchers found a dangerous combination of unauthenticated tool access and server-side request forgery, or SSRF, that could expose sensitive internal systems. The issue matters because Grafana is widely used to monitor production metrics, logs, traces, and incidents, making it a high-value target in enterprise environments.

Pillar Security reported that affected Grafana MCP deployments allowed a reachable caller to invoke MCP tools without authentication by using a locally generated session value in the expected format. In practice, this meant an attacker could call tools such as tools/list and tools/call even without presenting a real credential, and the server would still use its configured Grafana service account on the attacker’s behalf. Grafana responded by adding optional bearer-token authentication in v1.1.0, which returns a 401 error before tool execution when configured.

The second flaw was more subtle but equally dangerous. The grafana_api_request tool accepted an X-Grafana-URL value that let the caller choose the outbound destination, along with the method, path, body, and headers . Although Grafana had already prevented its service-account token from being sent to foreign hosts, the server still made the request and returned the response, which created a critical SSRF condition assigned CVE-2026-19516 with a CVSS score of 9.1.

Researchers showed that this SSRF primitive could be used to reach internal services and even simulate a cloud metadata flow in a controlled environment . That is important because the danger is not limited to token leakage; the server itself becomes a readable and method-capable proxy from its own network position, extending the attacker’s reach beyond what they could access directly.

The broader lesson is that MCP servers can function like identity brokers, translating user instructions into privileged actions performed with the server’s credentials and network access . Session identifiers, host validation, and origin checks may help with protocol state, but they do not replace authentication or authorization. For operators, the practical defense is clear: require inbound authentication, minimize service-account permissions, restrict outbound destinations with strict allowlists, and block private, loopback, and metadata ranges by default .

Thomson Reuters Court Records Breach Exposes Sensitive Data Across North America

 

Sensitive court records and personal information were spilled from a data breach in the court system, which impacts at least 12 states in the U.S., including the U.S. Virgin Islands and Canada, Thomson Reuters announced on Wednesday. The breach occurred in C-Track, a court case management software, run by one of Thomson Reuters’ subsidiaries. 

The company remains silent on how the hackers accessed the program, who was responsible and how much data was compromised, as well as the number of individuals impacted. Thomson Reuters stressed that the breach was within their own environment and “not related to security vulnerabilities in the networks, systems or data of the courts.” The company discovered unauthorized access to its system on June 30, and it initiated an investigation alongside outside cyber security experts and law enforcement. 

Their probe established that unauthorized intruders accessed some C-Track files in March. Meanwhile, a separate disclosure by the Montana Supreme Court revealed that Thomson Reuters advised the state court officials that unauthorized access to C-Track persisted up to June, which means that hackers may have remained undetected within the system for several months. The sensitive information spilled includes names, Social Security numbers, driver licenses, medical information, dates of birth, and health insurance. 

Thomson Reuters added that confidential, redacted, or otherwise restricted information from court records may have been accessed in some jurisdictions, but the company confirmed that no abuse of the situation has occurred. The data breach did not impact the operations of C-Track, which continues to function normally. Thomson Reuters implemented additional security measures, following the breach, after they were approved by outside cybersecurity experts, although the company did not disclose who they were. 

The courts in the U.S. whose data is at risk, according to the company, are the appellate courts in Alabama, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. In addition, several Pennsylvania courts, 10 Ohio district courts of appeals, the Supreme Court, and the Superior Court of the U.S. Virgin Islands are also on the list. The breach in Oregon Judicial Department added another state to the list, expanding the reach to at least 12 states. 

Nevada officials reminded their residents that the types of data compromised differs from state to state, and that not all the data in each state is necessarily confidential or protected. They added that, for example, in Montana, most of the data already was publicly available, but the state’s court system acknowledged the breach of the drivers’ licenses and dates of birth. 

In addition, several of the jurisdictions were notified weeks after Thomson Reuters became aware of the security threat. For example, the court administrator of Montana and the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General were notified of the unauthorized access to the data on July 23. The chief justices of Ontario agreed that it still remains unclear what information was at risk and how many people were impacted. Thomson Reuters notifies affected individuals that they can receive 12 months of free of credit monitoring and identity theft protection.

1 Folder Was All It Took: Security Researchers Find AI Coding Agents Can Be Hijacked Before a Single Prompt Is Typed




Opening a folder should not be a security event. For users of at least seven popular AI coding agents, until recently, it could be one. A newly documented set of vulnerabilities, tracked under the name GitSpawn, shows that pointing an AI coding assistant at a project folder was enough to hand an attacker code execution on the developer's own machine. No prompt had to be typed. No permission dialog had to be clicked. In some cases, the user had not even logged in yet.

The affected tools include Anthropic's Claude Code, OpenAI's Codex, Cursor, Block's Goose, Nous Research's Hermes Agent, Alibaba's Qwen Code, and xAI's Grok Build. These products sit on an enormous number of developer machines. Claude Code's npm package sees more than 77 million downloads a month. The tools examined most closely in the disclosure carry a combined GitHub following approaching half a million stars. This flaw reached deep into the software supply chain.


What actually happens when you open a folder

An AI coding agent needs context the moment it launches inside a project: what branch is checked out, which files changed, what the codebase looks like. The fastest way to get that information is to ask git, the version control system nearly every software project runs on. So these agents run background commands like `git status` or `git diff` as soon as a folder opens, often before the assistant has said anything to the user.

That part is normal. The danger sits in a git feature called `core.fsmonitor`, a performance setting built to let large repositories speed up status checks by handing file-change detection to an external helper program instead of scanning every file each time. Git learns which helper to run by reading the repository's own configuration file, `.git/config`. That file ships with the project. It does not live on the user's machine.

Anyone who builds a repository controls that file, which means anyone who builds a repository can set `core.fsmonitor` to run whatever command they want. Nearly every git command that touches a project's working files triggers something called an index refresh, and that refresh is what reads the setting and runs it. So the moment an AI coding agent runs an ordinary git command inside a booby-trapped folder, git executes the attacker's command on the developer's machine, under the developer's own account. Because the agent's own code is making that subprocess call rather than something routed through its interface, none of the approval prompts or sandboxing built into these tools ever sees it happen.

There is a limit worth knowing. A standard `git clone`, `fetch`, or `pull` will not trigger this, because those operations do not carry the repository's local configuration along with them. The malicious repository has to reach a victim as a set of files with its `.git` directory already inside: a zipped folder sent over email, a shared drive, a synced folder, a USB stick passed at a meeting. Developers, contractors, and consultants hand off projects this way constantly, which is what makes the delivery method plausible.


Which vendors fixed it, and which did not

Eight distinct findings were reported privately across the seven agents before this went public. Four of them were still unpatched at the time of publication.

Goose, maintained by Block, shipped a fix in version 1.44.0. The issue was catalogued as CVE-2026-72718, with a severity score of 7.0. Cursor and OpenAI's Codex both carried variants of the same flaw and have since patched them, though in both cases the vulnerability had already reached the vendors through other researchers' independent reports. Anthropic fixed the core.fsmonitor path in Claude Code with version 2.1.196. A second issue in the same product, tied to the `claude ultrareview` command and a different git configuration key, was still working as of version 2.1.252 at publication time. That configuration key has not been made public while the issue stays open, so as not to hand out a working template.

Two vendors had shipped nothing. Alibaba's security response center accepted the report on Qwen Code but had not resolved it by publication. xAI's Grok Build remained vulnerable through version 1.0.13; an earlier, related report had been closed by the company as merely informative before this disclosure connected it to the same bug. Hermes Agent's maintainers never triaged the report despite six separate contact attempts across five channels. The flaw was eventually assigned CVE-2026-71963 by VulnCheck, an independent numbering authority that can step in when a vendor stays silent.


This bug has been seen before

The shape of GitSpawn is not new to anyone who has followed git security for a while. Independent researcher Justin Steven documented abuse of the fsmonitor hook back in 2022. Visual Studio Code built its workspace trust model in 2021 to stop untrusted folders from running code the second they were opened in an editor. AI coding agents brought a version of that same exposure back by running git commands in the background before any of those trust protections had a chance to apply.

That is the part worth sitting with. Nothing about how these models reason or respond caused this. The exploit runs entirely in ordinary software plumbing, the subprocess call an agent makes to figure out where it is, firing before any of the safeguards a user assumes are in place actually engage.


What to do about it

If you receive a project as raw files rather than through a direct git clone, whether by email, shared drive, or a USB stick, check `.git/config` before opening it in an AI coding agent or any development tool. Anything in that file that names an external program to run deserves a second look.

If you build one of these tools, the fix is narrow: disable risky configuration keys like `core.fsmonitor` on every background git call, for example by running commands with the flag `-c core.fsmonitor=false` instead of trusting whatever the repository hands you.

AI coding agents keep taking on components they did not write and did not choose: plugins, extensions, connections to outside services, most of which arrive as files carrying their own settings and get trusted the moment they load. GitSpawn shows what happens when that trust runs ahead of the checks meant to govern it. The next version of this bug probably will not look like a git command at all.

Brazilian Government Site Compromised to Redirect Users to Betting Pages


An organization known as Gambling Goblin, which is a Chinese-speaking cybercrime group, has compromised Apache web servers owned by Brazilian government agencies and educational institutions, redirecting legitimate web visitors to attacker-controlled pages promoting online gambling and sports betting. Check Point Research has been monitoring the activity since mid-2025.


Attackers install rogue Apache modules on the web server and utilize them to reverse proxy selected visitors to external web sites. While the destination is controlled by the attackers, the traffic appears to originate from a legitimate domain, making it harder to identify the activity. 

It is designed to mimic trusted platforms like Google Play, Microsoft Store, and Amazon in order to facilitate identification of malicious sites. These familiar interfaces direct visitors to phishing sites, online gambling or sports betting services. Researchers believe that this campaign is primarily the result of SEO manipulation. 

It has been shown that operators are capable of exploiting trust associated with government and institutional domains by compromising high-reputation websites and serving or proxying attacker-controlled content in order to increase the visibility of gambling-related pages in search results by exploiting the trust associated with those domains. This campaign also demonstrates a broader trend in web-server compromises. 

Instead of defacing websites or uploading malicious files, attackers are altering the Apache environment directly, giving them greater control over how requests are handled as well as allowing compromised domains to participate in a wider network of delivery and redirection. 

Malicious Apache Modules Give Attackers Deeper Control

Modules within the Apache web server provide malicious modules access to request and response handling. These attacks may allow attackers to inspect incoming traffic, alter responses, redirect selected requests, and proxy content from external infrastructure by inspecting incoming traffic, altering responses, or redirecting selected requests. 

Researchers observed that the modules removed security headers from compromised sites prior to serving or proxying attacker-controlled pages as part of the Gambling Goblin campaign. During the change, security controls that would prevent the execution of injected or redirected content may be weakened. As a result of the selective nature of the activity, detection becomes more difficult. 

Even when specific requests, crawlers, or targeted traffic receive manipulated content, the compromised website may continue to operate normally for most visitors. This allows the legitimate site to remain functional while the attacker's infrastructure is quietly utilized to carry out his or her operations. 

A Broader Toolkit Supports the Campaign

The Apache modules appear to be only one part of Gambling Goblin’s infrastructure. Check Point researchers also identified a scanning component called cam-agent on exposed systems, which is used to gather information about internet-facing infrastructure and identify potential targets. 

After gaining access, the attackers can deploy additional tools through DownPro, a loader capable of retrieving payloads such as the ChUser backdoor, AlphaAgent and oRAT. The toolkit also includes utilities for testing SSH credentials, giving the operators multiple ways to maintain access and move further into compromised environments. AlphaAgent provides remote command execution, file transfers and tunneling capabilities, while also searching for SSH keys and shell history. 

The malware can be disguised as a legitimate system service to reduce suspicion. oRAT similarly establishes persistence through a service designed to resemble a normal firewall-related component. The infrastructure supporting the operation is also built for resilience. Researchers observed the use of newly created domains to replace infrastructure that becomes blocked or unavailable. Encryption, disguised processes and memory-based payload handling further complicate analysis and detection. 

Government Domains Used for Search Manipulation

 A campaign's use of government and education websites provides additional benefits beyond its initial compromise. Established public domains are more reputable with search engines and can provide greater visibility for web pages hosted or proxied through them. This infrastructure was used by researchers at Check Point to present fake application-download pages in Chinese, Vietnamese, Spanish and English, as well as gambling and fraud applications.

As indicated by the usage of multiple languages, the operation does not focus on a single region. A separate report from ANY.RUN published in July identified that at least twenty Brazilian municipal and police portals had been utilized to distribute malware in a campaign known as PhantomEnigma, which included at least 20 gov.br portals belonging to municipalities and police departments. 

As a result of the compromise, organizations are not limited to the visible website. There should be a comparison of Apache module inventories, server configurations, timestamps, running services, and SSH activity against known-good baselines. An unauthorized module, an unexpected proxy rule, or newly created services can be an indication of a deeper intrusion. 

The campaign demonstrates how a trusted public domain can be turned into a criminal infrastructure when a legitimate web server is controlled, while the underlying compromise remains mostly hidden from ordinary users.

5 Million WordPress Sites Exposed to SQL Injection Vulnerability


A severe security flaw in a famous WordPress migration plugin and backup could allow threat actors to take command of over millions of sites, experts have warned.

About the security flaw

The security flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-19949, it impacts the Backup plugin and All-in-One WP Migration, which is utilized by over five million active wordpress installations. The plugin lets site owners to migrate, import, export, and backup sites, this consists of media files, themes, plugins, and databases.

As per Bleeping Computer, the flaw is a second-order SQL injection vulnerability that could permit an unauthorized threat actor to run malicious code on a compromised site. The flaw impacts variants 7.109 and earlier and has been given high severity, with a 8.8 CVSS score.

Reporting of the flaw

The vulnerability was found by security expert Jack Taylor, who reported the incident to cybersecurity company Wordfence, which investigated and disclosed the flaw. On August 15, 2026, Wordfence informed the plugin’s developer, Servmask, which released variant 7.220 on August 20 to patch the flaw. 

“On August 14th, 2026, we received a submission for an Unauthenticated Second-Order SQL Injection vulnerability in All-in-One WP Migration and Backup, a WordPress plugin with more than 5 million active installations,” Wordfence reported.

Attack tactic

Contrary to flaws that can be abused immediately, this vulnerability consists of an extra step. Threat actors first place specially tailored data on a compromised website. 

The malicious information remains latent until a website admin does a backup restoration of the archive. “This vulnerability makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject SQL that is later executed when a site administrator performs an archive restore, which can be used to leak the plugin’s secret key and ultimately achieve remote code execution, leading to complete site takeover,” Wordfence said.

Misuse of malicious data

In the restoration stage, the stored malicious data can be used as SQL commands which allows threat actors to take out sensitive data from the website’s database.

An important target is the plugin’s secret ai1wm_secret_key.. If a threat actor accesses this key, it can possibly be used to move from database access to remote code execution (RCE), allowing the threat actor more control over the compromised website.

Through RCE, threat actors could install malicious code, change website files, and create backdoors.

Addressing the flaw

ServMask addressed the CVE-2026-19949 in variant 7.110 of the plugin. Users are advised to update their websites to the latest patched versions of Backup and All-in-One WP Migration.

On August 20, ServMask addressed the CVE-2026-19949 vulnerability in version 7.110 of the plugin.

Russian National Charged Over Malware Campaign Targeting 80,000 Freelancers

 


A Russian national has been extradited to the United States to face federal charges over an alleged malware campaign that targeted approximately 80,000 users of a freelance employment platform.

Searzhudin Tamirlanovich Aktulaev, 40, is accused of using hundreds of fraudulent accounts to distribute malicious Microsoft Excel attachments between June 2016 and November 2017. Prosecutors allege that the attachments downloaded remote-access malware capable of controlling victims’ computers and stealing information.

The indictment was filed under seal on June 1, 2021. Aktulaev was arrested in Cyprus in May 2025 and extradited to the United States on August 28, 2026, according to the US Department of Justice.

He appeared in federal court in San Francisco on August 31 and was remanded to federal custody. The indictment was unsealed the same day.

Fake Freelance Accounts Distributed Malicious Excel Files

According to prosecutors, Aktulaev and his alleged co-conspirators exploited the messaging system of a well-known freelance employment technology company located in California’s Northern District.

The DOJ did not publicly identify the company.

The conspirators allegedly created approximately 255 fake user accounts and used them to send messages containing malicious Excel attachments to around 80,000 freelancers.

Opening an attachment prompted the recipient to enable or execute an embedded macro. If the user complied, the macro downloaded malware from the internet.

This distinction is important: the indictment alleges that malware was distributed to approximately 80,000 users, but the DOJ announcement does not establish that every recipient opened the attachment or became infected.

Freelancers can be particularly exposed to attachment-based attacks because their work routinely involves receiving documents from unfamiliar prospective clients. A spreadsheet presented as a project brief, financial record or work assignment may therefore appear consistent with an ordinary business request.

TVRAT and DarkVNC Provided Remote Access

The indictment identifies two malware families allegedly used in the campaign: TVRAT and DarkVNC.

TVRAT, also known as TVSPY or TeamSpy, incorporated or abused components associated with TeamViewer, a legitimate remote-administration product. DarkVNC provided similar hidden remote-control capabilities using Virtual Network Computing technology.

Prosecutors allege that the malware allowed the conspirators to control infected computers and transfer stolen data to command-and-control servers.

The use of recognizable remote-access components can help criminals disguise malicious activity as legitimate administrative traffic. It can also make detection more difficult when organizations permit remote-support products in their environments.

The allegations do not indicate that TeamViewer or VNC Viewer participated in the operation. The case concerns malware that allegedly misused remote-administration technology.

Thousands of Computers Connected to US-Based Infrastructure

Court allegations state that domains supporting the command-and-control infrastructure were purchased using virtual currency. At least one command-and-control domain was hosted in the United States, and thousands of computers infected with TVRAT reportedly connected back to it.

Investigators discovered a database on the command-and-control infrastructure containing information associated with thousands of victims.

The DOJ also said a shared document stored in an email account used during the alleged criminal activity contained e-commerce login credentials and personally identifiable information belonging to hundreds of people.

Prosecutors allege that information stolen through TVRAT and DarkVNC was collected from the command-and-control servers and used by Aktulaev and his co-conspirators to conduct fraud and other criminal activity.

Approximately half of the identified victims were located in the United States. The DOJ said many—not all—of those US victims were in the Northern District of California, where the federal case is being prosecuted.

Aktulaev Faces Multiple Federal Charges

The indictment charges Aktulaev with conspiracy, aggravated identity theft and transmitting code or commands that caused damage to protected computers. It also includes allegations involving wire fraud, unauthorized computer access and obtaining information or value from compromised systems.

The most serious listed offense, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, carries a maximum potential sentence of 20 years in prison. A charge involving intentional damage to protected computers carries a maximum of 10 years, while aggravated identity theft can result in a mandatory consecutive two-year sentence for each conviction.

These are maximum statutory penalties rather than a predicted sentence. Any punishment would depend on which charges, if any, result in conviction and the federal court’s consideration of applicable sentencing rules.

Aktulaev is scheduled to appear before US District Judge Donato on October 5, 2026, for a status conference.

The FBI investigated the case, which is being prosecuted by the National Security, Cyber, and Special Prosecutions Section of the US Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs secured the extradition from Cyprus.

The Campaign Predates Aktulaev’s Arrest

The alleged campaign operated from 2016 to 2017. The indictment was filed in 2021, approximately four years after the campaign ended—not four years after Aktulaev’s arrest.

Aktulaev was arrested in Cyprus in May 2025 and extradited more than a year later. The DOJ has not explained why the indictment remained under seal or provided details about the extradition proceedings.

Because the case is at the indictment stage, all described conduct remains an allegation. Aktulaev is presumed innocent unless prosecutors prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

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